Public discourses in the United Kingdom on the freedom of movement in the European Union - a Q-methodological approach

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Public discourses in the United

Kingdom on the freedom of

movement in the European Union

- a Q-methodological approach

Bart Bussink

Leiden University

Master thesis

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Preface

This thesis is about public discourses on the freedom of movement of persons within the EU. I have chosen the United Kingdom as I think the topic has never been more salient than it is now. Following the referendum, both journalists and academics have attempted to explain why the UK voted against staying in the European Union.

Most articles I have drawn on while was working on this thesis, explained Brexit as a result of UK citizens’ opposition against immigration. However, most of these studies, only provided characteristics of persons who were more likely to oppose freedom of movement, or who were more likely to vote for Brexit. Age and education levels are in most cases good predictors of either opposition to freedom of movement or support for Brexit. But that means these studies only gave answers to the question “who”, rather than “why”.

If we want to make better policy and to solve social problems, it is not enough to know how to find people that are dissatisfied with freedom of movement, but we also need to understand their reasoning. This question does not necessarily need to be formulated negatively, as I think it is just as important to understand what people think are the benefits of freedom of movement.

As freedom of movement is increasingly under pressure in the UK, but also in other European countries, I think it is of great importance to carefully investigate the reasons undergirding this negative outlook, and I hope this study can serve as a first step to create a better understanding of what people think.

In writing this thesis, the help of my supervisors cannot be overestimated. My supervisors were professor Bernard Steunenberg and Elitsa Kortenska MSc. They have taught me the techniques necessary to be able to conduct this research. I am grateful for the time they have invested in me, providing advice, and I also appreciate their sense of humour and patience. The other participants in the Capstone group have also contributed to this academic process and therefore I would like to thank them as well.

I also would like to thank all those who have helped me to conduct my research in Northern Ireland. In particular, I would like to thank the Hyndman family that have helped me to find participants in my study and have me offered a place to stay. My thanks also go out to Raquel Amat, Lydia Grilo, and Ezraella Rachel. Also, I express my gratitude towards all participants and friends and family who have never wavered in their support. Lastly, I would like to thank my grandpa explicitly, to whom I dedicate my thesis.

Bart Bussink May 2019

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Abstract

One of the 4 pillars of the European Union is the freedom of movement of workers. Over the last decades, this has evolved to the freedom of movement of persons, which effectively means all European citizens have the right to freely move throughout the European Union. However, the future of the freedom of movement of persons has become uncertain, as the British people have voted to leave the European Union in the referendum held in 2016. Studies have found that one of the main reasons people have voted to leave the European Union was discontent with the freedom of movement of persons. Therefore, it becomes increasingly relevant to understand what discourses exist in the United Kingdom on the freedom of movement of persons, especially because no agreements have yet been made on how Brexit will affect it. In this study, Q-methodology has been used as the main method to identify public discourses on the freedom of movement of persons, as it is a powerful method of making subjectivity measurable. 19 respondents that were living in the UK have conducted a Q-sort in May 2018, which facilitated the identification of 4 different discourses. The main finding was that the attitude towards the freedom of movement of persons largely depends on individual cost-benefit calculations which also incorporate personal interests and beliefs. Those that benefitted the most of freedom of movement of persons were generally the most positive, while people who perceived freedom of movement as a threat because it could result in increased competition on the labour market, were the most reserved.

Keywords: European Union, Free movement of persons, freedom of movement, United

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List of abbreviations

2016 referendum The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum Bremain The United Kingdom remaining in the European Union

Brexit The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union DUP Democratic Unionist Party

EEA European Economic Area

EEC European Economic Community

EU European Union

GDP Gross Domestic Product

MAC Migration Advisory Committee NiNo National Insurance number

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

UK United Kingdom

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Introduction

A

IM OF THE STUDY

The thesis intends to identify the discourses surrounding the matter of the free movement of persons within the European Union. The aim of the research is to find out what popular opinions are present in the United Kingdom on the matter of freedom of movement of persons within the European Union1_{, and most importantly, how they can be explained.} This study will focus on the public discourses of people on freedom of movement of persons. Q-methodology, invented by Stephenson, 1935, is the method that will be applied in order to identify the public discourses. Q-methodology is a helpful technique to find out what opinions exists on freedom of movement of persons, as it makes subjectivity measurable. This study ought to provide more insight into the rationale behind opinions on freedom of movement. Such insight is useful for policymakers who can rely on it to change their policy agenda or communication strategies.

Insight on what people think about the freedom of movement, and why, is relevant as it is one of the 4 freedoms that constitute the internal market, which is at the very heart of the European Union. Especially in the context of the referendum on EU membership that was held in 2016, in which British citizens voted to leave the European Union, it is important to identify what opinions exist in the UK on freedom of movement. At the time of writing, there is uncertainty on what Brexit will entail and what the consequences will be for freedom of movement. In order to be able to shape Brexit in a way that suits the interests of the British population, it is important to consider existing discourses on freedom of movement in the UK.

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Relevance

EU

MEMBERSHIP REFERENDUM

Actors such as EU institutions but also the British national governments operate in a

concourse, which is defined as “an interplay or running together of positions, ideas, statements, and opinions in a domain of intersubjective communication” (Dryzek,

1989:476). Policy makers are constrained by this concourse, which means the actions of the policy makers should be accepted by the subjects that are interested in these actions. A policymaker acts within a concourse as long as its actions do not cause any conflict with any other subject within the concourse (Dryzek, 1989:476).

Awareness of these constraints can help them to better understand what policy options they have without exceeding the boundaries of the concourses. Understanding why people have certain opinions can also be of help to develop a contingent communication strategy considering people’s preferences and concerns (Wolf, 2010:577-579). In this study, the area of interest is the freedom of movement of persons within the EU. The aim is to find out how subjects within the concourse should act without causing conflict with any of the subjects within the concourse.

In other words, this means this is a study in which the boundaries of the policy options of certain actors, such as the British government have, are being explored.

Because of the referendum on EU membership of the United Kingdom in 2016, a lot of academic literature has been published on the reasons people have been voting for Brexit. Even before that, there were already studies conducted on why people voted for UKIP, a British Eurosceptic party.

