Truth Passes Through Fire and Does Not Burn: An Analysis of discourse and traditional justice in post-genocide Rwanda

(1)

Truth passes through fire and does

not burn

An Analysis of discourse and transitional justice in post-genocide

Rwanda

Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA)

Master History: Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2016-2018

Mark van de Beld

Mentor: Thijs Bouwknegt

Second Reader: Nanci Adler

(2)

(3)

Foreword

Before you lies my Master’s thesis, the result of a research into post-conflict narrative and discourse in Rwanda. This thesis is written to complete the Master’s program Holocaust and genocide studies at the University of Amsterdam.

Genocide and the events in Rwanda specifically have fascinated me ever since I took a course on the subject ‘Genocide after 1945’ in the second year of my Bachelor. Despite this fascination the writing of this thesis has proven to be quite the challenge for me. It is therefore with appropriate pride that I deliver this product of my labour.

I could not have completed this thesis without the help of some important people. I would like to thank Thijs Bouwkegt especially. For his patience, his guidance and making it possible for me to enrol in this Master program and participate in a study trip through Rwanda. I would also like to thank Yte Elbrich Schukking for supporting me through all the difficulties I encountered and for being a sparring partner. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, my family and my friends, who collectively provided enough pressure and comfort for me to carry on.

Wishing you much reading pleasure, With kind regards,

Mark van de Beld

(4)

Abstract

This Master’s thesis looks at the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide in an attempt to establish how and why the debates that are found within it are created and perpetuated. This thesis uses frameworks concerning the abuse of history and different notions of truth to look at the current debates in the historiography. Doing so, it demonstrates that history is abused by the Rwandan government through their attempts at influencing the possibilities of research and efforts to censor unfavourable outcomes. After that a thorough analysis of the transitional justice mechanisms that were used in Rwanda, especially the Gacaca courts, follows. Using the same frameworks, it is consequently displayed that the meddling of the government of Rwanda ICTR proceedings and influencing of national debates through Gacaca courts and special laws is abuse of history. Furthermore, the truth that is found through these transitional practices is a mixture of different notions of truth but resembles most closely an effectual truth.

(5)

Introduction

The release of Judi Rever’s book In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic

Front in March of this year has lead to controversy.1 In this book Rever details how members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the organization of Tutsi diaspora that ended the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and has been in power even since, have committed genocide against Hutu both during their struggle to topple the genocidal regime and afterwards in the Democratic Republic of Congo.2 While suspects of the Rwandan genocide have extensively been put on trial, these crimes committed by the RPF have been left unpunished. This counter-narrative to the official version of history that is propagated by Rwandan officials gave rise to a heated debate as people took to Twitter to speak out about Rever’s work.3 Some lauded Rever’s work, but most voiced their dissatisfaction, calling Rever biased and accusing her of working for genocide deniers and enemies of President Kagame. In Praise of Blood was nominated for the Hilary Weston Writer’s Trutst Prize for Nonfiction.4

This year marked the 24th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, a genocide marked by ethnic hatred and intimate violence. During a hundred days in 1994, Rwanda was the stage to a genocide in which predominantly Hutu were swept up by political elites to kill predominantly Tutsi. These two identity groups were at odds with each other ever since colonizers instituted a minority rule by the Tutsi and solidified the social classes into ethnicities. As a wave of violence swept the country many victims were killed up close and personal with agricultural instruments at roadblocks and places were they gathered.

24 years later, there are still numerous debates surrounding the genocide. The genocide has proven to be a popular subject of academic and journalistic research. Rwanda has also been home to a range of transitional justice mechanisms that have produced factual knowledge of what happened during the lead up and during the genocide itself. Yet, the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide is marked by multiple points of contention. The reception of Rever’s work moreover shows how heated these debates can get. The debates are sings that a common truth about the past has not been agreed upon by all parties. This begs

1_{Judi Rever, In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Random House}

Canada, 2018).

2_{Interview with Judi Rever, CBC Radio, 2 April 2018.}

3_{See the thread following Rever’s tweet to promote her book: “My book, In Praise of Blood,}

exposes the crimes that Paul Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front got away with. https://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0345812093/prhca-20 …” (@JudiRever, March 23, 2018).

4_{“Awarding the top Canadian nonfiction of the year,” Writer’s Trust Canada, accessed}

November 12, 2018, https://www.writerstrust.com/awards/hilary-weston-writers-trust-prize-for-nonfiction.

(8)

the question what truth actually is and how it is created or formed. Moreover, history is a discipline of nuance and interpretation that therefore naturally has debates. These characteristics also leave history open to be used of ulterior motives.

This thesis will not focus on the genocide of Rwanda on itself, but rather the discourse and historiography that has surrounded the genocide since its start. This focus on the historiography will provide knowledge of what others have to say about the genocide. In this light, this thesis will make use of publications on the Rwandan genocide and look into different transitional justice mechanisms, in particular the Gacaca courts system, that were practiced in post-genocide Rwanda. These institutions have provided information about the genocide just as scholars have and can therefore hold information concerning the creation of narratives. In order to be able to make claims of these sources and processes this thesis will look into theoretical frameworks about use and abuse of history and different understandings and definitions of truth.

Research into these debates is of interest because of the implications they have on the Rwandan people and their government. The RPF has ruled Rwanda ever since their victory over the genocidal regime. President Paul Kagame currently is on his third term after a change to the constitution. This position has potentially given the political elite considerable power to influence the shaping of the genocide’s narrative both inside Rwanda’s borders and outside. If truth is established through an open, democratic debate that gives room to multiple viewpoints and public acknowledgement it can help to heal the nation.5 The continuation of debates and especially the tone with which it happens now can be an obstruction to a lasting stability in Rwanda.

Central to this thesis is the following question: ‘what are the major debates about the Rwandan genocide and in what way has transitional justice contributed to them?’ To come to an answer to this question this thesis’ first chapter shall give an outline about the use and abuse of history along with an analysis of different kinds of truth. The second chapter will focus on the historiography, accompanied by the question ‘what are the major debates found in the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide and what interests are connected to the sides of these debates?’ The third chapter will focus on some of Rwanda’s transitional justice mechanisms using the question ‘in what way has transitional justice contributed to the shaping of narrative about the genocide?’

