The securitisation of climate change : a discourse analysis of the NATO and its member states

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Master Thesis

Political Science | International Relations Name: Elze van Langen

Student ID: 10786201

Supervisor: Dr. L. W. Fransen Second reader: Dr. F. Boussaid Date: 11 August 2016

Word count: 19.371

The securitisation of climate change

A discourse analysis of the NATO and its member states

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Abstract

Although the representation of environmental concerns in the security agenda is increasingly recognised, the securitisation of climate change remains a topic of contestation. This thesis elaborates on the question how the visions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its member states correspond regarding the securitisation of climate change. This research draws on the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016) and presents a comparative analysis of discourses on climate security. The discourses of the US, Germany and the Netherlands are analysed and complemented with the discourse of the NATO, which touches upon the lack of attention that has been given to climate security discourses within international organisations (IOs). This thesis argues that NATO generally constructs climate change as a territorial danger, which corresponds most with the discourse of the US. Although the leadership role of the US within NATO can be a plausible explanation for the similarity, it is argued that NATO’s vision may best be explained by its traditional identity of a military alliance. Despite expressions of fear for the militarisation of climate change, this thesis suggests that the short-term political implications of NATO’s vision are limited, since its mandate and policies concerning climate change are largely vague and undecided.

Cover photo by Isaac Cordal

The cement sculpture is created by street artist Isaac Cordal and belongs to a larger installation called ‘Follow the Leaders’. The artwork serves as a metaphor for power-mad businessmen who run our capitalist global order. However, after a picture went viral online, this sculpture was renamed by social media users as ‘Politicians talking about climate change’ (Cordal 2011; Sullivan 2014).

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Preface

Since several years, I am fascinated by the global issue of climate change. When I started to read more about this topic for my MA thesis project, I discovered an article by George Marshall (2014). In an attempt to explain the difficulties for our global society to find a collective response to climate change, Marshall found the answer in something we all share: our human brain. The exceptionally amorphous problem of climate change provides us with so many uncertainties that our human brain is incapable to fully address the issue. It touches upon our cognitive blind spots, fear of death and perception of threats. This made me realise that climate change is largely socially constructed, and that the way and to what extent it is perceived as a security threat can have great political implications. I decided to write my thesis about the securitisation of climate change, in which I analysed the discourse of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), an IO which traditionally is not involved with climate change. While I was still writing my thesis, I applied for an internship at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within two weeks I was hired as an intern at the ambassador for international organisations. Hence, I will continue to work with the NATO and many other interesting institutions. I am looking forward to the career that lies ahead of me, and I uphold the ambition to work with climate issues in the future.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Luc Fransen for his valuable guidance and advice, and dr. Farid Boussaid for taking the time to read my thesis as a second reader. I would also like to thank Ariane Berends for her support as a study advisor and involvement throughout the process. Subsequently, I would like to acknowledge the interview respondents, who provided me with new insights and information: Rob de Rave (HCSS), Louise van Schaik (Clingendael Institute), Michel van Winden (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Wilbert van der Zeijden (PAX for Peace). Lastly, I would like to thank the people who are close to me and have been of great support throughout my study.

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List of tables and figures

Figure 1.1: Research structure 9

Figure 2.1: Hierarchical comparative design 13

Table 3.1: Important keywords distinguishing between the danger and risk dimension 26

Figure 3.1: The space of politics and security 26

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Abbreviations

CCMS Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society CCPI Climate Change Performance Index

COP Conference of the Parties DOD US Department of Defence

DPCR NATO Defence Planning Capability Review

EC European Commission

EU European Union

GHG Greenhouse Gases

IO International organisation

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change KNMI Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn

NAS Dutch National Adaptation Strategy NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCA US National Climate Assessment NGO Non-governmental organisation NMP Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan PA NATO Parliamentary Assembly PBL Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving

RIVM Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu STC NATO Science and Technology Committee

UN United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research topic

The changing climate has already started to reshape our world. Droughts, floods, rising sea levels and water scarcity have made climate change an issue of security policies. The climate-security nexus is part of the larger context of broadening the definition of climate-security, a development that has taken place since the 1980s (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.1)1_{. The} intensification of the environmental debate and the changing strategic environment has even brought the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as an intergovernmental military alliance into the realm of environmental politics (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 80). The most recent Strategic Concept of 2010 revealed NATO’s concern about the future impact of climate change on areas of interest to the alliance (NATO 2010: 13). In the run-up to the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21) in 2015, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly (PA) urged the allied governments to support an ambitious legally-binding global agreement (NATO PA 2015).

While all NATO member countries agree on the likely impacts of climate change on international security, every single state has a different opinion on how much and which impacts it might have, as well as to what extent climate change should be integrated in foreign and security policies (Vitel 2015: 6). There are many possibilities to frame climate change as a security issue. In other words, the way in which the securitisation of climate change develops, can have many different outcomes. The reason for this is because climate security discourses can be important for the legitimisation of certain policies or actions, which normally would not have been approved when there was no recognition of climate change at all (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.2).

Hence, the recognition of climate change by a military alliance that traditionally does not focus on environmental issues and which conception of security lies within the traditional state-centric approach, is an interesting but controversial development. The way the NATO as an international organisation (IO) and its individual members construct climate change as a security issue, can have normative implications. It can give climate change more prominence within the political agenda, but it can also expand the military’s policy reach (idem: ch.1, 1.4).

1_{References of Diez et al. (2016) will not be showed in page numbers, but in (sub)chapters. This is because the}

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A comparative analysis of the climate security discourses within the United States (US), Germany and the Netherlands, as well as within the NATO, can provide a fuller picture on the different visions and interactions concerning the climate-security nexus.

1.2. Research structure

Following this introduction on the overall research topic and the second chapter of the thesis’ research design, chapter 3 will explain the theories which are useful for an understanding of the nexus between climate change and security. This part will elaborate on the theory of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School and the incorporation of the logic of risk in securitisation theory, which ultimately will arrive at the analytical framework on climate security discourses and the normative implications of securitisation. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the climate security discourses of the US and Germany as two members of the NATO. In chapter 5, these cases are complemented with an empirical analysis of the climate security discourse in the Netherlands. The NATO and the way it securitises climate change will be explored in chapter 6. Consequently, conclusions will be drawn from these different cases in chapter 7 (figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: The research structure

•Climate security •Research design Introduction • Securitisation • Analytical framework of climate security discourses Theory

•US & Germany •The Netherlands

•NATO

Analysis

•Conclusions Combination theory & analysis

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2. Research design

2.1. Research question

In 2010, former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for the alliance to play a significant role in the global response to climate change (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 80). In NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept of 2010 was recognised that “key environmental and resource constraints”, including climate change, “will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations” (NATO 2010: 13). Although the NATO has received great scholarly attention, research on the alliance and the way it constructs climate change as an emerging security challenge is scarcely represented in the literature.