In most studies, opinions on freedom of movement seem to correlate with voting behaviour. Usually these studies were not just focussed on free movement, but instead focussed on some elements related to freedom of movement, such as people’s opinion on immigration from other EU member states. Vasilopoulou (2016:219), for example, pointed out that the main variable that explains for support for Brexit was people’s opinions on Brexit.

As there is plenty of data available on the determinants of voting behaviour for either UKIP or Brexit, of which in some studies freedom of movement is mentioned either implicitly or explicitly as the most important factor that explains for the variety in voting behaviour, there is, however, limited data on why people make certain voting decisions.

Most studies create certain narratives. For example, people that have voted to “Leave” during the 2016 referendum, are frequently being referred to as “those that are left behind” (Antonucci, et al., 2017). Such narratives are usually based on data such as the median hourly wage or employment levels. Researchers focus on the conditions Brexit voters

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Relevance

generally live in and make certain conclusions based on this data.

Sometimes there is survey data available to get a better understanding of voter’s perspectives on topics related to the freedom of movement, such as migration and border control. This indeed provides information on what opinions and what conditions lead to certain voting behaviour, but as these are aggregate figures, they do not provide a lot of information on the way people reason on an individual level. Regression analysis can help to predict what opinion will increase the probability of someone voting for the UK to remain a member of the European Union but does not always explain why. For example, one person can be a proponent of EU membership because he thinks the economy will grow and therefore more jobs will be created, while another one opposes the EU because he thinks being part of the European Union means more workers can come which will cause unemployment. Regardless of whether any of these assumptions are valid, they are important for people’s perception and will influence how these people make decisions. This study aims to contribute to the existing knowledge of people’s perspectives on freedom of movement by adding more information on the way they reason.

As most studies on Brexit are creating narratives which are dichotomies, such as

“Bremainer” or “Brexiteer”, few studies focus on the characteristics of people that vote for

UKIP or “others”, there is limited knowledge about the “shades in between”. There may be a diversity of opinions among “Brexiteers” and “Bremainers”, which nevertheless have led to the same outcome in voting behaviour. This is consistent with the findings of this study, in which 4 discourses have been identified which are significantly different. This study could reveal some of the diversity between the two odds that most studies have focussed on so far and aims to add to the existing literature on why people have certain opinions on freedom of movement.

R

ESEARCH QUESTIONS

The aim of this study is to find out what people think about the free movement of persons within the European Union. In order to better understand existing opinions on freedom of movement of persons, it is necessary to find out what public discourses are present on this topic.

As a question, it looks like this:

1. ”What public discourses on freedom of movement of persons within the European Union can be identified in the United Kingdom?”

As the study seeks to find out what opinions there are in the United Kingdom on freedom of movement of persons, these opinions may or may not contradict expectations based on the examination of existing literature. After the study has found what opinions exists on freedom of movement of persons, the results will be compared to existing literature regarding freedom of movement of persons within the EU. It is also important to examine

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how the result of this study will contribute to knowledge about public discourses on freedom of movement of persons.

2. “How can the findings in this study be related to the existing literature on the freedom of

movement of persons within the European Union?”

This question is supposed to answer whether the findings of this study correspond to already existing theories and whether these findings add evidence to these theories. It is also possible that the outcomes of this study can lead to new theories on people’s attitude towards the free movement. Furthermore, another relevant question is how the public discourses that have been identified in this study are related to Brexit. In other words: 3. “How can the public discourses identified in this study be seen in the context of the outcome

of the 2016 referendum?”

Lastly, it is important to find out what practical implications the findings of this study may have. It is important to understand and acknowledge the concerns of citizens, so this can be considered while making policy.

Also, policymakers can get more support for their plans if they know how to communicate their ideas well. When the interests of the citizens are known, policymakers can explain how policy can contribute to the citizen's interests. The study will also include some policy recommendations which are based on insights gathered over the course of this study. Therefore, the last research question is:

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Background

Background

F

REEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE

UK:

A BRIEF HISTORY

To understand what free movement of persons within the European Union means, it is important to examine the legal framework and the actual consequences. Knowledge about the legal framework is necessary to understand what freedom of movement of persons within the EU is and how it has evolved over time. The consequences are important in the context of the 2016 Brexit referendum, in which freedom of movement of persons within the European Union was at the centre of public debate. One of the major reasons people voted for the UK to leave the European Union was discontent with immigration policies (Vasilopoulou, 2016:219). Within this realm, freedom of movement of persons has determined the UK’s immigration policy in regard to Europe. Therefore, it is essential to understand the reason(s) why apparently a large number of British people oppose freedom of movement within the European Union.

In the following paragraph, the evolvement of free movement of persons within the European Union will be discussed in chronological order.

The idea of freedom of movement of persons within the European Union starts with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Portes, 2016:14). It is the first treaty in which the 4 freedoms, respectively free movement of goods, workers, services and capital are mentioned. The aim was economic integration, and therefore the member states of the European Economic Community committed themselves to create a common market (Portes, 2016:14-15). At this point, the European Economic Community only had six members, which were West-Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands. At this point, the Treaty did not provide for freedom of movement for all citizens, but for workers and service providers only (McNaughton, 2017).

However, even though in the Treaty of Rome the 6 countries commit to the idea of developing a common market, intra-EEC migration was rare and few steps were taken to make migration within the EEC easier (Portes, 2016:14). Also, freedom of movement throughout the EEC was only meant to be granted to workers, as the economy was expected to grow if there would be optimal allocation of labour (Portes, 2016:14-15). As the British economy was growing after the Second World War, there was a strong demand for mostly low-skilled labour, but this was mostly met by workers from the British Commonwealth (Koikkalainen, 2011). An exception was Italy, from which a large number of workers emigrated during the “Gastarbeiter” period between 1958 and 1972, in which the country suffered from high unemployment (Koikkalainen, 2011).

