MA INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
MA THESIS
“Birds of the Same Feather?
Party Competition and Parliamentary Strategies
of the Right and Left-Wing Populist Parties in
post-crisis Greece”
Anna Bampili
S3560295
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the way the populist radical left reacts to the populist extreme right’s rhetoric on immigration issues. Greece is my case study, as it has both a popular radical left governmental party (SYRIZA) and a nativist, extreme right party, which is also a parliamentary member (Golden Dawn). Moreover, Greece has received a large amount of immigrant populations during the last decade, especially from Arab and Muslim Balkan countries. I argue that both SYRIZA and Golden Dawn appeal to the same electorate; people who are disappointed by austerity measures and are against the old party system, which has, however, cultivated a condition of clientelism between voters and party stake holders. Thus, competition between both parties is based on their ideological differences. Immigration is an issue that provides with a fertile ground for such discussion, as it is the main topic discussed by the Extreme Right, while the Radical Left is expected to avoid being exposed to the electorate by drawing attention to its rival’s ideology. In order to prove this argument, I analyze the content of 120 parliamentary questions and answers posed by Golden Dawn and SYRIZA between 2012 and 2018 about immigration issues, when both parties are able to interact in the parliament. 116 of them are questions posed by Golden Dawn to SYRIZA’s government. The answers of the ministries are revealing; Golden Dawn ties immigration with concerns regarding criminality, culture and economy, however, SYRIZA excludes Golden Dawn from the discourse, by enhancing the latter’s criminal past and nativist values. However, when it comes to the content of SYRIZA’s policies, little information is available. These findings confirm my initial argument.
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CONTENTS
1. Introduction………..4
2. Party Competition in the Discourse about Immigration: An overview of the Existing Literature………..8
3. Populism, the Left-Right Convergence and Issue Competition……….14
4. The Greek Populist Tradition and the Crises of 2010 and 2015………21
4.a. The Greek Party System……….21
4.b. Immigration in Greece and the Refugee Challenge………...24
5. The Old “New” Parties of Change: History and Positions of SYRIZA and GD……..26
5.a. Breaking “the serpent’s egg”: The rise and ideology of Golden Dawn………...26
5.b. SYRIZA’s suggestion of a “third” way……….….28
6. Methodology and Data Research………..32
6.a. Methodology and limitations of the Case Study………...32
6.b. Data Research………..…...33
7. Content Analysis of Golden Dawn’s Parliamentary Questions (PQs)………..36
7.a. Delinquency, Left-wing activism and Health………....37
7.b. Expenditure, Discrimination and Marginalization of the native-born labour force…...38
7.c. Poor Migration Policies………..40
7.d. Culture, Religion and National Security………....41
8. Content Analysis of SYRIZA’s Answers to GD………..43
9. Discussion and Conclusions………...48
APPENDIX I: Parliamentary Questions (Summaries)………...51
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List of Figures
Figure 1. Number of questions posed by GD...34
Figure 2. Issues discussed in 116 PQs by GD...36
Figure 3. Causes of delinquency within immigrant groups according to GD...37
Figure 4. Forms of state expenditure in GD's PQs...38
Figure 5. Aspects of discrimination against Greek people according to GD...39
Figure 6. Vulnerable economic sectors due to immigration according to GD...40
Figure 7. Reflections on State inefficiency in GD's PQs...41
Figure 8. Perspectives of cultural threat in GD's PQs...42
Figure 9. Reaction of SYRIZA to GD's PQs...43
Figure 10. Content of full answers given by SYRIZA to GD's PQs...44
Figure 11. Reasons for non-response according to SYRIZA's answers...45
Figure 12. Percentage of answers to GD's PQs by the Greek Ministry of Health (2015-2018)...47
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1. Introduction
Greece is confronted by multiple and intense political and economic challenges since the end of the military dictatorship, in 1973. The second decade of the 21st century has made the Greek society face financial crisis, austerity, violent protests (some ended to injuries, or even death of people) and a severe humanitarian crisis after the large immigration inflow of 2015. And while economy seems to grow1, refugee crisis is still a challenge for the Greek State. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2018, 60.000 refugees and asylum seekers stood in the Greek territory, with 14.000 of them living in refugee camps located in the Greek islands. The living conditions are poor; the Global Press has continuously denounced the Greek authorities for letting immigrants exposed to bad weather conditions, “trapped” in the camps without being able to leave the place, while many of them are victims of violence by criminal groups within the camp.
This is not a new story, however. Since 2015, when more than 1 million people entered the country, few things have changed as far as the Greek state is concerned. Most refugees and asylum seekers moved to other EU countries. However, the asylum awarding procedures remained slow, immigrants that arrived in the country have still no legal status, whereas recording and deportation of irregular entries is also difficult; refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants use the same networks to enter the country and according to the Greek and the EU Law, they cannot be deported in case they have applied for asylum2. Thus they are forced to wait, while NGOs and State organizations are ensuring human conditions during their stay.
While integration is presented to be a priority of the Greek State at the moment, actions of the Greek government are not transparent. Rarely do stake holders describe the conditions in the refugee camps, while less and less information is provided regarding the number of inflows and the actions the government undertakes towards the integration of the populations that have crossed the Greek border. The only source of details at the moment is UNHCR and political parties themselves, especially during parliamentary conversations that are available in the Hellenic Parliament’s official website3. As expected, most discussions regarding immigration issues are held by the Extreme Right, namely Golden Dawn, who is strongly against immigration and is vocal about these views.
1According to Eurostat, the real GDP growth rate of Greece in 2017 was 1.5%, comparing to -9,1% in 2011
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1
2 More on Greek Law on asylum at http://asylo.gov.gr/?page_id=141 3www.parliament.gr
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At the same time, the references of the left-wing Greek government regarding the immigration issue are limited in number. Moreover, it seems that the government censures every restrictive immigration policy, naming it as “extreme right policy”. In a conversation between all parliamentary parties in February 2016, the then minister of Education and member of SYRIZA (Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras- Coalition of the Radical Left), Nikos Filis, was called to speak about the immigration issue as a governmental member. Surprisingly, he did not give any information on SYRIZA’s concurrent and upcoming actions; instead, his speech included broad concepts of “democracy” and “humanitarianism” as necessary aspects of immigration policies, without describing, nonetheless, the content of those policies. Moreover, Filis accused the former government of mainstream right for closing Greek borders, thus leading Greece to isolation. He also added that New Democracy (the previous governmental party) cooperates with the extreme right in favor of austerity and corruption, linking the issue of financial crisis with the refugee crisis; closed borders are a GREXIT from Schengen, thus a bad cooperation with the European Union, thus a cause of austerity. Accordingly, SYRIZA, a “new” and “unexperienced” government was not responsible for addressing any crisis; the old parties, in collaboration with the EU should be liable4.
