Framing in the European decision-making process : analysis of the decision on the refugee relocation system

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Framing in the European

decision-making process

Analysis of the decision on the

refugee relocation system

Roos Lankhorst

11787074

rosemarielankhorst@gmail.com

European politics and policy in times of

crisis

First supervisor: Rosa Sanchez Salgado

Second supervisor: Beste Isleyen

Master Thesis Political Science

Specialisation International Relations

Graduate School of Social Sciences

University of Amsterdam

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1 In this thesis, I have attempted to make a contribution to the complicated and urgent debate on European migration policy. I would like to thank my supervisor Rosa Sanchez-Salgado, for her ongoing advice and – always quick – feedback. This really helped me to continuously keep writing and stay motivated.

Also, I would like to thank the five people that were willing to be interviewed by me and gave their view on this complex issue. These interviews gave me very useful insights in the process of decision-making on the refugee relocation system.

Finally, there are some people that might be happy that I do not have to write another thesis in the near future. Thank you for all your advice and patience.

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2

During the refugee crisis of 2015, the European Union faced the challenge of finding a common solution to the sudden, high influx of refugees. The refugee relocation system was one of the proposals of the European Commission as a response to this crisis. Based on mandatory quota, 120.000 refugees would be distributed among European member states in this system. Although the proposal was accepted, it was not successfully implemented. In order to decide on more successful European migration policies in the future, it is crucial to understand how this decision was taken. In this thesis, the role of framing in the decision-making process on the refugee relocation system is analysed. In order to examine this, a framing analysis and five interviews were conducted.

It was found that when the decision to implement the refugee relocation system was taken, the European solidarity-frame – arguing in favour of the relocation system – of the European Commission and some member states prevailed. However, the implementation did not work out: none of the member states made enough places available for relocation. Therefore in the implementation, the security-frame that was mainly used by Eastern European countries – arguing against the relocation system – eventually prevailed. Although most European member states argue in favour of supranational solutions on the European level, their priority lies with national interests in the end. This leads to a political stalemate in European migration policy and the risk that in the case of a refugee crisis in the future, the European Union will not be prepared again.

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4 1. Introduction

In 2015, the European Union presented the new ‘European Agenda on Migration’ (European Commission, 2015a). This new agenda was a combination of immediate action and long-term measures, in an attempt to “build up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration” (p. 2). Part of the European Agenda on Migration was the proposal of a ‘refugee relocation system’. This ‘relocation system’ is a distribution of persons in clear need of international protection among European member states (European Commission, 2015a). The division of refugees among member states takes place on the basis of an objective distribution key, founded on quantifiable criteria reflecting the capacity of member states to absorb and integrate refugees. This distribution key is based on the member states’ population size, total GDP, number of asylum applications and resettled refugees per one million inhabitants and the unemployment rate.

The proposal of a relocation system met strong resistance from several Eastern European countries, namely Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland (Robert, 2015). At the same time, the UN refugee agency UNHCR criticised the relocation system for not being enough to stabilise the situation at that moment. A few months after its implementation, the relocation system was heavily criticised for failing and being inadequate (De La Baume, 2016; Henley; 2016). The relocation system was meant to apply to 120.000 refugees, but only 660 refugees had been relocated in March 2016 (Henley, 2016). Moreover, member states had made only 6642 places available in total – 4% of the planned amount of places. The relocation scheme was dealing with logistical, bureaucratic and political obstacles according to politicians, officials and aid workers. In an overview of the current state of affairs of the refugee relocation system two years later, on the 12th of March 2018, it appeared that 33.844 refugees were relocated in total (European Commission, 2018). This means that the original plan for the relocation system to be completed within two years did not succeed (European Commission, 2015b). Furthermore, the relocation system was even – unsuccessfully – taken to the European Court of Justice by two European Union member states: Hungary and Slovakia (Euractiv, 2017).

It is clear that it was complicated to find agreement on the refugee relocation system, that the system did not work out as planned and that many agree on the obstacles of the system (Henley, 2016; Robert, 2015). Therefore, it is important to reconstruct how the decision on the refugee relocation system was actually taken. Decision-making within the European Union takes place in the European Commission, Council and Parliament: policy decisions are proposed by the European Commission and co-legislated by the European Council and European Parliament (Versluis, Van Keulen and Stephenson, 2010). During the decision-

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5 Figure 1. Timeline of the decision on the refugee relocation system.

making process, representatives of the member state governments are joined by these three EU institutions, but also by organised interests such as NGOs and lobby groups. In sensitive policy areas such as European foreign and migration policy, the final decision lies in the hands of the European Council. Usually, these decisions are taken by unanimity after finding consensus between all member states.

Looking at the existing literature on European integration, European crisis management and migration policies leads to several useful insights when analysing the establishment of the European refugee relocation system. Both intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist theory see crises as a part of European integration (Schimmelfennig, 2017), but they come to different conclusions on the possible outcomes of a crisis. Based on intergovernmentalism, it is difficult to predict whether a crisis leads to more or less European integration. From a neofunctionalist perspective, crisis is expected to lead to more integration rather than disintegration as a result from the spillover effect. Postfunctionalists argue that intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism tend to overlook the importance of public opinion and (national) identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Party leaders in government have become more concerned about the electoral results of their European decisions. This plays a role and could make them more restrained in their policy measures when dealing with a European crisis.

Timeline of the decision on the refugee relocation system (European Parliament, 2015)

May 27, 2015 Commission presents first set of measures of European Agenda on Migration, incl. proposal of mandatory relocation of 40.000 refugees July 2015 European Parliament votes in favour of the first relocation proposal Sep 9, 2015 Commission presents second set of measures of European Agenda on

Migration, incl. temporary relocation scheme for 120.000 refugees Sep. 14, 2015 European Council adopts the Commission’s May proposal by

unanimous vote

Sep. 17, 2015 European Parliament votes in favour of the temporary relocation scheme, sending a signal to the Member States that urgent action is needed

Sep. 22, 2015 Council adopts the second decision by a qualified majority vote, with Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary voting against, and Finland abstaining.

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6 It appears from the consulted literature on European migration policy, that the subject of migration has become securitised within the European Union (Huysmans, 2000; Karyotis; 2007). Although there are many actors in the European Union concerned with the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis (Perkowski, 2016), European Union policies remain focused on the security perspective. On the other hand, Haas (2008) argues that migration has its benefits as well, which is reflected in the fact that some irregular migration is tacitly accepted but strongly rejected in the public discourse. An overview of European migration policies therefore leads to the perception of different discourses and discrepancies. Postfunctionalists state that intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists overlook the importance of public opinion (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), but few authors have actually looked into the interaction between the different discourses during the refugee crisis. It can therefore be useful to analyse the use of framing within the EU at the time of the refugee crisis.

