Bachelor thesis: The European Turkey Statement & the ethics of Resettlement Raquel Lorenz(10658726)
Political Science
First Reader: dr. L.L. (Luara Leite) Ferracioli Second Reader: dr. A.M.R. (Annelien) de Dijn
The European Turkey Statement & the ethics of Resettlement
IntroductionIn response to the migrant crisis in 2015 Europe struck a “re-settlement agreement” with Turkey, limiting all entry to Europe to resettlement via Turkey, including the returning of migrants that have reached Greece. With the European Turkey Statement, Europe has joined the ranks of Canada, Australia and the United States in emphasizing large scale resettlement as the adequate and primary response to refugee protection- at the cost of accepting “direct arrival” refugees. While the current refugee protection regime leaves much to be desired, I argue that it also has much to be lost. In this thesis I attempt to show that resettlement undermines a “de facto duty to admit”, a long taken for granted understanding that directly admitting refugees was the most meaningful way states could ensure refugees right of non-refoulement. As a formally non-existent “de facto” duty rooted in practice and humanitarian values, this duty is likely to disappear unnoticed if it abandoning this practice seems
legitimized. From a normative perspective, an increasing trend to prioritize resettlement as only channel for refugee is problematic in a couple of ways. One of the key problems is that it is likely to put some people in such precarious situation that it can’t be justified. I also argue that any notion of resettlement as feasible (meaning in catering to the self interest of the states), and permissible (here meaning not violating the principle of non-refoulement) has to weighed against its potential side-effect to endanger some of the core values of the refugee protection regime. More specifically, I argue that any trend to making a claim to asylum contingent on the way of entry in the destination country rather than actually status of refugee threatens to undermine the universal character of the refugee protection regime. Before moving to the main section of this piece, I will shortly discuss the key premises that underline this normative perspective on the ethics of resettlement. First, the control of national (European) borders is morally permissible1. Secondly, the protection of refugees and their human rights is a normative goal, in which states are the primary agents to ensure them. Thirdly, The moral cost that are imposed on duty-bearing states plays a role in the stringency of theirduty to assist, but at the same time I assume that any of the countries in question are far from reaching threshold that would justify not assisting the refugees today.2
1
In line with Peter singer argument as “t 2
This piece is part of non-ideal theory that recognizes that feasibility plays a determining role in the normative discussion about the protection of refugees.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: in Chapter 1, I briefly outline the context, content and justifications of the ETS, showing that the deal is in fact part of larger trend of prioritizing resettlement over local integration, In chapter 2 I attempt to show that resettlement undermines a “de facto duty” admit refugees. In Chapter 3, I attempt to show that making resettlement the primary channel at the expense of accepting direct arrivals, is highly problematic from a normative perspective. Afterwards, I briefly discuss how the ETS would have been more permissible and its implications for the field.
Chapter 1: The European Turkey Statement
-"In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk, the EU and Turkey today decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU." (General Secretariat of the Council, 2016)
Part I: Content and Context
The escalation of the civil war in Syria in the spring of 2015 resulted in a humanitarian crisis, in which three million Syrians were forced to leave their country (UNCHR, 2016a). More than one million refugees have applied for asylum in Europe in 2015 (BBC, 2016) this has left European Policy makers with the biggest migration flows since the second world war. And North European member’s saw themselves thrust into a state of emergency, in which civil society and state struggled to facilitate and administer the continuing stream of refugees. In response to what was perceived and portrayed in mainstream media as a situation that was no longer attainable, European leaders started a series of talks with Turkey, that led up to the EU-Turkey Statement(ETS) (General Secretariat of the Council, 2016).
The statement consist of several working points, all of which are argued to be within the boundaries of international law: 1) “Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or
are two grounds for declaring asylum applications inadmissible in relation to Turkey: “1) first country of asylum: where the person has been already recognized as a refugee in that country or otherwise enjoys sufficient protection there. 2) safe third country” where the person has not already received protection in the third country but the third country can guarantee effective access to protection to the readmitted person” (EC, 2016).
2) “For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. Priority will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly 3) “Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighboring states as well as the EU to this effect”. ((General Secretariat of the Council, 2016).
4) Once irregular crossing between Turkey and the EU has ceded or has been “substantially” reduced members state can voluntary contribute to a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission. In exchange for Turkey’s full cooperation Europe has offered Turkey financial aid and visa liberalization.