Studies on securitisation have traditionally focused on either a case study concerning a single country or a global overview, with the danger of failing to reconstruct thorough securitisation dynamics. Recently, Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.2) addressed this gap by providing a systematic comparative analysis of discourses on climate change and security in four countries. The authors developed a six-fold matrix which allowed them to trace securitisations in more detail than so far has been done. It also clarifies the connections between security, threat and risk. Furthermore, it makes such securitisations more applicable to empirical analyses and enables the engagement with the normative debate surrounding securitisation.

This thesis will further elaborate on the analysis of Diez et al. (2016) by assessing the securitisation of climate change in the Netherlands and comparing it to the discourses in the US and Germany, which are already analysed by the authors. Although they took the state as the main referent object in their research, the literature has not yet offered a comprehensive understanding of climate security discourses within IOs (idem: 726). This research paper aims to address this gap in the literature by analysing the securitisation of climate change within the NATO, and by consolidating these findings with analyses of its NATO members the Netherlands, Germany and the US. This thesis will therefore elaborate on the question:

How do the visions of the NATO and its member states correspond with regard to the securitisation of climate change?

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2.2. Analytical framework: Analysing climate security discourses

This thesis will use the analytical framework on climate security discourses developed by Diez et al. (2016), because it provides a recent and comprehensive method to analyse and compare the securitisation on climate change in different cases. The framework consists of a six-fold matrix of securitisation with two dimensions. On one dimension it distinguishes between ‘threatification’ (the construction of security as an existential threat) and ‘riskification’ (a more diffuse logic of security). On the other dimension it distinguishes between three different levels of referent objects, which climate change is seen to threaten the most: the territorial, individual and planetary level.

On the territorial level, states are seen as the main referent objects. However, Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.2) acknowledge that other group entities can also be the referent object, such as the NATO. This means that the NATO as an alliance with 28 member states can produce articulations in terms of territorial danger or territorial risk. This argument is supported by McDonald (2013: 46-47) who argues that IOs play a key role in the provision of security in international contexts. Since climate change poses a threat to both states and individuals as components of international society, IOs in general are powerfully advanced in linking climate change to international security.

Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.3) acknowledge that their comparative research of four countries might run the risk of methodological nationalism, which might reinforce the boundaries of states. This is in conflict with the (to a large degree) transnational character of debates on climate change and the importance of transnational actors in these debates, such as international expert panels and NGOs. However, they also argue that climate policies eventually need to be adopted in national contexts in which political debates on climate change largely take place. The approach in this thesis meets this ambivalent issue by highlighting the linkages between the national contexts of the Netherlands, Germany and the US with the international context of the NATO.

2.3. Research design: Comparative design

In this thesis a comparative design is applied in relation to a qualitative research strategy, which means the research design takes the form of a multiple-case study (Bryman 2012: 74). A case study can be defined as an intensive examination of a single unit (setting) for the purpose of understanding a larger number of similar units (Gerring 2004: 341). This can be

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exemplified as the external validity or generalisability (Bryman 2012: 69). Hence, a multiple-case study is a research design in which the number of multiple-cases exceeds one. This research design has been chosen because this thesis has the ambition of theory-building instead of theory-testing and uses information-rich cases. The design has the advantage that it allows the researcher to examine the operation of generative causal mechanisms in divergent or similar contexts (idem: 74).

This thesis will elaborate on the NATO and three member states, namely the US, Germany and the Netherlands. The US is a relevant case in this study, since it fulfils a role of leadership within the NATO. From a military perspective, the US is most dominant with its high military expenditures (approximately 70 percent of total NATO expenditures) (Elshout & Koelé 2016: 10-11). However, its overall performance on climate change can be measured as poor, concerning its high emission levels and slow adoption of federal climate policies (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.1). Germany is an interesting case as well, since it has long been hesitant towards military involvement through the NATO (Carstensen 2016), as well as in its national debate on climate security. Accordingly, Germany is called an ambivalent forerunner in the field of climate change. While it is a highly industrialised country with a strong economic performance, it is also characterised by progressive climate policies (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4).

The climate security discourses within the cases of Germany and the US, mainly obtained from the secondary source of Diez et al. (2016), will be compared with the discourse of the Netherlands, obtained from primary sources. The Netherlands has been chosen as a case because it is seen as a loyal NATO member and is known for its ambition to play a leading role in environmental policies, though its performance on climate change is far behind Germany (WRR 2010: 9; Dutch Ministry of Defence 2013: 8; Germanwatch and CAN 2016).

Besides the systematic comparative analysis of the three NATO members, the climate security discourse of the NATO will be analysed as well. A reason for this is, despite the fact that climate policies eventually have to be implemented in national contexts, international and transnational actors are influencing these national debates (Diez et al. 2016: ch1, 1.3). Although the NATO and the Netherlands will receive special attention in this study, it will not be appropriate to compare an international organisation on a one-to-one basis with a nation-state. Therefore, the analysis of the NATO will be positioned above the comparative analysis of the three member countries (figure 2.1).

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NATO

The

Netherlands

(Diez et al. 2016)

Germany

United States

(Diez et al. 2016)

Figure 2.1: The hierarchical comparative design

The combination of data-collection methods is typical for case studies, which makes the strategy of triangulation appropriate (Eisenhardt 1989: 534). Triangulation in this thesis refers to an approach that uses “multiple methods of investigation and sources of data” (Bryman 2012: 392). In this study, a discourse analysis on 63 relevant documents has been carried out. These include policy papers and government reports and statements from the member states’ ministries in the sectors of defence, foreign affairs and the environment, as well as strategic concepts, treaties and resolutions of the NATO. Reports of research institutes and think tanks have been analysed, most of them can be found in the Dutch case, such as the ‘Advisory Council on International Affairs’ (AIV), ‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’ (WRR) and Clingendael Institute. Also, attention has been given to discursive entrepreneurs through opinion pieces and autobiographies. Consequently, civil society reports, newspaper articles, online news articles, and a radio fragment are used to reflect the broader debate.