Framing is about “shaping, focusing and organising the world around us” (Gray, 2003, p. 11). By sorting and categorising our experience of the world around us, frames are constructed. A representation of how we make sense of things is created, hereby taking a stance with respect to issues or events. Taking a stance involves making attributions about causality (how and why has something happened) and about responsibility (blaming or acknowledging responsibility). Therefore, a frame can be seen as an interpretation of what is happening and of our own and someone else’s position in this event. Looking at framing during the refugee crisis, leads to new insights in the way European Union actors have made sense of the causality and responsibility during this happening.

Especially in times of crisis, the different actors influencing the European decision-making process will try to prioritise their own interests by using specific frames (Boin, Hart and McConnell, 2009). According to Falkner (2017), this ‘frame contest’ eventually led to a domination of member state interests in European decision-making on migration during the refugee crisis. This is what will be analysed in this thesis. Therefore, the following research question and sub questions have been formulated:

How did the use of framing influence the decision-making process on the European refugee relocation system?

• Which frames can be identified and how have these frames been exploited? • Which role did the different actors play in the political crisis exploitation game? • Which role did the different actors play in the policy crisis exploitation game?

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7 Analysing a case of European decision-making during the refugee crisis is both academically and socially relevant. Although research on framing within the European Union and research on the EU’s migration policies during the refugee crisis both have been conducted (Daviter, 2007; Falkner, 2017; Greenhill, 2016; Holmes, 2016), these two fields of research have rarely been combined. This thesis will therefore lead to new academic insights on the dynamics of European decision-making in times of crisis. Next to this, it appears that the identity of the European Union and mutual solidarity between member states are under pressure, whereas at the same time irregular migration will remain a reality in the coming years (Greenhill, 2016). Especially in the field of migration, European decision-making is actually about people risking their life in an attempt to reach Europe. In the case of the refugee relocation system, the European Union did not manage to handle the crisis situation adequately (Henley, 2016). In order to decide on more successful European migration policies in the future, it is crucial to understand which lessons can be learned from the decision on the European refugee relocation system. Finding a common European approach to migration is in the interest of refugees, but also in the interest of the European Union itself. It is argued that if the European Union does not manage to find an answer to migration, this could put the existence of the European Union in its whole into question (Peeperkorn, 2018).

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8 2. Literature review: European decision-making in times of crisis

In the literature review, the existing scientific knowledge on European Union decision-making in times of crisis will be discussed. But before describing this, it is important to have a clear idea of the definition of ‘crisis’ in general, and ‘refugee crisis’ specifically. Also, the existing theories about European integration and policy making will be described. After discussing the concept of ‘crisis’ and European decision-making, the existing literature on European Union policy making during crises will be described. This will lead to a coherent overview of what is already known on the topic of this thesis.

2.1 The concept of ‘crisis’

Discussions on what distinguishes a state of crisis from business as usual in politics, have been widespread in social science (Dyson and Hart, 2013). From these discussions, Dyson and Hart have derived three characteristics that lead to an event or condition to be perceived as a crisis. First, the core values of a community are felt to be under threat as a result of the event. These core values can be for example safety and security, welfare, or fairness. Second, the event is associated with a sense of urgency. Governments do not seem to have enough time to deal with the event and have to turn to improvisational measures. And third, the event is characterised by a high sense of uncertainty. Questions are raised about both the political consequences and the nature of the event: what is happening, why is this happening and what will happen next? Taking all these elements into account, Dyson and Hart (2013, p. 3) have come to the following definition of a crisis: “When events occur that communities and/or their political elites interpret as a serious threat to the basic structures or fundamental values and norms underpinning the status quo, creating highly uncertain circumstances that call for urgent responses.”

People fleeing from other parts of the world to (Western) Europe is not a new phenomenon, but the amount of refugees entering Europe in 2015 was definitely perceived as a crisis (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016). In the first nine months of 2015, approximately 487.000 people had reached Europe’s Mediterranean coast. This was twice the amount of people that reached the European coasts throughout 2014. At that moment, around one million more refugees were expected to travel to Europe. The European Commission spoke of the ‘largest global humanitarian crisis’, that would define this decade according to German chancellor Angela Merkel. It led to a strong feeling of threat and urgency within the European Union and heated political debates about who was responsible and what the policy consequences should be (Greenhill, 2016), in line with Dyson and Hart’s definition of crisis (2013).

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9 Although the terms ‘migration crisis’ and ‘refugee crisis’ are mostly used interchangeably, both terms have different symbolic and legal meanings (Greenhill, 2016). ‘Migrants’ are generally seen as people moving for economic and voluntary reasons, whereas ‘refugees’ are mostly perceived as people being forced to flee for political reasons. The term ‘refugees’ seems to put more emphasis on the responsibility of the governments of host countries to protect displaced people – although this is very subjective and debatable. This thesis will use the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘refugee crisis’, because these are the terms used in most official international policy documents and declarations, such as the 1951 United Nations Convention of the Status of Refugees (Greenhill, 2016) and the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015). This thesis is about by whom and how responsibility is taken – or not – concerning the arrival of displaced people within the European Union and will therefore make the same linguistic choice as international organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations.

2.2 The European integration process and crisis

Historically, the main theories about European integration were intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (Cini and Borragán, 2007). Intergovernmentalism is characterised by state-centrism in explaining the European integration process. The theory is based on the realist idea of self-regarding actors, acting in an anarchical international system. Intergovernmentalism focuses on the difficulties of enforcing decisions in international organisations such as the European Union, as states want to remain very much in control of the process - without losing sovereignty. The European Commission is therefore seen as a servant of the member states. States only agree to delegate competencies to the European Union when this is perceived to be in their own benefit, according to intergovernmentalists. Supranationalists, on the other hand, view the institutions of the European Union as independent actors instead of dependent on the actions of member states (Tsebelis and Garratt, 2001). In their view, European institutions undertake actions that decide the direction in which European integration is going. Supranationalism relies on the neofunctionalist concept of ‘spillover’, which refers to the idea that political cooperation to reach a certain goal leads to the formulation of new goals in order to assure achieving the original goal (Cini and Borragán, 2007). This means that political cooperation is usually, without intention, extended over time.