Other European countries such as the Netherlands and Germany allowed large numbers of Turkish workers, while France saw its labour demand met by workers from (former) colonies, such as Algeria (Koikkalainen, 2011). In short, in most European countries, there was a significant gap between labour supply and demand. Movement of labour could

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theoretically reduce this discrepancy. Therefore, in 1968, the Council passed a directive to push freedom of movement within the EEC for workers. In this directive, the relatives of workers were granted the same rights as a worker, as well as self-employed people (Quigly, 1997: 146-147). This means the scope of the free movement of labour was significantly extended. Also, article 7 forbade a host state to expel a worker in case he involuntarily loses his job or gets ill, although a temporary residence permit may not be extended in these situations. Generally, the result of this direction was that more people were eligible to stay in other European countries than before, even if they were not workers themselves or unemployed (Council of the European Union, 1968).

In the early ’70s, the European Commission and the European Council tried to specify the rules on the free movement of workers. Directive 1408/71 came in force which defined how member states should apply social security schemes on workers, self-employed persons and their families. This concerned for example pensions and disability insurance. Directive 574/72 was meant to explain how directive 1408/72 should be implemented (McNaughton, 2017). The aim was to increase labour migration by allowing workers to retain their social security rights if they would work abroad. Losing social security rights by moving abroad was then considered a significant barrier to mobility, which the European Council tried to remove by these directives (Jorens et al., 2001). However, as directives have a “direct effect”, the provisions of the directive do not need to be implemented in national legislation (Jorens et al., 2001:239). The European law prevails over national law, but for workers, it was very hard to understand what rights they had as they needed to read European (case) law, so in practice, these directives did not have a significant effect. It was confusing as national legislation could be in contradiction with the rights they had as a worker within the EEC (Jorens et al., 2001:239). Also, the directives did not provide clear guidance on how social security rights could be retained when moving to another member state, as they were written in an era in which earnings-related social insurance schemes were most common. Later on, social benefits were mostly tax-financed, which made it more difficult to understand how the provisions in the directives should be interpreted, as classifications in the regulations were still based on a system of earnings-related social benefits (Jorens et al., 2001:238).

In 1973, the UK joined the EEC, but this did not lead to an increase of migrants moving to the UK immediately (Portes, 2016:15). This was largely due to the decrease in labour demand, as the economy was stagnating during the ’70s in most European countries. In the ’80s there was a limited increase when Spain and Portugal joined the EEC (Portes, 2016:15). However, after Spain and Portugal acceded, these respective economies showed strong growth, which resulted in the reduction of emigration flows from these countries. In the meanwhile, the EEC tried to increase the pace in which Single Market was being developed, with little emphasis on the free movement of labour, but instead, it was focusing on goods (Portes, 2016:15).

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Background

In the early ’90s, freedom of movement within the EEC was further developed. In 1992, Directives 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 90/366/EEC came in force (Condinanzi, et al., 2008:30). These directives significantly extended the scope of

“worker”, as also people that were not economically active had the right to reside longer

than 3 months in any EEC member state. Students and retired people now also had the right to reside in another EEC member state. Directive 90/364/EEC provided nationals of member states and their families the right to reside in any member state if no other provision gave them the right to do so (McNaughton, 2017:73). Also, the European Court of Justice (Condinanzi, et al., 2008:22-23) ruled that tourists should also have the right to enjoy the freedom of movement throughout the European Union, as they could be seen as “recipients” of services. The court also ruled that border guards did not have the right to check whether a citizen is engaged in any economic activity, thus showing an identity card was sufficient to be able to enter the territory of a member state (Condinanzi, et al., 2008:23).

As part of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, there was a plan to create further develop the internal market by a Monetary Union. The development of a Monetary Union resulted in another push for increased labour mobility within the European Union. The rationale behind this is as such: when most European countries use the same currency, the currency rate does not necessarily reflect the economic situation in each member state. Flexible currency rates could serve as a stabilizer. A decrease in exports leads to decreased labour demand. In these situations, the currency could be devaluated, so a country’s products will become cheaper. This will lead to increased exports and as a result, an increase in labour demand. If labour would be flexible, workers can move to other countries when labour demand is low, and they can come back if there is increased demand. In theory, labour mobility can compensate for the elimination of currency rates as an economic stabilizer (Portes, 2016:15).

Despite this economic argument, the Maastricht treaty shows a tendency to transform the EEC into an organization in which European integration goes beyond economics: the EEC was renamed to “European Union”, while the word “economic” has been scrapped (Condinanzi, et al., 2008:24). In the Maastricht treaty, the concept of European citizenship has been introduced. This effectively means that the right to freedom of movement within the European Union does not have an economic connotation anymore (Condinanzi et al., 2008:25). However, even though the Maastricht Treaty says that the right of free movement and residence is based on solely European citizenship, the treaty in itself did not immediately have practical consequences (Condinanzi et al., 2008:24). However, it served as a foundation for subsequent legislation and case law instead. The treaty did not annul previous European legislation that concerned workers or students specifically (Condinanzi et al., 2008:26-29). Menéndez (2009:1) said that was case law rather than the treaty that allowed the scope of freedom of movement to be widened. In particular, the cases of “Baumbast” and “Martínez Sala” were “putting flesh on the bones of the

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citizenship provisions inserted by the Treaty of Maastricht”.

In 2004, the Citizens Directive or the Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC) further stretched the definition of free movement from just workers to all citizens. This directive replaced the previously mentioned 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 90/366/EEC directives.

The aim was to have “uniform rules on the entry, residence and removal of citizens of the

Union” (Condinanzi et al., 2008:29) as those rules were now fragmented, as there was

legislation specifically to deal with “workers, self-employed persons, (…) students”, rather than just European citizens as mentioned in the Treaty (Condinanzi et al. 2008:29).

Furthermore, the same rights were granted to the family of all EU citizens. Article 2 made the definition of a "Family member" more clear: (a) the spouse; (b) the partner with whom

the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State; (c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependents and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); (d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); (Article 2, 38/2004/EC). However, this still allowed for some difference in

interpretation by the national governments, as for example, some countries do recognize same-sex marriages while others won’t. In 2018, the European Court of Justice ruled that same-sex spouses should also be recognized as a spouse and thus freedom of movement of the spouse cannot be restricted (ECJ, 2018; Najafi, 2018).

The Citizens directive also decreased administrative procedures when citizens move over the border, and also provide for the obligation of an EU member state to grant a permanent residence permit to any EU citizen that lives legally in a member state for 5 years or longer. The same rule applies to the family members of EU citizens, that will also receive a permanent residence permit, even if they were not a citizen of the European Union themselves. Only if a person leaves the host country for more than 2 subsequent years, this rule does not apply (McNaughton, 2017:73).