The choice of the documents is based on their importance, considering the time they were published and the public and/or political attention they received, and the extent to which the document links climate change to security. The documents were published in the time span of 1949 until 2016, but most of them find their origin between 1988 and 2016. The evident explanation for this is that the amount of publications increased due to the increased attention for the environment. Discourses can be defined as ‘selective representations of complex phenomena’ that traverse the conventional boundaries of different disciplines (Fairclough 2013: 3-4). In order to reconstruct the broader debate, discover linkages between actors and find certain motivations behind securitising moves, semi-structured interviews

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have been conducted with several policy-makers and experts within the field of climate change and security.

2.4. Relevance

This thesis wishes to make an empirical as well as a theoretical contribution. Empirically this thesis aims to provide a better understanding of how the NATO frames the emerging security challenge of climate change and to what extent this corresponds to the securitisation of climate change of its members, considering the Netherlands, Germany and the US. Theoretically this thesis aims to contribute to the debate about securitisation and elaborate on the underexposed aspects of the literature by using the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.2). The aim is to develop a better understanding of the logic of risk and its relationship with security, and of the effects of the related languages on political decision-making (idem: ch.2, 2.1).

There are many possibilities to frame climate change as a security issue and these different discourses are of importance for the legitimisation of certain policies, such as military security policies. Therefore, it is relevant to analyse discourses on climate security and to assess its normative implications. Whether these discourses can be perceived as a good or a bad thing, “depends on the exact ways in which the securitisation of climate change unfolds” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.2). When such a discourse brings climate change on the political agenda and thus facilitates political decision-making, it can be a good thing. But when such a discourse helps to expand the military’s policy reach and neglects climate policy, it can be a bad thing as well. How this takes place is in turn a consequence of several structural factors, such as the influence of discursive entrepreneurs or the historical evolution of a political institution (ibid.).

The way the NATO and the Netherlands as a NATO member construct climate change as a security issue, can thus matter in the legitimisation of policies. In this sense, the question of whether the linkage of climate change and security is a good or a bad thing depends on how the securitisation of climate change in these cases unfolds. In comparatively analysing the NATO as an international alliance and three of its member states, it is possible to assess to what extent the climate security discourse of the NATO corresponds to the discourses of its members and what further conclusions can be drawn.

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2.5. Outlook: the argument

This thesis shows that the vision of the NATO with regard to the securitisation of climate change corresponds most to the climate security discourse of the US. Both actors generally frame climate change in terms of a territorial danger, while Germany primarily constructs the issue as an individual risk and the Netherlands generally frames climate change as a planetary risk. Although the reason for the similar discourses of the NATO and the US touches upon the leadership role of the US within the alliance, this thesis argues that NATO’s vision is largely influenced by its traditional identity of a military alliance which is built on the principle of collective territorial defence.

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3. Theoretical framework: The securitisation of climate change

This chapter will elaborate on the theories concerning climate change and security. After the development of the climate-security nexus is discussed, the theory on securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School is explained. This theory on the narrow conceptualisation of security forms the basis for the rest of the chapter, in which the incorporation of risk as a broadening of the securitisation theory is described. Subsequently, attention is given to the analytical framework on climate security discourses developed by Diez et al. (2016). The chapter concludes with the normative implications of the securitisation on climate change.

3.1. The climate-security nexus

The growing appeal of ‘climate security’ in international politics represents a recent and sufficiently successful introduction of concerns about the environment into the security agenda. Despite this increased recognition, the nexus between environmental change and security continues to be a topic of contestation (Trombetta 2008: 585). First, Trombetta (2008: 585) argues that environmental problems are often overruled by ‘more urgent threats’. This can actually be understood as the perceived urgency of threats, since the human brain tends to recognise visible and recent threats, such as terrorist violence, as more urgent. Widely shared by cognitive psychologists, climate change is an exceptionally amorphous problem. “It provides us with no defining qualities that would give it a clear identity: no deadlines, no geographic location, no single cause or solution and, critically, no obvious enemy” (Marshall 2014).

Second, the contestation remains whether the environment can be considered as a security issue (Trombetta 2008: 585). This refers to the debate on security studies between the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘non-traditionalists’. The traditional conception of security is supported by political realists, who argue that security is centred around the military threat and the use of force. They take the state as the referent power-exercising object (Biswas 2011: 2). The increasing attention for the international economic and environmental dimensions from the 1970s and the rising concerns on identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s contributed to the dissatisfaction about the military and nuclear focus of

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security imposed by the Cold War. This generated the debate about the conceptualisation of security, in which the traditional notion of security was increasingly criticised by its insufficiency to explain emerging threats (Buzan et al. 1998: 2; Biswas 2011: 2).

Political scientists including Ullman (1983); Jahn, Lemaitre and Waever (1987); Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988); Brown (1989); Matthews (1989); Nye (1989); Haftendorn (1991); Crawford (1991) and Tickner (1992) explicitly argued for a widening of the concept of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 2). The incorporation of the environment into the realm of security initially appeared to be a reasonable idea, since it could increase the political relevance of environmental problems (Trombetta 2008: 586). According to Buzan (1991: 433) “environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” Others welcomed the concept since it emphasises different values like ecology, ‘globality’, and governance over values like identity, territoriality and sovereignty, traditionally associated with the nation-state. Yet others mentioned that environmental security could analytically contribute to a better understanding of new typologies of vulnerability and the associated potential for conflict (Trombetta 2008: 586).

Traditional security analysts opposed this development by arguing that the progressive widening of security endangered its intellectual coherence, incorporating so many issues that its essential meaning became void (Buzan et al. 1998: 2). This argument implied concerns about the possible evocation of “confrontational practices associated with the state and the military which should be kept apart from the environmental debate” (Trombetta 2008: 586). These concerns encompassed the possibilities of generating new competencies for the military -the militarisation of the environment rather than the greening of security- or the rise of nationalistic attitudes to protect the national environment. Moreover, security could undermine the cooperative efforts in order to deal with environmental problems, introducing a zero-sum rationality in which winners and losers could be created. Similar objections centred around the southern perception of environmental security as a security discourse of northern countries (ibid.).