Although both theories are not focused on crisis, both see crises as a part of the European integration process (Schimmelfennig, 2017). According to intergovernmentalists, the emergence as well as the limits of European integration are linked to crises. The European

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10 Union, in this view, was originally designed in order to defend the nation-state from deep economic and social crises and to balance the threat of the Soviet Union. From the intergovernmentalist perspective, changes in integration are mostly exogenous to the integration process itself. Schimmelfennig argues that this is largely true for the recent financial, Ukraine and refugee crises in the European Union. On the one hand, these international challenges could lead to an unwillingness to integrate regionally. On the other hand, these crises could lead to in increased willingness to cooperate when nation-states are not able to deal with international challenges on their own. Therefore, the intergovernmentalist focus on national preferences does not automatically lead to the expectation of more or less European integration.

Neofunctionalism and supranationalism are focused more on the presumption that crises are actually produced by the functioning of the integration process (Schimmelfennig, 2017). New powerful actors can be created or empowered from European integration and develop preferences and capacities themselves. Their preferences might be different than member states’ preferences – this is an example of the earlier mentioned spillover effect. From a neofunctionalist perspective, crises can be the result of massive spillover. However, spillover usually demands further integration and the more supranational actors are entrenched and institutionalised, the more difficult it becomes to disintegrate again. Therefore from a supranationalist perspective, disintegration is less likely to occur in the European Union in times of crisis than from an intergovernmentalist perspective.

Both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism are based on the functionalist idea that regional integration is the result of a mismatch between efficiency and the existing structure of authority (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The debate these theories have been engaged in for decades, is whether the impetus for regional integration comes from member states or from supranational actors, whether international institutions can be seen as autonomous from member states and whether regional integration transforms national states. However, both theories focus on economic preferences and on distributional bargaining between (economic) interest groups. Hooghe and Marks advocate to look at European integration from a postfunctionalist perspective. They claim that the debate on regional integration should move beyond the economic interests of specific groups, which is not enough to be decisive for European integration.

The first years of European integration were characterised by ‘permissive consensus’: elites were cutting deals on the European level, whereas public opinion was limited (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). But since 1991, this has changed into ‘constraining dissensus’: elites had to take into account their public when negotiating European issues. European integration became

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11 politicised, which means that the mass public became engaged in European issues as well. The difference is not that public opinion on European integration became more negative, but that decision-making elites could not ignore the Eurosceptic public anymore. Whereas European integration increased in scope and depth, the public’s identity remained stable and nationally oriented. Especially when people perceive their national identity as exclusive of other territorial identities, they are likely to be Eurosceptic. This is what distinguishes postfunctionalism from neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism: the idea that not only economic interests, but also identity is important in preferences on European integration. The discrepancy between national identity and European integration has consequences for party politics as well, according to Hooghe and Marks (2009). Mainstream parties are usually more pro-EU than their voters and have unsuccessfully tried to depoliticise the issue. On the other hand, Euroscepticism is cued by mainly populist right and radical left parties. As a result, national politics has become more tightly linked to European politics and party leaders in government are concerned about the electoral results of their European decisions.

2.3 The European decision-making process

When analysing a decision within the European Union, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of the European decision-making process. Most of the times, the question of ‘who decides’ in the European Union is a source of debate (Versluis, Van Keulen and Stephenson, 2010). Normally, decision-making takes place according to the co-decision procedure: a law is proposed by the European commission and sealed by the European Parliament and Council. When it comes to politically sensitive areas such as the European Union’s foreign policy, primary decision-making lies in the hands of government ministers and heads of state, united in the Council of Ministers and the high-level European Council. Usually, the Council takes decisions on the basis of ‘qualified majority voting’ (QMV): a 55-percent majority of member states representing 65 percent of the EU population has to be in favour. At least four countries have to vote against a proposal in order to block it. Only in a small percentage of cases, ‘contested votes’ are playing a role. This is when Council members vote against a proposal or abstain from voting. However, when it comes to matters perceived to be sensitive by the member states, the Council normally has to vote unanimously (Council of the EU, 2017). For example, this accounts for matters such as EU membership, EU finances and a common foreign and security policy.

Regarding the political space in which European decision-making takes place, Thomson Boerefijn and Stokman (2004) researched if there were specific actor alignments in the

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12 European Union. When it comes to the ‘integration-independence’ discussion regarding European Union decision-making, it appeared that this was mostly about policy change rather than European solutions versus national solutions. Often, the Commission would introduce radical proposals in the expectation that these would be modified in the discussion between member states in the Council. From this, it can be derived that the Commission is generally more in favour of policy change than the European member states. Furthermore, Thomson et al. (2004) looked at the division between Northern and Southern member states in the decision-making process. They found that Northern delegations tend to support market-based solutions, whereas Southern delegations usually support more regulatory solutions. But these were not very strong alignments: the most important finding of Thomson et al. (2004) was actually the lack of structure in the positions taken by actors. This lack of strong alignments prevents the formation of strong majorities in the European Union, which is crucial to the functioning of the EU. It prevents member states from seeing each other as strong allies or opponents. This would lead to decision outcomes that would consistently be further away from the preferences of some member states than others, and would therefore lead to a feeling of a bias against their interests within the European Union.

2.4 European migration policy over time

How did European migration policies develop over time? In an article on the development of a common migration policy in the European Union, Huysmans (2000) starts with the 1950s and 1960s. In this period of time, most western European countries were promoting immigration in order to recruit an extra, cheap and flexible workforce. This was not a politically sensitive issue until the 1960s and 1970s, when most immigration policies became more restrictive due to changes in the domestic labour markets. Next to this, politicians started to link migration to the destabilization of the public order and temporary guest workers became permanent settlers who reunited with their families. As a result, public awareness on immigration grew. However, it was not an issue that concerned the European Communities yet. This changed in the 1980s: during this decade, migration policy became politicised on the European level around the question of asylum. Political debates started to problematise migration by linking it to public order and national stability, perceiving it as a danger to domestic societies. Huysmans (2000) therefore argues that migration became securitised within the European Union.

This is confirmed by Karyotis (2007), who states that policymakers in the European Union increasingly started to perceive population movements as a danger to national security since the mid-1980s. Linking migration to security, based on the idea that immigration is related

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13 to human smuggling, terrorism and a socio-political threat to European societies, legitimises measures to restrict population movements. Karyotis signalled a short period of liberalization of European migration policies after the Amsterdam Treaty in the late 1990s, but this was brought to a halt after the 9/11-attacks in the United States. After these events, the discourse linking migration to security was reinforced and migration policies of the European Union were increasingly based on the exclusion instead of inclusion of non-European citizens. In 2007, Karyotis stated that the EU seemed to be in a dilemma regarding the direction of its migration policy. Concerns on internal security and terrorism were asking for more restrictive policy measures, but humanitarian concerns and pragmatic economic needs pointed towards more liberal migration policies. Karyotis expressed his expectation that the security concerns would prevail over other discourses. He stated that the security concerns were not only institutionalised within the European Union, but also that there was an unwillingness among European policymakers to research the existing myths around migration.

