Master thesis F.A. Quartero, BA S1075438
Houtstraat 3 2311 TE Leiden
Supervisor: Dr. M.A. Ebben Doelensteeg 16
2311 VL Leiden Room number 2.62b
Table of contents
Introduction 4
Chapter I: The Empire, Hamburg and the Duke of Holstein 12 Hamburg’s government 13 ‘Streitiger Elbsachen’: Hamburg and the Duke of Holstein 19 The Empire: Hamburg’s far friend 22
Chapter II: Hamburg’s political ambitions and diplomatic means 26 Goals 27 1. Commerce 27 2. Territory 31 3. Contributions 32 Means 33 1. Gratification 33 2. Publicising 36 3. Diplomatic support 38 4. Law enforcement 40 Hamburg’s diplomacy 43
Chapter III: Much to declare: Barthold Moller’s Regensburg accounts 45 Revenue 47 Expenses 51 1. Representation 51 2. Negotiation 54 3. Information 54 4. Affiliation 60
Hamburg’s Imperial politics 69
Conclusion 72
Bibliography 76
Figure 1: ‘Niedersachsen and Bremen, 1580’, at: Martin Knauer, Sven Tode (ed.), Der
Krieg vor den Toren: Hamburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1618-1648, (Hamburg 2000),
150-‐151.
Hamburg
An Imperial City at the Imperial Diet of 1640-‘41
Over time, the Holy Roman Empire has been subjected to many revaluations. Nineteenth century historians considered it a weak state, after the German aggressions of the First and Second World War scholars sought clues for a ‘Sonderweg’ in history that had lead the German proto-‐nation away from democratic principles and towards totalitarianism, followed by a reappraisal of the Imperial institutions that was sparked by historians in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland of the 1960’s.1 Owing to this last development in
historiography, an influential current of recent scholarship assesses the Empire and its institutions as a framework for political and intellectual interaction, rather than determining its ‘stateliness’.2 Within this new framework there is room to consider the
workings of the Empire in terms of multiple ‘layers’ of jurisdiction, overlapping areas of influence and different arenas of communication in which the Emperor, the Imperial institutions and the Imperial Estates engaged.3 This perspective is useful in
understanding how the Estates of the Holy Roman Empire operated as autonomous political agents as well, and how they managed to pursue their interests through their own independent – yet not sovereign – diplomacy. Because also in diplomatic historiography, the political reality of premodern times has long been seen through the prism of 19th and 20th-‐century statehood; nowadays the birth of an international system
at the Congress of Westphalia in 1648, based on sovereignty has been challenged.4
1 R.J.W. Evans, Michael Schaich & Peter H. Wilson (ed.), The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806 (New York 2011), 3-‐6.
2 Jason P. Coy, Benjamin Marschke, David Warren Sabean (ed.), The Holy Roman Empire, reconsidered, (New York 2010), 3. For an overview of the historiography on the HRE’s stateliness, compare: Peter H. Wilson,‘Still a Monstrosity? Some Reflections on Early Modern German Statehood’, at: The Historical Journal, 49 No. 2, (2006), 565-‐576.
3 Compare on the Empire’s legal system for example: Karl Härter, ‘The Early Modern Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (1495-‐1806): a multi-‐layered legal system’, at: Jeroen Duindam, Jill Diana Harries, Caroline Humfress, Hirvitz Nirmod (ed.), Law and Empire, Ideas, Practices, Actors, in the series:
‘Rulers&Elites’, Volume 3, (Leiden 2013), 111-‐131. On institutional protection of and ‘forum shopping’ by the Imperial Cities, compare for example: D. Petry, Konfliktbewaltigung als Medienereignis: Reichsstadt und Reichshofrat in der Frühen Neuzeit, (Leiden 2011). On the Empire as a platform for communication, compare for example: Michael North, ‘Das Reich als kommunikative Einheit’, at: Johannes Burkhardt, Christine Werkstetter (ed.), ’Kommunikation und Medien in der Frühen Neuzeit’, at: Historische Zeitschrift, Band 41, (München 2005), 237-‐249; Susanne Friedrich, Drehscheibe Regensburg: das Informations- und Kommunikationssystem des Immerwährenden Reichstags um 1700, (Berlin 2007).
