Hayek: between Tradition and Liberty

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Hayek: between Tradition and

Liberty

the Continuing Tension between Conservative Stability and Liberal Unpredictability

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Title: Hayek: between Tradition and Liberty

Author: Justin Intan Maria Hoijer

Student Number: 6065821

E-mailadress: jimhoijer@hotmail.com

Study: Research Master Philosophy

Teachers: G. van Donselaar and T. Nys

Date: 14-08-2017

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‘[T]he result of experimentation of many generations may embody more

experience than any one man possesses (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 122).’

‘[F]reedom has never worked without deeply ingrained moral beliefs and (…)

coercion can be reduced to a minimum only where individuals can be expected

as a rule to conform voluntarily to certain principles

(Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 123).’

‘[The] Western package still seems to offer human societies the best available

set of economic, social and political institutions – the ones most likely to unleash

the individual human creativity capable of solving the problems the twenty-fist

century world faces. Over the past half-millennium, no civilization has done a

better job of finding and educating the geniuses that lurk in the far right-hand

tail of the distribution of talent in any human society. The big question is

whether or not we are still able to recognize the superiority of that package

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1. Introduction

There seems to be a deep, unreconciled and often unrecognized tension in much of modern right wing political thought and practice. Many right wing politicians, parties and

philosophers want to reorder society on the basis of classical liberal1 ideals based on individual responsibility, private property and a large private sphere. However, at the same time many of the same politicians, parties and philosophers also argue in favour of a society based on conservative ideals in which community, communal values, communal

responsibility and traditions are central. While both classical liberalism and conservatism are not necessarily contradictory, there seems to be an obvious and deep tension between the more individualistic ideology of liberalism and the more communal centred ideal of conservatism.

A good example of this tension can be found in the ideals espoused by two important and influential representatives of the proud and honourable tradition of British conservatism: Edmund Burke and Margaret Thatcher. Edmund Burke’s (2015 [1790]: 508-509) view of society as a being constituted by the living, dead and those who are not yet born, who together form the nation is of course best exemplified in this legendary quote from ‘Reflections On The Revolution In France’:

Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure – but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, callico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other

reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of

1_{It is important to keep in mind that throughout this thesis, unless mentioned otherwise, when the term}

‘liberalism’ is invoked it is taken to refer to ‘classical liberalism’. While most modern Western political parties - of both the left and the right - are liberal in the sense of wanting a separation of church and state, defending a private sphere and want some form of capitalism not all are liberal in its classical sense. Furthermore, liberalism is taken as being intimately connected with capitalism. As many Marxists also have argued it might be said that in many respects classical liberalism is the accompanying ideology of capitalism. See chapter 2.2 for a more profound definition of classical liberalism.

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such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.

And while Burke placed society at the centre of conservative politics, a mere 200 years later Margaret Thatcher as a representative of the same tradition could pronounce that ‘there is no such thing as society’ in an often cited and scolded quote:

I think we have been through a period when too many people have been given to understand that when they have a problem it is government’s job to cope with it. ‘I have a problem, I’ll get a grant. I’m homeless, the government must house me.’ They are casting their problems on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And no governments can do anything except through people, and people must look to

themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours. People have got their entitlements too much in mind, without the

obligations. There is no such thing as an entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation.

While Burke and Thatcher are both representatives of the British conservative tradition, there does seem to be a wide gap separating Burke’s community focused politics and Margaret Thatcher ‘neoliberal’ approach to politics – although as Thatcher’s complete quote makes clear she definitely sees a larger role for local communities in society than is generally assumed. Although it should be noted that some of the difference between the two is

undoubtedly the result of changing opinions and possibilities throughout history, the deeper tension between a conservative, communal and tradition based politics, and a liberal and individualistic politics seems to be part of many, if not most, major Western right wing political parties and political philosophies.

