Psychological roots of support for the Dutch right wing populist freedom party examined

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Psychological Roots of Support for the Dutch

Right Wing Populist Freedom Party Examined

Master Thesis Political Science, Political Theory and Behaviour Rogier Post (10288902)

June, 2016

First Reader: G. Schumacher, Ph.D. Second Reader: M. van de Wardt, Ph.D.

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Populist parties have entered the political stage across Europe and arguably have become a force to be reckoned with. At the same time, it cannot be denied that support for populist parties is subject to fluctuations. The Dutch Freedom Party is a textbook example of a populist party. Looking at their track-record of how successful they have been electorally, they arguably are also an example of how inconsistent their support is. This begs the question what explains populist party support but also what could account for its fluctuation? In other words, can factors be identified that explain why voters move towards the Freedom Party and

why they move away from them?

The anti-establishment message of the Freedom Party is highly characteristic of populism (Rooduijn, 2014). Rhetoric which they combine with right wing anti-immigration policies (Ivarsflaten, 2008) and welfare state chauvinism (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Populist parties, thus, combine their anti-establishment message with a host ideology. This anti-establishment rhetoric partly explains the appeal of populist parties to voters, as anti-establishment attitudes (Akkerman et al., 2014) and party leader evaluation (Van

Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2010) are commonly identified as explanatory factors that account for the success of populist parties along with low socio-economic status (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubber et al., 2002) and ideological proximity (Van der Brug et al., 2000). In short, standard voting models in which support for populism is explained by demographic factors, anti-establishment protest attitudes and ideology are in no short supply.

But more recently, scholars have begun to investigate personality to explain the success of populist parties (Bakker, Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2015). Their argument is built on research that theorizes there is a link between personality and political behaviour (Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). Increasingly, there is evidence that

personality can be linked to ideology (Gerber et al., 2010; Jost, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a). Research into the link between personality and political attitudes is rooted in attempts to explain the psychological appeal of right wing anti-democratic regimes like Nazism and Fascism (Adorno et al., 1950). Also in current political psychological research there is a strong emphasize on the link between personality and right wing ideology. To assess personality, researchers often use the Big Five model of personality traits, which identifies five personality traits that comprehensively and parsimoniously describe personality: Agreeableness, Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extroversion and Neuroticism

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(Mondak, 2010). Researchers have consistently found correlations between ideology and these personality traits (Gerber et al., 2010; Jost et al., 2003). In addition, concepts like right wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) have also been shown to predict right wing ideology and support for right wing parties (Butler, 2000; Feldman, 2003) and to be correlated to specific Big Five personality traits (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a). In conclusion, there is a rich variety of current research that links personality to political preferences.

However, both strands of investigation, linking personality to support for populist – and right wing parties have not yet been combined to their fullest potential. It is the contention of this thesis that this lack of synthesis constitutes an avenue of research which is worthwhile pursuing. This is based primarily on the argument that, while investigation has provided evidence that the standard voting models independently possess explanatory power, research has demonstrated that a voting model in which the standard factors are combined explains support for populist parties best (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013). At the same time, however, the influence of personality has only been tested extensively together with ideology, largely ignoring the other factors: party leader evaluation and anti-establishment attitudes. This is somewhat surprising, as there are sound theoretical reasons to expect that personality also influences something like anti-establishment feelings. Distrust of politics and politicians, for example, has been linked to certain personality dispositions (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). In conclusion, scholars have largely and without good reason failed to synthesize strands of research linking personality to support for right wing ideology and populism.

The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to test the various proposed explanations and investigate the influence of personality on support for the right wing populist Freedom Party. In doing so, this thesis hopes to bring together the wide range of explanatory factors of populist voting that have been put forward: demographic factors, anti-establishment attitudes, ideological proximity and personality. In addition, the explanatory power of the various models will be tested over time in this thesis to try to account for fluctuations in support for the Freedom party. To test the contribution of all proposed explanatory factors over time survey data will be drawn from the politics and values waves of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for Social Science) panel. This thesis has the following outline.

First, the concept of populism and its relation to right wing ideology will be addressed. In the next section, all the proposed explanatory factors that were mentioned will be

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voting, which, in addition to socio-demographic factors, are theorized to explain support for (right wing) populist parties. Furthermore, theories explaining voting behaviour from

personality will be discussed in this section. The Big Five model of personality traits as well as the concepts RWA and SDO will be addressed. Based on these theories, testable

expectations will be formulated which will be explained in the subsequent hypotheses section. In the material & methods section, operationalization of the various concepts and the methods used to test the proposed hypotheses will be discussed. Next, results of these tests will be presented in two sections and conclusions will be drawn in the following section. These conclusions will then be discussed in the final part of this thesis.

Right Wing Populism

Populism is an ideology that expresses the worldview that society is made up of two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the good people versus the corrupt elite and which formulates the principle that politics should be the expression of the will of the people (Mudde, 2004:543). It is considered a “thin” ideology that can be combined with many different host ideologies, left wing or right wing. The fact that the corrupt, bad elite that is referred to can be any elite, economic, political, legal or media, is evidence of this. For instance, left wing populist parties might attack what they regard as greedy bankers who destroy the economy, while right wing populist might target politicians that in their view are irresponsive to the public or attack journalist who they believe to be obfuscating certain truths due to political correctness. The notion that an elitist establishment is ignoring the people and squandering national interests is deeply engrained in the populist message. Populist

communication with their grass root is infused with this message and it is this message that sets them apart from other parties (Rooduijn, 2014). The actual platform of any populist party is a combination of anti-establishment rhetoric and ideology specific policies that depend on the host ideology.

