On the fault line : European donor motives for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda

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On The Fault Line

European Donor motives for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda

Master Thesis Kathrin Kirste University of Amsterdam

MSc Political Science: International Relations Supervised by Sebastian Krapohl and Farid Boussaid

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Abstract

This paper aims at identifying the causal determinants for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda despite massive acknowledged human rights abuses. Rwanda has been praised by the political international community as an exceptional post-conflict case that emerged as a ‘model for the African renaissance’ after genocide and mass violence. However, most accounts fail to condemn the engineering of structural social, economic and political suppression of the post-conflict regime and several belligerent incursions in the neighboring DRC under President Paul Kagame. Irrespective, aid has been increased by the majority of donors.

Approaching the empirical puzzle of increased aid despite human rights abuses, a disaggregated in-depth four country case study of European OECD donors, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, is conducted. The Rwandan paradox is predominantly explained by a so-called genocide credit: donors are driven into ‘voluntary blindness’ of genocide redemption due to their international failure of preventing the tragic events of 1994. The post-genocide regime emerged as donor darling, while the international community produced a success story of post-conflict reconstruction.

Contrary, it is shown in this research that a pure examination from the genocide lens falls short on identifying underlying mechanisms of aid allocation ranging from the altruist to the selfish spectrum of motives. In order to close the gap of explanatories, a competitive deductive theory test of the idealist, realist and commercial lens is performed.

This paper provides a vanguard for donor-centered research on post-genocide Rwanda by dismantling the altruistic and selfish impetus of engagement beyond a mere genocide credit explanation. It is shown that the donor community does not for a homogenous unit. It is found that aid to Rwanda in the first post-genocide decade is influenced by strong competing geostrategic interests and, for some donors, indeed by a genocide-guilt informed moral obligation. In the second post-genocide decade, when the paradox became even more ubiquitous, aid is mostly determined by growing commercial interests. However, it is also found that donor motivations vary and altruism plays a dominant role in some cases.

Overall, it is concluded that donor policy to post-genocide Rwanda repeats the same mistakes from pre-1994 by ignoring a system of constructed suppression. Therefore, the international community is not only identified as bystander but as culprit of failed post-conflict reconstruction.

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Abbreviations

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CHRI Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DFID UK Department for International Development

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

GBS General Budget Support

GoR Government of Rwanda

MDG Millennium Development Goals

M23 March 23 Movement (Congolese rebel group)

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NRA National Resistance Army

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army

RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front

SBS Sector Budget Support

IFC International Finance Corporation

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UHRC United Human Rights Council

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1 Introduction

1.1 Empirical Puzzle and Research Question

Rwanda takes its place in the public consciousness as a country that emerged from genocide to “model for the African renaissance” (Zakaria 2009: para. 1). After the country suffered the most brutal genocide since the Holocaust, the nation seemed destined to fail and plunge into a post-conflict spiral. Today, the small country emerged as a key player in the Great Lakes region and the African Union. Rwanda’s leader and acclaimed liberator of the genocide, Paul Kagame, is praised by international politics, media and even some part of the scholarly community for his constant efforts of building a stable and well-ordered post-genocide society. In 2009, the Clinton Foundation awarded him the Global Citizen Award emphasizing that “from crisis, President Kagame has forged a strong, unified and growing nation with the potential to become a model for the rest of Africa and the world” (Clinton Foundation 2009: para. 5). Private investors and media institutions make similarly positive assessments. In 2014, the World Bank Doing Business report granted Rwanda a top position, while the Financial Times named Kagame as one of the fifty most influential people of the new millennium (Financial Times 2009; IFC 2015).

Despite Rwanda’s undeniable accomplishments, most accounts of post-genocide Rwanda miss to call attention to the social and political costs of its recovery. Contrary it is argued that the regime of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is based on a system of repression, exclusion and growing inequality that embraces all cultural, economic, political and even spatial arenas of the livelihood of Rwandans (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Since 1994, the Government of Rwanda (GoR)1 has practiced a deft authoritarianism that not only justified harsh restrictions on domestic opposition and civil society, but also on external critique from NGOs and international media broadcasting (ibid). Yet, the RPF boldness exceeded its own borders when it initiated two wars with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)2 in 1996/97 and 1998-2003. A number of UN reports pointed out committed war crimes and human rights abuses throughout the post-genocide decade. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly pinpointed at problems of structural violence and social

1_{The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame dominates the Government of Rwanda (GoR). It is}

the political arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). The terms are used in accordance with their military or political attribution.

2

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2 inequalities (Reyntjens 2010a; Strizek 2011).

Notwithstanding its uneven record, Rwanda is illustrated as a success story and remains a ‘donor darling’ among politicians of Western governments and multilateral institutions. Yet, the unflagging amount of aid to an authoritarian regime throughout the last 20 years constitutes a critical case. This paper aims at solving the puzzling paradox of growing foreign aid despite human rights violations by asking; why do European donor governments support

the Rwandan Government with growing development assistance despite its widely recognized human rights abuses?

1.2 Research Design

To shed light on this empirical puzzle, a qualitative comparative case study on aid allocation on four European donor governments, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, between 1994 and 2013 will be conducted.

Therefore, the theoretical angles and their contribution to explain aid allocation will be assessed in the first place. The paper takes a three-fold approach that attempts to broadly cover all ends of the spectrum for aid motivation. Therefore, idealist, realist and commercial theory are chosen to test for the normative, geostrategic and geopolitical as well as economic motivations of donors. Subsequently, the methodological framework will inform about the major methodological pillars of the conducted study. The disaggregated case study design as well as case selection and observation limitations will be outlined to assure validity and reliability of the research design.

The empirical part is dedicated to the in-depth case analysis. Firstly, the empirical puzzle is illustrated in more depth. Distinct evidence on suppressive post-conflict reconstruction and increasing donor contributions is provided. Accordingly, the puzzle is assessed by conducting an in-depth four case country study of the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. The theoretical assumptions will be tested for each case and thus a comprehensive picture on post-genocide aid allocation is revealed that exceeds the limited scope of former research on post-genocide Rwanda.

