Peaceful security doctrines in erosion: An analysis of the underlying reasons for a paradigm shift in the interpretation of Austria’s neutrality and Japan’s pacifism since the early 1990s

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Peaceful security doctrines in erosion

An analysis of the underlying reasons for a paradigm shift in the

interpretation of Austria’s neutrality and Japan’s pacifism since the

early 1990s

Master Thesis

Written by: Fabian Sommavilla

Student Number: s1734199

Supervised by: Dr. M. de Haas

2

nd

Reader: Prof. Dr. E. Bakker

Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

MSc Crisis and Security Management

May 31, 2016

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Abstract

In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious Allied forces imposed peaceful security doctrines on the countries of Austria and Japan as a result of their hostile behaviour prior to and during the conflict. Japan’s pacifism and Austria’s neutrality have so far effectively prevented the countries from actively engaging in military warfare. The public in both countries additionally attests these peaceful security doctrines to be the most important reason for their economic growth and their persistent peace throughout the Cold War decades. These developments were, however, only possible due to the direct/indirect security guarantees provided by the Cold War superpowers, most notably the U.S. The breakdown of the Soviet Union, along with the end of the Cold War then not only changed the international system as we knew it from a bipolar one into a unipolar one, but also turned out to be a vital turning point for the countries’ peaceful security doctrines. As soon as the Cold War contestation was over, the countries were to an extent deprived of their post-war security strategies. Due to the cessation of the conflict Austria’s importance as an arbitrator declined and the U.S. showed considerably less interest in solely guaranteeing for Japan’s security, a country which struggled with domestic economic problems at the time. In order to further ensure national security and economic prosperity the two countries had to change their security strategy. Austria henceforth actively sought economic and political integration within the European Union and Japan strengthened its international profile by engaging more actively in United Nations peacekeeping efforts and expanding its military cooperation with the U.S. The peaceful security doctrines thereby acted as an obstacle in both countries’ endeavours to further integrate themselves within the alliance with their respective referent states. The countries’ political elites were therefore willing to erode their peaceful security doctrines for the sake of their national security. Social Identity Theory (SIT) defined the countries’ security policies during the Cold War period as a mode of ‘social creativity’. A gradual erosion of the respective peaceful security doctrines then accompanied the switch to a mode of ‘social mobility’ during the early 1990s. SIT explains this shift with the political elites’ comparison with other states. As they perceived their countries’ status negatively and national security to be at risk, they decided to follow this mode of social mobility, thereby mirroring the practices of their respective referent state in order to elevate their position within the international arena of nation states. By looking at the two cases through the lens of SIT it was possible to highlight a series of commonalities in the recent developments and also to eradicate certain grey areas in the comprehension of the security policy change of the countries.

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List of Images, Tables and Figures

Front Page: Street art, official artist and title unknown. Attributed to the artist Banksy……….. 1

Table 1: The main current parties in Austria and their views on important issues concerning neutrality………... 47

Table 2: Important Treaties and Laws contributing to the erosion of neutrality ………. 47

Figure 1: Real GDP of Japan from 1880 until 1995 ……… 57

Table 3: The main parties in the Japanese party system and their position on various issues…. 74 Table 4: Timeline of important Treaties and Laws contributing to the erosion of pacifism... 74

Table 5: Comprehensive summary of the reasons for an eroding Austrian neutrality ………… 87

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1. Introduction

1.1. Austrian and Japanese peaceful security doctrines on the move

World War II has been over for more than seven decades now, but we can still feel its effects on world politics on a daily basis. The United Nations, nuclear weapons proliferation, the project of European Integration culminating in the European Union (EU) or the Israel-Palestine conflict are only a few developments that have occurred as a direct or indirect consequence of the most devastating armed conflict in human history. This short list of some of World War II’s consequences has already highlighted that even the most hostile conflict in human history has not resulted in the desired absolute abolition of war, even though pacifist movements have gained a considerable impetus in the following years. The Allied forces1, having emerged victorious from World War II, together with other countries of the world tried to diminish the prospects of warfare in the aftermath of World War II, most notably by the creation of the United Nations (UN). The UN charter in its preamble states that the countries have determined “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind” (UN Charter, 1945, preamble). Given this rediscovered devotion to peace, after the idea was already unsuccessfully introduced in the interwar-peace project of the League of Nations, it was only logical to pay special attention to some of the most aggressive powers of the World War II confrontation. Apart from the obvious special attention dedicated to Germany, the Allied powers also attempted to bring the major war allies of Nazi-Germany onto a peaceful post-war route.

Austria and Japan were two such countries and they also constitute the focus of this master thesis. After the end of the Second World War, the Allied forces imposed two rather different, but in their ultimate purpose similar, peaceful security doctrines on the two countries. The security doctrines should prevent the countries from actively engaging in war. And both countries have indeed not engaged in any direct military aggression since then. The peaceful security doctrines obtained and pursued by the countries were, however, anything but consistent in their interpretation until now. National, regional and international developments had a decisive impact on both doctrines and are widely perceived to have resulted in an

1

The Allied forces, meaning the main opposition of the German-led Axis powers during World War II, grew increasingly throughout the war and were comprised of a vast group of countries. When speaking of the Allied powers or forces one in general usually refers to the leading nations within this group, France, Great Britain, China (fighting Japan in Asia), the Soviet Union and the U.S.

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erosion of these very doctrines (Baumann, 2015; Matsumura, 2015). Although these erosions may not necessarily result in aggressive behaviour of any of the countries on the foreign policy front, these erosions certainly have a lasting effect on the countries’ regional security policies and ultimately their region’s security. It is therefore of the highest importance to critically reflect on these developments in an academic manner and even more important to understand why these changes came about. This thesis will try to solve this puzzle. In order to comprehend the recent developments in a comprehensive manner, a series of sub-questions, mentioned in paragraph 1.3. will accompany the following guiding research question of this thesis.

1.2. Research question

Why have the peaceful security doctrines, imposed upon Austria and Japan after their defeat in World War II, undergone a serious erosion of both Austrian neutrality and Japanese pacifism since the early 1990s?

1.3. Sub-questions

• How did the peaceful security doctrines come about in the first place?