Non-European refugees in Turkey don’t enjoy an official refugee status, as Turkey maintains a “geographical limitation” to the Refugee convention of 1951, which was constructed for Europeans fleeing from persecution only. Turkey currently maintains a dual structure with different procedures and rules for Syrians and migrants from other
nationalities: Non-syrian and non-European asylum seeker attain a conditional status and are dependent on being resettled to Europe for any durable solution (Aida, 2016).3 Syrians are placed under temporary protection, in which a full legal status is attainable and with that also some attempts for integration of Syrians, for example a work permit.4 Evidence suggest that Turkey’s arrangements precludes any long term solution for Syrians or non-Syrian refugees, but rather attempts to secure a short time solution for the immediate needs of
3 “The Turkish legal status of “conditional refugee” under LFIP affords to beneficiaries a set of rights and entitlements lesser to that granted to “refugee” status holders. Most importantly, “conditional refugee” status holders are not offered the prospect of long-term legal integration in Turkey and excluded from “family unification” rights.” (Aida, 2016) 4
The TPR itself also explicitly precludes any prospect of long term legal integration for “temporary protection” beneficiaries. (Aida, 2016)
protection (ibid). Finally, Turkey is under the a legal obligation to adhere to the principle of non-refoulement as it is part of customary law and therefore valid for countries that not have signed the convention.
Part II: Justification
The complex political situation makes it impossible to have a certain understanding of the real intentions and justifications of the ETS. A least favorable interpretation of what the ETS was set out to achieve, is that it effectively would prevent all claims for asylum in Europe. I will depart from the motivation put forward by creator and it mayor defenders. The first points of the ETS suggest that “breaking the business model of the smugglers and
preventing refugees from having to take to the dangerous route over the Aegean sea” were the main reasons for the ETS. Only in 2015 more than 3000 refugees have drowned on their way to Europe, under which many children and women (UNCHR, 2015). Gerald Kraus, the creator of the Deal, has argued that as soon people were willing to take in refugees, like it was the case in Germany in 2015, it would be better to fly them directly rather than to let them first risk their live at sea. (Kraus, 2016)
All of the European head of states, even those very much in favor of a far reaching refugee protection scheme, emphasized the regaining of control at Europeans external borders as the mayor achievement of the ETS. German minister Sigmer Gabriel advocates for the deal in a Newspaper interview: “This procedure will increase control over who is coming to us because asylum claim, identity verification, and registration are all being done before immigration.”(Spiegel, 2015) Kraus argues this deal was a solution for a people that “were willing to take in refugees but increasingly fed up with a situation of non-control” (Kraus, 2016)5. Evidence suggest that much of the specific policy of the ETS was designed to reconcile the principle of “control” with the Europe’s obligation under international law. For the immediate purposes of this paper it is not relevant exactly to what extend the ETS’s emphasis on control was a direct outcome of addressing real concerns of the population. This being said, the effect of public opinion has proven very powerful in the context of the
5 . Gerald Kraus, paints an alternative scenario, what he portrays as the status quo in which the Northern Border of Turkey is closed, and the situation in Greece deteriorate to such a degree, that refugees would not want to go there, what he labels the “Australian solution”. (Kraus, 2016)
refugee crisis. The civil engagement of German citizens in the summer of 2015, and a general feeling of commitment and optimism: “Wir schaffe das” gave Merkel the political room and/or motivation to suspend the Dublin rule and take in hundreds of refugees directly. One year later, in the Summer of 2016 the approval rating of Merkels refugee politics has
dropped lower than 50 percent.(Ibid) Part of this change can be understood in the light of rising populism, that have profited from depicting the crisis as “chaotic”, “uncontrollable”, and “highly risky”.
The explicit relocation of the “admission and processing part” to Turkey serves as a control mechanism in two ways: first as in “controlling” the numbers of refugees entering. Secondly as a “ex-ante selection process” where it is determined who is allowed to enter national territory and who is not, with the aim of filtering out certain asylum seekers. In recent decades much of the concern around irregular migration, was devoted to the entry of “economic migrants” and non-genuine refugees. In the context of this crisis, there is the concern that some of the “non-genuine refugees” would exploit the crisis as a opportunity to come into Europe unauthorized. The rise of terrorism in Europe has fuelled concerns that terrorist also would exploit the crisis and hide between regular refugees.
