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My gratitude goes out to the parliamentary staffers and lobbyists who were prepared to be the respondents for this study. Their names are not on these pages, but their input has been invaluable.
Masterthesis of H.J. Nutbey Political Sciences, University of Amsterdam January 2016 Coordinator Marcel Hanegraaff
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Table of Contents
List of appendices ... 5 I. Topic list for interviews with lobbyists ... 5 II. Topic list for interviews with staffers ... 5 Introduction ... 6 Theoretical framework ... 12 The definition of demand ... 12 Lobbying friends or foes ... 13 Lobbying as an strategy of exchange ... 14 (Counteractive) lobbying as a strategy of persuasion ... 15 Interest groups as sources of legislative subsidy ... 17 Hypotheses ... 19 Policy-process factors ... 19 Party-context ... 20 Issue-context ... 24 Methodology ... 26 Case selection ... 27 Unit of analysis ... 28 Data collection ... 28 The demand for political support ... 30 The demand for information ... 31 The influence of contextual factors on the demand-side of lobbying ... 33 Policy process context ... 33 Party context ... 36 Policy capacity ... 37 Ideological background ... 38 Legislative role ... 40 Issue-context ... 42 Technical nature of an issue ... 42 Political polarization ... 45 Theoretical insights ... 48 Conclusion ... 52 Bibliography ... 55 Appendices ... 605
List of appendices
I. Topic list for interviews with lobbyists II. Topic list for interviews with staffers III. List of respondents* IV. Transcript interview 1* V. Transcript interview 2* VI. Transcript interview 3* VII. Transcript interview 4* VIII. Transcript interview 5* IX. Transcript interview 6* X. Transcript interview 7* XI. Transcript interview 8* XII. Transcript interview 9* XIII. Transcript interview 10* XIV. Transcript interview 11* XV. Transcript interview 12* XVI. Transcript interview 13* XVII. Transcript interview 14* XVIII. Transcript interview 15* *Only included in the copy for the thesis-coordinator to protect the anonymity of the respondents.6
Introduction
On the 3rd of November 2015 Coco-gate broke. Notwithstanding its cheerful name the scandal meant a major blow to the public image of the Dutch Finance minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Who, as the Dutch newspaper NRC Next discovered, had included whole paragraphs written by the ING-bank into a law regulating the use of a risky financial product sold by the same bank. The headline of the article: ‘The bank asks, the minister complies’ (Driessen, 2015) was exemplary for the public reaction of indignation and dismay that followed the revelation.
Coco-gate was one event in a series of affairs in which the close relations between policymakers and (special) interests groups became subject to public scrutiny. For example, in January of the same year the same paper published an op-ed article written by the same minister. In this article he called upon the banks to stop their lobby against stricter regulations (Driessen, 2015b). The next day however the chairman of the lobby-group of the Dutch banks told that “Jeroen gave [him] a call directly after the article rolled of the press”, which gave rise to a further outburst of controversy about the close relationships of the bank lobby and the minister (De Witt Wijnen, 2015). In April 2015 Transparency International published a report in which it criticises the lack of lobby-regulation and the privileged access special interests enjoy in the Netherlands (Mulcahy, 2015). These events show the negative image of the influence that interest groups have on the democratic process. This image often sees interest groups influence as a corrupting force, that promotes special interests at the expense of the public good.
This view is widely held, even among politicians. They also seem eager to denounce lobbying, but at the same time take little action to restrict it. A proposal to introduce a lobby-register by the Member of Parliament Bouwmeester (PvdA) has been announced years ago, but has only been submitted for legislative consideration last month. Why this reluctance? When we look to Coco-gate, minister Dijsselbloem was quick to point out that the government nearly always talks with stakeholders about upcoming legislation. These regulations often concern complicated, technical issues. And when these are regulated by poor legislation, that will do a lot of harm. Special expertise and a clear view of stakeholder’s
7 interests and positions are needed to prevent this. Talking to lobbyists, he argues, is not the same mindlessly doing their bidding (Driessen, 2015b). Coco-gate shows us that the influence of interest groups can both be seen as a corrupting force and as a blessing for the democratic process. What is true? This question is a theme running through the scientific literature on interest advocacy. In this literature the opinions on the function and normative desirability of lobbyists are starkly divided (Lowery and Basher, 2004). The role of interest groups became a popular subject for research in the 1950’s. Political scientists such as David Truman (1951) identified interest groups as important ‘signalling devices’ through which citizens could transmit their preferences to decision-making; at any moment and more precisely than through a ballot. This so-called pluralist view was based on the idea that citizen would naturally mobilize into an interest group whenever they felt that it was in their best interest to actively engage with a policymaking-process. Interest groups mobilization would ultimately, Truman argued, result into a “Pluralist heaven” in which different stakeholders would compete for the attention of decision-makers to convey their point of view on an issue. Decision-makers benefit from this competition, as many different interest groups would provide them with all the information from which they try to make an informed decision (Lowery and Brasher, 2004). As the world entered the sixties, however, the functioning of the democratic process became subject to widespread criticism. This was also reflected in a new take on the role of interest groups. In the literature on interest advocacy a new school of thought was introduced, called the transactions-perspective. A drive behind this development was the introduction of economic models into the literature. The most important models was made by Mancur Olson, who argued in his book ‘The logic of collective action’ (1963) that mobilization is not equal among all stakeholders, as groups first have to overcome a collective action problem before they can organize themselves successfully into an interest group. This problem can much more easily be overcome by small, latent groups, such as businesses, who can offer selective incentives to those who contribute to their cause. For bigger groups with a diffuse interest the option to free-ride on the efforts made by others is much more attractive, as they often fight for non-excludable goods, such as clean air or nature preservation. Secondly, adherents of this perspective argue that decision-makers do not seek information from interest groups, but that they are looking for material gains. Legislators offer their services, against a price. In
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this view legislation is an commodity that can be bought by the highest bidder. Which is often one like-minded, well-funded interest group. This result in a ‘Pluralist hell’ in which special interest groups, having the deeper pocket, dominate the public good.