This speech might seem incoherent for a potential reader, however it reveals a truth about how radical left parties handle immigration in everyday life. It is tied to broad concepts of humanitarianism and democratic sensitivity, however, when it comes to actions, they disclaim any liability, turning the speech about immigration and the immigrants themselves into a tool for party competition. Following this observation, this research is going to investigate how Radical Left-wing parties react to Extreme Right’s anti-migration rhetoric. As I argue in this study, SYRIZA, as a government and a left-wing party, is trapped in the contradiction of its own values; its opposition to liberalism (a basic characteristic of the radical left-wing populists) cannot match its acceptance of large immigration flows and, similarly, the party’s humanitarian views on immigration cannot be combined with the Greece’s vulnerable economy. Consequently, SYRIZA seems to express its humanitarian opinion in an effort to limit Golden Dawn’s anti-immigration rhetoric (and its resulting popularity among the electorate). However when it comes to actions, SYRIZA is pinning its hope on the support of the European Union, because the state still needs assistance, due to its weak economy. As far as the refugees themselves are concerned, the lack of capacity of the Greek state is evident in their poor living
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conditions, whereas the discourse about them seems to be an opportunity for party competition, ignoring their need for actual support.
Although a radical left-wing party seems to have no direct interest in defending its ideas against the Extreme Right, Greece’s recent past has shown that both SYRIZA and Golden Dawn appeal to the same electorate; both parties gained popularity during the Greek Indignant Citizens’ Movement in 2011, as they protested against austerity measures and the corrupt, old party-system. As I will explain, both parties are populist (Mudde, 2016) and both parties are presented as defenders of the people against the elite, which is economic (SYRIZA) and cultural (Golden Dawn) globalization. Thus, competition between them is based on ideological differences, rather than political actions. Immigration is a fertile ground for expressing these differences, as it reflects ethical questions, such as human rights and solidarity of people in need, while it also reflects concepts of national security, border protection and national homogeneity.
Consequently, in Golden Dawn’s expressions against immigration, it is expected that SYRIZA reacts by attacking the opponent’s morale. Anti-immigration views and criticism against the government’s loose border policies are addressed by accusations of racism, xenophobia and anti-constitutional behavior, while immigration is presented as an issue directly related to human rights and dignity. In order to observe how this interaction is expressed in discussions’ between both parties, I will analyze the content of 120 parliamentary questions, posed to the government by the extreme right, who is considered to “own” immigration issues in the public discourse, between 2012 and 2018. I chose Greece as a case study, as it is a country that has received large amounts of immigrants during a period of economic austerity, which has led to popularity of both the Extreme Right and the Radical Left. Moreover, SYRIZA has been the main governmental party in Greece since 2015, which means that Golden Dawn’s questions are headed directly to the members of SYRIZA, thus the interaction between them is more intense.
The results of the research are impressing. Golden Dawn as an Extreme Right Party (ERP) seems to link immigration to delinquency, unemployment for the natives, culture, religion, national security, and ethnic homogeneity. SYRIZA on the other hand does not seem to have a coherent strategy: it employs the tactic of avoiding the question in the Parliament and labeling its opponent as racist. In more general terms, while Golden Dawn's strategy is framing immigrants as 'unwanted', 'dangerous', and 'criminal', SYRIZA as a counter strategy frames its opponent as 'criminal' and 'racist' referring to the humanitarian values and solidarity. While
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Golden Dawn is focused on immigrants at an individual level and on society, SYRIZA is focused on discrediting its rival.
The following chapters will explain the main argument, the background of the Case Study and the data analysis. Section 2 moves deeper in the existing literature about party competition and immigration, indicating the gap that this study is willing to cover. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework of my study, analyzing the concepts of populism, party competition and parliamentary activities. Sections 4 and 5 describe the background of the case study, namely the context of the Greek party system, immigration in Greece after 1990s and history and positions of SYRIZA and Golden Dawn. Section 6 describes the methodology of this research, including limitations and descriptive and introductive insights of the data that will be analyzed. Sections 7 and 8 provide with a detailed analysis of the content, providing figures and interpretations. Section 9 concludes.
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2. Party Competition in the Discourse about Immigration: An Overview of the Existing Literature
Europe is faced with the greatest migration inflow since World War II. The increasing insecurity in Middle East and North Africa, following the war and civil conflicts after 2000 has pushed thousands of people and their families to seek for a better life in the developed European countries, either as economic migrants or as asylum seekers. This surge does not come without reaction; an increase in the popularity of Extreme Right Parties (ERPs) is also evident and prevalent in European countries at the moment. The relationship between the two can be easily observed. As Moufahim & Chatzidakis (2012) explain, post-materialism has brought on the spotlight the “soft” concepts of values, identities and lifestyles. Saggar (2003) also states that the immigration issue became important after the 1960s, when insecurity about employment and welfare drove parties to playing the “race card”, which is now a permanent characteristic of the political discourse, especially in the UK, his own field of interest.
This helps ERPs shape a particular form of identity, a specific way of “being”, by othering different cultures. Immigration itself is considered an “explosive issue” (Fareed, 2016), as it brings on the surface these issues. ERPs are usually those which take advantage of every opportunity to express their opposition on immigration, endeavouring to “own” the issue in the public sentiment (Walgrave et al. 2009) and shape the anti-migration feelings of the public opinion. Pisoin & Ahmed (2016) use this concept of fear and “othering” of Muslim populations, in the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. They especially use the example of FPӦ in Austria in order to show how fears about unemployment, religion, criminality and terrorism and their linkage to immigration are the motivating power of the extreme right. Mieriņa & Koroļeva (2015) show that within liberal states it is more likely for xenophobic rhetoric to be reproduced, because of the state’s acceptance of migrant workers and asylum seekers, under a rights-based protection. Accordingly, anti-migration sentiment and xenophobic rhetoric, as well as migration policies of a country seems to be the result of multiple interactions, between parties and public opinion, parties and governments and between parties themselves.