There are still limitations, as a citizen can be expelled if he or she is an “unreasonable

burden on the social assistance system”. However, the boundaries of this provision are

unclear (Verschueren, 2014:178-179). Kramer (2017:187-188) mentioned that this provision exposes an ambiguity of European legislation, as one hand EU law “functions as

an instrument to remove barriers to the free movement of its citizens and a constitutive force of a borderless Europe” but on the other hand “facilitates the construction of mobile, entrepreneurial and “self‐sufficient” subjectivities in a European social market society”.

Kramer (2017) illustrates this with an example, in which a Dutch translator was to be expelled from Belgium as he couldn’t prove he would not “constitute an unreasonable

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Background

burden on the public resources”, even though he had his own company for 13 years and

had never used any form of social assistance (Kramer, 2017:187).

Also, the right of free movement can be restricted on “grounds of public policy, public

security or public health”, according to the TFEU article 45. The EU member states have

some discretion when it comes to defining whether a person imposes a public policy, health or security threat. However, while some EU member states are sometimes pushing the limits of this discretion, European institutions such as the European Court of Justice intervene regularly (Ristea, 2011).

In short, freedom of movement of persons within the European Union has been evolving over the past decades, and has developed from an entirely economic concept, in which the aim of freedom of movement was a more optimal allocation of labour, to a political idea in which freedom of movement is a right that is tied to citizenship. However, it did not lose its economic foundation entirely, as European migrants are still expected to be self-sufficient and to contribute to the country’s economy.

E

UROPEAN ENLARGEMENT

Over the past decades, freedom of movement within the European Union has developed from a right that only workers could enjoy, into a right that all European citizens and their families have. The number of persons eligible for free movement within the European Union did not only grow as a result of the development of European legislation, but also the European Union has grown significantly over the years. These two developments allowed tens of millions of persons to move freely throughout the European Union, and with some limitations, throughout the entire European Economic Area that consists of the EU and countries like Iceland and Norway which are not EU member states (Agreement on the European Economic Area, 2016).

Since the United Kingdom joined the European Union in 1973, 19 other countries joined the European Union (European Union, 2014 or later). However, as will be further explained in the paragraph “Economic and demographic consequences of free movement

within the European Union”, this did not lead to a substantial increase of migration

between European member states. This significantly changed after, in 2004, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Malta, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the European Union (Portes, 2016:15-17).

Some European countries opted for restricting the rights of free movement of the citizens of the 8 new member states during a “transition period”, as there was a large income gap between these countries and the older member states. These countries feared a very large number of immigrants coming from these countries. The UK, however, did not decide to implement restrictions (Grabbe, 2014:52; Portes, 2016:16-17).

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The reason that the UK was one of the few countries that decided not to restrict the entry of citizens of the new EU-member states is not clear, but according to (Portes, 2016:16) there are 3 factors that prompted the UK government to open its borders to citizens of these new member states immediately. One of the reasons is that the British government wanted good relations with the post-communist countries, most notably Poland. The British government also considered it an easy way of achieving economic growth without having to reform. Another explanation is that the British government feared that migrants would travel to the UK to work illegally, as they did not have a legal framework that allowed the government to expel travellers from these countries. It has also been argued that the British government underestimated the number of migrants that would come to the UK (Grabbe, 2014:52). This is however denounced as a myth by Portes (2016:16). In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union. This time the UK did impose restrictions until 2014. The UK also imposed restrictions when Croatia joined the European Union in 2013 for a period of 7 years (Ker-Lindsay, 2016:561).

Traditionally, the United Kingdom has been a proponent of enlargement of the European Union. According to Ker-Lindsay (2016:566-567) the main reason for this as a deterrent against pursuing greater political integration. The United Kingdom has been pushing for the accession of countries in the Balkan, in particular, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Also, in 2010, prime minister Cameron stated that he was ‘the strongest possible advocate’ for Turkish membership of the European Union, while other European member states were more reserved. An explanation for this is that both Turkey and the UK are countries that both prefer minimal interference in domestic policy by the European Union (Ker-Lindsay, 2016:557). Also in public opinion polls, support for European enlargement was relatively big in the United Kingdom around 2006 (Ker-Lindsay, 2016:557).

However, this changed quite rapidly after 2013, which Ker-Lindsay (2016:566-567) explained by the rise of the Eurosceptic party UKIP and the increased saliency of immigration in the British press, as well as the much higher than predicted immigration from the new European member states. The United Kingdom was the only country within the European Union that did not allow visa liberalization for most countries in the Balkan (Ker-Lindsay, 2016:563).

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Background

E

CONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

By 2000, just 1 per cent of the EU citizens lived in another EU country, while in the UK, 2% of the population was born in another country than the UK (Portes, 2016:15). As shown in figure 1, the number of migrants from other member states of the European has roughly doubled between 2004 and 2014 from 1,5 million to 3 million, while the UK had 59,87 million residents in 2004, 64,61 million people lived in the UK in 2014 (The World Bank, 2017 or later).

The number of migrants from outside the EU has increased too by about 1,5 million in the same period (Portes, 2016:15).

During the economic crisis between 2008 and 2012, the number of immigrants stagnated, but this number was rising rapidly when the economic recession ended (Portes, 2016:16). However, because of the recession, more migrants came from other EU countries, mostly from Southern-Europe as the unemployment levels in Southern-European countries were very high (D'Angelo & Kofman, 2016:180).

Figure 2 shows the annual number of NiNO registrations, which are necessary to obtain a job or to use social services. By 2013, about 2,4 million people that were NiNo registered were in England and Wales, of which more than 1 million came from Eastern Europe, while 355.000 people were born in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (D'Angelo & Kofman, 2016:179).

Most of the immigrants were, in fact, skilled workers in terms of education level, but instead, they received lower wages and most of these jobs were flexible. European migrants were also very mobile, as they often worked in places in which there has been a labour shortage, as those places were perceived as less attractive by the UK-born citizens (Portes, 2016:17-18).