It needs little explaining that the normative implications of the answer to the question whatever interest groups activity creates a pluralist heaven or hell are big. However, as with most big normative questions, the answer is ambiguous and contextual. The dynamic between decision-makers and interest group cannot be easily summarized in a theoretical framework. Reality is always grey instead of simply black or white. Factors are more intertwined than expected and, as John P. Heinz notes: “Data are inconvenient.” (et all, 1993,XIII). In the book ‘The Hollow Core’ Heinz and his co-authors propose a new approach, called neo-pluralism, that acknowledges that both theories from th pluralist- and the transaction-perspectives can be right. This depends on the conditions in which influence is exercised. Neo-pluralism moves away from big assumptions, with equally big normative implications, and opens the door for the two important notions. First the idea of variation, this simply means that the level of influence of a group can vary. Secondly the notion of contingency, this means that “influence is conditional on circumstances” (Lowery, 2014, 23). This approach opened the door for research that looked closely to the contextual factors that shaped the strategies and successes of interest groups. Such as questions into how the nature and political context of the issue affect the position of a lobbyist (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998), how important the relations of an lobbyist with other lobbyists are (Beyers and Braun, 2014) or how government action stimulates interest groups to become active on an issue (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, 2004; Leech at all, 2005)? Such questions seem more practical than normative, but they offer valuable insight into how circumstances affect the role of interest groups in the democratic process.
One of these questions warrants, in my view, special attention: which role do decision-makers play in activating and mobilizing interest groups? Despite all their differences both the pluralist- and transaction-perspective were pre-concerned by the ‘supply’ of interest advocacy. They focus on which external incentives urge groups to mobilize an interest group and how their membership-base and resources determine their strategies (for example: Beyers, 2002; Beyers and Kerreman, 2007; Dur & Mateo, 2013). Bluntly put, they assume that changes in the wider-socio economic context will cause interest mobilization. This will
9 in turn prompt government intervention. Government is seen as being on the receiving end. Once mobilized, a lobbyist would either inform, bride or pressure decision-makers to swing them his way. This view ignores the agency of government officials. Or as Heinz et all put it: “much of the literature on interest advocacy virtually ignores [elected] officials and appears to assume that, like billiard balls, they will go wherever the interest groups send them” (1993, 12). Instead they argue that, depending on the circumstances, a decision-makers can adopt a pro-active approach towards interest groups. They can bargain, aggrade or mediate with or between interest groups to use them for their own purposes. In the 2001, moreover, Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech found that government activity often preceded interest group mobilization instead of following it. This, they argued, indicates that there is a ‘demand’ for interest group activity. The mechanism by which the demand activates interest groups and the reasons why this process comes into being offers insight in how decision-makers see the position and function of interest groups within the democratic process. While multiple studies confirm the findings of Baumgartner and Leech active (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Baumgartner and Jones, 2002; 2004; Dusso, 2008, Leech at all, 2005; Mahoney, 2004) they offer little insight in the dynamics of this process. The demand of lobbying is seen as the reversed of the supply of it. Supply means that interest groups set the agenda for government action; while in the case of demanded interests the government sets the agenda (Leech et all, 20). In this line of argument the pull-factor of the demand for advocacy is found in the shortage of political attention in a decision-making arena. Where there is an abundance of potential topics that could warrant government intervention but a shortage of political attention that can move the government to act on it. This makes the introduction of a new topic on the political agenda cumbersome, costly and risky (Leech, 2005, 19-21). By bringing an issue on the legislative agenda and by becoming active on new policy fields the government does not only activate groups to defend their interest against government intervention, it also “[…] draws lobbyists to [an] issue by providing a coordination point to focus on, thereby suggesting that interest group efforts have a chance of success” (Baumgartner et all, 2009, 3). This explanation conceptualizes demand as a contingency created by the government action that opens up the opportunity for interest groups to extert influence on policy, not as a conscious action by a government official.
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There is quite some literature that shows that the relation between a policymaker and a lobbyist isn’t one of one-directional pressure, but rather one of reciprocal beneficial exchange. Heinz et all, for example, argues that government officials can lean on certain interest groups while bargaining with other government agencies, departments and officials (1963), Christine Mahoney and Frank Baumgartner show that government officials are more likely to get involved with issue’s where there is a high level of interest groups mobilization as they are more likely to gather support (2015). Dirk de Briéve, Marcel Hanegraaff and Alphonso Karr (2011) and Christine Mahony (2004) show that international organizations actively subsidize and attract certain interest group to lobby their organization. These few examples alone do show that decision-makers in certain circumstances have an interest in mobilizing certain interest groups for strategic reasons. Unfortunately the literature offers little insight into the dynamic by which legislators select the interest group they want to talk to or how circumstance affect this demand. In short: little is known about the factors that create and shape the demand by legislators for interest group input. The main reason for this omission is that the research on advocacy networks and coalitions is largely based on quantitative methods. Although these methods are able to show strong correlations to support the existence of demand, they are not able to clarify what factors create this need and what it is that legislators exactly want to gain from interest groups (Beyers and Braun, 2014, 116).
This thesis sets out to fill this gap in the literature by taking a closer look to the causal relation and dynamics of the demand for interest advocacy. Investigating this will hopefully give an insight in what move legislators to contacy the interest groups they talk to. This will be done by asking the following question: What factors explain which interest group’s input is in demand by policymakers? The focus on this study will be on the question under what circumstances policymakers are more prone to talk with interest groups with a similar position on the issue they are dealing with, and under what circumstances they have a greater demand for the input from groups with non-similar views. Why is this question relevant to the question whatever the influence of lobbyists on the democratic process is either a corrupting force or a blessing? In short, I argue that motives and agency matter. As said earlier, both in the public and scientific
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debate on interest advocacy there is a tendency to portray government officials and politicians as the puppets of lobbies. By examine the reasons why decision-makers ‘use’ certain interest groups and ignore others, this assumption can be tested. If policy makers only talk to groups that they agree with that would be troubling, when they talk to all interest groups with a credible stake in the matter at hand, you can see it as due diligence. Thinking in hyperboles, when it turns out that decision-makers have little agency and depend on one interest group to, let’s say, stay in office or to pay their bills, the normative implications are in line with those of the transcation-persective view of a pluralist hell. When, however decision-makers mobilize interests groups from all sides of an issue in order to make use of their expertise to improve legislation, the more bright view of a pluralist heaven will be supported. Such conclusions can, off course, not be derived from a mere master-thesis, which findings will probably be more ambiguous. This does not change the fact that this research may offer an interesting insight into the dynamics of the relation between policymakers and interest groups.