Black (2003) focuses on the interaction between public opinion and parties. People are usually insecure and concerned about economy, welfare and education, however when a party brings the immigration issue into discussion, in combination with the rest, important issues, interest in immigration increases. Thus, what can be realized is that public opinion is influenced by populist parties, at a top-bottom scale, rather than a bottom-up process. Jensen & Frølund
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Thomsen (2011) support this notion of parties influencing public opinion, drawing their attention to issues they might have ignored. They state that people themselves cannot shape the political agenda, while party competition can stimulate or decrease polarity. They use this theory in examining ethnic exclusionism in Denmark and Sweden, in order to show that the more left and right compete for immigration, the more immigration itself remains an important issue for public opinion. But why should we take for granted that left and right parties agree or disagree on migration issues? Is it possible that the more an ERP opposes to migration, the more a left populist party will be in favor of welcoming migrant workers and asylum seekers, or the opposite? Parties, especially populist, are not entities with unchangeable program and positions. Their program is rather shaped and influenced by their opponents. Accepting the notion that populist parties shape the agenda, it is interesting to go beyond the party-public opinion relationship, to the competition between parties, in order to investigate how this agenda is shaped.
Yilmaz (2012) explains that after the 1980s, the differentiation between left and right became weaker, in the light of neoliberalism. Worker representation was diminished and new, cultural issues invaded the public discourse (such as separation of the State and the Church). This “hegemonic crisis” led to the populist competition between “people” and “regime”. According to him, populist right was the first to start the conversation on immigrants and refugees and, consequently returned public opinion to the old, ideological competition between left and right. Judging from the outcome and the actions of populist parties, they “won”. In other words, the left-right polarization per se is a result of the action of right-wing populism, which used immigrants to spread this attitude to the people as well. Could that mean that left-populism already exists because of the extreme right? This could be a starting point for further research in how immigration is reflected in the competition between left-wing and right-wing parties.
So far, scholarship is mostly focused on party competition only at an ERPs-mainstream parties scale. Harmel and Svåsand (1997) have shown that when a mainstream parties (both left and right) move to the right due to the danger of an electoral loss by a successful new party. Roodmijn et al. (2014) and Alonso & Claro da Fonseca (2012) also support this thesis, especially when the new party is a populist and extreme-right party. Bale et al. (2010) also explain that especially mainstream left competes with extreme right, as they both target the same electoral group, which is poor workers. Mainstream left is more likely to move rightwards, as its ideological identity is more wide and, thus, it is easier for voters to lose their trust or feel that their beliefs are less expressed (Alonso & Claro da Fonseca, 2012).
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Mainstream right is also likely to move towards extreme-right rhetoric, although this might be risky for their liberal voters (Van Kersbergen & Krouwel, 2008).
Grigoriadis & Dilek (2018) examine political reaction to immigration and refugee inflows under the context of securitization at a domestic level. EU populist, especially right-wing parties have brought the issue of security after 9/11. But “speaking about security” leads to “practicing security”, which means that fears about safety usually influence governmental actions towards securitization. In 2012, the Greek government (a coalition between the conservative, mainstream right New Democracy and the mainstream left PASOK-Panhellenic Socialist Movement) built a fence in Evros river, the natural border between Turkey and Greece, in order to limit the inflows of asylum seekers and refugees within the Greek territory. According to their analysis this is an action influenced by the far-right Golden Dawn and the discourse about security, as expressed in Europe, despite the opposition of the latter to the construction of the fence. There is an evident interaction between mainstream parties and ERPs, especially when it comes to governmental actions. As mentioned, it is a matter of party competition, as mainstream parties are confronted with a risk of electoral loss, in the emergence of Golden Dawn. But how this concept is reflected in the relation between two, populist parties is another, interesting discussion.
Bulli & Soare (2018) examine the interaction between two populist parties in the context of migration policies, namely between LN and M5S, in Italy. In an extensive literature review, they end comparing both anti-migrant parties in terms of stability of their views. LN turns to be more stable to its positions than M5S, which changes its attitude according to the zeitgeist. What is important here is that there seems to be an impact of the extreme populist right on another populist party. Whereas both are opposed to immigration, party competition between the two could influences the second, weaker and less popular party towards a more changeable approach to immigration. But when it comes to different radical ideologies, this observation might be reshaped. How possible is it for a populist left party to be influenced by an ERP?
Literature is restricted when it comes to this question. Balfour et al. (2016) are few of the scholars that examine also the populist left reactions and notions on migration issues. They make a distinction between the left-wing populist rights-based approaches on solidarity, while far-right public speech is based on xenophobic platforms and identity-based fears of multiculturalism. The refugee crisis of 2015 turned the “secondary” issue of immigration to the center of political discourse, while parties (especially right-wing) took advantage of the issue to reactivate the interest of their voters, especially in EU countries that experienced the terrorist threat (such as France). What they argue is that mainstream left and right also moved to the
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right, especially considering issues of integration, which was mostly conceptualized as assimilation of migrant populations, rather that inclusion. Generally, mainstream parties have “lost” to the presence of the far-right, as they are unable to handle the crisis, ending to succumb to the populist speech themselves. What is missing, however is the reaction and the effect of the refugee crisis on the populist left, despite the fact that they accept the role of populist left in the public discourse. Even if an extreme party mainly benefits from the crisis, there is a strong presence of left populism in Southern Europe (e.g. Greece and Spain), which competes with ERPs for the preference of the “indignant” electorate.
Van Prooijen et al. (2018) make an effort to examine left-wing and right-wing populist parties as a whole. Despite their different ideological roots, they argue that both have some similarities that are interesting for further research. According to their view, refugee crisis itself has stimulated the polarity between right and left ideologies. Populist right parties have a “narrow-minded” reaction, being concerned about the maintenance of order and tradition, whereas populist left parties appear to be less concerned about the issue and more certain about their efficacy. Mainstream parties face the immigration issue as a complex challenge with various aspects (such as financial, social, political and cultural). On the contrary, populist parties converge in terms of solutions; both consider the solution to the crisis as a simple issue, namely deportation (right) and solidarity and asylum for everyone (left). What is interesting here is how these different solutions interact at both a part-party and at a party-government scale. As stated in the introduction chapter, Greece is an ideal case for further study, as its government is a populist government, consisting mainly by left-wing politicians, members of SYRIZA (Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras-Coalition of the Radical Left). During SYRIZA’s governance, Greece has received more than 800.000 refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants only between 2015 and 2016 (UNHCR), while extreme-right, nationalist Golden Dawn has gained popularity, especially in the territories where “hot spots” and refugee camps are located, namely in the East-Aegean islands (Sekeris & Vasilakis, 2016).