1.3 Relevance

The academic contribution of this research is two-fold. First, a qualitative disaggregated country case study adds to the prevailing quantitative research on donor-centered aid literature that discusses the primacy of self-interest motives as the overwhelming rationale

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vis-à-vis an altruistic impetus that is considered to be mainly epiphenomenal (Berthélemy 2006a,b; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). The research finds that aid to Rwanda is mainly based on selfish motives. The first post-genocide decade is highly determined by geostrategic and geopolitical interests. Post-genocide support is characterized by new, mainly Anglophone, donors that tried to consolidate their power while old Francophone donors withdrew or used aid to restore their lost influence. However, aid to Rwanda experienced unflagging increase particularly in the second post-genocide decade. The sharp upsurge is best explained in commercial terms. In recent years, the small land-locked East African country emerged as a hotspot for innovation, information technology and service industry. With being a hub for the regional market, equally new and old donors were keen to guarantee their share on the quickly developing economy. Accordingly, the paper provides support to the paradigmatic shift of realist informed aid allocation towards commercially informed aid throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The research also founds that altruism is not purely epiphenomenal and that the rationale of genocide redemption, in fact, has a genuine causal power in some cases at some times. In other cases it is exploited as disguise to justify unremitting amounts of aid to the geostrategic and commercial partner Rwanda. Accordingly, proof is also provided that the donor community does not necessarily constitute a homogenous unit.

Second, this research overcomes an academic examination of Rwanda that is highly dominated by normative approaches that explain aid allocation almost exclusively in terms of ‘genocide guilt’. Most analyses fail to include a variety of variables and thus fall short on providing a valid and reliable explanation for dubious post-genocide construction (Reyntjens 2010a; Hayman 2006 and 2011). Disclosing aid allocation from the spectrum of idealist, realist and commercial theory, this paper enlightens determinants that hitherto have been left in the shadows.

Additionally, this paper adds remarkably to contemporary Rwanda research. Most accounts are limited on the first post-genocide decade (1994-2004). It is shown in this paper that the Rwandan paradox becomes more ubiquitous throughout the second post-genocide decade (2004-2014). Covering the full range of 20 years of post-conflict reconstruction, it is proven once more that self-interests beyond the paradigm of genocide guilt prevail.

Finally, this paper constitutes a vanguard for development aid research in Rwanda. It is shown that the international community acted mostly on selfish reasons before, throughout and after the genocide. Aid allocation to Rwanda is a mixed result of genocide guilt as well as geostrategic, geopolitical and commercial interests that were perpetually pursued throughout

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post-genocide decades. Accordingly, unflagging amounts of aid were released to a regime that fosters political, economic and social suppression. Then and now, the international community did not only act as a bystander but as a proactive culprit of failed genocide prevention and, again, of failed post-genocide reconstruction.

1.4 Literature Review

Accessing the case of Rwanda as a post-conflict case is subject to a wide-range of political, academic but also established media research. This paper takes an International Relations approach that broadly speaking examines the interaction between Western donors and the post-genocide government of Rwanda (GoR).

On part of the theoretical classification, the paper is allocated among a growing amount of donor-centered aid literature. Important contributions by Alesina and Dollar (2000) or Berthélemy (2006a) identified political, geostrategic and commercial interest as main determinants for aid allocation. At the same time, World Bank researchers (Dollar and Levin 2004) claim that the altruistic elements have increased, especially throughout the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The case study at hand adds to the debate of aid determinants by a disaggregated selection that, to my knowledge, has not been conducted before.

Empirically, the paper follows up a remarkable body of IR literature that dealt with the dynamics of foreign assistance already before and during the 1994 genocide. It is generally referred to the works of Peter Uvin’s “Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda” (1998), Andy Storey’s “Structural adjustment, state power and genocide: the World Bank and Rwanda” (2007), Alison des Forges’ “Leave None to Tell the Story. Genocide in Rwanda” (1999) and Linda Melvern’s “A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide” (2000), who all added to the understanding of the genocide by including foreign determinants. However, the post-conflict literature took a rather positive approach on assessing the Western engagement in Rwanda’s recovery that is particularly explained by its genocide guilt. Early on, several scholars praised the Rwandan achievements with the support of Western aid agencies (Clark 2010; Clark and Kaufmann 2009; Ensign and Bertrand 2009) and therefore joined the bandwagon of the Rwandan success story that was reproduced by several international bi- and multilateral aid institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD but also the DFID and several other European donor countries (Muwanga 2008; Straus and Waldorf 2011).

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Only recently, research emerged that developed concern about Rwanda’s recovery and especially the debatable involvement of donors. A critical assessment in Anglo-Saxon academia is rare. Eugenia Zorbas (2011) added a contemporary publication with “Aid dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining the Rwandan Paradox”. With “Remaking Rwanda- State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence” the first anthology was published that came to different conclusion than the established positive assessments of post-genocide Rwanda (Straus and Waldorf 2011). A comprehensive picture is also offered by Belgian Rwanda expert Filip Reyntjens3 who claims that the international community has fallen prey to the RPF spin of manipulation. Due to its genocide credit, and thus, due to a deeply flawed donor assessment, the Kagame leadership was able to build an unchallenged regime of political and social suppression (Reyntjens 2004, 2010a, 2011). Recently, a growing openness for a critical narrative that includes the role of Western agents can also be noticed among established media. (Peterson and Herman 2011, BBC 2014)

In an even more radical narrative, the Kagame leadership is not only convicted of post-genocide crimes. ”The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and Its Consequences” asserts, among few, that the Rwandan genocide is centered upon a totally false claim. Therefore, not an extremist Hutu elite but the Kagame-led RPA itself triggered the genocide4 (Collins 2014). Evidence for Collins’ claims is supported by a growing scholarly (Erlinder 2014; Philpot 2004 and Strizek 2011). Proponents of a critical narrative also disclosed the crucial engagement of Anglophone actors from US and UK administrations that pursued own regional goals and therefore critically supported the RPA prior and post-genocide (Cameron 2013; Strizek 2011).

Considering the two competing narratives, implications for post-genocide research are inevitable. This paper therefore builds upon the claim that the academic revision of post-genocide Rwanda is highly politicized. It is further argued that a comprehensive and objective analysis of international involvement during and after the genocide is highly biased.

While not only academia and media but also human rights agencies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch push forward charges, a positive perception of the Kagame regime remains within the political arena. The debates about Rwanda’s contemporary governance are therefore polarized between a “visionary leadership” (Blair

3_{Reyntjens was banned from Rwanda as a persona non grata in 1995 when he first published critical articles}

about the authoritarian nature of Kagame’s Leadership.