5_{Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South}

(9)

Chapter one: Theoretical Frameworks of the Abuse of History

and Truth

Introduction

To come to an answer to the main question of this thesis, a demarcation must first be given of the theoretical frameworks that stand at the core of the question itself. This will happen in the following chapter. First, attention will go to the process of making history itself. There are numerous ways in which that process of writing history can be influenced. Using the theoretical framework brought forward by Belgian historian Antoon de Baets in his book

Gebruik en Misbruik van de Geschiedenis (Use and Abuse of History), I will demarcate what

in this thesis will be understood as abuse and irresponsible use of history, as well as how and why it occurs.6 Second, the focus will shift to truth. A narrative, or a version of history, is made up out of a series of statements and findings. These are claims on truth and together they make one narrative differ from another. But what exactly does truth mean? The final report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has put forward four different kinds of truth.7 And coming back to Antoon de Baets again, his book also mentions three notions of truth. Additionally, Bert Ingelaere and Phil Cark each have, in their study of the Gacaca courts, written on the concept of truth as well.8 I will use these four works to describe the different notions of truth and their characteristics. Some of them will have slightly overlapping definitions, while others are more unique. In mapping these definitions this chapter will help to come to an understanding of what truth is and how it relates to narratives. This understanding will subsequently be of use in the following chapters, where the many narratives on Rwanda’s genocide and their points of contention will be analysed and where the narrative-shaping properties of transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda will be examined.

As is stated in the introduction to this thesis, there exists a lively debate on Rwanda’s genocide that can be roughly drawn into two sides (the ‘conventional’ or official narrative that is most commonly known and generally favours the RPF’s role during and after the genocide, and the ‘counter’ narrative that is critical the actions and motives of the RPF during and after the genocide). Due to the RPF’s attitude towards criticism, which will be described more

6_{Antoon de Baets, Gebruik en Misbruik van de Geschiedenis (Amsterdam: Boon, 2008).} 7_{Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South}

Africa Report: Volume One (Cape Town, 1998).

8_{Bert Ingelaere, Inside Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Seeking Justice after Genocide (Madison:}

University of Wisconsin Press, 2016); Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts: Post-Genocide Justice

(10)

thoroughly in this thesis’ second chapter, any divergence from their narrative on the genocide – and by extension the Gacaca courts – is treated as an attack on the RPF and Rwanda’s peace.

Raising the stakes to such a high point has lead to a situation wherein Rwanda’s past is being scrutinized by researchers from all kinds of backgrounds. The result is that claims about history and truth are being made by people who in most cases have not enjoyed any historical training. This leaves the door open for the abuse of history – the use of history with the intent to deceive.9 If one is to make an analysis of the debates surrounding the Rwandan genocide and the Gacaca courts in this light, it is needed to first come to an understanding of what use and abuse of history entails.

A moral code for historians

In his book Gebruik en Misbruik van de Geschiedenis (Use and Abuse of History), Antoon de Baets writes on the multiple uses of history, focussing on the wrong ones in particular. Inspired by the moral codes of judges and journalists and moved by the lack of such a code for historians, he sets out to define a system of right and wrong for historical research.10 The first important distinction he makes is that between abuse and irresponsible use of history: the former is the usage of history with the intent to mislead, while the latter means a mere misleading or negligent use of history. The differentiating aspect between abuse and irresponsible use therefore lies in the intent of the action – not unlike the legal definition found in the Genocide Convention. But where this aspect of intent hampers the practicality of the legal term genocide, De Baets argues that it is a crucial element of his definition. He opposes reframing his definitions to focus on the consequences of the act because he sees the act in itself as damaging, regardless of any apparent victims. By sticking with intent as a key factor in the abuse of history, De Beats affirms that he is constructing a moral code rather than a legal one. In doing so, he is not preoccupied with any judicial consequences of his work.11

De Baets outlines his theory with a mental and a material component, where the mental element is related to the mind of the abuser and the material element to the conduct itself, its consequences and the circumstances in which it takes place. Focussing on the material element first, De Baets discerns three levels on which abuse can take place. On the

heuristic level, abuse takes place when sources are improperly collected. In practice this can

occur prior to research through the erroneous interference with cultural heritage or the

9_{Antoon de Baets, Gebruik en Misbruik van de Geschiedenis, 26.} 10_{De Baets, 13.}

(11)

(illegal) prohibiting of access to archives. During the research this occurs in the undue destruction, collection and usage of sources and making sources up. On the epistemological level, abuse takes place when non-scientific work is altered – through omitting, changing or making data up or twisting existing theories – to pass it of as scientific. This mainly happens during the research during the analysis of sources through undue descriptions of used sources and using intentionally faulty logic, rhetoric or interpretation of sources. On the pragmatic level, abuse happens when historians lie about the status or authorship of their work. It also entails when the reception of the results are influenced by censors, ordering parties and parties otherwise involved in the research, editors, publishers and peer reviewers.12

The other component to De Baets’ theory is the mental element. This is connected to the motives behind any abuse or irresponsible use of history. De Baets states that there exists a multitude of motives for the (ab)use of history and divides them up in two major groups. The first group of motives are what he calls scientific motives and include primary-scientific and secondary-scientific. The second, much larger group of motives consists of non-scientific or instrumental motives. These include educational, moral, didactic, cultural, philosophical, religious, metaphysical, racial/ ethnic, therapeutic, leisurely, literary, aesthetical/ artistic, psychological, economic, professional, ideological/ political/ social and judicial motives.13

Concepts of Truth

Another key factor in making sense of the many claims that are being laid on Rwanda’s history or in assessing the effectiveness of the Gacaca courts’ truth-finding capacities is to have an understanding of what truth exactly is. When looking up the definition of truth, one often finds descriptions along the lines of ‘the quality of being true’, or ‘the real facts about a situation, event, or person’.14 In this light, truth seems unquestionable and absolute; something that is to be established once and then never questioned again. Truth in this matter can be found in mathematics or hard sciences. For instance, any sane person accepts the fact that one and one equals two or that gravity causes objects to move. But in the former sentence lays a crucial element to truth: it needs to be accepted.

If a truth needs to be accepted upon to exist, a problem arises when one is looking for truths of the past. When sources are thinly stretched and leave room for interpretation, truth starts to lose its verified and indisputable character. Truth additionally becomes more subjective when it concerns important events, or when individuals stand to win or lose

12_{De Baets, 29 – 34.} 13_{De Baets, 38 – 40.}

14_{Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/truth, accessed}

(12)

something by their interpretation of the source material. Establishing truth in such an environment is challenging to say the least. A primary example of an effort to establish truth despite such a challenging climate is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.15 This Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) was instituted in the final years of the twentieth century to heal the nation after it had put an end to the Apartheid regime in 1994.16_{In its final report, the SATRC acknowledges the complexity of the concept}

of truth and describes four notions of it that emerged from many debates within the Commission.