In the case of right wing populist parties scholars have argued that anti-immigration policies and issues pertaining to the perceived threat on cultural identity by multiculturalism and European integration are what draw people towards right wing populist parties

(Ivarsflaten, 2008). The Dutch Freedom Party is considered an example of a prototypical right wing populist party. Their anti-establishment message, in which they frequently target

political elites, together with policy positions advocating strict immigration laws, leaving the European Union, and fighting the influence of Islam in Western Europe, has been their main

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platform. Their rhetoric expresses the idea that Dutch national interest is being neglected and that Dutch culture is being threatened by ethnic and Muslim minorities. This is exemplified by Freedom Party leader Wilders’ speeches in which he has spoken in 2006 about “a tsunami of Islamic influence” (website Volkskrant), in 2015 about “Islamic testosterone bombs who are after our women” (website Vrij Nederland) and in 2016 about “The European Union, the monster that wants to rob all European nations of their borders and identities” (website Freedom Party). There is, however, indication that the Freedom Party also advocates polices that can be considered economically left wing. Scholars have suggested that the Freedom Party engages in what is known as welfare state chauvinism (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Welfare state chauvinism refers to the practice of endorsing a strong welfare state, but only for the deserving native population, excluding those who are considered outsiders, such as immigrants and asylum seekers (ibid:2). This way, some classic left wing economic stances, like strong social benefits, state supplied healthcare and care for the elderly, are combined with right wing policies aimed at restricting access to these facilities, in this case to native Dutch citizens. In sum, the Freedom Party offers a strong anti-establishment message which is combined with right wing ideological stances on immigration and Islam, while advocating leftist social policies for native Dutch citizens excluding outsiders, giving these policies a right wing overtone. The relative success of right wing populist parties has sparked scholarly interests and over the years many voting models have been proposed to explain support for right wing populist parties. The next section will provide an overview of these explanations.

What Explains Support for Right Wing Populist Parties?

Voting for populist parties is most commonly explained by referring to low levels of socio-economic status (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006;) and by arguing that voters are attracted to populist parties based on their anti-establishment message (Akkerman et al., 2014). And although the notion that voters are attracted to populist parties based on ideological proximity (Van der Brug et al., 2012) is somewhat more controversial, this voting models has also been found to explain support for populist parties.

The link between socio-demographic factors and support for populist parties is based primarily on research that focused on support for the radical right. This research has shown that propensity to vote for radical right parties is highest in younger or older males with lower

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levels of formal education (Lubbers et al. 2002). The explanations for these phenomena rest on their dependence on the welfare state and the competition they face from immigrants. Members of these groups are more likely to view immigrants as competitors due to the increased strain on the welfare state they perceive immigrants to be. And secondly, lower educated individuals tend to be less skilled and therefore are more likely to suffer the adverse effects of increased competition in the labour market that is associated with higher levels of immigration (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006:421). Apart from these economic or interest based arguments there is also a line of reasoning that credits formal education with exposure to liberal values. Individuals with limited formal education are less exposed to these values and this is claimed to increase the likelihood of populist support (Weakliem, 2002). A link has also been established between type of employment, or class, and voting for extremist right wing parties (Kitschelt, 1995). People employed in manual labour jobs, commonly referred to as working class, show an increased propensity to vote for radical right wing parties compared to other professions. This is all summarized in the ‘losers of modernity’ thesis. Increased globalization and associated deregulation of financial and labour markets has resulted in a group consisting of lower educated, low skilled people that have difficulty maintaining in this world without borders (Kriesi, 2006). In short, there is a group of scholars who argue that socio-economic factors explain support for radical right parties.

The concept of protest voting is qualified by some as elusive because of unclarities surrounding conceptualization (see for instance Van de Brug et al., 2005). Two main types of protest voting can be distinguished in the literature. Some radical right wing parties were originally founded as antidemocratic parties and ideologically motivated voters may still be attracted to this antidemocratic origin. However, it seems highly unlikely that radical right wing parties could attract the voter base that they currently do based on this notion of ideologically motivated regime protest (Van der Brug et al., 2005). Conceptualizing protest voting as a vote to express discontent with the political elite or establishment is far more common. This type of voting is characterized by low levels of political trust and voting for radical right wing parties is claimed to be an attractive option for people that are high in political cynicism and political distrust (Belanger & Aarts, 2006). In this sense protest voting is considered to be different from voting based on ideological motifs because political

attitudes are stated to be of minor importance. This type of voting is not about changing policy but about voicing dissatisfaction (Lubbers, 2001). Another reason for people to vote for radical right wing parties that is emphasized in the literature can also be qualified as

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independent from ideological motivations: evaluation of political leaders. Although there is evidence that leader evaluation plays a minor role in vote choice for most people, there are indications that this might be different for people who vote for radical right parties (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2010).

The last voting model that explains support for radical right wing parties states that people vote based on ideological proximity. The idea that voters choose radical right wing parties based on ideology seemed farfetched to most for a long time. Radical right wing parties were viewed as racist or neo-fascist and scholars refused to believe that people would rationally vote for these parties (Van der Brug et al., 2005). Nevertheless, research continues to show that policy considerations are the best predictors of support for radical right wing parties (Van der Brug et al. 2000;2005;2012). The policy voting model predicts that people vote for these parties on the basis of party programs, which communicate ideological positions and issue positions, because they have determined that these parties are closest to their own preferences. Policy preferences about immigration and attitudes towards immigrants have been shown to explain support for radical right wing parties the best (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003). Voters for radical right wing parties in this regard cannot be said to differ from voters on mainstream parties, both choose on the basis of policy

preferences.

In sum, all three models possess explanatory power. There is clear evidence that policy voting is able to explain voting for these parties the best. The other voting models, however, have also been shown to contribute in explaining variance in support for right wing populist parties. Protest voting without regards for ideology conflicts with ideological nature of policy voting, but anti-establishment attitudes can contribute to the likelihood of a radical right wing vote. Therefore, it seems feasible that conjointly, the models are able to explain support for radical right wing parties the best. In fact, recent research has shown that voting for populist parties, of which the radical right is a party family member in many cases, can be best explained by a combination of policy voting, party leader evaluation and negative attitudes towards elites (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013). In conclusion, there are sound theoretical and empirical reasons to argue that voting models should account for socio-economic factors, anti-establishment attitudes, party leader evaluation and policy positions to explain support for right wing populist parties.

Apart from explaining support for radical right wing parties by ideological proximity, protest attitudes or socio-economic factors, there has been increased scholarly attention for the

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link between ideology and personality to explain votes for radical right wing parties (Dunn, 2015; Butler, 2000). Research into the psychological roots of ideology goes back to the 1950’s when scholars tried to explain the appeal of antidemocratic regimes like Nazism and fascism. The notion was developed that there are people with authoritarian personalities who’s ethnocentric, pre-fascist and authoritarian attitudes could be scaled (Martin, 2001:2). People that scored high on this F-test were categorized as Highs and possessed “a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what appears to be strong (..)”. “The formation of stereotypes and ingroup-outgroup cleavages” and “conventionality, rigidity (..) are but other aspects of the same fundamental personality pattern, and they can be observed in personal life as well as attitudes toward religion and social issues” (Adorno et al.1950:971). These were people with authoritarian personalities who gravitated towards antidemocratic regimes.