4 John Watkins, ‘Towards a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe‘, at: Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 38:1 (2008), 1-‐14; Maurits Ebben, Louis Sicking, ‘Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd, een inleiding’, at: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 2014, Jrg. 127, No. 4, 541-‐552. On the question of the birth of sovereignty, compare also: Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty,
The discipline of New Diplomatic History occupies itself with the diplomatic influence of non-‐sovereign entities, interprets diplomatic practice in its time specific context, and consciously omits teleological backtracking of concepts of ‘modern’ diplomacy. It counters the idea of a state monopoly on diplomatic practice and has more regard for unofficial diplomatic actors and networks, such as the intermediary role of traders, missionaries and spies, and the transnational brokerage of art. Noteworthy examples of non-‐sovereign diplomatic agents are cities or city-‐bonds like the Hanseatic League.5
In line with this developing discipline of New Diplomatic History, this research aims to make a contribution by way of a bottom-‐up historiography on the Imperial and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and its dealings at the Imperial Diet of 1640-‐’41, assessing the city’s external affairs in detail – both within the Empire and outside, both in design and in implementation. A couple of aspects make Hamburg in this juncture such an interesting case for diplomatic history. It was one of the Empire’s leading cities in terms of commerce and diplomacy.6 Through its wide-‐spanning trade network, the city’s
establishment maintained many foreign contacts. Hamburg’s financial and armament markets during the Thirty Years War (1618-‐1648) were second only to Amsterdam’s, and – partly because of this feat – Hamburg developed into the Empire’s main diplomatic centre. The fact that the Preliminary Treaty of 1641, which settled the date, locations and partaking powers for the conferences that became the Congress of Westphalia, was negotiated in Hamburg between 1638 and 1641, underlines the city’s significance as diplomatic locus even on a European scale.
Yet despite its eminence in these fields, Hamburg’s diplomatic relations have been a problematic subject of study. In part, this is due to the fact that Hamburg’s historiography has been subjected to the same changing societal and academic constellations as those that sparked the revaluations of the Holy Roman Empire as a whole.7 But foremost Hamburg’s diplomatic historiography is hindered by a severe
International relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, at: International Organization, 55 No. 2, (2001), 251-‐ 287.
5 On new views concerning Hanseatic history, compare: Antje-‐Katrin Graßmann, ‘Niedergang oder Übergang? Zur Spätzeit der Hanse im 16. Und 17. Jahrhundert’, at: Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, Band XLIV (1998).
6 Hermann Kellenbenz, ‘Hamburg und die französisch-‐schwedischen Zusammenarbeit im Dreißigjährigen Krieg’, at: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte, Band 49/50 (1964), 83.
7 Compare for example: L.G. Gallois, Geschichte der Stadt Hamburg, nach den besten Quellen bearbeitet, (Hamburg 1853), a ‘proud’ 19th-‐century historiography; Hermann Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkräfte im
shortage of source material. Consecutive calamities took a heavy toll on the city of Hamburg’s archives, starting with the Great Fire of 1842, which was particularly destructive, followed by devastations at the hand of Allied air raids in 1943 and a damaging flood in 1962.8 Calculations are that about 35% of the archive survived the
flames in 1842, excluding the lion’s share of the records from before 1741.9 This poses a
significant handicap to more exhaustive Hamburg-‐based historic research.
The image arising from most of the literature is one of Hamburg’s exceptionality, arriving at different kinds of isolation in typifying the city’s external affairs. If we take a quick overview, the standard work on Hamburg’s history inclines to the notion that during the first half of the 17th century Hamburg pursued its own interests, being for
example less than collegial to its partners within the Hanseatic League, and adhered to a reserved attitude in its external relations.10 The city’s main concerns in foreign politics
at the start of the 17th century are described as its autonomy, neutrality and free
navigation, characterised in their execution by a tactic of “diplomatischen Ausweichens
und Hinhaltens” – a diplomacy of evading and stalling.11 Some refer to Hamburg’s foreign
policies as ‘Schaukelpolitik’: politics based on the balancing of interests and strategic, unprincipled shifting of partnerships.12 Put more mildly, this preposition can be
characterised as ‘particularism’ – politics that serve the own, private good rather than a communal one; a principle often used to characterise the cooperation between the different cities within the Hanseatic League in the late 16th and 17th centuries.13
Historian Stephan Schröder summarises Hamburg’s main interests during the Thirty Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel 1590-1625, (Hamburg 1954), a 1950’s ‘liberal’ social-‐ and
economic history; Gisela Rückleben, Rat und Bürgerschaft in Hamburg 1595-1686: innere Bindungen und Gegensätze, (Marburg 1969), a ‘leftist’ social history; Percy Ernst Schramm, Hamburg: Ein Sonderfall in der Geschichte Deutschlands, (Hamburg 1964), a 1960’s antithesis of a totalitarian German model, Hamburg as exception/‘Sonderfall’.
8 Flamme, Gabrielsson, Lorenzen-‐Schmidt, Kommentierte Übersicht über die Bestände des Staatsarchivs Hamburgs, (Hamburg 1999), 18.
