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Powerfood : an analysis of relations between the state, local authorities and transnational networks in the production and sales of Quinoa in Bolivia

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POWERFOOD

An analysis of relations between the state, local authorities and

transnational networks in the production and sales of Quinoa

in Bolivia

Master Thesis Global Environmental Politics and Governance Merijn Zandstra 10063072 Thesis Supervisor: Robin Pistorius Second Reader: Imrat Verhoeven Universiteit van Amsterdam 30-01-2015

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Abstract

In a world where borders are losing their significance, the demand for global rules and regulations is high, policy makers are forced to rethink fundamental principles of governance. It seems that international institutions are no longer the exclusive preserver of national governments, as NGOs and transnational networks gain influence over international governance.

It is in this context that the case of Quinoa in Bolivia plays an important role. Known as the grain of the gods for its many positive attributions, this Andean grain’s popularity is rising

immensely. However, at the same time that this grain grows in popularity, a number of changes in its surrounding also take place. Bolivia’s state is thoroughly reformed by the election of Evo

Morales as president and Bolivia’s environment is threatened through desertification and a decrease of essential wildlife as a consequence of intensified Quinoa cultivation. Furthermore, both national and transnational organizations take interest in the livelihood of local Quinoa farmers while local communities are granted self-governance according to indigenous rights. This research focuses on the Bolivian state, local authorities and transnational networks and the relationships between them regarding the production and sales of Quinoa.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ... 1

1. Introduction ... 4

1.1 Changing paradigms of governance ... 4

1.2 Methods of research ... 5

1.3 The unique character of Bolivian governance ... 6

1.4 Bolivian governance: An introduction ... 7

1.5 Evo Morales and Bolivian governance reforms ... 8

1.6 The influence of Bolivian governance reforms on natural resources ... 9

1.7 Quinoa as powerfood ... 13

1.8 Cultivating quinoa and growing problems ... 14

2. Theoretical Framework ... 16

2.1 The role of the state ... 19

2.2 Decentralizing natural resources ... 20

2.3 Governance without boundaries... 22

2.4 Changing the world transnationally ... 23

2.5 Participatory governance... 26

2.6 Practical issues of participatory governance ... 27

2.7 Decentralization, transnationalism, participatory governance and the state ... 29

3. Transnational and Local Networks in the Quinoa Industry in Bolivia ... 31

3.1 Producer organizations in the Quinoa industry in Bolivia ... 32

3.2 Organizaciones Economicas Campesinas Indigenas y Originarias ... 32

3.3 Three important in the Quinoa industry ... 33

3.3.1 APROQUIRC ... 33

3.3.2 ANAPQUI ... 35

3.3.3 CECAOT ... 36

3.4 Producer organizations united on a national level ... 38

3.5 International organizations in the Quinoa industry ... 39

3.5.1 International organizations that focus on regional aspects ... 39

3.5.2 International umbrella organizations... 40

3.5.3 Empowering Smallholder Farmers In Markets ... 41

3.5 Transnational networks in the Quinoa industry ... 42

3.6 The impact of transnational networks in the Quinoa industry ... 43

4. State and local Governance structures in Bolivia ... 45

4.1 Bolivian state reform from neo-liberal to indigenous self-governance ... 45

4.2 Defining and implementing the new state paradigm ... 46

4.3 Local governance in Bolivia through the cargo system ... 48

4.4 The relationship between indigenous self-governance and state governance ... 50

4.5 Local governance in relation to transnational networks and state governance ... 52

5. Reforms and networks in practice ... 55

5.1 The relationship between self-governing entities and the state ... 55

5.2 The relationship between transnational networks and state governance ... 58

5.2.1 Transnational networks concerning regional aspects and the state ... 58

5.2.2 Transnational umbrella networks and the state ... 60

5.2.3 Transnational networks focused on political and legal aspects and the state ... 62

5.3 The state, local governance and transnational networks in practice ... 64

6. Conclusion and discussion ... 67

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6.1.1 The role of transnational networks in the production and sales of Quinoa ... 67

6.1.2 The role of local governance structures in the production and sales of Quinoa ... 68

6.1.3 Relations between the state, local authorities and transnational networks ... 69

6.2 Discussion ... 71

6.2.1 Limitations concerning actors ... 71

6.2.2 Limitations concerning size ... 71

6.2.3 Limitations concerning respondents ... 72

6.2.4 Further research... 72

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1. Introduction

1.1 Changing paradigms of governance

In a world where national borders are losing their significance and the demand for global rules and regulations is high, policy makers are forced to rethink fundamental principles of governance. One of the main challenges in rethinking governance currently is finding the relation between local and global governance.

According to global governance thinkers international institutions are no longer the

exclusive preserve of national governments. Instead an increasing influence in international policy making by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy networks, party networks and multinational corporations has caused a shift from interstate cooperation to more complex forms of governance. (Tallberg & Jönsson, 2010: 4)

A seemingly contradictory view of local governance is also rising in importance. This vision as Speer (2012: 2379) argues is based on the idea that having citizens participate in policy forming increases local government responsiveness and accountability. Thus “it is claimed to improve the efficiency and sustainability of public service delivery and the preferences of beneficiaries” (Speer, 2012: 2379).

Seeing as these two perspectives on governance appear to be opposite to each other, the question how these perspectives influence each other when both exist in one place at the same time is very interesting. One place where both of these perspectives exist at the same time is in the

quinoa industry in Bolivia. Following the election of Evo Morales as president, Bolivia has known a focus on local governance. However the rise in popularity of Quinoa has increased the influence of transnational networks at the same time. When analyzing the Quinoa industry in Bolivia the

following question arises:

 How and to what extent does transnational civil society through participatory governance influence the Bolivian state regarding the production and sales of quinoa in Bolivia?

In order to find an answer to the main question above, three sub questions need to be answered first:

 What forms of transnational networks exist in the Bolivian quinoa sector?

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 How do these networks and structures relate to each other and (inter)national quinoa markets and associated regulations?

Finding an answer to these questions could open the way to integrating transnational influences with state and local governance in order to create a thriving, yet sustainable economy that effectively supports local small communities in an economically upcoming country.

1.2 Methods of research

This study primarily focuses on the goals and motives of specific local populations, (trans)national networks and a state in one specific geographical location concerning changes in their respective surroundings regarding (making and influencing) policies, their effectivity and their legitimacy in the Quinoa industry. The results found during this study will be used to form a theory, hence this study is of an inductive nature. Finally, the focus of this study will lie on interpretation, more than theory testing. Due to the combination of these aspects, this study will therefore use a qualitative analysis strategy. (Bryman, 2008)

This study can also be seen as a case-study as it focuses on one specific set of actors on one specific location. However, the Quinoa industry in Bolivia is not the only location where

transnationalism and participatory governance exist at the same time. The results from this study might therefore also be used for other case-studies concerning the relation between transnationalism and participatory governance. This study can therefore in the words of Bryman (2008) be seen as an exemplifying case-study concerning the relation between transnationalism and participatory

governance.

