A contemporary struggle in the Balkans : oppositions to Nation-Branding Flagship Projects

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Oppositions to Nation-Branding Flagship Projects

By Michael Manu Moritz

Supervisor: David Evers

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Abstract

With the general collapse of communism through the late 1980s and early 1990s, there has been a burgeoning group of newly democratized nations. For many of these, the political system is not the only thing that is new; the conception of that particular nation itself – its name, borders, economy, composition of people, and culture – is often new as well. Coupling this with the rise of neoliberalism and globalization, building a national ‘brand’ has been perceived as a way to provide an internationally competitive edge and at the same time building internal cohesion. In the case of some of these newly democratized nations, that brand came hand-in-hand with large flagship projects, which are often in conflict with the new democratic ideals and public interests of their country. In response to these nation-branding flagship projects (NBFPs), opposition groups have formed to tackle the various threats to the public interest that these projects pose, including, in part, reclaiming the image of their country. This thesis will look at the processes leading to the development of two of these ‘nation-branding flagship projects’: the Skopje 2014 project in Macedonia and the Belgrade Waterfront project in Serbia. It will then find and explain the differences in opposition strategies (in terms of the formation and leadership, structure and organization, and tactics used) to these projects given relatively similar contexts but drastically different project types. Finally, it proposes a theory (Opposition Dispersion Theory) relating the difference in a project’s geographic ‘dispersal’ with a difference in the way that opposition groups to that project organize.

Key terms: nation-branding, flagship projects, strategies of opposition, public interest, recently democratized nations

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Preface

The motivation for this research comes from personal visits to Skopje and Belgrade over the past two years. During these visits, I was struck by the charm and cultural heritage of these Balkan capital cities, their countries, and the region overall; I was equally struck by the projects under development in these cities. Located unavoidably in their city’s center, these projects stand out as misrepresenting the traditional history and culture of the people or even the austere architecture of Yugoslavia that I had come to appreciate. In the case of Skopje, I was left with a strong feeling of distaste for the ‘kitsch’, superficial (Las Vegas-like) urban redevelopment in the city center as well as the rapid rate at which it was occurring.1 In the case of Belgrade, I saw an underutilized waterfront in the early stages of transforming into a ‘cookie-cutter’, international development reminiscent of developments around the Persian Gulf, China, etc. I was left wondering ‘why’ and ‘how’ these developments were happening. Did the communities resist these changes? If they did, why were they so unsuccessful? This line of thinking led me to an interest in how the oppositions to these projects play out, how they are similar, and how they are different.

1_{I visited in September of 2014 and again in December of 2015. In only 15 months, I saw dramatic changes to the}

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7. Conclusion ... 75 Epilogue ... 79 References ... 81 Appendix ... 88 Skopje Interviews ... 89 Vlado Apostolov ... 89 Novica Nakov ... 96 Snezhana Domazetovska ... 101 Ivana Dragsic ... 110 Demijan Hadzi-Angelkovski ... 119 Belgrade Interviews ... 125 Milica Lekovic ... 125 Andrija Stojanovic ... 133

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1. Introduction

With the general collapse of communism through the late 1980s and early 1990s, there has been a burgeoning group of newly democratized nations, many of which have no strong sense of self nor international recognition and standing. While in many cases the boundaries of these new nations tend to coincide with a majority ethnic group and therefore have some form of socio-cultural cohesion, each of these nations have been thrust into an increasingly neoliberal, globally competitive economy for which they are often unprepared. In this new context, cities and their respective states are finding means to outcompete and accumulate a greater amount of wealth than their competitors. This ‘fight’ to effectively climb the urban hierarchy utilizes what Harvey calls a ‘spatial fix’ which is “the construction of immobile socio-territorial configurations within which expanded capital accumulation can be generated; it entails the conversion of temporal into spatial restraints to accumulation” (Brenner, 1999). Although many places try to develop these ‘spatial fixes’, the added value and utility of such development is limited by the perception of the place in which they exist. In the case of many recently democratized countries, recent history and negative perceptions of the region have lessened international competitiveness – making

attracting foreign investors and higher end tourists more difficult (van Ham, 2001). Thus, the added value to a place by producing and using spatial fixes to attract wealth is limited by a negative reputation (and conversely, benefitted by a positive one).

One region of recently democratized nations trying to shed old, negative reputations is the Balkans; in particular, the successor states to former Yugoslavia after the series of ethnic civil wars in the 1990s. As a means to strengthen internal cohesion in the wake of these wars and to build an internationally competitive edge, these countries have adopted nation-branding to try and break away from a turbulent past and move toward a modern future. By rebranding

themselves, these nations attempt to show a new face to the world, opening greater opportunities for themselves. In many cases though, the branding techniques employed appear to be

‘superficial’: they simply take what already exists and make simple choices for what to highlight (and what to hide), remake symbols (flags, national slogans/mottos), present particular forms of arts and culture, etc. (Olins, 2002). However, in some instances, there are physical developments – new urban flagship projects – being produced with the expressed objective of helping

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function of a ‘spatial fix’. Moreover, these projects tend to be expensive and due to the physical nature of them, hard to reverse in the future should there be a desire to again rebrand the nation.

In the case of nearly all of the newly democratized countries of former Yugoslavia, the new governments tend to be conservative and riddled with corruption and nepotism (Musić, 2013; Kurtoglu Eskisar & Komsuoglu, 2015; Zeneli, 2015). This leaves the nations they govern vulnerable to flagship projects with socio-political and economic goals that are often antithetical to the public interest and the new ‘democracies’ they are built for. Such projects can be

manipulated and used for a litany of corrupt acts from money laundering to embezzling of public funds to enabling electoral fraud. Moreover, the sheer size of these projects and the

non-democratic way in which they are formed provides the additional threat to the public interest of a fraudulent, often kitsch, new brand for these young nations. Given the many aspects of public interest at stake in these projects, community oppositions naturally arise, targeting one or several aspects threatening the public interest. This thesis will be examining two cases of community opposition to urban nation-branding flagship projects (NBFPs) from the Balkans: the opposition to the Skopje 2014 project in Macedonia and the opposition to the Belgrade Waterfront project in Serbia. It will then seek to explain the differences in opposition strategies used against Skopje 2014 and the Belgrade Waterfront due to the differences in the physical manifestations of nation-branding employed through the development of these projects. This thesis hypothesizes that there is a causal relationship between the NBFP ‘type’ structurally and the oppositions to them such that some of the differences in strategies of opposition can be attributed to the differences in the project type being opposed.