As the debate between the traditionalists and the non-traditionalists went on, the concept of environmental security slowly gained popularity. In April of 2007 the issue of climate change was discussed for the first time in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although state representatives remained divided over whether climate change and, more

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generally, environmental degradation could be considered as a security issue (Trombetta 2008: 586), narratives about environmentally induced conflicts entered decisively onto the world stage. In that same year, the violence in Darfur was attributed to a combination of resource scarcities, demographic pressures, and climate change by influential actors such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon.

Well-known security pundits like Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jeffrey Sachs shaped the academic and even popular discussion by emphasising the connection between environmental degradation and violent conflict. Along with these climate conflict narratives came other predictions about the threat of so-called ‘climate refugees’ (Trombetta 2008: 592; Hartmann; 2013; 47). Research on environmental conflict and the corresponding narratives created an intense academic debate in which not only the empirical validity of claims and methodologies were addressed, but also the normative implications. Critics argued that the debate eliminated the responsibility of developed countries, represented people in the Third World as villains, and attempting to frame environmental problems in terms of national security (Trombetta 2008: 593; Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4).

Trombetta (2008: 593) argues that the climate security debate has shown two tendencies which can be translated into two discourses. The first one is influenced by a national security discourse with an emphasis on conflicts and population displacement, in which the threat to global order and stability has gained prominence. While this discourse is largely informed by reactive and defensive measures, the second discourse challenges these security practices by outlining the inadequacy of military responses and preparation in dealing with environmental issues. Instead, it shifts the attention to the concept of vulnerability and suggests the promotion of both mitigation and adaptation to environmental change. It argues that preventive measures to ensure safety and resilience provide the best results.

These two aspects – one inspired by reactive measures, and the other by preventive measures - are both present in climate security discourses of western countries (idem: 594). These aspects can be connected to two important concepts within the securitisation of climate change: the concept of threat and the concept of risk. These terms will receive more attention in the next paragraphs, in which theories on the social construction of security will be explained.

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3.2. The theory of securitisation (Copenhagen School)

The narrow definition of security finds its traces in realism, which can be identified as the mainstream approach in security studies. Realists tend to see environmental degradation as an issue of ‘low’ politics rather than a matter of ‘high’ politics, such as security. Constructivists and poststructuralists deliberately received more support by challenging this narrow perspective. They argue instead for a non-traditionalist approach of security, suggesting that threats are socially constructed (Trombetta 2008: 587).

The theory of securitisation, developed by the Copenhagen School and mainly associated with the research of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, is considered as “[t]he most innovative and thoughtful attempt to conceptualise the social construction of security issues” (ibid.). From a social-constructivist perspective it examines how problems are transformed into issues of security by differentiating security and the securitisation process from its purely political stance (Buzan et al. 1998: 4-5; Biswas 2011: 3). The theory is relevant in this debate because it investigates the implications of widening the security agenda and gives specific attention to environmental problems. Furthermore, it has been influential in the academic and political debate, since it warned for the risk of framing environmental issues in security terms (Trombetta 2008: 587-588).

The Copenhagen School argues that in the securitisation theory objective threats do not exist. Instead, any issue can go through a process of securitisation, in which it is transformed into a security issue. This happens through a speech act, a discursive process in which an issue is constructed by a political community as an existential threat. An issue only becomes securitised when it is accepted as a threat by the audience in wider society. As such, this transformation does not necessarily mean that a real threat prevails, but that the issue is framed in such a way that the perception of a security threat is created. As a consequence, the method of dealing with the issue will be transformed (Trombetta 2008: 588; Biswas 2011: 4).

As such, securitisation can be perceived as a more extreme form of politicisation. According to Buzan et al. (1998: 23-24) a public issue can be placed on a spectrum ranging from non-politicised, through politicised, to securitised. In other words, an issue can be completely absent in public debate and decision, through being part of public policy, to being presented as an existential threat. The latter phase of securitisation gives rise to emergency measures and justifies actions that are outside the normal boundaries of political procedure.

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In a security analysis three types of units are involved, in which a distinction is made between referent objects (things which are seen as threatened from existence with a legitimate claim to survival), securitising actors (actors who securitise issues by indicating a referent object as existentially threatened), and functional actors (actors who neither are the referent object nor the securitising actor, but who are affecting the decisions in a certain sector) (idem 1998: 35-36).

However, according to Trombetta (2008: 588) the Copenhagen School’s theory on securitisation has problematic consequences. Although a political community has the decision whether or not to securitise an issue, “[o]nce an issue is securitised the logic of security necessarily follows”. This logic brings with it a set of practices which are associated with the traditional logic of security, suggesting a zero-sum understanding of security and an ultimate form of antagonism (ibid.; Trombetta 2014: 136). It allows for emergency measures that go beyond otherwise binding rules (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). The broadening of the security agenda can therefore have dangerous consequences, since this rationality of security will spread to other contexts from which it previously had been excluded (Trombetta 2008: 589).

Alongside the problematic consequences in the theory of securitisation, the process of securitisation does not seem analytically accurate when applied to environmental issues (ibid.). The most notable peculiarities that the Copenhagen School identified in the environmental sector can ironically be associated with the amorphous problem of climate change. The theory of securitisation is associated with the inscription of enemies and issues governed by decrees rather than democratic procedures (Trombetta 2014: 136). However, the Copenhagen School argues that environmental securitisation has not been successful (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4), since “few appeals to environmental security have mobilised exceptional measures or inscribed enemies in any context” (Trombetta 2008: 589).

Yet other authors such as Trombetta (2008), Brauch (2009), Brzoska (2009) and Parsons (2010) criticise this argument and clearly recognise securitisation processes, especially in the field of climate change (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). Bourbeau (2015: 384) criticises the securitisation theory for underdeveloping and undertheorising the scale or variation of securitisation. Although a large amount of research has been done on the absolute distinction between securitised and un-securitised issues, no further differentiation is made when an issue has entered the security realm. As such, he argues that security is mainly perceived as a one-size-ﬁts-all concept. Consequently, previously mentioned authors

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say we need to contextualise securitisation: “that what the Copenhagen School considers the inherent ‘grammar’ of securitising moves is merely one form of securitisation prevalent in military sectors and western contexts” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). According to these authors Buzan et al. have a too narrow definition of securitisation, hence they look at climate change discourses through a lens that keeps them from seeing securitisation.