The focus on security concerns within the European Union, causes a tendency to overlook certain aspects of migration. In an article on migration from Africa to Europa, Haas (2008) speaks of the ‘myth of invasion’. Migration from Africa is conventionally seen as a result of war and poverty, leading to a ‘massive invasion’ of desperate Africans, resulting in international crime and terrorism. The offered solutions, aimed at curbing migration, are usually twofold: on the one hand, border controls are increased an migration law toughened, and on the other hand, development aid and trade are supposed to prevent people from migration. However, Haas argues that this discourse overlooks the mutual European and African interests in migration. Especially in southern Europe, the large labour markets in the agricultural, construction and service sector have become increasingly dependent on irregular migration labour. To a lesser extent, northern European labour markets are in need of the same types of migration labour. This has led to a discrepancy between the general public anti-immigration rhetoric and actual public action, tacitly tolerating irregular migration. Additionally, the picture of desperate Africans rules out the fact that these people have their own agency.

An important aspect regarding migration policies within the European Union is the concept of ‘international burden-sharing’: “the question how the costs of common initiatives or the provision of international public goods should be shared between states” (Thielemann, 2003, p. 253). This plays a role in purely budgetary issues, but also in less quantifiably issues such as the social ‘costs’ of accepting refugees. It is possible to look at burden-sharing from two different angles, based on a ‘cost-benefit logic’ or on a ‘norm-based’ logic. The cost-benefit logic relies on the idea that it might be rational to give up opportunities for individual benefits

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14 in order to co-operate and achieve collective goals instead. The idea that it is undesirable to undertake egoist actions and collective goals should be pursued on the basis of solidarity, is the foundation of the norm-based logic.

When looking at European migration policies in 2003, Thielemann (2003) found that interstate solidarity within the European Union was very low. However, there was still a move towards burden-sharing that was not exclusively based on the cost-benefit logic. It was not based on a concern towards other EU member states, but on the fear of potential threats towards European integration and the system of international refugee protection. Looking at countries’ commitment to commit to certain humanitarian and distributive norms, offered a useful addition to explanations based on the cost-benefit logic. It therefore appeared that the cost-benefit and norm-based logic were not mutually exclusive, but rather additional to each other.

Then, based on what is already known on European Union migration policies, how did the European countries respond to the recent refugee crisis according to the existing academic literature? Greenhill (2016) is very critical on the EU response to the refugee crisis. She states that many member states prioritised national interests over European solidarity, which illustrated that unregulated migration has the potential power to make people and governments feel insecure and threatened. She finds that the European Union has been very slow in providing aid to the Mediterranean states and in facilitating a resettlement system for the refugees to other EU member states, hereby creating bottlenecks and refugee camps in very bad circumstances. However, actors within the European Union did not only look at the refugee crisis from a security perspective (Perkowski, 2016). Images of 360 refugees drowning in front of the coast of Lampedusa in 2013, or the little boy Aylan Kurdi washed up on a Turkish beach, made many people realise the refugee crisis was about more than just security. This is exemplified by the fact that the European Commission talked about the ‘largest global humanitarian crisis’ (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016). Many NGOs, activist groups, citizens’ initiatives, governmental actors and EU agencies were active in order to save refugees from drowning and help survivors by providing food, clothing and information. Also security actors, such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex, looked at their work from a humanitarian perspective by emphasising the number of people they rescued for example. But Perkowski states that by strengthening the Frontex operations, putting greater focus on deportations and targeting smugglers, the focus of the actual European Union policies strongly remained on the security perspective of the refugee crisis.

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15 3. Theoretical framework: crisis management theory and the EU

In this chapter, the theories that will be used in the empirical analysis of this thesis will be described. Also, the possible frames that could be identified in the content analysis of this thesis will be derived from the existing academic literature. Next to this, the policy and political crisis exploitation game (Boin et al., 2009) and their relevance will be explained. This will form the foundation for the methodological and analytical part of this research.

3.1 Crisis management theory

According to Boin et al. (2009), crises can be seen as ‘frame contests’ in which various actors exploit the opportunity space induced by the crisis. Using strategies and manipulation, actors try to prioritise their own frame in order to become the dominant narrative. This might be beneficial for certain actors as it would strengthen their position and authority, attract or distract public attention or provide a possibility to change existing policies. It can therefore be called ‘crisis exploitation’, defined as “the purposeful utilization of crisis-type rhetoric to signiﬁcantly alter levels of political support for public ofﬁce-holders and public policies” (Boin et al., 2009, p. 83).

The framing of a (possible) crisis takes place at different stages: first of all, when deciding whether an event can be called a crisis or not (Boin et al., 2009). The significance of an event can be minimised, acknowledged or maximised. In the first case, actors take the risk of being called ‘blind’ or ‘passive’. In the second and third case, actors might be seen as ‘alarmist’ and ‘opportunistic’. But once talking about a crisis, questions about responsibility, blame and policy implications start to arise. This is when the second framing contest appears: causality. Who or what drives the course of events? Especially when maximising the significance of an event, actors claim that large mistakes have been made and changes in policy are necessary.

Subsequently, crisis framing takes place in two different spheres: the political and the policy game (Boin et al., 2009). The political game implies the clash between government and opposition, whereas the policy game is about the clash between proponents and opponents of the regulatory and administrative status quo. In the political game, opponents of the status quo have to decide whether they can blame the incumbent office-holders of the crisis, if they just want to damage their reputation or if they want them to be completely removed from office (see Figure 1). The office-holders have to decide whether they take or deny responsibility for the crisis, and to what extent they do this. It was found by Boin et al. that in the political game,

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16 oppositional forces are likely to succeed when a crisis is perceived to have endogenous causes, incumbents have been in office for a long time, the media are supporting opposition and when they manage to instigate a political inquiry.