1.1 Problem Statement

Several of the ‘young’, newly democratized countries of the Balkans have started to produce urban flagship projects intended to invent and/or add to the brand of their nation. The two largest of these urban NBFPs in the Balkans are the Skopje 2014 project in Macedonia and the Belgrade Waterfront project in Serbia. While NBFPs are supposed to enhance the competitive edge of a nation, and thus in some way contribute to the public interest, these projects have seemingly been produced in a way antithetical to both a deontological and consequentialist conception of public interest. In short, both the Skopje 2014 and Belgrade Waterfront projects are financially burdensome on the public, misuse public urban space, have been designed and produced in a non-democratic manner – without public input – and therefore are creating new national brands

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without the involvement of the people for whom that national brand represents. As a result, opposition groups contesting these projects have formed in both Macedonia and Serbia. However, while these projects are both NBFPs and are being developed in relatively similar contexts (politically, economically and socially) with many of the same threats to public interest, they are structurally different project ‘types’ from one another: the Skopje 2014 project is a widely spread, cosmetic renovation of the city center; Belgrade Waterfront is a single site along one of the rivers in the city center upon which a large, high-end mixed-use development is going up. As such, it is possible that the different ways in which the projects physically manifest themselves lead to their respective opposition groups organizing and functioning differently.

1.2 Structure of the Study

Given that this thesis is trying to identify a causal relationship between a NBFP ‘type’ and the strategy of opposition to these projects, it will be examining some of the theories and empirical studies conducted related to nation-branding, large-scale urban flagship projects, and community strategies of opposition. It will then use a comparative case study to see if and how a NBFP type impacts the oppositions in the context of the recently democratized countries of the Balkans. Thus, following this Introduction Chapter (Chapter 1), Chapter 2 will present a literature review on nation-branding flagship projects and oppositional strategies to these NBFPs, placing this thesis within the literature. Chapter 3 will provide a theoretical discussion based on the literature review, identifying ways to approach NBFPs and strategies of opposition against them. In Chapter 4, the methodology – the research question and research design – will be outlined and explained. The Case Studies will then be presented in Chapter 5. This will be done by first presenting the contextual similarities and differences in which the case studies exist to try and identify what other factors may be at play in terms of the strategies of opposition employed. It will then introduce the case projects (Skopje 2014 and the Belgrade Waterfront), giving a brief history of the projects as well as a comparison between them. Finally, Chapter 5 will present the ‘stories’ of the oppositions to the projects: their motivations to form, their leadership, how the opposition movement organized, and what actions they took. In Chapter 6, the analysis of the case studies will be presented, showing the ways in which the oppositions differ in Skopje and Belgrade and in what ways it seems that the differences can be attributed to the differences in the NBFP type. Finally, Chapter 7 will present this thesis’s conclusions, including a proposed theory on the relationship between a project’s dispersion and an opposition’s organization

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2. Literature Review

2.1 Neoliberalism, Globalization, and the Nation-Branding Flagship Project

There is a profuse amount of literature focused on neoliberalism and globalization (Brenner, 1999; Harvey, 1989b; Harvey, 1998; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1989). Generally speaking, neoliberalism is seen as manifesting itself as a “prevailing pattern of market-oriented, market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring” (Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009). This leads to what Swyngedouw (1989) calls an “increasingly footloose and mobile capital seeking out profitable locations”; or as Sassen (2000) succinctly refers to as a

“hypermobility of capital.” This new ‘footloose’, ‘hypermobile’ context for capital goes hand in hand with the phenomenon of globalization and the subsequent competition between cities, regions and countries to remain relevant in an increasingly competitive, international arena (Brenner, 1999; Jessop and Sum, 2000). As a result, cities engage in a “speculative deployment of resources to attract investment” (Hubbard, 1996). One of the ways in which places ‘deploy’ resources is by forming what Harvey refers to as a ‘spatial fix’ – immobile fixed capital (like transportation infrastructure, business centers, etc.) – as a means of increasing international relevance and climbing the urban hierarchy (Harvey, 1989a; Harvey, 2001; Brenner, 1999). One way that this can be done is by producing new megaprojects. According to Lehrer & Laidley (2008), while new megaprojects (like large-scale flagship projects) are as much political projects as those of the past, there is an “ideological difference that old mega-projects were undertaken in support of societal progress while new mega-projects support interurban global

competitiveness.” Del Cerro (2013) likewise finds that the new urban megaproject is a tool used by political and business elites to improve urban competitiveness. Using Harvey’s ideas,

Hubbard (1996) discusses how cities also change their urban landscape (often by adopting particular architectural fashions) as a means of improving attractiveness for investors as well as “for those living in the city, rebuilding internal confidence.” This too is often done by producing large-scale flagship projects which have the effect of improving international prestige and

internal cohesion beyond simply producing an economically competitive spatial fix (Siemiatycki, 2013). That is, these large, urban flagship projects project an image of status and power meant to attract investment (Dyble, 2013); this is in effect ‘place-branding’.

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While place-branding is a strategy often used by cities and regions to outcompete other cities and regions, it can be taken a step higher and implemented at the national level as well: so-called nation-branding. There has been much research on the use of nation branding as a means of improving a nation’s international appeal and competitive edge, with most of this research focused on the use of mottos/slogans, art, and symbols (van Ham, 2001; Olins, 2002; Kaneva, 2011). That is, nation branding often chooses to take what already exists and repackages it in a way that ‘sells’ to an international audience so as to create a (positive) sense of place to which prospective tourists and investors can attach it to. This neoliberal morphing of what should be first socio-political into an economic tool is succinctly summarized by Graan (2013):

In an age of neoliberal nationalism, national representation is thus increasingly realized as an economic function (i.e., representation in the service of attracting foreign capital), rather than as a political function (i.e., representation in the service of citizens’ myriad and

heterogeneous interests). Moreover, nation branding assumes that the former function can fulfill the latter.

Like so much of marketing however, this does not mean that the sense of place nor the brand that is produced is in fact authentic or true to the place that that brand has been created for. Moreover, as both nation-branding and large-scale flagship projects directly relate to the desire for a place (in this case, a nation) to improve its standing in the global hierarchy, the idea of nation-branding can manifest itself in the form of large-scale, urban flagship projects.