In the following decades further research built upon this work attempting to improve the F-scale. Adorno (1951) had assumed that socio-political attitudes are unidimensionaly organized on a dimension which is a direct expression of a personality dimension (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a:1862). But empirical research contradicted this assumption and called into question the notion that these attitudes are expressive of a single unitary personality or motivational dimension. For a time, this led to a loss of interest in the link between

personality and politics. But this interest was revived in the 1980’s by Altemeyer (1981). This revival ultimately led to the development to two concepts which coincide with two relatively independent socio-political attitude dimensions: right wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO).

RWA was conceptualized by Altemeyer (1981) as a tendency towards

conventionalism, authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression. This way RWA expresses beliefs in coercive social control, in obedience and respect for existing authorities, and in conforming to traditional moral and religious norms and values (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a:1863). RWA has also been conceptualized as a social conformity versus autonomy dimension (Feldman, 2003). Regardless of conceptualization, RWA has been linked to conservative attitudes (Butler, 2000; Gerber et al., 2010), prejudice (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002), moral and ethnic intolerance (Butler, 2000; Napier & Jost, 2008) and political conservativism (Jost et al., 2003). In addition, there is also evidence linking RWA to political movements. Research has shown that RWA predicts support for the right wing populist Tea Party in the United States (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012) and right

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wing populist parties in Denmark and Switzerland (Dun, 2015), although these results could not be replicated in Austria and the Netherlands (Dun, 2015).

SDO is conceptualized as “a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal or hierarchical, that is ordered along a superior-inferior dimension” (Pratto et al., 1994:742). It is theorized that individuals who are higher on SDO are drawn to ideologies and policies that maintain or enhance social inequality and are relevant to intergroup relations. Research has persistently found SDO to be correlated to ethnocentrism (Jost & Thompson, 2000), prejudice (Sibley and Duckitt, 2010a) and political conservatism (Jost et al.2003).

Although RWA and SDO correlate with many of the same attitudes, research has demonstrated that both are powerful but independent predictors of these socio-political attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a:1864). Additional research has substantiated this finding by indicating that the correlation between RWA and SDO is generally positive, but weak and could vary considerably across regions and countries (Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005). The exact nature of RWA and SDO, however, is subject of discussion. Altemeyer’s (1981) assumption that RWA and SDO are personality dimensions has been challenged on a number of bases. First, scholars have noted that many scales measuring RWA and SDO only consist of items that ask about social attitudes as opposed to behavioural reactions that personality inventories usually do (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a; Dunn, 2015; Martin, 2001). Secondly, there is

experimental evidence that if RWA and SDO are measured using social attitudes, they can be manipulated by varying contextual factors, like socio-political position (Poteat et al., 2007; Guimond et al., 2003). And thirdly, there is proof that RWA and SDO correlate only weakly with standardized measures of personality (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) but strongly with social attitudes and values (Saucier, 2000). In conclusion, current research tends to indicate that RWA and SDO are social attitudes or values rather than personality dimensions. The

implication of this critique is that if RWA and SDO are better conceptualized as dimensions of social attitudes, then they are likely influenced by personality (Sibley & Duckitt,

2008:250). A dual-process motivational (DPM) model is theorized to explain how RWA and SDO originate from personality traits and social beliefs, how their underlying motivational goals result in a wide range of social outcomes, like ethnocentricity, prejudice and intolerance and how they predict political ideology (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a:1861).

RWA expresses the motivational goal of maintaining societal security, social order and social cohesion relative to individual freedom, autonomy and self- expression (ibid:1867;

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Feldman, 2003). These motivational goals are influenced by the worldview that society is inherently dangerous, unstable and threatening which in turn stem from personality traits and exposure to social environments that are perceived to be threatening to stability, social order and social cohesion. The personality trait dimension of autonomy versus social conformity was determined to predispose individuals to adopt this worldview of an inherently dangerous and threatening world and to move them towards right wing authoritarianism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a: 1868).

SDO derive from the worldview that society is a highly competitive jungle in which the strong exploit the weak and it is every man or woman for themselves. This belief in a competitive jungle world makes dominating and overpowering others imperative and these are therefore the underlying motivational goals that are expressed attitudinally in high SDO (ibid:1869). As in RWA, the worldview associated with SDO is thought to stem from personality dispositions, namely from the personality dimension of tough- versus

tendermindedness combined with exposure to social environments characterized by ingroup dominance, inequality and competition (ibid:1869). The DMP model, in conclusion, theorizes that if certain worldviews are made salient by the social environment, RWA or SDO are the result. This means that the DPM model theorizes that a social environment that is perceived to be threatening to social order, security and certainty will increase the effect of RWA and a social environment that makes salient issues of group dominance, competition and resource scarcity will increase the effect of SDO. Another way to understand this is to say that SDO and RWA have different motivational paths that can be activated by specific situational factors that increase the predictive power of RWA and SDO. Three hypothesis have been proposed to explain how SDO and RWA exert their different effects.

Firstly, the differential prediction hypothesis suggests that even though RWA and SDO predict many of the same ideological attitudes and political orientations, their different underlying motivational goals should also predict different outcomes, for instance support for different political parties and policies or prejudice against some outgroups but not others. Duckitt & Sibley (2010a) provide a review of research establishing that RWA and SDO indeed predict different outcomes in accordance with their respective underlying motivational goals. RWA, for instance, has been shown to predict support for right wing parties that emphasize law & order policies, while SDO predicts support for parties that place an emphasis on free market economics (ibid:1877).

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predict outcomes differently because they express different underlying motivational goals then these different outcomes should be related to factors influencing these motivational goals (ibid:1880). Perceived threat to social cohesion has been shown to increase the effect of social conformity versus autonomy on socio-political attitudinal correlates of RWA, such as

prejudice and intolerance (Feldman, 2003:51). This means that it is plausible that the effect of RWA is contingent on perceived threat to social cohesion. Other research has corroborated this finding by showing that RWA is more strongly predictive of right wing policy or right wing party support under socially threatening conditions (Cohrs et al., 2005). If, on the other hand, group competitiveness over relative dominance or over scarce social resources is primed, SDO has shown to predict anti-immigrant attitudes when RWA did not (Dru, 2007). In addition, cross-country research has found differential moderating effects. In countries were immigrants are viewed as increasing the crime rate or weakening the unity of that country, the effect of RWA on anti-immigrant attitudes is particularly high. But in countries were immigrants are viewed as economically threatening because they are viewed as stealing jobs from the native population, the effect of SDO on anti-immigrant attitudes is most

prominent (Cohrs et al., 2009).