In the climate security debate, such a contextualisation of climate change has led to the explanation of a diversity of versions of securitisation. Although these theories have contributed to our understanding of securitisation mainly by differentiating between various referent objects of security, they are still relatively close to the Copenhagen School formulation and remain largely theoretical in nature (ibid.). Diez et al. (2016) recently developed an analytical framework which proposes a more deductive way of distinguishing climate security discourses by creating two dimensions. The first dimension includes different levels of referent objects, while the other addresses the conceptualisation of risk in the climate security literature. The scholars argue that the literature largely ignores or does not draw systematically on the notion of risk (idem: 431). In order to distinguish climate security discourses in a systematic way, this thesis will use their framework, which will be discussed later in this chapter. First will be elaborated on the concept of risk.

3.3. The influx of risk into the field of security

One of the long-established criticisms of the Copenhagen School by authors belonging to the so-called Paris School, comes from a presumed ‘sociological’ approach of securitisation. This has led to a flourishing literature on the growing relevance of risk in security practices. The criticism pointed to the failure of Buzan et al. to “see the emergence of security framing through day-to-day bureaucratic practices and routines, as well as diffuse forms of power in decentralised networks, including private actors such as the insurance industry” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). In light of the growing awareness surrounding the uncertainty and complexity of contemporary threats, scholars, bureaucratic planners and insurance brokers are increasingly using the concept of risk in order to conceptualise current security dynamics, as well as ‘resilience’ as a strategy of societies and individuals to prepare for endogenous or exogenous shocks as situations of risk (ibid.; Trombetta 2008: 590; Bourbeau 2015: 375; Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4).

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Although the risk-security literature often uses the term ‘securitisation’, it effectively implies that the logic of the security field has already been transformed. Corry (2012: 241-243) distinguishes two groups of risk theorists who share assumptions about the logic of security, but reach different conclusions with regard to the generation of risk and the way it is dealt with. The first group draws upon the theory of world risk society developed by sociologist Ulrich Beck. Risk society can be defined as a social scenario, a scenario which describes the transformation process of late modern society into its probable result: a risk society (Rasmussen 2001: 289; Beck & Holzer 2007: 3). This (western) society is increasingly confronted with the unwelcomed side effects of successful modernisation, which nobody completely understands and which results in a diversity of possible futures (Giddens 1999: 3; Beck & Holzer 2007: 3). As such, it is a society that is increasingly concerned with the future (and with security), which generates the conception of risk. The idea of risk is associated with the will to control, and particularly with the aspiration to control the future (Giddens 1999: 3). In a risk society external risks are transformed into manufactured risks, since they are created by the progression of human development (idem: 4). According to Beck this happened through the process of ‘reflexive modernisation’, in which risks have become the consequences of modernisation itself instead of the consequences of a lack of modernity, as was the case in the industrial society (Bulkely 2001: 432-433). Since most situations of manufactured risk are inherently ambiguous and reflexive, responsibility can neither easily be assumed nor attributed. This applies both to circumstances where risk is an energising principle (financial markets), and where risk needs to be limited (health risks, or ecological risks) (Giddens 1999: 7-8). As such, the ecological risk of climate change is perceived as a paradigmatic example in Beck’s theory of risk society, since environmental problems can hardly be assigned to one particular source or actor and its sources as well as its experiences transcend temporal, spatial and social limits (Bulkely 2001: 432; Matten 2004: 378).

The second group of risk theorists is inspired by French philosophers such as Foucault and Bourdieu. For them, “risk is neither a modernist tool for calculating insurance premiums nor a vain pretence at being in control of the uncontrollable global age, but is itself a particular rationality of government that works to legitimate certain technologies of power” (Corry 2012: 242). They show how logics of risk facilitate increasing securitisation of populations by focusing on the institutions and practitioners of security, bringing new domains of human life under governmental control. In this way risk is not an inevitable

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feature of a macro-sociological transformation. Rather, risk is used purposively as a strategy by institutions as a mode of ‘governmentality’ in order to secure their role as providers of security and protection and to mask some of their failures (Bigo 2002: 65).

Foucault developed the concept of governmentality in 1977 which summarises the concerns about the working of the government. The neologism consisting of ‘govern’ and ‘mentality’ points to the processes of governing and the mentality of a government as the way of thinking about how the governing happens. It is thus a rationality (a practice) and an art of (a way of thinking about) government (Foucault et al. 1991: 2-3). Theorists on risk and governmentality are pessimistic about the situation of populations and discuss the normative implications of securitisation (Corry 2012: 243). One example is the securitisation of climate change in the US in 2009, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched its Center on Climate Change and National Security. Hartmann (2013: 46) argues that the linkages between climate change, conflict, and natural disasters produced by the defence interests of the US, do not only threaten a distortion of climate policy, but also further militarise development and humanitarian assistance.

Despite the different assumptions, both groups of risk theorists argue that security is not an objective ‘good’ as it is for realists. Instead, they follow the Copenhagen School in considering security issues as socially constructed and changeable. They both argue that security is increasingly being thought of in terms of risks rather than threats. Although for different reasons, both groups are concerned about the ever-expanding security agenda which they see as partly driven through the concept of risk. Therefore, they ask primarily the question of ‘what does security do?’ rather than ‘what should security do?’ (Corry 2012: 243).

This thesis will follow these arguments and will draw primarily on the perspective of the second group, who’s assumptions correspond to what Eckersley (2004: 9) categorises as critical constructivism: a combination of critical theory and constructivism. Critical constructivism critically questions the internal, rather than the external, norms and values existent in understandings and practices in modern society. For the analytical ambition of this thesis the approach can be used as a method to unmask contradictions, tensions and hidden forms of powers within and between ideas and practices in climate security discourses. Furthermore, critical constructivism can help to explore changes in thought and practice which may help to identify the normative implications of securitisation (idem: 8).

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3.4. Differentiating securitisation: threat or risk?

Although in the literature there is no single definition of risk, several features are common to most conceptualisations. Risk presents a relatively long-term potential threat that is typified by a radical uncertainty and leads to a more diffuse sense of anxiety. Risks are often perceived as manageable, and “invite the calculation of the incalculable” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4). In contrast, security threats are direct, existential and urgent, for example the drowning of islands or violent resource conflicts. Security threats are inclined to be identifiable or even personifiable (such as certain practices, a specific country or group of people), whereas risks are often more diffuse and lead to more diffuse referent objects (potentially risky behaviour, risk-areas or risk-groups) (ibid.). Hence, risk policies are focused on precaution, and programmes on risk-reduction intent to increase the resilience of a referent object (Corry 2012: 245). Where threats are uninsurable because they lead to devastation, risk is typically the object of insurance (Diez et al. 2016: ch.1, 1.4).