9 Hans-‐Dieter Loose, ‘Das Stadtarchiv der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg im Großen Brand von 1842’, at: Joachim W. Frank&Thomas Brakmann (ed.), Beiträge zum 300-jährigen Jubiläum des Staatsarchivs der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, (Hamburg 2013), 69.
10 Werner Jochmann, Hans-‐Dieter Loose (ed.), Hamburg: Geschichte der Stadt und Ihren Bewohner, Band I (Hamburg 1982), 310.
11 Jochmann, Loose (ed.), Hamburg: Geschichte der Stadt und Ihren Bewohner, 259.
12 Rückleben, Rat und Bürgerschaft in Hamburg 1595-1686: innere Bindungen und Gegensätze, (Marburg 1969), 68. Also, ‘Schaukelpolitik’ was a surviving strategy for other smaller Estates as well, compare: Ernst Böhme, Das Fränkische Reichsgrafenkollegium im 16. Und 17. Jahrhundert, Untersuchungen zu den
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der korporativen Politik mindermächtiger Reichsstände, (Stuttgart 1989). 13 Karl-‐Klaus Weber, ‘Die Hansestadt Lübeck und die Generalstaaten. Die Beziehungen zwischen der Stadt als Haupt der Hanse und der Republik von ihrer Gründung 1579 bis zu Beginn des Dreißigjährigen Krieges im Spiegel niederländischer Quellen’, at: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und
Years War, especially during the 1620’s and 30’s, as maintaining legal and military independence, especially from Denmark, securing access to the different trade routes as well as the possibility to trade with all parties and, being a staunchly Lutheran city, securing the Imperial Right of Reformation (Reformationsrecht).14 Indeed, concerning its
independence, Hamburg abandoned several Swedish initiatives to close a political and military alliance during the period between 1618 and 1635. Likewise, the city dismissed such attempts by the Emperor and Spanish Habsburgs trying to expand their power in the Baltic region around 1628.15 During the Thirty Years War Hamburg’s economic
interests, served by peace and neutrality, invariably trumped the risks involved with such commitments. Still, according to Hermann Kellenbenz Hamburg’s neutrality should not be regarded as a goal in itself, but rather as a matter of pragmatism that turned the city’s weakness into a strength; thus the city’s government achieved Hamburg’s unique position as an exchange market for goods, ‘big finance’ and information.16
However, Hamburg’s function as an important node of European diplomacy is understood to stand in stark contrast with its own involvement with ‘big diplomacy’. For example, in assessing the role of Hamburg’s government in the Preliminary Treaty negotiations (1638-‐1641) the much-‐respected historian Hans-‐Dieter Loose (1937) has asked himself two questions: to what extent were they a precursor to the Peace of Westphalia (according to Loose: not at all), and was the city’s government diplomatically involved?17 Regarding the second question that the “preserved sources in the
Staatsarchiv show foremost the [establishment’s] consideration for the city’s own
interest” and that “those responsible for governing the city [of Hamburg] have not actively contributed [to the coming-‐about of the Hamburg Preliminary Treaty of 1641], be it as idea-‐giver, be it as intermediary”.18 Another subject that Loose has treated was
the mission to Regensburg that is studied here: Senator Barthold Moller von Baum and Syndicus Johann Christoph Meurer’s envoy to the Imperial Diet of 1640-‐1641, extending
14 Stephan Schröder, ‘Hamburg und Schweden im Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Vom potentiellen Bündnispartner zum Zentrum der Kriegsfinanzierung’, at: Verein für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, (1989), 305-‐331. 15 M.E.H.N. Mout, ‘"Holendische propositiones". Een Habsburgs plan tot vernietiging van handel, visserij en scheepvaart der Republiek (ca. 1625)‘, at: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, Vol. 95 (1982), 345.
16 Hermann Kellenbenz, ‘Hamburg und die französisch-‐schwedischen Zusammenarbeit im Dreißigjährigen Krieg’, at: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte, Band 49/50 (1964), 106-‐107.
17 Hans-‐Dieter Loose, ’Vorspiele zum Westfälische Frieden in Hamburg’, at: Martin Knauer, Sven Tode (ed.), Der Krieg vor den Toren: Hamburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1618-1648, (Hamburg 2000), 269-‐284. As a marker of his stature, Loose has been honoured with an academic tribute: Hans Wilhelm
Eckardt&Klaus Richter (ed.), ‘Bewahren und Berichten: Festschrift für Hans-‐Dieter Loose zum 60. Geburtstag’, at: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte, (1997) Bd. 83, Teil 1.
it to the Viennese Imperial Court until the spring of 1642. Although reflecting mostly upon the function of ‘öffentlichkeit’, or ‘public accountability’ at this mission, Loose concludes with regard to the city’s diplomatic efforts that Hamburg’s institutionalised disadvantage at the Diet as an Imperial City and its disengagement with the ongoing peace process – the main stake at the Imperial Diet convention of 1640-‐‘41 – qualified its conduct as an “in greater historical context peripheral diplomacy”.19 In other words,
Loose arrives at the conclusion that Hamburg’s diplomacy was disappointingly self-‐ engaged.