Thirdly, the differential mediation hypothesis suggests that the effects of RWA will be mediated by perceived threats to social order or collective security while the effects of SDO will be mediated by feelings of (economic) competition and ingroup over outgroup

dominance. Several studies have supported this mediation hypothesis. McFarland (2005), for instance, found that both RWA and SDO were related to American students’ support for the war on Iraq. The effect of RWA, however, was fully mediated by perceptions of Iraq as being threatening, while the effect of SDO was fully mediated by a lack of concern for the human cost of war, which fits with the tough-minded, competitive motivational characteristic of SDO. In conclusion, based on the DPM model, three hypotheses about the mechanisms of RWA and SDO have been proposed and research has generally supported these hypotheses by showing that RWA and SDO often predict the same type of outcomes but that there are differences that can be attributed to their underlying motivational goals. Moreover, the effects of RWA and SDO often involve differential moderation by situational factors that

differentially activate these motivational goals and their effects often are differentially mediated. To investigate the psychological antecedents of these concepts, current research commonly uses the Big Five model of personality.

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comprehensively and parsimoniously explain behaviour based on individual-level differences: Agreeableness, Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Extroversion (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). The Big Five model theorizes that personality develops in early childhood, has a genetic component and remains stable over time (Mondak, 2010) and is therefore considered well-suited to examine the link between personality and political behaviour.

Agreeableness is a trait that refers to co-operative, altruistic, sympathetic and trusting tendencies (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Individuals who score low on Agreeableness are thus generally distrustful of others, self-centred, uncooperative, cynical and tough-minded (Costa et al., 1991). Low Agreeableness has been shown to correlate with specific political attitudes and behaviour, like distrust of politicians (Mondak & Halperin, 2008), support for right wing parties (Schoen & Schumann, 2007) and social-conservative attitudes (Gerber et al., 2010). In addition, research has found that Agreeableness corresponds with the personality dimension of tough- versus tendermindedness, that low Agreeableness predicts SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), and that low Agreeableness can be linked to support for populist parties regardless of host ideology (Bakker et al., 2015).

People who score high on Openness to experience are more likely to be creative, imaginative, curious, nonconformist and have high self-efficacy beliefs (Mondak & Halperin 2008). Low levels of this personality trait are associated with voting for right wing parties and conservative attitudes (Gerber et al.2010; Schumann & Schoen, 2007). In addition, low Openness to experience has been show to correlate with RWA (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).

Neuroticism refers to the experience of anxiety, negativity, anger and depression (Digman, 1990; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). There is evidence that people who have high levels of Neuroticism are drawn to political parties that promise shelter against material and cultural changes (Schoen & Schumann, 2007) and that Neuroticism correlates positively with economic liberalism, but also with culturally liberal attitudes, although this last relationship is relatively weak (Gerber et al., 2010:121). Predictions regarding political behaviour and Neuroticism, therefore, are inconsistent.

Conscientiousness manifests by a preference for order, self-discipline and conformity (Digman, 1990; Mondak, 2008). People who score high on Conscientiousness have

conservative attitudes, both socially and economically (Gerber et al., 2010) which matches their preference to conform with the status quo and resist change. In addition, high

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applies to individuals who are lively, sociably and active (Mondak & Halperin, 2008) and is not linked to specific political attitudes and ideology (Gerber et al., 2010). In conclusion, rich evidence exists linking personality traits to various aspects of ideology and political

preferences. Based on the discussions of right wing populism, theories regarding the

motivational needs underlying right wing ideology and their personality trait antecedents, it is now possible to formulate expectations about the mechanisms that link personality to RWA and SDO, ideology and ultimately to support for right wing populist parties. These will be presented in the next section.

Hypotheses

The Freedom Party advocate policies aimed at restricting immigration and decreasing the influence of Islam. These policies theoretically align with the proposed differential

motivational goals of RWA and SDO. In light of this, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1a: RWA predicts support for the Freedom Party.

H1b: SDO predicts support for the Freedom Party.

Anti-immigration policies could appeal to voters because they promise to decrease

competition over scarce social resources such as unemployment benefits and competition over jobs, which aligns with theorized SDO specific motivational goals. The differential mediation hypothesis predicts that this effect of SDO is only mediated by views that immigrants are economically threatening, not because they are a threat to social cohesion. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H2a: The effect of SDO on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by economic threat.

H2b: The effect of SDO on support for the Freedom Party is not mediated by cultural threat.

The differential moderation hypothesis could account for fluctuations in the effect of SDO on support for right wing populism and explain why individual vote intention for the Freedom

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Party varies over time. In times of economic hardship, the economic reality is expected to make salient SDO and increase the effect of SDO on support for the Freedom Party. These perceptions of threat might change over time while personality traits that predispose individuals for SDO stay constant. This is summarized by the hypotheses that:

H3a: The effect of SDO on support for the Freedom Party is moderated by economic threat.

H3b: The effect of SDO on support for the Freedom Party is not moderated by cultural threat.

As previously discussed, low Agreeableness has been shown to predict both SDO and support for populist parties regardless of host ideology. Because SDO is theorized to stem from personality traits, it is expected that the effect of low Agreeableness on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by SDO. Therefore, the effect of agreeableness is expected to disappear when controlling for SDO. This leads to the final hypothesis concerning SDO:

H4: The effect of Agreeableness on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by SDO.

Because there is no previous evidence linking openness to experience, neuroticism, conscientiousness and extroversion to SDO, no expectations will be formulated about their relationship and the effect that they might have on support for the Freedom Party.

Immigration and the presence of ethnic and religious minorities could also be

perceived as threatening the existing social order or threatening social cohesion and cultural identity, which aligns with RWA motivational goals. The differential mediation hypothesis predicts that the effect of RWA is only mediated by the view that immigrants are threatening because they weaken the existing social and cultural order, not because they pose an

economic threat. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H5a: The effect of RWA on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by cultural threat.

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H5b: The effect of RWA on support for the Freedom Party is not mediated by economic threat.