To find an answer to the research question this thesis will try to establish an series of interviews with lobbyists and (staffers of) members of the Dutch House of Representatives. Both lobbyists and government officials will be asked what they think that decision-makers hope to gain when they reach out to interest-groups and under which circumstance these decision makers are likely to do so. This way a number of hypotheses, based on work from the pluralist-, transaction- and neo-pluralist perspectives, will be tested. Given the results I will try to establish which function interest groups fulfil for these legislators and how contextual circumstances alter the demand of legislator for their input. I hope this will lead to new theoretical insights into the demand-side of lobbying
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Theoretical framework
In this section a theoretical framework will be constructed through which an answer to the research question will be sought. This will be done in three steps. First, an overview of the literature on the demand side of lobbying will be given. Secondly, building on the current literature on interest advocacy, I’ll introduce the main theoretical insights on what legislators expect to gain from interest groups input. Thirdly, I’ll distinguish the factors which I expect to shape the demand of legislators for interest group input and formulate the related hypotheses.The definition of demand
This thesis wants to explain why government officials, especially legislators have a demand for the participation of interest groups in a political decision making process. The literature on interest advocacy has always be mostly concerned with how the internal traits and strategies of interest groups and,later, the structural factors of the environment in which these operate have influenced their ability to ‘supply’ lobbying activity to legislators. From this so-called supply-side authors have been mostly concerned with the amount of access interest groups got to policymakers (for examples see: Langbein, 1986; Hansen, 1991; Dur and Mateo, 2013), which interests were able to organize themselves and how this was reflected in the interest community (Walker, 1991; Wonka et all, 2010;) and how political structures altered the opportunities for interest groups to exercise influence (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008; Princen and Kerremans, 2009).
As mentioned in the introduction, in the recent decade more attention has gone to how government activity acts as a catalyst for interest group mobilization. These studies look beyond the supply of interest activity and try to determine which interest groups are actively participating in policy-deliberations and what their desired outcomes are. These studies find strong correlations between government activity and the output of interest groups. Therefore, they argue that interest groups do not always create output before a government becomes activate on their policy are, but rather that they are stimulated to participate in policy deliberations by government activity (Baumgartner et all, 2009). This is called the demand side of lobbying. How should we understand this demand for lobbying?
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In the work that investigates the demand-side off interest group activity, demand is mostly seen in rather passive terms. Demand is equalled with political activity and the number and scope of legislative proposals under consideration (Dusso, 2008; Gray and Lowery, 2002; Leech et all, 2002; 2005; Mahoney, 2004). The more active the government becomes on an issue the greater the demand of policymaker for the input of interest groups that are active on those issues. This definition, however, is narrow. While this, quite statistical, conception of demand does tell us that government activity creates a demand for interest group input. Neither does it show what motivates policy makers to talk to interest groups. It offers hypotheses, but does not offer a definite insight into the question why interest groups take the trouble to publish position papers and research reports, hire lobbyists or organize network events. Neither does it tell us why legislators, who are often strapped for time and resource, take the trouble to read, talk to or attend the abovementioned outputs. The fact that legislators spend their valuable time and resources on the output of interest groups shows that policymakers gain something from doing so; the output of interest groups helps legislators to fulfil certain needs. I propose that if we want to understand the phenomenon of ‘demand for interest groups’ we have to look what motivates legislators to talk with interest groups. What do they hope to gain from doing so; what needs does this input fulfil and which factors create these needs?
In this study I see the demand for interest activity as the need that individual legislators have for interest groups input to do their work to the best of their ability. This means that the focus is not so much on how political activity stimulates lobbying activities, but rather on how political and institutional factors create a need by legislators for certain goods that can most effectively be provided by interests groups. This definition allows us to see the different functions interest groups have for legislators and under what circumstances these functions are needed.
Lobbying friends or foes
The literature on interest advocacy contributes different functions to interest groups, what specific role legislators want to fulfil can expected to be reflected in which interest groups choose to engage with. On a lot of issue there are lot of different interest groups active. Legislators, however, most often lack the time and resources to have an in depth
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conversation with all of them. Therefore it’s likely that legislators will prefer to talk to those interest groups that can provide them with the input in any other shape or form, also called policy-goods, they need most. Likewise, will interest groups prefer to engage with those legislators from which they know that their efforts will be effectively invested. This brings us to a longstanding debate within the literature on interest advocacy about whatever it is more effective for interest groups to support legislators that are supportive of your cause, so-called friends, or rather to persuade those who aren’t (yet), your so-called foes, to your camp? The answer this questions has considerable impact on the function that you can attribute to interest groups in a in policy making process.
The longstanding pluralist notion was that interest groups lobby legislators with the aim to persuade them into their camp. The assumption was that policymakers are driven to engage with interest groups from all sides of an issue to gather as much relevant information they need to make an informed decision; thus interest groups function mostly as sources of information (Truman, 1972). However in 1963 Raymond Bauer, Ithel Pool and Lewis Dexter concluded, after an extensive study of the contacts between interest groups and legislators of the U.S Congress, that legislators predominantly talked with interest groups with whom they shared the same ideological background and policy positions. Or, as Lester Milbrath put it, “[legislators] only hear what they want hear” (1963, 210). This indicates that interest groups do not have the role that the pluralist view attributes to them. If legislators and interest groups only engaged with the counterparts that already agreed with them interest groups don’t function as actors through which legislators can make sense of the world in a balanced way. But, if interest groups don’t fulfil that function, what do they do? Multiple explanations have been formulated to explain this phenomenon, which can roughly be divided in three schools of thought.