It could be argue that the justification of this resonates with the idea of
“humanitarian need approach” from Gibney as discussed by O’Sullivan: ”He points out that there are a number of powerful advantages in recognizing resettlement as a way for states to fulfill some of their responsibilities under a humanitarian principle. For instance,
resettlement programs reduce the overall financial and political costs of refugee intakes: the costs of processing onshore applications are lessened or avoided, and the programs allow states to manage their refugee commitments with ‘greater predictability and less risk’.” (O’Sullivan, 2016)
The part III: Resettlement
Resettlement is classified as one of three durable solutions for refugee protection by the UNCHR. “Resettlement involves the selection and transfer of refugees from a state in which they have sought protection to a third state which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent residence status.” (UNCHR, 2011) The other two durable solutions are expatriation and local integration. Resettlement as a durable solution is often invoked as a tool for burden-sharing. Fact is that most of the world’s refugees population today is hosted
by developing countries and neighboring countries of refugee-producing states (UNCHR, 2015). The idea behind burden-sharing is that the moral cost of hosting refugees should be shared through the international community. There are different ideas about on which principles this burden sharing should be based on. In this essay I argue that capacity should be the main criteria for distributing the moral cost between states, while recognizing that contribution to harm, as would be in the case of an unjust intervention or war, ought to be taken into account in allocating responsibilities to different states. The example of Canada taking in more than 30,000 refugees directly from neighboring countries , in the context of Syrian crisis is the ideal example of a case in which resettlement is used to relieve some of the burden these countries face in the moment (Government of Canada, 2016).
Resettlement as a strategy applied within this context is an important tool for the
international community to ensure the protection of refuges, and is highly desirable from a normative perspective.
The examples of countries that “host” large scale resettlement programs like Australia and Canada has shown that beyond serving this humanitarian function it also serves as a “justification of controlling the entry of other asylum-seekers” (O'Sullivan, 2016, p.1). In these cases, the emphasizes on resettlement as the main channel of entry has gone at the expense of local integration6, the other durable solution of the UN: In the Australian case, this is done by intercepting boat arrivals and sending them to island states where they are detained in an offshore program, until they are being resettled to other states (ibid). In what follows in this chapter I will argue that with the ETS, Europe is following the current trend of “rich countries” in prioritizing resettlement over “direct local integration”.
With the ETS, and the closure of its external borders, Europe limited the chance for asylum in Europe to the “resettlement” channel in Turkey. 7 Point 1 states that migrants who arrive on the Greek Island, can be returned to Turkey based on the “safe third country” principle, in practice this could mean the return of a large group of migrants that are prima facie refugees. Back in Turkey a refugee can make a claim for resettlement with the UNCHR or LLIG. But the “one for one rule” clearly states that refugees that have returned are disfavored in selecting resettlement candidates. This creates a strong incentive for refugees
6
An asylum seeker that is directly admitted and receives asylum of its destination country, if she is recognized as a refugee
7
Exception is entry via boat to Italy. Research suggest that few Syrians are under the population of these migrants.
to stay in Turkey, a sign of a strategy to discourage migrants to go to Europe in the first place.
So far I have only mentioned “the three durable solutions” for refugee protection. But those often stand at the end of a refugee’s road to indefinite protection: in practice the protection of refugees is complex and dependent on different stages: The receiving and processing of claims, the assessment of the merits of the claims, the provision of protection pending durable solutions and the provision of durable solutions (UNCHR, 2011). With the ETS, Europe has effectively (relocated) the most immediate requirements of protection of the Syrian population to Turkey. Finally, let me note that he availability of resettlement spaces in Europe is at the discretion of the individual states, making it a humanitarian measure rather than a stringent duty.
While it makes sense to view the ETS as part of a wider trend of countries prioritizing resettlement over local integration, still there are some contextual factors that make it different from for example the Australian case. Firstly, the classification of Turkey as a “safe third country” is unprecedented, and highly controversial (Norwegian Refugee Council 2016). Secondly, the deal is a reaction to a humanitarian crisis, that is occurring in relative proximity to Europe, rather than resettling people that wait somewhere far away and discouraging migrants from all over the world to come there. Fourthly, The example of Australia that has intercepted boats and processed them in small Island states, is s not comparable to the numbers of Syrians and other refugees that now wait for resettlement in Turkey.
Chapter 2: The risk of abandoning the practice of the duty to admit
The most important principle of the Refugee Convention is the principle of non-refoulement: the practice of not returning refugees to countries in which they are liable to persecution. The principle of non-refoulement is a negative duty, insofar it requires states to
refrain from harming people by returning them to a place where they suffer persecution.
