State Terrorism in the Philippines
Unmasking the securitized terror behind ‘War on Drugs’
Master Thesis, Spring 2017 George Plevris (s1722026) Supervisor: Dr. M. Kitzen
Second Reader: Liesbeth van der Heide
University of Leiden- The Hague Campus Master MSc. Crisis & Security Management May 2017
Leiden University,
The Hague
By the end of this paper, I believe you will come to the same observation that I arrived: Terror (-ism) is the finest tool of political and social
governance a state can deploy. If executed well, it does not only achieve the goal of submission of the audience, but it eliminates
the latter’s tool of resistance: hope.
Abstract
Typically, modern states have the monopoly on legitimate violence drawn from their sovereignty and democratic rule of law, on the behest of their citizens. This ‘legitimate’ violence however has seen a rise in the last two decades, and taken forms of intricate civil wars, wars on crime, wars on drugs and wars on terror. Yet, despite outcries for violations of laws and human rights, of crimes against humanity and war crimes, policies of extreme violence performed by the democratic states are hardly ever labeled as state terrorism. This paper will explore the scholarship of state terrorism, often a contested topic among academic and experts, and will approach the issue through the current ‘war on drugs’ raging in the Philippines. The theoretical premise that I will carve out aims to explore and acknowledge the existence of state terror but also the difficulty in naming it. What factors blur the picture of a government deploying state terrorism in its crime-governance policies? Securitization and Responsibilisation, as the two most prominent discourse theories on crime governance will shed light to the issue.
Key words: state terrorism, securitization, responsibilisation, war on drugs, Philippines, discourse
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 5
Chapter 1: Theoretical Frameworks ... 10
1.1. State Terrorism ... 10 1.2. Securitization Theory ... 16 1.3. Responsibilisation Theory ... 19 1.4. Theoretical Proposition ... 21Chapter 2: Research Design ... 25
2.1. The Choice of a Case Study ... 25 2.2. Unit of Analysis and Units of Observation ... 27 2.3. Methodology ... 28Chapter 3: Uncovering Philippines’ War on Drugs ... 31
3.1. From social, law enforcement drug policies to a war on drugs ... 32 3.2. Securitizing discourse as a cloak of invisibility ... 43 3.3. Responsibility, Greed and Fear ... 53Chapter 4: Unmasking the state terror in the War on Drugs ... 57
4.1. Deliberate actions of violence against individuals the state has a duty to protect ... 58 4.2. Role of state actors and state-sponsored actors ... 63 4.3. Instilling extreme fear to the targeted audience ... 69 4.4. Change of behavior: the means justify the ends ... 73Conclusion ... 77
Observations ... 77 Lessons Learned ... 80Bibliography ... 80
Introduction
When Clausewitz once said, “war is the continuation of politics by other means”, I doubt whether he had in mind modern applications of the concept in domestic politics and crime governance. At the very best, what he must have thought was states, empires, even kingdoms, deciding to claim and effectuate what their diplomacy and politics of trade or economics could not by the brute force of the canon. Where other means were ineffective or insufficient to meet a political end, war was seen as inevitable. In 1945 war was “prohibited”, the UN Chartered stands tall of that prohibition, a watchful eye above the international community. Democracies agreed to that without much resistance; after all which self-proclaimed and acknowledged democracy will claim merit and value in such a devastating tool. Instead, (collective) self-defense took the place of war, and diplomacy and peace triumphed. If this was the narration of a fairytale, the happy ending will be due just about now.
But neither war died nor democratic states forgot its raw power and added value. On the contrary, ‘armed conflicts’, as is now the political correct term in international affairs and international law, have spread and still stand strong in many parts of the world, whether international or non-international in their character. But this paper is not a “story” on international conflict. It is a “story” of how war moved realms, and relocated, immigrated to the domestic level. Since 2001, a landmark date for the international community, the noun “war” has crawled its way into much government policies and tactics, as a favorable term for once to indicate the serious commitment of the government to the eradication of a threat, and at the same time to underline the dire, existential nature of that threat. The United States has been waging a “war on terror” ever since, one with a far-reaching hand, much domestically as so internationally. Mexico has also dealt long with its drug crime in similar terms, and last December, a decade was “celebrated” since Felipe Calderon first declared in 2006 a tough “war” against the drug
cartels and their networks of organized crime.1 For Mexico, ten years after, this “war” has become so normalized, a routine operation, that the level of tolerance for the degradation of human lives has seem to have sunk in low thresholds.2 Similar situations, similar
‘wars’ have been fought in Colombia, in Argentina, in Brazil. Crime, whether drug, organized, terror or mafia crime, is now attracting a new way of governance by the state.
Last June, following the Presidential election of Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines joined the club of ‘war’-on-crime countries, by declaring in open terms a crackdown on all drug users, pushers, and addicts in the country. Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’ has since then made headlines domestically and all over the world. At the very moment these words are written, I cannot state with certainty the death toll this ‘war’ has claimed. Every couple of days, every other week, the numbers keep rising, with the last count being at more than 9,000 people.3 And it is people that are dying, not just “drug personalities”, a favorite term used by Filipino police and government officials. It is Filipino citizens being killed on the street, in their homes, in a police cell, whether they are drug addicts, recreational users or pushers.
These killings, often called extrajudicial or summary killings, have attracted the attention of the international community, and of some domestic opposition. Yet, law and morality seem to dominate in the outcry, focusing on whether Duterte is guilty for crimes against humanity, complicity to murder and so forth. This observation, with slight tones of surprise enclosed in “Yet”, by no means aims at underestimating the nature and power of law, or the value of recognizing these killings as such: murder and crimes against humanity. After all, if accountability is to be attained, this will primarily happen through legal means and paths. But it is peculiar how easily the attention is shifted on the outcome, the killings, and its legal branding, without looking the wider frame of the policy. Last year, Open Society Foundation released a report detailing and discussing 1 Reggie Thomson, “A Decade into Mexico’s War on Drugs”, Stratfor Worldview, December 11 (2006), available at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/decade-mexicos-war-drugs 2 Daniel Barker Flores, “Mexico’s war on drug has a long shelf life”, International Policy Digest, January 4 (2017), available at: https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/01/04/mexico-s-war-on-drugs-has-a-long-shelf-life/ 3 Patricia Lourdes Viray, “Philippines maintain commitment to drug war along side ASEAN”, The Philippines Star,April 27 (2017), available at:
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/27/1694443/philippines-maintains-commitment-how the “war on drugs” in Mexico has lead to crimes against humanity and mass atrocities.4 The report is an excellent account of all the atrocities that have taken place in
the last decade in Mexico, detailing the actions of both sides, but it does not refer to the aspect of state terrorism. Similarly, in the case of Philippines, Duterte was quickly accused of crimes against humanity, and recently a complaint was filed against him in the International Criminal Court.5 The narrative remains the same, and for good reasons. But Duterte’s policies are not simply one-sided, and should not only exist, named and shamed in the realm of law. They remain policies based on fear and terror, policies that won elections, mobilized support, distorted, and still do so, the role and the purpose of the state. State terrorism does include internationally prohibited acts, and can lead to the commission of international crimes. But it is a policy nonetheless, a choice of politics that must be acknowledged as equal atrocious as international crimes are.