One of the ways in which these Nation-Branding Flagship Projects (NBFPs) manifest themselves can be considered similarly to the ‘Bilbao effect’ – that is, the production of a

monumental, culturally charged and symbolic flagship project (in the case of Bilbao, a museum) (Moulaert et al., 2007; Siemiatycki, 2013). These projects supposedly help attract and build socio-economic wealth by internationally signaling revitalization for a region as well as

(re)building internal confidence (Siemiatycki, 2013). While the Bilbao effect refers specifically to monumental, cultural structures like museums, the idea it carries of a symbolic, single ‘point’ development can be transferred to refer to any number of different urban flagship project types. This matches with the general shift in implementation and structure of large flagship projects from long, linear public infrastructure projects (like highways, utility lines, etc.) to more district based developments (like new central business districts, mixed-use areas, etc.) (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008). In terms of where these new, ‘district-based’ flagship projects are built, in general, “the preferred location is in old industrial areas, ports in decline or other terrains with a

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residual urban use...” (Díaz Orueta, 2015). Given that these projects tend to be developed on brownfield sites in central, yet still peripheral, locations (at least in the context of the US and Europe) these projects can develop in a visible location that is still in a way isolated from the rest of the city center. Often these projects are “characterized by repetitive architectural designs that contribute to the commodification of the city, [and] are generally located in areas devoid of interaction between old and new spaces, large and small, which gives centers its special and distinctive character (Fainstein, 2008).” (Díaz Orueta, 2015). As a result of developing and transforming old abandoned industrial areas, the image of the old center can be maintained while still “giving way to new spaces that symbolically represent the progress of the new economy.” (Díaz Orueta, 2015). Thus, the positive signaling associated with the Bilbao effect can also be seen as present within the new, ‘district-based’ flagship projects.

These new projects (much like their predecessors, older megaprojects) are not always favorably met by the community and often face opposition. However, the new megaprojects in today’s ever globalizing, neoliberal economy have also managed to learn from past oppositions, employing various discursive strategies about socioeconomic and environmental benefits as well as public space to better appeal to the community:

The problem that we identify therein is that while these benefits, or rather the discourses forwarding these benefits, allow the new mega-projects to be more readily embraced by a variety of communities, they in fact obfuscate their major beneficiaries and ideologies — most often the development industries rather than the local populace, and the quest for urban status rather than the pursuit of urban inclusion. (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008) Thus, while the benefits of the project may seem real, the discourse promoting these project ‘benefits’ shifts attention away from other important issues (like public expenditures for private gains). This threat to the public interest is further exacerbated by a lack of public participation at the beginning of the planning process when potential development options are being chosen. Instead, public participation tends to start in the middle of the planning process and focuses on profit-maximizing options whilst discouraging any social practices outside of the capitalist mode of production (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008).

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2.2 Oppositions to Nation-Branding Flagship Projects in a ‘Weak’ Civil Society

Opposition groups and resistance generally are, by definition, reactionary (that is, opposition can only exist in reaction to the thing being opposed). Of course, that means that some opposition groups (and their resistance cultures) may possess conservative ideologies (e.g. Neo-Nazis) and work against the production of new communities. However, while the reactionary nature of resistance has the capacity of stopping new communities from forming, it also has the capacity of forming anti-hegemonic movements, opening up opportunities for new communities

(Duncombe, 2007). An example of such a movement is Reclaim the Streets (RTS), which turned cultural resistance into political practice as a strategy of opposition (Duncombe, 2007). Running on an anti-automobile ideology, RTS teamed up environmentalists and London’s rave culture in the early 1990s, throwing massive street parties, as a means of raising awareness and physically (albeit, temporarily) reclaiming streets (Hunt, 2013). Other tactics utilized by RTS used equally media drawing actions which included creating a fake beach on the M41 in London in 1996 (and using giant costumes on stilts to ‘discretely’ drill out tarmac and plant trees); and organizing a coordinated Global Party during the G8 Summit in Birmingham in 1998 (Hunt, 2013). RTS was so successful that it has been reproduced in cities around the world.

Another strategy that opposition groups may utilize stems from Richard Cloward’s and Frances Fox Piven’s so-called Cloward-Piven Strategy. Developed in the mid-1960s to reform the American welfare system, the Cloward-Piven Strategy proposes forcing radical change by overloading the system in need of change (in their case, the American welfare system) until it can no longer function and thus precipitates change (Piven & Cloward, 2011). This strategy of a new order from chaos is one that could be applied in the context of urban flagship project oppositions as well. That is, if a social movement can mobilize with critical mass, the strain it puts on government institutions and private actors may be great enough that a change or stop to the project could be made the politically and fiscally sound decision. In regards to Bilbao effect projects, Siemiatycki (2013) makes the point that “expensive proposals for new flagship arts facilities can sometimes be cancelled if they face sustained public opposition, especially if they are branded as elite facilities or those serving visitors more than local residents.” However, in stricter (more authoritarian) contexts with a weaker civil society, like the transitional states in the Balkans, such actions could be less effective given political contexts in which the government does not react to public needs (and may have vested private interests). Even more conventional

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forms of opposition, such as in the streets protests (like RTS) are relatively ineffective given that they are actively ignored, not reported, or misreported by state media, thus other tactics may be of better use (Irion & Jusić, 2014).

While street protests are historically the primary vehicle of political dissent in Southeast Europe, the opposition movement against the Slovenian government in late 2012 and early 2013 shows how grassroots political movements learned to work with established institutions (e.g. labor unions) to force political change (Musić, 2013). Stemming from this finding, Musić (2013) also found that in the Balkans:

There is now a tendency to move away from loose organisational models, a vague ‘anticapitalist’ ideology and ambivalent social actors and focus on more structured initiatives... In Croatia and Serbia, the activists coming out of the student movement are seeking ties with the critical activists inside the trade unions. (Musić, 2013).

Such an example of working with parts of the establishment can be translated to using political opposition in government as a means to help incite or progress particular opposition movements. In the case of political institutions, Goldstone (2003) finds that oppositional parties often go beyond their governmental role in parliament, choosing to mobilize the people in protest campaigns as a strategy for their political goals. The role of the government opposition and the community opposition can also be flipped, with opposition movements using oppositional parties as a means to their ends. Not only does it provide institutional support, but oppositional parties have the capacity to unify geographically disparate populations in a country much like other types of social organizations (Almeida, 2012; McCammon, 2001).

While institutional support in the form of government opposition can be seen as

beneficial to opposition movements, it can also be seen as detrimental. Castells (1977) identified urban social movements (USMs) as the highest level of a proposed hierarchy of citizen action based on its effects on broader society (starting with ‘participation’ to ‘protest’ and finally ‘USMs’). Leontidou (2010) states that “Castells saved the characterisation ‘USMs’ for those which brought about radical changes in political power, or caused radical transformation of the urban system and its meanings, or had specific outcomes in the political arena.” As such, USMs are characterized by their spontaneous, grassroots origins and thus run counter to the more rigid, ‘top-down’ approaches working through the ‘third sector’ (NGOs and some SMOs) which tend to try to work and create coherence within current institutions. Leontidou (2010) finds that these more institutionally oriented movements (of the third sector):

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...usually marginalises ‘spontaneous’ USMs in favour of more organised forms, which by definition compose a ‘strong’ civil society. The whole discussion may act as a discursive filter, distorting our understanding of social processes by stressing competitiveness and social cohesion rather than conflictual cultures and oppositional social movements. (Leontidou, 2010)

As such, social movements “seeking integration into EU, state, local state and dominant structures cannot create alternative cultures in civil society.” (Leontidou, 2010). Thus,

movements which end up taking such institutional routes to accomplish their goals may be self-defeating in the sense that they end up reinforcing the problematic institutions at play and lose the ‘conflictual culture’ needed for real change. Moreover, Leontidou makes the point that the ‘more organized forms’ of these ‘top-down’ third sector groups exist within a ‘strong’ civil society. Recently democratized countries, the countries of the Balkans included, generally tend to have weaker civil societies (Ekiert & Foa, 2012).