Seeing as the aim of this study is to analyze and evaluate reactions by the Bolivian state regarding the influence of the three concepts described above, a mixed method approach is in place. By using mixed methods the actual reaction by the state, as well as its effect on the local population and the international market can be analyzed. To achieve this goal, the three methods of analysis will be: Literature reviews of laws and publications by and of the Bolivian state and important organizations in the production and sales of Quinoa, as well as semi-structured interviews with experts in the field of (especially Bolivian) governance and experts in important organizations for the production and sales of Quinoa.

In this study, the Bolivian state, local authorities and transnational networks that play a role in the production and sales of Quinoa will be analyzed. By doing so an advice can be created not only for the policy making process concerning the Quinoa industry in Bolivia, but possibly also for

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6 other industries and countries where decentralization of natural resources, transnational civil

networks and participatory governance exist at the same time.

In order to find the answers to the questions posed in this research, the results of the research will be structured as following: First the transnational networks will be analyzed. This will be done through analyzing the structures, goals and motives of multiple organizations and networks that play an important role in the production and sales of Quinoa. Afterwards the structure, goals and motives of both the Bolivian state and local authorities will be analyzed. These elements combined will lay the groundwork needed to analyze how and to what extent the transnational networks and local authorities influence the Bolivian state. This will be done through analyzing the effect that the three different actors have on each other through their goals, motives, implemented policies, and cooperative efforts. Although the theoretical framework on which these analyses are based will be explained in the next chapter, some historical and economical context concerning the transnational networks, the Bolivian state and Quinoa in this case are in place. The next paragraphs will provide these contexts, starting with the unique character that Bolivian governance has as a consequence of the reforms of the state and a globalizing world. Afterwards the historical context of the Bolivian state is in order as this might provide insights on (motives behind) current policies, reforms and goals. Finally, the rise of popularity of Quinoa and its consequential perils will be described as they might also provide insights on motives and goals of the different actors analyzed in this research.

1.3 The unique character of Bolivian governance

As stated earlier in this research, the recent reforms of the Bolivian state combined with a globalizing world give governance in Bolivia a unique character. Before going deeper into the historical context of the state, it is important to emphasize and explain this unique form of governance.

The character of governance in Bolivia has changed recently as this country has shifted its governance paradigm towards an increasingly participatory form of governance that includes the right to self-governance for a number of indigenous-campesino entities (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011: 13), while in order to realize its political goals it is dependent on its growing economy that heavily relies on the export of natural resources (Cameron, 2013: 184; Koekoek, personal communication, 2015). Combining these elements it can be argued that pressure is exerted on the Bolivian state from two different directions. On the one hand local authorities (and their increased importance) emphasize local needs and demands, on the other hand international markets provide the financial support needed to achieve political goals.

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7 Keeping this in mind, it is interesting to analyze the role of transnational networks in Bolivia. As argued in the first paragraph, transnational networks are growing in importance in the making of (inter)national policies. In the case of the production and sales of Quinoa (as will be explained more thoroughly later on in this research) these transnational networks seem to take on a double role. On the one hand they focus on local communities and their livelihoods, while on the other hand they try to improve the position of Quinoa on the (inter)national markets (Fair Trade International website, 2014; Mercadero website, 2014; EFSIM website, 2014). These transnational networks thus seem to influence the Bolivian state on the one hand directly through focusing on (inter)national markets and indirectly through focusing on local communities. A further and more thorough elaboration on the role of transnational networks and state and local governance structures in the production and sales of Quinoa in Bolivia will follow in respectively chapters three and four of this research. For now it is important to keep in mind that the transnational networks seem to be a third important actor (next to the state and local authorities) in Bolivian governance.

Thus it has become clear that Bolivian governance seems to have a unique character. It is a policy making process wherein three different important actors that play a role: The state, local authorities and transnational networks. In this form of governance it would seem that the Bolivian state is under pressure from needs and demands from on the one hand a local, and on the other an international level. It is important to emphasize this unique character and to keep this in mind throughout the research.

Because of this unique character it is also important to gain insights in the historical context of Bolivian governance. The historical context might provide insights into motives and decisions of the current Bolivian state, consequentially creating deeper insights into this unique character of governance. After elaborating on the historical context, the choice of Quinoa as a research case and its relevance can be explained.

1.4 Bolivian governance: An introduction

Bolivia has a long and troubled history when it comes to governance. It has known periods of colonization, revolution and citizen protests against the government. As Kaplan (2006: 503) states: “Bolivia's past has been so tumultuous that 'Bolivianization' at one point became a synonym for political and social decomposition”. But even in the more recent history the country has not known a stable form of government. Support for democracy dropped 15 percent between 1996 and 2005 and the country has known five heads of state between 2000 and 2005 (Kaplan, 2006: 502). As Kaplan (2006: 503) and Arsel, Mena, Pelligrini & Radhuber (in Bavinck, Pelligrini & Mostert,

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8 2014: 115) argue most of these troubles are a direct result of the country's demography, geography, history, but more importantly its reliance on a few rich natural resources. According to Arsel, et al. (2014: 115) the most added value from natural resources comes from post-extraction phases of refinement, commercialization and further use. Bolivia does not take part in any of these three phases. Instead, the country has always been distinguished by highly unequal trade relations and a dependence on these resources making it a peripheral state in the capitalist world system. Despite Bolivia's richness in natural resources, the country thus remains very poor.

1.5 Evo Morales and Bolivian governance reforms

According to Schilling-Vacaflor (2011) a great deal of Bolivia's population was excluded from political participation due to discriminatory legislation prior to 1952. In fact, even after theoretically granting every citizen basic human rights (the right to vote and the right to basic education for instance) in the1960s, cultural diversity was still not recognized and a new and restricted political elite emerged, implementing new exclusionary mechanisms. Thus a wide gap between civil society and state as well as high levels of social inequality persisted. (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011: 5).