Stavrakakis et al. (2017) already set this debate in the Greek context. They examine the differences between populist left (SYRIZA) and Extreme Right in accordance with their general positions and their opinion on migrant integration. SYRIZA is found to be more pluralist and open to migrant populations compared to the right. Although they recognize the extreme right Golden Dawn as a nationalist, anti-democratic, authoritarian supporter of racial and ethnic “purity” (thus nativist), they exclude it from the comparison. Instead they compare SYRIZA to its governmental ally, ANEL (Anexartiti Ellines-Independent Greeks), a right-wing populist party that formed a coalition with SYRIZA in 2015, against austerity. They find
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that the vast majority of SYRIZA voters and members believe that immigrants should not adopt the Greek way of living, while ANEL believes the opposite and is in favor of assimilation. As for Golden Dawn, they reject its identification with a populist party, as they are a neo-Nazi, paramilitary scheme. What is problematic with this view is that it excludes a democratically-elected party, which is widely accepted by scholarship as an ERP, and has a larger electorate than ANEL. Moreover, Golden Dawn is the main party that mobilizes migration as a main, vital issue for Greek society, while ANEL expressed mainly its opposition to austerity measures, which was the main reason for its election. Under the concept of “issue ownership”, Golden Dawn is the party that is the most vocal in the public discourse about immigration in Greece. Finally, the power of ANEL is diminished, as numerous members moved to SYRIZA during their common governance, while Golden Dawn remains stable, if not boosted in the emergence of the refugee crisis. On the other hand, however, their results show that, despite their coalition, SYRIZA and ANEL do not influence each other regarding migration issues, which might mean that their main mission is fiscal adjustment, while migration policy is not a top priority. This is an important aspect of how SYRIZA has reacted to immigration issues so far.
Figgou (2015) investigates how the discourse about “illegality” of migrants is a useful counter-argument to the need of shaping a complete immigration law in Greece. The relationship under examination here is the one between citizenship and national identity. Using these concepts, Golden Dawn expresses its opposition to multiculturalism and brings into the spotlight the issue of security and national homogeneity, othering Islam and equating it with terrorism. However, this fear of “illegal” immigration hide an underlying racial prejudice and is used as an argument for opposition to regular immigration as well. Nonetheless, the reaction of SYRIZA is not clear here, despite the fact that, as a governmental party, it has the authority to shape asylum and migration policies. According to Nestoras (2015), for SYRIZA, pro-refugee agency is mostly a battle of words. The so-called concept of “illegal immigrants” is a certain field of discourse between SYRIZA and Golden Dawn. The latter considers every foreign-born person in the country as an agent of irregular migration, while the former supports their right of asylum and integration, as there are no “illegal people”. However, when it comes to take decisive steps towards the improvement of the living conditions of the refugees, SYRIZA disclaims any liability; the neo-liberal policies of Europe are responsible for the humanitarian crisis in the Aegean Sea. Moreover, financial vulnerability of Greece seems to be
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an inhibitor when it comes to integration. SYRIZA seems to attribute responsibility for the refugee crisis to European policies.5
Evangelinidis (2016), explains that the Greek government’s humanitarian rhetoric is based on the right of refugees and asylum seekers to move to the country of their preference, even if this is against the European Law. Although the attack on the opponent’s morale has a positive effect on people’s solidarity sentiment (Agelopoulos, 2015), what could this sympathy and acceptance mean for refugees and asylum seekers themselves is another issue. So far, nothing; refugee crisis in Greece has taken the shape of a humanitarian crisis as well; people cross the Greek borders or die in hot spots every day under indecent and poor conditions, while human rights violations are a reality that all newcomers have to deal with. How this crisis is reflected on the rhetoric of both populist parties and to what extent they interact with each other and with what results is a topic for further research. The next section discusses the theoretical framework of this study in investigating the interaction between populist left and right-wing parties in Greece.
5 In 2017, SYRIZA established a new coordinating section of the party, which is responsible for immigration
issues. The official announcement about its establishment included the following: “The idea of a physically bordered Europe-a real fortress- is against international legitimacy and human values […] The prevention policies that are shaped by hegemonic Europe, closed borders and constant, every-day obstacles to the (refugees’) relocation have nothing to do with its tradition; they cultivate and boost xenophobic, racist and extreme-right voices […]”. More on this announcement are available at
https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/71750/To-neo-syntonistiko-toy-Tmhmatos-Prosfygikoy-%E2%80%93-Metanasteytikoy-toy-SYRIZA1.html (only in Greek).
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3. Populism, the Left-Right Convergence and Issue Competition
In order to examine the dynamics that shape pro- or anti-migration rhetoric, it is useful to analyze the circumstances under which parties interact. This thesis focuses on left and right-wing populist parties, because, as explained below, they seem to appeal to the same electorate, despite the fact that they come from radically different ideologies. Consequently, they are more likely to enhance their differences in public speech, in order to promote their uniqueness. As in Greece both left-wing and right-wing populist parties of SYRIZA and Golden Dawn expressed their opposition to austerity measures and European policies, it is more likely to compete in other important issues that are urgent in the political agenda, such as migration and refugee crisis. Moreover, SYRIZA, as a governmental party, is also likely to try to avoid full answers regarding immigration issues, while trying to enhance ideological differences. In other words, immigration is the main deviation point between populist left and right in the context if agreement on other issues.
Anthony Downs (1957) has shown that parties try to draw attention on ideology rather than on actual political actions, aiming for an electoral win. Voters select a party according to their income or benefits provided by governments (and governmental parties). Thus, in a democracy where (rational6) voters are not fully-informed on the quality of governmental action, selection is made according to ideologies and their beliefs, as shaped by comparing all competent parties. This means that parties take advantage of the electorate’s ignorance and try to influence them regardless of their policy, using “agents”. Firstly, agents let parties be aware of the attitudes within voters, giving them the ability to act according to public opinion. Then, according to Downs (1957), the lack of information creates a “demand for ideologies in the electorate”.
Consequently, voters that have no information on governmental work, vote for ideologies, while the government and parties within democracies cultivate imperfect knowledge, so as to withdraw unequal distributions and unfair policies. (Downs, 1957; Dalton, 2008). This strategic polarization is most evident in multi-party systems, as voters have a wide range of choice. Multi-party systems lead to coalition governments, which may reflect multiple ideologies, so ideological competition can be more intense. Voters are no well-informed because, although they vote according to the potential benefits, they do not believe their selection can really determine the result (Downs, 1957).
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Accordingly, Greece at the moment is a multi-party democracy. SYRIZA, a radical left party that is the main governmental force, tries to be re-elected. As Pantazopoulos (2013) explains, SYRIZA’s anti-austerity rhetoric led to its initial electoral success. However, SYRIZA’s government did not manage to “change” EU policies, as it expected after its win in 2015 (Mudde, 2017). Following Downs’ reasoning, in order to influence public opinion towards a new electoral win, SYRIZA should try to persuade its voters by attacking the ideology of its opponents, while trying to avoid answering about its actual actions. Golden Dawn is a perfect example of an opponent; it is an anti-austerity, extreme right party, that appealed to anti-memorandum and anti-EU protesters, as SYRIZA did. The similarities between both parties can be clearer when analyzing theories regarding populism.