Lobbying as an strategy of exchange
The first explanation is grounded in the transaction-perspectives and builds on Chris Schatschneider’s view that policy is a commodity that can be sold to the highest bidder (1963). The nature of this exchange can be material and/or political: in exchange for their support for the policy position of an interest group legislators receive support, most often in the form of campaign contribution, political endorsements or in other forms of political backing (see Austen-Smith, 1996). Adherents of this theory, such as Grant McConnel (1966)
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and Theodore Lowi (1966), argue that the pluralist view of a pluralist heaven is naïve: interest groups do not act as sources of information for legislators. Rather, they are agents of exchange who trade political and financial support for influence on the policy outcomes. But a vote is not a product; there is no way to enforce a deal that is made between a legislator and an interest group. These exchanges have no formal standing and legislators can vote and act as they want, free from external interference. Therefore, as James Snyder, argues can the exchange between interest groups and legislators only be made through a repeated pattern of ‘investments’ by interest groups in legislators, combined with the establishment of a relation based on “mutual trust” (1992, 17). From this perspective friendly lobbying is only natural, an interest group will lobby the same legislators over a a prolonged period of time to makes sure they will support their positions consistently.
This explanation is mainly based on data from the United States Congress. This warrants some caution when trying to apply this theory on policy-arenas in other countries. The role of money in American politics is substansial. The country has, amongst other factors, no system for subsidized campaign finance. In comparison; in Dutch politics money plays a limited role. Most political parties are financed by government subsidies and have income-source of their own from membership fees; which makes them less depended on donations. Although there have been a few instances in which political donations have been subject of controversy, especially in the case of parties without members such as with the PVV, the influence of campaign finance should not be overstated (Koole, 2008). It can be assumed that the mechanisms outlined above will play a minor role in this thesis and therefore I will only look to political support in the form of endorsements and other forms of political support.
(Counteractive) lobbying as a strategy of persuasion
The second explanation, formulated by Austen-Smith and Wright, is an updated approach to the pluralist view on lobbying. It is based in the signalling theory, which sees lobbying as the “strategic transmission of information from an informed interest group to an relatively uninformed legislator” (Güllberg, 2008, 36). In line with the classic pluralists it maintains that the most important function of interest groups is to supply legislators with information to compensate this information gap. Interest groups can warn legislators for the economic
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implications of a new environmental regulation, the numbers of jobs that will be lost after the closing of a tax loophole or the environmental dangers of a construction-project. This ‘private’ information on an issue can help legislators to make sense of practical and political implications of their decisions. Strategic transmission of information means that interest groups will try to appeal to the pre-existing preferences of legislators to have the best result possible legislators from different sides of an issue. For example, business groups will prefer to talk with green parties about the opportunities that a new government program will offer to their ‘sustainable solutions’, while they will emphasize the economic benefits and grow opportunities to parties that are vocal supporters of the business community. Likewise they will omit, or in extreme case lie about, information that will have a negative impact on a legislator’s position. This means that different legislators will hear different stories from the same lobbyists, as they will try to skew a legislator’s view in such a way that it will align with their own interest (Potters and van Winden, 1991).
According to Austen-Smith and Wright this asymmetrical provision of information moves competing interest groups to lobby not only legislators that are undecided or who don’t agree with them, but also those legislators that a have similar policy position to “counter act the lobbying efforts of opposing groups” (1994, 26). Legislators however are not ignorant and can be expected to be aware of the fact that interest groups will provide them with biased information, as Potters and van Winden point out (1991). Therefore it can be expected that legislators adjust their strategies in such a way that they will be likely to get the most balanced information-stream possible. I argue that the best way to do so is by applying the adversarial principle when engaging interest groups and thus to speak with interest groups from all sides of an issue.
The idea that legislators are looking for a balanced stream of information will not only be reflected in whatever they talk with competing interest groups. They will also be more likely to talk to those groups that are best able to give them the most comprehensive information from a large group of actors, as legislators don’t have time to talk to all stakeholders themselve (Chalmers, 2013). This makes interest groups that are well embedded within a network of like-minded interest groups more attractive for legislators, the best of examples are umbrella organizations, sector associations and other groups that represent a collection of similar interests. These organizations provide legislators with a clear point of contact to
17 learn more about the preferences, information and insights of a great deal of stakeholders. In this perspective lobbyists not only act an intermediary between stakeholder and policy makers, but also as brokers between likeminded stakeholder who make sure that these talk with a single voice (Heaney and Lorenz, 2013; Ainsworth, 1997).
Interest groups as sources of legislative subsidy
The notion of counteractive lobbying has received quite some criticism. First of all, it is argued that the cases that Austen-Smith and Wright use in their study were not representative for the majority of lobbies (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996). Secondly Richard Hall and Alan Deardorff point out that interest groups lobby friends more intensely than they lobby undecided or opponents, as if it demands more effort to maintain a legislator on his or her’s current position than it does to change them. To make sense of this tendency Hall and Deardorff propose the idea that lobbyist act as a form of legislative subsidy (2006). In this approach interest groups don’t try to change the preferences of legislators; they subsidize like-minded legislators in their effort to reach a goal they share. This theory rests on the assumption that legislators want to be active on as many issues as possible. At the same time however, legislators have to deal with a scarcity in time and resources. These constrains force them to make strategic choices about the issue’s they want to take on the ones they have to let go. By acting as a “service-bureau” lobbyists offer their resources to ‘subsidize’ likeminded legislators in achieving a shared goal. This frees up resources for legislators which they can allocate to other issues. This which enables legislators to be active on more issues than they could be active on without the support of interest groups (Ibid, 72).
According to this theory legislators are most interested in information that supports their position, to a large extent the kind of information they are interested in is not different from the ‘private information’ that is central to the signalling theory. Legislators lack the resources to research and gain in depth, understanding of an issue under consideration, while this information is necessary in formulating arguments and strategies in defence of a certain policy-position (Esterling, 2004, 242-244). By providing information to support the positions of legislators interest group with similar position are able to further their own agenda while easing the workload of the legislator (Hall and Deardorff, 2006, 74). However,
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next to this information do legislators also want to receive another kind of information from ‘allied’ interest groups, Hall and Deardorff argue. This is political intelligence. This is information on the procedural and political side of an issue: head counts, inside information from government departments, intelligence about the strategies and tactics of other political actors etc. Lobbyists are in position to gather this kind of intelligence because they operate in so-called lobbying enterprises and are constantly informed of the policy positions, strategies and preferences by other lobbyists. Legislators have a need for this information because it reduces uncertainty on legislative outcomes and can expose political opportunities. (Ainsworth and Sened, 1993; 1997).