However, while the political elite dominated the Bolivian government unrest among the indigenous and campesino sectors. Eventually, during the 1990s the indigenous and campesino organizations became the most important challengers of the existing social order. They were strengthened by global developments in the recognition of indigenous people's rights in

international human rights instruments like the International Labor Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention and the United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples as well as support for indigenous rights by a large number NGOs. As of 1994 the political

participation of indigenous and campesino citizens was further strengthened due to decentralization policies and a new law: The Law of Popular Participation. (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011: 6-7)

In 2005 Bolivia elected Evo Morales as their new (and first indigenous) president with 54% of the votes. This victory can be seen as a consequence of the successful water and gas protests in 2000 and 2003, as well as MAS' (Morales' party) ability to form alliances with all different sectors of society (from indigenous organizations to urban intellectuals and trade unions). Although Morales' first term did not go without conflicts (sometimes even resulting in violent clashes between government and opposing parties), Morales did manage to change Bolivia's constitution. This new constitution recognizes Bolivia as a plurinational state with political pluralism,

establishing that the state's sovereignty is based on the Bolivian people and is exercised in both a direct and delegated way. It states that Bolivia's type of democracy is participatory, representative

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9 and communitarian. (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011: 9)

Two elements of the new Bolivian democracy are important in this research and deserve some elaboration. First the participatory part. The Bolivian democracy's mechanisms are referenda, legislative initiatives of citizens, the recall referendum for public servants, the assembly, the city council, and the previous consultation. Furthermore it states that members of the judicial branch (after pre-selection by the legislative branch) will be elected by the Bolivian people. Second the communitarian part. The Bolivian government recognizes self-governed indigenous-campesino entities. The election of representatives in these entities take place according to the communities' own norms and procedures. Also the indigenous peoples’ and communities' right to

determination has been incorporated and is compromised in two dimensions: the right to self-government executed within the framework of indigenous autonomy (including exercising indigenous political, juridical and economic systems) and the right to fully participate in state institutions and society. (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011: 13-14)

1.6 The influence of Bolivian governance reforms on natural resources

The multiple forms of governance that Bolivia has known (as described above) have led to a number of back and forth changes between privatization and nationalization. In 1937 for example, the state nationalized the hydrocarbon sector, the beginning of a nationalization period that led to the nationalization of the mining sector in 1952. In the 1960s there was a period of liberalization, only to be interrupted by the nationalization of Gulf Oil in 1969. The latest pendulum swing towards privatization took place during the 1980s and 1990s and marked the emergence of civilian protest movements. (Arsel, et al., 2014: 115)

Two key conflicts took place in the following years that would strongly influence the reforms of Bolivian governance, yet again swinging the pendulum away from privatization. The first was a major protest against a private water company in the city of Cochabamba. A massive protest group successfully managed to force a private water company to withdraw from its attempts at privatizing the public water network. The second took place three years later when a number of demonstrations to prevent the government's plans to export natural gas through Chilean ports were held. The government argued that the incomes from natural resource exportation would strengthen the Bolivian economy. Protesters argued that this would be yet another example of resource extraction that would not benefit the people. These protests led to the killing of sixty-seven

protesters, after which then sitting president Gonzalo Sánchez (held responsible for both the export plans and the killings) was forced to resign. (Kaijser, 2014: 66)

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10 As stated above, Evo Morales and MAS gained massive support as a consequence of the protests against privatizations of natural resources. This support can to some extent attributed to two elements. First, to Morales' objective to decolonize Bolivia, meaning to increase the value of anything that is perceived as “subaltern and/or denied by colonial power” since Spain's dominion over Bolivia (Burman, 2011, in: Kaijser, 2014: 68). Second, and possibly more important, according to Kaijser (2014: 89) there is a resource nationalism narrative in Bolivia. In this narrative natural resources are closely tied to national identities and are perceived as an almost mythical solution to the immense levels of poverty in Bolivia. One of Morales' main political points, and one of the first steps that he undertook when in control was to increase state control over natural resource

extraction using the incomes for public welfare and poverty alleviation. (Kaijser, 2014: 88-90) A change concerning natural resource extraction that is growing following the election of Morales is the importance of environmental problems. Environmental issues in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s were primarily dealt with as technical issues. In the Morales administration (as part of the focus on indigenous people) there is an emphasis on proceso de cambio, the process of change. Important elements of this proceso de cambio are respect for Pachamama (literally translated Mother Earth, the most important deity for the indigenous people of the Andes) and vivir bien (meaning having one's basic needs met, while living in harmony with the natural world, the opposite of vivir mejor, or “living better”, meaning to gather as many material costs as one can without regard for the environment or others) (McNeish, 2013: 233). These two elements have shifted the state's paradigm away from material wealth and towards a paradigm of

environmentalism (Kaijser, 2014: 84-85).

This focus on environmentalism and more nationalized governance creates interesting dynamics concerning natural resources (extraction), as well as transnationalism. Although the nationalization of natural resources extraction and the focus on environmentalism have led to an increase in incomes for the state (that have been used for welfare programs) the extraction itself has led to environmental and social consequences for people affected by the negative impacts on the local level (McNeish, 2013: 227-239). These negative consequences have caused (foreign) environmental movements to side with the local communities (that have lost, or are to lose

territories and livelihoods due to the negative impacts) and protest against the extraction policies of the Bolivian government. At the same time the Bolivian government is finding it hard to reconcile its environmental ideals with the urge for resource extraction (and the pressure to extract from national and foreign interests). (Kaijser, 2014: 91)

The complex situations that are caused by the interplay between the economic benefits and the unintended negative impacts of the natural resource policies by the Bolivian government

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11 become clear from McNeish's (2013: 232) article. He argues that “coverage of events by the media, environmental organizations, other NGOs, and Bolivian and foreign analysts” is mainly focused on criticizing the responses and actions by the Bolivian government, but little focus has been given to complex interests of the local communities.

Thus it can be stated that Bolivian governance has undergone significant changes in the past six decades. On the one hand it would seem that Bolivia now emphasizes the importance of its local communities and their local customs and systems. If anything Bolivia's new constitution seems to shun the international market by increasing state control over natural resources. On the other hand the nationalization of natural resources and their export have increased the Bolivian economy, creating room for welfare programs but also pressure from national and foreign interests. The intensification of these extraction policies and the influence of foreign economic interests however on their turn have a number of negative consequences for the people that are supposed to benefit from these policies. As a consequence, environmental movements (from outside Bolivia) have now sided with local communities to protest against the extraction policies, while other national and foreign actors try to build networks to create sustainable ways of extraction that can also support local communities. At the same time due to the tensions between economic interests, environmental consequences and the urge to decrease local poverty, combined with the history and nature of conflicts in Bolivia, the likelihood for new conflicts is growing (see for example McNeish's (2013) article). Thus local and transnational forces are influencing the future of Bolivia and its natural resources. And now, there is a new globally wanted natural resource on the rise: Quinoa.