With this research, I would like to dig deeper into the preserved archival material of Hamburg’s manifestations at the Diet of 1640-‐‘41 to arrive at a more positively defined valuation of the city’s diplomacy, embracing both Hamburg’s pursuit of self-‐ interest as typical Estately behaviour, and the fact that the city’s contribution to Imperial and European politics was of modest, maybe indeed ‘peripheral’ proportions. To this end I shall carefully assess what were the political goals that Hamburg’s government pursued at the Diet, but – more importantly – I shall look at the diplomatic means that Hamburg employed to reach these goals. Congruent with New Diplomatic History, this study focuses more on the process of diplomacy, rather than its results.20 In other
studies on the Holy Roman Empire as well, the emphasis of research gravitates towards the ‘how’, rather than the ‘what’ in order to come to a better understanding of its functioning.21 A third factor to be researched is the contribution of Hamburg’s own
diplomacy in this process. Which choices did Hamburg’s government and its diplomats make in using the Imperial institutional framework to work towards their aspired goals? How could Hamburg, as a small Estate within the Holy Roman Empire, exert influence on Imperial politics? And how did Hamburg’s diplomats depend on their masters in Hamburg; did they enjoy a certain “Verhandlungsspielraum”, a freedom to act independently, or not? This last question has been studied almost exclusively in the
19 Hans-‐Dieter Loose, ‘Hamburgische Gesandte auf dem Regensburger Reichstag 1640/41, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte von offentlicher Meinung und Diplomatie Hamburgs in der Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts’, at: Zeitschrift für Hamburgische Geschichte, Vol. 61 (1975), 17.
20 Maurits Ebben, Louis Sicking, ‘Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd, een inleiding’ in: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 2014, Jrg. 127, No. 4, 547.
21 Compare: D. Petry, Konfliktbewaltigung als Medienereignis: Reichsstadt und Reichshofrat in der Frühen Neuzeit, (Leiden 2011), 12.
context of the Peace of Westphalia.22 These questions shall be addressed foremost in the
second chapter, which is based on the diplomatic correspondence.
What I hope to show is that, although there is no conclusive evidence that Hamburg engaged in the ‘great politics’ of Europe and the Empire that Loose has been looking for, the level at which it conducted its diplomacy was in many aspects at eye-‐ level with the Kingdom of Denmark, and perhaps better developed than previously perceived. Hamburg’s government and diplomats maintained relations within the highest spheres of Imperial government and -‐bureaucracy, lobbied at the Prince Electors and their representatives, and were able to rally diplomatic support from European powers such as the Dutch Estates-‐General.
The second pillar of this research is based on the mission accounts, which are treated in the third chapter. Also based on the New Diplomatic History framework, the aim is to gain insight into the everyday reality of Hamburg’s diplomacy at the Imperial Diet of 1640-‐‘41. I shall assess how the diplomats moved about their business at this Regensburg convention; how were Hamburg’s diplomats able to gather essential information? How did they flesh out their tasks in representing their hometown? Which practical methods of gaining information and influence did they apply – gift-‐giving, bribery, espionage, persuasion by eloquence? Secondly, we shall see how their demands were met – by other diplomats and their households, Regensburg citizens, Imperial dignitaries, and bureaucrats. What does this eventually tell us about the and government culture of the Empire around 1640; only a few years before the Congress of Westphalia of 1643-‐1648? To this end I shall treat the diplomats’ conduct in Regensburg according to the classic interpretation of a diplomat’s responsibilities: representation, negotiation and information – with the added criterion of ‘affiliation’. This parameter I have added because the traditional three-‐step approach lacks the officious and personal dimension of diplomacy that is so characteristic for this era.
The thus achieved ‘bottom-‐up’ interpretation of the Diet through the mission’s financial accounts and the window they provide on the everyday dealings of Hamburg’s diplomats shall hopefully contribute to our understanding of the role of lower-‐ranking diplomats, their entourage and their households in the daily praxis of diplomacy.23
22 Daniel Legutke, Diplomatie als soziale Institution, Brandenburgische, sächsische und kaiserliche Gesandte in Den Haag 1648-1720, (Münster 2010), 48.