Additionally, in line with the differential moderation hypothesis, it is expected that the effect of RWA is greater if cultural threats are perceived, while economic threats are not expected to increase the effect of RWA on support for the Freedom Party. Again, this could account for variation in support over time. Consequently, the hypotheses are proposed that:

H6a: The effect of RWA on support for the Freedom Party is moderated by cultural threat.

H6b: The effect of RWA on support for the Freedom Party is not moderated by economic threat.

Based on the discussed research correlating RWA, low Openness and high Conscientiousness with support for right wing parties, it is expected that all three predict support for the Freedom Party. A conceptual tension between populism and RWA has been noted because populism is characterized by anti-establishment rhetoric, which conflicts with the authority abiding elements of RWA (Bakker et al., 2015:). But following Altemeyer’s (1981) definition of RWA, which describes a submission to established and legitimate authorities (Jost, 2003:345), it could also be argued that this tension doesn’t exist because populist rhetoric frequently calls into question the legitimacy of established governments for a lack of responsiveness to the people. In light of this, the formulated hypothesis regarding the relationship between RWA and right wing populist parties is expected to hold up.

Additionally, the hypothesized effects of Openness to experience and Conscientiousness on support for the Freedom Party are expected to be mediated by RWA because, as previously argued, RWA is also theorized to stem from personality dispositions. Therefore, these effects are expected to disappear when RWA is controlled for. This leads to the following

hypotheses:

H7a: The effect of Openness to experience on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by RWA.

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H7b: The effect of Conscientiousness on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by RWA.

Because Neuroticism, Extroversion and Agreeableness have not been linked to RWA, no expectations will be formulated about their relationship and the effect that they might have on support for the Freedom Party.

Right wing ideology is also expected to predict support for the Freedom Party. Additionally, as argued, SDO and RWA are both correlated with right wing ideology. Therefore, the effects of RWA and SDO on support for the Freedom Party are expected to disappear when controlling for right wing ideology. This is summarized by the hypotheses that:

H8a: The effect of RWA on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by right wing ideology.

H8b: The effect of SDO on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by right wing ideology.

Finally, any other possible associations between personality and the Freedom Party are expected to be captured because the full set of personality traits will be introduced. Associations between support for the Freedom Party and Agreeableness, Openness and

Conscientiousness are expected to be found when RWA, SDO and right wing ideology are not controlled for.

Anti-establishment attitudes and leader evaluation have also been identified as factors that predict voting for right wing populist parties. As argued, Agreeableness is expected to predict support for populist parties. And since low agreeableness is also correlated with political cynicism, the effect of agreeableness is expected to be mediated by

anti-establishment attitudes. The effect of agreeableness on support for the Freedom Party is therefore expected to disappear when anti-establishment attitudes are controlled for. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H9: The effect of Agreeableness on support for the Freedom Party is mediated by anti-establishment attitudes.

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Additionally, because age, sex and education have been shown to have an effect on support for right wing populism, they will also be controlled for. Finally, a schematic representation summarizing the proposed hypotheses how Big Five personality traits exert their influence is presented in figure 1.

Openness to experience

Conscientiousness RWA

Right wing ideology

Freedom Partysupport SDO

Agreeableness

Anti-establishment

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the hypotheses how Big Five personality traits work to impact Freedom Party support

Material & Methods

To test the proposed hypotheses, support for the Dutch Freedom Party is investigated. This party is considered an excellent candidate because of a combination of anti-establishment rhetoric and right wing ideology, particularly pertaining to immigration (for a more elaborate discussion, see section “right wing populism”). Data is drawn from the politics and values waves of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for Social Science) panel administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, the Netherlands). The LISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly Internet surveys. The panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a computer and Internet connection. A

longitudinal survey is fielded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including work, education, income, housing, time use, political views, values and personality.

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The longitudinal nature of this panel means that the effect of PVV support predictors can be tested over time. The LISS panel is currently comprised of 8 waves, spanning between 2007 and 2015. Respondents were asked “Which party would you vote for if elections were held today?”. A dummy variable was created with: vote for the Freedom Party (1) and all other parties (0). Due to the dichotomous nature of this dependent variable, logistic regression analysis is considered the appropriate tool to test the proposed hypotheses. In addition, this is a method previously used to investigate the influence of personality on support for populist parties (see for instance Bakker et al., 2015). Big Five personality traits were measured using 50-item International Personality Item Pool – Five Factor Model (IPIP-FFM) which measures each trait using 10 items (Goldberg et al., 2006).

RWA and SDO were measured using value orientation data. While both are often measured as social attitudes, values are also used to measure authoritarianism. In this practice, respondents are asked about child-rearing values they belief are important (see for instance Feldman & Stenner, 1997:747). The importance of obedience versus self-reliance,

independence or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners and being considerate or well-behaved are surveyed to determine authoritarian tendencies. In line with this practice,

authoritarian predisposition was measured with a questions that asks respondents to answer on a scale how much they value obedience as a guiding principle (1= extremely unimportant, 7 = extremely important). This way an authoritarianism scale is created whereby low scores reflect low authoritarianism and high scores high authoritarianism. SDO was measured in a similar way by asking respondents about their attitude towards (social) equality. Respondents’ preference for this was measured by asking them to determine on a scale how much they value equality as a guiding principle (1= extremely unimportant, 7 = extremely important). This item was reversed so that low scores refer to low SDO and high scores refer to high SDO.

One clear advantage of using values as indicators of authoritarianism and SDO is that the use of questions that tap into right wing attitudes can be prevented. This is valuable because it is hypothesized that in the mechanism of support for right wing populist parties, right wing attitudes are further down the line. Therefore, using values instead of

socio-political attitudes any possible multicollinearity between indicators of right wing ideology and RWA or SDO is prevented. The problem of multicollinearity is salient because the LISS panel doesn’t contain items that measure RWA or SDO directly. Instead, items would have to be used that are considered part of right wing ideology that RWA or SDO is expected to predict.

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For example, the intergroup inequality dimension of SDO would have to be measured using an item that asks respondents to give their opinion about the statement “Legally residing foreigners should be entitled the same social security as Dutch citizens” or “Differences in social class should be smaller”. RWA would have to be measured using items like “It is unnatural to have women bosses in firms” or “Immigrants should be allowed to retain their culture”. It is clear that all those items are part of right wing ideology that RWA and SDO are expected to predict. In conclusion, value orientations are considered to be well suited to capture RWA and SDO.