The popularity of Quinoa has grown immensely in the past decades. Where it sold for $70 per ton ten years ago, it now sells for as much as $2,000 per ton. Along with the price, the quantity has also increased greatly. In 2010 Bolivia's Ministry of Rural Development and Land stated that the country produced 36 106 tonnes of Quinoa, in 2013 this had increased to 58 040 tones. Finally the amount of land used to produce Quinoa has increased dramatically. In 2010 and 2011 a total of 64 789 ha was used to grow Quinoa, in 2012 this had grown to a total of 104 365 ha. (FAO, 2013: 60-62)

In 2013 the area cultivated with Quinoa in Bolivia reached 131 192 ha, in 2014 it reached 160 000 ha and the Bolivian state strives to reach a total of 200 000 ha in 2015. Export however has decreased from 65% in 2013, to 46% in 2014. This decrease mainly has to do with a rise in export from Peru to the United States (the biggest importer of Quinoa), resulting in a 19% decrease of Bolivia’s Quinoa exports to the United States. Although the Bolivian state is striving to regain the lost percentage of export, a number of Quinoa exporters seem less concerned about the loss, as they argue that the primary goal of the exporters in to provide good quality, not so much as quantity. The

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12 Quinoa exporters argue that Bolivian Quinoa is of better quality as it is both organic and healthier than its Peruvian counterpart. (Economia Bolivia website, 2014)

According to the Bolivian Embassy in the Netherlands the growing popularity of Quinoa has not gone unnoticed by the Bolivian state. They argue that Quinoa is in the top 15 of exportable products and therefore is an important economic sector. In 2011 the state has therefore released a normative establishing the production, processing and marketing of Quinoa in the Andean regions as a national priority. As a consequence it has also become a priority for the Bolivian Embassies to promote the export of Quinoa around the world and to position the product on foreign markets. (Brieger (First Secretary of the Bolivian Embassy in the Netherlands), personal communication, 2015)

But it is not only the Bolivian state that has reacted to the growing popularity of the grain. Recently both the international media and the world of science have paid more and more attention to not only the grain, but also those who produce the grain and the circumstances under which the grain is produced. In many of these articles possible negative effects concerning the sustainability of the industry, its effects on the environment and the effects on local farmers and communities circumstances are the explored (see for instance Farmletter, 2013; New York Times, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2013; Jacobsen, 2011; FAO 2013; Carimentrand & Ballet, 2010). These possible negative effects have also attracted the attention of international NGOs. A number of Bolivian producer organizations has for instance taken steps to qualify for membership of international NGOs like Oxfam and Fair Trade. Other producer organizations are taking the step to cooperate with

international organizations that are backed by foreign governments and promote sustainability and an improvement of the local farmers’ livelihoods. These are for example organizations like

Mercadero, an NGO based in the Netherlands and supported by the Dutch government that since two years has intensively cooperated with producer organizations in Bolivia, and Empowering Smallholder Farmers In Markets (ESFIM) that provides legal and political advise and support for the producer organizations (Koekoek, personal communication, 2015; ESFIM website, 2015). These organizations will be explored in detail in the third chapter of this research, however for now it can be stated that they provide support to the producer organizations on financial, political and legal areas. Thus they show that the Quinoa industry represents a clear case to examine the relationship between a nationalizing, decentralizing state and transnational networks in the production and sales of a natural resource that is growing in popularity.

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13 1.7 Quinoa as powerfood

Quinoa is a small grain cultivated from the southern part of Colombia to the north of Chili and Argentina, although mainly in Peru and Bolivia. The grain is characterized by its ability to grow in climate extremes (drought and frost) and its nutritious values (an exceptionally good balance of proteins, fats, oils and starch) and even its by-products are commonly reused as feed for sheep, cattle and poultry, fuel, in the manufacture of detergents, soaps, shampoos, toothpaste, stain removers, foam stabilizer for beverages, and insecticide, and as preparation for material for fire extinguishers, mineral floatation (in mining and hydrometallurgy industry) and photographic processing. (Soto & Carrasco, 2012: 29-35 in: Giuliani, Hintermann, Rojas & Padulosi, 2012). As a consequence of its many positive aspects quinoa is now being categorized as a powerfood and the demands for the grain have grown immensely in the past years.

Walsh-Dilley (2014: 5) argues that until 1990 the market for quinoa was extremely limited and regional. In fact the price for quinoa was so low that many local farmers' livelihoods were supplemented by extensive seasonal, long-term and permanent migration. However, as of 1980 the interest of the international community (and as a consequence the demand) for this extremely healthy grain started to grow. Due to the fact that the high altiplanos of Bolivia and Peru are the only places where quinoa can be grown successfully, the value of the grain also increased

tremendously (Walsh-Dilley, 2014: 5). For example, the value of the export of the grain per metric ton has risen from $4,408 thousand in 2004 to $43,156 thousand in 2009 (Soto & Carrasco, 2012; 48 in: Giuliani, et al. 2012). According to the FAO the total value of the quinoa export in the world increased from $13,1 million in 2005 to $78,9 million in 2012 (FAO, 2013: 61).

Up until the year 2000 the export of quinoa was relatively low and never passed the 2000 tons a year. According to the FAO this has changed dramatically since then. They argue that between 2005 and 2012 the export has grown eightfold. This increase is clearly visible in Bolivia. In 2007 Bolivia exported a total of 10 585 Quinoa, in 2012 this had increased to a total of 25 899 tones (64% of the total export of Quinoa). This increase in value influences the consumer price of Quinoa as well. Between April 2008 and April 2009 the average quinoa retail price increased by 80%, as of 2013 the quinoa retail price stands at 27 Bolivares per kilogram. This is more than double its level in April 2008. (FAO, 2013: 60-64)

It is important to note that during the increase of the international market's influence on the Bolivian quinoa industry, the emphasis of Bolivian governance has shifted towards a more local form. Examples of this can be found in large areas of Andean Bolivia, where the number of indigenous representatives (Quechua and Aymara) in municipal councils keeps growing, where

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14 elected bodies are monitored by vigil bodies whose members are selected from traditional local governance systems (peasant syndicates and neighborhood councils) (Blair, 2000; 23-25) and the appointment of certain regions as communidades originarios entitling these regions to undertake local governance according to local custom (Walsh-Dilley, 2014; 7).

1.8 Cultivating quinoa and growing problems

There is however always an interplay between a product and the international market. As Bolivian quinoa entered the international market, the international market entered Bolivia. The market pressure is taking its toll and researchers and development practitioners are growing concerned that many Bolivian farmers will resort to what is nearly a monoculture in order to produce enough quinoa to satisfy the demands (Astudillo & Aroni, 2012; 81 in: Giuliani, et al. 2012). As Small (2013; 177) argues: “Both critics and defenders of the quinoa trade are in agreement that the recent meteoric growth of the industry represents a major threat to the environment”. For those living in poor regions, the desire to escape from poverty outweighs the protection of the environment (Small, 2013; 177). In Bolivia the chance to escape from poverty has resulted in a drastic desertification of the landscape (Astudillo & Aroni, 2012; 89 in: Giuliani, et al. 2012) and a significant loss of wild land and wild creatures essential for the environment (Small 2013; 177-178).