• What were the consequences of the peaceful security doctrines for the countries’ social-economic status during the Cold War?

• When and how did the erosions of the peaceful security doctrines take place? • How does Social Identity Theory explain these erosions?

1.4. Academic and Societal Relevance

The case studies presented in this thesis will demonstrate that the peaceful security doctrines in both countries are in fact not as peaceful anymore as they were initially meant to be. Major reasons for such a development were the countries’ considerations in terms of their national security and survival. The link with Crisis and Security Management is thus depicted by this thesis’ focus on the highest possible kind of security management a country can pursue, its quest for national security. Additionally, if public administration is seen as “the study of government decision making, the analysis of the policies themselves, the various inputs that have produced them, and the inputs necessary to produce alternative policies” (McKinney &

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Howard, 1998, p. 62), the link with this thesis is clear. This thesis will repeatedly highlight that the foreign and security policies of the countries depicted, were decisively influenced by various inputs of a series of external and internal circumstances, forcing the countries to produce an alternative security policy strategy.

The societal dimensions of these recent erosions are not always clearly recognizable for the broad public. While the Austrian aspirations to pursue further European integration have had some significant implications, such as a single currency, jointly elected institutions and the free movement of persons, the positive spin-offs on the Japanese side are less clearly evident to the public. It is, however, undisputed that both countries have greatly benefitted from these developments from an economic perspective. Nevertheless, it is also undisputed that both peaceful security doctrines still enjoy great popularity in both countries. The recent erosions of these doctrines thus consequentially not only affect society in both countries, but also in neighbouring and geographically as well as ideologically close countries. It needs to be highlighted that an eroding peaceful security doctrine does not necessarily lead to an increasing readiness to use violence or force by a country, but this thesis will highlight how eroding peaceful security doctrines and political and military alliances reinforced certain dependencies that potentially have the power to unwillingly drag these peaceful countries into conflicts. While a peace-loving attitude alone, would therefore necessitate a closer look into every case that shows signs of less peaceful behaviour, be it among civil groups, political parties or other states, it also has to be justified why this thesis focuses on the two countries of Austria and Japan for an analysis of an erosion of peaceful security doctrines.

1.5. More similar than different

Even though interstate conflicts are in gradual decline ever since the end of World War II, states are still the dominant players within the international arena, which is, not least, underpinned by the importance of the UN and the UN Security Council for progress in international conflicts (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p. 195). States also still play a decisive role in many other types of conflicts, be it in civil or intrastate wars, or other forms of warfare, such as the so-called ‘new wars’, fighting transnational criminal or terrorist organisations (Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 195-197). Austria and Japan both regained their national sovereignty, in 1955 and 1952 respectively, after having faced Allied Occupation in the aftermath of World War II and both countries also were allowed to accede to the UN shortly

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afterwards. At least since their accession to the UN, Austria in 1955 and Japan in 1956, the countries were fully recognised at the international stage again. And while all members within the UN are usually seen as equal2, they are of course rather different in reality. Austria and Japan are also different in many aspects. Japan is with an approximate 378.000 km2 almost 4,5 times bigger than Austria with its 84.000 km2 in terms of territory size (The World Factbook, n.d.). Japan has 126,9 million inhabitants and its population is therefore more than 14 times bigger than Austria’s with its 8.7 million inhabitants (The World Factbook, n.d.). Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices3 in 2014 was $ 4.602 billion and therefore more than ten times higher than Austria’s GDP with $ 437 billion (The World Bank, n.d. a). And lastly, Japan’s military spending totalled up to $ 40,9 billion in 2015, whereas Austria merely spent $ 3,2 billion in 2014, less than a tenth of Japan (The World Bank, n.d. b; SIPRI, 2016).

When looking at these figures one might get the impression that the two countries are in fact everything but comparable. There are, however, also a series of figures, but more importantly also internal and external developments, that paint a rather different picture. They demonstrate that Austria and Japan are more alike than one would expect, especially when it comes to issues surrounding their peaceful security doctrines. The case studies as well as the comparison and the analysis will highlight how both countries’ ways towards regaining national sovereignty, their economic growth during the Cold War, their political elites’ decisions concerning the peaceful security doctrines and their publics’ opinions about these peaceful security doctrines are only a few developments where a series of commonalities exist. Matsuoka (2003) also highlighted a series of developments in the countries that show how they clearly resemble each other, such as their wartime past and their lack of historical reappraisal (Matsuoka, 2003, pp. 21-25; 45-49). Looking at all these developments through the lens of Social Identity Theory (SIT), will underscore the comparability of these developments even more. It demonstrates an even greater resemblance between the countries in terms of the erosions of their peaceful security doctrines in past decades, thus making the countries most similar cases. This will also help to eradicate grey areas in the field of

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Within the UN General Assembly member states are seen as equal, according to the one-country-one-vote principal. The UN Security Council on the other hand, as a relict of the Allied forces’ victory in World War II, must be regarded as a rather unequal elite club of nations, despite the fact that a series of non-permanent members are regularly chosen to have a seat at the table. Nevertheless the veto power of the five permanent members clearly outweighs the non-permanent members’ importance.

3_{GDP at market prices in current US$, “is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the}

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International Relations and Security Studies that have so far not come up with a fully satisfactory explanation for these policy changes, let alone recurring patterns on the way towards less peaceful security doctrines of countries. Chapter 3.1. will further elaborate on this matter.