Within in the field of moral theory the stringency of this norm is widely accepted, even by those scholars that claim that states have a right to control their border.8 In the political
context, and as a legal, institutionalized norm, it finds the level of support that resemble those of universal human rights. As part of customary international law, it is binding to all states, even those that not did sign the Convention or treaties hereafter.
The idea that states also have positive duties towards refugees, however, is highly contested: the refugee convention does not include any clause that states an explicit binding positive duty to admit refugees nor to grand them asylum. And it is widely
recognized that the duty of refraining from harming the refugees does not lead to an explicit positive duty of the receiving states to assist them. The call to include a specific positive duty of states to grant asylum to those individuals who otherwise are not able to have their basic human right protected, is as old at the Refugee Convention itself, but has failed to this date due to its political infeasibility (Fitzpatrick, 1996). In her article “The Danger and appeal of the refugee convention” Ferracioli has advanced resettlement as possible tool to address the constrains blocking legal reform or at least create the condition in which legal reform is possible: by the decoupling the stages of processing the refugee and the stage of final
arrival, irregular migration and smuggling are discouraged, two key factors that inform public opinions about procedural fairness. Ferracioli’s argument is based on the premise than in “this way we can actually pursue reform in a way that does not risk losing what the
international community has already achieved”. But her argument is too narrowly focused on the principles of the Convention and overlooks an already existing practice in the current refugee regime.
I argue that gaining a chance at possible (and indeed needed) reform is outweighed by the risk resettlement poses to a “de facto duty to admit” that to this day remains relevant in the context of refugee protection. This positive duty is an international norm, that is practiced by most duty-bearing countries. The UNCHR states “A state
presented with an asylum request, at its borders or on its territory, has and retains the immediate refugee protection responsibilities relating to admission, at least on a temporary basis. This responsibility extends to the provision of basic reception conditions and includes access to fair and efficient asylum procedures”(UNCHR, ). Resettlement endangers this duty by legitimizing that the admitting and processing stage can and ought to be outsourced to third countries. That a strong sense of the principle of a “de facto” duty to admit still exist in the international community is also reflected in the ETS. Much criticism has focused on the possibility of mass expulsion in the context of the ETS.
Chapter 3: Resettlement; A normative discussion
In this chapter I will argue that the trend towards resettlement as the only or primary avenue for refugee protection has consequences that have been overlooked in the discussion around forced migration, and that besides any ethical objections it might also threaten some of the core values of the refugee convention.
Part I: Vulnerability
At the heart of theorizing about refugees lies the state of vulnerability that comes with losing the protection of a national government. As Hannah Arendt so famously proclaimed: ‘Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to
guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity that has befallen ever-increasing numbers of people...” (Arendt, 1973) The loss of these rights, makes it extremely difficult for these individuals to achieve a minimal threshold of well-being. More importantly, in this context, it leaves them unprotected against arbitrary violence from other nation states or individuals. Hannah Arendt was very pessimistic what human rights could be achieved without people being forced to comply to them, or in her words “ the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.” (Ibid) Although research around the ethics of forced migration suggest that her analysis is still most relevant, I argue that “universal
human rights” do in and of themselves matter. And refugees that have lost the protection of their states are individuals that depend solely on their humanity, or differently put as them counting as humans in the eyes of others. Groups that get associated with immoral behavior are likely to be seen as less than human, and thus as less deserving of humane treatment. (Esses, V. M., et al, 2008) ) This taken, together with the fact, that refugees are already highly
vulnerable makes depicting a group of refugees as immoral highly problematic.
In what remains in this section I attempt to show that emphasizing “re-settlement” as the (only) legitimate way for a claim to asylum has led to the association of immoral
behavior to a specific group. I than argue that the rhetoric of “control” and “filtering out refugees” is likely to produce a similar or extremer version of this.