Many of the region's incomes also increased following the quinoa boom in the international market. The increased incomes however seem to have had little effect on the difficult conditions in which many people live. Health and nutrition statistics for the southern altiplano remained at the same low, or even declined during the quinoa boom and many communities are losing people to economic and educational opportunities further afield. (Astudillo & Aroni, 2012; 84 in: Giuliani, et al. 2012).

A final growing problem with the quinoa boom is the earlier mentioned increase in value. As Brett (2010; 29) argues: “The successful development of an export market benefiting some rural communities has made quinoa too expensive for the majority of the urban population”. Thus quinoa appears to become Bolivia's next natural resource to enrich everyone but the Bolivians.

To sum up, there is currently a paradigm shift taking place in the world of governance. International networks are gaining importance in the creation and implementation of national and international policies, while the power of the state seems to decrease. At the same time the Bolivian state has been reformed and now focuses on nationalization and local communities. In the middle of these two opposing views, Quinoa is growing in importance on both the domestic and foreign markets and the conditions and circumstances surrounding the production and sales of this grain are

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15 attracting the attention of multiple (international) organizations. Thus it becomes interesting to find out how these actors with seemingly opposing views relate to each other in the production and sales of a product that is important on both the national and the international level, and of which both the value and quantity are increasing with possible risks for the environment and local communities. To find out how these different actors relate to each other, an analysis of both the different networks, as well as the reform of the Bolivian state (and the consequences of this reform) are in place. The next chapter will provide the theoretical framework through which these analyses can be made.

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2. Theoretical Framework

In recent years states have become more and more influenced by three trends: Decentralization, transnational civil societies and public pressure. In order to properly explain the influence of these trends, they will need to be defined and explained. The following chapter will therefore examine all three concepts and their respective positive and negative effects. By explaining these effects

beforehand, it will be easier to discern them in the actual case. Also the interplay between these concepts and their combined influence on the state can be explained. Once the concepts and their influences are explained, the reaction of the Bolivian state on these concepts can be analyzed and recommendations to other states concerning these concepts might be made.

As stated in the introduction, the Morales administration has reformed the Bolivian state significantly. Its policies now focus on nationalization and decentralization of natural resources, while decreasing malnutrition and poverty in an environmentally friendly way. However, there has also been a rise of international actors that play a role in the production and sales of Quinoa. Many of these international actors cooperate with Bolivian organizations thus forming transnational networks. As argued in the introduction, these transnational networks are gaining importance in the making of (inter)national governance. The rise in popularity of Quinoa has created an interesting interplay between state policies and transnational networks that can be best explained through the model of Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010). Although this model will be explored more thoroughly later in this chapter, a quick description beforehand is in place in order to distinguish the different relationships that play a role in what they call “global modernity” (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1889).

They argue that due to globalization, interrelations between economy, politics and civil society have changed causing “… more frequent and intense interpenetrations of states, markets, and civil societies” (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1889). According to them politics and authority are deterritorialized and denationalized. With this deterritorialization and

denationalization, the role of citizen-consumers has changed and traditional state authority is no longer the only accepted form of environmental authority. Spaargaren and Oosterveer (2010: 1889) argue that there are three forms of global authority emerging in a globalizing world: State (or political) authority, moral authority and market authority. Spaagaren & Mol (2010: 1890-1891) furthermore argue that these different forms of market- and civil-society based authorities are

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17 increasing in importance and emerging next to and partly beyond traditional state authority. The different forms of authority, the interplay between these different forms and the role citizen-consumers can play in the context of a globalizing world becomes clear in the model created by Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010: 1890) that is depicted below.

Figure 1 - Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010) Citizen-Consumers model

The different forms of authority can be mobilized and used as legitimate sources of power by citizen-consumers (Spaargaren & Mol, 2010: 1890). Also, they argue that there are three ideal-type roles through which citizen-consumers can become engaged with global (environmental) change and mobilize the different authorities: Ecological citizenship, political consumerism and life(style) politics. These different roles will be thoroughly explained in paragraph 2.4. For now however, it is already important to mention the role of transnational networks in these different roles. According to Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010: 1892-1894) transnational networks (and especially

environmental NGOs) empower citizen-consumers through combining the different individual concerns into one focused concern and increasing the negotiation power of citizen-consumers. Thus they are able to give citizen-consumers power and authority in a non-trivial way (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1894). Once again the precise role of these transnational networks will be described in paragraph 2.4. However, the power of these transnational networks is strongly dependent of its members and in order to keep this power, the networks will have to act according to the needs and demands of the majority of their members. In short using Spaargaren &

Oosterveer’s model (2010: 1890) as the basis three different actors can be distinguished concerning the policy making process in a globalizing world: The state, citizen-consumers and transnational networks.

Applying this model to Bolivian governance however arguably alters one of the actors. Bolivian governance currently strongly focuses on decentralization and participatory governance,

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18 thus actively engaging citizen-consumers in the policy making process through local governance structures. Thus the citizen-consumers now seem to play both a direct role in the policy making process through local governance structures and indirectly through transnational networks. At the same time, the transnational networks also seem to play both a direct role through transnational public governance, and an indirect role through citizen-consumers (and consequentially local governance structures).

Thus, applying Bolivian governance to Spaargaren & Oosterveer’s model (2010: 1890) a second model can be created. The actors that play a role in this second model (and their respective relations to each other) have been described in short in the paragraph above, but will be explained more thoroughly in the next paragraphs. However, before going deeper into the actual meaning of these actors and concepts, it is important to create a clear overview concerning the actors, concepts, their interplay and their role in the policy making process in Bolivia. This overview can be found in the second model that shows the application of Bolivian governance to Spaargaren & Oosterveer’s model (2010: 1890). Further elaborations on the actors and concepts in this model can be found in the paragraphs corresponding with the respective actors and concepts in this model. The numbers in this model correspond with the paragraphs concerning that actor or concept.

Figure 2 – Different actors and their relationships in policy making in the production and sales of Quinoa

LOCAL GOVERNANCE 2.5 Transnational public governance 2.4 DECENTRALIZATION 2.2

TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL NETWORKS

2.3 Influece by members 2.3 - 2.6 Influence by NGOs THE STATE 2.1 2.6 Participatory governance

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19 2.1 The role of the state

The starting point of the analysis in this research will be the Bolivian state. The state is chosen as it can be argued that without the consent of the state, participatory governance could never work. This can be seen in the decisions concerning involvement of non-state actors by the state.