Figure 3.1. Crisis exploitation (I): the political game (Boin et al., p. 89)

When it comes to the policy game, a struggle takes place between status quo and change-oriented players during a crisis (Boin et al, 2009). Advocates of change need to decide whether they want to advocate for a complete paradigm shift or incremental change. Status quo-players need to figure out to what extent the current policies have been destabilised by public and expert opinions on the crisis, and whether they have the arguments to openly resist policy change. When both advocates of change and the status quo are stubborn, either a policy standstill or major policy change can be expected. However, it is most likely that the outcome is somewhere in between these two situations. Therefore, it is concluded by Boin et al. (2009) that even in the wake of a destabilising crisis, only incremental change is expected to take place. As a result, they state that crisis is not a sufficient condition for policy change to occur.

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17 Falkner (2016) has researched the policy effects of crises in nine EU policy areas and came to a different conclusion than Boin et al. (2009). One of the main questions in Falkner’s research (2016) was whether the EU fell into a pattern of ‘new intergovernmentalism’ under pressure of the recent crises, or if the supranational institutions of the EU were all still playing their role. In her research, she analysed the effects of the financial, economic and external relations (including migration flows) crises within Europe on policy areas such as competition, climate, migration and health policy in the EU. It was found that crisis-induced pressures made preferences change and new compromise solutions possible. Although the changes might not have been sufficient to lead to long-term solutions, policy reform took place in almost all policy areas. Therefore in contrast to Boin et al. (2009), Falkner (2016) finds that crisis has the possibility to lead to more than just incremental change, and actually is a sufficient condition for policy change to occur.

Only in the fields of migration and foreign policy, blockage dominated the policy debate according to Falkner (2016). Despite the extreme circumstances during the refugee crisis, almost no reforms took place in these policy areas. Therefore, Falkner concludes to see a strengthening of supranationalism instead of intergovernmentalism in all researched policy areas, except for migration and foreign policy. It is suggested that the lack of policy change in these last two policy areas is not necessarily the result of political decisions, but of changed framework conditions that have not been effectively counter-steered – a phenomenon called ‘drift’. This lack of effective counter-steering in the fields of migration and foreign policy, could be the result of the by Boin et al. (2009) described frame games that were played out in the decision-making process of the European Union. As Falkner’s research was more about policy change than about policy continuity, this suggestion is not confirmed and rather a recommendation for further research.

3.2 Sub questions and expectations

As stated before, an attempt will be made in this thesis to find out how frames were used in the European decision-making process on the refugee relocation system. In order to answer this research question, three sub questions have been formulated that will now be further explained.

3.2.1 Which frames can be identified and how have these frames been exploited?

Boin et al. (2009) have explained how crises lead to ‘frame contests’ in which actors of influence attempt to prioritise their own interests. In order to analyse how framing influenced

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18 the European decision-making process on the refugee relocation system, it is first important to see which frames were used, how, and in which frequency.

Before doing a frame analysis, it is important to identify the different frames that were used during the European decision-making process in the refugee crisis. This will lay the foundation for the analytical part of this thesis. The description of the frames is based on the Critical Frame Analysis-approach of Verloo (2005). In this approach, a set of ‘sensitising questions’ leads to a frame analysis in which the discursive elements, but also attributed roles and voice are analysed. This implies a diagnosis of the policy problem (what’s the problem represented to be?), the prognosis of the policy problem (what action is proposed?) and the roles and voice attributed to various actors. Thus, the main questions are ‘what is wrong?’; ‘who/ what is responsible for this problem?’; ‘what should be done?’ and ‘who should do something?’. These questions lay the general foundation of the description of the frames, but also of the conducted frame analysis and discussion of the policy and political crisis exploitation game (Boin et al., 2009).

A frame used during the refugee crisis that has been named by many authors, is the security-frame (Huysmans, 2000; Karyotis, 2007; Greenhill, 2016). In this frame, the problem is the amount of refugees coming to European member states and the possible danger they pose to the European countries. Migration is linked to the destabilisation of public order (Huysmans, 2000), human smuggling, terrorism and a socio-political threat to European societies (Karyotis, 2007). This frame was reinforced by the attacks of 9/11 in the United States. It is less about the security and agency of the refugees coming to Europe (Haas, 2008) and more about the consequences of their migration to the European Union. The refugees are perceived to be ‘massively invading’ to Europe, according to Haas. The consequence of this frame is the exclusion of non-European citizens and a call for more restrictive policy measures regarding migration (Karyotis, 2007).

On the other hand, some actors within the European Union are looking at the refugee crisis from the perspective of the humanitarian frame. As was already pointed out by Thielemann (2003), European member states were not solely concerned about their own societies but also about the international protection of refugees, based on humanitarian norms. The problem in this frame is the suffering of the people moving to Europe, the dangers they meet during their travel, the fact that people drown and wash up on the European beaches and if they manage to arrive, the conditions in which they arrive and stay in the European Union (Perkowski, 2016). This frame is less about the consequences of their arrival to European societies. The possible policy consequence of this frame is a stronger focus on rescuing refugees

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19 from drowning and providing them with food, clothing and information once they arrived. Also, it could lead to more liberal migration policies within the European Union (Karyotis, 2007).

The concept of ‘European solidarity’ is expected to play a role in the discussion on the refugee relocation system as well. Solidarity is one of the values underpinning the project of European integration and cooperation (Sangiovanni, 2013). It is a value that should bind the different member states together and in times of growing malaise, it is something that is referred to often. In the ‘European solidarity’-frame, the problem is that European member states are putting their own interest above the interest of the European Union and their fellow member states. Instead of acting as separate and egocentric actors, the solution to a crisis is therefore cooperation between the member states and finding a common solution according to this frame. The burdens of a crisis should not be carried by only specific member states, but equally shared by all European member states. Especially European institutions put a stronger focus on the need for European solidarity during crises, according to Sangiovanni (2013).

Fourth, the economic frame can be identified. This frame can actually be divided into two frames: the frame of economic interest and the frame of economic hardship. The first one is described by Haas (2008), who states that within Europe, different labour markets are dependent on irregular migration labour. Among others the agricultural, construction and service sector do not have enough employees without the addition of migration labour. As a consequence, irregular migration is tacitly tolerated by some European member states in order to restore their internal labour markets. It is important to note that this frame is usually not admitted and accompanied by an anti-immigration discourse in public. It is therefore a frame that is not expected to be recognised much in the public debate.

The frame of economic hardship is expected to be communicated more in relation to the refugee crisis and European migration policies, as it is a frame that is cued by right-wing populist parties (Swank and Betz, 2003). In this frame, the problem is the threat of migration to the domestic economic market and the danger it might cause for the existence of the welfare state. The immigration of people doing lower-skilled work – together with other consequences of globalisation, such as the increase of international trade and capital mobility – is perceived to lead to lower wages and the decline of lower-skilled jobs for European citizens. As a result, immigration is opposed by people worrying about their economic situation and political leaders linking migration to the deterioration of the welfare state and wages in their country.