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Figure 2 (D'Angelo & Kofman, 2016:180)

Many studies have been conducted on the macro-economic impact of migrants from the European Union. Immigrants from other EU-country were on average higher educated (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014: 34-35) than the UK-born population and have higher employment rates (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014: 21).

As most of them received education outside the UK, migrants from EEA countries contributed more to the state budget than they have consumed (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014:36-38). However, as many migrants moved to the UK in a relatively short period of time, the capacity of social services was insufficient in some regions. In some regions, there have been shortages of schools because of the rapid population growth. Financially the greater number of migrants were beneficial for keeping up the social services, but social services in the UK were experiencing difficulties with adapting to the new situation (Portes, 2016:18). George, et al. (2011: 9,18) argue that this was barely the case for

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Background

migrants from Eastern Europe, as they were usually young and came to the UK without family, rendering the pressure on the social services low.

Even though there was little evidence that suggests that immigration from EU countries increase unemployment or other economic distress in the UK (OECD, 2012, Simionescu, 2017:767-7682_{) there were some studies that imply that increased immigration causes} unemployment and lower wages among lower-skilled workers (Becker et al., 2017:626). According to Nickell and Saleheen (2015), in the (semi-)unskilled sector, a “10 percentage

point rise in the proportion of immigrants is associated with a 2 percent reduction in pay”

(Nickell & Saleheen 2015:23).

Most studies, however, do not find evidence for increased unemployment rates overall as a result of the migration of workers from the European Union (OECD, 2012:127-128). In contrast, there is evidence that the GDP per capita has grown as a result of the accession of the EU8 (2004) and EU2 (2007) countries, but only very modest (Migration Advisory Committee, 2014:212-215).

R

ISE OF

E

UROSCEPTICISM

Freedom of movement within the European Union evolved gradually and has been a controversial topic for many years. In 1993, the British Social Security Secretary Peter Lilley said in a speech: “there were people touring Europe pretending to look for work while

they were really seeking the best benefits: Not so much a Cook's tour as a crooks' tour. Why do they come to scrounge off us? They certainly don't come here for the climate" (Bates,

1993). The suggestion that the British welfare system attracts large numbers of European migrants has been persistent, as well as the notion that the welfare system is in danger because migrants are believed to “drain the welfare system”.

Even though these notions have not been supported by empirical evidence (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014; Portes, 2016:19), these ideas remain part of the public debate.

However, Lilley did not blame the European Union for the alleged “benefit tourism”, as other European countries shielded their welfare systems for migrants, while the United Kingdom did not.

Euroscepticism was already a phenomenon in British politics in the ’70s and was initially mostly present within the Labour party (Helm, 2016). At the end of Margaret Thatcher's reign, this changed, and it became the Conservative Party that was most divided on the future of European integration and was split in a pro-European and Eurosceptic wing, while the Labour party was generally in favour of European integration (Helm, 2016). But immigration, even if related to freedom of movement within the then called European Economic Community, was mostly regarded as a separate issue (Evans, 2016:470).

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In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Conservative Party should be considered as the UK’s very first populist Eurosceptic party. William Hague, the Conservatives party leader between 1997 and 2001, took Eurosceptic and anti-immigration stances, focussed on “law

and order” and held a speech in which Hague said to stand up for the people against the “elitist, liberal government” (Bale, 2018:265-266). His successors would continue on the

same course until David Cameron would become the party leader of the Conservative Party.

In 1993, the same year Lilley held its speech, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was founded, which was a “hard‐Eurosceptic” single issue party. The aim of the party was the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (Lynch, et al., 2012:734-736). However, the party did not receive a lot of attention and until 2004, it barely gained any seats in the (European) parliament (Lynch, et al., 2012:736). In 2006, Nigel Farage became the party leader of UKIP, and he transformed UKIP from a single-issue party into“a populist

radical right party that was campaigning heavily on immigration and a populist critique of established politicians” (Lynch, et al., 2012:736).

According to Farage, “immigration is the biggest issue facing this country” (Tournier-Sol, 2015:146). Farage explicitly mentions Eastern-European migrants as a problem and says that the European Union is the main source of immigration. Thus, according to Tournier-Sol (2015:146), Farage effectively managed to equal the European Union to immigration, which is highly salient, while the European Union has traditionally been a low salience issue for the British voters.

According to Gliddon (2016:105), it is debatable whether the European Union has been indeed a low-salient topic because even before the rise of UKIP, the European Union and its predecessors were already part of the public debate since the 1970s. However, according to a YouGov report (2004), only 10 percent of the British population mentioned

“Relations with the European Union” as one of the two main policy priorities, while 26% of

the population chose “The number of immigrants and asylum‐seekers coming into the

country” as one of their main priorities, which is among the priorities chosen most

frequently. Even though Tournier-Sol’s claim that the European Union has been a topic that has low saliency, may be exaggerated, Tournier-Sol is right in the sense that attention for immigration issues in the public debate has increased over the time.

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 played right into Farage’s hands, as shown by Evans (2016:470). Evans finds that attitudes towards the European Union and immigration are strongly related since 2004 among UKIP voters.

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Background

Figure 3 (Evans, 2016:473)

People that have a negative attitude towards immigration usually also have a negative attitude towards the European Union, which is attributed to the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 in which Eastern European countries joined the European Union. Until 2004, the correlation between opinions on the EU and immigration was not as strong. Someone that was Eurosceptic could still be favourable towards immigration and vice versa. This makes sense, as until 2004, immigration from countries such as Romania or Bulgaria was not associated with the European Union, as these countries were no member states at the time, while after 2004 these things were mostly rendered the same because it was freedom of movement that has allowed labour migrants from these countries to work in the UK.

It is unclear if it has been the enlargement itself that made the attitude towards the EU and immigration converge or that this is caused by the “strategy” of UKIP to make people associate the EU with immigration, or whether both developments were mutually reï nforcing one another. Bale (2018) supports the latter theory. Bale argues that because of the European enlargement, quite unexpectedly, large numbers of migrants came from Eastern Europe to the UK. In 2005, a young David Cameron became the leader of the Conservative Party. He vowed to modernise the party and wanted it to become more

“liberal conservative” (Bale, 2018:267), mainly as an attempt to regain votes from Labour

at a time the British parliament and government have been dominated by the Labour party for more than a decade. He mostly ended the Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant attitude of the Conservative Party, granting UKIP a monopoly on Euroscepticism. The popularity of UKIP was strengthened by the large increase of immigration from the European Union, as well as the lack of competition by the Conservative Party. After 2007, the Conservative Party returned to their previous strategy in which often criticise the European Union, but at that time they had already lost their monopoly on Euroscepticism (Bale, 2018:274). In

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the meanwhile, there was an economic crisis in the Eurozone, which the Eurosceptics tried to exploit to boost their popularity (Bale, 2018:274).