4_{It is not the aim of the paper to uncover the truth about the dynamics of the genocide. The evidence will be}

conducted as far as it is relevant to the research at hand. The condemnation of human rights abuses by the Kagame regime is purely based on factual findings from several UN reports. For further reads on the genocide and the competing narratives see Collins 2014.

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2009: para.1) vis-à-vis Paul Kagame being labeled as “the greatest war criminal in office today” (Erlinder 2014: para.1). Acknowledging the contradicting narratives of the genocide and post-genocide regime, this paper aims to enlighten the gap between academia and politics with an objective assessment of political motivations of European governments. It therefore contributes to a growing body of donor-centered European literature on the Rwandan case that, more than 20 years after the genocide, lacks a comprehensive and unbiased reappraisal.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Definition of Variables

Dependent Variable

In accordance with the aid literature, the dependent variable will be limited to Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements as complied by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).5 Although the size of donors to Rwanda is determined by their total ODA contributions, this paper will also include ODA per capita allocation that is suitable for a comparative approach (see figure 3 and 4). ODA can be allocated through different modalities6 of general budget (GBS) or sector budget support (SBS).

Independent Variable

This x-focused research aims at identifying the competing causal power of motives, and thus, interests of donors as determinants for aid. According to the theoretical aid literature, one can distinguish between two major objectives of self-interest vis-à-vis altruistic interest. In broad terms, realist and commercial theory explain aid allocation on the ground of selfish donor motives. Objectives differ from geostrategic, geopolitical to commercial interests. On the other hand, altruistic motives along the needs and merits of the recipient countries are emphasized by an idealist approach. For the case at hand, a dimension of genocide guilt

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The Aid literature distinguishes between commitments and actual disbursements. Canavire- Bacarreza et al. (2006) argue that disbursements more accurately reflect the actual transfers taking place. Contrary it is argued by Berthélemy (2006a) that commitments mirror the decision and intentions by donor governments better than the real capacity to disburse or implement aid on part of the donor and receiver government. For the research at hand, this distinction exceeds the scope of this paper. For the sake of simplicity, general ODA disbursements are considered.

6_{The modality of aid allocation is, nevertheless, not a dependent variable itself. They are rather discussed as}

indicators for interests within the theory section. The dependent variable is limited to its behavior of increasing or decreasing aid allocation.

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among donors becomes particular important within the idealist scope of explanatory variables.

In the following, the theoretical counterparts of the hitherto outlined relevant variables will be introduced.

2.2 Idealist lens on aid allocation

Idealism emphasizes values and norms and therefore assumes that aid allocation is an altruistic mean to address the needs and merits of a receiver country. The logic of appropriateness serves as an imperative to social and political behavior and decisions and therefore trumps a mere rational logic of consequences. Idealist scholars argue that the driving forces behind aid programs are humanitarian motives and that states have an ideological commitment to poverty alleviation. The moral argument draws on broad statistical evidence examining the amounts of aid given by donor countries and the income-level of recipient countries. Consequently, major recipients of aid have been the poorest countries in the world (Lumsdaine 1993).

Still, the humanitarian motive is controversial among development scholars. The normative argument is seen as purely rhetoric and is contradicted by a huge body of literature that classifies altruistic interests at best as secondary and at worst as motives that do not matter at all. The main realist critique therefore suggests “if aid [was] provided purely on a needs basis, [one] might expect the most aid to go to the poorest nation. This is not the case" (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009: 330). Values and norms therefore appear to be epiphenomenal motives of aid allocation.

Despite the strong critique from realist strands, it is claimed that the influence of altruistic motives has increased under the emergence of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD (Berthélemy 2006a). Moreover, in accordance with the human development approach, inclusive institutions embodied in the principles of good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law were highlighted (Easterly 2002). The theoretical reorientation towards human development trickled down into the political sphere and was manifested in, inter alia, the OECD’s guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Cooperation or in a commitment of European Union States to direct aid to countries with better policies and institutions (DAC 1997; UN 1998; Woods 2005).7 At latest with the

7_{However, several studies being concerned with the causal relationship of aid allocation and human rights}

conclude that merits have no strong explanatory power for aid allocation (Berthélemy 2006a; Neumayer 2003). The initial assumption that a commitment to the UN Charter of Human Rights would automatically influence

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formulation of the MDGs, aid was redefined with a focus on human security. While the Cold War was considered to have distorted foreign aid for geostrategic goals, emphasis was later put on the reduction of poverty, diseases, illiteracy and human insecurity (UNDP 2002).

Yet, the case of post-genocide Rwanda is not a mere case of altruism to an impoverished nation. A strong impetus of ‘genocide guilt’ and therefore value-informed redemption determined aid considerations among donors. It is thus occasionally referred to the ‘genocide lens’ which means a sub concept of the idealist approach that addresses merely the moral obligation due to genocide guilt. Coining the term ‘genocide credit’, the avant-garde Rwanda critic Filip Reyntjens argues that most donors are informed by feelings of guilt that result from the international failure to prevent the large-scale massacres in 1994. Therefore, the framing8 of Rwanda as a victim of genocide becomes particular important. Thus, it can be assumed that aid allocation is guided by a moral obligation to repair the heavy hypothec of a genocide burden (Reyntjens 2010a). However, with regard to the earlier outlined competitive narratives of a post-conflict Rwandan regime, the possibility for a diverging framing becomes central for the research at hand. If the GoR under Paul Kagame is either framed as liberating or perpetrating presumably determines the moral obligation to allocate aid.

Hypothesis and Operationalization

Subsuming the theoretical pillars of idealism, it is assumed that aid allocation is determined by altruistically informed norms and values.

Normatively informed aid allocation is most probable indicated by development policy that emphasizes human development vis-à-vis mere economic development. Aid should be most likely channeled to the humanitarian sector, for example through sector budget support (SBS). However, humanitarian aid is typically defined as emergency relief and therefore channeled to nations in need of immediate support after a human crisis (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2015). Since Rwanda is predominantly framed as ‘post-conflict’, aid allocation to emergency relief is expected to decrease with progressing post-genocide years. Humanitarian sector allocation thus appears to be insufficient to indicate humanitarian motives. Nielsen (2010) identifies allocation to the social infrastructure sector with a focus on health and

aid allocation as a foreign policy tool to exercise instrumental power is not consistent with broad-scale empirical findings: bad performance has in a number of cases led to both, increase but also decrease of aid (Neumayer 2003).