According to a previous interpretation of populism, expressed by Aslanidis (2016), populism can be described as a discourse that perceives society as an entity, which is divided in two, antagonistic groups. The “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”. Populists support the notion that policy should be a reflection of the volonté générale (general will) of people (Mudde, 2004), while they are opposed to pluralism, elitism, liberalism and cosmopolitanism, as these values are perceived as challenging for the homogeneity and the welfare of the people. Populism, as expressed in Europe at the moment, includes radical ideologies, nationalism and euroscepticism, always enhancing the competition between the people and the “establishment” (Katsambekis, 2017). For populist parties, people should be the motivating power of every radical change and they are the main actor, who questions authority.
In Europe, most states are considered to be what Rodrik (2018) calls “liberal technocracies”, which means that they are restricted both politically and economically, following international regimes, rather than the will of the electorate, something that stimulates the discourse about a deficit of democracy in the EU. A basic characteristic of populism is that it claims to speak in favor of people, who share the same interests. Moreover, populist parties try to prevent any restriction to their authority, both economic and political. For instance, the world trade regime might limit the freedom of the populist party within a specific state, thus it should be overcome (financial populism). Similarly, in the political context, if an institution or an authority is considered to be an obstacle to the will of the populist party, it should be ignored as well (political populism). Under this concept, Rodrik (2018) suggests that financial populism is occasionally needed in democracies, as it is the only way to prevent political populism. Put differently, in cases where people are dissatisfied by the state due to economic reasons, it is suggested that parties should undertake some actions against the economic regime, in order to avoid further dissatisfaction of people with institutions, that might lead to their preference for
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parties that oppose these institutions. This is a useful concept to bear in mind when explaining the rise of populism in Greece during financial crisis. In this case, people voted in favor of parties that opposed austerity measures. If institutional grievance was more prevalent in the public sentiment, intervention of populist parties in democratic institutions might be a challenge for liberal democracy.
In his article “Populism and the Economics of Globalization”, Rodrik (2018) explains how both the ethno-national and the anti-liberal aspects of populism are results of what he calls the “globalization shock” When it comes to the rise of populist parties, the way it is expressed is related to how globalization is felt by the society. When globalization is reflected in migration flows, the ideas of ethnic separation emerge, leading to the rise of populism and nativist parties. On the other hand, when globalization is a salient issue in terms of trade, finance and investment, the primary issue is the competitiveness of the state under discussion; the less competitive it is, the more the financial crisis is deepened, which means that the need of austerity measures becomes prevalent. Austerity leads to the people’s demand of redistribution, which is the main position of populist parties. In the case of Greece, globalization shock is realized under both perspectives; In a period of austerity, where the impact of the Great Recession brought at the spotlight the weaknesses of the Greek economy, the country had to encounter another challenge, namely the great number of refugees and asylum seekers entering its territory after 2010 and to date.
But which are the main characteristics of populist parties at the moment? Pappas (2016) distinguishes between three types of populist parties; antidemocratic, nativist and “pure” populist. According to this distinction, anti-democratic parties make a compromise with the rules of parliamentarism, however they question them openly. They are in favor of state interventionism in open markets and capitalism and they tend to be correlated with actions of violence. Golden Dawn is usually presented as an anti-democratic party. However, after their prosecution as a criminal group in 2013, they have limited their anti-democratic speech, focusing on nationalist expressions against the political system, trying to resemble nativist parties of the EU. Nativist parties are supporters of welfare chauvinism, but do not question democratic institutions and constitutional law. Furthermore, they do not oppose liberalism, however they impose identity issues, being negative to the co-existence of the “nation” and the immigrants, who are perceived as an invasive other. Populist right-wing parties of EU countries, such as LN in France or FPӦ in Austria might belong to this category. Finally pure populists are loyal to democratic values, but they undertake illiberal actions, especially when it comes to expressing their disagreement with liberal policies. As Mudde (2017) argues, the
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relationship between populism and liberal democracy is complex and includes “the good, the bad and the ugly”. The “good” trait of this relationship is that populism brings into the surface important issues that are widely avoided by the elite (e.g. austerity and immigration). However the “bad” aspect is that populism denies potential differences and inequalities within the entity of the “pure people”. Consequently, people or groups of people that express their opposition to a populist rhetoric are immediately categorized as part of the elite. Finally, when it comes to power, populism reveals its “ugly face”; it risks the balances of liberal democracy, by excluding the agenda of its opponents, while creating polarization.
SYRIZA seems to be placed in this final subcategory of populist parties. As a first “good” aspect of its increasing popularity was the fact that dissatisfaction of people became known to the decision makers, both at a domestic and an EU scale. However, a “bad” aspect of their rhetoric was that they quickly expressed against “capitalists” and “rich” people, while middle class in Greece was either the party’s valuable allies, or “petty householders”, who were aggressively opposed to the “common good” in order to protect their property. Finally, the recent years of their governance are characterized by polarity; the discourse about the right-left distinction is a daily trait of their political speech, boosted by historical conflicts between the two groups.
Apart from the different categories they belong to, left and right-wing populists have even more differences regarding their origin and behavior. First of all, the political space was reshaped after the 1960s towards different concepts of justice and different ideas. Instead of the traditional Right-Left division, cultural conflicts between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values gave a new dimension to party competition, leading to the rise of the New Left and the Extreme Populist Right, which are two opposite poles (Bornschier, 2010). According to Katsambekis (2017), the difference between left and right-wing populists is that the former recognize the people as an heterogeneous group, consisting of various classes, ethnic groups, religions, etc., which are, however cooperating against the (liberal) elite that obstructs their welfare, whereas the latter does not focus on the heterogeneity of people, but the homogeneity of their nation, thus excluding potential discords, such as people of other nationality or religion. Salmela and von Scheve (2018) try to define the emotional dynamics that motivate Right-wing and Left-wing populism. They conceptualize populism as a result of fear and insecurity of contemporary societies. Right-Wing expressions of populism are based on the sentiment of hate against those who are perceived as its enemies, while Left-Wing populism is usually expressed through actions regarding the emancipation of the people from liberal policies leading to austerity. What happens when these two opposite notions of justice
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interfere and oppose in the same political system is one of the main issues under investigation in this paper.