The problem in the case of terrorism deployed by states is the incompatibility of the notion with state sovereignty, democracy and the rule of law. Critics of the concept, as will be explained in this thesis’ first chapter, strongly oppose any argument about (democratic) states being capable of terrorism. The concept of state terrorism has only been allowed to flourish, marginally, and to develop, predominantly, on the international level. On this occasion, state-sponsored terrorism is often tolerated and usually swept under the rug of economic state policies and national security interests. State terrorism is limited in international coercive diplomacy, or surrogate, secretive activities that aim for one state to undermine the stability of another.6 Only when the case comes to dictatorial regimes, coups and authoritarianism do critics ‘budge and inch’ and engage in relevant discussions of domestic state terror. But even in these cases, state terrorism is purported as a covert action, of secret and clandestine support, either materially and/or
4 “Confronting Crimes Against Humanity in Mexico”, Open Society Foundation, November (2016), available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/undeniable-atrocities-en-20160602.pdf 5 Oliver Holmes, “Mass Murder Complaint filled against Philippines’ President Duterte at ICC”, The Guardian, April 25 (2017), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/25/mass-complaint-launched-against-philippines-president-duterte-at-icc 6 See Mitchell C., Stohl M, Carleton D., Lopez G., State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement, in Stohl M. and Lopez G. (eds) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research, New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 1-26, at p. 5, (1986).
economically, of paramilitary and vigilante groups, which the state will never acknowledge or be linked to.7
My thesis will draw upon this incompatibility, the debate in state terrorism, and it will try to demonstrate how democratic states and democratically elected leaders can and do deploy state terrorism as policies to meet governance goals. Philippines will be a well-suited case study for a number of reasons. First of all, because Duterte run and won a presidential election on precisely that policy; a ruthless, no mercy, bluntly and vocally articulated killing of drug users and pushers. Secondly, because that policy, that way of curtailing drug crime, found quick implementation in police and state agencies, gathered much support and some opposition; and above all because it materialized not only through police misconduct and criminal action, but through the appearance and predominance of death squads. What is more, the case is of further interest due to discourse President Duterte used before and after his election to the presidential office. Himself a public and vocal supporter of extrajudicial killings, he has defended his policy against critics domestically, and internationally (UN, EU), and remains still one of the most popular Presidents in the Philippines’ history.8 I will therefore take stock of the
discourse used alongside with the “war on drugs” and try to explore how it has impacted the latter. I will mobilize the two prominent theories when it comes to discourse and governance of security, namely securitization and responsibilisation.
The first chapter of the thesis will present and build my theoretical framework. State terrorism, securitization and responsibilisation will be examined and analyzed, each in a different section, discussing current formulated scholarship, as well as keeping key elements on the side, to be used throughout the paper. At the last part of chapter one, I will put forth my theoretical proposition, the premise that structures my research question and research goal: to what extent can the current ‘war on drugs’ in the Philippines be assessed as state terrorism, and how security discourse has impacted on its perception. Chapter two will deal with the research design and methodology of the thesis,
7 G. Martin, “Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues”, Sage Publications, at.
pp. 81-111, (2003).
8 Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth about Duterte’s Popularity in the Philippines”, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/the-truth-about-dutertes-substantiating the choice of a single-n case study. In Chapter three, I will offer an extended account of the situation in the Philippines. I will look on statistics, reports, present and juxtapose facts with policies, including speeches and discourse used by the President and the Filipino government. The goal of this chapter is to allow the reader to become familiar with the situation on the ground, and enumerate all the information, facts and figures necessary before we proceed with the analysis. Chapter four will do exactly that: put the information presented previously in a context, that of state terrorism, and analyze it step by step. At the same time, due account will be given to securitization and responsibilisation as elements that can impact the perception of state terrorism by observers, or magnify its impact for the audience. Finally, in the last part of the thesis, I will conclude with my observations, and answer the research question.
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
As briefly described in the Introduction, the aim of this thesis is to describe and explain the current socio-political phenomenon and violent behavior that devolves in the Philippines, labeled as ‘war on drugs’, starting as a landmark date the election of Duterte in the office of the President of the Philippines. The main research question seeks an answer to the inquiry of whether, and to what extent state terrorism as a political science theory fits and explains the violence in the Philippines, while secondary research questions aim to examine and explore potentially how securitization and/or responsibilisation strategies are factors that have either facilitated or distracted the understanding of the said violence as a phenomenon of state terrorism.
In this first chapter I will discuss the three main theoretical frames that will be deployed in my thesis, namely state terrorism theory, securitization theory and responsibilisation strategy. In three different sections each theoretical frame will be taken apart and explored, through a short definition and a brief literature review. Subsequently, once all theoretical frames are clarified I will proceed with the last part of this chapter, which is the theoretical proposition. There I will present my theoretical premise, the hypothesis upon which I will base my analysis, by bringing the three above theories in one instrumentality that will be used for the purposes of this case study.