8_{Frames can be ideologies or shared cultures of understanding and serve the organization and interpretation of}

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education, water, food and energy, as well as communication and roads as a classic indicator for a normatively-led aid policy.

However, it can hardly be determined with certainty if sector allocation to the social infrastructure sector is led by altruistic or selfish motives. Improved human capital can equally serve to enhance the economic capability of receiver nations, and in turn, commercial benefits of donor countries (see commercial lens). Therefore, it appears to be impossible to identify the causal power of altruistic motives in the presence of evidently trumping geostrategic or commercial determinants. In accordance with the dominant aid literature, it is presumed that altruism is rather epiphenomenal than determinant. A dominant causal power will be claimed if, and only if, indicators for commercial or realist variables are very low. Additionally to sector assessment, it will be checked for the rhetoric emphasis on normative joint values such as the respect for human rights or the alleviation of poverty. However, rhetoric claims are hardly a strong indicator by itself and will be investigated in synergy with its actual materialization through, for example, a stronger conditionality in the presence of human rights abuses. At the same time, the moral obligation for genocide redemption will be examined. Acknowledging that this is methodologically hard to grasp, it will be assessed how the relationship between Rwanda and the respective donor government was designated towards reparation of genocide guilt through, for example, political communiques or speech acts.

2.3 Realist lens on aid allocation

For long time, relations between the North and the South, particularly aid-relations, were mainly ignored by realist strands. With the emergence of globalization, more attention is given to the development paradigm also within realist theory. The realist lens emphasizes security concerns, relative gains and power relations between actors of the North and South, and thus, between the donor and the receiver of aid. Southern, especially, emerging nations therefore pose a potential threat to the dominant role of Western nations.9 Since development aid is highly politicized, economic growth and development do only play an epiphenomenal role to the aid agenda (Cohn 2008). Contrary, it is a well-established result within the aid literature that many donors pursue their own overwhelming interest of power and security. Thus, aid is highly determined by geostrategic goals of military power and geopolitical

9_{Despite its remarkable achievements, Rwanda is still classified as developing country and not as an emerging}

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motives of gaining political influence.10 Within North-South relations, colonial legacy11 becomes particular important to donors that want to maintain or even increase their geopolitical and geostrategic salience in former colonies through aid allocation (Bearce and Tirone 2010; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).

While realist interests appeared to dominate aid allocation during the Cold War era, a decrease of aid distortion towards geostrategic and geopolitical ends decreased thereafter. Especially with the formulation of the MDG, a shift towards aid as a means to reduce poverty and human insecurity took place (Cohn 2008; Neumayer 2003). However, since 9/11, security concerns have come to dominate foreign policy again, and thus, inevitably spill over into aid policy. Post-conflict reconstruction and the stabilization of failed states became a priority to the donor community. With Afghanistan being by far the biggest receiver of aid, evidence is provided that aid is primarily channeled to ‘failed states’ that pose a threat to international security, and not necessarily to the poorest countries that need it the most (Woods 2005). Based on these empirical findings, it can be theoretically assumed that mere humanitarian aid remains typically low while geostrategic informed aid is given in large quantities.

As a result from the theoretical discussion, the theory test from a realist lens is guided by the main assumption that aid allocation is determined by geostrategic and geopolitical interests.

To measure the realist informed interests, a set of indicators is suggested. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) advocate a radical version of realist political economy of aid assuming that aid serves primarily as a tool of political survival to the elite of the donor but also the receiver government. According to their argument, aid is a mean to buy political concessions by converting it into public and private goods for the winning coalition of the recipient government. Policy decisions, including aid and goods distribution, are made by leaders. Therefore, aid is most likely channeled directly to the government through general

10_{In this paper emphasis is put on the variables of geostrategic interest (military power) and geopolitical interest}

(political influence). The literature on realist interests is rather fragmented and hardly provides a consistent measurement since various studies emphasize different variables (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Strictly speaking, relative economic power is also captured by realist theory. However, economic interest will be clearly assigned to the second lens of commercial interests.

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Here, colonial legacy is not an independent variable in terms of determining aid allocation per se. It is rather seen as a variable that is omnipresent in all lenses and therefore does not constitute a distinct object of analysis. In realism, the power relations are emphasized, while commercial theory highlights the already established economic links. The idealist lens assigns importance to the morally constituted responsibility that grew out of a long-term relationship.

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budget support (GBS). GBS is seen as a tool to increase the ownership of the receiver country since the government is able to allocate the donation according to its own preferences. Hence, aid can also be channeled easily towards the military sector that constitutes a crucial pillar of power to authoritarian regimes. At the same time, GBS increases the possibility to buy policy concessions from the receiver leadership and therefore to put forward the interests of the donor government (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Hayman 2006).

A second indicator for geostrategic interests is constituted by military support beyond the dimensions of GBS. This might be logistical or financial but also rhetorical support of military goals of the receiver government that equally put forward the donor government’s geostrategic interest.

Nevertheless, a contrasting dimension considers geostrategic and geopolitical donor interests that do not coincide with the winning coalition of the receiver government. Therefore aid is most likely channeled to coalitions that put forward the donor’s diverging interest; this might be political or military oppositional forces or civil society organizations.

2.4 Commercial lens on aid allocation

A second strand of selfish donor motives is constituted within the liberal assumption of

commercial interests.12 Opposing the realist emphasis on geostrategic and geopolitical interests, it is assumed that economic interests primarily determine political actions. Aid serves to promote economic development for the receiver government that, in turn, enhances the economic prospective of the donor (Cohn 2008).

While security motives do not always apply for all donors, it is assumed that aid allocation is permanently influenced by trade linkages. Therefore, aid is given to enhance the export of goods and services to recipient countries (Berthélemy 2006a; Neumayer 2003). Although the liberal approach can be justified on grounds of Western security and prosperity objectives as well, it differs from realism by emphasizing absolute gains and mutually benefitting relations (Cohn 2008).