Examining them separately, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties are radical at a level of rejecting the established sociopolitical system, while they are considered to be populist as long as they use the public sentiments of fear and disappointment in order to negotiate with their opponents (Betz, 1993). Radical Left-Wing Populist Parties also have these characteristics, however during the past years of “ideological prevalence” of left parties, workers continued feeling marginalized in the welfare state. Thus, the migration inflows under the acceptance of the domestic stakeholders was perceived as ignorance of their problems (Givens, 2017). Moving deeper to their similarities, Lamprianou & Ellinas (2017) explain that institutional grievances are a dominant factor that leads to the rise of populism. Accordingly, there is a notion that voters might easily move from a populist party to another. Indeed, Golden Dawn and SYRIZA came to fame after the demonstrations and protests of “indignant citizens” in Athens. For more than five, continuous months, people would participate in these protests every afternoon, expressing their opposition to the “old-party system”, asking for new political reforms and parties that would be closer to people than to the interests of elitist groups. Both SYRIZA and Golden Dawn expressed an anti-austerity rhetoric, while calling for “leaving” or “changing” Europe. Following this reasoning, it is possible that, as long as both parties gained popularity in the same public movement, they compete for the same electorate. And if that is the case, followed by both parties’ opposition to fiscal adjustment, it is expected that they both try to expose their ideological differences to the public, in order to gain its preference. Put in another way, the reason voters should prefer SYRIZA instead of Golden Dawn or the opposite, lies in their unique characteristics and not in their similarities. What makes a unique characteristic for both these parties and the rest of left and right-wing populist parties in Europe is their ideology, as well as their positions on immigration.
Especially when it comes to asylum seekers and Muslim refugees, right-wing populists do not accept actions of sympathy; refugees are considered to be an invasive other, that put at risk the homogeneity of the nation (Ignatieff, 2017). Especially after 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in Europe after 2010, the extreme right presented Muslim terrorists as a generalized and extended threat, opposing those who entered Europe seeking for help. Despite the fact that terrorist attacks were undertaken by people who were born and raised in European territories, fear was a salient issue of the extreme right rhetoric. On the contrary, the reaction of left-wing populists to the refugee or migration crises seems to be what Mooers (2009) has called “the fetishism of difference”; they enhance the importance of multicultural citizenship because they
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want to surpass inequalities that already exist in capitalist economies, apart from race or gender. Although the receiving country might confront poverty, austerity or weak institutional structure, they usually take advantage of refugee populations in order to express their ideas of solidarity and multiculturalism, so that they appeal to their electorate. In Greece, SYRIZA has continuously presented migrants as victims, weak people in need of protection and as poor, vulnerable groups, while mainstream parties who call for a conservative migration policy are presented as “inhuman, racist extreme rights”7. Thus, migration issues are tied to ideological values.
Finally, competition between SYRIZA and Golden Dawn should be reflected in their parliamentary work. Green-Pedersen has repeatedly referred to the concepts of “issue competition” (2007) and “issue ownership” (2010). Accordingly, parties compete for the issues that should be put primarily in the political agenda. In the past, competition was mainly ideological, however nowadays there is a complexity in all important issues, so competition is based mostly on the issues themselves, rather than ideas. The main aim of a party is to draw the opponent’s attention on the topic it considers as salient. For instance, in this case study, Golden Dawn might speak about migration issues, in order to force other political parties to expose their ideas on the same topic. Thus, through competition, agenda is shaped by all parties. Interestingly, it is possible that parties take advantage of controversial issues, in order to express their different opinion and juxtapose it to their competitors. The increase of issue competition among European parties has led to a shift in non-legislative parliamentary activities, namely parliamentary questions to the government. What he also explains is that these activities are popular among parties, as they call the government to answer a topic that is chosen by the parties themselves. Of course, parties usually prefer to ask about issues that they “own” (Green-Pedersen, 2010). Ownership is achieved by continuous reference to the topic, either in speeches or in the media, or in parliamentary work. Consequently, a nativist party might pose questions about the issues of ethnic homogeneity or migration, in order to expose its opponents’ ideas and own the issue in the public sentiment.
What is achieved by issue ownership, is that parties are considered to be the entities who have better knowledge of this specific issue. Moreover, they appear to be the ones who “care”
7 In February, 2016, during a parliamentary discussion, Nikos Filis, the former Greek Minister of Education and
member of SYRIZA, mentioned that New Democracy, the previous, mainstream right government, cooperates with extreme right forces against immigrants, leading to the drowning of refugees while crossing the sea borders. New Democracy was in favor of a strict border policy; however there has never been any evidence regarding cooperation with the extreme right, especially considering the fact that Golden Dawn members were prosecuted during its governance. www.parliament.gr
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about the issue, compared to their opponents. What I investigate in this thesis is how the migration issue is reflected in parliamentary discussions between the right and the left-wing populists, what this reflection might mean for the way that governmental actions are shaped and to what extent the discourse between the two implies their claim for the same electoral basis.
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4. The Greek Populist Tradition and the Crises of 2010 and 2015
This chapter sets the background of the case study. The first part describes how populism has always been present in the Greek party system, leading to the election of populist, anti-austerity parties after 2012, as well as the values that shape anti-immigration sentiment in Greece. The second part focuses on immigration as an emerging issue for the Greek State after 1990 and to date. In this way, the data under examination (see Appendix I) can be better understood, as they contain information regarding these values (such as religion).
4.a. The Greek party System
Vasilopoulou et al. (2014) have expressed the notion that Greek democracy is a “populist democracy”. As they explain, populism is an important trait of the Greek party system and this can be reflected on the parties’ tension to avoid any liability for their actions and to shift the responsibility to their opponents. After the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974 and the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy, two parties were perceived as the most popular competitors; New Democracy, a mainstream right party with conservative beliefs and PASOK (Panellinion Socialistiko Kinima-Panhellenic Socialist Movement), the first mass socialist party in Greece, which also formed the first socialist Greek government in 1981 (Tsakalotos, 1998). PASOK brought a wide variety of economic reforms towards modernization (Tsakalotos, 1998; Lyrintzis, 1987); for instance, the welfare state was re-shaped following a social-democratic pattern and labor rights were protected. Moreover, PASOK brought changes in social values; the abolition of dowry agreements and the decriminalization of adultery are only some of them (Dimitras, 1990).
PASOK was a populist party, regarding its opposition to institutions8. Furthermore, it cultivated in the consciousness of people what Pappas (2014) calls “Biased Beliefs”; anti-market, anti-foreign and anti-institutional sentiments. Anti-market beliefs opposed to the free market mechanisms, considering the intentions of individuals and markets as “immoral”. Anti-foreign sentiment was mostly related to anti-American views, while there was a distinction between those who were believed to admire Greeks and those who were perceived as
Anthellines (anti-Greeks). The latter became a vivid feeling in Greek society especially after
the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974), which was perceived as the result of a conspiracy of
8 For instance, according to Vasilopoulou (2018), PASOK was strongly opposed to EEC membership during the
first years of its popularity. One of its most famous slogans was “EEC and NATO, form part of the same syndicate”, attacking the “dependency status” of Greece, who joined EEC in 1978, while ND was the government.