To investigate two of the hypotheses that are formulated based on the DPM model, the differential mediation hypothesis and the differential moderation hypothesis, the following items were selected. To determine the hypotheses associated with RWA, the belief that there are groups in society that pose a threat to social cohesion, an item will be used that asked respondents to express their opinion on whether they belief immigrants weaken the unity of the Netherlands (1 = disagree entirely, 5 = agree entirely). To test the hypotheses associated with SDO, the belief that outgroups are economically threatening because they compete with the native Dutch population over jobs, and item was selected which asked respondents how likely it is that the increased number of immigrants will cost Dutch people their jobs (1 = very unlikely, 4 = very likely). Both items were drawn from the single wave LISS study

‘Immigrants in the Netherlands’ which was fielded in the same time period as wave 4 of the longstanding LISS core study ‘politics and values’.

Anti-establishment attitudes were determined with respondents’ answers to the question how much confidence they have in politicians, (0 = no confidence, 10 = full confidence) and evaluation of Freedom Party leader Wilders was measured by using the answers to the question “what do you think of Geert Wilders? (0 = no sympathy, 10 = full sympathy). In order to control for ideology, ideological positions on economic and social issues were measured using statements about income differences (1 = increase, 5 = decrease) and whether obtaining asylum in the Netherlands should be made easier (1 = harder, 5 = easier). By reversing both indicators, attitudes could be scored from left wing to right wing. Finally, age, gender, and education level were controlled for using data from the LISS panel background variables. Descriptive statistics of the wave-independent independent variables are presented in table 1.1 Table 1.2 displays the wave specific independent – and dependent variables.

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Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics of the wave-independent variables

Variable M SD % Min Max N #items Alpha

Agreeableness 37,09 3,93 20 50 6576 10 0,80 Openness 35,12 4,98 13 50 6576 10 0,77 Extroversion 32,98 6,29 11 50 6576 10 0,86 Neuroticism 25,86 6,75 10 50 6576 10 0,78 Conscientiousness 37,32 5,16 15 50 6576 10 0,77 SDO 1,82 1,09 1 7 6563 1 RWA 4,90 1,45 1 7 6564 1 Age 45,47 15,39 18 94 9774 Gender Male 48,8 Female 51,2 Education Primary 8,3 Intermediary secondary 24,4 Higher secondary 10,3 Intermediate vocational 23,5 Higher vocational 24,6 University 9,4

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Table 1.2. Descriptive statistics of the wave-dependent variables

Wave 1 2007/08 Variable M SD Min Max N %

Anti-establishment attitudes 5,17 1,83 0 10 6505 Sympathy for Wilders 2,79 2,69 0 10 6153 Social attitudes 3,86 0,91 1 5 6627 Economic attitudes 2,26 1,02 1 5 6414

Vote intention 5303

PVV 5,1

Other 94,9

Vote intention 3808

PVV 7,8

Other 92,2

Vote intention 4567

PVV 13,8

Other 86,2

Anti-establishment attitudes 4,82 1,89 0 10 4866 Sympathy for Wilders 3,58 2,88 0 10 4737 Cultural threat 2,50 1,04 1 5 4278 Economic threat 2,49 0,76 1 4 4555 Social attitudes 3,87 0,89 1 5 4979 Economic attitudes 2,18 0,97 1 5 4756 Vote intention 4259 PVV 12,5 Other 87,5

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22 Table 1.2. Continued

Vote intention 4414

PVV 10,2

Other 89,8

Vote intention 4626

PVV 9,5

Other 90,5

Vote intention 4325

PVV 10,6

Other 89,4

Vote intention 4795

PVV 13,6

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Regression Analyses Examining Big Five Personality Traits, RWA, SDO and Ideology

In order to determine the differential predictive value of SDO and RWA on voting for the Freedom Party, logistic regression analyses were run controlling for age, education and gender. By introducing RWA and SDO to the model separately, their isolated effects were determined over time. The results of these regression analyses can be seen in table 3. Controlling for age, education and gender analysis reveals that vote intention for the

Logistic regression models, odds rations reported with standard errors in parentheses. *_{p <0.05}

Freedom Party is predicted by both RWA and SDO. Results presented in table 3.1

demonstrate that in wave 4, for instance, the odds ratio of having expressed an intention to vote for the Freedom Party is 1.14 (p<0.05) for SDO and 1.23 (p<0.05) for RWA. Similar results can be seen in table 3.2. SDO and RWA both significantly increase the odds of voting for the Freedom Party in waves 6, 7 and 8, although the odds ratio for SDO in wave 8 is only 1.01. In most other waves an effect is reported of RWA or SDO, but not both. For wave 2 (table 3.1), an odds ratio of 1.28 is observed which means that each increase in SDO is associated with an 28% increase in the odds of wanting to vote for the Freedom Party. Similarly, an odds ratio of 1.16 for RWA is reported in wave 3 (table 3.1) and wave 5 (table 3.2), indicating that each increase in RWA is associated with an 16% increase in the odds that Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4

1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 Age 0.98* 0.98* 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99* 0.99* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Education 0.73* 0.73* 0.74* 0.77* 0.67* 0.70* 0.68* 0.71* (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) Male 2.30* 2.43* 2.01* 2.33* 1.87* 1.99* 1.46*_1.59* (0.19) (0.19) (0.74) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) SDO 1.15 - 1.28* - 1.10 - 1.14*_- (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) RWA - 1.04 - 1.12 - 1.16* _- _1.23* (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) Constant 0.16* 0.18* 0.11* 0.10* 0.50*_0.29* _0.50*_0.22* (0.38) (0.44) (0.37) (0.47) (0.31) 0.38) (0.33) (0.42) N 2,897 2,898 2,399 2,400 2,229 2,229 2,214 2,214 Pseudo R² 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 -Log Likelihood 1059 1062 1202 1222 1336 1629 1431 1419 Table 3.1. Effect of RWA and SDO on Freedom Party vote intention.

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vote intention for the Freedom Party is expressed in both waves. Finally, in wave 1 (table 3.1) no effect of RWA or SDO on the odds of voting for the Freedom Party is observed.

Logistic regression models. Odds rations reported with standard errors in parentheses. *_{p <0.05}

Next, to test the differential mediation hypothesis, the respective hypothesized differential mediation factors of SDO and RWA were modelled to investigate whether they mediated the effect of RWA and SDO on vote intention for the Freedom Party. This analysis was carried out with data from wave 4 of the LISS panel core study and data from the single wave study immigrants in the Netherlands. The results are presented in table 4 (model 2 and 3).