Moving now to the source material, the central case study in this research is the city’s diplomatic conduct at the Reichstag of 1640-‐1641. This mission documented in over 60 letters of correspondence – amounting to more than 40 pages in transcription – between the city government and its diplomats in Regensburg, as well as the diplomats’ financial accounts. These accounts cover all revenues and expenses, starting at the envoy’s departure on 25 August 1640 until its return on 14 April 1642. At this Imperial Diet, Hamburg’s diplomacy centred around the main threat to the city’s commerce and security, which were the mercantilist and expansionist politics of Christian IV (r. 1588-‐ 1648), King of Denmark and Duke of Holstein-‐Glückstadt. To counter its impeding neighbour, Hamburg made direct appeals to Emperor Ferdinand III (r. 1637-‐1657), but also managed to effectively use the legal and political protection of institutions such as the Imperial Aulic Council – the Emperor’s most trusted legal court.
The correspondence between the Hamburg City Council and its representatives in Regensburg is a scarce and extraordinary source for the study of Hamburg’s Reichs-‐ political agenda as well as its diplomatic methods. This is important, because diplomatic historiography on Hamburg’s government is out of proportion with its significance as a diplomatic and economic centre during the Thirty Years War. In combination with study of the representatives’ account book, the total exchange of 59 letters from the Hamburg Senate to Regensburg and four letters from the diplomats to Hamburg form a respectable quantity of material to study the exchange of information, orders and (requests for) advice. The coarse balance between letters from the Senate and those written by Moller and Meurer bears some implications for the research. Because the Senate’s letters are more instructive and the diplomats’ more explanatory, the practical process of diplomacy – the ‘how’ – is overshadowed by the political ideal – the ‘what’ – ventilated by the city’s government. The financial accounts however are able to complement the correspondence in this respect, revealing for example which people and parties were paid for their cooperation, as well as other financial services that were lent to Hamburg’s ‘allies’ in Regensburg. Also, to reveal something extra on Hamburg’s practices he research in this study is supplemented with information from the Dutch National Archive as well – adding primarily correspondence from the United Provinces’ resident agent in Hamburg.
The structure of this paper is built up through a macro-‐, to meso-‐, to micro-‐level treatment of Hamburg’s diplomacy. In the first chapter, a general introduction to the city
of Hamburg’s starting position is presented: the form of its government and diplomatic apparatus and relation to the Empire, a background on its main political concern – the King of Denmark’s anti-‐Hamburg policies, and a short summary of the prelude to the 1640 Imperial Diet, its main points of discussion and an overview of the Imperial institutions that were involved in the politics and workings of the Diet. The second chapter focuses on Hamburg’s goals, methods and form of diplomacy through the letters of correspondence. Finally, the third chapter zooms in even further, using the financial accounts as a window upon the everyday movements of Hamburg’s diplomats.
Chapter I
Hamburg, the Duke of Holstein and the Empire
Its physical conditions provided the Imperial City of Hamburg with many advantages: the town was ideally situated for the purpose of trade, with the river Elbe unlocking both the Eastern trade to Scandinavia and the Baltic, and the Western trade to the Iberian peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea. Its fortifications, designed by the Dutch engineer Johan van Valckenburg and constructed between 1615 and 1625, were considered insurmountable by contemporaries.24 During the Thirty Years War it had the
fortune of lying outside the main Imperial thoroughfares, saving it from fates like the Sack of Magdeburg in 1631. Likewise Hamburg escaped occupation by armies of the war faring parties like Nuremberg (by Sweden, in 1632) or Wolffenbüttel (by Imperial troops, in 1627). In addition, its importance to the invading ‘Confederates’ – especially Sweden – as a financial and diplomatic centre, as well as indemnity payments, precluded Swedish occupation.25
Before the 17th century, this geographic ‘peripheral’ quality used to be heartfelt
by Hamburg’s citizens with regard to the Emperor, who ruled from the far-‐away, inland cities of Vienna and Regensburg. In the words of a 16th-‐century contemporary he was
“not considered much” in Hamburg.26 And vice versa, until years after the conclusion of
the Peace of Westphalia the city – as well as the whole of the regional consultative body of the Lower Saxon Kreis (Niedersächsische Reichskreis), that included the principalities Holstein, Mecklenburg and Braunschweig-‐Lüneburg and the Imperial Cities of Bremen, Lübeck and Goslar – was deemed Reichsfern by the Emperor and his administration.27
Indeed, even in 1710 a messenger departing from Hamburg travelled faster to London by ship than to Vienna by express-‐coach.28
Yet, during the 17th century Hamburg’s attitude toward the Empire changed, as
the city grew increasingly dependent on the Emperor’s protection because of the intensifying Danish economic, diplomatic and military pressure. Consequently, the
24 Karl-‐Klaus Weber,’Unneimbahre Stadt’, at: Martin Knauer, Sven Tode (ed.), Der Krieg vor den Toren: Hamburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1618-1648, (Hamburg 2000), 98.