1.1 State Terrorism
One of the perennial issues in classic and current international relations theory and political science is that of terrorism. It is not a concept foreign to the understanding of security politics and security policies. On the contrary, terror has been a “means to achieve ends” that predates modern concepts, and even finds origins in 18th century France and the Revolution of 1793. Yet, it remains a concept difficult to pinpoint with such clarity as to invoke international consensus. Many scholars, academics and politicians have recognized the definitional difficulties when it comes to terrorism as well
as the lack or agreement in one [definition], amongst them Silke9, Barker,10 and Weinberg et. Al;11 And yet, despite the lack of agreement on what terrorism is, Laqueur
notes that more than a 100 definitions of terrorism have been attempted and are currently in place, some to be found in international legislation, others in national or regional legal frameworks, and others for purposes of academic and scholarly studies.12 This is important to recognize when attempting to conceptualize state terrorism, as it includes a double caveat; not only do we endeavor to examine an already controversial concept, that lacks uniform understanding (terrorism), but one that also prioritizes the role of a contested actor (the state). In a general note however, the majority of terrorism definitions, setting the actor involved aside, have in common the understanding that terrorism has in its core the instrumentalization of the victims’ suffering (whether chosen randomly or deliberately) as a means to communicate a message to an audience, often -but not necessarily- of political nature.13
Turning to the debate of terrorism employed by states, there are two opposing approaches, with an intermediary position: On the one hand, some scholars argue that states simply cannot and do not engage in terrorism. In that approach’s conceptualization of terrorism, only non-state actors can engage in it and this is due to their inability to wield violence in a legitimate way. States on the other hand, as sovereign entities, have a legitimate monopoly on violence that evades the definitional constructions of terrorism, and is grounded on the right and duty to maintain a minimum of order on which society and civilized life rests upon.14 A middle ground is reached by still focusing on the act of terrorism but remaining less resilient in the depiction of its actor; such a possibility allows identifying states as actors of terrorism, but even in that case a call for a sharp distinction of the two, based on situational elements, is still in place. Scholars such as Jackson and Richardson have insisted on drawing a bright red line between the two, for 9 Silke A., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, London: Frank Cass., p. 2, (2004). 10 Barker J., The No-nonsense Guide to Terrorism, London: Verso, p. 23, (2003). 11 Weinberg L., Pedahzur A., and Hirsch-Hoefler S., The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16 (4): 777-794, (2004). 12 Laqueur W., The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Aims of Mass Destruction, Oxford University Press, pp. 5 (1999). 13 Jackson R., Murphy E., Poynting S., Terrorism, the State and the Study of Political Terror, in Contemporary State Terrorism, Routledge, pp. 1-11, at p. 4, (2010). 14 Lagueuer, W., No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, New York Continuum, p. 237, (2003).
reasons of pragmatism and analytical purposes, turning the spotlight in the apparent differences between the two concepts rather their similarities.15 On the other hand, the
third approach to state terrorism categorically argues that states can and actually do engage in terrorism. The proponents of this approach argue that the focus of the research should not be on the nature of the perpetrator, but on the very act itself, allowing state and non-state actors to be examined equally. For scholars like Goodin and Blakeley, terrorism, regardless of the nature of the perpetrator, entails a number of specific moral wrongs, beyond the unjustified killings and harm, such as the instrumentalization of human suffering, the intention to cause widespread fear and the betrayal of the duty to care towards fellow citizens.16
At this point another clarification must be made. The terrorism studies literature, to some extent and with more ease, locate state terrorism in the international sphere, identifying and examining cases where one state engages in terrorism activities in another state, which would also entail state sponsoring or state financing terrorism. State terrorism then is perceived to be a form of coercive and covert foreign policy, and much like Clausewitz’s “war as continuation of politics by other means” it aims to have an equal goal. In line with this perception, frontline scholars like Stohl, writing back in 1984, recognized 3 broad categories of state terrorism: a) overt engagements in coercive diplomacy; b) covert participation in assassinations, coups, bombing campaigns and similar; and c) surrogate activities, in which assistance is offered to a secondary state or insurgent organization for the conduct of terrorism.17 Although this understanding of state terrorism as more obvious in the international foreign-policy practice of a state is not wrong, it should not be seen to preclude a parallel application of the concept for domestic use. Examples in Latin America can explain both the involvement of a state in terrorism in other countries for political, foreign policy gains, such as the frequent US
15 Jackson R., Jarvis L., Gunning J., and Breen Smyth M., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 181, (2011); and Richardson L., What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, NY: Random House, p. 5, (2006). 16 Goodin R., What’s Wrong with Terrorism?,Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 102, (2006); and Blakely R., Bringning the State Back into Terrorism Studies, European Political Science, 6 (3): 228-253, (2007). 17 Stohl M., Carleton D., and Steven E. Johnson, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter" Journal of Peace Research, No. 3,: pp. 1-11 (1984).
(CIA) activities in Guatemala, Colombia, as well as domestic state engagement in terrorism, such as in Argentina, during the “Dirty War”.
Relevant typologies that describe the relationship, even proximity, of the actor to the act of terrorism, of either international or domestic nature, have been brought forth by other prominent scholars, in a more modernized and pragmatic approach. Conn differentiates between state terrorism (direct perpetration), state involvement in terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism (indirect perpetration).18 In a similar way, Blakeley not only distinguishes between state perpetration and state sponsorship of terrorism, but goes a step further in separating what she calls “limited state terrorism”, that is targeted at a specific narrow audience, and what she labels as “generalized state terrorism” where the entire population is meant to be targeted as the audience of the terrorist act.19 For Blakeley, a prominent scholar in terrorism studies, the significance of the audience as the recipient of the message plays key role in identifying acts of terrorism and separating them from violence and criminal behavior.
For the purpose of this thesis, the latter approach will be adopted, supporting that states are capable entities of committing terrorism, with emphasis given at the domestic nature of the act. Accordingly, my analysis will primary focus on the constituent elements of terrorism, without of course downplaying the viewpoint of the state as the actor. What those constituent elements then must be, that will lead us to determine if the violent act is (state) terrorism? There are a couple of important definitional attempts to be discussed before presenting the one adopted for the purposes of this case study. Eugene Walters is one of the first scholars back in the 70s to attempt a conceptualization of what terrorism entails;20 he proposed three key elements to consider: first, there is violence, threatened or
perpetrated, directed at some victim; second, the violent actor intends that violence to cause terror in some witness who is generally distinct from the victim, with the later being instrumental to the act; and lastly, the violent actor intends or expects that the terrorized witness to the violence will alter his or her behavior. Later, in the 80s, other 18 Conn J., Typology of Terrorism, in Jarvis L., and Lister M., State Terrorism Research and Critical Terrorism Studies: An assessment, in Critical Studies on Terrorism 7 (1): 43-61, at 45, (2013). 19 Blakeley R., State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, Abington Routledge, p. 35 (2009). 20 Walter E., Terror and Resistance, Oxford University Press, (1969).
