The Private and Public Sectors in Conflict Resolution: A Comparison Between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the Private Military Intervention That Preceded It

(1)

The Private and Public Sectors in Conflict Resolution

A Comparison Between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the Private Military Intervention That Preceded It

Written by: Aleksandar Maricic Student number: s1782010 Supervised by: Dr. J. Matthys Second reader: Mr. S. Boeke

Leiden University - Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management

(2)

ii

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to compare the performance of public and private sectors interventions as a means of conflict resolution in order to make recommendations that could improve their results and outcomes.

In the first part the phenomenon of public and private sector interventionism is discussed and the context of the research – the Sierra Leonean Civil War, is presented. This is followed by laying out the necessary theoretical framework in part two. The theories utilized in this thesis stem from studies of public management performance and conflict resolution theory. They are adapted and combined into a unified method for comparing performance at conflict resolution in part three. In part four this method is applied to two case studies, that of the private military intervention conducted by Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and the subsequent United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. A detailed look into elements of performance: context, objectives, inputs, activities, outputs, efficiency, effectiveness for each individual case study is provided, followed by a comparative chapter on the three key aspects of performance – efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.

The results suggest that the strengths of the public and private sectors in conflict resolution are complementary, while the possibility of collaboration promises to shore up their individual weaknesses. Taking that into account, the thesis argues that the best path for future interventionism is one of collective action by both private and public sectors. This discussion is presented in part five.

(3)

iii

List of Tables

Table 1 - Operationalization ... 27

Table 2 - Summary of Organizational Contribution: EO Intervention in Sierra Leone, May 1995 - March 1997 ... 40

Table 3 - Summary of EO Intervention performance in Sierra Leone ... 52

Table 4 - UNAMSIL Expenditures ... 57

Table 5 - Financial Breakdown: 1 July 2001 – 30 June 2002 ... 58

Table 6 - Resource Breakdown for 5 September 2002 ... 59

Table 7 - Summary of Organizational Contribution: UNAMSIL, October 1999-December 2005; ... 74

Table 8 - Summary of UNAMSIL Performance in Sierra Leone ... 82

Table 9 - EO-UNAMSIL Efficiency and Effectiveness Comparison ... 84

(6)

vi

List of Figures

Figure 1 - “Tip of the Spear” Typology ... 7

Figure 2 - Types of Performance ... 9

Figure 3 - Production Model of Performance ... 10

Figure 4 - Productivity and Efficiency ... 12

Figure 5 - Conflicts by Type 1946-2008... 14

Figure 6 - The Hourglass Model of Conflict Resolution ... 16

Figure 7 - Research Framework ... 18

Figure 8 - Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies ... 20

Figure 9 - Map of Sierra Leone... 28

Figure 10 - EO Objectives in Sierra Leone. ... 31

Figure 11 - EO structure in Sierra Leone at deployment, 1995 ... 33

Figure 12 - Distribution of requirements by cost component. ... 58

Figure 13 - UNAMSIL Deployment: November 1999 – November 2005 ... 59

Figure 14 - UNAMSIL Deployment progress March – December 2001 ... 63

Figure 15 - Pace of UNAMSIL Drawdown ... 64

Figure 16 - DDR Programme Progression ... 65

(7)

vii

List of Abbreviations

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

CDF Civil Defense Forces

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of Western African States

EO Executive Outcomes

OAU Organization of African Unity

PMC/PMF Private Military Company/Private Military Firm

RSLMF Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces

RUF Revolutionary United Front

RUFP Revolutionary United Front Party

SLA Sierra Leone Army

UN United Nations

UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

(8)

1

Part 1: Introduction

1.1 The Proliferation of Private and Public Sector Interventionism

The end of the Cold War signaled a tectonic shift in world politics. The disappearance of bloc based confrontation and the decline of Communism represented a triumph of historical forces with a wholly different perception of the relationship between the state and the markets. Spurred by the electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States, proponents of their economic policies sought to prove that the market could more efficiently perform the role of what had become an overburdened, unwieldy state (Avant, 2005, p. 35). An ever increasing number of previously state exclusive functions shifted to the private sector and it is perhaps no surprise that the provision of security partially followed suit (Singer, 2008, p. 38). The impetus was not exclusively ideological but also driven by political realities on the ground and the changing nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War world.

The end of the struggle between superpowers ushered in conflicts that had no ideological backing (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). With no overreaching narrative to spur political interventionism many former Cold War battleground states were abandoned to their internal political dynamics, forcing them to seek support from other sources – and the corporate world was well positioned to take advantage of this situation. The means for the private sector to offer these services became plentiful. Military downsizing ensured a constant stream of trained personnel without alternative employment opportunities and they quickly swelled the ranks of a new phenomenon – the (re)emergence of Private Military Companies, corporate entities that offer various military related tasks for hire (Singer, 2008, p. 42; Avant, 2005, p. 33). Concurrently, massive stockpiles of Cold War arsenals, often from former Eastern bloc countries were made available to whomever was able to afford them – providing these companies with the tools to pursue their trade (Griffiths, 2005, p. 530). Perhaps the apex of this new form of corporate activity was encapsulated by what Peter W. Singer termed “tip of the spear” companies, firms that offered direct military involvement on their clients’ behalf (Singer, 2008, p. 93). The best known of these was the South African PMC “Executive Outcomes”. It combined all of the trends mentioned above: a regulatory vacuum in its host country, a large pool of unemployed

(9)

2 apartheid era security personnel to draw from, leadership experienced in obtaining equipment and arms and a willingness to market their talents to states shaken by the disappearance of their Cold War sponsors. Executive Outcomes would eventually become a contentious symbol. To some it was a triumph of market organization and private sector initiative (Howe, 1998, p. 308). Others saw it as wanton mercenarism and the return of colonialism in a new guise (Pech, 1999, p. 81).