In their investigation of an authoritarian context and the entrepreneurial state (with a weaker civil society as is seen in the Balkans), Eraydin and Tasan-Kok (2013) draw from the Turkish experience to show how “economic liberalism can be combined with increasing social control, restrictions, penalization and exclusion.” They broadly found two types of community opposition which formed against the Turkish government’s state-led developments: elitist and self-interest movements. The first tended to be formed and led by more affluent, educated groups which organize (often through NGOs) to contest government decisions that could impact their desires and/or beliefs; and the latter were grassroots movements organized by those members of society excluded from government who are directly (physically) impacted by a decision (Eraydin and Tasan-Kok, 2013). This difference in opposition formation is reminiscent of the differences between old and new megaprojects. In the case of many older megaprojects, acts of urban renewal displaced large numbers of people (often as a form of ‘slum-clearing’) which naturally gave rise to more grassroots oriented movements. However, in the case of new megaprojects, given their relative isolation from the direct surrounding areas (i.e. brownfield locations), the number of people being directly (physically) harmed is less and therefore other aspects of public interest (i.e. environmental degradation, privatization of public space, misuse of public funds, increase in traffic congestion, etc.) may lead to already established community groups

responding to those aspects which go against their organizations’ goals (Adams & Watkins, 2002). Again, in the case of a weak civil society though, the actions that can be taken may be

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limited. While researching contemporary social movements in Russia, Beissinger (2012) distinguishes between the actions of a conventional civil society versus those of a ‘virtual’ civil society. Essentially, when the tactics normally used by conventional civil societies (such as street protests) fail due to a restrictive context, ‘virtual’ civil societies act as a means to keep the protest movement alive: via dense networks of online interaction (blog communities, online groups, and social-networking sites). However, these ‘virtual’ civil societies are not found to be effective given their unstable associations (issues of commitment given the ease of ‘entering’ and ‘exiting’ online communities), the inability to generate viable political alternatives, the tendency “to breed a false sense of representativeness within the opposition” (in which a minority group on the internet claim to speak for the masses), and the general inability to effectively support long-term democratic development (Beissinger, 2012).

Studies have also found that if there are more social organizations in a community, then new collective action campaigns can form and sustain more rapidly perhaps due to the ability to share resources, activate more people, and band together (Almeida, 2012; Morris, 1984;

Andrews, 2004). This matches with the idea that USMs radical change is usually reached through the combination with various types of struggles (Leontidou, 2010). In the case of the Atlantic Yards megaproject in Brooklyn, New York, the three primary groups contesting the project were community coalitions involving “a diverse array of existing community and neighborhood-based groups, block associations, collectives, and business associations.”

(Thompson, 2011). While the weaker civil societies of the Balkans may not have the number and density of social organizations of a place like New York City, the tactics utilized once organized are arguably still applicable when organizing against a large-scale flagship project. The groups opposing the Atlantic Yards project utilized a number of tactics including: “imagining

alternatives, researching information about the developer, project plans, and agreements, and disseminating that information through litigation, creating alternative discourses of development and community, and organizing residents and elected officials to put pressure on decision-makers through letter-writing, phone calls, protests, and media statements.” (Thompson, 2011). The reason that the oppositions to these new megaprojects tend to use so many tactics may have to do with the way in which new megaprojects are planned and presented. Diaz Orueta &

Fainstein (2008) find that megaprojects are legitimized using rhetoric espousing environmentally sustainable aspects of the projects and the provision of public amenities. This narrows the

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openness of the public debate as people are funneled into conversations of the details – the aesthetics – of the project instead of more substantial debates (like whether the project should happen at all). This has led to a feeling of inevitability for these projects and “a stance by potentially oppositional groups in which they bargain for benefits (‘planning gain’ in British terminology) rather than questioning the underlying logic of the programs.” (Diaz Orueta & Fainstein, 2008). Beyond the environmentally and socially beneficial tropes used by the project developers, perhaps the most influential and successful form of project marketing is the

promotion of economic benefit that will benefit all. This use of economic benefit has an added effect:

The extent to which public funds are diverted from schemes that might more greatly benefit most people is obscured, and since relatively few people are directly injured, it is difficult to mobilize opposition. This is particularly the case when subsidies to developers are provided off-budget in the form of tax forgiveness. (Diaz Orueta & Fainstein, 2008) Thus, in the case of NBFPs that can successfully convince the greater public that the

development of the project will be an economic boon for the city, region, and/or nation, have the ability to silence many that would otherwise protest its development.

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2.3 The Relevance and Place of this Thesis within the Literature

According to the literature, there seems to be a clear reason for why both nation-branding (and place branding more generally) and flagship projects are common developments in a globalizing, neoliberal world. Moreover, the connection between flagship projects and nation-branding is apparent; flagship projects have the capacity (due to their sheer size and standout appearance) to act as the foundation for projecting a new image on the national brand. Another clear finding in the literature is that large-scale projects (megaprojects) in this neoliberal context (with greater private interests in the mix) may threaten aspects of the public interest in both consequential (i.e. high costs to the public budget, misuse of public space, inaccurate portrayal of the represented communities, etc.) and deontological (i.e. lack of proper participation – non-democratic) ways. These threats to the public interest naturally give rise to oppositions to such projects. Opposition movements form and organize in different ways depending on the context and the item of contestation, and they use a diverse array of specific tactics and actions to further their oppositional goals. The nature of how oppositions form and the actions they take is clear and abundant within the literature. However, as so far as this research has found, there does not appear to be research connecting the physical manifestation, or ‘type’, of a NBFP and the ways in which opposition groups form and act. Moreover, there are a limited number of NBFPs in the Balkans since democratization, thus there is a limited amount of literature focusing on them. As such, this thesis is trying to act as a first attempt at seeing if there is a causal relationship between the physical manifestation of nation branding in an urban flagship project and the subsequent oppositions to them.

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3. Theoretical Discussion

This theoretical discussion section seeks to take the literature presented above and provide a means by which the strategies of opposition to NBFPs can be approached in the context of the recently democratized countries in the Balkans. To begin with, this chapter will aim to show what general ‘types’ (physical manifestations) of NBFPs can be classified from the literature. Given the overwhelming number of possibilities for a NBFP, this chapter will only outline three general NBFP types. This chapter will also look at who forms and leads these oppositions, how they organize at the individual group and coalition level, and what specific strategies or tactics they may employ. Moreover, given that the countries in the Balkans are considered to be composed of weaker civil societies, this section will try to form accounting for that contextual characteristic.