prominent scholars like Lopez, Stohl, and Mitchell build up on these elements to reach a definition of state terrorism that entails the following:
“Terrorism by the state (or non-state actors) involves deliberate coercion and violence (or threat thereof) directed at some victim, with the intention of inducing extreme fear in some target observers who identify with the victim in such a way that they
perceive themselves as potential future victims. In this way they are forced to consider altering their behavior in some manner desired by the actor”.21
In the last years, mainly after 9/11, there have been attempts to redefine terrorism studies, modernize the research agenda and further explore the concept of state and non-state terrorism. This is in line with the overall proliferation of new theories, or old theories that have been revisited, such as the privatization of security, the governance of crime and crime prevention, and governance of security. In light of the first observation- the revisiting of the agenda of terrorism studies-, Blakeley in a recent publication critically discusses conceptions of state terrorism, and by building up on past definitional attempts, such as the ones briefly presented above, she arrives in the following proposition: four key elements are encompassed in state terrorism:22
a. There must be a deliberate act of violence against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such act if a climate of fear has already been established through preceding acts of state violence;
b. The act must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including paramilitaries and private security agents;
c. The act or threat of violence is intended to induce extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that victim;
d. The target audience is forced to consider changing their behavior in some way, without that change need to be political.
I will adopt this definition of state terrorism in my analysis, as it covers extensively all the relevant aspects and elements of terrorism raised by other scholars, yet it
21 Id. supra note 5.
underlines the role of state as the perpetrator of this act. Blakeley gives particular importance to the role of the audience and the victim of the terrorism act, and argues that what differentiates state terrorism from other forms of state repression is the instrumentality of the victims’ suffering to “reason” the audience and coerce a calculated reaction from it. Further analyses in the field of security studies and governance of security have crossed paths with that instrumentality of state terrorism. Stohl for example has underscored the need for the research to focus on the dehumanization as the key precursor to state terror, and to that end he has formulated many relevant propositions in his writings. He calls for better knowledge about regimes that support state terrorism, the justifications, camouflages or strategies used to surround and disorient from it.23 Attention is shifted to how state terrorism is realized, viable and practiced, and goes in some cases undetected. Other scholars point out further needs in the debate, namely to concentrate on how courses of actions, subjects and objects are constituted as part of state terrorism: “[…] demands attention to the discourses/rationalities and technologies of governing, and the ways in which projects selectively align and assemble diverse entities to achieve their aims, either directly or by ensuring the ‘self-government’ of relevant actors”.24
This modern approach that widens the scope of analysis brings forth a combination of theoretical frameworks of security governance that might prove useful in understanding the complete picture of how state terrorism is deployed. Because the importance and instrumentality of the victims and audience of terrorism lies at heart of the state terrorism theory, cross-reference to security governance theories that adopt the same approach is fitting. I propose two of these theoretical frameworks to be combined with that of state terrorism: securitization and responsibilisation. Both the above theories have at their core the role of the actor and the audience; in securitization, while the securitizing actor performs the process, it is the audience, as the receiver, that will embrace and endorse the policies proposed, thus rendering the securitizing act successful. In a similar reasoning, responsibilisation theories, as strategies to govern crime and
23 Stohl M., Old myths, new fantasies and the enduring realities of terrorism, in Critical Studies of
Terrorism, London: Rutledge, pp. 43-50, (2008).
24 Bulkeley H., and Schroeder H., Beyond State/non-State Divides: global Cities and the Governing of
security, aim at raising and appealing to the sense of insecurity of the audience, so as it would feel the need to partake to the crime-governing policies the actor, usually the state, proposes, so as to ensure its own security. Keeping that in mind, the connection is not hard to see. State terrorism also aims at an audience, and has as its end goal to motivate them, through fear and the pain of victims, to change their behavior, or to adopt a specific one. Therefore, as Sthol argued, many strategies of discourse influence and manipulation, can interfere, disrupt or blur the true colors of state terrorism. Or even so, help the latter make its effects be more widespread. This very premise is to be examined in this thesis.
1.2. Securitization Theory
Securitization as a theoretical construct was born out of the so-called “Copenhagen School”, that dealt with and analyzed security as part of the discipline of security studies. Securities studies themselves were an offspring of the field of “strategic studies” and International Relations that found much ground for research during and after the Cold War.25 This school of thought, with its major representatives being Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, focused its work on the character of security, “what security is”, by “who” it is defined and on what terms, and what does it potentially include. The Copenhagen School built up on definitions of security as first conceptualized by Wolfers, the “absence of threats to acquired values”, and went on to argue that security is a contested and ambiguous issue.26 Similarly other scholars came to align with that proposition on the elusive and indeterminate ability to define security, while its use has ever been expanding. Garnett claimed that the concept of security has been dangerously overdeveloped and extended that it was close to lose its meaning.27 In the same note,
25 Charrett C., A critical application of Securitization Theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security, International Catalan Institute for Peace, pp. 1-48, (2009). 26 Wolfers A., National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, Political Science Quarterly, 67 (4), pp. 481-502, at p. 483, (1952). 27 Garnett J.C., European Security after the Cold War, in Davis M.J. (ed), Security Issues in the Post-Cold
Baldwin stated, “security has been turned into a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists”.28
In their studies of what security is and how it is framed the Copenhagen School coined the theory of securitization, which builds on their understanding of security based on existential threats and emergency measures. Buzan, Waever and De Wilde defined the concept of securitization as “ [a successful speech-act] through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exception measures to deal with that threat”.29 This approach to security emphasizes its particular discursive and political force in achieving a goal, while its special nature justifies the use of extraordinary measures to reach that goal. To that definition of Buzan et al., Balzaq attributes a firm separation of “normal” and “exceptional” politics, while claiming it not to be necessary to understand the security process. According to him, securitization is:
“An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artifacts (metaphors, policy tools, images, analogies, stereotypes and emotions) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reason for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be immediately undertaken to block it”.30
According to its proponents, securitization is the (successful) move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics; in that sense it can be seen as a more extreme version
28 Baldwin D. A., The Concept of Security, Review of International Studies, 23(1), pp. 5-26, at p. 9, (1997). 29 Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilder J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London,Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.23 (1998). 30 Balzacq T., A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions and Variants’, in Balzacq T. (ed), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, London: Routledge, p. 3 (2011).