First of all, as Edwards, Halligan, Horrigan & Nicoll (2012: 152) argue there are different levels of involvement: From simply providing information to citizens and relevant groups, to empowering them with actual control over decisions. The state furthermore decides who to involve in the decision making processes. A state can for example decide to randomly select non-state actors in the policy making process, but it can also chose to involve those participants from groups that are otherwise less likely to be involved (for example senior citizens). Next to the level of involvement and who is to be involved in the processes, the state also decides the mechanisms of involvement. A state can for example decide to simply use informational websites and educational programs, if it only wishes to inform those involved. If it wishes to actively involve certain actors in the decision making processes, it can also have the actors participate in negotiation tables, advisory committees and even go as far as to delegate powers to local actors. Finally, the state decides when at what stage of the process the non-state actors are involved. Depending on how active a state wants to involve the non-state actors a state can decide to involve these actors in the planning,

implementation or evaluation phases of policy making (Edwards, Halligan, Horrigan & Nicoll, 2012: 152-156).

In Bolivia, the state has chosen to have (especially the indigenous) citizens actively participate in the decision making processes. As stated in the introduction, the Bolivian state recognizes and stimulates self-governed indigenous-campesino entities (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011: 13-14). As McNeish (2013: 233) argues, the Morales administration of 2005 also decided to

nationalize the natural resources as part of their proceso de cambio. Only afterwards was the power to allocate small concessions of natural resources transferred to local governments (Ribot, 2005: 98). Combining the elements above it becomes clear that participatory governance can only work with the consent of a state. This is clearly the case in Bolivia, and therefore the state is chosen as starting point for the analysis of this research.

Having defined the starting point of the analysis, it is important to elaborate on the concepts that influence this starting point. As can be seen in the table, the decentralization of natural

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20 resources is an interplay of both the state (being the starting point of the analysis) and local

governments. It is therefore important to elaborate on this concept before moving on to the other two concepts.

2.2 Decentralizing natural resources

In this research the theory of Ribot (2005) will be used to elaborate on the decentralization of natural resources. This theory is chosen as Ribot focuses mainly on developing countries including Bolivia, which makes the theory highly relevant for this research.

Almost all developing countries are currently undertaking decentralization reforms, and more interesting, many are undertaking decentralization reforms concerning natural resources (Ribot, 2005: 87). These decentralizations are mostly justified as a means to increase access, use, voice, and manage governmental claims and concerns about, and change institutional reforms for local resource management and create an institutional basis for more participatory management and use of natural resources (Ribot, 2005: 90). As argued above involving local actors into policy making improves policy outcomes, the sustainability of policies, responsiveness, accountability and efficiency.

However, according to Ribot (2005: 93) when it comes to decentralizing in the

environmental arena the transfer of power and accountable and representative local institutions are essential. He argues that currently many governments (especially environmental ministries) resist transferring appropriate and sufficient powers to local authorities, most likely due to the fear of losing economic benefits and (often vague and misguided) concerns about maintaining standards, social and environmental well-being, and political stability (Ribot, 2005: 93). Thus in order to make the decentralization of natural resources work, there are a number of key issues that need to be dealt with.

According to Ribot (2005: 96) these key issues among others concern the three basic elements of decentralization: accountability, discretionary power and security. First Ribot (2005) argues that reaching perfect accountability, even in local authorities, is impossible. Electoral

accountability for example, is strongly depended on the electoral process and the elected authorities often are more accountable for their party list than for the local population. According to Ribot (2005) however, alternative institutions (such as NGOs) often have even less systematic

accountability to the public, as they largely depend on their members. Finally, chiefs, headmen and other customary authorities also do not tend to be very democratic. As they often inherit their

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21 positions, their degree of local accountability depends on their personalities and local social and political histories. One way governments and NGOs can make sure that local authorities are accountable is by choosing to work with and build on elected local governments where they exist, insisting on and encouraging their creation elsewhere, encouraging the admittance of independent candidates in electoral processes and applying multiple accountability measures to all institutions making public decisions. Examples of these accountability measures are accessible legal recourse, separation and balance of powers in both local and central authorities, free media, public

discussions and meetings, fiscal and political transparency, local government finance through local taxation, performance-based contracts, civic education, public service and civic dedication, social movements and other forms of protest, and finally central government oversight. (Ribot, 2005: 89, 96-98)

Furthermore Ribot (2005) argues that providing discretionary powers to local authorities is essential for decentralization to work. Not only are local authorities with discretionary power able to respond flexibly to local needs and aspirations, they also give the local population a reason to engage with the state and to demand that decisions based on their needs are made. Ribot (2005) also argues that these discretionary powers that the local authorities are provided with should have significance or value to local people. Examples of such discretionary powers are mandates, however these should be sufficiently supported fiscally and technically, and they should not be the only powers given to the local authorities. Commercially valuable resource-use opportunities for example should also be transferred to the local authorities. Concerning technical decisions about natural resources, Ribot (2005) argues that they (even on a central level) should be made without influence about who should have access to the resources and who should benefit from them. Ribot (2005) also argues it is important that at each level of government attention is paid to the separation and balance of powers. Finally he argues that public resources (such as forests and pastures) should always be kept within the public sector (and not privatized). (Ribot, 2005: 99-101)

The third important aspect Ribot (2005: 102) addresses is security. He argues that for successful decentralization, powers should be transferred as secure rights. Local authorities will only invest in new arrangements and enable local people to be empowered as citizens (rather than seeing them merely as subjects) when they feel that the powers they have received are secure. Ribot (2005: 102) argues that if powers are transferred without security, it is more likely for local

authorities to overexploit natural resources as they feel their position is temporary and they thus need to gain as much as possible while they have the power. He continues by stating that the most desirable and effective way to provide security of powers is by transferring them through legislative reforms, rather than ministerial decrees or administrative orders.

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22 Next to these three important aspects of decentralization, Ribot (2005: 89) recommends that

attention should be paid to supporting equity and justice, establishing minimum environmental standards, establishing fair and accessible adjucation, supporting civil education, and developing indicators for monitoring and evaluating decentralization and its outcomes.

Finally, it is important to note that as the world keeps changing, new problems will emerge and therefore the reforms concerning the decentralization of natural resources will continue to take place. As Ribot (2005: 86) states: “In practice, an end-point of decentralization reform is never reached, since reform entails an ongoing political struggle between local and central interests”. It is therefore most important to give decentralization the time to stabilize and grow before judging it.