3.1 Typifying Nation-Branding Flagship Projects: General Physical Manifestations

According to McNeill & Tewdwr-Jones (2003), while addressing the nation-branding impacts of Bilbao effect projects like the nearly built Cardiff Opera House, they broke down the way to look at these type of projects into three aspects: aesthetics, function, and location. When using these three main aspects to typify NBFPs in the context of globalization and neoliberalism, the assumption is that visibility and aesthetic appeal/effect are key to the NBFP successfully acting as a form of nation-branding. It will also assume that the aesthetic chosen is one that either progresses the desired image of the nation or at least the desired image of the actors producing the project. This aesthetic can seek to be modern with the goal of producing a cutting edge image for the country, or it can seek to be more traditional and focus on heritage as a means of standing out. As for function, that is dependent on the project and can range from cultural amenities, like museums or sports stadium, to new business districts. The chosen function for a project also has an impact on the produced image as well as on the success factor for the project. In the case of Cardiff, the proposed opera house was never built, even given its backing from various societal elites, because developing a large-scale, branding project that functioned as an opera house in a city like Cardiff (which does not particularly prize opera) did not make sense and was

successfully opposed. In terms of location, given the need for a branding project to be highly visible, this thesis will assume that a NBFP is in a central location or place of national

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another way to look at the location aspect of an NBFP. McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones only looked at the single-site specific cases of monumental structures, thus they were looking at location only in terms of where that single-site is located. This thesis proposes a different way of approaching a project’s location, by the project’s dispersal. Given the size of NBFPs, they can be a large project concentrated on a single point or area (whether as a single monumental, Bilbao-eques structure or as a district-based development), but they can also be a project with multiple subprojects dispersed over a greater area.

As such, the physical aspects making up any given NBFP type are as follows: aesthetic (modern, traditional, etc.), function (performance hall, museum, central-business district, residential district, aesthetic as function, etc.), and location (concentrated on a single-site versus dispersed). Of course, given how many different aesthetics and specific functions an NBFP could have, there are too many possible combinations of these aspects that could result in a different type of NBFP than this thesis could feasibly cover. Thus, only three general NBFP types have been identified (summarized in Table 1). To come up with these general categories, this thesis assumed that not every combination of aspects was likely for an NBFP. For one, it is assumed that an NBFP will be centrally located (due to the necessity of high visibility for NBFPs).

Moreover, a project with a dispersed location will be assumed to be built for an aesthetic purpose given the lack of utility from a geographically piecemeal project beyond a change in general appearance (the individual subprojects may have their own functions, but the overall NBFP – given that it is focused on branding – can be assumed to be producing a new image). Thus, this thesis typifies the physical manifestation of NBFPs into three main categories:

(1) Highly visible, centrally located ‘single point’ symbolic developments akin to those stemming from the Bilbao effect;

a. Aesthetic: modern or traditional; Function: mixture of specific function and aesthetic; Location: concentrated

(2) New, ‘district-based’ urban flagship developments built in visible, semi-central areas like those presented by Díaz Orueta (2015);

a. Aesthetic: modern or traditional; Function: CBD/residential/ commercial district; Location: concentrated

(3) Cosmetic developments (façades, monuments, art, etc.) typically meant to reimagine (or rebuild) the history and culture of the nation – these are geographically dispersed, aesthetic projects which can be likened to a ‘facelift’ renovation.

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Summary of Three General NBFP Types

Aspect NBFP Type 1 NBFP Type 2 NBFP Type 3

Aesthetic Modern or traditional Modern or traditional Modern or traditional

Function Combination of a specific function and aesthetic

CBD/residential/commerci al (mixed-use) district

Aesthetic

Location Concentrated – single point Concentrated – single district Dispersed Funding and Ownership*

Public and/or private Public and/or private Public and/or private *Although not a physical characteristic of a project, given that the funding and ownership of a project may impact the motivation of an opposition, this project ‘sub-aspect’ will also be considered through the course of this study.

The first two of these three NBFP types are structurally new places (green/brownfield developments or urban renewal projects) that can produce a big enough impact on the city’s image that it actually changes the international and internal brand of the city and of the nation. Generally, these types of projects can be seen as means to ‘modernize’ and build upon an already established national identity. One key difference between these two project types is that Type 1 has an initial symbolic effect, with its economic growth pole function a secondary effect. In the case of Type 2, the visual impact is there as well, however, the economic benefits of developing a modern, iconic district (like a new CBD or mixed-use area) can provide more tangible

economic benefits (i.e. high-end office space, luxury residences, etc.). While there has been a general shift of flagship projects to be more single site (‘district’) specific as Lehrer and Laidley (2008) found, NBFPs are not necessarily constrained to this ‘type’. Another type of NBFP can be seen as less of a single point or district site and more in line with traditional ideas of branding. That is, instead of simply adding a single, new iconic point development meant to change the future image of a nation (like a Type 1 or 2 project), NBFPs can also be used to ‘build’ or ‘rewrite’ the identity of a nation. While this is possible with a Type 1 and a Type 2 project, it is certainly the case for a Type 3 NBFP.

Type 3 NBFPs are not as prevalent in the literature given the relative lack of them in modern democratic states. There are examples from non-democratic contexts of the past in which versions of this project type were built. Examples range from the 19th_{century Haussmann}

renewal of Paris to the 1980s renewal of Bucharest as a part of the Systematization of Romanian cities under Ceauşescu. While both of these projects have familiar visual aspects of a Type 3 NBFP, these projects differ from the Type 3 NBFPs that this thesis is investigating in several ways: (1) they were done in authoritarian contexts, and (2) both of these projects were done with

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a function beyond aesthetic (in the case of Paris, to address issues of sanitation, disease and public order; and in the case of Bucharest, to construct new government buildings and to abide by systematization standards). Nonetheless, looking at these cities today, it is the aesthetic

impact of these projects that has carried through the most – both of these cities are internationally defined by the imagery of these projects, and, as the largest cities and capitals of their respective countries, their image is one tightly bound to their nations’ brands. Moreover, while there can be massive structural changes based around this project type (as was seen in both Paris and

Bucharest), the focus of this NBFP type is more ‘cosmetic’ with restructuring and adding to the preexisting landscape instead of building a structurally new area (like with a Type 1 and Type 2 NBFP).