The first of these notions of truth is the factual or forensic truth. This is a truth based on factual, corroborated evidence or reliable, impartial and objective sources. It answers the basic questions of what happened to whom, where, when, how, and who was involved. It moreover describes the causes, patterns and context of the violations concerned. The forensic truth serves to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in the public discourse. The second notion of truth purported by the SATRC is the personal or narrative

truth. Based on individual storytelling, this notion is based in personal recollections. It can

contribute to the process of reconciliation by ensuring that the truth includes the validation of those individual experiences of people who previously had been silenced. The third notion of truth is the social truth. This is established through interaction, discussion and debate. Essential herein is the public aspect of the process of establishing the truth. Social truth is about having a transparent and democratic discourse that is broadcasted to the public so that it can contribute to the reinstating of essential norms of social relations between people. Finally, the SATRC established the healing and restorative truth. This truth places the facts and what they mean within the context of human relationships – both between civilians and between the state and its civilians. Acknowledgment plays in important part in this truth, as the full and public acknowledgement of the past can lead to the restoration of the dignity of victims and instil in the public a sense of ‘never again’.17

In his book providing his before-mentioned frameworks on the use and abuse of history, De Baets also offers some insights on truth. He gives three concepts of truth, the first one being the factual truth. This truth is similar to the factual or forensic truth as described by

Africa Report: Volume One (Cape Town, 1998).

Africa Report, 24.

(13)

the SATR. It is what De Baets calls a scientific and objective sense of truth that corresponds with the realities of the past that it describes. De Baets’ second notion of truth is the moral

truth. He states that a moral truth does not necessarily describe what has happened in the past,

but much rather what should have happened. This kind of truth relies on the status of its origin, as in this notion a statement is considered true if it is purported by a reliable person. The third and final of De Baets’ notions of truth is the orthodox truth. In the orthodox notion truth is somewhat conservative, as the acceptance of this truth relies on the seniority and authority of its claims.18

As Bert Ingelaere is analysing the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, he also starts to deliberate on kinds of truth. Ingelaere acknowledges and uses the notions of truth that were produced by the SATRC.19 However, he also adds to these four a fifth notion: that of the

effectual truth. In the effectual truth, true is that which has the desired consequences given the

circumstances. This makes effectual truth inherently subjective, as what is accepted to be effectually true depends on the particular time, place and social forces at work while recording the truth.20

Finally, like the aforementioned authors, so too does Phil Clark work out concepts of truth. Similar to Ingelaere he does so in context of his research on the Gacaca courts. Clark provides us with three notions, the first being the therapeutic truth. This truth is intended to facilitate healing and is based on personal and emotional recollections of individuals. Clark’s second notion is that of the legal truth. As it is based on evidence delivered to prove innocence or guilt, this legal truth corresponds with the SATRC’s and De Baets’ notion of factual truth. The third notion of truth as written down by Clark is the restorative truth. This truth entails expressing or shaping of truth in order to restore relationships. It thus has a healing element, but provides healing to an entire community while the therapeutic truth heals on an individual level.21_{Besides these notions, Clark also writes about three processes related}

to truth finding that can be distinguished. The first one is truth telling and refers to the public articulation of the truth. This often happens in legal settings at tribunals, or truth commissions. Truth hearing is about the reception of truth telling. Along with truth speaking, this makes a dialogue of post-conflict truth. Finally, truth shaping is the process of reshaping or remodelling the post-conflict dialogue to cater for something other than solely facilitating

18_{De Baets, 54.}

19_{Ingelaere, Inside Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 161 – 162.} 20_{Ingelaere, 12, 143.}

(14)

healing. Truth shaping can have nefarious motives: Clark mentions truth shaping can be attempted by political elites to cover up their own crimes.22

Conclusion

This chapter was all about the theoretical frameworks that are needed to come to an answer to the main question of this thesis. From the moral code for historians as purported by Antoon de Baets, that contemplates the different ways and motives in which irresponsible use and abuse of history occur, to the deliberations of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, De Baets, Bert Ingelaere and Phil Clark, these frameworks should be kept in mind when reading chapters to come. In Chapter Two, I will write on the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide and analyse the points of contention and points of consensus that are found in it. In an attempt to disentangle this web I will analyse the stakeholders involved with the points of contention. In Chapter Three, I will analyse the transitional justice mechanisms of post-genocide Rwanda, paying particular attention to the Gacaca courts. The frameworks and theories discussed in this chapter will be used in the following two chapters to analyse the findings and answer the sub-questions.

(15)

Chapter two: A web of narratives of the Rwandan genocide

Introduction

The previous chapter has elaborated on the frameworks of truth and the use and abuse of history. In the following chapter our attention will turn to Rwanda specifically. As Scott Straus mentions in his chapter on the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide in Dan Stone’s

The Historiography of Genocide, ‘despite its relative recentness, the Rwandan genocide

already has given rise to a very large body of work’.23 Throughout the same chapter by Straus it also becomes apparent that, while the many authors whom write on the genocide agree on broad range of aspects, the historiography also is home to multiple points of contention.24 While contention in and of itself is normal, when it comes to Rwanda’s past the debates around these points of contention are all but gentle. An example of such a debate is the argument that featured in Human Rights Quarterly between Luc Reydams and Raymond Debelle et al.25 What started with Reydams’ questioning of the functioning and motives of Ngo African Rights and its publication Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance26, turned into a back and forth filled with personal attacks and other fallacies. In his most recent addition to that debate, Reydams claims that there is a phenomenon in which critics of the Rwandan government or the official narrative on the genocide are denounced and intimidated by a group of what he calls ‘Friend of Rwanda in the West’.27

Central to this chapter is the question ‘What are the points of contention and consensus in the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide and how can the points of contention be explained?’ To answer this question the following chapter will look at the points of contention and consensus that are apparent in the literature and, in an attempt to make sense of the existence of the points of contention, analyse what can be gained from supporting one side. Doing so will not provide conclusive answers to the running debates, but rather explain why these debates continue to exist and who stands to gain from it.

This chapter is structured in the following way: using the outline from Straus’ article, the points of contention in the literature will be listed first. Each of these points will be

23_{Scott Straus, “The Historiography of the Rwandan Genocide”, in The Historiography of}

Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 517.