2.3 Governance without boundaries

The term transnationalism is currently used more often than ever. Transnational dynamics however are not new at all. Many scholars agree that transnationality is as old as the nations and national societies themselves (see Tallberg & Jönsson, 2010: 22 and Pries, 2008: 13). According to Pries however, there are four primary challenges concerning transnationalism as a research program. First, appropriate units of analysis need to be defined. Second, there is a need to measure the real empirical extent of transnational social phenomena. Third, analyses must be made about the internal structures and processes of transnational societal units as well as the interrelation between

transnational and non-transnational types of societal units of analysis. Fourth, there is a need for developing an adequate methodology and satisfactory methods for transnational research. (Pries, 2008: 2-5).

As for these challenges Pries (2008: 6-7) argues that there are three important types of international studies: Cross-national comparison, World System research and Transnational

Studies*. Each of these types has three different units with which an analysis can be made: Units of reference, units of analysis and units of measurement. A unit of reference can hereby be defined as where the research takes place, a unit of analysis can be defined as what will be researched and a

* The Cross-national comparison focuses on social phenomena within bordered nation states and national societies, whereas the World System research focuses on larger (but still bounded and bordered) regions like Europe, North America or the world as a whole. Transnational Studies on the other hand focuses on social phenomena that are without borders and/or pluri-local (Pries, 2008: 7-9)

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23 unit of measurement as concerning whom the research is done (Pries, 2008: 6). In a transnational research these units can be defined as following: Units of reference can be seen as border crossing, pluri-local, societal spaces; units of analysis as biographies, families, organizations, institutions, or identities; and units of measurement as individuals, households, rituals or flows of goods.

Khagram & Levitt (in Pries, 2008: 22-23) argue that concerning the empirical extent of

transnational social phenomena, there are five different forms of transnationalism. The first of these,

empirical, focuses on “describing, mapping, classifying and quantifying” new and important

transnational phenomena and dynamics. The second is methodological, this form focuses on reclassifying existing data, evidence, and historical and ethnographical accounts based on bounded or bordered units in order to reveal transnational processes. Thirdly, theoretical transnationalism concerns explanations and interpretations that parallel, complement supplement or are integrated into existing frameworks and accounts. The fourth is philosophical transnationalism and focuses on metaphysical assumptions that social worlds and lives are inherently transnational. The fifth form of transnationalism however is the most important one for this research. This one they call public

transnationalism and it focuses on creating space to “imagine and legitimate options for social

change and transformation that are normally obscured, by purposefully abandoning the expectation that most social processes are bound and bordered” (Khagram & Levitt, in: Pries, 2008: 23). (Khagram & Levitt, in: Pries, 2008: 22-23)

2.4 Changing the world transnationally

According to Vinnari & Tapio (2012: 46) the agricultural system has undergone significant changes during the past decades. Important in these changes is the rapid globalization of the sector.

International trade has increased more than five-fold during the last fifty years and the consumption of different foodstuffs has started to converge globally. These changes in the sector along with prospects of an ever growing population pose an unprecedented threat to the environment. (Vinnari & Tapio, 2012: 46)

As a consequence sustainability and consumerism have re-emerged on the public and

political agendas framed in a new public transnationalism paradigm. Spaargaren & Mol (2008: 350) argue that where during the 1980s and 1990s the environmental reform agenda was aimed at the

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24 productive sector, the focus is now shifting towards consumption and citizen-consumers.

Governance concerning sustainable consumption according to this new paradigm has become a complex issue because it faces a globalizing world and increasing influence of non-state actors and networks. (Spaargaren & Mol, 2008: 350)

One of the non-state actors that plays an important role in this new paradigm is the citizen-consumer. Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010: 1889) argue that in this globalizing world there are three global authorities and ideal types of political roles for citizen-consumers: Ecological citizenship, political consumerism and life(style) politics. Ecological citizenship according to Spaargaren & Oosterveer primarily refers to “the participation of citizens in, and their orientations toward, political discourses on sustainable development” (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1891). They argue that ecological citizenship is focused on environmental security, meaning that citizens demand a good quality of life in the form of a safe and clean environment for them and their children, as well as transparency and openness of information regarding major political decisions that affect their lives (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1891). According to Spaargaren &

Oosterveer (2010: 1892) post-national forms of ecological citizenship will become more important in the near future, strengthened by the upsurge in informational governance and the increase of transnational networks for environmental politics and governance.

Political consumerism is focused on the authority of the consumer, meaning that the citizen-consumer “uses his or her buying power not just to satisfy needs, but to reveal to the providers of products and services their specific ethical and political preferences as consumer” (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1892). According to Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010: 1893) the power of the consumer so far is not very significant, they are depicted as captive consumers who fall victim to the power of retailers and major companies. As a consequence the need for consumer-empowerment has increased as production and consumption chains globalized. According to Spaargaren &

Oosterveer (2010: 1893) (environmental) politics have reacted to this lack of power of the citizen-consumer with forms of politics that are directed towards upstream actors in globalized production and consumption networks and chains. They argue that political consumerism “refers to all the political forms that connect environmental activities of upstream economic actors, of production-consumption chains and networks, more directly and visibly with the interests and activities of citizen-consumers at the lower end of these chains and networks, and vice versa” (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1893). An important role in this political consumerism is that of the

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25 most often originates from environmental NGOs which try to mobilize citizen-consumers for

environmental change and helping to articulate and direct the un-focused concerns of citizen-consumers for sustainability towards providers in production and consumption chains. In this way environmental NGOs give citizen-consumers authority and power. Environmental NGOs

furthermore play a crucial role as they are regarded by citizen-consumers as the most reliable and successful trust-enhancing mediators between market actors and citizen-consumers. (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1892-1894)

Finally, life(style) politics according to Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010:1896) refers to the ways in which (groups of) individuals at some point in time (especially when confronted with sudden changes or challenges) are made to reflect on their everyday lives and narratives attached to those lives. These politics are important to sustainable consumption policies as they deal with “individual affairs without disconnecting the private and personal from the public and the global” (Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010: 1896). According to Spaargaren & Oosterveer (2010: 1896) these life(style) politics lead to a spillover effect that works both from the individual towards the public and the global, and the other way around. If for instance sustainable consumption is firmly rooted in an individual's lifestyle, he or she will be disturbed (or de-routinized) when his or her employer lacks (the promotion of) sustainable consumption. On the other hand, if an employer makes sustainable consumption available for its employees, the employees are likely to resort to sustainable

consumption in their own homes. These three ideal types thus show the importance of non-state actors as the citizen-consumer and environmental NGOs in the new paradigm regarding sustainable consumption.