This narrative of triumphant privatization and state retreat, often repeated in popular and academic accounts of the era paints a somewhat misleading picture. While states did indeed accept a transfer of many of their former roles to the private sector this process was not universal. In the domain of international conflict resolution the new political status quo was seen as an opportunity for those forces that felt constrained by the preceding ideological mold. The United Nations, a product of statist idealism, had great difficulties in performing its intended role under the overbearing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Within the organization, the end of the Cold War was met with optimism – sparking a new era of UN interventionism (Sorenson & Wood, 2005, p. 2).

History would see these two very different forces meet on the same battlefield, neither opposed nor truly on the same side. Two interventions by Executive Outcomes and the United Nations would take place in the drawn out civil war in Sierra Leone. Both would go on to claim success, which lead to the creation of competing narratives. One side portrayed the private sector as undoubtedly more effective albeit controversial, the other proclaimed the UN missions a historical success (Howe, 1998, p. 331; Olonisakin, 2008).

The goal of this thesis is to reexamine those narratives and establish a unified theoretical framework that can be used to compare the effectiveness of the two in order to ascertain the particular advantages and disadvantages each form of interventionism. The conclusions of this research could hopefully be utilized toward the goal of achieving a superior model of international conflict resolution.

(10)

3

1.2 Research Question and Sub-Questions

In light of the preceding chapter, the basic question that guided this research was:

How do the UN mission in Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes intervention that preceded it compare in terms of performance at conflict resolution?

In order to provide an answer it is necessary to explore the following sub-questions:  What constitutes performance in the field of conflict resolution?

 What are the criteria for success or lack thereof in this endeavor?  Do the interventions meet or fail to meet these criteria?

Further explanatory value is also provided by answering:

 What were the circumstances that facilitated the respective successes and/or failures in these interventions?

 What did these interventions have in common, and where do they differ?

1.3 Academic Relevance

This thesis melds the public academic discourse on the privatization of security, public-private sector relationships with international relations, international law and conflict resolution. As states look toward the private sector more and more to share the burden of the provision of security the academic debate surrounding its privatization is still quite relevant. Within that debate there are two noticeable trends. The first is a current in favor of giving Private Military Companies a role in peacekeeping on the basis of several successful private sector interventions, in particular those of Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone. Their argument is usually performance related – PMC’s are portrayed as a more flexible, effective and cost-efficient alternative to the public sector (Shearer, 2008, p. 76; Howe, 1998, p. 331). Opponents of this line of thinking, a substantial group within academia, seek to expand the discussion by adding concerns regarding the legality, ethics and inherent market contradictions of a privatized use of

(11)

4 force (Singer, 2008, p. 133; McFate, 2014, p. 57). In their perspective, performance advantages recede into the background of these (often insurmountable) concerns.

This thesis also represents a performance comparison – but its goal is not to support either school of thought. Instead it aims to contribute to the academic debate by providing a more scientifically valid basis for comparison. The issues with existing analyses of the role of the UN or EO is that they are done either in isolation or that they do not use a common set of criteria.

Proponents of PMC’s compare the private and public sector, pointing to the success of the former and the failure of the latter. They take a historical outcome and use it as an argument in favor of inherent performance superiority. In the particular case of Executive Outcomes vis-à-vis the UN in Sierra Leone, it is usually a portrayal of how the company changed the military situation, the time-frame in which it was achieved and how much it cost. These points compare favorably to the subsequent UN interventions and therefore a broad conclusion in favor of the private sector is easy to make. However, establishing what happened does not necessarily explain why it happened. Only a clear understanding of “the why” provides the necessary point for a genuine comparison between the public and the private sector. Scott Fitzsimmons’s application of the normative theory of military performance to the EO interventions in Sierra Leone and Angola came the furthest in explaining the why the company succeeded in its task – but it is still limited to only the private sector (Fitzsimmons S. , 2010).

This thesis aims to also represent the “other half” by applying the same theory to subsequent UN interventions, operating on the assumption that similar or identical criteria allow for the most scientifically valid comparison. A thorough answer as to why the UN succeeded or failed in its goals – and why it did so would provide a basis from which more conclusive arguments in favor of either the public or private sector could be drawn.

1.4 Societal Relevance

The collapse of the Cold War order was followed by a proliferation of what Martin van Creveld termed “low intensity conflicts”, confrontations between states or groups below the level of a conventional war (U.S. Army, 1990; Van Creveld, 1991, p. 21). These struggles frequently led to

(12)

5 protracted instability, the collapse of state institutions and great suffering of the civilian populations. Consequently, the demands for state interventionism within the framework of UN Peacekeeping increased greatly. Examining the outcomes of these UN missions reveals a number of successes as well as many failures and enduring flaws. Similarly, private sector interventionism has been heavily criticized on an ethical and practical level – despite notable achievements. This research will show that both approaches possess unique advantages which could be harnessed to greater social benefit if the (uneasy) relationship between these two sectors could be reconsidered. The end goal would be to empower the state led conflict resolution mechanisms with the efficiency and dynamism of the private sector with the intent of lessening the economic and humanitarian damage in conflict zones, as well as bringing a speedier end to the protracted intra-state conflicts that continue to plague many areas around the world. The primary societal value of this research is therefore in empowering policy-makers with a stronger “toolbox” for conflict resolution in order to reduce the overall cost and impact of wars. The secondary societal value resides in resolving the problematic position of private sector interventionism within a traditionally state-dominated sphere. This research will show that the lack of cooperation between the UN and the private military company (influenced by a perceived lack of legitimacy of the private sector) negatively influenced the duration of the conflict and resulted in greater harm to the state and its population. A push for an accommodation in this matter would open up avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two sectors.