UKIP was supported by most of the British printed media that were hostile towards the EU (Daddow, 2015:6). Not all British newspapers were Eurosceptic, but those with the largest readership were, most notably those that were owned by Rupert Murdoch, a conservative and Eurosceptic media mogul (Blitz, 2006). This effectively meant that the balance between pro-European and Eurosceptic newspapers in terms of readership was 1 million versus 8 million (Daddow, 2015:6).

N

EGOTIATIONS WITH

B

RUSSELS ON A NEW DEAL WITH THE

UK

In 2015 the British Prime-Minister David Cameron was in negotiations with the European on a deal which was supposed to make changes to European legislation and the relationship the UK has with the European Union. The aim was to make membership correspond better to British interests (Daddow, 2015:4). As foreign secretary Philip Hammond put it: “One size does not fit all” (Daddow, 2015:4) which meant that an exclusive EU deal for the UK was necessary. Cameron himself wanted to tighten immigration rules, so people would not “come and live in Britain and claim benefits” (Flamini, R., 2013:38). He demanded more leeway in the adoption on rulings of the European Court of Justice, and he was strongly against the EU’s Working Time Directive, which restricts the number of working hours for workers (Flamini, 2013:38).

Cameron’s “shopping list” he brought with him to the negotiations with the European Union is mostly undisclosed, but according to the BBC (2016) and his own speech (Cameron, 2015) it is about “curbing EU immigration by cutting welfare benefits” and making it easier for member states to block certain EU legislation, as an attempt to “boost

sovereignty”.

After there would be a new deal with the European Union, a referendum would be held in which the British public could decide on the membership of the European Union. Cameron was not a proponent of leaving the European Union, but according to Flamini (2013:38), promising a referendum served a mainly domestic political goal. According to Daddow (2015:4-5), there were two factors that drove him to this decision. First of all, his party, the British Conservative Party, was deeply divided on the relationship with the European Union for decades. Secondly, within the UK the idea that the country has a special “outsider

position” which needed to be preserved was very strong. Therefore, new negotiations with

the EU to reï nforce its position as an outsider would lead to increased public support.

Negotiations primarily focussed on freedom of movement

Officially, Cameron had 4 objectives during the negotiations with Brussels of which one involves reducing regulation that is related to the Single Market, the efficiency of the European as an institution and laws that restrain the decision-making capacities of

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Background

national parliaments. The most important objective is related to freedom of movement (Kirkup, 2015).

He said that he wanted to “tackle abuses of the right to free movement, and enable us to

control migration from the European Union, in line with my manifesto" (Kirkup, 2015).

Cameron does not seek to introduce quota’s of migrants from the European Union that can enter the United Kingdom, but nevertheless, he wants to do something about “the very

high flow of people coming to Britain from all across Europe” (Cameron, 2015).

Cameron said that the pressure on schools, hospitals and socials services are too great to cope with because of freedom of movement. He also wants to forbid citizens of new EU member states to come to the UK to work, until the economy of the respective member state is on par with existing member states. He also stated that freedom of movement is often abused by “sham marriages” and “fraudsters” (Cameron, 2015).

Instead of introducing quota’s his government is convinced that the number of migrants can be reduced because they consider the welfare benefits offered in the UK as a pull factor. A more concrete example of Cameron wants to achieve this is by requiring migrants to work for four years before being eligible for child benefit, tax credits or council housing (Kirkup, 2015).

Reception of the European deal

In 2016, the deal that was supposed to keep the United Kingdom within the European Union had been agreed upon by both Cameron and Brussels (BBC, 2016). The deal indeed allowed for fewer benefits for working migrants in the UK. For a maximum of 4 years, the UK is allowed to exclude labour migrants from the tax credit scheme in which workers receive a tax cut. This exclusion takes place gradually. During the first year, the migrants will receive no tax credits, but after four years they will have the same rights as other British nationals. This measure will only apply to all new EU migrants that come to the UK in a period of 7 years, as it is no permanent measure and is being referred to as an

“emergency brake” (BBC, 2016).

Other welfare benefits cuts for migrants were already agreed upon earlier and were not part of the deal. Jobseekers in the UK from other EU countries would not receive unemployment benefits for the first 3 months, and after six months they must leave the country (BBC, 2016).

Child benefits will still be sent to other EU countries but will be adjusted to the local costs of living. Other demands, such as excluding EU migrants from social housing entitlement were not accepted by the EU. Furthermore, as part of the deal, a legally binding reservation will be made that says that the UK “is not committed to further political integration in the

EU” (Weiss, 2016:2).

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The other main “concession” of Brussels was the introduction of a “red card”, which gives the national parliament's veto power on proposals by the European Commission in case 55% of all parliaments are against such a proposal. In practice, this will probably not be used, as even other arrangements, such as the less radical measure “yellow card”, which can be triggered by national parliaments, were barely used (Eurofound, 2017, BBC, 2016). Also, the regulations that gave national governments the right to deny spouses entry for a family reunion if they suspect it involves a scam marriage would be clarified (Weiss, 2016:10). Not all parts of the deal with the European Union were expected to have practical implications, such as the promise of the EU to reduce red tape, as this topic has been on the EU agenda for a long time (Weiss, 2016:6, European Commission, 2005). But it is remarkable that freedom of movement has indeed been restrained by the agreement as it is one of the main principles of the European Union. Especially considering Bulgaria regarded limiting freedom of movement to be a red line (Weiss, 2016:20), and some other countries called this “non‐negotiable” (Weiss, 2016:9). According to Weiss, “this package

on social benefits and free movement presents the first‐ever roll‐back of integration in this area of EU activity” (Weiss, 2016:10).