1.6. Body of knowledge and knowledge gap

Due to the great importance of the trans-pacific partnership between the United States of America (hereafter U.S.) and Japan there is already a great amount of literature on this relationship, but also on Japan’s Cold War economic boom. Funaiole (2015) highlighted how “China’s emergence as a global power has come at the expense of Japan’s position within the regional power hierarchy” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 362), accompanied by a decline in academic literature on Japan in recent years. Austria’s role in this respect is rather limited anyway. Austria’s security policy was seldom a topic addressed by scholars outside of Austria. The actual erosions of their respective security doctrine, taking place in both countries, were nevertheless extensively discussed by academics from both, a political as well as a legal perspective (Fisher, 1999; Luif, 2016; Öhlinger, 2014; Pence, 2006; Ramchandani, 2013; Schöpfer, 2015). Nonetheless, few of these approaches did succeed in depicting an overall theoretically satisfactory justification for these erosions. Funaiole (2015) predicted such a further erosion of pacifism in Japan in his work on ‘Conceptualizing Japan’s Foreign Policy Trajectory Through Social Identity Theory’ by adapting and incorporating Social Identity Theory. Larson and Shevchenko (2010) used SIT even earlier to understand foreign policy behaviour of states. Nevertheless, using SIT purposefully to analyse peaceful security doctrines has, despite being touched upon by Funaiole (2015), not yet been satisfactorily exercised by anyone. A study comparing the recent erosions in Japan and Austria has also never been done. This thesis therefore aims at filling this knowledge gap and thereby hopes to attain further insight in why the two countries decided to deviate from their peaceful security doctrines, and why others might follow in their footsteps in the future.

1.7. Reading guide

It is thus the ultimate goal of this thesis to understand what made these policy changes regarding the peaceful security doctrines in the countries come about. In order to do so chapter 2 will first outline the methodology used to tackle the problem and explain why a

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Multiple-Case Replication Design was chosen for this thesis. Chapter 3 lays the theoretical groundwork for the adaptation of Social Identity Theory for the two cases presented in this thesis. The first of the two cases is outlined in chapter 4, investigating the Austrian foreign and security policies since World War II, with a specific focus on the changing peaceful security doctrine of neutrality since the early 1990s. This is followed by the case investigating similar dynamics in Japan. Chapter 5 thus represents the case study dealing with an erosion of Japanese pacifism. Chapter 6 includes a comparison of the two cases along six different lines as well as an analysis of the cases through the lens of SIT. Chapters 7 and 8, building the Conclusion and Discussion respectively, contain the answer to the research question as well as the sub-questions, and a critical discussion of the implications of the conclusion.

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2. Methodology

2.1. Case Study Design and Case Selection

The case study design chosen for this thesis is closest to a Multiple-Case Replication Design. Similar to replications of experiments this design aims at finding commonalities in results between two cases, by testing whether similar findings occur in a most-similar case. Funaiole (2015) has developed a rich theoretical framework in his essay on Japan’s foreign policy trajectory, which is an important step for a replication design to produce satisfactory results (Funaiole, 2015; Yin, 2009, p. 54). Funaiole’s work, however, focused on Japan’s foreign policy trajectory in general whereas it is the aim of this thesis to look in close detail into the erosions of the peaceful security doctrines of countries. The respective peaceful security doctrine, in the Austrian case depicted by its ‘neutrality’, in the Japanese case depicted by its ‘pacifism’, is therefore the unit of analysis of this thesis. For this reason I decided to refine and deepen both Funaiole’s theoretical framework and his work on Japan, especially as the most severe erosion to Japan’s peaceful security doctrine occurred after the publication of his article. In order to replicate the significant findings within his and also my research, I set out to find a “literal replication” (Yin, 2009, p. 54), a case where it was likely to find a similar development as in Japan. The most fitting case therefore had to be selected. Most fitting in this regard means that the case should fit the replication design at the best possible rate (Yin, 2009, p. 91). The decision not to look at more than two cases for this Multiple-Case Replication Design was taken due to feasibility issues, as it would not have allowed such an in-depth analysis as envisaged within the scope of this thesis. Taking ‘only’ two cases is also justified if the “theory is straightforward” (Yin, 2009, p. 58) and robust. I attest my theoretical framework these attributes.

The decision to examine the recent erosions in Japan’s peaceful security doctrine in great detail within the first case was rather easy and clear as Funaiole’s (2015) work built a solid basis for the thesis and therefore also a suitable case (Funaiole, 2015). Japan has also represented the most prominent case of a country with a peaceful security doctrine for a long time, which further justifies its selection. A series of laws, introduced in late 2015, which depicted the most serious erosions of Japan’s pacifist doctrine so far, attracted not only international, but also my personal attention in late 2015, especially after my visit to Japan in summer 2015. Since then it has been my personal intention to also examine the erosion of

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peaceful security doctrines in other countries that were defeated in World War II. The eligibility criteria for the second case were thus rather limited. Austria was insofar a logical choice for me as an Austrian citizen, as I did not only closely recognise and follow the recent erosions taking place in Austria, another prominent peaceful country of the post-war period, but also because I could easily access and understand all the relevant documents. Additionally, I was able to easily get in touch with relevant experts, academics and politicians for background interviews and discussions. Having a solid foundation of knowledge about a case before examining it, is seen as a clear advantage and therefore made a screening for a possible second case easy, as I already knew where to gain the relevant information from (Yin, 2009, p. 91). Last but not least, I was of course also very interested in understanding the recent developments in my home country. A quick screening of the aforementioned commonalities of the two countries, allowing the necessary replication and comparability quickly produced satisfying results, for which reason I decided to pick these two cases.

The overall rationale for choosing this Multiple-Case Replication Design was also substantiated by the conviction that “prior knowledge of the outcomes” (Yin, 2009, p. 59) was greatly given, “with the multiple-case enquiry focusing on how and why the exemplary outcomes might have occurred” (Yin, 2009, p. 59). The design is therefore fully in line with my research question as well as my sub-questions, focusing on why and how these recent erosions have occurred in the two countries.