(13)

6

Part 2: Theoretical Framework

The inherent challenge to a comparison between the interventions of Executive Outcomes and the United Nations lies in defining what is being compared and how this is to be done. The “what” can be summarized as performance at conflict resolution. However, taking into account that both of these concepts are broad and subject to a variety of contested interpretations, it is necessary to more narrowly define them.In the first part, the phenomenon of the Private Military Company is clarified. Subsequently performance as a concept, model and the process of its measurement within the public sector will be examined. This is followed by a historical and theoretical exploration of conflict resolution, performed through external intervention. Through the discussion of conflict resolution the role and methods of the United Nations within this process will be made clear - which comprises the final component of this framework.

2.1 Private Military Companies

Private Military Companies or Private Military Firms (PMF) are “corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support training and technical skills” (Singer, 2008, p. 8). Singer’s definition aligns with the two key characteristics of PMC’s established by Mandel: non-governmental ownership and control combined with a focus on the provision of coercive security (as cited in Carmola, 2010, p. 18). They are organized as registered businesses and integrated into the global marketplace, forming a coherent privatized military industry (Singer, 2008, p. 45; Avant, 2005). PMC’s “are considered legal entities bound to their employers by recognized contracts and in many cases at least nominally to their home states by laws requiring registration, periodic reporting, and licensing of foreign contracts.” (Singer, 2008, p. 46). Their potential employers can be states, international and non-governmental organizations, other corporations and even wealthy individuals (Avant, 2005, p. 7). The private military industry has been classified in a myriad different ways. Singer’s “Tip-of-the-Spear” typology, although dated for the purposes of understanding some of the more recent PMC’s (Carmola, 2010, p. 25), has explanatory value for the particular case study used in this thesis. “Tip-of-the-Spear” is a traditional military concept in which troops are distinguished based on their proximity to active

(14)

7 combat: units engaged in fighting form the “tip”, whereas support and logistics services make up the rear. In the same manner, PMF’s can be classified according to the “range of services and level of force” they offer and use (See: Figure 1) (Singer, 2008, p. 93).

Figure 1 - “Tip of the Spear” Typology (Singer, 2008, p. 93)

This research examines one specific type of Private Military Company, the Military Provider Firm. According to Singer, the role of this PMC subtype is “to engage in actual fighting, either as line units or specialists and/or direct command and control of field units” with the purpose of either replacing the client’s forces or, more commonly, improving their effectiveness as a “force multiplier” (Singer, 2008, pp. 92, 94). The provision of direct combat capability is indeed the

differentia specifica of Executive Outcomes although it offered a broad spectrum of military

related services (Executive Outcomes, 1998; Barlow, 2007; Howe, 1998, p. 312; Pech, 1999). Along with the (less successful) British firm Sandline International it presented a unique

(15)

8 phenomenon (Kinsey, 2006, p. 13). Subsequent private military companies would steer away from the wide-scale engagement in direct combat.

2.2 Performance in the Public Sector

Scholars of public management recognize that “quantification of government activity has been a recurring tendency” (Van Dooren, 2008, p. 15; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 106). According to Van Dooren, eight distinct performance related movements appeared in the twentieth century. The seventh of these, New Public Management, is particularly relevant to this thesis as much of the theoretical literature stems from authors ascribing to this theory. NPM originated from experiments with managerial approaches to the public sector in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom in the 1980’s, spreading globally in 1990’s. One of its central tenets, established in Osborne and Gaebler’s key text “Reinventing Government” is that extensive performance measurement is an important tool for evaluation and improvement of public sector performance (Osborne & Gaebler, 2008, p. 146; Hood, 1991, p. 4; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 109). In fact, although it just one of the ideas put forth by Osborne and Gaebler, NPM practically became synonymous with performance measurement (Van de Walle & Van Dooren, 2008, p. 1). A simple definition of performance measurement identifies it as a “bundle of deliberate activities for quantifying performance” (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 32). The end goal of these measurement efforts is the incorporation of the resulting performance information into the management and policy systems of public institutions (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 87).

One of the greatest challenges of the measurement process is defining performance. Performance as a concept utilized in science possesses a variety of meanings and definitions, depending on the needs of particular disciplines (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 2). In the broadest sense Dubnick defines it as a form of behavior, “motivated or guided by some intent or purpose” and differentiated on the basis of two criteria: “(a) the quality of the actions being performed, and (b) the quality of what has been achieved as a result of those actions” (Dubnick, 2005, pp. 391-392). Depending on whether the focus on these two components is high or low Dubnick identifies four types of performance: competence, productivity, production and results (Dubnick,

(16)

9 2005). Van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan modify Dubnick’s typology, changing “productivity” to “sustainable results” and “results” to “good results” (See: Figure 2) (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015, p. 3).

Figure 2 - Types of Performance (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015)

Performance as production (P1) correlates to all intentional actions that are performed

irrespective of success. In the public sector these are activities such as police patrols, judging in courts, medical treatments etc. - in other words, inputs. Performance as competence/capacity (P2) focuses on the quality of actions, the application of “higher levels of knowledge, skill and understanding” in carrying out a task on the assumption that higher competence leads to better quality outputs (Dubnick, 2005, p. 392; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 3). Conversely, performance as good results (P3) neglects competences in favor of measuring the quality of achievements or outcomes. Finally, performance as sustainable results (P4) covers the whole gamut, potentially including inputs, outputs and outcomes in any performance measurement effort (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 4). The conceptual understanding of ‘performance as sustainable results’ is utilized in this thesis.

In order to operationalize it, it is necessary to adopt a more in-depth model of performance. Performance in the public sector is usually conceptualized as a form of ‘service production’, according to the logic of the production process, the basic model for which was derived from the private sector (Boyne, 2002, p. 17; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 20). Most models of organizational performance in the public sector are based on two related models: the ‘economy-efficiency-effectiveness’ (3Es) model and the ‘inputs-outputs-outcomes’ (IOO) model

(17)

10 (Boyne, 2002, p. 17; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 133). These were eventually refined to form an ‘extended production model of performance’ (See: Figure 3), which sees wide use in the study of public management (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 20; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 134).