25 Zeiger, Hamburgs Finanzen von 1563-1650, (Hamburg 1936), 110. 26 Jochmann, Hamburg: Geschichte der Stadt, 200.
27 Tomas Lau, ‘Diplomatie und Recht: die Rolle des kaiserlichen Residenten bei innerstädtischen Konflikten in den Reichsstädten der Frühen Neuzeit’, 98.
28 Dorothea Schröder, Zeitgeschichte auf der Opernbühne, barockes Musiktheater in Hamburg im Dienst von Politik und Diplomatie (1690-1745), (Gottingen 1998), 14.
Imperial diplomatic arena became more and more important. Not only did Hamburg seek to contain Christian IV by Imperial directives; the Imperial Supreme Courts of the
Reichskammergericht (Imperial Cameral Court) and Reichshofrat (Imperial Aulic
Council) were also important to legitimise Hamburg’s claims and to influence the Emperor, who was the Empire’s source of all justice, and as such never abandoned during its existence.29 In this last respect, coaxing the Emperor, the Reichshofrat was of
special significance, as we shall see when we dive into the function of the Aulic Council as a diplomatic pressure tool in the second, and the mission’s expenses on members of the Aulic Council in the third chapter.
Before we turn to matters of the Imperial Diet and the Holy Roman Empire, it is important to understand the mechanisms behind Hamburg’s government and its politics at Estate level. Therefore, we shall look first at the city’s government, the background of the diplomats that were despatched to Regensburg, and take a small advance on the city government’s attitude towards the Empire. The second paragraph treats the city’s conflict with Denmark – after all Hamburg’s prime concern in its external politics – and the third paragraph concludes with an introduction to the Diet of 1640 and the institutional framework that Hamburg was able to utilise diplomatically.
Hamburg’s government
Hamburg was an ‘immediate’ (Reichsunmittelbare) city, meaning that it was directly subjected to the Emperor and had no other overlord. In 1640 Hamburg was a republic under dual jurisdiction of Ferdinand III and a self-‐governing commune ruled by an overlapping system of councils. The most important of these were the Rat, the Senate, and the Bürgerschaft – the Assembly of Citizens. The day-‐to-‐day governing of the city befell to four Burgomasters, who were appointed for life, and the Senate. The Senate consisted of 24 elected members, belonging to a social class that may be accurately described as a ‘merchant aristocracy’ or ‘urban patriciate’.30 By way of the Senate and
other governing bodies such as the influential parish foremen, the Aldermänner, Hamburg was ruled by a distinguished group of men, comparable to the well-‐studied
29 Michael Hughes, ’The Imperial Aulic Council („Reichshofrat“) as Guardian of the Rights of Mediate Estates in the Later Holy Roman Empire: Some Suggestions for Further Research’, at: Vierhaus (ed.), Herrschaftsverträge, Wahlkapitulationen, Fundamentalgsetze, (Göttingen 1977), 199.
30 Gisela Rückleben, Rat und Bürgerschaft in Hamburg 1595-1686: innere Bindungen und Gegensätze, (Marburg 1969), 59.
Dutch Republic’s Regenten elite.31 This elite often clashed with the Assembly of Citizens,
consisting more of traders and artisans – a friction that temporarily eased during the Thirty Years War.
The Senate was supported by three legal Secretaries, and two ‘Syndici’ who managed the city’s foreign affairs.32 Just like so many offices in the Early Modern, waxing
bureaucracy, the effective responsibilities under the function of Syndicus depended on the person holding the office. According to a professional guide that was published in the Northern Netherlands in 1645, the term derived from the Greek ‘sundikos’, which means “with council, speaking, writing”.33 A Syndicus was expected to bolster a thorough
knowledge of languages (foremost Latin and French) as well as the history of the lands he served.34 A Syndicus was ideally legally trained in multiple disciplines, and thus able
to advise the city’s government not just on private legalities, but also on public and international matters. The emphasis on the juridical knowledge of the Syndicus is mirrored by the fact that the metier of government in 17th century Hamburg became an
increasingly legal one: from 1643 onward, all 4 Burgomasters were legally trained. Another important institution in the field of Hamburg’s home politics and diplomacy was the Treasury (Kammerei). The Treasury controlled the city’s finances, including those regarding diplomatic missions, and was the terrain of repeated clashes between Senate and the Assembly of Citizens. To prevent friction however, the Senate had invited a commission of 36 burghers to be counselled on matters concerning Denmark, which supported the Regensburg mission.