Even though the agreement does have some impact on freedom of movement, the “EU

reform deal” as it was often called, was not well received among Eurosceptics while

Cameron’s own party was strongly divided.

The Daily Mail used strong words to condemn the deal and it described it as “The great delusion(…) that they will do nothing to curb migration and will trigger years of benefits chaos” (Slack and Groves, 2016). It also explicitly mentioned the issue of freedom of

movement, as the article says: “Other pivotal issues – such as restricting freedom of

movement – were never even raised” (Slack and Groves, 2016), suggesting that the

agreement did not mean freedom of movement was altered at all.

Eurosceptics were already negative about the deal even before it was published. According to the British newspaper, the Express, a conservative Member of Parliament (MP) has said that“Cameron’s demands don’t add up to anything. They will make it easier for us to say that the EU cannot change and so we need to get out. Cabinet ministers who want an EU exit are getting ready to speak out” (Hall, 2015).

Chris Kandall (2016), a civil servant working for the European Union argued that the EU’s concessions were very moderate, as nobody expected the Eurosceptics to be satisfied with any deal, while Cameron had the political task to defend the deal at any cost. He argued that the deal would have little impact on the referendum, which explains that the EU was unwilling to make any significant concessions.

The Economist (2016) considered the concessions made by the EU to be quite substantial but agreed with Kandall that Eurosceptic Conservatives and the Eurosceptic press were

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Background

rather focussed on Cameron failing to achieve all the changes he insisted on before the negotiations (The Economist, 2016).

T

HE

EU

REFERENDUM

4 months later there was the referendum in the UK in which a small majority of the votes were in favour of leaving the European Union. As freedom of movement was widely discussed in the British media and was also an important part of the reform deal, the notion that freedom of movement was an important factor that made the UK vote for Brexit is also supported by empirical evidence, which will be further examined in the literature review.

Irish border issue

A major issue that complicates the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union is the border between Northern Ireland and the UK. In case of a “hard‐Brexit”, which means the UK will also withdraw from the European Single Market, freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and persons between the UK and the remaining member states will end (Powell, 2018).

During the 2016 referendum, the majority of the people in Northern Ireland voted for the UK to remain a member of the European Union (55.8%) (Bloomberg, 2016). It not known why a majority of the Northern Irish population voted to “remain”, but in newspapers, it is assumed very often that most people feared that the border with the Republic of Ireland will close as a result of Brexit. This could have various implications, as the Northern Irish economy has strong ties with the economy of the Republic (Green Left Weekly, 2018; Sloat, 2018).

For the last decades, the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland has been open to goods and persons, but in case the UK withdraws from the EU, border policies may change. The reason for this is that the UK cannot leave the European Single Market without closing the border, as goods can be transported freely to any EU country once they have reached the Republic of Ireland. UK citizens would still be able to enjoy the freedom of movement within the EU, by simply crossing the Irish border, while EU citizens will be able to enter UK territory from the Republic (Powell, 2018).

The European Commission fears that the UK leaving the Single Market could lead to sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, which had suffered from a civil conflict between Catholics and Protestants claiming the lives of 3.500 people. According to the European Commission, a physical border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is to be considered “a symbol of division and conflict” (European Commission, 2017:2).

As of writing, it is unknown whether or how the border issue will be solved. A creative solution that has been proposed is that the territory of Northern Ireland would remain a

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part of the Common Market while the rest of the UK territory withdraws from it. This would effectively create a border within the United Kingdom (Boffey, et al., 2018). The border issue is important to mention as most of the respondents that took part in this study were living in Northern Ireland, in which the issue could be of even greater importance and therefore could influence the attitude of these people towards freedom of movement.

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Literature review

Literature review

P

UBLIC OPINION ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

Over the last years, several studies have been conducted to explain why people would vote for the UK to leave the European Union, as well as why people vote for Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP. In most cases, freedom of movement of persons within the EU was explicitly mentioned as reasons for people to vote for either a Eurosceptic party or for the UK to leave the EU.

Studies that were specifically focussed on public attitude towards freedom of movement of persons are less common, which makes this study relying mainly on studies that try to explain voting behaviour during parliamentary elections or during the 2016 referendum. Nevertheless, there is one specific study that focussed primarily on public attitudes towards freedom of movement of persons, but this study is a pan-European study and its focus on differences at a country level are rather limited. The aforementioned study has been conducted by Vasilopoulou & Talving (2017). They also claim that no other studies have been conducted on public attitude towards freedom of movement of persons within the EU (Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017:2).

This study is based on data from the Eurobarometer. First of all, it shows that of all European countries, support for freedom of movement within the UK is lowest compared to other member states, as 34,4% of the citizens are “against” freedom of movement.

Figure 4 (Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017:16)

The study concludes that at an individual level, “individual level rational cost‐benefit

considerations and cosmopolitanism play a significant role” (Vasilopoulou & Talving,

2017:12). Among students for example, that often study abroad and work in other countries, 93% is supportive of freedom of movement.

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Overall, there is stronger support for freedom of movement of persons among higher educated and high-skilled workers. Those that identify as “European citizens” are more likely to be supportive of freedom of movement of persons. Wealthier European countries tend to show a more negative attitude towards freedom of movement, which can partially explain the relatively high percentage of persons opposing freedom of movement of persons within the UK.

In wealthier countries, socio-economics are a good predictor of attitude towards freedom of movement, as those that have a lower social-economic position tend to be more sceptical, especially when they perform manual labour (Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017:12).

Figure 5 (Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017:17) Figure 5 illustrates the main determinants of public attitude towards freedom of movement. of persons within the European Union. An interesting conclusion is that attitudes towards immigration from countries outside the EU and within are not correlated, neither “perceptions that immigrants contribute to their country” (Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2017:3), which means the debate on freedom of movement of persons with the EU is broader than just being anti- or pro-immigration.

Explaining voting behaviour in the EU referendum

Vasilopoulou (2016:219) found that a “Leave” vote was primarily due to dissatisfaction with freedom of movement of persons within the European Union. Therefore, the study is relevant as it attempts to explain the public attitude towards freedom of movement of persons within the EU.