Figure 3 - Production Model of Performance (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 21)

This model will serve as a framework for the evaluation and comparison of the two interventions featured in this thesis. Therefore, the process and its individual components must be examined in-depth. Loosely following the order shown in Figure 3: socio-economic issues (1) dictate certain needs (2) for action by the public sector. Through social and political processes these needs are transformed into more or less quantifiable objectives (3) for the individual organization or programme. The organization is then allocated (or mobilizes) certain inputs (4) in the forms of financial and human resources to stage activities (5) that yield outputs (6) (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 23; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 134). Outputs in the

(18)

11 public administration approach differ from the economic notion of outputs as consumed goods. They are “products or services that come out of the production process, regardless of whether they’re consumed or not” due to how difficult it is to quantify the consumption of some public needs – such as safety (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 23).

Several relationships emerge, the first of which is relevance (7). Relevance refers to the degree to which the objectives of a policy match societal needs. The second relationship is economy (8). It is defined as ‘the cost of procuring specific service inputs of a given quality’, often simplified as ‘expenditure’. The value of economy as an indicator of performance is contested due to the difficulty of proving its direct correlation to outcomes. Simply put, high or low expenditures do not necessarily lead to better or worse results, nor are either of these two options necessarily superior to the other (Boyne, 2002, p. 17). Efficiency (9) is the third, represented by the ratio of inputs over the outputs (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 15). Figure 4 illustrates this relationship. Four organizations: A, B, C and D are represented, with their respective inputs (X-axis) and outputs (Y-axis). The first three are perceived as efficient because no organization is able to produce the same output with equivalent inputs. Organization D is inefficient due to a comparatively lower output with same input (as organization B). This somewhat deterministic relationship is well suited for industrial production but requires further clarification for public sector activities. Efficiency in the public sector implies producing the maximum amount of “societal profit” with a given amount of input. “Societal profit” itself is difficult to define but it is a necessary substitute for the private sector equivalent of financial profit, as profit seeking is not the objective of the public sector (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 22).

(19)

12 Figure 4 - Productivity and Efficiency (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 22)

Cost-effectiveness (10) and effectiveness (12) are the fourth and fifth relationships respectively.

Cost-effectiveness represents the ratio of input over outcome - how the invested resources relate to what has been achieved. Effectiveness on the other hand is the ratio of output over outcome, measuring to what extent the product of an organizations activities led to meeting the overall goals. (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 15; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 24).

The model recognizes two different types of outcomes: intermediate (13) and final (14). The difference between them is the degree of influence that the organization exerts on each. Intermediate outcomes are usually the direct result of organizational activity, whereas final outcomes are influenced by the context (15) – circumstances on which the organization has limited or no influence. The sixth and final relationship, the assessment of sustainability and

utility (11) results by contrasting needs with (final) outcomes.

The production model of performance incorporates all four of Dubnick’s perspectives on performance: performance as production (P1) correlates to inputs, performance as good results (P3) to outputs. Performance as competence (P2) loosely correlates to effectiveness – a more competent actor should be more effective at their chosen role. Finally, performance as sustainable results (P4) brings the first three together and is therefore encompassed by the model

(20)

13 itself. It is synonymous with what Bouckaert and Halligan define as the span of performance. However, this model is also flexible enough to be applied across several increasingly encompassing levels of vertical organization, or what they term the depth of performance. The individual levels are: micro (individual organization), meso (level of ‘consistent policy’, e.g. education) and macro (government or governance wide) (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008, pp. 16, 18). The analysis of this thesis focuses on the micro level.

2.3 Conflict Resolution and Interventionism

The term “Conflict Resolution” as it is used in this research must be understood on two different levels: a broader, semantic meaning and as a specific strategy within international relations. The semantic approach is necessary in order to outline the core components of what is, within IR, a very disparate concept. “Conflict” in this case entails a “perception of incompatibility between two or more actors and the range of behavior associated with such perceptions” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 20). It is considered resolved when: “(1) A discernible outcome has been reached; (2) conflict behavior terminates; and (3) a satisfactory distribution of values and resources has been agreed upon.” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 20). Conflict resolution in international relations, builds on this basic meaning but encompasses very different approaches and values. A basic distinction is between the Cold War and Post-Cold War conceptions of conflict resolution.

The Westphalian, state-centric international order characteristic of the Cold War was formed by the experiences of World Wars I and II, the nuclear threat and the bipolar distribution of power. It posited state sovereignty as inviolable and states themselves as the only source of legitimate political action (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 6; Richmond, 2008, pp. 97-100). Inter-state conflicts were perceived as a dispute between equals and negotiations was the favored form of conflict resolution. However, for intra-state conflicts, state sovereignty meant that international conventions of territorial integrity and non-intervention effectively barred (non-consensual) foreign intervention (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 7; United Nations, 1945; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975). It also provided governments “a privileged position in any conflict resolution process, relegating opposition movements to the subordinate position

(21)

14 of ‘rebels’, and taking for granted the maintenance of existing state structures“ (Clapham, 1998, p. 194; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, pp. 8,10). Recognition and international standing could be given to movements that challenged states only when there was an agreement between the superpowers, their allies and the “non-aligned”, as was the case with ‘liberation movements’ fighting against colonialism (as defined by relevant UN resolutions) (Clapham, 1998, p. 194). This is the crux of the Cold War concept of conflict resolution - a mechanism intended to maintain the state dominated status-quo. Outside of the specific legitimate causes for insurrection agreed upon by the international community, successful resolution of a conflict meant the reassertion of state authority and control.

The collapse of the Cold War order ushered in conflicts based on identity or access to resources (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). It accelerated an already existent trend of an overall increase in the number of conflicts which peaked in the mid 1990’s (See: Figure 5). The overwhelming majority of these conflicts were intrastate in nature.