Development is seen as the efficient use of scarce resources and the imitation of a Western model of liberal democracy as the final form for human government and self-sustaining growth. Following the approach of modernization theory, the increase of a state’s per capita

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Commercial theory is a sub-theory of liberalism that provides a juxtaposition of variables that range from morally informed state preferences within the scope of ideational liberalism to factors of representation within republican liberalism (Moravcsik 1997). Here, the level of analysis is limited to the three-fold distinction of power vis-à-vis commercial interests and morally informed altruistic motives. For a further discussion on the limitation of variables see below.

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income through donor-based investment is advocated. Aid is aimed at capital accumulation, increased investment, social mobility, efficient division of labor and the diffusion of advanced technology and innovation (Sachs 2005). Developmental programs promote incentives for a growing private market economy through inclusive institutions that enhance private property rights and the rule of law (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Hartwick and Peet 2009). Aid is seen as a means to an end of economic integration through free trade and capital flows. Albeit liberal theory emphasizes development aid as a positive sum game, the commercial lens stresses how economic development in turn advances the selfish economic interests of the donor government.

Accordingly, the commercial lens assesses the empirics from the main assumption that aid allocation is determined by economic interests.

It is repeatedly suggested in the IPE literature that commercial interests are at play when the trade index between donor and recipient countries is high (Berthélemy 2006a; Canavire-Bacarreza et al. 2006 ). However, due to the lack of comprehensive data on all cases, the flow of exports and imports are checked to the extent they are available.13

The trade index approach, however, appears to lack a broad set of indicators for commercial interests. Especially since Rwanda does not constitute a significant trading partner to any of the here examined donor countries, it appears hardly representative for actual commercial links. In 2001, a UN report revealed the engagement of companies from almost all here examined donor countries in illegal resource exploitation in the DRC that is highly facilitated by Rwandan actors (UN 2001). Therefore, regional trading structures beyond official records will be taken into account to capture the whole scope of commercially informed interests of aid allocation. However, it needs to be noted that the involvement of companies from donor nations does not necessarily indicate a direct causal link for commercial interests of the donor government. Bearing in mind the risk of producing speculative arguments, it will be tested for further indicators.

In accordance with an earlier approach of sector examination, a check for aid allocation towards the economic sector, covering the economic infrastructure and production sector will be included. Nevertheless, social infrastructure sector support can likewise advance

13_{It is acknowledged that the trade index is a preferred method of making trade relations comparable. However,}

a comprehensive data set on all cases was not available. Moreover, some cases lack sufficient data on export and import figures.

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commercial interest by improving the human, and thus, economic development of a favored commercial partner. It is therefore assumed that distinct human capital building within the social infrastructure is aimed at ‘hard’ economic development when sectors such as higher education, labor security, infrastructure and roads, agriculture and production sectors are addressed. This might be contradicted by social infrastructure support that rather focuses on ‘soft’ areas such as health, gender equality and youth education, which are classical sectors of human development (Nielsen 2010).

A strong interest in economic partnership is further indicated by common economic institutions and a rhetorical emphasis on economic integration in diplomatic statements. Hitherto the range of selfish and altruistic motives that determine aid allocation and their respective indicators were outlined. In the following, methodological pillars of the research design, its conceptual scope and its methodological limitations will be addressed.

3 Methodological Framework

3.1 Methods

In order to conduct an in-depth empirical investigation, the case study design appears to be the most suitable option. Being qualitative in nature, the paper consists of a contextual analysis of donor motivations from a comparative perspective. Variance is generated through a case selection with variance on the dependent variable and independent variable, and therefore cannot be assigned to a purely similar or dissimilar case design.

It is not the aim of the paper to establish new theories; therefore, partly competing, theoretical concepts will be tested in a deductive manner. Moreover, it is not necessarily the primary aim to produce strong generalizable findings. Since the design will operate with a relatively small number of cases (small n), it might be difficult to control for third variables and to determine causality. It is acknowledged that generalizable findings are at the heart of the positivist case study design; however, the exceptional case of Rwanda captures a highly politicized struggle over Rwanda’s historical and contemporary reality (see literature review, Uvin 1998). Hence, the case study design offers unique possibilities to assess the exceptional case of Rwanda’s context that statistic studies on an aggregated level were not equipped for. Yet, the case of Rwanda holds implications for further research on donor engagement with hybrid post-conflict systems in Africa. Despite its exceptional genocide background, Rwanda is seen as a

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laboratory for a new post-conflict agenda of donors that was implemented in the late 1990s (Uvin 2001). Therefore, cases such as Liberia, South Sudan and Burundi come to mind for ‘lessons learnt’ that might derive from this case study.

To identify the determinants for aid allocation a set of various methods will be applied. Content analysis of primary and secondary literature, press releases and secondary authority interviews will be conducted. Process tracing becomes particularly important to understand the relationship and therefore to provide evidence for the ‘genocide guilt’ variable. Examining the commercial motives, quantitative data will be gathered and interpreted in synergy with a contextual analysis.

3.2 Case Selection

The case selection concentrates on bilateral OECD donors within the European Union and therefore excludes multilateral institutions and non-European bilateral donors from the population of cases.14 In the aid literature it is assumed that a variety of actors has different objectives and aid allocation therefore varies to a large extent between groups of bi- and multilateral actors. Alesina and Dollar (2000) assume that multilateral institutions are driven by altruistic objectives and therefore are less prone to political-strategic interests than bilateral donor countries.15 Canavire-Bacarreza et al. also find that bilateral aid is stronger influenced by export and trade considerations than multilateral aid. However, bilateral aid objectives cannot be generalized. Berthélemy furthermore argues that an aggregation of donors is only legitimate under the presumption that all donors behave the same; however, his research finds otherwise (2006b). Consequently, a disaggregated bilateral case approach is more likely to generate an ‘unpolluted measurement’ of donor-centered interests of aid release.

Logically, the six biggest European donors the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and France were selected for a preliminary empirical test round. Hayman distinguishes the donor structure along old and new donors. Germany, Belgium and France have been active donor countries already before the genocide, while the United Kingdom,

14_{Non-European donors are excluded for two reasons; First, Berthélemy criticizes that the aid literature is}

highly focused on the US influence while European research still lacks comprehensive case studies (2006a). The US is the biggest donor to Rwanda. Interesting insights on geostrategic motivations for high aid allocation are given by Strizek (2011). An inclusion of non-Western donors such as Japan, Korea or New Zealand seems to be less important considering the low amount of aid allocation.