3.2 Strategies of Opposition to Nation-Branding Flagship Projects

Given the lack of preexisting research on NBFPs (and the subsequent lack of research on the oppositions to them), there is no way to accurately predict how an opposition may be affected by the type of NBFP. However, the literature review did find aspects of movements that ought to be examined when looking at oppositions targeting large, urban flagship developments more

generally. The three aspects of a strategy of opposition that were identified are: (1) why it formed and who leads it; (2) how the groups structured individually and how the opposition organized as a whole (at the multi-group level); and (3) the tactics used. Each of these aspects of an opposition can be different simply due to contextual reasons (political, socio-cultural,

economic, etc.). Thus, in order to best identify if and how a strategy of opposition is impacted by a change in NBFP type, it is critical to establish the nature of each of these aspects for an

opposition. These aspects are summarized in Table 2 below.

Looking first at why an opposition forms to an NBFP, there are a number of reasons, the most likely of which are threats to the public interest similar to that of any large development (i.e. misuse of public space or public money, non-democratic/non-participatory planning process, etc.). The motivations for forming impacts those who are motivated to form and lead an

opposition. This places the leadership of an opposition into two general categories as described by Eraydin and Tasan-Kok (2013): elitist and self-interest/grassroots movements. In terms of the structure and organization of an opposition, the structures of the individual opposition groups can be vertical or horizontal, and the organization of the opposition movement as a whole, which is the focus of this category, can be unified (as a single group or as a coalition of multiple groups)

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or divided. The combination of tactics used by an opposition vary widely. Once it is established how these three aspects of a strategy of opposition are composed, there is a process that needs to be taken to disentangle which aspect(s) are impacted by the socio-political context of the

opposition and which aspect(s) are impacted by the NBFP. Then again, there is a process to figure out which aspect(s) composing a NBFP were the ones responsible for the affected opposition aspect(s).

Table 2

Summary of the Aspects of an Opposition Formation and Leadership Elitist versus self-interest

Organization Unified versus divided

Tactics Used Any number of possibilities (i.e. street protests, educational events, litigation, etc.)

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4. Methodology

This chapter will present the research question (and sub research questions) for this thesis. It will then present the way in which this thesis will answer these questions: first, by explaining the key concepts being addressed; second, by giving the rationale for the case studies that were chosen for this study; and third, by providing the research design and data collection method used to answer the research question.

4.1 Research Question and Hypothesis

Stemming from a desire to understand why these young, democratic countries (with weaker civil societies) are developing the way they are and in order to address the observations which

motivated the investigation of the development of these NBFPs and the oppositions to them, this thesis has identified a potential cause and effect relationship between the NBFP ‘type’ and the strategies of opposition employed against these projects. As such, this thesis seeks to answer the following research question:

In the context of recently democratized countries in the Balkans, how and to what extent do strategies of opposition to nation-branding flagship projects differ according to the differences in project type?

This research is based on the hypothesis that: opposition strategies differ according to the differences in the project type being opposed.

4.1.1 Research Sub Questions

The following sub research questions will be used to help answer the above central research question:

1. What is the type of nation-branding flagship project being opposed? 2. Why did the oppositions to these projects form, and who is leading them? 3. How are these oppositions organized?

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4.2 Key Concepts

In order to answer this research question, this thesis explored whether a causal relationship could be found between the structural type of flagship project being produced in newly democratized countries (in this case, Macedonia and Serbia) and the subsequent community opposition to it. To do so, it focused on two main concepts: Nation-Branding Flagship Projects (NBFPs) and strategies of opposition to these projects. NBFPs are large-scale urban developments generally in high visibility locations by national standards (like the centers of capital cities) where they have the greatest visible impact on the internal and external image of the country. As a result, they are flagship projects which have a greater potential to change the national ‘brand’. Also, this study is treating NBFPs as urban projects, not like other forms of megaprojects with branding effects (i.e. transportation infrastructure improvements). There are different types of nation-branding

flagship projects based upon the purpose of their development and the way in which they are physically structured. The three main categories of these projects were identified in the

Theoretical Discussion (refer to Chapter 3.1). Strategies of opposition are the different ways in which the opposition to the projects in question organize and execute actions meant to achieve the desired effect of said opposition’s goals (stopping or changing the project). They will be approached in terms of their motivation to form and leadership, their individual group structure and composite group organization, and the tactics used. The relationship between the NBFP type and the strategy of opposition with, context factored in, is conceptualized in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 – A conceptual framework showing the relationship between the NBFP type and the strategy of opposition. Nation-Branding Flagship Project Type B Nation-Branding Flagship Project Type A Opposition Strategy A Opposition Strategy B Project Type A Contextual Factors – Cultural – Political – Economic – Social Project Type B Differences in strategies of opposition Differences in project type R e s u l t s i n R e s u l t s i n

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4.3 Case Study Selection

In terms of the project selection, the Skopje 2014 and Belgrade Waterfront (Beograd Na Vodi – in Serbian) projects were picked in large part due to the similar contexts in which they exist: both projects are under construction and exist in the center of the capital cities of their respective countries (which are recently democratized countries in the Western Balkans – more specifically, Former Yugoslavia); both projects are government led (at the city and national level); both Macedonia and Serbia suffer from issues of corruption at all levels of government (Musić, 2013; Kurtoglu Eskisar & Komsuoglu, 2015); and both of these projects have the stated vision (and possible effect) of changing the internal and external ‘brand’ of the city and the nation. The contextual similarities help this thesis to better isolate the independent variable under

investigation (‘project type’) when trying to see if there is a causal relationship between it and the dependent variable (‘strategies of opposition’). Moreover, this design allows for a

generalization of the relationship between project type and strategies of opposition as well as replicability using other cases in the future. Additional cases from the other three Western Balkan nations (Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo and Albania) would have been chosen for this study as well, however there are no flagship projects of similar scale to the Skopje 2014 and Belgrade Waterfront projects that have been recently completed or planned. Thus, this research is limited to the largest, most ‘extreme’ cases of NBFP projects in the Balkans, which should help highlight the relationship between the NBFP type and the differences in the strategies of opposition most clearly.

As for the opposition groups, the selection was made in as inclusive a way as possible. That is, any group that has organized actions targeting one of the case study projects was sought out and included (if possible). After initial contact with activists in both Skopje and Belgrade (known via a personal contact – refer to the Appendix for more information on how contacts were made), the case selection of opposition groups was made using a ‘snowball’ method: previous contacts were used to acquire relevant, new contacts at other organizations which were known to also be making actions against the projects in question. The following groups were identified in Macedonia: First Archi Brigade (Prva Arhi Brigada), Freedom Square (Plostad Sloboda), Student Plenum, I love GTC (Go Sakam GTC), Solidarnost, and Defenders of the Park. The following group was identified in Serbia: Ne Da(vi)mo Beograd (Do not give/(drown) Belgrade).