(22)

15 It is at this time that according to Clapham, Western states, their civil societies, non-governmental organizations and the international institutions they established rewrote the rules of peacemaking (Clapham, 1998). The “traditional approaches” were described as ineffective, dedicated more to maintaining the state dominated status quo and “balance of power” politics – conflict management, as opposed to conflict resolution (Richmond, 2002, p. 75). This broadening of conflict resolution theory is best represented by the “hourglass model of conflict resolution responses” (See: Figure 6). Within it, conflict settlement and containment (grouped under the aforementioned term ‘conflict management’) are representative of Cold War conflict resolution efforts. However, only conflict transformation as the “deepest level of cultural and structural peacebuilding” can address the root causes of conflict and “rebuild societies (not just states) via both top-down high-level and bottom up grassroots methods” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 10; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 12). The two forms of conflict resolution are said to mirror Galtung’s distinction between “negative peace” - the absence of direct violence and “positive peace”, a broader dedication toward human security, justice and the needs of the individual (Galtung, 1969, p. 183; Richmond, 2002, p. 76; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 10). One of the basic assumptions of the new “second generation” approach, stemming from the shift toward human security is that “all parties to a conflict had a ‘standing’ which required that they be recognized as valid participants in any peacemaking process” (Clapham, 1998, p. 194). This shift may seem slight, but it is deeply disruptive to state authority because it provides legitimacy to a host of actors that would have otherwise been excluded from the ‘traditional’ conflict resolution mechanism.

(23)

16 Figure 6 - - The Hourglass Model of Conflict Resolution (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 12)

This Post-Cold War change in the basis of legitimacy paved the way for loosening the norms against intervention in the internal affairs of states, leading to the principal method of conflict resolution explored in this thesis: direct intervention in a conflict by a third party. When conducted by individual states, coalitions of willing states, regional organizations or the United Nations they fall under the concept of Humanitarian Intervention. Berchovich and Jackson define humanitarian intervention as a “form of third-party conflict resolution that involves attempts by external actors to deescalate the conflict and facilitate pacific settlement” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 102). According to the United Nations, humanitarian interventions are complex peace operations that combine peacemaking, peacekeeping and

peacebuilding – the sum of the methods shown in Figure 6. Berchovich and Jackson note that

these operations also sometimes include the use of offensive military force to achieve their goals, also known as peace-enforcement (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009).

Humanitarian interventions represent an evolution of the Cold War conflict resolution method of

peacekeeping, from which they differ in the following ways: actors, tasks, aims, principles and

(24)

17 in these interventions. The scope of undertaken tasks has expanded from traditional military duties to humanitarian and political activities (such as election monitoring). The aims of a humanitarian operation are explicitly political with the purpose to achieve what are described as “humanitarian goals” - a concept whose meaning is still contested. Particularly important are the three crucial ways the principles of humanitarian interventions differ from peacekeeping:

1. Consent. Peacekeeping was strictly based on consent of the disputing parties, humanitarian interventions need not be.

2. Non-use of force. This was one of the key traits of peacekeeping missions. Humanitarian interventions entail “employing military means for humanitarian ends under a UN sanction” (as cited in Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 102).

3. Impartiality. Unlike peacekeeping operations humanitarian interventions differentiate between and “take sides” among disputing parties.

Finally, the post-Cold War context has changed. Humanitarian interventions take place in intrastate conflicts, often during their active phase (as opposed to after a ceasefire has been reached) (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 103).

There is no theoretical basis for a direct intervention in a conflict by a private entity – indeed, the only interventions recognized as such in conflict resolution literature are humanitarian interventions. During the state dominated Cold War political and military arrangements this form of action by the private sector was unthinkable. Furthermore, it failed to form in the subsequent period even after the intervention examined in this thesis, although some scholars as well as the private military industry made significant efforts toward enabling such a possibility. However, there is sufficient overlap in the tasks and goals these two interventions to allow for comparative study, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter.

(25)

18

Part 3: Methodology

3.1 Methodological Framework

There is no set way to evaluate the success or failure of conflict resolution efforts. Humanitarian interventions in particular, with their contested normative foundations and competing expectations are even more controversial to assess. In an effort to structure the analysis of the interventions in a way that facilitates a direct comparison this research combines the basic framework of the production process of performance, injecting conflict resolution theory into it.

Figure 7 - Research Framework

In order to provide points of comparison the broad concept of performance from the research question was broken down into three aspects: efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. It is along these three aspects that the interventions will be compared. Each of them is examined by contrasting a number of contributing factors that, taken together, reveal how the organization fared in those aspects.

Efficiency is the balance between two factors: budget/resource expenditure and the overall

(26)

19 organization A expended more or less resources than organization B to achieve result X. Unlike effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, it is an internal assessment of the performance of the organization itself, regardless of its short or long term impact on the conflict.

The meaning of Effectiveness utilized in this thesis stems from the theory of conflict resolution. It establishes two basic criteria that can be used as benchmarks of success of an intervention:

1. Whether lives were saved and the destructive effects of conflict mitigated (in comparison to the preceding state).

2. Whether conditions for a lasting political solution were put in place (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 108).

Effective conflict resolution is therefore: a conflict resolution effort that has improved the

humanitarian and security conditions existing in the area in question and helped put into place a lasting political solution. The beneficial aspect of these criteria is that they allow for a

non-zero-sum outcome: an intervention can prove to have prevented casualties and destruction while perhaps failing to facilitate lasting peace – thereby allowing a portrayal more nuanced than blanket statements of failure or success. Put together, effectiveness is therefore the sum of three factors: the results of the organization’s activities, their intermediate effect of these results on the security and humanitarian conditions and the implementation or lack thereof of a long term peace.

Cost-Effectiveness is the third aspect of performance. It is comprised of the relationship

between three factors: the resources expended and the intermediate and final outcomes of the intervention. What this means is that cost-effectiveness of an intervention is evaluated by contrasting what has been achieved at two junctures (short and long term) with the associated expenditures. As with effectiveness, it is not a binary evaluation – an organization can be cost-effective in achieving short term results, while not being cost-cost-effective in the long run and vice-versa.