24_{Straus, “Historiography”, 519 – 534.}

25_{Luc Reydams, “NGO Justice: African Rights as Pseudo-Prosecutor of the Rwandan}

Genocide,” Human Rights Quarterly 38 (2016), 547 – 588; Raymond Debelle et al, “Rebuttal to: ‘NGO Justice: African Rights as Pseudo-Prosecutor of the Rwandan Genocide,’ by Luc Reydams,” Human Rights Quarterly 40 (2018), 447 – 465; Luc Reydams, “Protesting Too Much: A Response to Linda Melvern et al,” Human Rights Quarterly 40 (2018), 466 – 473.

26_{African Rights, Rwanda: death, despair, and defiance (London: African Rights 1995).} 27_{Reydams, “Protesting Too Much,” 466 – 467.}

(16)

examined on its backgrounds, its contributors and the consequences that the opposing views hold, or in other words: why the contention exists on these specific subjects. This will then be followed by shortly dealing with the points of consensus. These points of consensus serve to demonstrate that the point of contention are not arbitrarily chosen and beg the question why contention exists on these exact points. Finally, the conclusion of this chapter will summarize the findings and tie them in with the main question of this thesis.

Contention

The following section of this chapter will be devoted to the points of contention that dot the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide. In his chapter on the historiography of the Rwandan Genocide, Scott Straus, an American political scientist, provides a list of disputes found in said historiography. 28 This chapter will follow along with his summing-up of disputes, but will also add to it. In the following section the following points of contention will be treated: the debate surrounding who assassinated Rwandan president Habyarimana; the chronology debate, with the question of when the planning phase of the genocide started; the identity and number of victims; the identity of perpetrators; and de debate surrounding the extent of RPF crimes before, during and directly following the genocide.

Who assassinated the president?

The first point of contention that will be analysed is the assassination of president Habyarimana on April 6 1994. The assassination, in which the president’s plane was downed by anti air rockets over Kigali, is widely accepted as the starting point of the genocide (more on this later). What remains a major point of controversy however is the question who bears responsibility for the murder.

The question of who did it gained traction rather quick, as is exemplified in Alison Des Forges’ 1999 publication Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide In Rwanda.29 Des Forges has tried to make sense of this shrouded event that started the genocide. She lists three most likely actors – the RPF, moderate Hutu parties and Habyarimana’s own circle (the

akazu) – from which she deems the latter one as the most likely perpetrators.30

Gérard Prunier dedicated more work on this topic and dismisses claims that the French or Belgian governments were involved in the assassination – two theories expressed in the months following the downing of the plane by journalists and a Rwandan ambassador

28_{Straus, “Historiography”, 530 – 534.}

29_{Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human}

Rights Watch, 1999).

(17)

respectively.31 Prunier also disqualifies the claim originating from a US-based Ugandan exile group and later chartered by the akazu that the RPF shot down the plane.32 In the first place because killing Habyarimana went against the interests of the RPF, for the signing of the Arusha Accords gave the RPF a good political settlement that Habyarimana seemed dedicated to uphold. Killing the president would jeopardize this achievement.33_{Moreover, the RPF had}

not planned any military actions to profit from a temporary disrupted Rwandan government. It took two full days for the RPF to start fighting the regime, a lack of initiative that to Prunier proves the RPF’s innocence in assassinating Habyarimana.34 Just like Des Forges, Prunier points at the Hutu hardliners of the akazu as being the most likely perpetrators. First, because the akazu had been home to a number of extreme hardliners who sought to achieve total ethnic and political domination by killing all Tutsi and moderate Hutu. These extremists were in conflict with Habyarimana. Second, Prunier notes the prevalence of the notion of genocide in Kigali during 1993 and 1994. Death lists had been drafted and there were even articles and radio broadcasts that alluded to some special events in April of 1994. Third and most importantly, Prunier finds the speed and efficiency of the events following the assassination incriminating. Roadblocks were build by Interahamwe and houses were searched by Presidential Guard using death lists in less than an hour following Habyarimana’s death.35

On the other side stand writers like Scott Straus and André Guichaoua. Straus explains a contrasting opinion that is the result of interviews with a number of RPF defectors and a French investigation published in 2006. According to these sources, the plane of Habyarimana was not shot down by the akazu, but by the RPF itself. This way the triggered genocide served as a pretext for the RPF Tutsi in exile to overthrow the Rwandan government and take back the country for themselves. Three pieces of data are brought up to support this claim, namely the quickness with which the RPF reacted to the crash, the fact that after more than two decades of RPF rule in Rwanda no condemning evidence for the akazu has been found and the fact that the military top of Rwanda’s government also died in the plane crash, leaving its forces in disarray.36_{Guichaoua stands with Straus and suspects the RPF of bringing down}

Habyarimana’s plane. When serving as an expert witness at the International Crime Tribunal

31_{Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: C. Hurst & Co.,}

2005), 213 – 215.

32_{Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 215, 216.} 33_{Prunier, 220.}

34_{Prunier, 221.} 35_{Prunier, 222 – 225.}

36_{Scott Straus, “The Historiography of the Rwandan Genocide.” In The Historiography of}

(18)

for Rwanda (ICTR), Guichaoua came across documents from high-level Rwandan officers detailing how the attack was launched, along with the mentioning of witnesses and participants. Incriminating as they were, ICTR prosecutor Carla Del Ponte decided not to follow up on these sources.37 Guichaoua writes that many of the names from these initial documents resurfaced in other independent research efforts. This has led to the concerning individuals becoming the targets of arrest, abduction and assassination in Rwanda, often trying to flee the country.38_{The effort to suppress these individuals and their position within}

the RPF hierarchy are reasons for Guichaoua to suspect the RPF of assassinating Habyarimana.39

Planning the genocide

There is another point of contention that is in a similar vein to the contention surrounding Habyarimana’s assassination. This debate focuses on the question whether and when the Rwandan government hatched the plan to commit genocide.