To illustrate this fact one can look at the American Republican Party which generally pleas for substantially lowering taxes, individuating health care and promoting individual responsibility, while at the same time standing up and defending tradition, conservative Christian values and stressing the importance of churches and religion in society (Website GOP; Website Republican Views). On the European continent the same pattern can be found in many right wing parties. To take a pressing example: most Western European ‘populist’

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parties – France’s ‘Front National’, Germany’s ‘Alternative for Germany’ and Holland’s ‘Party for Freedom’ - seem to stress the importance of classical liberal values, in the form of individual rights to freedom of speech and a large private sphere protected from governmental intervention2, while all the while stressing the importance of conservative, nationalistic and patriotic values (Website Euronews; Website BBC; Website Democratic Society).3 That these two sides are in a constant tension comes to the fore when for example the Republican Party has as one of its main goals to limit governmental intervention in the private sphere of its citizens, while at the same time is for a continued prohibition on all recreational drugs (Website GOP).4 And to give another example the ‘Party For Freedom’ says to adhere and give chief importance to classical liberal values – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc. - while at the same time arguing that Islamic influence should be constrained in the

Netherlands on the basis of the Dutch society being traditionally Judeo-Christian and Humanistic (Website PVV).

But the tension between conservatism and liberalism cannot only be found in practical politics, philosophically as well there has been a long history of tension between the two ideologies. Much of the tension comes especially to the fore in liberalism’s embrace of capitalism. As Albert Hirschman (1982: 1466) has shown in his seminal paper ‘Rival Interpretations of Market Society’ from the 18th

century onwards conservatives criticize capitalism on the basis of the idea that it undermines the morality which is the basis of society. And as many prominent social scientists have pointed out, capitalism and the

resultant mobility undermine the by conservatives valued sense of community (Baudet, 2013: 190-192; Becker and Bussemaker, 2006: 20-25; Judt, 2010: 118-119). A central criticism of conservatives of liberals is that liberalism in combination with its strong adherence to capitalism destroys communities and traditional morality which are the basis of a stable society (Nisbet, 1952: 169).

In recent philosophical thought this tension between conservatism and liberalism might be exemplified by the works of Friedrich Hayek. Although Hayek (2011 [1960]: 519)

2_{Although it should be noted that many of these populist parties are often less classical liberal on economic}

policy than their mainstream right wing counterparts. For example most of these populists parties are critical of international free trade and want to protect the welfare state.

3_{It should be noted that the more traditional right wing parties (VVD, lé Republicans, CDU) in western Europe}

also seem to have the same internal tension between conservatism and liberalism.

4_{Of course this is an oversimplification of reality since some prominent republicans are for the legalization of}

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explicitly denies being a conservative he obviously, as will become clear, adheres to and defends many conservative ideals. Hayek is both a staunch defender of individual liberty, free markets and small government and a resolute proponent of the value of traditions. The tension between liberalism and conservatism which besets, as we have seen, many political parties in their practical capacity, is duplicated philosophically in Hayek. Something which is also observed by influential Hayek interpreter John Gray (1980: 120): ‘Hayek’s social thought embodies competing and irreconcilable commitments, conservative and libertarian, traditionalist and individualist, sceptical and rationalist.’

In Hayek’s (2007 [1956]: 45) work we can see this for example in the fact that in many respects he seems to be quite critical of conservatism and traditions: ‘[I]n its

[conservatism] paternalistic, nationalistic, and power-adoring tendencies it is often closer to socialism than true liberalism; and with its traditionalistic, anti-intellectual, and often mystical propensities it will never, except in short periods of disillusionment, appeal to the young (…) [emphasis mine].’ However, compare this quote to Hayek’s seemingly more critical stance on individualism and less critical stance on tradition a mere eight years earlier5:

It must remain an open question whether a free or individualistic society can be worked successfully if people are too “individualistic” in the false sense, if they are

too unwilling voluntarily to conform to traditions and conventions, and if they refuse

to recognize anything which is not consciously designed or which cannot be demonstrated as rational to every individual. It is at least understandable that the prevalence of this kind of “individualism” has often made people of good will despair of the possibility of achieving order in a free society and even made them ask for a dictatorial government with the power to impose on society the order which it will not produce itself [emphasis mine] (Hayek, 1984 [1948a]: 149).