2.2. Data collection and Analysis

For the data collection I used three of the “six commonly used sources of case study evidence” (Yin, 2009, p. 113), namely documents, archival records and interviews, to benefit from a greater validity of results due to “data triangulation” (Yin, 2009, p. 116). This triangulation, using multiple different data sources is “a major strength of case study data collection” (Yin, 2009, p. 114). The ‘documents’ used in this thesis included, inter alia, government strategy papers, various pamphlets of politicians and news articles. I also heavily relied on ‘archival records’, such as treaties, public survey data and budget records from the countries. Additionally, I relied on ‘interviews’, mostly being conducted in the form of confidential background discussions and interviews due to discretion issues of diplomatic personnel, but also one on-the-record interview with my former University professor Dr. Reinhold Gärtner on January 12, 2016 about the Austrian foreign policy trajectory since

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World War II and the Austrian identity as well as its political party system. Three other background interviews were held with both Austrian and Japanese diplomatic personnel about the respective country’s foreign policy endeavours in the past and the present. One of the interviews took place in The Hague on February 8, 2016, two of them were held in Vienna on January 16, 2016, all of them being made possible due to personal connections stemming from my time as an intern in both an Austrian and a U.S. embassy. These, however, were more important for my personal overall understanding of the matter than for actual empirical findings or the analysis. The triangulation of data sources allowed not only to get a more comprehensive and more sophisticated picture of the developments in the countries, but also increased the validity of the results. In general I used a historic approach somehow, depicting the historical background first in each case, as it is in my opinion crucial in both cases to comprehend this time period in order to fully understand the recent developments, especially the change in the countries’ security policy. As an erosion is a gradual process it was only logical to highlight the enlarging extent of the erosion by means of a temporal axis, demonstrating how, why and by whom the countries were pressured to erode their peaceful security doctrines.

The analysis of the cases, where I compared the two cases along six different lines and analysed them in the light of the theoretical framework, applying Social Identity Theory (SIT), comes closest to Yin’s technique of a ‘logic model’ (Yin, 2009, p. 149). This logic model “deliberately stipulates a complex chain of events over an extended period of time” (Yin, 2009, p. 149), which is in line with my historical approach of looking into what kind of events triggered a certain kind of behaviour of the countries’ political elite. Using SIT I tried to match “empirically observed events to theoretically predicted events” (Yin, 2009, p. 149). SIT was thereby definitely the key to fully understand the developments in a comprehensive manner as will be shown in the analysis.

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3. Theoretical framework

3.1. The inappropriateness of grand theories

In order to be able to find out how Japanese pacifism and Austrian neutrality have changed since the early 1990s, and also to be able to explain why these changes came about, a theoretical framework is needed that is able to cope with the complexity and also the inconsistency that can be found in both foreign and security policy behaviours of the two countries in recent years (Funaiole, 2015, p. 363; Plassnik, 2013, p. 55). It will be highlighted in the case studies how these fluctuations in the behaviour are owed to both, internal factors, such as economic (in)stability or domestic politics, and external factors such as the breakdown of the Soviet Union or other geopolitical trends on the respective continents. Nevertheless many of the major theories of International Relations have serious difficulties in explaining alternating state behaviour on the foreign policy front over long periods of time, as was highlighted in various chapters on the different ‘big theories’ in Frank Schimmelfennig’s introductory work on International Relations ‘Internationale Politik’ (Schimmelfennig, 2008).

In his paper on ‘Conceptualizing Japan’s Foreign Policy Trajectory Through Social Identity Theory’ (Funaiole, 2015) Matthew P. Funaiole tried to go a different way and attempted to tackle the issue of alternating foreign policy behaviour by using a very scarcely used approach in the field. He also highlighted how the big theories of International Relations, such as Realism, Constructivism or Liberalism are only helpful to explain short periods of recent Japanese history, none of them, however, are able to fully interpret Japanese foreign and security policy behaviour since World War II consistently (Funaiole, 2015, pp. 362-363). Funaiole therefore tried to solve this problem by “employing insights from social psychology to bolster International Relations literature” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 363). Social Identity Theory (SIT) thereby functioned as his ‘weapon of choice’ to tackle the problem and should play the social psychological part of Funaiole’s fusion of concepts. This was especially helpful as Social Identity Theory is said to strongly emphasise this linkage of internal and external factors (Haslam, 2004 in Funaiole, 2015, p. 364), which will also be of great importance for this master thesis and therefore justifies a closer look into the theory.

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3.2. Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory (SIT) is a well-established and frequently used theory and tool in Social Psychology and was first introduced by Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner in 1986 in their work on ‘The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). At the core of the concept of Social Identity Theory (SIT) lies the assumption that social identity is capable of explaining intergroup behaviour (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Tajfel and Turner highlight how every human being is part of different social groups throughout one’s life, whereby it is not necessarily important whether it is a social group one was born into, like for example citizenship or race, or a social group one deliberately chose to be in, such as a sports-team or an occupation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, pp. 8-9). Tajfel and Turner call members of such a group the so-called “in-group” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 21).

Their main findings were a result of previously held minimal-group experiments (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971). In these experiments Tajfel demonstrated that when being randomly split into different groups, people promptly developed a certain kind of group identity next to the already existing personal identity. Test persons were continuously promoting their own in-group and favouring an outcome in which they could maximise the difference between in-group and out-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 in Funaiole, 2015, p. 364). These results mean “people are motivated to seek positive social identity by comparing in-groups favourably with out-groups” (Turner & Oakes, 1986, p. 4). Interestingly the studies also showed how people derive their positive self-esteem not only from evaluating the own group positively (in-group favouritism) but also from discrediting the other one (out-group discrimination), which goes in accordance with people favouring relative over absolute gains for their personal in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 16). The aforementioned principles of people aiming for positive results in general, and thereby aiming to be better than the relevant opposite group, can be seen as the first and second of the three principles characterising human behaviour in groups respectively, according to Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 16). The third principle, which constitutes that if “social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 16), is of special interest for this thesis and for understanding countries’ foreign and security policy behaviour, as we will see later.

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As of now it is primarily important to highlight what these key findings mean for the actual implementation of Social Identity Theory. Funaiole highlights how the aforementioned in-group favouritism is said to have real and distinctive effects in social behaviour (Funaiole, 2015, p. 364). As the status, a group finds itself in, is of utter importance for the group’s self-perception, for the group’s self-esteem and lastly also for the group’s identity, groups very often feel the need to improve their position (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 70). However, whereas “status is based on a group’s standing on some trait valued by society” (van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 1993 in Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 69) and status is also considered a “positional good, meaning that one group’s status can improve only if another’s declines” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 69), SIT introduces insofar a decisive modification, as it objects this simple “zero-sum conception by pointing out that groups have multiple traits on which to be evaluated, so that comparisons among them need not be competitive” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 69). Nevertheless, groups regularly strive for so-called positive distinctiveness, meaning that they do not only want to be different than other groups, but also better (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 68). Funaiole (2015) highlighted how these preconditions for intergroup comparison are especially given for states within an anarchical international system (Funaiole, 2015, p. 364). States, each of them building an own kind of group themselves, are therefore prone to assessing their identity negatively and trying to enhance their status whenever they feel that they could strengthen their position within the international community (Funaiole, 2015, p. 364). It will be highlighted in the case studies how this was also the case for Japan and Austria, but first it is necessary to point out what qualifies Social Identity Theory in explaining the changes that have occurred in Japanese and Austrian foreign policy.