The contributing factors and aspects of performance presented here are further developed in: 3.4 Operationalization.

(27)

20

3.2 Case Study Design

In the process of selecting an appropriate research strategy to explore the topic of this thesis the case study sets itself apart from the other four strategies identified by Yin: experiments, surveys, archival analysis and histories (Yin, 2003). Yin recommends the selection of the appropriate strategy according to three criteria: the form of the research question, whether the researcher possesses control of behavioral events and whether the research focuses on contemporary events (See: Figure 8).

Figure 8- Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin, 2003, p. 5)

As can be seen in Figure 8, a case study is “preferred […] when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.” (Yin, 2003, p. 1). The fulfillment of the first two criteria are clear, leaving only the differentating factor beween histories and case studies (contemporariness of events) to be addressed. Yin recognizes a degree of overlap between these two strategies, highlighting that case studies usually include two sources of evidence not included in histories: direct observation of the events being studied and interviews of the persons involved. The research presented here finds itself at a halfway point between these two strategies. Direct observation of the phenomenon is not possible. However, valuable primary sources have recently become available and are included in this research. Furthermore, the overall trend of public and private sector interventionism is still present and many of the actors active in their respective fields. As these are ongoing processes and the information is

(28)

21 revealed only gradually, it is natural for research to lag behind. Therefore, the case study is the more appropriate resesarch strategy.

The form it takes in this thesis takes is a Holistic Multiple-case Design. The overall context of the research is the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002). Within it, I examine two cases. The first of these is the Executive Outcomes intervention in SL (May 1995 – March 1997). The second is the United Nations Mission that followed it (October 1999 – December 2005). The benefit of this approach is that it involves the same historical event (the Sierra Leone Civil War) and, changed circumstances on the ground notwithstanding – it is the best existing example of the public and private sectors engaged in conflict resolution.

The decision to examine the relatively short contract of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone was made based on the limited pool of private sector interventions to choose from. The only other viable alternative in terms of scale could have been the EO intervention in the Angolan Civil War and corresponding UN Missions. However, that conflict that is significantly more complex – it encompasses several distinct UN Missions over a time period of twenty-seven years. It would have been extremely difficult to examine within space of this thesis while maintaining a decent quality of analysis. On the other hand, an examination of the United Nations Peacekeeping efforts offers a far larger pool of possible case studies to choose from. However, there was no other situation that shared so many common points of comparison due to the fact that both interventions operated in the same conflict and were close temporally.

The primary challenge of this research is the small sample size. Simply put, there is a possibility that specific, unrepeatable circumstances represent the principal factors in the successes and failures of these interventions, thereby making it difficult to draw broader conclusions.

3.3 Data Collection and Sources

For data collection I used two of the six common sources of case study evidence, documents and archival records (Yin 2009). In order to incorporate the benefits of data triangulation into this thesis I examined each intervention from several different standpoints.

(29)

22 There are three fundamental topics and accompanying sets of sources that are relevant to this thesis. The first of these is the political history of the conflict in Sierra Leone. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an in-depth examination there is still a necessity to contextualize the case studies utilized in it. Therefore a basic overview of the causes of the conflict and events leading up to the two interventions is provided based on the works of Hirsch, Harris and Francis. Hirsch, the former U.S ambassador to Sierra Leone offers a political and historical analysis of the war. Harris wrote extensively on civil wars and democracy in the West African region. Francis’s primary focus is on mercenary intervention in Sierra Leone but he provides valuable background information to the conflict.

The second set of sources it that relating to the role of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. This

was evaluated primarily by utilizing sources originating from within the company itself, as these represent the most valuable first-hand accounts. These were contrasted with relevant media reporting and scrutinized through already existing academic analyses of the company. The quality of sources pertaining to this intervention has improved significantly in the past decade but it is still somewhat burdened by a lack of impartiality and the resulting difficulty of precisely establishing important nuances of what was (in the West) a poorly covered and fairly obscure conflict. Nevertheless, two recently released first-hand accounts provide invaluable information. The first is the comprehensive portrayal of the company’s history and activities: “Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds” (2007) by its co-founder and CEO, Eeben Barlowe. The second: “Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone” (2012) complements the preceding “top-down” perspective with a detailed narrative from the field by Roelf van Heerden, the firm’s second-in-command during the SL operation. Academic summaries of the firms’ performance in Sierra Leone were conducted by a multitude of authors of which the most thorough can be ascribed to: Peter W. Singer (2003), Sean McFate (2015) and Scott Fitzsimmons (2010). However, only Fitzsimmons incorporated most of the newly available sources as well as valuable interviews with company members – other accounts are either more generalized or written in the period when sources were quite poor and particularly dependent on journalistic coverage. Although much of the coverage was sensationalist in nature with dubious factual value, one important source is Khareen Pech’s dissection of EO for the South African “Institute of Security Studies” publication: “Peace, Profit or Plunder: The Privatization of Security in War-torn African Societies” (1999). Unlike other journalistic sources it is has a basis

(30)

23 in (limited) first-hand experience and offers a valuable counter-point to the dominant company narrative.

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was examined in a similar manner: through relevant

UN documents, media sources and academic literature. As a case study, it is significantly better documented than the PMC intervention that preceded it. Relevant organization sources include Resolutions of the Security Council for the period of 1997-2006, Statements by the President of the Security Council made from1996-2005 and Reports of the Secretary-General for the period of 1995-2006 – a total of one hundred and ten documents. A summary of UNAMSIL is provided by the organization’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2003 - “Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone” and several other documents touch upon this topic. Of the academic sources that comprehensively examine the mission Olonisakin’s “Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL” is particularly notable while Sorenson and Wood provide a broader look into peacekeeping into the Post-Cold War era.

The only standpoint left unrepresented is that of the Sierra Leone government itself whose media presence was weak at the time and still suffers from a paucity of official sources that present its position in detail. Motivation of some of the better known figures is necessary to explain certain political decisions and is incorporated into the research but the sources for this information are external and comprised of United Nations documents, Executive Outcomes accounts, academia and media reports.