15_{Contrary, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, inter alia, provide evidence that the IMF and World Bank are highly}

politicized and aid allocation is influenced by geostrategic interest of major shareholders (2009). See also Berthélemy (2006a).

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Sweden and the Netherlands became involved into aid allocation with a drastic eruption in 1994 (Hayman 2006). To what extent this distinction contributes to solve the empirical puzzle, will be shown throughout the course of the empirical analysis.

For the sake of an in-depth research, four cases remained after a preliminary test: The United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. France was selected to create variance on the dependent variable. In contrast with the majority of donors, ODA remained significantly low during the post-genocide period while, at the same time, a particularly bad diplomatic relationship with the Rwandan government remained. The same applied partly for Belgium, while ODA generally increased. Therefore, a crucial dissimilarity on the dependent variable was already generated by including Belgium and France. The United Kingdom was chosen because of its genuine importance as international donor and because its position as biggest European donor to Rwanda. In contrast, Sweden was excluded because the ODA curve is, except for the difference in amplitude, very similar to the UK case. It is also argued in the literature that Sweden acts as a ‘silent partner’16 through UK aid policy. Roughly examining the Swedish and British case, it became evident that the same sectors are indeed addressed with a similar outcome in ODA allocation. Acknowledging that minor differences would have been revealed in an in-depth research, the Swedish case was excluded on the basis of high similarity. The same logic applied for Germany and the Netherlands. Both donors have a roughly speaking similar aid allocation with negligible differences between 2009 and 2013. At the same time, Germany’s per capita aid is almost as low as the French allocation. In contrast to France, it is assumed that the low donation derives from a rather spotless historical relationship17, and therefore from a limited interested in its former colony (1891-1919). Finally, the Netherlands were chosen because of its limited prior engagement with the East African region. In contrast to the three other cases, geostrategic or geopolitical engagement is expected to be modest. The Netherlands have had a relatively small influence of colonial legacy in the region. The Netherlands therefore add remarkably to the research design by fore coming omitted variable bias.

16

The term ‘silent partnership’ refers to one donor giving another donor a mandate to act on its behalf in policy discussions in a given sector (Hayman 2006).

17_{However, just recently the Green and Left opposition parties called on Germany’s parliament to examine the}

events in Rwanda since Germany’s role during the genocide remains unclear. Official records to German engagement remain confidential or are unavailable. Germany maintained exceptionally close relationships to the post-genocide regime and was one of the first governments to acknowledge the RPF as legitimate leadership (Strizek 2011). Development agencies are omnipresent and diplomatic ties are strong. Although a strong deviation is not expected from the exclusion of the German case, it is emphasized as remaining case study that would close a gap in Rwanda Research.

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The case selection results in four cases and an equal distribution of old (France and Belgium) and new donors (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). High variance is created on the dependent variable with three donors of increasing aid through different modalities (GBS or SBS) and one donor decreasing aid. Therefore, a counterfactual test case is included. The design does not constitute a purely perfect similar case design. However, a general commendation of Rwandan achievements and a tendency to intensify aid relations is at play. Acknowledging the imperfect conditions of reality and, nevertheless, include them into the positivist approach, forestalls an often criticized abstract theorization of our real environment.

3.3 Limitations on the Research Design

Observation Period

The research at hand captures the post-genocide period of Rwanda from 1994 until 2013. Data collection afterwards was mostly constrained, but significant events will be taken into account in the outlook. Although human rights abuses and restrictions of civil liberties are on the daily agenda, a meticulous examination of each case in every year of aid allocation appears to be highly unfeasible. Due to the scope of the paper, the analysis will limit itself to critical events of human rights abuses for each country case throughout the observation period. Significant markers for human rights abuses are the UN reports that were published in 2001, 2008, 2010 and 201418.

Agents and Structures

The analysis will be limited to bilateral aid allocation and therefore perceives the state as an actor. However, various theoretical strands of the here discussed lenses would include a variety of further variables that could obtain explanatory power but exceed the here suggested level of analysis. For example, ideational and republican strands of liberalism as well as constructivist notions of idealism perceive the state as a multi-layered actor. Opening up the black box, ODA is not only determined by the government level but the several layers of identities that form the state. Thus, individual actors, civil society, political fractions or distinct interest groups (such as a Rwandan diaspora) are emphasized as agents that shape preferences of the state apparatus (Moravcsik 1997; Noel and Therian 1995). Yet, this desirable all-encompassing approach appears to exceed the possibility to examine all

18

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level causal determinants to a satisfying degree. To identify their causal power that precedes the preference construction on the state level exceeds the limits of this paper. Acknowledging their undeniable influence, they will be included on a contextual basis (see figure 1).19

Exclusion and Causal Power of Variables

Classical aid-research variables such as geography and population size (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) are excluded since the comparative case study obtains variance on the donor side.

Further, no distinct causal power is assigned to the relationship between donor and receiver country and the respective framing of the GoR by the donor government. Framing serves rather as an indicator for genocide guilt that is incorporated in value creation within the normative approach of idealism. However, the causal nature of frames and relations remains debatable. Evoking the hen-egg problem it appears problematic to identify frames, including the donor relationship to Rwanda, as a cause or a consequence to or from aid allocation. Therefore the relationship and framing of Rwanda will be examined empirically merely for a contextual understanding. The test of causal determinants is limited to the above outlined variables.

Finally, the question of most dominant motives as part of a broad debate in aid literature needs to be addressed. Empirical findings constitute that both altruistic and selfish tendencies matter in allocation of aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006a and 2006b). It is therefore acknowledged that explanatories are not necessarily mutually exclusive and geopolitical, geostrategic, commercial but also altruistic motives can exist analogously. Yet, a methodological problem remains when it comes to rank the strongest causal power of competing explanatories. So far, there is virtually no solid evidence on the relative importance of various variables (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Proponents of realist and liberal approaches argue for the trumping power of selfish variables, while idealists claim that altruistic motives are beyond a mere epiphenomenal influence (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Nielsen 2010). In accordance with the aid literature, selfish motives are expected to be present in assumedly every country case. A counterfactual test for altruistic motives in the absence of selfish stimuli will most likely not be feasible. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the dominance of variables will be discussed individually for each case on the basis of

19_{In a more comprehensive approach it could be discussed if agents shape state preferences in the first place or}

it they rather adhere to an already prevalent superstructure of state preferences. It is not expected that approaching state preferences and their agents in a rather mixed approach will pollute the findings since the focus of this research is not how preferences come into being.