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4.4 Research Design

This thesis organizes the case studies into three categories: contextual background, information about the projects, and information about the oppositions. The reason the study is structured in this way is to clearly separate and explain the different variables at play. For the contextual background, this thesis will look at the ethnic, linguistic, geographic, scalar, economic, and political similarities and differences between Macedonia and Serbia and between Skopje and Belgrade. By examining these contextual aspects, this thesis can better understand the

motivations and perceived needs for different types of NBFPs as well as the context in which oppositions have to form. The rationale is that contextual similarities and differences account for some of the similarities and differences between the projects as well as between the opposition groups. The information on the projects themselves (focusing on what is being built, where it is being built, and some history on the planning and development process) is to be used to identify the specific NBFP aspects for each, answering the first research sub question: “What is the type of nation-branding flagship project being opposed?” Lastly, the information regarding the opposition groups is presented. This is primarily sourced from a series of interviews conducted with active opposition members, but it is also informed by some other sources (like newspapers, magazines, and blogposts). The interviews constitute the bulk of the research for this thesis and provide a clear explanation of: the motivation to organize, the leadership, the individual group structures and opposition movement organization, and the tactics used. This information

effectively answers research sub questions 2, 3 and 4: “Why did the oppositions to these projects form, and who is leading them? How are these oppositions organized? What tactics do these oppositions employ?” With the answers of these questions, the thesis can identify if and what the differences in the strategies of opposition to the projects are.

Finally, once the differences between the NBFPs and between the opposition movements are established, a short analysis can be conducted to determine if (and to what extent) the

difference in NBFP type impacted the differences in the strategies of opposition. This analysis will be done by identifying (1) what contextual aspects motivated the opposition groups to behave in a certain way, and (2) which aspectual difference(s) between the NBFPs contributed to a difference in the oppositions. The responses from the interviews in conjunction with the

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4.4.1 Data collection method

In order to accomplish the research necessary for this thesis, seven interviews were conducted over Skype. These interviews were done in a semi-structured, narrative format with opposition leaders and opposition movement members (current and former): five with people from Macedonia, two with people from Serbia. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in a ‘narrative’ format: that is, the only questions being asked were questions or statements meant to prompt responses needed to answer particular questions regarding the projects and the oppositions to those projects (refer to the research sub questions for the information these questions were seeking), otherwise the interviewees were given the space to ‘narrate’ a story about how things occurred and why. Follow-up and probing questions were asked if something new came up or if more detail or clarification was needed to something said. In short, each of the interviews can be characterized as ‘casual’ and ‘conversational’. While each of the interviews is meant to help explain this thesis’s sub questions and cumulatively the main research question, each has a slightly different structure and slightly different questions asked relative to the person being interviewed – based on their group affiliation and role (refer to the Appendix to see

interview transcriptions).

In terms of choosing which people to interview, as mentioned in the ‘Case Study Selection’ section above, a ‘snowball method’ was used. For this thesis, a personal contact was used to be put in touch with Novica Nakov in Skopje. He is not an active participant of any of the opposition groups in Skopje, but he was involved in some early actions against Skopje 2014. This contact was made over Facebook (with all communication over Facebook Messenger) and eventually resulted in a Skype interview with him. From Novica, contacts were made with Vlado Apostolov of BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), Demijan Hadzi-Angelkovski of the Student Plenum at Saints Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje, Snezhana

Domazetovska of the First Archi Brigade, and Ivana Dragsic of Freedom Square. Each of these people were connected with over Facebook with communication occurring via Facebook Messenger, and each of them was eventually interviewed over Skype. Given that Ivana of Freedom Square knows activists working against the Belgrade Waterfront project, she was able to put me in touch with Dobrica Veselinovic of Ne Davimo Beograd (NDB). While scheduling a Skype interview with Dobrica was not possible, Dobrica connected me with other members of NDB, Milica Lekovic and Andrija Stojanovic, via email, both of whom were interviewed.

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5. Case Studies

5.1 The Contexts

This thesis is focused on two countries in the Balkans: the Republic of Macedonia (also known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYROM) and the Republic of Serbia. These countries (and the NBFPs being developed in them) were selected in large part due to the relatively similar contexts between them given their adjacent location, cultural and linguistic similarities, and shared history. While there are many contextual similarities between the countries, there are still differences that must be made explicit. To make these differences clear, this chapter will describe the ethnic, linguistic, geographic, scalar, economic, and political similarities and differences between Macedonia and Serbia and between Skopje and Belgrade.

5.1.1 Differences within a Common History

Serbia and Macedonia have very long shared history. Up until the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia or SFRY) and the violent ethnic wars that followed in the early 1990s, Serbia and Macedonia were two republics within the same country from 1945 until 1991. Prior to that, both were a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918 – 1945) and the Kingdom of Serbia (1882 – 1918) which Macedonia became a part of in 1913 (Judah, 2000).2 In 1991, Macedonia separated from Yugoslavia with relatively little violence, avoiding most of the violence later associated with Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia However, some differences are already made apparent at this point: unlike Macedonia, which became its own country, Serbia persisted as the larger part of the rump state of Yugoslavia and only later became an independent country in 2006 with the separation of it and Montenegro.3 Serbia’s desire to continue the legacy of Yugoslavia is indicative of the general ethnic nationalist desire for a ‘Greater Serbia’ that would encompass a large part of the Balkans (more or less matching the area of the Serbian Empire of the 14th century) outside of Serbia’s modern borders with significant historical ties to the Serbian people (Guzina, 2003). This type of ethno-national sentiment is also present in Macedonia with the desire for ‘Greater Macedonia’ based along the regional border prior to the Bucharest

Agreement of 1913 (Vangeli, 2010). Given the large Albanian minority in the country (and fears

2_{Before the Bucharest Agreement of 1913, the land of modern Macedonia was under Ottoman rule for over 400}

years. Likewise, most of modern Serbia was under Ottoman rule for over 300 years but separated in 1815 as the Principality of Serbia (which later became the Kingdom of Serbia) (Judah, 2000).

3_{From 1992 until 2006, Serbia was the Republic of Serbia within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which}

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of a ‘Greater Albania’ movement), the idea of a Greater Macedonia is not as strong as the

Greater Serbia movement and is perhaps not addressed by the government to avoid adding to the ethnic tension in the country (Hilaj, 2013).