When Straus wrote his chapter on the genocide’s historiography, the contention associated with this chronology debate lay in when the planning started. He lists multiple writers who advocated different dates, ranging from October 1990 to March 1994.40_Straus’

work was published in 2008 however and as he himself is quick to point out, the ICTR at the time had not yet finished its investigation into the matter.41

As of now, the ICTR has closed up shop almost three years ago and its legacy has been open for discussion. A more thorough analysis at the ICTR will follow in Chapter 3 but for now it is sufficient to review the case against Théoneste Bagosora. Bagosora was a colonel in the Rwandan Army (FAR) and was part of the hardliners in the akazu. During the period of instability following Habyarimana’s death, Bagosora played an important role in setting up the interim government that would rule Rwanda until the RPF victory.42 Guichaoua notes furthermore that the theory of planning of the genocide had taken on mythical proportions over the years, with a pivotal role ascribed to Bagosora.43

As such, he was indicted by the ICTR on counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and more importantly conspiracy to commit genocide. In its verdict the Chamber claimed that

37_{André Guichaoua, From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990-1994}

(University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 145.

38_{Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 146.} 39_{Guichaoua, 147.}

40_{Straus, “Historiography”, 531.} 41_Idem.

42_{See chapter 7 of Guichaoua, From War to Genocide.} 43_{Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 322.}

(19)

while it could not exclude the possibility of the existence of a conspiracy to commit genocide prior to April 6th44, the evidence that was brought forward by the Prosecutor Office was circumstantial at best.45 It contended that acts like training militias and composing lists of RPF accomplices were fitting with the context of the war with the RPF and did not prove a conscious targeting of Tutsi civilians.46_{As a result, the Chamber reasoned it was not}

convinced that ‘the Prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the four Accused conspired amongst themselves or with others to commit genocide before it unfolded on 7 April 1994.’47 The Chamber ruled Bagosora guilty of genocide, but freed him of the charge of conspiracy to commit genocide.48

Victims: who and how many?

Following the discussions concerning Habyarimana’s assassination and the planning of the genocide, focus will now shift to contention within the historiography concerning matters during the genocide itself. The first point contention in this category concerns the victims of Rwanda’s genocide. As with many other point of contention, the differing opinions can be roughly drawn into two groups: the mostly Western scholars and researchers on one side and the largely regional or African scholars and the RPF on the other side. In the coming section the debates surrounding the identity and quantity of the victims will be detailed.

One aspect of the contention surrounding the genocide’s victims is their identity. It is generally understood and accepted that the Tutsi formed the major target group, making up the vast majority of the total victims. According so some scholars however, besides the Tutsi there were also Hutu being prosecuted by the same génocidaires that killed Tutsi.49 While Tutsi were killed for belonging to a perceived ethnic group, Hutu that found their death did so for different reasons: Mahmood Mamdani points to the fact that Hutu killed Hutu out of political reasons. This happened in cases where moderate Hutu were killed for not supporting the Hutu Power movement or were suspected of backing the RPF. Alternatively, Hutu killed Hutu for social reasons with the aim to steal their property and land and redistribute it.50 Lee Ann Fujii and Linda Melvern argue along the same lines as Mamdani and add to the mix the

44_{International Crime Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et}

al.: Judgement and Sentence (Arusha, 2008), para. 2107 - 2109, 538.

45_{ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., para. 2110, 539.} 46_{ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., para. 2109, 539.} 47_{ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., para. 2113, 540.} 48_{ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., 568.}

49_{See Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (Abingdon-on-Thames:}

Routledge, 2011) 352; Des Forges, 201; Straus, 526.

50_{Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the}

(20)

role of regionalism. They remark the historical rivalry between the north and south of Rwanda and pose that some Hutu were also killed because they were prominent southern Hutu and therefore considered rivals of the interim government, whom originated from the northern parts of Rwanda.51

In contrast, the official narrative leaves little room for debate concerning the victims of the genocide, stating that only Tutsi found their deaths. In her book Whispering Truth to

Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation52_{Susan Thomson notes that the official}

representation makes a clear distinction between Hutu and Tutsi and the frame in which they were targeted. According to the narrative only Tutsi were killed in the genocide, while the Hutu that died at the same time were victims of politicide that died in massacres.53 This distinction relies on a specific understanding of the underlying reasons of the killings. In the official final report on the Gacaca courts of Rwanda54, an elaboration on this nuance can be found. In a section that aims to respond to criticism, the report brings forward the eight stages of genocide as theorized by Gregory Stanton.55 Following this theory, the report postulates that what occurred was a genocide against the Tutsi only. A stage like dehumanization did not occur against the Hutu; therefore they cannot be considered victims of genocide.56 It is here that the unique way in which the RPF uses information to suit their needs first appears in this thesis. I will pay more attention to this further down the line.

Besides the victim groups of the genocide, the total number of victims of the massacres is another disputed point. A number of different estimations exist, generally ranging from 500,000 – made by Des Forges working with census figures from 1991 – up to 1,000,000 deaths – made by a post-genocide research charged by the RPF.57 According to National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG) the exact number of victims

51_{Lee Ann Fujii, Killings Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University}

Press, 2009), 48; Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide (New York: Verso, 2004), 170, 192.

52_{Susan Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in}

Postgenocide Rwanda (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013).

53_{Susan Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power, 80.}

54_{National Service of Gacaca Courts, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (Kigali, 2012).} 55_{Stanton’s theory is often circulated by government officials and institutions in their}

explanation of genocide, see for example the website of Rwanda’s National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG), http://www.cnlg.gov.rw/genocide/background/?L=0 , for Stanton’s theory see: Gregory Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide” (working paper, University of Yale, 1998).

56_{National Service of Gacaca Courts, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (Kigali, 2012), 189 – 190.} 57_{Des Forges, 15 – 16; Straus, 526.}

(21)

sits at 1,070,014.58 Here again, the divide between Rwanda’s government and – by and large – Western academia is clear. Longman notes that the RPF and its supporters have continually advocated for the largest possible number of victims in order to underline its significance.59

Perpetration in the genocide

A fourth point of contention is the level of perpetration in the genocide and the make up of the perpetrator group. Some scholars, like Mamdani, state that virtually all Hutu Rwandans were perpetrators in the genocide.60 This complies with the general conception that the genocide in Rwanda is unique for its massive popular support. Other authors, like Melvern and Longman, state that there was a cooperation effort between trained units of the army, police and militias during the many massacres.61 This means that ordinary Hutu – that is those locals who were not trained as militia or belonged to the interahamwe62 – only perpetrated on a small scale,

often as a result of coercion. Longman specifically notes that participation in patrols and roadblocks by ordinary Rwandans was generally done rather reluctantly and that normally only trained groups committed large-scale bloodbaths.63

Memoires and testimonies that were collected by Jean Hatzfeld in his book Machete

Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak64_{paint a picture that is situated somewhere in between}

full on participation of the population and perpetration by predominantly army, police and militia. The perpetrators he interviewed tell stories of being pressured into killing65, but also reveal that they were trained and supported by interahamwe.66 While anecdotal at best, Hatzfeld’s collection of interviews does illustrate that participation of civilians in the killings was widespread. Many of the interviewees recall massacres as group activities carried out by local communities under the supervision of interahamwe.