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dominant indicators throughout the empirical assessment. Accordingly, conclusions about the initial objectives of aid allocation, coherent with the theoretical assumptions, will be derived.

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Figure 1: Level of Analysis and Causal Relationships between Variables20

20_{The main level of analysis within the here presented paper are the state interests (state preferences). A micro-level analysis including the level of state actors cannot be}

conducted in an all-encompassing manner. It is also not the aim of this paper to identify the causal or consequential nature of the relationship/framing variable. However, they will be included to a certain degree on a contextual basis

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4 The Case of post-genocide Rwanda

4.1 The Rwandan success story

“Rwanda has rebelled against its destiny. It has recovered from civil war and genocide more fully than anyone imagines possible and is united, stable, and at peace. Its leaders are boundlessly ambitious. Rwandans are bubbling over with a sense of unlimited possibility”

(Kinzer 2008: 2)

With the end of the civil war in 1994, the post-genocide regime of Rwanda made tremendous effort to reconstruct its society. The consequences of one of the most brutal genocides the world has ever seen can hardly be overestimated. Shortly after the plane of President Habyarimana and his Hutu-Elite was shot down, a 100 day long well-planned massacre erupted in which between 500.000 up to 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed.21 Not only economic and political devastation was the result. Still today, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons suffer from inhumane conditions (Straus and Waldorf 2011). In the official narrative, it were radical Hutu triggering the mass slaughter, while Tutsi Paul Kagame22 and his RPA victory brought an end to civil war and pervasive killings (UNHRC 2015). A contradicting chronicle of events, inter alia, claimed by French authorities, considers the genocide being triggered and effectively organized by Kagame’s Tutsi elite himself (Strizek 2011; Collins 2014).23

In autumn 1994, a transitional government was installed that was considered by the international community as a model of democratic post-conflict consolidation (Uvin 2001). Quickly a strong centralized state evolved on the foundations of an all-encompassing military apparatus with Paul Kagame being the Minister of Defense and Vice President of Rwanda. During the constitution phase between 1999 and 2003, Rwanda was provided with significant

21_{The number of victims differs according to the competing narratives of the genocide. Officially a victim ratio}

of 500.000 up to 1 million Tutsi is stated (Des Forges 1999). According to a competing narrative, Tutsi and Kagame’s RPA were, in fact, the real perpetrators during the genocide. Therefore a victim ratio of 280.000 Tutsi vis-à-vis 750.000 Hutu is considered to be at the heart of the truth (Strizek 2011).

22_{Paul Kagame and his Tutsi family fled during the social revolution in the early 1960s from Rwanda to}

Uganda. His attempt of liberation throughout the early 1990s is interpreted differently throughout the region and the globe (see literature review).

There he became a senior Ugandan army officer conducting military training in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US and The United Kingdom (Cameron 2012).

23_{The whole spectrum of causal mechanisms, motives and actors of both narratives cannot be outlined in this}

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logistical and financial support from donors. In 2003, Paul Kagame became the elected President with more than 95 per cent of votes. He was reconfirmed as President for another seven years with more than 93 per cent in 2010. EU observer missions reappraised the democratic progress made in post-genocide Rwanda (Hayman 2011). Political institutions were built from scratch with noteworthy pace. Concerning the quota of women in parliament, Rwanda is known for having the highest gender equality worldwide. Most of the MDGs are expected to be met by the end of 2015; child mortality dropped by two thirds and nearly universal primary school enrolment is attained (World Bank 2014a).

Economically, Rwanda provides a remarkable development success including high growth rates, rapid poverty reduction and reduced inequality. Rwanda seeks to become a middle-income country in 2020 by transforming its low-middle-income agriculture-based economy to a knowledge-based, service-oriented economy. As a hub for information technology, Rwanda envisions to become a so-called ‘Singapore for Africa’ (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Rwanda repeatedly was a top performer in the World Bank’s Doing Business report, and thus, became an attractive country for investments (IFC 2015).

4.2 Reconstructing suppression and war

“A prince must not have any other object nor any other thought but war, its institutions, and its discipline; because that is the only art befitting one who commands.”

(Machiavelli 1532: XVIII)

Despite Rwanda’s remarkable economic success of post-conflict reconstruction, most accounts fail to call attention to the social and political costs of its recovery. Under the disguise to guard against the recrudescence of ethnic violence, several genocide-ideology laws were passed that restrict free speech and paralyzed political opposition, civil society and media institutions. Two powerful intelligence service agencies, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and External Security Organization (ESO), build up an omnipresent security apparatus, and accordingly, a general attempt to control people and political space (Human Rights Watch 2014; Reyntjens 2010a).

Politically, mechanisms from heavy-handed repression to subtle cooption are exercised to oppress opposition. Hutu and moderate Tutsi politicians are consistently sidelined as a threat to RPF hegemony, cabinet constellations are regularly shaken-up and corruption is on the daily agenda (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Considering the 95 per cent victory of the RPF, Rwanda is effectively a one-party state. Countless examples of political suppression illustrate

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that there is no space for dissenting views: Joseph Sebarenzi, the former parliament speaker was removed from office after democracy strengthening efforts, and Victoire Ingabire, the opposition leader was imprisoned on utter political motivations (Human Rights Watch 2010). Only few other countries have such a high record of ministers, parliament members, army-officers, civil servants and judges that were victims of extra judicial killings or were in jailed in the absence of any regime change during post-genocide decades. In fact, Paul Kagame is the only sitting President worldwide with more than 30 high ranking military officials in his government that are accused in UN reports of several war crimes (Straus and Waldorf 2011). The 2003 elections confirmed the limited political pluralism. Observers raised “Stalinist procedures” (Reyntjens 2010a: 11) of fraud, intimidation, ballot-box stuffing and major lacks of transparency.