This stems from another key difference that can be drawn at this point: these two countries have drastically different perceptions of their national identity. In the case of Serbia, the national Serbian identity is well established and has been for centuries. Moreover, it was the largest of the republics in Yugoslavia, and Serbs are still the largest of former Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Albanians). Within Serbia, 83% of people identify as ethnically Serbian, making for a relatively ethnically cohesive country – therefore a nation more easily able to develop an ethnocentric national identity (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2012). As a result, should Serbia choose to work on its national brand, it will simply be building upon the image that it already has – perhaps seeking to transform it to provide a fresh, new look that shows progression away from its

turbulent recent history. On the other hand, Macedonia does not have an ethnic super majority like in Serbia upon which to build a national identity. While the Slavic Macedonian ethnicity is the majority (64%), there are also substantial populations of Albanians (25%), Turks (4%) and Romani (3%) in the country (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2004).4 These ethnic demographic differences between Macedonia and Serbia is reflected in the language.5 Again, Serbian accounts for the vast majority of first language speakers in Serbia (accounting for 88% in 2011) (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2013). On the other hand, the

Macedonian language does not account for a supermajority of native language speakers, only accounting for 66% (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2004). The disparity between the languages is made more acute due to the fact that Serbian was the official language and lingua franca of Yugoslavia. As a result, it is well spoken and understood in Macedonia (amongst older populations in particular), but Macedonian is less well understood in Serbia.

Even just looking at these demographic differences, the type and magnitude of a new national identity to be built is likely to be different in these countries. Where Serbia (Serbs

4_{Note that these statistics come from 2002 as that was the year of the last census in Macedonia. There is speculation}

that funds have not been allocated for a more recent census in order to maintain an inaccurate population count used by the ruling party for electoral fraud (Marusic, 2013).

5_{Both the Macedonian and Serbian languages are a part of the South Slavic language family, and the two languages}

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specifically) already have a well-established national identity and a collective pride based in that identity, Macedonia is struggling to build a national identity. This is in part due to Macedonia’s larger ethnic minority groups, but it also comes down to the very name of the country. The name of both the Macedonian ethnicity and of the country come from the ancient region of Macedonia (which covers modern Macedonia, Northern Greece, southwestern Bulgaria, and small parts of Albania, Kosovo and Serbia). The name does not have to do with the history of the Slavic population in the Balkans (which did not arrive to the area until the 6th_{century), but it was} instead adopted by a group of these Slavs, and due to the historic-political position of Macedonia with the Serbs and the Bulgarians, the Macedonian demonism was not even that widely used until the early 20th century (Palikruševa, 1997). Moreover, given that the name ‘Macedonia’ evokes an ancient region much larger than that of the modern state of Macedonia, there are other places that are referred to as ‘Macedonia’ other than just the modern state. The most notable of these is the region of Macedonia in northern Greece. Greece has taken issue with Macedonia calling itself this name, and this dispute has had consequences on the country of Macedonia such that it is referred to by the UN as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and has been vetoed by Greece to continue its NATO accession process (as a part of its EU accession process) until the naming dispute is settled (Lungescu, 2008). Thus, even the ultimate national symbol, the very name of the country, is challenged. This same argument has also impacted the flag that the country uses. The original flag of Macedonia was the Vergina, which was the symbol associated with the Kingdom of ancient Macedonia, a nation which not only had part of its territory in northern Greece but eventually also conquered the rest of the Balkan peninsula (including all of modern Greece) (World Heritage Encyclopedia, 2016). As such, use of the Vergina, like the name, is seen as having potentially imperialistic ties. As a result, Macedonia has a different flag than the one originally desired by the country (albeit, similar) – another major symbolic blow to the national identity.

Another affront to the Macedonian national identity comes from Bulgaria, with

arguments that the Macedonian Slavs are just a break away “ethnicity” from the Bulgarians.6 The sentiment by some of the Slavic population of Macedonia as identifying as ethnically Bulgarian

6_{This is rhetoric perpetuated by some Bulgarians and even previously by the current governing party}

(VMRO-DPMNE) under Ljubco Georgievski given the close Slavic ties, the relationship the two nations had during and after World War II, as well as the sizable number of Macedonian Bulgarians and Bulgarian Macedonians (Vangeli, 2011)

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exacerbates Macedonia’s identity issue. This is further accentuated by the high-level of mutual intelligibility and linguistic similarity between the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages (to the point where some linguists see the two as dialects of one another).

Figure 2 – A map of Former Yugoslavia with the modern national boundaries and with the case cities of Belgrade and Skopje in bolded boxes (Wikimedia, 2016). As can be seen, Macedonia is smaller than Serbia and is located in a peripheral location in the southern part of the country.

This conflict with identity is in line with a similar conflict with the Serbs historically. Like Macedonia, Serbia has also had its share of international disputes, albeit the disputes Serbia has been entangled in are less focused on national symbolism and of a more violent nature. The most notable of these disputes is its claim to Kosovo, an area with an ethnic Kosovar Albanian

majority and a small Serbian minority, which separated in 2006 in a violent conflict with the help of NATO intervention. The Kosovo conflict along with the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s (in which Serbia has often been regarded as the aggressor) has produced a very different need for a new image for Serbia than the new image needed for Macedonia. Where Macedonia has had its

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identity questioned and different aspects of its national symbolism challenged, Serbia has a distasteful internationally bloody recent history.

While the differences in the ethnic and linguistic make-up of these countries is not

insubstantial, and while various international relations could motivate different branding needs in each of these countries, perhaps an equally important difference is the difference in centrality and scale at both the national level of Macedonia and Serbia as well as their respective capital cities (the sites of the case studies). Within Yugoslavia, and within the West Balkans more generally, Serbia was and is the largest part (by both area and population). On the other hand, Macedonia was one of the smaller republics within Yugoslavia and is located in a peripheral, mountainous region in the south along the Greek border. To put this in perspective, the

population of Serbia, according to its 2011 census, is 7,186,862 whereas Macedonia’s, according to an estimate at the end of 2014, is 2,069,172 (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2016). Moreover, Belgrade was the former capital of Yugoslavia and is the largest city of Former Yugoslavia, a metropolis with a population of 1.23 million in the city proper and over 1.65 million in its administrative district (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2013). On the other hand, Skopje was merely a regional capital of Yugoslavia and, as of the most recent census in 2002, only had population of 506,296 (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2004).7 This difference in scale and centrality is reflected in the differences of the economic

development of each of the countries and their capital cities as well. For instance, Serbia has a more diversified and industrialized economic history than Macedonia, and Belgrade has an economy 3.5 times larger than Skopje’s economy (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2011; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2012).

A final key difference between Skopje and Belgrade is that Belgrade has maintained large parts of its historical core and outlying historical neighborhoods, whereas Skopje is a city with little of its historical architecture intact. In 1963, Skopje suffered a devastating earthquake which claimed the lives of 1,070 individuals and which destroyed 80.7% of the city’s residential structures, leaving 75.5% of the population homeless (Petrovski, 2004). In the wake of this earthquake was a reconstruction project from Yugoslavia’s central government in cooperation with an amazing international effort from both sides of the Iron Curtain. This eventually

7_{While there are unofficial estimates, the 2002 census is the most recent official count or estimate that has been}