of politicization.31 Its elements are the securitizing actor, the referent object, the referent threat, the audience and the securitizing speech act. The theory places in a central position the securitizing actor and its relationship with the audience, while the speech act itself is the securitizing move, the securitizing attempt. If the latter hails of acceptance by the audience then we can talk of a securitized issue. According to Buzan et al. the possibility of a successful securitization will vary dramatically with regard to the position held by the actor; it is thus a very much structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security and having the power to define it (like presidents, prime ministers, defense experts, military generals etc.).32
Facilitating conditions to securitization are (a) the internal demands to the speech act of following the grammar of security; (b) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor, meaning the relationship between the audience and the speaker and above all the likelihood of the former accepting the claims of the latter; and lastly (c) the very features of the alleged threats that can either facilitate or impede securitization.It is important to note that securitization does not work as a “carte blanche” for all topics and all referent objects, as a uniform recipe to be applied regardless. On the contrary, depending on the issue and sector to be deployed, securitization must follow the respective logic and grammar of security, meaning that the securitizing actor has to apply a sub-form or grammar, which is specific to the intended sector. There are five prevalent sectors for securitization theory: the political, the economic, the military, the societal and the environmental.33
What would entail for a security speech act to be successful? According to its three main proponents, there are three steps: identifying an existential threat, the need for emergency action, and the effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of the rules. The distinguishing feature of the securitization is the specific rhetorical structure, that emphasizes the survival, and which is deployed towards the audience through the act. Buzan claims that the phenomenon of securitization can be studied directly, without requiring indicators; the focus turns to the discourse and political constellations that use
31 Id, supra note 21. 32 Id., supra note 21.
it. If through an argument, with particular rhetorical and semiotic structure, the securitizing actor has managed to break free of rules and procedures that he would otherwise be bound by, and has achieved in making the audience tolerate violations of rules otherwise to be obeyed, then the securitizing move has been successful and we can talk of securitization.34
Securitization theory has been criticized and scrutinized, although it remains an appealing and hopeful concept in understanding the process of security. Balzacq et al, raise their concerns on the vague and simplistic statement of the theory that ignores more subtle elements, such as culture, geography, history and ethnography, and raises up to a pedestal the discursive power of the actor.35 For securitizing scholars like Balzacq the audience does more than merely sanctioning a securitizing move; it is part of an intricate negotiated enterprise, between itself and the securitizing actor. Additionally, he had been the prominent critical scholar to express concerns as to the extent to which the said theory reflects adequately and reliably real-world practices, if it is comprised by specific conditions that are required to make the securitizing act successful, or if it is just a scholarly device for theorizing.Additionally, others point out the weak conceptualization of the audience in the theory, the lack of a coherent model for failed securitizing moves, and the lack of clarity and consistent application of the theory to the empirical analysis.36
1.3. Responsibilisation Theory
Finally, the last theoretical concept to utilize and explore in this paper is the theory, or for some ‘strategy’, of responsibilisation. As with the securitization theory, this too was developed in the process of redefining security and its governance, in particular with the rise of privatization and the policies of crime governance. The idea of the 34 Id., pp. 24 35 Balzacq T., Léonard S., Ruzicka J,, Securitization revisited: Theory and cases, International Relations, 30 (4), pp. 494-531, at 506/507, (2016). 36 Holger Stritzel, Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond‘, European Journal of International Relations 13 357-383(2007); Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert, ―Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory‖ in Balzacq (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve edited by Thierry Balzacq,New York, 57-76, (2011); Mark Salter, ̳Securitization and Desecuritization: Dramaturgical Analysis and the Canadian Aviation Transport Security Authority‘, Journal of International Relations and Development 11: 321-349 (2008).
responsibilisation strategy revolves around the concept of the state being one of many actors that can provide security, and that the state alone is not capable and cannot effectively be responsible for preventing and controlling crime. This strategy is part of a new mode of governing crime. As theorized in Garland’s text, responsibilisation involves the state seeking to act upon crime not only through a direct approach, say police, courts, prisons, social works, but also, and increasingly, indirectly, by trying to activate action on the part of non-state actors.37 The primary concern in this case is for the state to successfully devolve responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies organizations, individuals that are found outside the traditional spectrum of the sovereign state, and persuade them to act appropriately.
As a theoretical concept responsibilisation is closely connected with security and crime governance and the effect that privatization has to it. According to Lea and Stenson, the phenomenon should be seen in the wider context of neo-liberal political discourse that aims to transfer responsibility for a host of public goods, from the state to individuals, families and communities on the one hand, and market on the other.38 Often also observed in welfare policies, responsibilisation strategy targets high-risk groups, and wholly or partly legitimizes a discourse of self-responsibilisation. It employs technics of persuasion, such as public campaigns, speech acts, extensive mass media advertising, aiming to create a consciousness of “sense of duty” and thus lead to change of practices. Citizens and private actors involvement is a key element of responsibilisation practices. A notable example of such practices is the Neighborhood Watch programs that were implemented in the US and UK, or local security networks like the KVO (Keurmerk Veilig Ondernemen) in the Netherlands, that aim to encourage citizen involvement in community based voluntary security initiatives.39 Caparini nonetheless underlines the concerns of many scholars that we are heading towards a pluralization of security, towards a state governing from a distance, only to retain a meta-regulatory role while the 37 Garland D, The Limits of the Sovereign State: strategies of Crime Control in the Contemporary Society, British Journal of Criminology, 36 (4), pp. 445-471, at p. 452-455 (1996). 38 Lea J. and Stenson K., Security, Sovereignty and Non-State Governance From Below, Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 22 (2), pp.9-27, at p. 12 (2007). 39 Caparini M., Applying a Security Governance Perspective to the Privatization of Security, in Bryden A. and Caparini M. (ed), Private Actors and Security Governance, LIT&DCAF, pp. 263-284, at p.266,
actual implementation of security measures is taken by private individuals.40 The dangers of such a process would be to rationalize and legitimize the security provision by non-state actors, in different standards and in more flexible terms. To take it a step further, skeptics of this approach argue that attempting to successfully responsibilise non-state actors and individuals in providing and caring for their own security will erode the democratic character of the security governance. When states are the sole provider of security and the way it is governed, there is the perception- and only that according to Hiscock- that security should be provided in a equitable, legitimate, effective and accountable way.41 Yet, by surrendering security governance to private discretion there is a chance it will loose its accountable character, and end up operating in the margins of legality.