Controlling for age, gender and level of education the reported effect of RWA (odds ratio of 1.23, p<0.05) disappears when the cultural threat variable (odds ratio of 1.76, p<0.05) is introduced to the model. However, when economic threat (odds ratio 2.14, p<0.05) is introduced, an effect of RWA remains observable (odds ratio 1.13, p<0.05). Turning to the effect of SDO on vote intention for the Freedom Party, this effect (odds ratio 1.14, p<0.05) disappears when economic threat (odds ratio 2.20, p< 0.05) is controlled for. Additionally, when cultural threat (odds ratio 1.80, p<0.05) is introduced to the model, the effect of SDO on intention to vote for the Freedom Party also disappears.

To investigate the hypothesis that RWA and SDO are differentially moderated by factors that make salient their respective underlying motivational goals, threat to social cohesion and economic threat respectively, interaction effects between RWA and SDO with Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8

1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 Age 0.98* 0.98* 0.99* 0.98* 0.97* 0.97* 0.98* 0.98* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Education 0.66* 0.69* _0.70*_0.74* _0.62*_0.66* _0.67*_0.69* (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Male 1.70*_1.81* _1.90*_2.08* _2.01*_2.29* _2.01*_2.02* (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) SDO 1.11 - 1.17*_- _1.23*_- _1.01*_- (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) RWA - 1.16* _- _1.22* _- _1.24* _- _1.26* (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) Constant 0.49 0.28* _0.29*_0.14* _0.98 _0.46 _1.10 _0.34* (0.38) (0.49) (0.40) (0.51) (0.39) 0.51) (0.37) (0.47) N 1,870 1,870 1,899 1,899 1,698 1,698 1,593 1,593 Pseudo R² 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 -Log Likelihood 1026 1022 1031 1026 993 990 1,151 1,035 Table 3.2. Effect of RWA and SDO on Freedom Party vote intention.

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their respective threat factors were modelled. The results of these analyses are also presented in table 4 (model 4 and 5).

Table 4. Mediation -and moderation effects of cultural – and economic threat on RWA and SDO

Logistic regression models. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in parentheses. *_p<0.05

The interaction effect of RWA and cultural threat has an odds ratio of 1.01 (p<0.05), which is substantially smaller than the main effect of RWA on support for the Freedom Party (odds ratio: 1.23, model 1). In addition, a significant odds ratio of 1.13 is reported for the interaction effect of RWA and economic threat. For the interaction between SDO and economic threat (model 4) an odds ratio of 1.38 (p<0.05) is reported, substantially larger than the main effect of SDO (odds ratio: 1.14; table 4, model 1). Lastly, the interaction effect of SDO and cultural threat has an odds ratio of 1.27 (p<0.05), which is also larger than the main effect of SDO.

Next, the influence of personality traits on support for the Freedom Party were

RWA SDO 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Age 0.99*_0.98*_0.98*_0.98*_0.98*_0.90*_0.99*_0.99* _0.99*_0.99* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Education 0.71*_0.72*_0.74*_0.71*_0.73*_0.68*_0.72*_0.71* _0.70*_0.70* (0.05) (0.06) (0.06 (0.06) (0.06*_{) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)} Male 1.59*_1.61*_1.51*_1.66*_1.50 _1.46*_1.41*_1.56* _1.42*_1.58* (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) RWA 1.23*_1.12 _1.13*_0.86 _0.82*_- _- _- _- _- (0.54) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) SDO - - - 1.14*_1.13 _1.00 _0.46*_0.47* (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.16) Cultural threat - 1.76*_- _- _- _- _- _1.80*_- _- (0.07) (0.07) Economic threat - - 2.14*_- _- _- _2.20*_- _- _- (0.11) (0.11)

RWA x cultural threat - - - 1.01*_- _- _- _- _- _- (0.01)

RWA x economic threat - - - - 1.13*_- _- _- _- _- (0.02)

SDO x cultural threat - - - 1.27*

(0.04) SDO x economic threat - - - 1.38*_-

(0.05) Constant 0.22*_0.08*_0.05*_0.39 _0.37 _0.50*_0.07*_0.13* _0.64 _0.79 (0.42) (0.52) (0.33) (0.48) (0.02) (0.33) (0.49) (0.45) (0.38) (0.39) N 2,114 1,649 1,685 1,649 1,685 2,114 1,685 1,649 1,685 1,649 Pseudo R² 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 -Log Likelihood 1419 1066 1082 1077 1093 1431 1083 1069 1095 1086

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analysed. The effects of the full set of Big Five personality traits on vote intention for the Freedom Party were tested, controlling for age, gender and level of education. The results of these regression analyses are presented in table 5.1 and table 5.2, model 1. All five Big Five personality traits are associated with vote intention for the Freedom Party, although not all personality traits effects are observed in every wave. Additionally, the strength of the effects and the direction of the effects vary substantially between personality traits. Agreeableness is negatively associated with the odds of voting for the Freedom Party in wave 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8. In table 5.1, for instance, results presented in model 1 show that each increase in

Agreeableness score decreases the odds of expressing an intention to vote for the Freedom Party by 5% (odds ratio 0.95, p<0.05). This effect of Agreeableness on vote intention, however, cannot be seen in waves 4, 5 and 7. Openness to experience affects vote intention for the Freedom Party in a similar manner. Significant negative associations between Openness to experience and support for the Freedom Party are reported in waves 1, 4 and 8, although this effect is not observed in the remaining waves. Conscientiousness has a positive effect on the odds of intended support for the Freedom Party in all waves, with the exception of waves 5 and 6 and Extroversion has a similar effect in waves 1, 2 and 3. Neuroticism, lastly, increases the odds of Freedom Party vote intention in waves 7 and 8.

In model 2 in tables 5.1 and 5.2, the results are presented of the effects of the Big Five personality traits on the odds of Freedom Party support controlling for RWA and SDO. The reported effects of Agreeableness that were significant in model 1 disappear when SDO is significant (waves 1 and 6), although this is not observed in wave 2. If, however, the effect of SDO is not significant, the influence of Agreeableness on support for the Freedom Party reported in model 1 does not disappear (wave 3 and 8). When RWA is controlled for, the effect of Conscientiousness disappears (wave 4 and 7), although in wave 2, 3 and 8 both RWA and Conscientiousness significantly affect the odds of Freedom Party support. The effect of Openness to experience also is inconsistently affected by the introduction of RWA to the model. In wave 4, Openness to experience remains significant controlling for RWA, but loses its predictive power in wave 8. Controlling for RWA and SDO also has an inconsistent influence on the effect of Extroversion. The effect disappears in wave 1 (SDO: p<0.05; RWA: ns) but remains significant in waves 2 (SDO: p<0.05; RWA: p<0.05) and 3 (SDO: ns; RWA: p<0.05). Finally, the effect of Neuroticism disappears in wave 7 when RWA and SDO are controlled for (p<0.05). In wave 8, the predictive power of Neuroticism also disappears, however, in this wave only the effect of RWA is significant (p<0.05).