3.3. Groupism and the added value of Neoclassical Realism and Social Constructivism

Social Identity Theory “is a group-centric theory that is sensitive to external forces and yields considerable insight on the variables that affect foreign policy” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 365). In terms of the insights from the International Relations literature for his adaptation of Social Identity Theory, Funaiole heavily relied on the well-developed theories of Neoclassical Realism and Constructivism, inspired by the works of some of the most renowned authors of the fields such as Peter J. Katzenstein (1996) or Alexander Wendt (1992) respectively (Funaiole, 2015, p. 365). For Funaiole, humans are “fundamentally social creatures who are

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compelled to compete in groups” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 365). Aspects of groupism can be found in both of these key International Relations theories. He therefore defines groupism as “the tendency of individuals to form into groups and depend upon these groups for material and subjective resources” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 365). Next to groupism, egoism and power-centrism are the other main aspects highlighting a realist view of the world (Wohlforth, 2012 in Funaiole, 2015, p. 365).

Funaiole (2015) does not want to combine SIT with a merely realist approach, but rather aims to incorporate Constructivism as well, which also makes a lot of sense because other scholars, such as Alden and Aran have highlighted the added value of both theories in understanding foreign policy behaviour and even more importantly, also foreign policy change of countries (Alden & Aran, 2012, pp. 116–118). Constructivist approaches thereby show their effectiveness in explaining why state elites believe foreign policy change to be inevitable in order to avert negative outcomes (Alden & Aran, 2012, p. 93), which is why Chris Alden and Amnon Aran (2012) have argued for such an inclusion of constructivist theories in Foreign Policy Analysis, especially in terms of foreign policy change (Alden & Aran, 2012, p. 110). “Neoclassical realism’s integration of ‘intervening variables’ such as the role of perception, the role of leadership and domestic structures found within particular state actors as an explanatory source for diversity” (Alden & Aran, 2012, p. 117) of foreign policy outcomes thereby clearly highlight this theory’s added value to the overall complex act of defining a country’s foreign and security policy strategy.

For this reason two very important adaptations have to be made to the realist view of the classic resource-allocation puzzle. Taliaferro highlights how a country’s political elites’ and leaders’ “perceptions and calculations of relative power and prestige” (Taliaferro, 2006 in Funaiole, 2015, p. 365) are essential to determine actual state behaviour. The constructivist idea of the importance of “social factors, such as the collective identity of a state or the perception of political elites” (Wendt, 1992 in Funaiole, 2015, p. 365) is equally important. The political elite within a country must therefore “filter and interpret the pressures of the international system before crafting foreign policy” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366). The close interplay of neoclassical realism, constructivism and SIT is also clearly visible when Funaiole clarifies, how “realist notions of self-interest are constructed by the perception of state elites, which are in turn [.] beholden to the collective identity and norms of the state” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366).

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3.4. The fusion of the theories

Funaiole (2015) argues that there exists a need to compensate the lack of preciseness that is present in defining the clear “boundaries for identities or the exact degree to which identities influence the foreign policy apparatus of a particular state” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366). For him this is the point where Social Identity Theory comes back into play.

“The prevalence of in-group favoritism and intergroup comparison noted in SIT are essential to understanding how state elites formulate foreign policy strategies. States are themselves a type of group, and the leaders of state-groups are the policy elites charged with fortifying state security. However, the perception of those leaders determines how security is conceptualized and the foreign policy strategy pursued.” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366)

This is the point where Social Identity Theory and foreign policy behaviour come together. We have learnt so far how people tend to behave when finding themselves in groups and we have also found out about the beneficial input of the theories of Neoclassical Realism and Social Constructivism. We do, however, still lack an answer to the question how states, depicting a distinctive group of their own, behave if their current social identity within the international system is perceived as unsatisfactory. Tajfel and Turner (1986) have highlighted that “individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 16). States are not any different in this regard. By “conceptualizing states as groups within the vocabulary of SIT” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366), Funaiole points out that states want to redefine their position as well, by choosing one of the three modes previously ascribed to group behaviour by Tajfel and Turner; social mobility, social comparison or social creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, pp. 19-20). Funaiole’s state-adapted version of Tajfel and Turner’s work therefore looks like the following:

“1. Social mobility is when a state seeks to elevate its position within the international system by mirroring the practices of a successful referent state.

2. Social competition occurs when a state attempts to equal or eclipse a dominant state(s) by challenging their superiority.

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3. Social creativity is a re-imagining of the power hierarchy by a subordinate state with the intent of achieving recognition in an alternate domain that does not challenge the dominant state(s).” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366)

Although a more detailed description of the three modes will follow later, Larson and Shevchenko (2010) sum them up coherently and succinctly when they argue that states “may improve their status by joining elite clubs, trying to best the dominant states, or achieving preeminence outside the arena of geopolitical competition” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 67).

It is important to know that each of the strategies outlined above “necessitates the identification of a referent group that provides each state with an external benchmark for comparing itself” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 367), thereby once again highlighting the added value of neoclassical realism and constructivism. Foreign policy “enables states to interact with external forces (as realists emphasize) and, therefore, necessitates the presence of some external other-group or state (as constructivists suggest)” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 367). Interstate relations may therefore also be seen as a form of social interaction like it is taking place between two small local groups, albeit of course being followed by results of greater impact for society and the international community. It is important to highlight once more that foreign policy behaviour of states, does not emerge in isolation or out of the blue, but rather it is the result of a comparison of states on the international stage and the friction that arises as a result of it. One could even argue that this friction produces a certain foreign policy behaviour in the first place (Funaiole, 2015, p. 367). The added value of SIT therefore lies in giving insight in this continued process of comparison (Funaiole, 2015, p. 367).