An attempt was made to portray the events in as balanced a manner as possible. However it must be stated that the conflict in Sierra Leone and the interventions in particular were highly polarizing issues in their time which makes obtaining unbiased and credible information difficult. Most authors writing about PMCs such as Singer and McFate made comparisons between UNAMSIL and EO – but these take the form of commentary touching upon some basic observations of both interventions (such as financial costs, time, military successes) rather than rigorous analysis. EO representatives espouse the successes of the company and tend to portray the UN in a less than favorable light. The United Nations sources and academics focusing on UN themes in general and UNAMSIL in particular are likewise dismissive of the role of EO in Sierra Leone. The reason for this is an underlying competition between the two organizations for “status” in successful conflict resolution. Whether this competition truly necessary is a legitimate

(31)

24 question, but its existence is enough to incentivize a one sided approach to the events that transpired in Sierra Leone. The existence of strong vested interests in a particular narrative dominates every aspect of the issue and on occasion the researcher is left only with the option of accepting some claims at face value.

3.4 Operationalization

In order to operationalize the methodological framework presented in 3.1, I designed 11 questions that meld the production process with conflict resolution in a way applicable to the two case studies. They are loosely divided into two groups – the contributing factors and the relationships (efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness) that can be analyzed from their interplay.

Contributing Factors

1. What the politico-economic situation in Sierra Leone prior to the intervention? – This question is designed to place the intervention in the context of the political and military events as it entered the conflict in Sierra Leone. Its purpose is to provide data for the eventual reflection of the organization’s effectiveness. The answer is provided through examining contemporary accounts of the conditions in the country prior to the intervention.

The following four questions are intended to cover the sum of the organization’s contribution to the overall process.

2. What are the objectives set for the organization? - These objectives may be clearly outlined, as in the case of the relationship between EO and the SL government or self-imposed and more vague (UN Mission). Unforeseen objectives – those that emerged out of a changing situation on the ground are included as well. Goal attainment, or failing to meet set goals is a factor in the eventual effectiveness and cost-effectiveness comparison.

3. What are the resources (inputs) the organization expended in pursuit of those objectives? – The resources in question are the total costs of intervention either for the government of SL or UN member states. Along with budget information this includes a look into the manpower,

(32)

25 military hardware and other elements, the scale of which is useful for comparing the performance of the two organizations.

4. What notable activities has the organization undertaken to achieve its objectives? – This segment analyzes the major successes or failures of the organization. Objectives are used as a way to select and narrow down the activities analyzed, as their sum total goes far beyond the scope of this research.

5. What were the immediate results of those activities (outputs)? – The answers will be presented

in line with their corresponding activity from preceding question for practical reasons. The principal dichotomy of interest is success or failure to meet the goals of the organization (whether the activity in question achieved the intended the goal or not), but relevant commentary on the implications of these results on the course of the intervention is provided as needed.

Efficiency

6. How do the funding and means of the organization compare with the results of organizational

activities (inputs – outputs)?

Efficiency is the first relationship from the production model. At the simplest level we are interested whether organization A expended more or less resources than organization B to achieve result X. However, without a benchmark of expectations regarding the optimal relationship between expenditure and outputs, efficiency is difficult to evaluate. As there is no such benchmark in conflict resolution we are limited to comparing the organizations directly.

Effectiveness

This combination of conflict resolution theory and the production model of performance gives the following questions:

7. Has the intervention resulted in less casualties, material damage and otherwise improved the humanitarian situation (intermediate outcome 1)?

8. Has the intervention resulted in greater stability, thereby improving the security conditions within the country (intermediate outcome 2)?

(33)

26

10. If the peace did not last, were there any circumstances outside the organization’s control than influenced this outcome? This question represents an adjustment and necessary final link

between intermediate and final outcomes, in order to shed additional light on the success or failure of an intervention.

Cost-Effectiveness

The final remaining relationship of note in the production model is the ratio of inputs to outcomes. At its simplest it seeks to answer the question what was “bought” with the invested resources and following that which result entailed the consumption of less resources – insofar as the results are comparable.

11. If the invested resources led to the desirable outcomes then which organization has shown a

superior ratio (less costs for more lasting results)?

The questions presented here comprise the methodological framework that will be applied to each intervention in turn. Following that the results will be compared across the two organizations and reflected upon. A summary of the framework is provided on the following page.

(34)

27 Concept Variables Operational Definitions Measurement Source Performance

at conflict resolution

Socio-political context

The starting socio-economic situation and the needs as defined by government in question.

1. What the politico-economic situation in Sierra Leone prior to the intervention? (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015) Organizational contribution

The sum total of

organizational involvement in the conflict including: 1. The defined objectives; 2. Inputs – the resources the organization expended; 3. Specific activities intended to realize set objectives.

4. Outputs – what the organization produced, after objectives, inputs and activities are taken into account.

2. What are the objectives set for the organization?

3. What are the resources it commands in pursuit of those objectives?

4. What notable activities has it undertaken to achieve its objectives (military combat missions, local peacekeeping, humanitarian programs etc.)? 5. What were the immediate results of those activities?

(Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015; Dubnick, 2005)

Efficiency The relationship between the inputs and outputs, resource expenditure and immediate results.

6. How does the funding and budget information compare with results of organizational activities (and subsequently to the same results for the other case study)?

(Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015)

Effectiveness The relationship between organizational outputs and outcomes, with the latter consisting of intermediate and final outcomes. Final outcomes entail adjustment for environmental factors that are beyond the organizations control.

7. Intermediate outcome 1 - has the intervention improved the humanitarian situation? 8. Intermediate outcome 2 – has the intervention improved the security conditions?