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Table 5.1 The effect of Big Five personality traits on vote intention for the Freedom Party

To control for the effect of right wing ideology, social – and economic attitudes are introduced. These results are presented in model 3 (table 5.1 and 5.2). Firstly, economic attitudes have no significant effect. Social attitudes, however, are a powerful predictor of Freedom Party support across all waves (with the exception of wave 7). Odds ratios are reported between 3.29 and 4.60, p<0.05 (effect sizes per wave, in ascending order: wave 1, 4, 2, 6, 3, 8, and 5). The effects of RWA disappear in waves 2 and 5 when ideology is controlled for. This result, however, is not observed in waves 3, 4, 6 and 8, where RWA continues to have a significant influence on the odds of Freedom Party support, although effect size does decrease in all waves and is substantially smaller in size compared to the effect of right wing Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Agreeableness 0.95*_0.96 _0.96 _0.93*_0.93*_0.96*_0.95*_0.95*_0.96*_0.98 _0.98 _0.99 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Openness 0.95*_0.95 _0.96*_0.98 _0.98 _0.99 _0.97 _0.97 _0.98 _0.95*_0.96*_0.96 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Extroversion 1.03*_1.03 _1.03 _1.04*_1.04*_1.03 _1.03*_1.03*_1.02 _1.04 _1.02 _1.02 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Conscientiousness 1.05*_1.05*_1.03 _1.05*_1.04*_1.02 _1.04*_1.03*_1.02 _1.04*_1.02 _1.02 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Neuroticism 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age 0.98*_0.98*_0.98*_0.99 _0.99 _1.00 _0.99*_0.99*_0.99 _0.99*_0.99*_0.99 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Education 0.76*_0.76*_0.79*_0.77*_0.77*_0.77*_0.69*_0.70*_0.72*_0.72*_0.73*_0.74* (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) Male 2.38*_2.37*_1.99*_2.04*_1.94*_1.74*_1.83*_1.80*_1.52*_1.64*_1.59*_1.43* (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) RWA - 1.02 0.99 - 1.14*_1.10 _- _1.16*_1.15*_- _1.24*_1.21* (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) SDO - 1.17*_1.08 _- _1.28*_1.19*_- _1.12 _1.02 _1.19*_1.13 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Social attitudes - - 3.29*_- _- _3.39*_- _- _3.78*_- _- _3.35* (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) Economic attitudes - - 0.94 - - 1.05 - - 1.05 0.95 (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) Constant 0.33 0.18 0.00*_0.24 _0.06*_0.00*_0.85 _0.35 _0.00*_0.55 _0.15 _0.00* (1.23) (1.30) (1.49) (1.14) (1.20) (1.33) (0.91) (0.97) (1.09) (0.97) (1.03) (1.12) N 2,879 2,897 2,839 2,399 2,399 2,399 2,292 2,292 2,292 2,114 2,114 2,016 Pseudo R² 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.22 -Log Likelihood 1045 1043 915 1193 1179 1067 1620 1609 1425 1418 1402 1207

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ideology. Additionally, the effect of SDO disappears in waves 1, 4 and 6, but remains

significant in wave 2, although here as well the effect size decreases and is small compared to the effect of ideology.

Table 5.2 The effect of Big Five personality traits on vote intention for the Freedom Party

Finally, age, education and gender significantly affect the probability of vote intention for the Freedom Party. The following odds ratios are reported: age: between 0.97 and 0.99 (p<0.05), education: 0.65 to 0.77 (p<0.05) and gender: 1.43 to 2.38 (p<0.05).

Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Agreeableness 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.95*_0.96 _0.97 _0.96 _0.96 _0.92 _0.94*_0.94*_0.95* (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) Openness 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.02 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.96*_0.97 _0.97 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Extroversion 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.02 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) Conscientiousness 1.04 1.03 0.99 1.03 1.02 0.99 1.05*_1.04 _1.01 _1.07*_1.06*_1.02 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Neuroticism 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.03*_1.01 _1.01 _1.03*_1.03 _1.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age 0.98*_0.98*_0.99 _0.99 _0.99*_0.99 _0.97*_0.97*_0.96*_0.98*_0.97*_0.99* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Education 0.69*_0.70*_0.69*_0.71*_0.72*_0.73*_0.65*_0.66*_0.60*_0.68*_0.70*_0.68* (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) Male 1.75*_1.70*_1.63*_1.91*_1.84*_1.57*_2.32*_2.15*_2.14 _2.12*_2.16*_2.22* (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.45) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) RWA - 1.17*_1.09 _- _1.26*_1.22*_- _1.28*_1.28 _- _1.23*_1.19* (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) SDO - 1.14 1.03 - 1.21*_1.09 _- _1.26*_1.04 _- _1.03 _0.93 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.20) (0.08) (0.09) Social attitudes - - 4.60*_- _- _3.50*_- _- _1.35 _- _- _3.96* (0.16) (0.14) (0.25) (0.16) Economic attitudes - - 1.03 - - 1.08 - - 0.63*_- _- _1.02 (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07) Constant 1.65 0.61 0.00*_0.30 _0.07*_0.00*_1.63 _0.28 _3.73 _0.96 _0.37 _0.00* (1.19) (1.26) (1.49) (1.19) (1.27) (1.45) (1.18) (1.27) (3.31) (1.08) (1.16) (1.39 N 1,870 1,870 1,799 1,899 1,899 1,833 1,098 1,098 823 1,573 1,573 1,530 Pseudo R² 0.08 0.09 0.26 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.26 0.12 0.13 0.29 -Log Likelihood 1018 1011 835 1028 1013 877 984 966 213 1127 1115 910

Psychological roots of support for the Dutch right wing populist freedom party examined

Psychological Roots of Support for the Dutch

Right Wing Populist Freedom Party Examined

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