“Direct arrival refugees” vs. “resettlement refugees”
The experience of countries like Australia and Canada, has shown that a growing emphasis on resettlement as the primary (legitimate) way to enter into national territory has produced two categories of refugees, those that enter through resettlement channels and those that
do not (in states which are only reachable by the sea, resettlement refugees are associated with those refugees that wait in resettlement camps somewhere far away). Research suggest that creating the category of “’direct arrival refugees” has gone alongside their stigmatization with immoral behavior. In Labmans article on the Canadian asylum system she argues that increased emphasis on resettlement while at the same time reducing asylum: “serves to divide refugee flows into two categories of deserving and undeserving” (Labman, 2001). In her article “the ethics of resettlement: Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region” in 2016 O'Sullivan, demonstrates that Australian politicians portray resettlement refugees as those following the rules of a queue of all refugees that are waiting in line for asylum, and “arrival refugees” as trying to steal their spot (O’Sullivan, 2016). Evidence suggest that the construction of one path as legal, has led to the construction of the direct arrival way as illegal. O’Sullivan argues prioritizing resettlement hase gone hand in hand with penalizing the “direct arrival” refugees. In both countries refugees that arrive directly face penalizing features: Boat arrivals are subject to lengthy mandatory detention and exclusion from Australian territory. (Ibid) In the context of everyday life penalization is closely linked to the context of criminal behavior. Her analyses of “direct arrival refugees” as criminalized seems therefore very plausible.
O’Sullivan’s criticism has focused on the inequality that is produced by such policies, and how this inequality should be judged from a normative perspective. (Ibid) I argue that the inequality resulting from these policies are outweighed by the fact that de facto
inequalities between refugees are already exist: people who actually make it to the national borders by boat, are more often male, alone, and relatively wealthy. By applying
resettlement as a principle some of these inequalities might actually be reversed. In this light, her argument does not seem convincing. In my view, it is not the inequality between these two groups that is cause for concern, but rather that the one group is put in a highly precarious situation: Depicting “direct arrival” refugees as immoral or criminal makes them highly vulnerable for violation against their rights. The island of Neuro and the Christmas Island, in which refugees seeking to make their way to Australia, are well known for their inhumane treatment of refugees, violation against their human rights and detention periods that last from 5 to 8 years9. Journalist and academics interpret these events, as Australia
9
trying to discourage refugees to take this route. In my view it is likely that the
dehumanization of “direct arrival” refugees and these violations are correlated. To draw any definite link is of course impossible, other factors such as the remoteness of these places for example are likely to play a part.
In the case of the ETS, a similar construction of the “’arrival” refugees as illegal can be observed. Point three states that Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighboring states as well as the EU to this effect. Consequently refugees that have made it Europe to are “portrayed as doing so illegally”, The reader should note that this is an impossibility, because the principle of non-refoulement entails that people are allowed to make it to the border. The “one for one rule” punishes refugees that have entered or try to enter Europe. As suggested earlier one of the main objectives of “re-settlement”’ in the ETS is to increase control over who comes in. I argue that in the same way that “on-shore arrival” is portrayed as an illegality through the construction of a legal route, asylum seekers who have not gone through the resettlement procedure could be portrayed as not being genuine refugees or worse as likely to being terrorist. Placing a lot of emphasizes on control, makes the “uncontrolled” part of the refugees suspicious of immoral behavior.
From a Kantian deontological dehumanizing one group is not permissible “for what ever endexclusion, discrimination or punishment one group for the greater good of “more control” or “taking in more refugees” is not permissible, it violates the principle that people should never be used as an instrument to achieve something else.
Part- II “Resettlement”- a challenge to the universal character of the Refugee Convention?
While the question of who should count as a refugee has been the subject of much debate in recent years it has long been an implicit consensus by policy makers and academics alike that the moment people have attained official status as a refugee, duties regarding their protection ought to be derived solely from the fact that they are a refugee. In that sense, the duties that are owed, are the same for every refugee: to provide a minimal standard of
they are frightened to complain because of a culture of impunity on the island. At least 29 cases of rape and sexual assault – including against children – have been reported to Nauru police, but there have been no arrests or charges laid”’ (The guardian, 2015)
protection. In other words: their achievements or skills, or where they comes from should not matter for the stringency of the international community to help them. The exceptions are vulnerable groups like children and handicapped people. Children are at higher risked to be abused and exploited during the process of claiming asylum and the ongoing placement in refugees camps. Preferring the application of that of a child to that of adult, can therefore be seen as permissible from a normative view.
With the idea that the duties owed to refugees are based on their status and their status alone comes the formal equality between refugees. Policies that hurt this principle of formal equality, are problematic not only because of the intrinsic value of equality but because they undermine the powerful idea that the right to protection for refugees are based on the principle of the integrity and dignity of the individual alone. In what follows, I will argue that the ETS harms the principle of formal equality between refugees by
considerably decreasing the effective claim to asylum for” non-Syrian refugees who are “returned” to Turkey.