When a risk is invoked as an existential threat and insurance is no longer possible, a security logic sets in. Such a logic demands emergency measures in order to prevent the threat from occurring under any circumstances. In contrast, a risk-based approach constitutes of mitigation to the possible consequences of climate change (ibid.) and adaptation to changing conditions and new risks (O’Brien 2012: 667). Considering the features of the conceptualisation of risk, it appears to be an appropriate way of framing the threats caused by climate change. Corry (2012) made a contribution to the identification of threats by distinguishing between ‘securitisation’ and ‘riskification’ as two opposing logics of security. The scholar links securitisation to the direct defence of a referent object against an existential threat, while he refers riskification to the governance of a referent object in order to control ‘conditions of possibility’ for damage against it. Thus, riskification focuses on the probable harm and requires a different mentality of governing than securitisation (Corry 2012: 256).

Although Diez et al. (2016: ch.1, 1.4) largely agree with this characterisation of security and risk, they argue that risk is “a variation of security rather than a category separate from it”. According to these scholars, this argument is not only supported by the fact that risk is generally classified under security considerations, but is also backed by the historical development of the security-risk debate. Therefore, their analytical framework distinguishes between riskification and ‘threatification’ which they see both as variations of securitisation. In this way securitisation forms a continuum on which risk and danger as two poles can

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intersect. This supports the argumentation that in climate security discourses arguments on risk can include references to existential threats for the purpose to bolster argumentative force (ibid.).

The inclusion of risk results in an enlargement of the scope of security, whereas the original formulation of the Copenhagen School relies on a strict distinction between normal politics and securitisation. While literature on climate change policy has provided essential insights into different logics of securitisation, the problem that this widening runs counter to the dichotomous theory of Buzan et al. is largely ignored. The analytical framework posed by Diez et al. (2016) therefore comprises politicisation as a third process next to the two possibilities of securitisation: threatification and riskification. In this way it is possible to conceptualise the area between politics and security as another continuum. As a consequence, political arguments can have both a securitising and a politicising effect (idem: 494).

3.5. The analytical framework of climate security discourses

Central to the analytical framework of Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) is a two-dimensional conceptual matrix, which on one dimension distinguishes between threatification and riskification as two versions of securitisation. On the other dimension, the matrix consists of three different levels of referent objects. Consequently, the matrix covers six categories of climate security discourses which are all able to change the nature of politics (idem: ch.2, 2.2). By adding the logic of risk to the field of security, Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) ask how this will change the security realm, what the relationship is between risk and security and if the related languages differ in their effects on political decision-making. Although these questions are not necessarily new, the authors argue they have not been answered in a fully comprehensive and consistent manner. This paragraph will elaborate on the theoretical considerations of the framework.

Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.1) argue for a re-conceptualisation of politics, security and risk, in which risk is seen as a sub-category of security and in which the concept of securitisation (Copenhagen School) is re-labelled as ‘threatification’. While the scholars recognise that risk also calls upon threats, threatification increases the urgency of those threats. It therefore refers to the extreme threats of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation process, summarised under the label ‘danger’ (table 3.1). Subsequently, Politics, Risk and

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Danger are developed as poles of a triangle in which political debates stretch out. Dependent on its articulation, an issue can be ‘threatified’, ‘riskified’ or ‘politicised’ (figure 3.1). In the latter form the political relevance of the issue is increased without referring to a threat. An issue can also be ‘de-securitised’ and thus ‘re-politicised’ when its invocation of security is weakened in either form (ibid.).

Table 3.1: Important keywords distinguishing between the danger and risk dimension (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.1)

Figure 3.1: The space of politics and security (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.1)

Besides the distinction between the two types of securitisation, there is the second dimension consisting of three levels of referent objects which are based on existing literature on climate security: the territorial, individual and planetary level. The territorial level is based on the environmental conflict discourse with the conceptualisation of the state as the main referent

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object. However, territorial articulations may also be assigned to other group entities. Central in this level is the defence of a specific territorial order. In contrast, the individual level comes from the environmental security discourse which is closely linked to human security. In this case the referent object is the individual or a global society of individuals. Consequently, the planetary level comes from the ecological security discourse with its holistic and cosmological outlook. Here it is the planetary ecosystem that is threatened, or the biosphere as a whole (idem: ch.2, 2.2). These three levels of referent objects combined with the two logics of securitisation form a typology of six categories of climate security discourses. These are summarised in table 3.2, in which illustrations of typical speech acts are provided as an example.

Table 3.2: A typology of climate security discourses (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.2)

3.6. Normative implications of securitising climate change

The Copenhagen School considers the closures to the political debate and hence the constraints to deliberation as the most important normative concern of securitisation. There may also be other less formal normative implications, such as the purposive closure to the debate by discursive entrepreneurs. Although several authors raised their concerns about the normative consequences of securitisation, not all types and stages of securitisation are necessarily ‘bad’. Securitisation in for instance its first stage leads to an opening up of the

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political agenda, which is clearly not harmful. In order to estimate whether the other stages are ‘bad’ depends on a consideration of various normative concerns and an assessment of the kind of measures that are taken by taking into account the specific context (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5).

In light of the debates about the morality of securitisation, the differentiation of the various climate security discourses of Diez et al. (2016: ch.2, 2.5) gives rise to the question of “whether some forms of securitisation may be normatively preferable to others.” This is particularly the case when comparing the articulations of risk and danger and considering the different levels of referent objects in the analytical framework. Some theorists argue that a risk-based approach may be less problematic than a securitisation based on danger, since it does not necessarily imply emergency measures as anticipated by the Copenhagen School (Corry 2012: 255). However, others say that exceptional precautionary measures can be legitimised in a risk-based articulation, in the case of uncertain and incalculable risks. A third argument, coming from the Paris School, even highlights the idea of hidden securitisations in riskifications which also have their dangers.

Despite these somewhat ambiguous propositions, at the diagnostic and prognostic level there are significant differences between risk- and danger-centred discourses. Yet, it is important to recognise that “the goal of risk-based measures is not to eradicate the risk completely but to manage and govern it, and to contain it at a tolerable level” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5). The normative question that arises here is: ‘tolerable for whom?’ This has mainly to do with the difference between industrialised countries (dominant in climate security debates and connected to mitigation and adaptation) and developing countries (mostly seen as endangered but very much neglected from a western perspective in terms of mitigation).