The frames described above, are focused on content: the consequences of the refugee crisis for the people and European societies affected. But it is expected that frames around the process of decision-making on the European level have played a role in decision-making on the

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20 European refugee relocation system as well. On the one hand, it can be stated that during a crisis, it is important to quickly find a common solution. Decision-making should be focused on finding agreement among European member states and from this view, it is not problematic to transfer authority from the national level to the European level. This can be seen as the ‘European agreement’-frame. On the other hand, as was already pointed out by Scharpf in 1994: European Union policy-making reduces the capacity of member states to shape the collective fate of their own citizens. This could lead to a feeling of decreasing autonomy among member states, which could play a role in the establishment of the European refugee relocation system as well. In this case, this could lead to a ‘European imposition’-frame: states claiming that the European Union is imposing a measure on them, whereas they want to find their own solutions to the refugee crisis.

Type of frame Frame Problem

Content

Humanitarian Humans suffering during the refugee crisis Security Refugees as a threat to European societies European solidarity Lack of common EU migration policies Economic interest Lack of cheap labour forces within the EU Economic hardship Refugees as a threat to European welfare states Process European agreement Inability to find a common agreement

European imposition Imposition of common EU migration policies Table 3.1. Overview of expected frames.

3.2.2 Which role did the different actors play in the political crisis exploitation game?

The political crisis exploitation game is about the clash between government and opposition (Boin et al., 2009). An important question in this game is: who is responsible for the events in this crisis? This adds to the frame analysis, because it is not only important which frames were used by the actors but also which role these actors played in the process (Verloo, 2005). On the level of the European Union, it is interesting to see which actors were part of the government and which ones were part of the opposition, as this is not as clear as on the national level. This could have consequences for their use of framing and their political position during the refugee crisis.

Part of the political crisis exploitation game is also the earlier described blame question: whether the ‘government’ can be blamed for the crisis and whether they take the conclusion to

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21 accept or deny their responsibility (Boin et al., 2009). Although it is not likely that there will be serious political consequences for any actor in the scattered political landscape of the European Union, it might be possible that there has been a change in their reputation. Therefore, the influence of public opinion and media are taken into account in the political crisis exploitation game as well.

3.2.3 Which role did the different actors play in the policy crisis exploitation game?

The policy crisis exploitation game is concerned with the clash between proponents and opponents of the regulatory and administrative status quo (Boin et al., 2009). Should the way in which migration is managed within the European Union be changed as a result of the refugee crisis, or should it remain the way it was? According to Boin et al., only incremental policy change can be expected in the wake of a crisis. Falkner (2016) argues otherwise, but did see a lack of policy change in the fields of migration and foreign policy in the European Union during the refugee crisis. By looking at the role of the policy crisis exploitation game as described by Boin et al. (2009), it can be analysed to what extent it is true that this did cause a lack of effective decision-making when it comes to the European refugee relocation system.

In order to find an answer to this question, it has to be analysed which actors took place in the most important discussion on the relocation system, which position and frames they advocated and to what extent policy change eventually took place. Two factors mainly play a role in the crisis exploitation game: to what extent status quo-players resist policy change, and whether advocates of change push for fundamental or incremental change (Boin et al., 2009). It is expected that the discussion on the refugee relocation system takes place between strong opponents and moderate proponents of the system. This could lead to either politically imposed incremental adjustment or a policy stalemate.

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22 4.

Methodology

For the analysis of this thesis, the case study method will be used. A case study can be defined as “the detailed examination of a small sample – at its extreme a single example – of an item of interest, and typically also from a particular perspective” (Tight, 2010, p. 337). In this research, a single case has been chosen: the decision that was taken on the European refugee relocation system. The decision on the European refugee relocation system represents an extreme case of European decision-making for several reasons (Yin, 2003). First of all, because the decision was taken at the height of the refugee crisis. Next to that, it was a controversial decision that met strong opposition, especially from Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland (Robert, 2015). Contrary to the normal procedure in this policy field, the decision was taken on the basis of a qualified majority vote instead of unanimity (European Parliament, 2015). Furthermore, the decision was even taken to the European Union’s highest court by Slovakia and Hungary (Euractiv, 2017). And finally, it was a decision that was not implemented successfully (Henley, 2016).

A qualitative research method will be used in this thesis, in the form of a discourse analysis. Discourse can be defined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 2006, p. 67). By doing a discourse analysis, it is possible to track and trace the meaning of politics and political actions. It consists of examining the argumentative structure of documents and other statements, as well as the way in which these arguments are made. In this thesis, the discourse analysis takes the form of a frame analysis, which starts from the assumption that there are multiple interpretations in policy-making and that dominance and exclusion have to be addressed in policy-making (Verloo, 2005). Therefore, a frame analysis is about which frames are dominant, if specific patterns can be recognised and if there are processes of exclusion in the policy-making process. The frame analysis will consist of a range of documents, in an attempt to cover the different positions in the decision-making process on the European refugee relocation system. Therefore, European Parliament debates, NGO press releases, speeches of the president of the European Council, Parliament and Commission and heads of states, statements of European business organisations and country declarations are part of this frame analysis. A full description of the documents can be found in Appendix A.

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23 Coding of the frames

By using the qualitative research program Atlas.ti, the gathered documents will be automatically coded. In order to see how the frames have been used by different actors, the different actors have been divided into different groups, as displayed in Table 4.1: European Institutions (consisting of the European Council and the European Commission documents), European Parliament debates, NGOs, the member states (the Visegrad Group, Germany, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands) and business actors. The Visegrad Group – consisting of Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland – consists of the only member states that clearly oppose the refugee relocation system (Robert, 2015) and presented many joint statements. Therefore, these states are put together in one category. The other EU member states included (Germany, the UK and The Netherlands) have not taken this clear stance against the refugee relocation system and will therefore be compared to the opposing Visegrad Group. It was intended to include Southern European member states in this thesis as well, because they might perceive the discussion on the refugee relocation system differently than Germany, the UK and The Netherlands. It has been attempted to find speeches and policy documents of France, Italy and Greece, but these documents were too difficult to find unfortunately.

Table 4.1. Documents per group of actors.