Exchange Persuasion Legislative subsidy
Policy goods Campaign
contributions;
endorsements; votes.
Expert and private
information. Expert and private information; political intelligence
Friends or foes Friends Friends and foes Friends
Preferred interest groups characteristics
Specific interests,
premium on resources Broad member-ship base; strong ties with like-minded groups Support capacity and good intelligence position These additional informational demands also put a premium on different interest groups-characteristics. When legislators have a need for legislative subsidy they are best served by interest groups that have what I call support capacity, that is the access to the right sources of information and the manpower to process and produce information (Klüver, 2012, 494-495). And secondly a position in advocacy network through which they are able to receive information from the opposing sides off an issue. This puts lobbyist with a far-reaching network, and many so called weak ties, in advantage (Granoveter, 1973; Beyers and Braun, 2014).
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Hypotheses
The last section showed what different functions interest groups can fulfil for legislators. However, what prompts their needs for these different kinds of input?. Legislators operate in a highly dynamic environment, which we can expect that to influences their strategies and needs. In these respect Heinz and colleagues write about the “structural attributes of influence” (1992, 98),they argue that the influence of interest groups depends on structural and contextual factors in their environment. This thesis does the same and I propose that the demands for interest group input will differ according to the contextual incentives that legislator’s receive. I distinguish three sets of structural attributes that I expect to influence a legislator’s demand. I expect that these factors affect from which interest groups legislators want to receive input: the phase of the policy process, the characteristics of the party to which the legislators belong and the nature and political context of the issue at hand.
Policy-process factors
The first factor that I expected to have a bearing the demand of legislators for interest group influence are the different phases of a policy-process. Legislative decision-making is strongly institutionalized and its procedures dictate the restrictions and opportunity that legislators face, this will most likely influence their behaviour and needs. Christophe Crombez showed this in the context of EU decision-making. He showed that the success of lobbyists in the EU depends on the stage of the policy-making process in which they convey information to policymakers (2002). Crombez found that the need for information is biggest in early phases in which proposal are introduced and judged. The idea that the needs of legislators differ per phase of a policy process is straightforward and can also be expected in the Dutch context. At an early point in the process policymakers are themselves still determining their exact position on an issue, or at least they are still able to tinker with it. In an early stage they will be more likely to to be actively orientating themselveon the issue under consideration by gaining all relevant information. For this they can expected to rely on interest groups on all sides of an issue as this wil give the most complete picture. However, as proposals move through the process political position are taken and less likely to be changed. When a proposal is publicly discussed in debates most legislators will already have decided which position they will take.20
Once a position is taken legislators are more likely to have a need for information that is supportive of their position as they will need to defend their position vis a vis other legislators. The expert information and political intelligence that like-minded interest groups are best able to provide them with will help legislators in doing so. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: As a policy process progresses legislators will have a greater demand for legislative subsidy.
Party-context
Secondly, I also expect that the characteristics of the political party to which a legislator belongs influence will his or her demand for interest group input. Political parties provide legislators with the resources they need to do their work. Parties form the ideological fundament on which legislators base their views and are constitutive for their political position vis a vis interest groups and other political actors. Especially in the Netherlands, where the political system is characterized by strong party discipline, their impact can be expected to be profound. I expected that the following three traits of a political party will be relevant for this study: their policy-capacity, their legislative role in relation to the executive branch and their ideological background. Policy capacity The policy capacity of a legislator depends of the amount of resources he has at his disposal when doing his legislative work. Central to this concept is what Salisbury and Shepsle call the “political enterprise”. Political enterprises are the offices of legislators, including both the legislator and his staff, that produce the “products” of legislation and political influence (1981). The bigger a political enterprise is, the more time, money and manpower a legislator can distribute among the issues under his attention. The total of these resources is the policy capacity of a legislator. How a legislator can distribute the resources of his political enterprise depends on how much different issues he has to attend to. The higher this number, the lower the amount of resources he can assign to each one.
I expected that, when resources are scarce and a legislator will have a greater need for legislative support from likeminded interest groups. An extreme example to illustrate this can be seen in state legislatures in the United States. In these legislatures business-friendly
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legislators regularly submit equally business-friendly legislative proposals completely written by a business association called the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). Alexander Hertel Fernandez, who studied this phenomenon, argued that ALEC could supply pre-made legislation to state legislators because it offered them the chance to have a legislative output, and the corresponding attention and political momentum, despite the limitations of their part-time mandate and small staff that would never have allowed them to write a bill themselves (2014).
In the Dutch parliamentary system a legislator’s policy capacity largely depends on the number of the seats that his party holds in the legislature (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum van de Universiteit Leiden, 2015). This has two reasons. First, the financial and personal means that a party has to his disposal is dependent on the number of seat its hold. For every seat a party gets a subsidy for the recruitment of personnel and other operative costs. Secondly, as the Netherlands has an electoral system of proportional representation legislators don’t have to attend to local constituencies. They don’t have the freedom to pick their own political issues. Instead parties distribute subjects among their legislators. This limits the political agency of individual legislators. Every party wants to be active on as many topics as possible, they will distribute most topics notwithstanding the number of seats they have. This means that a party with ten legislators is active on the same number of topics as a party with forty legislators. A legislator from a small party has to deal with a far greater number of issues than his colleagues from bigger parties, while also having less supportive staff at their disposal. This mechanism limits the policy capacity of small parties. Therefore it can be expected that smaller parties have a bigger need for external legislative support. This leads to the hypothesis: H2a: Legislator from smaller parties will have a greater demand for legislative subsidy from interest groups. Ideological background The strategies and aims of political parties are shaped by their ideological beliefs. I expect that these beliefs also impact their strategy towards, and demand for, interest groups. I distinguish between parties in the ideological middle and those that move more to the outer reaches of the continuum. Figure 1 gives an overview of the position of the Dutch political
22 parties in the spectrum. In this thesis I limit myself to the parties that have been a more or less constant factor Dutch politics and therefore only include those that have been elected into parliament at least twice successively. How should we see the influence of ideology on the legislator – interest group relation? As discussed earlier recent research indicates that the relation between parties and interest groups with similar ideological positions tends to be stronger than with divergent positions (Bauer et all, 1963; Baumgartner et al, 2009; Milbrath, 1963). Would it not make sense that the opposite is also possible? I expect that the ideological background of a party can also impact their relation with interest groups in a negative way. For instance where a right-leaning, pro-business legislator will have a favourable view of business-associations as they both support the ideals of a free market economy. A left wing legislators will have a much less positive view of the same interest group, as it represents the nterests that are undermining the welfare state. This can be expected to create a feeling of animosity that creates a barrier between the legislator and interest group in question.