The biographies of Hamburg’s 1640-‐1641 Reichstag diplomats, Syndicus Johann Christoph Meurer and Senator Barthold Moller shall serve here both as an introduction to the structure of Hamburg’s government and as examples of the sort of men that formed the city’s elite and diplomatic apparatus. The profession of diplomacy in this period is generally understood to be the domain of men of considerable esteem: well-‐ educated, well-‐endowed, well-‐travelled and well-‐bred. To this conception the Hamburger diplomats were no exception. Councilman Barthold Moller von Baum (1605-‐ 1667), firstly, descended from a prominent Hanseatic family. His father Vincent Moller
31 Renate Bridenthal (ed.), The hidden history of crime, corruption and states, (New York 2013).
32 Postel, ‘Reformation und Gegenreformation 1517-‐1618’, at: Werner Jochmann and Hans-‐Dieter Loose (ed.), Hamburg, Geschichte der Stadt und Ihren Bewohner, Band I (Hamburg 1982), 194.
33 Bernhard Alting, Syndicus, ofte tractaetken over ’t ambt van de Syndiicquen, ende pensionarisen door Bernhard Alting, rechtsgeleerde, (Groningen 1645), 1.
had served as Syndicus to the Hamburg Senate, and his mother Elisabeth Beckmann was a Burgomaster’s daughter. The Beckmanns had been pioneers in Hamburg’s Brazil trade in the late 16th century, did well in the copper business since the start of the 30 Years
War and were related by marriage to other leading patrician families such as Vögeler and De Greve.35 Barthold himself married a daughter of Burgomaster Albert von Eitzen
(1586-‐1653). His father-‐in-‐law was actually in office as Burgomaster since 1623 and one of the leading contacts in the diplomats’ correspondence.36 Moller had studied
jurisprudence in Leiden, and graduated in both civil and canonical law at the University of Basel in 1629. After his studies, Barthold Moller went on a Grand Tour, visiting France, England and Holland. Shortly after his return to Hamburg, he was elected Secretary to the Senate (Ratssekretär) in 1630, and became a Senator himself in 1635. Before Barthold Moller was to represent Hamburg at the Reichstag of 1640 he had been on several diplomatic missions, for example to the Dutch Estates-‐General in The Hague in 1631 and the Danish King in Glückstadt in 1640. Hamburg’s struggles with Denmark dominated the agenda at both occasions. Precisely because of the paramount importance to Hamburg’s foreign policy we shall look at the development of relations between Hamburg and Denmark more closely in the next paragraph. In 1642 Moller succeeded Hieronymus Vögeler as Burgomaster. In this capacity, he would leave his marks on city politics foremost in the intensification of relations with France. Interestingly, in his later career Moller received a pension from the French crown, probably in acknowledgement of the steady improvement of Hamburg’s relations with France during Moller’s years as Burgomaster. Barthold Moller von Baum was officially thanked for his services by the King of France in 1652.37
Moller’s colleague deputy and Syndicus Dr. Johannes Christoph Meurer (1598-‐ 1652) was a son of a previous Hamburger Syndicus and Privy Councillor of Holstein Philipp Meurer. His studies led him by the universities of Rostock, Thübingen, Straßburg, Wittenberg, Leipzig and Jena, where he eventually received the title of Doctor in both civil and canonical law in 1619. On his subsequent Grand Tour, Meurer visited besides England, France and the United Provinces also the Southern Netherlands and Italy. By the time the Imperial Diet started in 1640, Meurer had been on several
35 Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkräfte 111-‐113.
36 Twice in the correspondence, the city’s Secretary Paridom van Kampen pardoned the fact that he had not been able to have Burgomaster Von Eitzen autograph to officially approve the sent letter.
37 Hermann Kellenbenz, ‘Hamburg und die Französisch-‐Schwedische zusammenarbeit im dreißigjährigen Krieg’ in: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte, Band 49/50 (1964), 96.
diplomatic missions; the most successful of which was probably his visit to the Imperial Election (Kaiserwahl) in 1636 – be it against considerable cost to the Treasury.38 Meurer
married three times, his second marriage concluded in 1640 with Barthold’s sister, Margaretha Moller von Baum. Meurer would later serve as Hamburg’s deputy at the Osnabruck negotiations.
The city of Hamburg’s diplomatic apparatus employed, most importantly, a resident to the Estates-‐General in The Hague in concordance with Lübeck and Bremen. This resident was Lieuwe van Aitzema. Secondly, the Hanse made use of Consuls to act as intermediaries in trade and commercial politics on the Iberian Peninsula as well.39
However, we shall see that around 1640 Hamburg also employed two Agents in Vienna, who were apparently invested with the task of forwarding Hamburg’s interests in the toll case at the Imperial Court.