Subsequently, the frames have been coded. For every frame, three words are used that can be related to a specific frame (see Table 4.2). In the case of the human rights-frame, these words are ‘human rights’, ‘humanitarian’ and ‘human dignity’. In order to identify the security-frame, the word marker ‘security’ is used, next to ‘defence’ and ‘terrorism’. The economic interest-

Type of actor Name of actor Amount of pages

European Institutions European Council 17

European Commission 69

EP Debates European Parliament 127

NGOs Amnesty International 76

Human Rights Watch 46

Member States Visegrad Group 34

Germany 25

The Netherlands 15

United Kingdom 13

Business Actors BusinessEurope 5

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24 and economic hardship-frames have been put together in the analysis of Atlas.ti, because these frames are recognised by the same words (‘labour market’, ‘unemployment’ and ‘economy’). In the analysis, the distinction between these two economic frames will be made again. European solidarity is identified by the word markers ‘cooperation, ‘solidarity’ and ‘unity’. For the European agreement- and European imposition-frames, it was most difficult to find word markers that successfully identify the frames. In the end, it was decided to use the word markers ‘reject, ‘oblige’ and ‘mandatory’ for the European imposition-frame, and the word markers ‘qualified majority’, ‘consensus’ and ‘in favour’ for the European agreement-frame.

Table 3.2. Frames and codes.

Interview methodology

Next to the frame analysis, a number of interviews has been conducted with representatives of relevant European institutions and interest organisations playing a role on the European level. These interviews were individual and semi-structured: some prepared questions are asked (as displayed in Appendix B), but respondents also had the opportunity to articulate their own answers and motives, and to indicate what they perceive as the most important issues (O’Reilly, 2012). The interviews were on the respondent’s views on European migration policy in general, the decision-making process around the refugee relocation system and the relocation system itself. These interviews are used to fill possible gaps and substantiate the frame analysis, but also to reconstruct the decision-making process on the refugee relocation system. This reconstruction is based on the description of the policy and political game by Boin et al. (2009).

In total, five interviews are conducted. In Table 4.3, an overview of the respondents can be seen. All interviews were conducted by phone, except for the interview with the NGO Lobbyist which was conducted in person. The interviews took in between 30 and 60 minutes. The interviews with the representatives of the interest organisations (VluchtelingenWerk and

Frame Marker 1 Marker 2 Marker 3

Security Security Terrorism Defence

Human Rights/ Humanitarian Human rights Humanitarian Human dignity

Economy Economy Labour market Unemployment

European solidarity Cooperation Solidarity Unity

European imposition Reject Oblige Mandatory

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25 BusinessEurope) were the shortest interviews, because these respondents were only involved in the discussion on the relocation system on the side lines. Although VluchtelingenWerk is a Dutch organisation, the respondent works as a lobbyist in both Dutch and European politics and could therefore also provide information on the NGO’s perspective on European

migration policy. This interview was an addition to the frame analysis, as VluchtelingenWerk is not aimed at human rights in general such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, but specifically at the position of refugees.

Table 4.3. Overview interviews.

Although none of the respondents stated to be strongly against the refugee relocation system, two respondents were able to give more insights into the motives of the opponents of the refugee relocation system: the policy officer of the European Commission and the parliamentary assistant of the ECR Group. Before working as a European Commission Officer, this respondent worked for the Czech Republic Ministry of the Interior at the

Department for Asylum and Migration Policy. During the discussion on the refugee relocation system, he was still in service of the Czech government. The Czech Republic is one of the Visegrad countries and strongly advocated against the relocation system. Although he was officially speaking on behalf of the European Commission, this respondent was also willing to give insights on the Czech perspective. The parliamentary assistant of the ECR Group works for the Dutch delegation that is not necessarily against the refugee relocation system, but many colleagues in his parliamentary group were. Therefore, he could give information on their arguments as well. Together, these two respondents could compensate for the fact that strong opponents of the refugee relocation were difficult to arrange an interview with.

The most important information from the interview with the BusinessEurope Advisor, was the fact that his organisation was not very much involved in the discussion on the refugee

Function Organisation Interview Duration

Lobbyist Asylum Policies VluchtelingenWerk Nederland 37.00 min

Parliamentary Assistant EP S&D Group (PvdA, Netherlands),

European Parliament

42.27 min

Parliamentary Assistant EP ECR Group (CU/SGP, Netherlands),

European Parliament

55.24 min

Policy Officer Asylum Unit, DG Home Affairs,

European Commission

52.37 min

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26 relocation system. Business organisations are mainly focused on economic migrants, highly skilled labour and an how to integrate people into the labour market once they are legally admitted to a European country. He could only give some summary information on

BusinessEurope’s perspective on European migration policy in general, and on his personal views. Therefore, this interview is used and cited less in the analysis than the other interviews.

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27 5.

Analysis

In this chapter, the three sub questions of the thesis will be answered based on the frame analysis and interviews that were conducted. First, it will be identified to which extent the frames described have been used, by whom and how. Subsequently, it will be analysed how the political and policy crisis exploitation game of Boin et al. (2009) took place in the discussion on the refugee relocation system.

5.1 Frame analysis

5.1.1 Which frames can be identified and how have these frames been exploited?

In order to answer the first research question, the frames have been automatically coded using Atlas.ti (see Table 5.1). The absolute amount of times in which the word markers related to the frames are used, is displayed per document group, but the average amount per page in each document group is displayed as well. This is because the amount of documents per category is not evenly divided. The description of the use of these frames is divided into two parts. First, a factual description will be given on the amount of times the different actors used the word makers related to the frames. However, as stated by Verloo (2005), “frames are not descriptions of reality, but specific constructions that give meaning to reality, and shape the understanding of reality” (p. 20). Making use of a word marker is not necessarily the same as making use of a frame. Therefore subsequently, it will be analysed to what extent actors made use of specific frames and how these frames have been exploited by the different actors. This will be done again with Verloo’s methodology for comparative frame analysis in mind, in which different main questions are asked: ‘what is wrong?’; ‘who/ what is responsible for this problem?’; ‘what should be done?’ and ‘who should do something?’. This latter analysis will be illustrated by examples from the documents and the interviews that have been conducted.

As can be seen in Table 5.1, the word markers related to the security- and European solidarity-frame were recognised more than 200 times: respectively, 247 times (0.58 times per page) and 254 times (0.59 times per page). The humanitarian word markers were used 174 times, which is 0.41 times per page. The other word markers – related to economy, European imposition and European agreement – were found to be used less: respectively, 44 (0.10 times per page), 37 (0.09 times per page) and 19 (0.04 times per page) times.

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28 Table 5.1. Use of word markers.