“For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. Priority will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU
irregularly.” This statement suggest that the duties owed to those refugees that have
entered or try to enter Europe are less or different than those that have not. In the previous section we have seen that different treatment of refugees, of the “direct arrival group refugee” is no rare occurrence in similar agreements. But in my view the ETS takes it one step farther: Non-European refugees are not recognized as official refugees in Turkey, they only have a conditional status as non-Syrians or temporary status as Syrian, this makes any integration to the society in the sense of real integration in the sense of self-reliance difficult for Syrians and impossible for non-Syrians. For non-Syrians resettlement to Europe is the only way to make an effective claim to asylum. The ETS implies that refugees that try to enter or have entered are less likely to be preferred, with more than 3 million refugees in Turkey now, they have very little chance to being selected for resettlement to Europe within the “one for one” scheme. Note that non-Syrian refugees have no chance to be selected all. While Syrian are at least have a granted temporary protection and are legally guaranteed not to be returned, all other non-European refugees are have to await resettlement for having a chance to claim asylum. This also brings them at risk of deportation and ultimately
the violation of their right of non-refoulement, though ultimately this would also mean a violation for the principle of non-refoulement from Turkey. Besides the point that exposing these individuals to such a high risk, which is impermissible from a normative view, the moment a refugee can forfeit any meaningful chance to asylum because of something he did, like not taking the preset route like resettlement, or not belonging to a certain group of nationality , the formal equality and universal character of refugee rights are undermined. Now, one might argue that there has been to little evidence so far to support such statements, but I argue, in a similar vein of Gibney’s argument in his article “Should
citizenship be conditional? The ethics of denationalization” in which he suggest that any violation of the universal character of citizenship, however small, are a danger to the institution itself (Gibney, 2013). The more so because Europe is thought to set international standards for refuge protection.
Conclusion
With the ETS Europe has joined the existing trend of emphasizing resettlement as the
primary response to refugee protection- at the cost of accepting “direct arrival” refugees. By explicitly relocating “the admition and processing stage” to third countries “resettlement agreements” undermine the practice of the “de facto duty to admit”, a long taken for granted understanding that directly admitting refugees was the most meaningful way states could ensure refugees right of non-refoulement. This also poses a few problems for the system of refugee protection:
First, from a Kantian (deontological) perspective any increase in vulnerability of one group, any exclusion, discrimination or punishment of one group for the greater good of “more control” or “taking in more refugees” is not permissible, because it violates the principle that people should never be used as an instrument to achieve something else.
Second, I also argue that the increase in vulnerability has the potential of bringing the group of “direct arrival refugees” in such a precarious situation that it can’t be justified. And finally, any moves to making a claim to asylum contingent on the way of entry in the destination country rather than actually refugees status endangers the universal character of the refugee convention. In assessing future “resettlement agreements”.
Let ‘s take a look of a few numbers depicting the reality of this moment regarding the dire situation of refugees in Europe (or rather around) today: only 2,935 refugees have been resettled in Europe so far, and more than 3 million are still stuck in Turkey without any perspective for taking up a normal life let alone to “flower”. The humanitarian situation in Greece continues to deteriorate. So far only 7,919 asylum seekers have been relocated from Greece to other EU countries. Evidence suggest that Turkey has virtually closed off its
borders to Syrian, resulting in many deaths at in the border zone. Evidence suggest that ETS lacked the necessary legal and institutional framework to carry out a robust protection for all refugees, most notably because non-European refugees only possess a conditional or
temporary status, which means that they are denied full possibilities of integration. This being said there are a lot of ways in which the deal could have been more permissible from a normative aspect. Much of what is needed in order for it to be so, is focused at addressing the precarious situation of “returned refugees” which make the deal, highly problematic form a normative perspective. First it would bee needed to drop the clause that states that refugees who have tried to enter or have the entered Europe directly are disadvantaged in their selection into resettlement. Second, a more sensitive application of language in which this deal has been drafted, and in which the media has been discussing it concerning
especially the criminalization of on-shore arrival refugees. Third, ad perhaps most
importantly, large scale resettlement from Turkey to Europe must actually happen in order for this deal to be permissible. How to safeguard these principals in practice might be one of the major challenges for the EU in the coming times.
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