When we consider the political motivations and affiliations of this socially homogeneous elite however, the picture fragments considerably. The Senate represented different factions and schools of thought as to which power(block) was to be favoured as Hamburg’s ally. Not surprisingly therefore, many members of Hamburg’s ruling elite operated within the diplomatic networks of larger European powers – Barthold Moller’s service to France being only a first example. During the period of interest here, circa 1640, hints of the Hamburg elite’s foreign loyalties are plentiful. Moller’s predecessor as Burgomaster for example, Hieronymus Vögeler (1565-‐1642), was an informant for the Spanish crown.40 Moller’s father in law, Burgomaster Albrecht
von Eitzen, was “the undisputed leader of the pro-‐Emperor faction in Hamburg, and worked together continuously with the Emperor’s resident [Von Siebern] both against the Danish-‐Swedish and Anglo-‐Hollandish currents in city and Senate”.41 Barthold’s
brother Vincent Moller von Baum married the stepdaughter of Swedish resident Johan Adler Salvius in 1646, received a royal knighthood and was installed as Swedish representative to the Niedersachsische Kreits.42 Lastly, Councilman Georg von Holte
38 Reichshofratakten, 211. 6 January 1637.
39 Jorun Poettering, Handel, Nation und Religion: Kaufleute zwischen Hamburg und Portugal im 17. Jahrhundert, (Göttingen 2013).
40 Jochmann, Loose (ed.), Hamburg: Geschichte der Stadt und Ihren Bewohner, 250.
41 Neue Deutsche Biographie, https://www.deutsche-‐biographie.de/sfz12954.html#ndbcontent [03-‐08-‐ 2017].
42 Heiko Droste, ‘Ein Diplomat zwischen Familieninteressen und Königsdienst: Johan Adler Salvius in Hamburg (1630-‐1650)’, at: Nähe in der Ferne: personale Verflechtung in der Frühen Neuzeit, (Berlin 2005), 94.
operated as correspondent of the Estates-‐General between the residencies of Foppe van Aitzema and Hendrick Schrassert in 1640.43
Although we have seen that the historiography emphasises Hamburg’s reservations towards friendly external relations during the Thirty Years War, a quick advance on the diplomatic correspondence suggests that the policies of Hamburg’s governing elite around 1640 were predominantly pro-‐Emperor. Danish dominance and other threats to Hamburg’s commerce and security inspired Hamburg’s primeval political strategy to retain the Emperor’s benevolence.44 This strategy can be read in the
Senate’s complaint, ventilated in a letter to Moller and Meurer from July 1641, that there were rumours saying that “we confer and conclude treaties with France, Sweden and other Reichswiederwertigen but we have never as much as thought of this”.45 This was
slander, according to the Senate, “with which some think to denigrate us before the Emperor and the Imperial Estates”. Also, Hamburg stressed its importance to the Empire several times in the correspondence. In one of its first letters to Regensburg in October 1640, the Senate wrote its envoys that a wrong result in casu the Elbe tolls could mean “this city’s ruin, as well as damage to the entire Roman Empire”.46 Again in November,
the Senate expressed a warning that any disadvantage to the city would have consequences for the Empire’s well-‐being.47 And lastly, in spite of Loose’s claim of
disengagement by Hamburg’s government, correspondence between the Emperor and his special representative in Hamburg Aulic Councillor Kurt Von Lützow, archived in Frankfurt, shows that Hamburg’s Syndici Meurer and Lündemann in fact did intermediate between Von Lützow and the Swedish resident Adler Salvius.48 This
occurred in Hamburg in the period between October 1639 and the start of Meurer’s
43 NA 1.01.02 inv. nr. 6078.
44 For example, 19 December 1640: “[sich bei] HUSANO melden vor ein antreff oder zusammenwirkung, mocht ERFOLG schwer fallen zu stande, willen wir in jeder fall [Ferdinand III] und das REICHES HULFE nicht begeben, entzwüschen wird [euch] dahin laborieren, dass uns wie hiebevohr in ersten schreiben aangedeutet, moge ZUGELASSEN werden NUOUIS MODO jedoch intra praejudicium [Ferdinand III] ex IMPERII uns davon zu liberiren und dadurch an dem REICHE et [Ferdinand III] nicht GEFREUELT zu haben”.
45 HaStA 111-‐1_26223, 31 July 1641: “also solten wir gefählige concilia und Bundtnüßen mit Franckreich, Schweden und anderen des Reichs wiederwerttigen tractiren, wir aber niemals davon die geringste gedancken gehabt”.
46 HaStA 111-‐1_26223, 24 October 1640. 47 HaStA 111-‐1_26223, 28 November 1640.