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external actors (such as England and the US). As far as the anti-institutional beliefs are concerned, people’s dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic system and their notion of corrupt state mechanisms and institutions were important issues that directed the public vote (Pappas, 2014).
These issues were reflected in the Greek political discourse. As Pappas (2014) explains, institutional grievances contributed to the maintenance of political clientelism; people would not consider the Greek State as a meritocratic one, which could provide them with welfare and protection, thus it was a safer option to vote for a party in exchange of occupation in the public sector, otherwise they might not have the chance to claim their right to employment, due to the “corrupt” system. Tsoukalas (1991) has explained that “political clientelism” and patronage in the relationship between policymakers and individuals led to a high amount of occupation in the public sector and in services, rather than in vital parts of the Greek economy, such as agriculture. As a result, the majority of native-born population was interested in being employed in public services or being self-employed, whereas production declined.
Apart from the Greeks’ preference in being employed in institutions and services, their cultural values have proven to shape decision makers’ action, in the context of “political clientelism” and patronage, as described above. Greek mentality is based on some archetypical “virtues” that determine their attitude towards politicians and other populations (Rozakou, 2012). These virtues include the ideas of religion and historical supremacy. According to a recent survey on the differences between Eastern and Western Europe when it comes to national identity and beliefs, 76% of Greek people consider religion as an important element of their national identity. Moreover, 89% consider their culture as superior to the others, granting them the highest score in the European sample9.
Consequently, it comes with no question that the economic crisis in Greece in 2010 came to challenge and question this mentality of Greek people. The generous Greek welfare state was strictly criticized, whereas the overload of public employees, in combination with the high amount of public expenditure going to extra benefits to public workers. In 2007, only three years before the emergence of the crisis in the country, public expenditure for social protection and health was more than 22% of Greece’s GDP, whereas the economy’s deficit was -7% (Eurostat, 2007). However, while economists might have predicted the surge of the Greek debt in the upcoming years, people still believed that their life would not change. The resorting of
9 Pew Research Center, 2018
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the Greek government to the EU support mechanism inaugurated a new period of strict monitoring and austerity measures, taking Greek citizens, who expected that their political choices, as well as their comfort in high-paid jobs and their consequent benefits had come without a price, by surprise. Knowing that previous governments took advantage of their need for employment and welfare, calling them to compensate for their “loose years”, they soon expressed their grievance against the old party system, calling for an end to austerity (Aslanidis & Marantzidis, 2016).
For more than five continuous months, from May to October 2011, Syntagma square, the central square of Athens, which is located in front of the Greek Parliament building was full of “indignant citizens”, who protested against austerity and old parties. Their manifestos, however where not specific. Some of them demanded a constitutional change, that would lead to the ancient Greek pattern of “Direct Democracy”. Some other groups expressed their opposition only to the concept of paying for public goods, avoiding to pay for transportation, toll post, taxes and services. Some other would protest against EU membership, while others would support a EU model based on inclusion. Despite their basic differences, people cooperated towards the so-called change, supporting solidarity between them. Ideologies were of secondary importance; Greek people’s interest was the center of attention.
The impact of the Indignant Citizens Movement (Kinima Aganaktismenon Politon) on public voting became evident in the national elections of 2012 (Aslanidis & Marantzidis, 2016). Old parties, PASOK and New Democracy were still the new government, as they agreed to collaborate in order to form a strong coalition that would be able to negotiate the fiscal adjustment with the EU and IMF representatives. However, their parties were obviously defeated; the real “winners” of this electoral “battle” were the extreme right (Golden Dawn) and left-wing populists (Coalition of the Radical Left-SYRIZA). Both of them existed many years before the crisis, however they were less popular, especially due to their radical past. Golden Dawn was accused of racist and anti-left attacks during the 1990s and the 2000s, whereas SYRIZA was a parliamentary party of small percentage (approximately 3,5-4%), that was denounced by mainstream parties as a supporter of anarchist and anti-authority groups, as the party’s youth would often cooperate with such groups in protests against educational reforms. SYRIZA turned to be the second party in people’s preference, being the main parliamentary opponent of the coalition government. Golden Dawn surged from 0% to almost 7% (Ministry of Interior Affairs, 201210), bringing into the surface a fear that was ignored by
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the majority of Greek people; the Greek society was still very conservative and had not abandoned its populist sentiments. On the contrary, the impact of populist values in Greek people’s voting behavior was most obvious than ever. “Populist democracy” retrieved its power, and reshaped itself, using different and even more extreme powers. In 2015, this was evident; SYRIZA was now a governmental party, while Golden Dawn had stable results, yet it was third in public preference, outnumbering PASOK of the “old system” in the overall votes (Ministry of Interior Affairs, 201511).
4.b. Immigration in Greece and the Refugee Challenge
As expected, these values and pathogenicity could not but be reflected in the Greek migration policies after 1980. Greece was mostly known as a sending country after World War II, as more than 5 million people migrated to Northern Europe, Northern America and Australia. However, after Greece became a member of the EU, it attracted an increasing amount of populations. Migration inflows emerged as an increasingly important issue only after the geo-political changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent downfall of communism in Balkan countries (Triantafyllidou, 2009). Since 1991 and to date, more than 1,5 million people have crossed the Greek borders, aiming to start a new life . Nowadays, the official number of foreign-born people in Greece is 999.911 out of 11 million people (OECD, 2014), which means that about 9% of the population is of foreign descent. The vast majority is from Eastern Europe, especially from Albania, but also from the Middle East, namely Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Iraq. There is also presence of migrants of African and Latin-American origin, but at a lower rate (OECD,2017).
Despite the significant number of foreign-born people in the Greek territory, Greece did not have a decent migration law before the late 1990s, while usually legislation would occur after the emergence of a migration crisis. Albanian families that crossed the Greek border after 1991 led to such a crisis; they made the Greek government face its own inefficiency to control not only irregular inflows, but also the quality of life and the integration of migrant populations. Most policies were focused on the citizenship of migrants, but after a long period of their illegal working and living in the country. Moreover, Greek people seemed to take advantage of the immigrants’ precarious situation. Most immigrants are employed them in low-paid jobs, while many of them were victims of racist attacks. However, the fact that the majority of native-born population was interested in being employed in public service, due to the reasons that are
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mentioned, created the need for cheap labor in vulnerable sectors and in occupations that are considered “heavy” and demanding (Alipranti-Maratou, 2007). Consequently, in order to avoid a collapse in production, legalization of illegal migrants became necessary. In the following years, migrant populations have taken important steps towards integration. They participate in the Greek economy, they create families and their children are recognized as Greek citizens, having full access to education, welfare and insurance (Ministry of Immigration Policy).