Another factor that contributes to this dynamic is that political parties who’s ideological position lies towards the edge of the political spectrum, will try less to appeal to a broad electoral base, as more moderate parties will do (Grossmman and Helpman, 1994). Moderate parties have an incentive to talk to as many societal groups, and thereby potential voters, as possible as they want to carefully choose their position to prevent alienating voters and/or the position where they will have the most political gains. Parties with a less moderate ideological position don’t face this constraint. They can be expected to voice the position of certain societal (fringe) groups more pro-actively. I assume that the less the interest represented by a group is compatible with a parties ideological background the less
Left
SP PvdD GroenLinks PvdA D66 CDA VVD PVV
23 willing a legislator will be willing to talk to them, even when their position on specific issues are not that far apart. Thus I expect that when the ideological position of a party is more extreme, its distance to opposing interest groups will increase. This will be reflected in the fact that these parties will exclude more interest groups as potential interlocutors as they deem the ideological distance insurmountable. Consequently less moderate parties will also rely more heavily on a small number of interest groups with similar views as they can provide them with input that suits their common position and therefore are more open to legislative subsidy from like-minded interest groups. This leads to the hypothesis:
H2b: The more extreme the ideological position of legislators, the greater their demand for legislative subsidy.
Legislative role
Another factor that I expect to have an impact on the demands of legislators is their relationship with the executive branch. Dutch governments depend on governing coalitions in parliament. The legislative agenda of these coalitions are formulated in coalition-agreements before a government is installed. The agreement made is often considered as political binding and any breaches will lead to a political crisis. Whatever a party is part of the coalition or opposition is what I call it’s legislative role. The fact that coalition parties are bound by political agreements makes their fairly predictable. They monitor and steer the implementation of the pre-made agreements and coordinate their responses to new issue, both amongst each other and with their ministers in the executive branch (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014, 125-134). Consequently It can be expected that most of the legislative proposals that are submitted by government departments for legislative approval are in line with the a positions of the governing parties. This make it likely that legislators from coalition parties will have to defend the information and arguments provided by the government to the parliament during the parliamentary process. At the other side of the aisle are the opposition parties. These parties are (most often) not bound by any political agreement and are looking to distinguish themselves from each other and the parties within the governing coalitions. (Martin and Vanberg, 2003)
I expect that opposition parties have a greater need for the input of interest groups for two reasons. The first reason is that opposition parties need expert information to counteract
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the government’s political agenda. Opposition parties want to offer alternatives to proposed policies and put new issues on the agenda. When doing so they can rely less on the information that is prepared by government departments, as these will tend deliver information that supports the pre-agreed position of the governing coalition. Secondly, I expected that opposition parties also have a greater demand for political intelligence. The connection between coalition parties and their ministers at government departments can be expected to be relatively close. This will gives their legislators an advantage, as they will be more up to date with the status and content of policies are in the making. As opposition parties lack this form of access to the executive branch they will depend more on interest groups to provide them with this information. Thus, I expect that opposition parties have to find alternate sources for information from which they can use to close the information gap
vis a vis parties of the governing coalitions. This will create an incentive to find policy
capacity outside the parliament. This leads to the next hypothesis: H2c: Parties in the opposition will have a greater demand for legislative subsidy than parties in the governing coalition.
Issue-context
Thirdly, I expect that the issue-context will also have an influence on the demand for interest group input by legislators. In this respect I suspect that two factors are especially salient: the technical nature and the degree of political polarization in which it is discussed. Technical nature Baumgartner and Leech (2001) show that interest groups that operate in niche-policy-fields, with issue of a relatively small scope and a more technical nature, are more successful than those that operate on high profile issues. They explain this by pointing to the fact that technical complexity requires expert-knowledge, which is often not directly at a legislator’s disposal. To get a grasp of such a policy-proposal on their own accord legislators would have to devote a considerable amount of time and manpower to issues that often offer little potential political gains. This negative cost-benefit analysis will make a legislator more inclined to depend on interest groups to get an insight in the policy under consideration. Furthermore, I expect that legislators will prefer to consult with likeminded interest groups. These groups can be expected to provide the additional support to make sense of technical25 in terms that legislators understand. Engaging with interest groups from multiple sides will only increase a legislator’s workload, as he only will have more information to process and compare. This leads to the following hypothesis: H3a: Legislator will have active on issues with a technically complex nature greater demand for legislative subsidy. Political polarization The last factor that I expect to influence legislator demand for interest group input is the political context in which an issue is debated. In this respect Virgiana Gray (et all, 2014) suggests that as party competition increases, the demand for interest group input grows. The authors argue that political polarization increases uncertainty about political outcomes. This heightens the need of legislators for allies to support their policy positions. Or in the words of Gray et all: “[…] in a more polarized duel- to-the-death [kind of] world politicians will have a powerful incentives to mobilize any allies they can find and to punish those who do not show up suited for battle” (2014, 7). This leads to the expectation that a high degree of political mobilization will increase the demand for legislative subsidy. This leads to the hypothesis: H3b: Legislators active on issues where there is a high degree of political polarization will have a greater demand for legislative subsidy
Hypotheses
Policy-process factors H1 As a policy process progresses legislators will have a greater demand for legislative subsidy Party-contextH2a Legislator from smaller parties will have a greater demand for legislative subsidy from interest groups. H2b The more extreme the ideological position of he greater their demand for legislative subsidy H2c Parties in the opposition will have a greater demand for legislative subsidy than parties in the governing coalition
Issue-context H3a
Legislator will have active on issues with a technically complex nature greater demand for legislative subsidy
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Methodology
Finding the causal relation that creates of the demand for interest group input poses methodological problems. Where correlations can be statically proven, the dynamics of human interaction that cause interest group activity are hard to capture in testable variables (Beyers and Braun, 2014, 116). Social relations and interactions, especially those in a highly dynamic decision-making arena, are however hard to capture. Furthermore, the relation between a legislator and lobbyist are further complicated by the fact that they are often established and consumed in informal settings: by meetings in the hallways, through casual conversation, a few e-mails, a phone-call. There is not particular setting in which they can be studied freely. The only way to gain insight in the dynamics with these relationships is to talk to those who are a part of them (Devine, 2002, 199). In order to overcome this problem this research will rely on interviews with subjects on both side of the relationship. By asking them how they perceive the relation between legislators and lobbyists, and how they themselves act within it, the formulated hypotheses will be tested.