3.5. The three modes of social behaviour of states

3.5.1. Social mobility

“Social mobility is when a state seeks to elevate its position within the international system by mirroring the practices of a successful referent state” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366). Some sort of ‘personal’ social mobility does in fact occur millions of times a day around the world, in fact everyone can think of a time when he or she tried to act in a certain way just to belong to a certain kind of group, be it the cool kids on the school bus or a social or political movement. On the state-level, social mobility is not too different. Smaller- and medium-sized states (in

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terms of their political, military, economic and social power) regularly “adopt the political and economic norms of the dominant powers to be admitted to more prestigious institutions or clubs” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 71). Examples of such institutions and clubs include, inter alia, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

While this mode of state behaviour may be especially true for relative young states in their quest for gaining international recognition, it is undoubtedly true that new elite clubs and organizations are being founded almost every year, building ever new incentives to join such clubs even for well-established states. Putting it in very simple words one might even say that small- and medium-sized states are trying to ride in the slipstream of the big states. An “emulation of the institutions, values, or ideology of the dominant states” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 72) by states seeking social mobility is thereby as likely as are states’ leaders’ different efforts to fortify the “goal of joining a more elite organization or club as proof of higher status” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 71). Japan and Austria have both switched to such an approach at some point during the 1990s; Austria when they were advancing towards the EU accession, emulating their successful referent state Germany; Japan did so when they were becoming more actively engaged in international and multilateral forums such as the United Nations, but also when the military alliance with the U.S. became gradually stronger, thereby constantly emulating the successful referent state.

3.5.2. Social competition

“Social competition occurs when a state attempts to equal or eclipse a dominant state(s) by challenging their superiority” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366). This social mode may look similar to the low-level form of everyday social competition in sports competitions or market dynamics, if for example two companies with the same product are fighting to achieve market dominance. It is actually slightly different though, as pursuing social competition in the social psychological sense and also in the state-centred approach by Funaiole, is rather seen as a result of a non-achievement of social mobility. “If elite group boundaries are impermeable to new members, the lower-status group may strive for equal or superior status through a strategy of social competition” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 72).

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The classical example on the state-level for social competition may constitute the Soviet Union’s challenging of the United States (and the whole Western world) during the Cold War in the second half of the twentieth century (Funaiole, 2015, p. 367). Another historic example would be Japan’s turn to “imperialism in the 1930s after the failure of the Meiji-era social mobility strategy of emulating the values and institutions of Western powers” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 72). “Indicators of social competition include arms racing, rivalry over spheres of influence, military demonstrations aimed at one-upmanship, or military intervention against a smaller power” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 73). It is worth highlighting that perceived illegitimacy and instability of the dominant group can also lead to social competition (Turner & Brown, 1979 in Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 72). In times of an ever-decreasing number of inter-state conflicts, this actually occurs more frequently in intra-state conflicts and less in inter-state conflicts (Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 203-204). As social competition usually implies some sort of military or at least political aggression, this mode is less relevant for Japan’s and Austria’s present as they are still rather defensive and peaceful countries, but it definitely was the case in both countries’ past. As already highlighted, Japanese imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th century is one example, but we will also see how many political observers fear a renewed Japanese form of social competition under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and nationalist supporters in 2016. Likewise Austrian expansionism in the 19th and early 20th century also depict a form of social competition, trends predicting a renewal of such an approach are however scarce, not to say non-existent.

3.5.3. Social creativity

“Social creativity is a re-imagining of the power hierarchy by a subordinate state with the intent of achieving recognition in an alternate domain that does not challenge the dominant state(s)” (Funaiole, 2015, p. 366). If the status hierarchy is not challenged and there are barricades blocking the way towards mirroring a dominant state’s behaviour, or even if there are not enough incentives to do so, states may seek prestige and recognition in a different domain by either “reevaluating the meaning of a negative characteristic, or [.] finding a new dimension on which their group is superior” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 73). This approach may also resonate very well with the modus operandi in market dynamics and hereby actually fits the case. If access to certain profitable markets is limited and

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confrontation with the superior companies is not sought, small companies tend to come up with creative new ways of making profits of their own in other segments of the market.

On the state-level of the international arena small and medium-sized countries frequently boost their profile and international standing by using this approach. Yet it is highlighted, how for “social creativity strategy to succeed, the lower-status group’s proposed criteria for status must be recognised as valid and worthwhile by the dominant group. Status cannot be attained unilaterally” (Tajfel, 1978 in Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 73). Almost as if states were acting in a division of labour, this approach may, however, be beneficial to more than just one country. Some frequently used approaches suggesting that a country pursues social creativity are for instance offering one’s country as a location for diplomatic negotiations, as did Austria in the second half of the 20th_{century (and still does to some degree), with these efforts even}

being institutionalised through the opening of the UN-headquarter in Vienna. The specialisation of a country’s efforts in the economic arena, as was done by Japan in the aftermath of the defeat in World War II is another one (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 74).

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4. Austria and its eroding security policy doctrine of neutrality

4.1. What is neutrality? What defines a neutral country?

The term ‘neutrality’ has paved its way into modern English language via Late Middle English and Old French and originated, like many terms frequently used in International Relations and warfare, from Latin. The Latin word ‘neuter’, composed of the syllables ‘ne’ and ‘uter’, meaning ‘not’ and ‘either’ respectively, translates best into our modern use of the word ‘neither’ or as already mentioned ‘neutral’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Along with finding its way into many other disciplines and areas, neutrality first gained international acceptance in politics after the 1815 Vienna Congress. As part of an effort to reorganise the European continent in the aftermath of the horrible devastation of the Napoleonic Wars, the five signatory states Austria, England, France, Prussia and Russia declared to respect Switzerland’s integrity in the borders of 1815, if the country promised to stay neutral in any further conflicts (Suter, 1998, p. 160). While Switzerland had already behaved neutral before, 1815 marked the date of its first documentary evidence and the so-called beginning of modern Swiss neutrality. Depending on how narrowly one defines neutrality, the number of neutral countries in 2016 in Europe varies between five, seven, nine and ten4 (Pajević, 2013, p. 10).