58_{National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide, “Background”,}

http://www.cnlg.gov.rw/genocide/background/?L=0 .

59_{Longman, 53.} 60_{Mamdani, 4.}

61_{Melvern, 182; Longman, 42.}

62_{Bert Ingelaere notes that the term interahamwe initially denoted members of the MRND}

youth wing, out of which a militia grew during Rwanda’s civil war. After the genocide the definition of the term expanded and started to include all those who were suspected of perpetration, Bert Ingelaere, “The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda”, in: International IDEA,

Transitional Justice after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc

Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm, 2008), 29.

63_{Longman, 42.}

64_{Jean Hatzfeld, Seizoen van de Machetes: Het Verhaal van de Daders trans. Théo Buckinx}

(Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 2004).

65_{Hatzfeld, Seizoen van de Machetes, 30.} 66_{Hatzfeld, Seizoen van de Machetes, 44 – 47.}

(22)

Some of the conclusions that can be derived from Hatzfeld’s work are compliant with what Scott Straus found during extensive research on the identity characteristics of the genocide’s perpetrators. From his interviews with confessed and sentenced perpetrators Straus has made the observation that perpetrators were in many aspects regular Hutu citizens.67 The perpetrators originated by and large from ordinary backgrounds and were ordinary in terms of age, education and occupation.68_{Lee Ann Fujii backs up Straus’ findings with her research,}

stating that ‘joiners’, a term she uses to describe the low level perpetrators, where ordinary men and women.69 Moreover, Straus found that armed militias like the interahamwe played an important role in genocidal attacks but were, conversely to what Hatzfeld’s interviews implicate, only present in around a quarter of them.70

Finally, Straus concludes that in total around 7 to 8 per cent of the adult Hutu population (14 to 17 per cent of the adult male Hutu population) participated in the genocide.71 While this is still a reasonably big group of people, it stands in contrast to the aforementioned claims by Mamdani.

The case of RPF crimes

The fifth and final point of contention that will be dealt with in this thesis is the one surrounding the crimes perpetrated by RPF soldiers during the genocide and the years following their victory. It is held as a fact by scholars and in general Western authors who researched the genocide like Thomson, Des Forges and Prunier, that in its war on the genocidal government the RPF committed a number of serious crimes themselves. Thomson writes that the RPF committed reprisal killings during the genocide, costing the lives of ten to fifteen thousand Hutu. Moreover, the RPF forfeited to save countless other lives regardless of ethnicity due to its focus on military victory instead of protecting civilians.72 Des Forges and Prunier furthermore give attention to the fact that out of the RPF controlled areas flowed many stories of forced disappearances, summary executions and massacres.73 Part of these stories can be turned down as efforts by the interim government to spread fear for the RPF.74 But the accounts offered by writers like Des Forges and Prunier are also accompanied by

67_{Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell}

University Press, 2006) 96.

68_{Straus, The Order of Genocide, 108.}

69_{Lee Ann Fujii, Killings Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University}

Press, 2009), 15 – 16.

70_{Straus, The Order of Genocide, 114.} 71_{Straus, 118.}

72_{Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power, 81.} 73_{Des Forges, 701 – 722; Prunier, 266.} 74_{Prunier, 297 – 298.}

(23)

official reports, as is the case with Kibeho, a place for refugees where, after the genocide, the RPF was responsible for a massacre of Hutu refugees and internally displaced persons.75 The Gersony Report is another example.76 A UNHCR mandated research endeavour confirmed systematic crimes committed by RPF soldiers during their advance but was barred from publication.77

The official narrative of the Rwandan government and its supporters vehemently denies all responsibility for civilian deaths during their war on the genocidal regime. Official documents like the RPF’s report of the Gacaca courts, state that some actions against civilians did occur during the war but that they were acts of individual soldiers without approval of the RPF leadership.78 Accusations concerning RPF campaigns following the end of the genocide, like the incursions into the Democratic Republic of Congo or the massacre at Kibeho, are written off, as these actions are deemed fundamental for peace and stability in post-genocide Rwanda.79

Consensus

It is now demonstrated that the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide is home to a number of debates. These debates aim to settle who is responsible for the assassination of president Habyarimana; whether the genocide was planned and if so from when; the identity and number of the genocide’s victims; the identity and number of perpetrators; and the severity and nature of RPF crimes. Now that these points of contention genocide have been handled, the following part of the chapter will examine a number of points of that same historiography where consensus exists. These points of consensus serve to demonstrate that the historiography is not only composed of debates and confrontations. The fact that there exist a great number of concurrences in the writings on the genocide means that the contentions that

75_{For a detailed report on the Kibeho massacre see: Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie T E. “The}

Kibeho Crisis: Towards a More Effective System of International Protection for IDPs,”

Forced Migration Review 2 (1998), 8 – 11; Paul Jordan, “Witness to Genocide – A Personal

Account of the 1995 Kibeho Massacre” accessed on 29 March 2018

http://main.anzacday.org.au/witness-to-genocide-a-personal-account-of-the-1995-kibeho-massacre.

76_{Robert Gersony, “Summary of UNCHR Presentation Before Commission of Experts 10}

October 1994: Prospects For Early Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees Currently in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).

77_{Victor Peskin, “Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the}

Prosecturorial Endgame at the ICTR” in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (eds.), Remaking

Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence (Madison: University of

Wisconsin Press, 2011), 174.

78_{National Service of Gacaca Courts, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (Kigali, 2012), 190.} 79_{Longman, 57 – 58.}

(24)

inhabit these same writings are peculiar and worth investigating. The upcoming section of this chapter will, partly based on Straus’ Historiography of the Rwandan Genocide, handle the consensuses on the following subjects: the roots of ethnicity; the influence of Rwanda’s colonial past; the course and extent of the genocide; including the start and finish of the genocide and the party accountable for the end of the genocide.