In summary, it seems that the politics of sustainable consumption are moving beyond state-based environmental authority. With the rise (in importance) of transnational networks and citizen-consumers, national governments are no longer the most important player and interstate cooperation is being replaced by more complex forms of governance (Tallberg & Jönsson, 2010: 4; Spaargaren & Mol, 2008: 358). Contrary to this macro paradigm of transnationalism however, many policy makers in recent years also emphasize the importance of a micro paradigm: Effective governance for the people is made with the people.

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26 2.5 Participatory governance

The previous paragraphs argued that the rise of transnational networks and citizen-consumers are causing a decline of national government authority. However, they also influence governance on the local level. To elaborate on how transnational networks and citizen-consumers relate to

participatory governance, an elaboration of participatory governance is in order first. After elaborating on the theoretical aspects of participatory governance, the possible practical issues of this form of governance will be described. By describing the theoretical aspects and the possible issues, a link can be made as to how transnational networks relate to participatory governance.

Many policy scientists agree that in recent years policy makers have shifted their focus from a top-down, managerial form of policy making to a focus outside of governments towards citizens (for example: Edwards, Halligan, Horrigan & Nicoll, 2012; Lee, 2013; Speer, 2012; Andersson & van Laerhoven, 2007). Possible reasons for this change in focus are a decline in trust of citizens in the public sector organizations along with rising expectations of being consulted, the emergence of more complex policy problems that governments are unable to resolve on their own, unintended consequences of public sector reforms embedded is New Public Management and the rise in importance of ICT.

As a consequence, many policy makers now feel the need for collaborative relationships with (groups of) citizens, that (groups of) citizens need to be encouraged to share responsibilities, disseminate information to better inform discussions and to seek opportunities to involve (groups of) citizens in government activities. Going so far as to allow citizens to reframe issues that have been set for discussion and even letting non-governmental players initiate agendas. (Edwards, et al., 2012: 151, 157). This theory of creating effective governance with the people is called participatory

governance.

Participatory governance mechanisms aim to facilitate the participation of ordinary citizens in the public policy process, by involving citizens in the decision-making over the distribution of public funds, the design of public policies and monitoring and evaluating government spending (Andersson & van Laerhoven, 2007:1090; Speer, 2012: 2379). Thus it engages people affected by a problem in the process of solving it (Lee, 2013: 405). By involving ordinary citizens in this process, participatory governance increases institutional accountability, empowers marginalized groups, improves policy outcomes, furthers democratic ideals of self-determination and equality, improves the sustainability of public service delivery (Lee, 2013: 405; Speer. 2012; 2379). In short, successful participatory governance should make government institutions more accountable, legitimate, and responsive (Gaventa, 2004 in: Speer, 2012: 2380).

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27 Concluding Ackerman (2004: 459) argues that successful participatory governance can be achieved through involving citizens in an as early as possible stage, stimulating the participation of society, institutionalizing the civil involvement in formal legal structures and decentralizing the government while its center remains responsible for the supervision and coordination of activities in the local units. However, the aspects described in this paragraph are mostly theoretical ideals that do not always work in practice. The next paragraph will therefore explore some of the possible

practical issues with participatory governance.

2.6 Practical issues of participatory governance

The previous paragraph has shown the theoretical aspects of participatory governance. However, as often the case in the world of governance, the practical side often differs from these theoretical ideals. This paragraph will elaborate on some of the possible practical issues of participatory governance. After explaining these issues and combining them with the theoretical ideals described in the previous paragraph

Although having the ordinary citizens influence policy decisions in theory has a positive effect on the effectiveness of the implementation of these decisions, there is still a lot of criticism on the practical side of participatory governance. A number of scholars for example fear that

participatory governance might have outcomes that are the opposite of its aims. There is for example the issue of active participation. The OECD (2001: 12) defines active participation as:

“... a relation based on partnership with the government, in which citizens actively engage in defining the process and content of policy making. It acknowledges equal standings for citizens in setting the agenda, proposing policy options and shaping the policy dialogue – although the responsibility for the final decision or policy formulation rests with the government”.

Scholars argue that although providing citizens with information and consulting with them, there is often too little use of active participation. For example, in practice often the poor citizens do not represent themselves, but are represented by proxies. On the one hand these proxies reduce costs and logistical challenges of direct participation. On the other hand these proxies often lack the “... direct experience that [citizens] offer, they may not adequately represent the [citizen's] interests, are susceptible to co-optation and acquiescence, and can even be less inclusive and less broadly accountable than the government” (Lee, 2013: 429).

Furthermore, although mobilizing large numbers most likely leads to more political power, actually mobilizing citizens to participate is easier said than done. As Lee (2013: 430) argues:

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28 “More direct support for mobilization as a means of convincing participants of the value that

marginalized stakeholders bring to the table would include funding and training for organizing efforts”, thus effective mobilization often takes significant time and money.

Also, bringing in multiple (non-governmental) actors increases the complexity of the already complex accountability issue. For with a great number of actors involved, who is accountable in the end?

Concluding the positive effects participatory governance claims to achieve can only be achieved once a number of important barriers are overcome. Motivating citizens to participate, finding an answer to the accountability issue, making sure the input of citizens is taken seriously (and integrated in policies), these are all issues that have to be resolved in order for participatory governance to work. However, once these issues are resolved, participatory governance can make government institutions more accountable, legitimate and responsive. In this research participatory governance is therefore perceived as a future form of effective governance, if its negative effects can be reduced. As Speer (2012: 2385) concludes:

“... it is implement successfully in developing country contexts. Yet, most of the studies that have been conducted in … developing country contexts come to the conclusion that it will be a long and protracted process to enable and motivate civil society actors and public officials to engage effectively in participatory governance arrangements. This requires among other things increasing the density of civil society and the capacity of citizens to engage in public discourse, reducing poverty and motivating central governments to support participatory governance actively”.

Combining the previous two paragraphs with the earlier paragraphs concerning transnational networks and citizen-consumers a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, as argued in the paragraphs concerning transnational networks and citizen-consumers, there is a trend towards ethical consumption and an increased concern regarding the environment among citizen-consumers. As also argued in these paragraphs, the transnational networks (and especially environmental NGOs) both give the citizen-consumers power and are perceived as the most reliable and successful in mediating with market actors. Part of this support of transnational networks to citizen-consumers is through informing and focusing the concerns of the citizen-consumers. Second, the paragraphs concerning participatory governance argued that the role of the citizens within policy making processes is growing. Although there still are practical issues with participatory governance, this form of governance is growing in importance.

Combining these two conclusions provides an insight in the relationship between transnational networks and participatory governance: The role of citizens, and consequential

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