The interviews will be, in the definition of Huitt and Peabody, semi-structured: they will only be structured by a topic list which will “allow more opportunity for probing and give […] the correspondents considerable room to expand on their answers” (quoted in Peabody et all, 1990). This method is best suited for multiple reasons:
- A semi-structured interview (for topic list see: appendix I and II) offers the opportunity to test the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical framework.
- The relation between legislators and lobbyist are complex and often based on social factors, routines and the views of the interviewees are often subjective. The perception of both legislators and lobbyist might exaggerate or diminish their own role in the relation, just as they might well not be fully aware of why the act the way they. This more free-form of questioning will allow more room to probe the interviewees so that their (unconscious) behaviour and biases can be questioned to discover their deeper motives (Babbie,2010,318-322, Berry, 2002).
- A high degree of freedom gives room to explore variables that are not included in the theory and/or hypotheses. This not only permits me to test the theories in a more fundamental way, it also opens the opportunity to amend them and to follow up other clues for new theoretical insights.
27 The interviews are recorded and transcribed after completion. The transcribed answers will be grouped on basis of their topic. To make the transcript better applicable they only include the most important remarks from the respondents. To verify that their statements are not wrongly interpreted all transcripts were sent to the respective respondent to offer them the opportunity to comment and review their statements in further details. Only three requests for (small) alternations were made. The transcripts are included as appendixes to this thesis to the coordinator of this thesis (see: appendix III to XX). To safeguard the anonymity of the respondent these transcripts will not be published publicly The coordinator of this thesis will receive a list of the respondents names. If needed the sound recordings of most the interviews are available on request.
Case selection
This research will be based on a single case study of the relation between members of the Dutch ‘Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal’ and representatives of various Dutch interest groups or professional lobbyists. The Dutch parliament has 150 members and is the highest elected political body of the Dutch government. The Dutch administrative capital of the Hague harbours an interest community of at least 600 active lobbyists who lobby the Dutch government (Akkerman, 2015). The choice to focus on a political body instead of an government department or agency has two reasons. First of all, most of the theories used in this thesis are based on data from the U.S. Congress (and in lesser extent from the European Institutions). Studying those cases would present this research with a considerable amount of practical and financial problems. This made it more logical to focus on the most comparable institution in the Netherlands. Secondly, government agencies are less transparent than political bodies. Gaining access and finding the right persons to talk would have made the selection of respondents very difficult and beyond the scope of this thesis Although it can be assumed that the dynamics between legislators and interest groups do not fundamentally differ per country or decision-making arena, it is important to be aware of some particular factors of the Dutch case which can influence the validity of this study. First of all there are few important institutional and cultural characteristics. One of those is the electoral system. Firstly, the Dutch parliament is elected by a system of proportional
representation, districts do not directly elect legislators (although they can be chosen by so-28
called preferences votes, but this is uncommon). This limits the political agency of legislators in relation to their political party; as parties are paramount to the chances of legislator to get re-elected. Because parties decided a legislator’s place on the ballot. Secondly, the Netherlands has a tradition of neo-corporatism. Although this tradition is becoming less pronounced, the traces of this hierarchical interest representation system can still be expected to influence the composition of the Dutch interest community. In this community traditionally important interest groups can be expected to enjoy an elevated position vis a
vis newer interest groups (Andeweg and Irwin, 188-211).
Because all the respondents operate in the same legislative arena it is hard to take the characteristics of the Dutch political system into account as independent variables. It is likely that these characteristics will influence the validity of this study. However, looking to the validity of other studies done on interests advocacy in the Netherlands, these effects should not be overstated (See for example: Beyers and Braun, 2014; Dur and Matteo, 2013).
Unit of analysis
As this research focuses on the demands of legislator, it is clear that they are the unit of analysis in this research. However, as noted before, Robert Salisbury and Kenneth Sheple argue that a legislator cannot be seen as just an individual member of parliament, but that his staff should also be included in the equation as their combined manpower dictates the amount of work and issue’s and legislator can handle. Thus their concept of the political enterprise will be the unit of analysis in this study. This means that there will be no distinction made between a staffer and his member of parliament and they will be considered as a single entity.
Data collection
As explained in the methodology section the data-collection is done through sixteen semi-structured interviews. Eight of these interviews were with staffers of legislators. I choose to interview staffer because they are responsible for writing the speeches, position papers and other material for legislators. This means that they are most active in contacts with lobbyists. Also because they manage the legislators agenda.. This makes that staffers can be seen as the gatekeepers of the legislators. They can be expected to be very up to date with all a legislator’s dealings with interest groups. Another advantage is that staffers have less
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demanding schedules than legislators and that they are less subject to public scrutiny. This makes them more accessible and reliable sources.
The eight other respondents were lobbyists. They were interviewed to gain insight in how they experience their interactions with legislators, who of them are more forthcoming in approaching them, what kind of requests they get from them and what circumstances tend to make legislator approach them. Involving respondents from sides of the legislators-lobbyists relationship allows me to double check observations a get a comprehensive picture of the interactions.
Overall the validity of this research seems robust. I interviewed staffers from six different political parties from diverse ideological backgrounds. Of the major Dutch political parties only staffers from the CDA and GroenLinks are not represented in this research. The interviewed lobbyists also represented a wide variety of interest; they include a one working for a NGO, two representing business associations, one representing an individual company, three lobbyists work for a lobbying firm and one works for an umbrella-organization. The major omissions in this respect are labour unions.