4.2. Legal dimension of neutrality

During the “long nineteenth century” (Hobsbawm, 1987, p. 6) an increasing number of the relatively young nation states declared their neutrality. As a result of this development, the international community addressed the issue of neutrality, amongst others, in the multilateral surrounding of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Especially the 1907 conference, intended as an expansion to the previous one, with its ‘Convention relative to the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land’ (Hague V, 1907) and the ‘Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War’ (Hague XIII, 1907) must be seen as a key cornerstone of the ‘neutrality movement’. As section XIII of the Conference (Hague XIII) regulates the rights and duties of neutrals in naval war, it is less applicable to the case of landlocked Austria and will therefore not be dealt with in this thesis.

4_{Pajević considers Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland to be the 5 ‘major’ neutral countries,}

“while in the group of ‘small neutrals’ are Liechtenstein and Vatican City. Former members of Non-alignment Movement, Malta and Cyprus, are also sometimes considered to be neutral” (Pajević, 2013, p. 10). I consider San Marino also to be a neutral country.

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Article 1 of Section V of the 1907 Convention unambiguously states how “the territory of neutral Powers is inviolable” (Hague V, 1907, art. 1), for which reason it is also restricted for any belligerent to transfer troops, munitions or other war supplies through the territory of a neutral country (Hague V, 1907 art. 2). In contrast, sick and wounded soldiers are allowed to be transferred through the country (Hague V, 1907, art. 14); the Geneva Convention applies accordingly (Hague V, 1907, art. 15). It is important to mention that the participation of citizens of a neutral country in any sides of a war is per se not forbidden (Hague V, 1907, art. 6), as long as no recruitment (Hague V, 1907, art. 4) or military training has happened on the neutral territory. Interestingly, neutral countries are not obliged to scotch the export and transport of weapons or ammunition (Hague V, 1907, art. 7). Article 10 addresses another particularly important issue, the right of neutral countries to defend themselves in case of being attacked, without losing the status of neutrality (Hague V, 1907, art. 10). Whereas escaped prisoners of war do not have to be interned by the neutral power (Hague V, 1907, art. 13), it is the case with belligerents (Hague V, 1907, art. 11). Article 17 highlights how a neutral country loses its neutral status should it commit any acts of hostility against, or works in favour of a belligerent (Hague V, 1907, art. 17).

In order to wrap up the legal dimension of neutrality it should be noted that Section V of the Hague Conventions illustrates that neutral countries act neutral towards belligerents in a case of war, permanently neutral countries in contrast such as Switzerland are legally bound to behave neutrally in any future armed conflict (Sherman, 1915, p. 220). As can be seen in article 10 of Section V of the 1905 Convention, neutrality does not per se denounce the right of a sovereign nation to arm and defend itself against any possible future hostile acts against it. Such militarised neutrals are then said to be in a state of “armed neutrality” (Oppenheim, 1906, p. 325).

4.3. Reasons for becoming a neutral country

The previous paragraph focused on the most prominent and important legal aspects, the duties and rights of neutral powers once they have declared themselves as such. Nonetheless, it is also of great importance to examine why countries feel compelled to declare themselves as neutral? What drives a country to seek neutrality in its foreign policy behaviour? Sheehan (2013) argued that permanent neutrality is a concept applicable only to “small states” (Sheehan, 2013, p. 121) and that this foreign policy “far from being passive, often requires a

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great deal of political skill and strategic investment” (Sheehan, 2013, p. 122). According to him, three factors play a crucial role for a country to declare its neutrality.

Legal agreements, like the multilateral mentioned above, but also bilateral ones with protective powers are one decisive factor when it comes to declaring neutrality, also because the neutrality and integrity of small states almost always exclusively depends on big states’ acceptance of the status-quo (Sheehan, 2013, p. 123). Decisive factor number two is a strong domestic foundation within society (extremely high within Austria, see chapter 4.12.) and the political elite (subject to considerable fluctuations, see chapter 4.13.) The most important factor for Sheehan (2013, p. 122) and other scholars such as Gottmann (2007) is, however, a state’s geographical position on the world map (Gottmann, 2007, p. 119). Whereas a neutral country in a best-case scenario would be situated as far away from any major power as possible, a neutral finding itself enclosed between two major powers would depict a worst-case scenario, according to the researchers, although both scenarios do not make up the majority of actual neutral countries. The greatest number of neutrals finds itself in the position of a so-called “rim state” (Sheehan, 2013, p. 123), which is the condition of being the neighbouring country to one major power, while being simultaneously dependent on this major power’s approval.

The case of a neutral Austria amidst war-shaken Central Europe does not really fit this scheme. Due to the overarching political developments at the time Austria was trying to regain its sovereignty and gain neutrality after World War II, as well as the special historical background of Austria, this riddle can, however, not be solved without looking at the history of Austria’s 2nd Republic.

4.4. Austria’s 2nd Republic: Restored Austrian sovereignty by accepting neutrality

In order to understand the erosion of Austria’s neutrality, one first hast to understand how Austrian neutrality came about in the first place. This paragraph therefore addresses the first sub-question of how the peaceful security doctrine came about in the first place? In the 1945 post-war Europe, the militarily defeated Austria faced an uncertain future (Sheehan, 2013, p. 131). Although Austrians perceived themselves for far too long merely as the “first victims” (Naimark, 2013, p. 228; Baumann, 2015) rather than accomplices of Nazi Germany, it is undoubtedly true that post-war Austria was stripped off of its last ally, when the Allied Forces

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began to occupy the country. With no protective major power in close range and bipolar tension between the two Cold War blocks building up, not only to the west and the east of Austria, but literally in Austria, the prospect for a sovereign, yet neutral Austria was futile. In fact, Austria’s “neutrality turned out to be everyone’s second choice” (Sheehan, 2013, p. 131). It was even described as a “geopolitical miracle” (Hösele, 2015, p. 156). Both superpowers came to the conclusion that they were unable to integrate Austria peacefully into their sphere of influence and unwilling to risk a direct military confrontation at the time, or as Sheehan (2013) put it, “the cost of a better outcome was higher than they were willing to pay” (Sheehan, 2013, p. 131). In fact, a neutral Austria could together with Switzerland represent a buffer between the NATO countries West Germany (potential NATO member at the time) and Italy, therefore even representing a strategic advantage for the Soviet Union (Sheehan, 2013, p. 131). The U.S. also seemed to be able to live with a “neutralization” (Rathkolb, 2001, p. 69) of Austria if it were not be seen as a model that could also be applied to other countries such as the separated Germany. In the midst of a first political thaw of the superpowers after Stalin’s death in 1953, Austria then made a huge effort to receive sovereignty again.