When assessing the different levels of referent objects, some remarks can be made by questioning if some are normatively more preferable. On the territorial level, climate securitisation in terms of national security conceptions and conflicts between states or groups can be highly problematic. In a positive way, the discourse helps to bring climate change on the agenda of coalitions that would normally not have taken climate change seriously, such as the UN Security Council or the NATO. However, it can also distract the attention from efforts of climate change mitigation to rather adaptation measures and interferences in countries at risk, which can ultimately take the form of military intervention (ibid.; Hartmann 2010: 241).

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But in the end, it depends on the time and the context whether a territorial securitisation can have positive or negative consequences (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5).

The individual level seems to be more suitable for climate security discourses, since the pitfalls of the territorial level can be avoided (Detraz & Betsill 2009: 307). In a positive way, the individual discourse focuses on the people who are most vulnerable to climate change and stays away from national security conceptions based on the traditional state-centred security logic. Nevertheless, individual securitisation has the danger that the ones seen as vulnerable are becoming the ones who are dangerous themselves. For instance, when climate change threatens poor populations in developing unstable countries in their human security, it becomes easy for securitising actors to make a dangerous territorial argument. This argument can focus on failing states, terrorism and large-scale migration movements, which in turn can lead to concerns of national security for industrialised countries (Diez et al. 2016: ch.2, 2.5).

The discourse of the planetary level can be perceived as the least problematic, because it underlines the interdependency of the whole international community and its surrounding ecosystem. It calls for the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) and for sustainable measures in economic activity. However, the planetary approach might be too weak to produce a policy output that can be considered as successful, and has difficulties in producing the same degree of attention compared to arguments with a clearer referent object. Moreover, the discourse has a thin line with the ambiguous framing of climate change in the past and can therefore be dismissed as unworldly and naïve. The Kyoto Protocol which aims at a reduction of GHG emissions and its doubtful success is an example of this discourse (ibid.).

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4. The United States and Germany: Territorial versus individual climate

security

This chapter will elaborate on the dominant climate security discourses within the US and Germany. While the US constructs climate change as a territorial danger, in Germany are individual framings dominant. In both cases, the relationship between the member country and the NATO is briefly explained, followed by an elaboration on the general climate debate, the securitisation of climate change and the main actors in the debate, the political consequences and a short conclusion. This chapter is based on secondary sources, in which the book of Diez et al. (2016) is used as the main source and guide for further research of the cases of the Netherlands and the NATO.

4.1. The United States: Climate change as a territorial danger

4.1.1. The United States and the NATO

Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the US has been a leading country of the NATO. The current US defence expenditures are twice as much as European expenditures and count for 70 percent of the total NATO expenditures (Elshout & Koelé 2016: 10-11). From a purely military perspective, one can say the US is capable of independent military action and therefore does not need its European allies (Erdmann 2013). However, the need and value of the NATO has been firmly established within the national strategy and army doctrine of the US for years (Schmidt 1994). The NATO serves not only as an important source of stability and economic prosperity, but NATO allies also contribute in a fundamental way to the legitimacy of American foreign policy. Furthermore, in a world which is increasingly dominated by different power blocks such as Russia and China, the alliance forms a powerful basis of mutual democratic values and economic interests (Erdmann 2013; De Rave 2016).

4.1.2. The general climate debate

The US is usually seen as a stumbling block to an international treaty in which the reduction of GHG emissions is presented. The country is by far the largest contributor of emissions in history with 339,174 metric tons or 28 percent between 1850 and 2007 (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.1). Although China has now surpassed the rate of US emissions, the US can still be

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seen as one of the largest emitters per capita (World Bank 2013). “The high emissions output and the slow adoption of meaningful federal climate legislation or international commitments have led to the US ranking in the lower regions of most international climate policy tables” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.1).

Although the overall climate performance of the US can be seen as poor, from the late 1960s the environment became a great policy concern in the country. Due to a vigorous environmental and scientific advocacy community and the implementation of progressive laws, the US evolved into an environmental forerunner (idem: ch.3, 3.2). After years of political and public awareness of climate change, in the late 1990s support for firm environmental regulation increasingly disappeared and more sceptical attitudes towards climate change took over the domestic political landscape (Grundmann & Scott 2014: 222). This trend consolidated during the presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009). Increasing opposition against environmental and climate policies came from both Congress with anti-environmental Republicans and an effective non-governmental lobby in which the business community was particularly showing its stance (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.2).

After Democrat Barack Obama was elected as President in 2009, climate issues made their entry again in the top of America’s political agenda (Vig 2013: 98-102). Obama argued for ‘a new era of global cooperation on climate change’ and his statements were backed by a Democratic majority in Congress and more support from the public and even the business community. However, this optimistic picture was short-lived due to “the failed UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen in late 2009 and the Democrat’s defeat in the Senate in the mid-term elections of 2010, and later in the House of Representatives” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.2). In the following years Obama’s attempts to push for climate legislation and invest in renewable energies did not succeed.

Nevertheless, climate change remained on the agenda, due to the contribution of domestic advocacy efforts, international pressure, greater media coverage and climate friendly policies set by individual states such as California. In 2014, reports from the National Climate Assessment (NCA) and think tank CNA highlighted the seriousness of climate change and its consequences for US security (ibid.). Although on emission levels the US still performs poorly, the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) has recently discovered positive signals. Where in 2015 the CCPI ranked the US on place 46, this changed in 2016 to place 34. This mainly comes from the CCPI policy ranking, in which the US climbed from place 35 to 12

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partly due to its efforts towards international climate negotiations (Germanwatch & CAN 2016).

4.1.3. The securitisation of climate change

Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.3) distinguish the debate on climate security in the US in two phases: the first phase in the 1980s and 1990s centred around environmental security on a planetary and individual level, while the second phase from the mid-2000s focused solely on climate change as a territorial danger. Early arguments in the 1970s on climate security mainly focused on issues such as food security and sea level rise, which can be categorised in the planetary and individual level. Although these arguments were overshadowed by the Soviet threat, after the Cold War non-traditional security issues gained more attention. The lack of a clear enemy gave room to ‘new discourses of danger’, in which climate change slowly became one of the most serious environmental security concerns.