To safeguard the reliability of the data some measures were taken. Firstly, all respondents were asked to single out one or two issue’s they were recently active on and answer the question these issue’s in mid. This was done to prevent that respondents would confuse issue specific circumstances or that they would answer questions based on hearsay in their professional surroundings. What proved helpful was the fact that in most instances I had the opportunity to interview staffers and lobbyists active on the same issues, which allows me to compare statements and perceive the dynamic from both sides Secondly, the interviews were held on the basis of anonymity to allow the respondents to answer the questions as freely as possible. Two staffers weren’t allowed to have the interview recorded, but his was the only constraint that I encountered during the entire interviewing process. The interview were all taken in a professional setting but had an informal nature. Respondents appeared to be open and forthcoming. Therefore I assume that the reliability of this study is robust.
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What legislators want
As pointed out in the theoretical framework, different strands of thought in the literature on interest advocacy distinguish different benefits that interest groups can allocate to legislators. These benefits don’t seem to be equally in demand by legislators, all though this is probably specific for the casus of this study. Based on the data collected in this study it can be concluded that Dutch legislators have little demand for political support from interest groups, while they are very open to the information that interest groups can provide them with. Based on the interviews some general observations can be made in about the needs that legislators have for interest groups input.
The demand for political support
The first, and expected, observation is that the exchange theories find little support in this study. The relations between lobbyists and legislators don’s seems based on tit for tat-exchanges, neither in the form of material support nor in the form of political support. The latter does find a little bit more support, as legislators take the preferences of the interest groups that represent their (potential) electorate into account when choosing a position on an issue. The notion that politicians exchange their influence directly for political support is disputed by fourteen of the seventeen interviewees. The other three respondents, all of which are lobbyists found that legislators actively try to identify themselves with an interest to enlarge their political exposure, such as opportunities to talk at high-profile events or to get positive coverage in either sectorial or popular papers and magazines (interview 1; interview 10; interview 11). The instances they recall most often involve legislators from parties that have clear ties to certain sector, such as the CDA, that has strong ties to the agricultural sector. Respondents are unanimous in saying that material support plays an even smaller role in the relations between lobbyists and legislators in the Netherlands. In this respect respondents point to the strict regulations that forbid Dutch legislators to accept gifts above a worth of €50,-, the requirement of noting these gift in a public register and the high level of public scrutiny on this point. This attention warrants special concern at the side of legislators to stay clear of any sign of undue behaviour. Up to the point that one staffer even pays the coffee when meeting a lobbyist in the parliamentary building, priced €0,80,- a cup (interview
31 13). A lobbyist that has been active for over twenty years contrasted this with the lobbying-practices in the 1980’s: “Back in those days it was still accepted to invite legislators to high-profile events like rugby-matches in Twickenham and F1-races on the circuit of Zandvoort. These invitations were happily accepted. This is unthinkable in the current political atmosphere. The €50,- limit might just enable you to grab a simple lunch with policymakers. (interview 1, 3).”
Most respondents voiced the view that the Dutch political system and culture does not offer much incentives for trade-offs between interest groups and lobbyists, due the small role of campaign finance in Dutch politics and the absence of a tradition that puts electoral premiums on endorsements (interview 5; interview 6; interview 9; interview 13; interview 14).
The demand for information
The core assumptions of both the signalling and the legislative subsidy theory, which both assume that interest groups act a source of information for legislators, found stronger support. Interviewed lobbyists see their function in similar terms. They see it as their job to transmit factual information to inform legislators of the interests of the groups they represent (interview 1; interview 2; interview 3; interview 5; interview 8; interview 9; interview 10; interview 11). Thus, information is the key demand of legislators when dealing with interest groups. The kind of information that legislators want to receive differs per context in which an issue is discussed and depends on the relation they have with the interest groups they are talking too.
On the one hand all staffers expressed the importance of talking with a diverse range of interest groups with a legitimate interest in their policy field, no matter their position on the issue. Staffers see it as their “democratic duty” and value the new insights into an issue that interest groups can offer them (interview 6, similar views in interview 4; interview 12; interview 13 and interview 15). Likewise all lobbyists expressed that they wanted to talk to all political parties, no matter their ideological position or voting record (interview 1; interview 2; interview 3; interview 5; interview 8; interview 9; interview 10; interview 11). These talks are based on the free exchange of facts and viewpoints through which a
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legislator can make sense of an issue, both from a factual and a political perspective. This is what Güllberg (2008) deemed ‘private information’. Information about the practical and economic implications of a proposed policy plays a dominant role in the exchanges between staffers and lobbyists. Interest groups provide legislators with information on the effects of a proposed policy they themselves could not possibly collect. Staffers told that they, by talking to lobbyists, are better able to grasp the different effects of policy proposals on a sector or individual citizens. This insight can relate to expected positive results of a policy, its unwished side effects or information about the practical and technical limitations or possibility of the proposal at hand (interview 6; interview 7; interview 12; interview 13; interview 14). This insight can relate to expected positive results of a policy, its unwished side effects or information about the practical and technical limitations or possibility of the proposal at hand (interview 6; interview 7; interview 12; interview 13; interview 14). For instance, when working on a proposal to raise the energy-tax a staffer for a coalition party talked with a company that would face enormous additional costs if the proposal passed. That the company would be hit so hard was an unforeseen consequence that had not even crossed anyone’s mind yet (interview 4, 2). In these contacts interest groups have a chance to plea and to convince a legislator of their position. On the other hand, the staffer who talked to the company that faced a financial backslash due to a tax increase, did not change his view on the matter. Even more, he said to have “never changed his position” on basis of contacts with interest groups (interview 4). While four staffers cited instances in which they altered their position based on private information of interest groups, the acknowledged that these were rather exceptions than rules (interview 6; interview 7; interview 14; interview 15). Virtually all respondents answered in the same fashion, they deemed contacts with likeminded actors as more effective. Lobbyists found easier access to legislators that have a similar view on an issue (interview 1; interview 2; interview 3; interview 5; interview 8; interview 9; interview 10; interview 11). While staffers said to have in most cases more use for information that is supportive of their position (interview 6; interview 7; interview 12; interview 13; interview 14). The notion that interest groups act in a way as to make sense of an issue is only a part of the story. When engaging with likeminded interest groups legislators also have a demand for other kinds of information. First of all they more actively ask for arguments and facts that