The State Treaty (Staatsvertrag), re-establishing Austria as “a sovereign, independent and democratic state” (Austrian State Treaty, 1955, article 1), was then signed by all the occupying powers in 1955. It, inter alia, prohibited a so-called Anschluss, a political or economical union with Germany. Although giving in to the occupying powers’ demand of proclaiming neutrality in order to receive this treaty, Austria quite skilfully managed not to include a single mentioning of neutrality in the State Treaty of May 1955, but promised to adopt a neutrality law after the enactment of the State Treaty and the withdrawal of the last foreign soldier. Austria held its promise and passed the Declaration of Neutrality on October 26, 1955, in which Austria in two short paragraphs proclaimed,

“For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria of her own free will declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal.” (Neutrality Law, 1955, art. 1)

It was added that “[i]n order to secure these purposes Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory” (Neutrality Law, 1955, art. 2).

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4.5. A neutral Austria until 1995

In the following years the date October 26, gradually turned out to be more and more important for Austrians and especially their identity. Already in 1956 it was decided to celebrate this date as ‘the day of the flag’ (Tag der Fahne) and in 1965 Austria formally declared November 26 to be its national holiday (R. Gärtner, interview, 12 January, 2016; Bundesgesetzblatt, 1965). The four decades of Austrian neutrality policy between 1955 and 1995 were of course most heavily affected by the bipolar Cold War confrontation between the two ideologies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Austria’s location in the heart of Europe, one of the most heated regions during this conflict, naturally brought various tensions with it during these years. The clashes between the Soviet Union and Hungarian revolutionists in 1956 as well as the suppression of liberalization movements in Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet Union demonstrated the ever-present danger Austria faced during this time (Ruggenthaler, 2015, pp. 145-149). The widespread belief that the West would come to Austria’s help in case the Soviet troops were to cross Austrian borders was, as we learnt years afterwards, only partially true, namely only when the for NATO so important route between Italy and Germany in the west of Austria were to be attacked (Rathkolb, 2015, p. 288). Austria’s liberal and dignified handling of the refugee flows in both these events did on the other hand result in greater appreciation by the ‘West’ and signalised the soft affiliation with the Western block (Rathkolb, 2015, p. 289).

Nevertheless, was Austria’s positioning in this period of time a continued back and forth. Even Austrian politicians felt at times uncomfortable with the ‘rocking chair politics’ (Schaukelstuhlpolitik) of the Austrian chancellor Raab in the first years after the State Treaty. Austria did, however, manage to position itself as the country being able to cope with this ‘special role’ in such a difficult period of time. Especially under the reign of the former Foreign Minister and then Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian government then managed to accede a position, which was frequently described as the one of a ‘bridge builder’. Others went even further and characterised Austria’s position as the “superpower’s darling” (Bischof, 2013, p. 13). Bruno Kreisky was the Austrian Foreign Minister from 1959 until 1966 and he was the Chancellor of Austria from 1970 until 1983. Considering that the decades in the 1960s and 1970s are widely perceived as the “golden ages” (Rathkolb, 2015, p. 291) of Austrian neutral policy it is unequivocally true if one attests Kreisky to be the main responsible figure in shaping this important period of time for Austria.

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Kreisky started to interpret his role as Foreign Minister of a neutral country in a very active way, early on after assuming the position. Efforts to initiate talks and an initial rapprochement between the Soviet Union and his social democratic (party) friend Willy Brandt5 were stopped soon afterwards due to U.S. distrust, but already casted a shadow of what was to expect from the social-democratic Viennese (Rathkolb, 2015, p. 292). Especially under President Kennedy, Kreisky soon took on an incredibly sensitive and important role not only as mediator but also as a middleman. In 1962 Kreisky was even the one to communicate the Soviet de-escalation attempt during the Cuban Missile Crisis, after which, as a result, the U.S. Pershing rockets stationed in Turkey were exchanged against the Soviet atomic weapons on Cuba (Rathkolb, 2015, p. 293).

Kreisky’s “active neutrality” (Bischof, 2015, p. 13; Luif, 2016) was thereafter continued until he resigned as Chancellor in 1983. Kreisky was a leading figure in establishing Vienna not only as a frequently used neutral ground for negotiations between various parties of conflict, he was also a decisive figure responsible for establishing the United Nations Office in Vienna. Austria had acceded to the UN in 1955 and the building was promised to the UN in 1967 already and ultimately realised and built from 1973 to 1979. It thereafter accommodated important organisations such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These organisations were already located in Vienna before, but also many new and other subsidiary organisations of the United Nations found a home in Vienna in the years to come. Kreisky’s engagement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, his efforts to end poverty in the Third World, but also his efforts to improve the Austrian relations to its neighbours to the East were renowned, although not always uncontroversial (Plassnik, 2013, p. 66). Many, including the U.S. administration by times, even thought that Austria was not only cleverly taking advantage of the international network of relationships, but that Austria was using its geopolitical position in Europe to exceed and cut across its position in the international arena (Rathkolb, 2015, p. 291).

Kreisky’s active neutrality policy and especially his policy of détente towards the East of Austria (neighbourhood policy) were also perceptible in another diplomatic arena. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) proved to be the key player on the continent for the policy of détente and also a key setting where the European neutrals could achieve considerable results, reflecting the interests of small nation states (Rathkolb, 2015, pp. 294-295). Austria’s neutral policy in the years after Kreisky did in many ways try to

Peaceful security doctrines in erosion: An analysis of the underlying reasons for a paradigm shift in the interpretation of Austria’s neutrality and Japan’s pacifism since the early 1990s