The roots of ethnicity

Starting with the history of Rwanda itself, the primary consensus appears to be the nature of what later became Rwanda’s two major ethnicities. It is uncontested that these ethnic groups started out as identity groups that were primarily linked to occupation. In general, pastoralists were considered Tutsi while agriculturists were considered Hutu. It also implicated status, with Tutsi enjoying a higher status than Hutu. Mobility between these groups was common however, as fortune or disaster struck individuals. Another element of pre-colonial Rwanda on which most agree is the degree in which it was governed under a single monarchy. This monarchy was centralized and hierarchical. More importantly, it was one of the most powerful monarchies in the region and served as a unifying component of Rwandan society.80

Linda Melvern follows the consensus on what set Rwandan society on its destructive path. She acknowledges the solidifying of once fluid identity groups by colonial powers and post-independence political elites. A valuable addition by Melvern is her mention of the regional factors that were at play in Rwandan society both before and during the genocide. She remarks that Rwanda’s first two presidents came from respectively the southern and northern regions of the country and that they, especially president Habyarimana, relied increasingly on the kinsmen from their home regions.81

Timothy Longman also agrees on the notion that the categories Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were prevalent in Rwanda long before any colonizer crossed the border. He adds that the categories cannot be seen as ethnicities, especially since their people share a common culture, language and integrated communities. According to Longman, being Hutu or Tutsi was only one of a number of identifying parameters that also included lineage and region. He furthermore endorses the view that the ‘ethnicities’ were made more salient by Germany and Belgium, who based their policies on social Darwinist ideas and reshaped Rwanda’s history.82

80_{Melvern, 4; Prunier, 20 – 23.} 81_{Melvern, 8, 12.}

82_{Timothy Longman, Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda (Cambridge:}

(25)

Gérard Prunier further supports the idea that there were many more ways to identify other than Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in Rwanda. He repeatedly refers to clans or tribes as being important identification markers that often consisted out of both Hutu and Tutsi.83

Colonial influence

This role played by Germany and Belgium is another major point of consensus in the literature on Rwanda’s history. Widely endorsed is the insight that especially the Belgians tried to substantiate their racist ideas with pseudoscience and heavily supported on the Rwandan Tutsi as cliental leaders of the country to maximize Belgium’s profits from Rwanda. Gérard Prunier suggests that, while these policies and their supporting history were made up out of whole cloth, the Rwandan people over time came to internalize the imposed divide. He states that even the poorer Tutsi came to believe they were inherently more valuable than their Hutu peers. Hutu for their part, frustrated with continually being confronted with their supposed inferiority, started to hate all Tutsi, even those of the same social standing as themselves.84 Prunier even goes so far as to say that the synthesized colonial reality became such an important element of Rwandan society that it survived decennia of Western absence and became the foundation for post-colonial realities set by Rwandan elites. It eventually enabled the high level of perpetration during the genocide, as to Prunier the incorporated ideas and myths outweighed any possible material interests.85

Temporal boundaries

Broad consensus also exists on the starting and ending points of the genocide. A clear beginning is recognized in the assassination of president Habyarimana. Returning from a convention for regional heads of state in Tanzania, his plane was shot from the sky as it was about to land. The Presidential Guard and other military elements came out of their barracks in the same night, shortly after the crash, to assassinate political opponents of the Hutu Power movement and prominent Tutsi.86_{While this event is commonly marked as the triggering}

event of the genocide, there exists little agreement on the identity of the Habyarimana’s killers. This will later be examined more extensively.

Like the start, the end of the genocide is also generally understood and accepted. It is dated on 17th July, the day that the RPF ended their fight against the genocidal regime by

83_{Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: C. Hurst & Co.,}

2005), 15, 24, 85.

84_{Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 38, 39.} 85_{Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 40.}

86_{Des Forges, 187, 191; Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of}

(26)

officially toppling it. Having already taken Kigali, the RPF managed to subjugate the last stronghold of the interim government in Ruhengeri on this date.87

Course and extent

Another point of consensus is the general course and extent of the genocide. Starting soon after the crash of Habyarimana’s plane the hardliners of the Hutu Power movement sprang in action, killing their political opponents and solidifying their own position. It is Gérard Prunier who points out that in this initial phase, these two categories almost completely overlapped each other. In Kigali, most people who belonged to the social and political elite were still Tutsi, by virtue of the past colonial favouritism.88

Once the members of the akazu felt they were sufficiently in control of the political landscape in Kigali they continued to form an interim government. Subsequently, they started to spread the violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu throughout the country. Leaders of prefectures and towns who rejected the massacres were simply replaced with individuals who did support the killings. In doing so, the interim government was able to spread the genocide all over Rwanda by the 21st_{of April.}89

Scholars point out that the scale of the massacres was enormous. Tutsi were targeted and killed all over Rwanda at roadblocks, their homes, in fields and at large gathering places. The victims were killed by military, paramilitary forces and militias, often accompanied or witnessed by neighbours and other ordinary Rwandans. Often times, the victims were humiliated, tortured or raped before their death and their bodies mutilated afterwards. At places were large groups victims sought refuge or fought back at their assailants, government forces or militias from adjacent communities where called in and often came to help. The government forces usually used their modern weapons to weaken the amassed victims and then left the locals and militias to finish the job with crude equipment.90

Halting the genocide

A final and important point of consensus is the fact that the RPF played a crucial role in bringing an end to the genocide. Many scholars point out how the international community failed to act during the build up and course of the genocide.

Melvern notes how the United Nations Security Council first held a specific meeting on Rwanda on the 3rd of May – almost a month after the assassination of Habyarimana. The

87_{Des Forges, 302; Daillare, 474 – 475; Prunier 299.} 88_{Prunier, 232.}

89_{Melvern, 210.}

(27)

one thing on which the Council could agree was that a forceful intervention was out of the question. Sounds went up for a humanitarian mission or a symbolic delegation to Rwanda. Members of the Council also pointed to neighbouring countries and the Organization of African Unity as entities more suited to act.91 Even though General Dallaire of UNAMIR repeatedly called for reinforcements and a broader mandate, the UN failed to come up with any meaningful actions.92

Because there was little to no international intervention – Opération Turquoise initially backed the interim government but did not come in direct confrontation with the RPF– the conflict continued to encompass only two sides. 93 It is widely described as a war between the interim government of Rwanda and the invading RPF. Eventually the interim government lost the war, partly because it kept siphoning troops and supplies from the frontline to aid in the genocide.94

Conclusion

This chapter has focussed on the historiography of the genocide in Rwanda. As is exemplified by the debate between Reydams and Debelle and al., the historiography is home to some discussions that fought out quite harshly. Now that the historiography of Rwanda’s genocide has been analysed both on its contention and consensus, the question remains why specific subjects remain contested while others do not. In the following paragraphs I will elaborate on why the identity of Habyarimana’s assassins, the planning of the genocide, the genocide’s death toll, the genocide’s perpetrators and the crimes committed by RPF soldiers are contested topics. Who stands to gain from what position on each of these cases?