5.1.2 Which actor used which frame?

First the three European Union actors: the Council, Commission and Parliament. Regarding the European Council and Commission, it occurs that these actors have made use of word makers related to the European solidarity- and security-frame most, in relation to other frames. To a lesser extent, the European institutions made use of words related to human rights (30 times, 0.35 times per page). It occurs that ‘European imposition’-word markers were used 13 times by the European institutions, whereas a ‘European agreement’-word marker was used only once. In the European Parliament debates, European solidarity is addressed most (0.47 times per page) – about three times as much as the human rights- (0.15 times per page) and security-frame (0.17 times per page). The human rights-words are used in the debates by representatives of the Greens/EFA, EPP, S&D and the ALDE group, or by representatives of the European Commission. The security-frame was mainly used by the ECR, PPE and EFFD Group. As for the other three frames, the economic and European imposition-frame have barely been used in the debates in the European Parliament. The European agreement-frame was found to be used ten times in the debates (0.08 times per page), by members of the ALDE Group, of the Greens and of the Commission.

The NGO documents show a strong focus on the human-rights frame, addressing this 99 times – 0.81 times per page on average. It is important to point out that both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the NGOs consulted, are specifically focused on human

Hum. Rights Security Economy EU Solidarity EU impos. EU agreem.

European Institutions 30(0.35) 54(0.62) 3(0.03) 68(0.79) 13(0.15) 1(0.01) EU Parliament Debates 19(0.15) 22(0.17) 1(0.01) 60(0.47) 3(0.02) 9(0.07) NGOs 99(0.81) 60(0.49) 4(0.03) 19(0.16) 9(0.07) 1(0.01) Visegrad Group 8(0.24) 46(1.35) 1(0.02) 44(1.29) 12(0.35) 2(0.06) Germany 8(0.32) 48(1.92) 4(0.16) 22(0.88) 0(0.00) 2(0.08) United Kingdom 7(0.54) 18(1.38) 4(0.31) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) The Netherlands 2(0.13) 14(0.93) 12(0.80) 36(2.40) 0(0.00) 2(0.13) Business Actors 1(0.20) 4(0.80) 15(3) 4(0.80) 0(0.00) 1(0.20) Total 174(0.41) 247(0.58) 44(0.10) 254(0.59) 37(0.09) 19(0.04)

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29 rights. It is therefore possible that they show a stronger focus on the human rights-frame than other NGOs that might have been involved in the discussion on the refugee relocation system. Words related to the security-frame were used relatively much by the NGOs as well (60 times, 0.49 times per page). It has to be noted that 19 out of these 60 times, it is not about national or European security, but specifically about human security. In most other cases, the word ‘security’ is used in a functional or critical way – when talking about the behaviour of security guards for example. Other frames seem to have been barely used by the consulted NGOs, as they used these word markers in between 0.02 and 0.07 times per page.

Then, the member states, divided into the Visegrad Group and other EU member states (Germany, United Kingdom and The Netherlands). More than the other document groups, these actors make use of word markers related to security – 1.35 times per page by the Visegrad Group countries and respectively 1.38, 1.92 and 0.93 times per page by the UK, Germany and The Netherlands. The results of Germany might be influenced by the fact that one of Merkel’s speeches in the analysis, was on a security conference. This speech is still used because it also focuses on migration, but it could make the results regarding her use of the security-frame biased. The human rights-frame seems to be used less by all member states. The Visegrad Group uses these word markers 0.24 times per page, the UK 0.54 times per page, Germany 0.32 times per page and The Netherlands 0.13 times per page. When looking at European solidarity, larger differences can be seen between the member states. For the Visegrad Group (1.29 times per page) and The Netherlands (2.40 times per page) it seems to be a frame that they use a lot. On the other hand, the United Kingdom only uses a word maker related to European solidarity once. Germany is somewhere in between these member states, using the European solidarity-word markers 0.88 times per page.

Only The Netherlands has made use of the economic word markers 12 times (0.80 times per page). This frame is used less by the other member states. The word markers of the process frames have not been used much by any of the member states. The European imposition-frame was used zero times by the UK, Germany and The Netherlands. The Visegrad countries make use of this frame 12 times, which is 0.35 times per page. The European agreement-frame word markers were used incidentally by Germany, The Netherlands and the Visegrad Group. The United Kingdom did not make use of this frame once. The only group that makes clear use of the economic frame are the business actors: they make use of these word markers 3.00 times per page. This is more than any other frame for this group of actors, but the European solidarity- and security-frame were used as well (both 0.80 times per page). For this group, it is important to note that the amount of pages for this document group is low – only five pages. This was

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30 meant to be a higher amount, but it appeared that not much has been written about the refugee relocation system or European migration policies during the refugee crisis by the business actors. Therefore, it is more difficult to make generalizations for this group of documents.

5.1.3 How have the frames been exploited?

It has now been described how many times the word markers related to the frames were used per group of actors. However, using word markers related to a frame, does not necessarily mean that actors make use of the frame itself. Below, it will be analysed in what way these frames were used exactly by these actors.

The European solidarity-frame

It is the frame that seems to be used most in the documents analysed: European solidarity. The use of word markers related to solidarity can be interpreted in two ways: European solidarity with the refugees and European solidarity among European Union member states. This is an important distinction, because it relates to different frames. In the case of solidarity with refugees, it is about the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis. When actors speak about European solidarity among member states, this is part of the European solidarity-frame as described in the theoretical framework. In this frame, the problem is that European member states are not showing solidarity towards each other – something they should do. For this, the member states themselves are responsible and they should find a solution together, which should lead to a better common migration policy based on fairness and solidarity among all member states. It is therefore a frame that is expected to advocate in favour of the refugee relocation system. It is not surprising that the European solidarity-frame was found to be used much by the European institutions and MEPs: solidarity is one of the founding principles of the European Union (Sangiovanni, 2013).

First and foremost, the European solidarity-frame was used by the European Commission and Council. This is in line with Sangiovanni’s observation that over the years, the European institutions tend to respond with references to ‘solidarity’ in times of possible danger to the European Union (Sangiovanni, 2013). Many times, the European Commission and Council point out that the refugee crisis is a European problem that can be solved only by European solidarity. Exemplifying is Avromopoulos’ statement on a press conference in Kos, September 4th_{2015: “We can only face and overcome this crisis is we act as a true Union, in} full solidarity.” The same is stated by Jean-Claude Juncker (example 1), Donald Tusk (example 2), Frans Timmermans, Federica Mogherini and in official documents of the Council and

Framing in the European decision-making process : analysis of the decision on the refugee relocation system