1.4. Theoretical proposition
Taking the above theoretical frames into a combining account, my proposition aims to explore the following: state terrorism as a suitable concept to describe the wave of violence that has struck the Philippines since the election of President Duterte in power. Whether the “war on drugs”, as it is labeled by its proponents, can be seen as an organized attempt to achieve societal and domestic state policies (drug control), that utilizes violence to cause terror to a wider portion of the population, that includes drug addicts/users/dealers and their families, as a means of deterrence and punish, aiming at making them forcibly change their behavior, and thus reach the desirable goal of the state. Thus the main theoretical proposition will be examining to what extent state terrorism is taking place in Philippines.
At the same time, I will explore how the strategies of securitization and responsibilisation, have facilitated either the goals of the state, which is to terrorize and achieve political and societal change, or have impaired the public from recognizing state’s violent behavior for what it is: state terrorism. As explained in the theory so far,
40 Id.
41 Hiscock D., The Commercialization of Post-Soviet Private Security, in Bryden A. and Caparini M. (ed),
there is valid reason to ask the question how is state terrorism construed domestically, and what interaction with governance of security it entails. Has securitization discourse cast a veil over state terrorism carried out by the Philippine’s government, normalizing and masking it as emergency and exceptional measures? Have responsibilisation strategies attained a reverse effect, in desensitizing the audience to think that it should too partake in such violent acts, as a need to the elevated emergency situation? Do the reported “death squads” constitute a reverse application of “neighborhood watch”? These are some of the sub- questions that the thesis will try to explore and explain. To depict my use of these frames, I present the following schematic: In Figure 1.a all theoretical concepts are placed vertically, upon the horizontal line that represents the state. The analysis here is state-centered, meaning the state is the actor deploying all three strategies, terrorism, securitization, and responsibilisation. There are three possible combinations of the theoretical proposition: a) none of the theories are applied in conjunction, but can only be observed separately from the other (figure 1.a applies); b) all three theories are observed in the analysis, and are seen to form part of the same theoretical equation, thus forming a pyramid (figure 1.b); c) only two pair of theories converge, and are observed to be deployed in combination (figure 1.c). In the latter assumption, state terrorism is the stable, main theoretical line of reasoning, and thus it is the two others that will be tested along it.
Chapter 2. Research Design
Having established the theoretical grounds upon which I will base this endeavor, I will turn to the research approach most suited. In this chapter therefore I will present the design of my research, the methodology to be applied, as well as the conceptualization of my reasoning and the data on which I will rely upon. As explained in the Introduction, I have chosen the design of a case study to scrutinize my proposition. I will focus on the Philippines as the singular case on which I will test whether state terrorism can explain the eruption of violence, and how and to what extend securitization and responsibilisation strategies have facilitated that effort. Let me first start by explaining shortly the nature of the case study as a choice of research design, the very characteristics of mine, the units of analysis and observation, and go on with the methodology of the thesis.
2.1. The Choice of a Case Study
Case studies are part of a multitude of research strategies deployed in social and political sciences. And although case studies are often misconceived to fit better in the area of empirical and practical science, with empirical observation and field research, that is not the only possibility. On the contrary, case studies have been frequently used in descriptive analytical research, with many historic elements to it, and can encompass various approaches. In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” or “to what extend” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with real-life context.42 Case studies can be explanatory, exploratory or descriptive. They can also combine all three elements, as there is no strict hierarchy on the design of the research. In fact, some of the major case studies in social and political sciences have been a combination of two or more kinds.43 The study of a social phenomenon features front and
42 Yin R. K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social Research Method Series, Vol. 5,
(2003).
43 For example, see Allison G.T. & Zelikow P., Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis,
center in a case study: research is carried out within the boundaries of one social system (the case), that can include people, organizations, local communities or nation-states; the researcher monitors the phenomenon during a certain period of time, or alternatively, by collecting information afterwards with respect to the development of the phenomenon during a certain period; the focus is on process tracing, the description and explanation of social and political processes that unfold between persons participating in the process, their values, expectations and behavior.44 In case studies several data resources are used, with the main ones being available documents, interviews and/or observation.
Some of the advantages of the case study include the simplicity of theory application, which is based on the goal to have a “sufficient blueprint” for the study, grounded on the structured and well-developed theoretical frameworks. Case studies of this sort allow for concrete and step-by-step implementation of theory to the case, reaching a successful conclusion that is much dependent on the commitment of the researcher and collection of facts, and not to outside factors of unpredictability. Additionally, case studies allow for analytic generalization, which means that the case does not represent a “sample”, but the goal is to expand and generalize theories, and not to seek to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).45
I chose this research design due to my belief that it better serves the purpose of my research and study. Throughout the academic process of learning about security and concepts of its governance, securitization and responsibilisation have always been to my mind strong theories that can find application in an array of issues along the spectrum of security. The nature of both concepts, their reliance and study through discourse and speech acts, campaigns and public sentiment does not facilitate a strictly qualitative, statistical analysis. In a similar manner, state terrorism is also a strain of international relations theory that, although it can be quantified in to data, - number of terrorists attacks, organizations, casualties, etc.-, it renders itself more adaptable to a descriptive analytic application to the facts. Therefore, looking to examine the interaction of these concepts, it would be more efficient to do so in the design of a case study. At the same time, the inspiration for this research topic came from the very distinct case of the
Philippines. The eruption of violence, the wave of extra-judicial killings, of the targeting of a specific portion of the population, and above all with the open and public support of the government, under the controversial public speeches of President Duterte, all these factors made the case of the Philippines a suitable one for such a research design.