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Literature review

Figure 6 (Vasilopoulou 2016:224)

YouGov, which is a company that specialises in opinion polls, states that the two things the respondents mentioned the most that should be changed, is related to migration. EU migrants should receive fewer benefits, and the UK should have greater control over borders and immigration from the European Union (Vasilopoulou, 2016:223).

In a multivariate regression analysis, Vasilopoulou (2016:224) explained why people are supportive of leaving the European Union. The main finding was that the support for leaving the European Union is strongly correlated with a desire to restrict EU citizen’s rights to work in the UK. Also, people that think EU migrants should only get welfare benefits from the EU member state in which they are a citizen, instead of receiving welfare benefits from the UK government, are were more likely to vote for Brexit (Vasilopoulou 2016:224).

Vasilopoulou (2016) further examined these findings by trying to explain which determinants can predict support for restricting EU citizens’ right to work in the UK, as well as support for only allowing them to receive welfare benefit in their country of origin. Vasilopoulou (2016:225) equalled these two variables to freedom of movement, although this means a rather narrow definition of freedom of movement, as it does not include tourism or studying abroad for example. These two variables were nonetheless chosen because the ability to work in another EU member state and the ability to transfer welfare benefits when they move to another country are important elements of freedom of movement of persons within the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2016:224-225).

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Relevance

Nevertheless, Vasilopoulou tried to find determinants that can explain support for a least a part of freedom of movement. These determinants are characteristics such as education level, income and partisanship. Knowledge of which determinants are expected to make people have different opinions on free movement is of great importance for this study because Q-methodology requires participants to be very diverse in terms of opinions. Therefore, it is important that people that have different opinions on freedom of movement are selected.

These characteristics will be later used in the study to select relevant criteria for the P-set, which are the people that will conduct a Q-sort.

Understanding who the persons are that support freedom of movement, as well as those that do not and their backgrounds can also be helpful to understand more of the reasoning behind people’s opinions on freedom of

movement.

Correlation between freedom of movement and the referendum outcome

As people’s opinions on freedom of movement are a good predictor of support for Brexit, opinions on freedom of movement are therefore very likely to be bound up with their voting behaviour during the referendum. For this reason, Vasilopoulou (2016:225) also tried to explain the determinants of attitude towards freedom of movement and as a consequence Vasilopoulou examined the

determinants of support for restrictions of EU citizens’ right to work in other EU countries (1) and support for EU citizens’ receiving welfare benefits only in their country of origin (2).

Vasilopoulou found out that age, gender and “self left-right

placement” in the political spectrum are significantly

correlated with either one or both of the dependent variables.

Men significantly show less support for restricting EU migrants to work in the UK than women.

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Literature review

However, gender does not have any significant effect on referendum voting itself, although gender can weaken or strengthen the effect of other variables slightly (Halikiopoulou, et al., 2018; Vasilopoulou, 2016:224). Older people are more likely to favour restricting EU citizens’ rights to work in the UK. People that think ethnic diversity is not beneficial for British society are also more likely to be in favour, while people that are identifying with Europe are more often against restricting these rights.

People that vote for right wing-parties also are more often in favour of both restricting EU citizens to work in the UK, as well as only receiving welfare benefits in the country of origin.

More specifically about freedom of movement, Vasilopoulou also said that “scepticism towards EU freedom

of movement is prevalent among both Labour and Conservative supporters” (Vasilopoulou, 2016:226), and

not just among supporters of Eurosceptic parties. Vasilopoulou (2016:225-226) concludes that utilitarian considerations, such as the ability to make use of freedom of movement and the fear of labour migrants “taking jobs” are most relevant to predict both opinions on freedom of movement of persons as voting behaviour during the 2016 referendum.

Explaining the 2016 referendum outcome

There have been multiple studies in which is attempted to explain why people would vote for Brexit. Most studies are based on survey data. An example of a study based on survey data was conducted by Halikiopoulou et al. in 2018. However, a study conducted by Becker, Fetzer and Novy (2017) had a different approach, as it did not attempt to find an explanation for why a person would vote either to remain in the EU or to leave, but instead compared the referendum results for most regions in the UK with certain characteristics of the respective region. Examples of such characteristics are the number of EU immigrants that live in the region, as well as unemployment rates and waiting lists for medical treatment. This study is important to evaluate the effects of freedom of movement on the people’s opinions, as the study includes data on the number of Eastern-European migrants, migrants from the oldest member states of the EU, as well as migrants from outside Europe. This information is not provided in other studies that attempt to explain for leave votes as they only focus on individual characteristics mostly gathered from

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It is a very detailed study which provides a lot of information about the conditions citizens live in and how these conditions correlate with their voting behaviour during the referendum. One could argue that someone would not necessarily vote to leave the EU because a person thinks it does not benefit himself, but rather because of that person thinks EU-membership does not benefit other people around him or her. When someone lives in a neighbour with high unemployment levels, his or her opinion about the EU may be affected as well, even if the person him- or herself is not at risk of becoming unemployed, such as retirees.

Becker et al. (2017) noticed that differences in voting behaviour are substantial between different regions of the UK. It is important to note that overseas territories and Northern Ireland are not included in the study as no regional data was present (Becker et al, 2017:604).

Demographics and education

The study conducted by Becker et al. (2017) provides evidence that a fear of jobs being taken by European migrants as a result of freedom of movement was a reason for people to vote Brexit. One of the results was that in regions that saw a larger than average increase of Eastern European migrants, there were significantly more Brexit voters.

However, this was only the case (Becker et al, 2017:635,628) in regions in which there were more unqualified workers and people working in the manufacturing industry. On the contrary, a larger flow of Eastern European led to fewer people voting for Brexit in regions where the median hourly pay was higher and where more people were working in finance (Becker et al, 2017:635).

In regions which the growth of migrants from the initial 15 EU member state was the highest, there were no significant differences in terms of Brexit voting (Becker et al, 2017:626).

Education, in general, seems to have a very strong effect on voting behaviour, as regions in which a larger share of the population is unqualified were also the regions in which voting to leave was more popular (Becker et al, 2017:628).

A higher education level has the exact opposite effect, except for when the growth of highly qualified people was larger than average. In these regions, it had an upwards effect

Public discourses in the United Kingdom on the freedom of movement in the European Union - a Q-methodological approach