9. Final outcome – did the peace and stability instituted during and post intervention last?

10. If it did not, were there any circumstances outside the organization’s control than influenced this outcome?

(Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015) Cost Effectiveness

The relationship between inputs and outcomes, a measure of whether invested resources

11. If the invested resources led to the desirable outcomes then which organization has shown a superior ratio (less costs for more

lasting results)?

(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015) Table 1 – Operationalization

(35)

28 Figure 9 - Map of Sierra Leone (Van Heerden, 2012)

Part 4: Analysis

Chapter 1: The Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone

1. 1 Context of the Intervention and the Roots of the Sierra Leone Civil War

As is often the case with civil wars, the conflict cannot be explained merely in the sequence of events leading up to it. Rather, it was an accumulation of underlying trends that reached a critical breaking point. In the case of Sierra Leone, those trends multiplied over the span of several

decades. After achieving

independence from the colonial rule of the United Kingdom in 1961 and a brief spell of progress, the fledgling multi-party democracy decayed under the governance of Prime Minister Siaka Stevens (Hirsch, 2001, p. 147).

Stevens ruled Sierra Leone from 1968-1985, during which he

consolidated and expanded his position, transforming the political system into a one-party state marred by corruption, powerless institutions and economic disintegration (Harris, 2012, p. 56; Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 849; Francis, 1999, p. 324). Subsequent military rule of General Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) only exacerbated long standing ethnic tensions, poverty and state collapse, ending in a coup of junior military officers led by Captains Valentine Strasser and Julius Maada Bio in April 1992 (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 133). They inherited a precarious political and military situation.

(36)

29 The Civil War in Sierra Leone is inseparable from the ambitions of Charles Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and subsequent President of the country. The beginning of the First Liberian civil war (1989-1997) found Taylor’s NPFL combatting the Liberian government. The regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the Liberian situation by forming a military force with the intent of containing the conflict - the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). When the ECOMOG forces intervened in August 1990 with the support of the government of Sierra Leone Taylor’s forces found themselves under pressure. In retaliation he decided to “open a second front” by fermenting instability within Sierra Leone. To that end he supported the creation of the Revolutionary United Front (Hirsch, 2001, pp. 147,150; Harris, 2012, p. 77; Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 850).

Initially a small group of Sierra Leonean exiles, foreign mercenaries and Liberian fighters, the approximately 100 strong RUF invaded the south-east of Sierra Leone in March 1991. These forces were led by Foday Sankoh, a Sierra Leonean rebel who would remain at the head of the RUF for the majority of the war (Francis, 1999, p. 235). The gradual decay of the Sierra Leonean state, its armed forces and institutions along with economic corruption fed the rapid growth of the RUF, the support it initially had among the population and its early successes. Thus the instigators of the coup of 1992 found themselves in a war of attrition, gradually losing ground to the RUF forces. The army of Sierra Leone was enlarged by mass recruitment but the quality of these forces was low and its military activities were not economically sustainable even prior to these measures (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 134). The ability of the RUF to choose its engagements and the cross border support it enjoyed from Liberia ensured that by April 1995 it had taken such large swaths of territory that it was threatening the capital of Freetown (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 136).

Understanding the precariousness of the situation, Captain Valentine Strasser who had established himself as the de facto leader of the Sierra Leone government, sought foreign assistance but skeptical of the legitimacy of his rule the United Nations declined to intervene (Barlow, 2007, p. 322). It was western business interests (Branch Energy Ltd) operating in the diamond producing areas of Sierra Leone, concerned with the future of their mining concessions

(37)

30 that brought together Strasser and Executive Outcomes, pledging to financially support the subsequent EO intervention in May 1995 (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 144).

On the whole, the conditions for intervention can be deemed extremely unfavorable. Sierra Leone’s problems went deeper than the dire military situation as years of misrule brought about unstable and corrupt state institutions, a virtually bankrupt economy and a non-existent civil society that would make resolving the conflict exceedingly difficult.

(38)

31 Figure 10– EO Objectives in Sierra Leone. Source: (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 147)

1.2 The Objectives of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone

The initial objectives of Executive Outcomes reflected the immediate demands of the military situation. According to Barlow and Van Heerden they were comprised of five phases (See: Figure 10) (Barlow, 2007, p. 324; Van Heerden, 2012; Francis, 1999, p. 327):

1. An advance party would be deployed to Freetown to relieve pressure and strengthen the defense of the city. Simultaneously, training of the SLA troops under EO would commence. The goal of this phase was to clear the RUF threat east of Freetown.

2. Following the success of the first phase the main strategic objective would be securing the diamond mining area of Koidu (Kono) in order to deprive the RUF of resources to continue to war.

3. Phase three entailed clearing the roads east to Liberia, on the way to the main RUF stronghold at Joru.

4. Phase four was to be the destruction of the RUF HQ at Joru.

(39)

32 forces in Sierra Leone would be defeated.

Further objectives arose out of political and military necessities:

6. EO was tasked with administering the Kono district. This included building local institutions and consensus among the key stakeholders of the region, providing security capacities and ad hoc humanitarian aid (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 175; Barlow, 2007, p. 356).

7. Maintaining the security situation during February 1996 elections and forcing the RUF to participate in the subsequent peace process (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 228).

(40)

33 Figure 11- EO structure in Sierra Leone at deployment, 1995. Source: (Van Heerden,

2012, p. 146)

1.3 Organizational Inputs - Tallying the Costs of the Intervention

Estimating the expended resources (the inputs) of the Executive Outcomes intervention is both straightforward and deceptively difficult at the same time. When looking at purely the costs of EO’s operation, the budget information is available and consistent, as are the means the organization brought to bear in the realization of its first two goals (See: Figure 11). Executive Outcomes provided the manpower and some of the military support services such as parts of the air wing, while the government of Sierra Leone secured the equipment, small arms, fighting vehicles and other military hardware (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 146). Following the takeover of Kono, the framework in Figure 11 was expanded to a total of 150 operatives (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 204).

The Private and Public Sectors in Conflict Resolution: A Comparison Between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the Private Military Intervention That Preceded It