2.2. Unit of Analysis and Units of Observation
The unit of analysis, as follows from above, will be the ‘war on drugs’ currently conducted by the Filipino government. The theoretical propositions will be contradicted and tested again this policy, to examine the extent of compatibility and explanatory degree. The units of observations will be first and foremost President Duterte, as the champion and enforcer of the policy, government officials, the police, as well as the audience and public in the Philippines. Because the unit of analysis entails theoretical propositions that include and attempt to explore discourse power, i.e. contribution of securitization and responsibilisation theories to the one of state terrorism, it is important to map as many speech acts, discourse elements, and public sentiments as possible. To better understand the units of analysis and observations and how they fit in the theoretical premise, I have compiled the following table:
State Terrorism Securitization Responsibilisation Case-Study Units Deliberate Acts of
violence (or threat of) against citizens the state has a duty to protect Securitizing speech proposing Emergency action against a referent threat Responsibilisation campaign: state not the only provider of security
Speech acts, policies and governmental behavior: “war on drugs” in the Philippines State Actors, or non-state actors in conjunction with state
Securitizing actor State actors, private security actors
President Rodrigo Duterte & Filipino governmental officials Targeted audience
that identifies with targeted victims
Audience that is securitized as a referent object of the threat
Targeted audience, individuals of a high-risk group
Drug personalities and the wider public of the Philippines Change of behavior of the audience Change in the normal behavior of state- normalization Change: the targeted audience takes up action for
Change in the drug crime rate, behavior of drug personalities
of emergency action its security
2.3. Methodology
My approach to the problem in the case study of the Philippines is a descriptive and exploratory one. I have formulated my research question by asking the questions “to what extent” and “how”. In the former, I am interested to the extent of applicability of the state terrorism theory to Presiden Duterte’s “War on Drug” policy. I have already defined and conceptualized what state terrorism is for the purposes of this thesis. I will use Blakeley’s 2010 definition and constitutive elements. Then, setting the day of the presidential election of (President) Duterte, his official ascension to a state office, as a landmark date (30 May 2016) I will deploy and apply these state terrorism definitional elements to analyze the actions of the Philippine government thereafter. Due notice nonetheless will be given to the months previous to the election, the presidential election race, and some information from the background and history of President Duterte. This is so because he will feature as the securitizing actor in my research, thus his discourse before the election is also of importance, as it can be seen to have heavily influence the outcome. In the data collection phase (chapter 3) I will attempt to map major official and unofficial government acts in the course of the declared “war on drugs”. By mapping the policy I will have a blueprint, which I can then juxtapose and overlap with the blueprint of state terrorism and see the extent to which they match. This in any case remains an analytical and descriptive process that will include however some quantitative elements, such as number of victims killed, number of people targeted, statistics on drug use etc.
The issue in the Philippines is the extensive use and sale of drugs that has created, according to the governmental discourse, a huge number of drug addicts and has contributed to the rise of drug crime. Thus to assess this argument, I will inevitably have to collect statistical information through national, international and NGO reports. These will include among others UN official reports; NGO’s like Human Rights Watch, publications and news articles, official statements by the Philippine government, etc.
At the same time, I will attempt an exploratory research to examine how the two described strategies, namely securitization and responsibilisation, have affected the ‘war on drugs’ and how the fit with the constitutive elements of the deployed state terrorism definition. My main inquiry when contemplating the facts of the case is why, what happened and the public opinion is so tolerant of such extreme violent behavior. How come people participate themselves in the extra-judicial killings, and remain “immune” to the controversial statements their head of state is making? For this part of the research I will concentrate on a micro-level of analysis, i.e. I will focus on the discourse used by the President of the Philippines, as the main representative of the state apparatus, and its effects on the people of Philippines, the wider audience. It may be necessary to extend my base of actors when the factual circumstances demand it, and thus turn to police or other government officials. Similarly, the data collection process will be one of discourse and speech act analysis, media coverage and campaign slogans/elements. However, to properly assess the securitization and responsibilisation part of the research, I will shortly extend my focus by a couple of months prior to the election. This is due to the fact that Duterte was elected on an extensive campaign advocating the ‘war on drugs’. Therefore it is vital to examine the rhetoric used and the effect it had on the audience, i.e. the citizens of Philippines. From a prima facie, ex-facto assessment, I could argue that since he was eventually elected in the office, this attests to some kind of success of his securitizing move. Of course that would be a premature assessment, as it does not comply fully to the basic elements of a successful securitization, the extreme measuress taken, which where seemingly effectuated after his ascension to the office.
In the next chapter of this research paper, Chapter 3, I will present the collection of data. This will be a descriptive-discursive presentation of the most relevant facts, information, statistics and current developments that will complete the picture of what is the current, real-life situation in the Philippines. One of the main restraints I will come across, and which could be foreseen from early on, is the potential language barrier. As I don’t speak local language, a first disclaimer is that I will primarily rely upon English reports and information. Especially for the discourse and speech act analysis this will inevitably be a drawback, but only a small one, since English is one of the two official languages of the Philippines, so I am optimistic that I will have wide access to materials
and speeches. What is more, I will have to rely heavily on local, national media outlets, and to the extent possible to international ones. As a result, this will influence the reliability of the information. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the majority of the essential information will be found in local news reports, and a prima facie reliability- unless otherwise showed- must be conferred to them. In Chapter 4 I will then proceed with the analysis, contrasting and juxtaposing my theoretical conceptualization to the information, data and observations gathered. As I stated in the previous chapter, section 1.4 of my Theoretical Proposition, there are three possible conclusions -plus one- to reach, namely that state terrorism is observed regardless of the other two supplementing theories, state terrorism is observed with both supplementing theories, or state terrorism is observed with one of the two supplementing theories. Various degradations and degrees of interaction can be observed. There is the “plus one” possible conclusion where state terrorism itself will not apply to the case. Finally, the last chapter will be my concluding remarks on the progress and process of the research, with lessons learned and the answer to the research question.
Chapter 3: Uncovering Philippines’ ‘War on Drugs’
This chapter will come to serve as a brief presentation of facts and figures, sketching the situation on the ground, and allowing the reader to formulate a clear picture of what is going on the Philippines, before the next step, which would be the analysis of the facts based on the theoretical premise. This chapter’s structure follows that of the theoretical conceptualization; first, I will present some basic figures and statistics about the current situation in the Philippines: statistics and information on drug users and addicts, the rate of drug crime before and after President Duterte’s elevation to the public office, facts and numbers on the people killed so far, as well the arrests made, and registrations on rehabilitation centers. The reasons I will turn to these facts and figures is due to the fact that state terrorism comes to serve a policy, a political –usually- purpose on behalf of the state. In our case, what I examine as state terrorism is the so called “war on drugs”, therefore it only makes sense to look at the plausibility of the numbers, to assess the need for a “war” against drugs, instead of an anti-drug campaign, or health and social policies.