The years of financial crisis in Greece, however, coincided with the generalized crisis in Middle East and North Africa. Civil conflicts, wars and insurrections in countries such as Pakistan, Syria and Iran led many people to decide to move to European countries. Greece, due to its geographical position is considered to be a first country of choice; as an EU country, it still provides the benefits of asylum and integration, following EU regulations, while moving from Greece to other European countries should not be a difficult process. Consequently, from 2014 only and to date, more than 1 million refugees and asylum seekers (1,131,376 according to UNHCR, 2018) have crossed the Greek sea borders and have found temporary accommodation in refugee camps in the Greek islands and Northern Greece. At the moment, the estimated average number of arrivals per day is more than one hundred. The vast majority of them is asylum seekers. Even if not all of them have made use of regular methods to enter the country12, the asylum process in Greece is quite slow and bureaucratic; no matter of their status, asylum applicants are supposed to wait, or even re-apply in case they are rejected.
How Greek society reacts to this sudden increase can be easily reflected on the policies of its elected representatives. Golden Dawn, as a nationalist, right-wing party is strongly opposed to the so-called “invasion of smuggled immigrants”, paying attention to the marginalization of Greek workers and their families and on the precarious position of the Greek homogeneity, in the light of the increasing population of Muslims. On the contrary, SYRIZA was more active as an opposition party, rather than as a governmental party. Before 2015, support and integration of all asylum seekers was the only solution that was compatible with its members’ notions of solidarity and humanitarianism. The following chapter will analyze in depth the manifestos of both SYRIZA and Golden Dawn, aiming to present their similarities and to explain their ideological background, which motivates and stimulates their competition.
12 In their 2017 survey for International Organization for Migration, Tahir, Kaner and Bury stated that for
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5. The old “new” parties of change: History and positions of SYRIZA and GD 5.a. Breaking “the serpent’s egg”: The rise and ideology of Golden Dawn
“The Popular Nationalist Movement of GOLDEN DAWN is at the forefront of the battle against the Memorandum and the sinful system of the parties of the political establishment. Against the population distortion, because of the millions of illegal immigrants, and the dissolution of the Greek society that is promoted by the coalition parties and the so called Left. It proposes a National policy for exiting the crisis imposed on our country. It fights for a Greece that belongs to the Greeks.”13
Popular Union-Golden Dawn is a nationalist party, whose action became known to the public in mid-1990s, when it participated in EU parliament elections (1994), as well as in National elections (1996) and continued taking part to date. The official website of Golden Dawn offers no further information regarding its historical background, despite the fact that the party exists before the 1990s. What is avoided to be said is that Golden Dawn has strong connections with Greece’s authoritarian past; the party’s founding members already participated in political groups which supported the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936-1941), while the leader of Golden Dawn was also a member of EPEN, a youth organization formed by dictator Georgios Papadopoulos, who established an authoritarian regime in Greece back in 1967 and until 1974 (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015). After its establishment in 1983, the party remained inactive until 1990s, when it started taking part in elections, however without success.
Golden Dawn was mostly perceived as a paramilitary, extremist group. During the 1990s, some of its members were accused of violent and abusive actions, especially against left-wing students and activists and against immigrants. However, the party remained unknown and marginalized during the following years, as it did not achieve any electoral win before 2010, when its leader, Nikos Michaloliakos was elected as a member of the municipality of Athens (Ministry of the Interior, 2010).
The popularity of Golden Dawn increased during 2011 and 2012, when it received almost 7% at both the National elections of May and June. Its anti-austerity rhetoric, in combination with the general dissatisfaction of people from both most popular post-dictatorship parties directed the poll towards their decline, under the context of a common will for “change”. This is why, according to Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou (2015), the voters of Golden Dawn have
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not specific demographic characteristics, comparing to the electorate of other European populist right-wing parties. What is likely, however is that people that work both in the primary and secondary sector and are strongly opposed EU are more prone to vote for Golden Dawn. Indeed, as it can be easily understood from the party’s self-identification above, Golden Dawn is supposed to be a solution to the crisis and memoranda policies, opposing to the “sinful” party system, which clearly reflects the public sentiment against the “old” parties as expressed in 2011.
Consequently, the main positions of Golden Dawn’s political manifesto are focused on the concept of the Greek Nation State and the economic crisis. Accordingly, they build their rhetoric on the idea of the “National Tragedy”, which means that “traitor” decision makers took advantage of the illusions of the citizens about finding employment in the public sector, ending to a vicious circle of corruption and waste of public wealth14. The financial crisis is regarded as an experience that awakened the people and stimulated their desire for national independence, against the domination of foreign stakeholders. Golden Dawn longs for the renaissance of the “glorious Hellenism” and is in favor of geostrategic claims (such as unification with Cyprus or North Epirus).
As far as the Debt is concerned, GD does not recognize it and opts for its cancellation, as it is a result of corrupt governments that should pay for it or be sentenced to imprisonment. The party’s thesis on the position of Greece in the EU is that the EU destroyed state economy, thus it suggests that all production should be under state control. Banks should be public and wealth needs to be redistributed according to the needs of Greek people. In addition, GD supports reforms in constitutional law and suggests providing Greek people with incentives, so that they create families, opposing abortion and self-determination.15
Apart from institutional and economic changes, Golden Dawn devotes a wide share of its programme to immigrants, or, as they mention, to “illegal” immigrants. According to their positions, all immigrants should be deported, as they consist a threat for Greek employment and Greek spirit and nation16. They liken immigrants to criminals, taking for granted their involvement in illicit activities, such as smuggling and suggest their exclusion from welfare
14 See more on Golden Dawn’s positions and manifesto at
http://www.xryshaygh.com/assets/files/xa_politiko_programma.pdf (available in Greek only)
15 See more on Golden Dawn’s positions and manifesto at
http://www.xryshaygh.com/assets/files/xa_politiko_programma.pdf (available in Greek only)
16 About the threat of immigration for the Greek nation, Golden Dawn’s manifesto mentions: “Demographic
ageing is a deadly risk for Hellenism. Combining it with large illegal immigration inflows means that in a few years we are going to be a minority within our own Homeland”.