Looking into Habyarimana’s death, the short answer to the before-mentioned question lies in its reputation as the starting point of the genocide.95 Because the common acceptance of the assassination as the event that finally tipped Rwanda over into genocide, the question of responsibility for starting the genocide is inherently tied to the downing of the plane. For the RPF, whom have ruled Rwanda since their victory over the genocidal regime, it is unthinkable to bear any responsibility for starting the genocide. According to the RPF, they

91_{Melvern, 222.}

92_{Dallaire, 359 – 360, 364 – 365.} 93_{Des Forges, 683; Prunier, 294.} 94_{Des Forges, 698.}

95_{The notion that Habyarimana’s death is the start of the genocide is accepted by amongst}

others: Straus, “Historiography”, 525; Guichaoua, From War to Genocide, 146; Jones,

(28)

saw their homeland plunge into genocide and decided to save their people from devastation.96 In doing so they sacrificed their lives in order to save Rwanda and its people from genocide, the Second Republic97 and any colonialist, un-Rwandan remnants like ethnic salience and foreign interference that had continued to linger even after Rwanda’s independence.98 Due to the close ties between the RPF during the genocide and the RPF as a ruling party now, the current regime’s authority is inherently and closely connected to the purported moral high ground of its predecessors. Conversely, if it were true that the RPF actually was behind Habyarimana’s death it would fundamentally undermine its own claim to power. It would subsequently also cast doubts on many other elements of the official narrative and call into question the regime’s authority and policies.

By all means there appears to be no conclusive evidence of an extensive planning phase of genocide. While Clark in his overview of the historiography states that the planning of the genocide was largely agreed upon, the ICTR verdict in the Bagosora trial has concluded that there is not enough proof that such a conspiracy existed. It is crucial to the RPF to have the conspiracy to commit genocide accepted as their narrative propagates a planned and continued effort destroy all Tutsi. To the side accused of this conspiracy it is important to have the theory proven wrong as it would lessen their punishable acts under the Genocide Convention.

The salience of the discussion surrounding the genocide’s death toll is of a similar nature of the one surrounding the downing of Habyarimana’s plane crash. Since Rwanda’s current political elite draws so heavily on its role during the genocide, a higher number of victims is favourable to their case. This works in both a domestic and international context. Domestically, a high victim count amplifies the heroism of the RPF’s victory over the genocidal regime. As Longman argues, the genocide has been made to form a pivotal point in Rwanda’s history.99_{In paring these two elements together, a large death toll enlarges the}

current regime’s prestige, authority, and right to rule. In the international context, a high number of casualties serves to amplify the severity of the genocide. The international community, having failed to purposefully act upon the genocide, is reminded of their inactions by the RPF. An example of this behaviour is found in the RPF’s mingling in ICTR

96_{Longman, 56.}

97_{The First and Second Republic of Rwanda are the names given to Rwanda’s two regimes}

that ruled after the country gained independence in 1962, ruled by respectively Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal Habyarimana.

98_{Longman, 57.} 99_{Longman, 37.}

(29)

proceedings.100 The bigger the official death toll, the bigger the leverage Rwanda’s government has over the international community. Cruvellier notes that the debate surrounding the number of victims has been so convoluted with politics that, ‘depending on which figures people use to estimate the number of deaths, they end up taking an ideological position.’101

The debate concerning the crimes committed by the RPF during and after their armed struggle with the genocidal regime has a, by now, recognizable pattern. Rwanda’s government has constructed a foundation history in which they fought for the liberation of Rwanda. Many RPF soldiers were killed during this war and their sacrifices are remembered and commemorated annually during the Day of Heroes.102 To accept that these heroes systematically and purposefully killed Hutu on the scale that is portrayed in for instance the Gersony Report would cause problems with their image, and in extend the RPF. In contrast, the victims of these crimes and their relatives stand to gain from a more nuanced approach to this debate. These people are predominantly Hutu, a group marginalized since the genocide.103 Ingelaere writes of the resentment that was caused by not trying these crimes in the Gacaca courts.104

This chapter has shown the multiple debates that continue to exist on Rwanda’s genocide. As described above, it appears that the RPF is a recurring party when analysing the stakeholders in these debates. Rwanda’s political elite stands to gain or lose from all the debates. It has a limited influence on the findings of research performed by foreign actors: authors who are critical on the RPF and its policies risk being barred from entering Rwanda,105 while others are rewarded with special medals commemorating their outstanding friendship with Rwanda.106 If we look back to the frameworks described in the previous

100_{More on this in Chapter three, Peskin, “Victor’s Justice Revisited”, 174.}

101_{Thierry Cruvellier, Court of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for}

Rwanda (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 45

102_{Longman, 53.}

103_{Jennie Burnet, “Whose Genocide? Whose Truth?” in Hinton, Alexander Laban & O’Neill,}

Kevin Lewis (eds.), Genocide, Truth, Memory, and Representation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 89.

104_{Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda:}

Justice without Lawyers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 333.

105_{A primary example is Alison Des Forges, who continued her endeavours even after this}

ban, Don Webster, “The Uneasy Relationship between the ICTR and Gacaca,” in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (eds.), Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass

Violence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 185.

106_{Daniel Sabiiti, “How Igihango Medal Recipients Fell for Rwanda”, KT Press, November}

(30)

chapter, this behaviour fits in the theory of De Baets as abuse of history. By influencing possibilities of research, like barring certain researchers from entering the country, and attempting to influence the reception of works, as shown by the preferential treatment of Linda Melvern, Rwanda’s government is abusing history both at the heuristic and pragmatic level. The RPF thus tries to influence the debates that are held outside its borders, but what about the debates within its borders? The next chapter to this thesis will look into this.

Out of the transitional justice mechanisms that were employed in Rwanda, especially the Gacaca courts had the goal of establishing the truth about what happened during the genocide. In the first chapter, we have seen that there exist multiple definitions on what truth means. In this second chapter, we have seen that Rwanda’s government is a stakeholder in the major debates that surround de genocide’s historiography. The third chapter will analyse transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda in an attempt to come to an understanding in what way they contributed to the narrative on the genocide.

Truth Passes Through Fire and Does Not Burn: An Analysis of discourse and traditional justice in post-genocide Rwanda