Secondly, I will briefly examine some speech acts by the President and government officials of the Philippines. This is meant to serve as the factual background on which I will analyze the theoretical premise of securitization. How has the “war on drugs” been framed by the state, and particularly by President Duterte? The very use of the word “war” indicates from the very beginning a highly charged discourse. But further examples of the language used prior to and after his election are necessary to evaluate the extent to which it has affected the public’s perception of the drug issue. I will incorporate excerpts from speech acts and discourse in my paper, and highlight in bold the operative words at which emphasis must be paid to understand the securitizing attempt. Lastly, I will then proceed with juxtaposing reports and articles that describe the reaction of the public, the citizens of Philippines, to that war. To what extent have they embraced this practice, do they support it, and if they do, do they feel the need to be part of this war, and individualize the responsibility that arises from the encouragements of their President. This chapter is to be understood as a bridge of information and facts between the
theoretical part and this thesis’ actual analysis. The reader will get a clear picture – to the extent possible- of the situation on the ground, in order to follow the analysis and conclusion in the next chapters.
3.1 From social, law enforcement drug policies to a ‘war’ on drugs
One of the main arguments and campaign poster in President Duterte’s electoral run was the dire situation of drug users and pushers in the country. The problem of drug use has always been an acute one in the Philippines scoring all time highs from the 1990s up until 2004. But thinking on the issue, and looking at the facts, is the problem that acute to justify a shift from social policy and law enforcement approach, to a full fledged war on drugs? To answer this question, I will turn to the numbers and statistics of drug use and drug crime in the Philippines, as well as in other neighboring countries, looking at official national and UN reports, news articles and commentaries, in an attempt to sketch the true extent of the issue. Then, I will turn to the response by the Duterte, the very “war on drug” practice, the number of victims it has claimed so far, the police practices and the reports of “Death Squads”, pertaining both to current police operations, but also some dating back to when Mr. Duterte was Mayor at the city of Davao.
To begin with, during the election campaign, as well as after the rise to the office, President Duterte has claimed a soaring number of drug users in the country, claiming an alleged number of more than 3.1 million people. This figure has been used again and again in reports and speeches of many governmental officials. Although the Dangerous Drug Board (DDB), the official institution that releases the relevant statistics every year, has not yet published its 2016 report, the report it published in 2015 lies in stark contrast with this alleged number. In 2015 the current drug user rate was around 1.8% of the entire population (age 10 and above), meaning that roughly 1.8 million people were drug users. The latter term is meant to signify individuals who are currently using or have used illegal drugs more than once; emphasis in these data is given regarding the use of methamphetamine drugs (what is known as shabu in the Philippines). The time of the survey of this report is between January 1st 2015 and February 5 2016, only four months
before the election of President Duterte.46 What is more, reports from the previous years show a relative fluctuation in the numbers of drug use, with some small increases after 2008. But even so, that such resurge does not reach the extent put forth by Duterte during and after his election campaign. According to the National Surveys of the DDB, in 2012 there were 1.3 million reported drug users47 while in 2008 the number was higher, at 1.7 million.48 The drug situation in the Philippines has seen worse days, as the highest numbers were recorded in 2004, of a soaring rate of 6.4 million users. The graph below shows the official reported drug user number from 1999 till 201249:
46 Jodez Gavilan, “DDB: Philippines has 1.8 million current drug users”, Rappler news report, September 19, 2016, available at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/146654-drug-use-survey-results-dangerous-drugs-board-philippines-2015 47 “National Study on the Current Nature and Extent of Drug Use in the Philippines”, Dangerous Drugs Board, (2012), available at: http://www.ddb.gov.ph/research-statistics/research/45-research-and-statistics/88-2012-researches#a 48 “Study on the Current Nature and Extent of Drug Use in the Philippines”, Dangerous Drugs Board, (2008), available at: http://www.ddb.gov.ph/images/psrsd_report/2008%20National%20Household%20Survey.pdf 49 “Explainer: How serious is the Philippines drug problem?”, Rappler news reporting, August 27 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331-data-drug-problem-philippines
These numbers of course should not be seen in absolutely certainty, as there have been issues reported on the methodology and validity of the DDB’s research methods. It also becomes obvious from the above graph, that the said surveys are not conducted or made publicly available every year. To that end, it is important to look to other outside sources, and how they reported the drug situation in Philippines and cross reference the reliability of the above numbers. The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime’s (UNDOC) reports help shed light on the matter. Indeed, in 2007 the published UN Word Drug Report noted that the Philippines had the world’s highest “methamphetamine prevalence rate” at that time.50 According to the same report, behind Philippines, Australia had the highest rate of methamphetamine use for the same time period.51 In 2013, UNDOC published a more specialized report, titled “Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-typed Stimulant and Other Drugs”, with particular emphasis in the regions of Asia and the Pacific.52 There a comparative listing of all relevant countries took place, and Philippines featured no longer on the top of the list. The report noticed that methamphetamine drug use in the Philippines was on a steady decrease till 2012, while in compering the rates with neighboring countries, Philippines numbers meet the average of the region: Australia had a methamphetamine increased rate in 2010, reaching 2.1% of the general population, while people reporting methamphetamine use for at least one time in the lives was situated in 7% of the general population, in contrast with Philippines, which that number rises to 4.1%.53 In fact, recent reports argue that methamphetamine drug addiction in Australia is one of the major threats to its health future.54 What is more, UNDOC has noted that the prevalent rate of drug use in the Philippines remains low in
50 “World Drug Report”, United Nations Drugs and Crime Office, pg. 151 (2007), available at:
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf
51 Id. page 151.
52 “Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-typed Stimulant and Other Drugs: Challenges for Asia and
Pacific”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Smart Programme, November (2013), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/2013_Regional_ATS_Report_web.pdf
53 Id., pg 41-42.
54 Sharon Verghis, “We are Ticking Time Bombs:Inside Australia’s Meth Crisis”, Time Magazine, May