Economically, the development achievements appear to be a mirage. Despite its MDG achievements, large inequalities exist between social classes, geographic regions, and not to mention, Hutu and Tutsi (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Comparatively, the GDP per capita in Rwanda is one of the lowest in Africa. Before the RPF took over power, Rwanda ranked on the top position (World Bank 2015a). The majority of Rwandan economy is further made of non-tradable goods which capture services and goods that are used for domestic consumption and are not comparable to imports and exports. Foreign aid still accounts for more than 30 per cent of Gross National Income and is by comparison with neighboring countries among the highest in Sub-Sahara Africa which average lies by 3.4 per cent (World Bank 2014b). In 2001, a UN report exposed findings on illegal exploitation of mineral resources and the extraction of considerable revenues in the DRC that was conducted by Rwandan actors (UN 2001). Accordingly, the small, land-locked and resource scarce country opted for hazardous avenues to foster its economic development that was just appraised by the international community. Aid subsidies and illegal resource extraction appeared to have contributed strongly to non-sustainable growth objectives.

Regarding free media, independent coverage risks violence, fines or even imprisonment. The BBC Kinyarwanda service was banned from Rwanda after broadcasting a Kagame-regime critical documentary. Reporters without borders denounce the government for constantly harassing journalists domestically and abroad (Reporters without borders 2014; BBC 2014). External critique by International NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or the UN is refused on behalf of the Rwandan government. Rather, the GoR accuses

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criticism as an action of ‘harboring génocidaires’24. Their reports are considered to produce dangerous lies and inaccuracies that endanger the national unity and security of Rwanda’s post-conflict society. The most serious onslaught on civil society took place in 2004 when a number of civil society organizations were dissolved with the claim that they would spread genocidal ideology (Amnesty International 2003; Reyntjens 2010a).

At the same time, Kagame justifies his authoritarian rule on grounds of a little empowered and submissive Rwandan citizenry that already enabled the dynamics of the 1994 genocide (RPF 2008). A Machiavellian enlightened leadership therefore forestalls divisionism and fosters Rwandan unity.

The RPFs boldness exceeded its own borders when two wars against the Congo were initiated in 1996/1997 and 1998. The second war lasted until 2003 and became known as Africa’s World War (Prunier 2009). Rwanda’s belligerent incursions did not only force a regime change25, but caused extensive suffering and death. Backed by an overriding security concern of the post-genocide elite against external and internal threats of Hutu refugees, massive human rights abuses were undertaken against refugee camps inside and outside the Rwandan borders. The Gisenyi or Kibeho instances are only two among several massacres carried out by RPA soldiers against thousands of Hutu civilians (UHRC 199426, Prunier 2009). The humanitarian impact for Congolese and Rwandan people was devastating. Millions of civilians were displaced and hundreds of thousands killed and raped by the RPA and armed groups. A series of reports and investigations found Rwanda motivated as much by profit as by an overwhelming self-defense rationale. Kagame reasoned the involvement on the continued threat to Rwanda posed by Congolese Hutu that included remnants of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide (Prunier 2009; Strizek 2011). However, with elections taking place in Rwanda at the same time, the international community set up a priority for stability versus accountability. Seeing Rwanda’s need for security through the prism of genocide, rarely any action was undertaken on part of the international community (Hayman 2011; Uvin 2001). Yet, UN reports continuously detected new revelations. In 2008, the Rwandan support

24_{The term génocidaires was labeled by the post-genocide regime to generally condemn Hutu and former}

government members and proponents. The French term bares linguistic importance since France is seen as an ally of the former regime and a supporter for the Hutu fraction during the genocide. The French language was banned as official language from schools and public institutions throughout the post-genocide years.

25_{In 1996, a regime change in the Congo was initiated by the AFDL, a rebel movement that was largely under}

the command of the RPA. The AFDL was led by Laurent Kabila who later became the president of the DRC (Stearns and Borello 2011).

26_{The GoR pressured the UN into suppressing the Gersony Report that proved the RPA’s killings of Rwandan}

civilians. Likewise, it blocked the ICTR from indicting any RPA soldiers for war crimes (Stearns and Borello 2011).

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for Laurent Nkunda, a leading warlord in the Kivu provinces was made public. Finally in 2010, it was confirmed that Rwandan forces deliberately committed genocide on Hutu refugees throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s (Stearns and Borello 2011; UN 2008 and 2010).27

Despite the formal end of the Second Congo War and Rwanda’s commitment to Peace in 2002, violence and human rights abuses persisted in the fragile DRC. Ten years later, a new UN report investigated the perpetrating role of Rwandan forces in backing M23 rebels to further destabilize the Congo. The Rwandan military took a proactive role in recruiting child soldiers, provided logistical and military support and training. In exchange, the illegal resource extraction of rare materials such as gold and ivory was perpetuated (UN 2014). Consequently, the UN reports from 1994 (known as Gersony Report), 2001, 2008, 2010 and 2014 (with a draft leaked in 2012) confirmed that the RPF regime with certainty exceeded its legitimate, short-term security prerequisites.

4.3 Funding Fraud

Nevertheless, neglecting the fundamental human rights fraud, the international political reappraisal of Rwanda’s economic and human development continued and trickled down into growing aid allocation. In the first post-genocide decade, ODA represented approximately 50 per cent of Rwanda’s budget. Although the GoR emphasizes its willingness to increase its independency from aid, ODA still constitutes between 30 to 40 per cent of the total state’s expenditure (World Bank 2014a). Since the 2000s, SBS has picked up in the education and health sector. However, the Rwandan Government repeatedly indicated that its preferred aid modality is GBS. Today, the three most important donors to Rwanda are the World Bank, the European Commission and, interchangeably, The United Kingdom and the US which covered 85 per cent of total ODA in 2005 (GoR 2006).

Throughout the 20 years of post-genocide recovery, aid to Rwanda experienced an overall tendency of upsurge. Crisis relief peaked in the immediate genocide aftermath, with a high proportion of emergency and food aid until 1996. Although the late 1990s experienced a negligible slowdown of aid allocation, total ODA to Rwanda increased again significantly from 2004 onwards. Due to the 2003 presidential elections and increased regional stability a growth of +45.3 per cent in 2004 and again +20.6 per cent in 2005 took place. With the 2010

27_{The GoR pressured the UN to quash the report. At a meeting with Ban Ki-Moon, Kagame threatened to}

withdraw three thousand soldiers from the UN and AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur if the official version of the report will be leaked (French and Gettleman 2010).

On the fault line : European donor motives for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda

On The Fault Line

European Donor motives for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda

Abstract

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

1

Introduction

2

Theoretical Framework

3

Methodological Framework

4

The Case of post-genocide Rwanda