Until the 1990s, the general focus on climate change was more international and framed as a planetary or individual danger in order to claim the need for an international climate regime. While statements of climate change as a planetary or individual danger were often conflated with the destruction of the ozone layer and later with global warming, these articulations gradually became more cautious and were rather described in long-term risks. This representation led to difficulties in the mobilisation of more support in public and political circles. Together with the increasing impact of climate sceptics and their campaigns against binding agreements to combat climate change, the general climate debate as well as the climate security debate lost prominence in the late 1990s.

After Bush was elected as President in 2001 and the ‘war on terror’ started ensuing from the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the so called ‘soft’ climate issues were almost excluded from the US security sector. While funding was cut, executive orders were reversed, institutions were renamed and important personnel replaced, opposition and dissatisfaction with Bush’s moves eventually helped the second phase of the climate security debate to emerge. The appearance of a study in 2003 commissioned by Andrew Marshall, an influential defence adviser of the US Department of Defence (DOD), marked the beginning of the territorial danger discourse in the US (ibid.). The report stated in an alarming way that climate change “should be elevated beyond a scientific debate to a US national security concern” (Schwartz & Randall 2003: 3).

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Because this report was in variance with the official stance of the Bush administration on climate change, it had limited political impact. However, it paved the way for a broad range of climate security studies which significantly reduced the amount of planetary references. Climate change increasingly became a topic of US national security and its image from being an abstract, distant and global environmental concern transformed into an issue with immediate consequences for US security. Hence, the Bush administration was put under pressure by the opposition to give climate change considerable political attention. Together with the fourth assessment report of the ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (IPCC), this created awareness of climate change and its security implications among the general public and within military and political circles (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.3).

When Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.4) took a closer look to the climate security discourses within Congressional debates and think tank reports in the US, they saw 2007 as the year in which the territorial danger discourse gained prominence. “The most common articulation presents US national security as threatened by the direct physical and the indirect socio-economic and political effects of climate change” (ibid.). The installations and training procedures of the US military were mentioned as mainly threatened by the direct dangers of climate change. An important CNA report in 2007 depicted climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that could exacerbate instability and conflict in states which were already fragile. Within this discourse, climate change could not only further destabilise certain regions, but could also lead to the spread of terrorist ideologies and even nuclear war. In this way, the connections between climate change and military interventions were easily made (ibid.).

Among influential actors in the US, Diez et al. (2016: ch.3, 3.5) discovered that environmental NGOs are since the turn of the millennium relatively absent in climate security discourses. Instead, security think tanks largely influence the debate. This is because in the US experienced politicians and high-ranked military officers are often employed in these think tanks. Also, think tanks facilitate the heavy workload of active politicians by providing policy concepts and talking points. Besides this thin line with the government, think tanks maintain good connections with the media and with other non-governmental actors. Hence, they are able to provide cover for government actors who wish to go public with a new and perhaps provocative view.

Not only institutions, but also individual actors can be discursive entrepreneurs in such a debate. Actors such as Kurt Campbell, Sherri Goodman, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko actively

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engaged in reframing climate change as a national security issue. The engagement of the military in the climate security debate was an important part of their strategy, since the military enjoys an extremely good reputation in politics and among a large amount of the US public. Environmental NGOs kept away from the climate security debate, partly because of their lack of expertise in the security field and partly because they did not want to damage their environmental and liberal image. Another unusual feature in the second debate in the US was the lesser involvement of research institutions or scientists, especially in comparison with Germany. The catchy and policy-oriented language of think tanks received much more attention, since they construed the complex scientific argumentation into political language and received great prestige as security experts (ibid.).

4.1.4. Political consequences

According to a think tank expert, “the climate security debate has not scored a goal but has moved the ball a bit across the field” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.3, 3.6). Three important political consequences underlie this debate. First, the climate security discourse enabled politicians, regardless of their political stance, to speak about climate change without having the fear to be labelled, and thus bridged the gap between the liberals and the conservatives. Second, climate change received increased attention and caused the issue to enter the realm of high politics, which contributed to more initiatives on climate legislation. Furthermore, the debate had a strong effect on the American defence, security and intelligence sector and its focus changed from mitigation to adaptation measures (ibid.).

4.1.5. Conclusion

The securitisation of climate change in the US underwent a transformation from an emphasis on planetary and individual risk in the 1980s and 1990s to a focus on arguments of territorial danger from the mid-2000s. The security think tanks were highlighted as the most important actors in the second debate, since their national security conceptions gained incredible attention within policy circles and among the wider public and because of the strong reputation of the military. The predominant territorial danger discourse particularly affected the security and defence sector and tended to a political approach of adaptation.

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4.2. Germany: Climate change as an individual insecurity

4.2.1. Germany and the NATO

West Germany became a member of the NATO in 1955, when its status as an occupied country came to an end. With Germany’s reunification in 1990, the “former German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in its membership of NATO” (NATO 2016c). Germany’s membership played an important role in NATO’s enlargement with the inclusion of Central and Eastern European democracies (NATO 2016d). In line with its foreign policy consensus as a ‘civilian power’ after the Second World War, Germany has long maintained a restrained approach towards military involvement. In the alliance it depended on US leadership in the fields of military policy and ‘hard power’ (Overhaus 2004: 551; Carstensen 2016). Germany spent in 2015 1,18 percent of its GDP on the military, which is under the 2 percent norm of the NATO and even less than its expenditures in 2014 (NATO 2016e). However, Germany recently committed to enhance its military role in the NATO, partly as a consequence of the unease about Russian assertiveness (Carstensen 2016).

4.2.2. The general climate debate

While the US is depicted as the fallen forerunner in climate policies, Germany is a significantly different case and rather seen as a forerunner, though an ambivalent one. “Germany has been a consistent advocate of binding international climate agreements, passed various rounds of legislation to curb CO2 emissions and reduced emissions to a considerably higher extent than many other countries” (Diez et al. 2016: ch.4, 4.1). The country managed to decrease its emissions by 26 percent between 1990 and 2012, and thus performed better than its original reduction aims of 21 percent set in Kyoto. In this way Germany helped to accomplish the reduction targets of the European Union (EU) (Werland 2012: 55). Accordingly, with a 22nd _{place, Germany takes a high position in the CCPI (Germanwatch &} CAN 2016).

However, during the 1950s and 1960s Germany’s rapidly growing economy led to perceptible environmental pollution and the country lagged far behind on environmental protection. In this time, the US introduced new environmental policies. Together with the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 held in Stockholm, this provided an important drive for German environmentalism. Reports such as the ‘Limits to Growth’