And just a few years later Hayek (1984 [1967b]: 364) defends the philosophical tradition – his form of classical liberalism which is opposed to ‘modern liberalism’6 - that is ‘reverent of

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It should be noted though that Hayek already had started working on the Constitution of Liberty in 1948 (Hamowy, 2011: 6-7). So both quotes arguably come from the same era in Hayek’s thought.

6_{Hayek actually doesn’t call it ‘modern liberalism’ himself but refers to it as the ‘second kind of liberalism.’}

However, for clarity sake I refer to Hayek’s target of criticism here as ‘modern liberalism’, something which is logical since Hayek’s criticizes in much of his work the meaning liberalism has gotten in modern times – a

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tradition and recognizes that all knowledge and all civilization rests on tradition.’ The tension comes even more to the fore when Hayek (2011 [1960]: 81-82, 84-85, 122, 124-126) on the one hand defends the traditional while at the same time arguing for continuing innovation. But these examples only exemplify the internal tensions in Hayek’s work between his

conservative and liberal tendencies. However, many political philosophers, political scientists and political commentators have shown that there is a general tension between conservatism and liberalism (Nisbet, 1952; Haar, 2011: 97-117; Baudet and Visser, 2012: 7-12). Thus, even if Hayek’s work could be interpreted in way which makes it internally consistent it is not clear if a general reconciliation between liberalism and conservatism is even possible. To point to just one argument for their incompatibility it has been argued that markets undermine the traditions which it needs for its own functioning (Hirschman: 1982). If such criticism holds true, it might be even more problematic for Hayek’s intellectual outlook than its presumed inner tensions. Fundamentally, Hayek’s staunch defense of classical liberalism might be incompatible with his equally staunch defense of traditions both on the basis of his own theoretical outlook and on the basis of external criticism.

Thus, we have two main problems which we are going to analyse in this thesis. First of all we are going to try to understand how Hayek’s conservative and liberal outlooks are related and if he is successful in his resolution of the tension between these outlooks on his own terms. Second of all we are going to assess the general criticism that there is a deep and fundamental flaw in right wing political theory in that it cannot reasonably reconcile its conservative and liberal tendencies. We will address the problem in the form of some ‘lessons’ which both conservatives and liberals can learn from Hayek. As has been noted by other interpreters as well (see for example Haar, 2011) Hayek’s concept of tradition tries to bridge the gap between conservatism and liberalism and it is here that Hayek’s work might hold some valuable lessons for both conservatives and liberals bringing both ideologies closer together in the process.

We will start our project by giving a preliminary description of liberalism, conservatism and why Hayek’s work can be considered to include elements of both philosophical outlooks in the second chapter. In the third chapter we will lay out Hayek’s political outlook and give special attention to his understanding of tradition. His political theory will also be critically examined in this chapter. In the fourth and last chapter we will

meaning which, according to Hayek, has brought it more in line with ‘socialism’, ‘democratism’ and

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argue that although Hayek does try to make a connection between his liberal and conservative tendencies some flaws remain. Furthermore, we will show that both conservatives and liberals can learn some important lessons from Hayek’s work, lessons which might help if not bridge the gap between both philosophies, might at least help to substantially reduce the gap.

It is in the way in which Hayek’s theoretical framework shows that conservatism and liberalism can be brought closer together that his preeminent importance and continuing relevance for modern political philosophy and political practice lies. Understanding Hayek brings us a long way in correctly understanding modern right wing politics.

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2. Hayek, Liberalism and Conservatism

In this chapter we will briefly show that Hayek has both liberal and conservative elements in his political philosophy. First we will show that Hayek’s liberal tendencies can be found in the fact that he is in favour of a minimal and neutral government. Furthermore, he sees it as the main task of the government to safeguard a large private sphere. Economically Hayek supports a mainly capitalistic economy based on private property and free markets. Second we will show that Hayek has some conservative tendencies. While Hayek denies being a conservative, we will show that his understanding of conservatism is deeply flawed. If conservatism is defined as adhering to scepticism, pluralism, traditionalism and realistic pessimism than Hayek can be said to have several conservative beliefs. It should be kept in mind that the sketch given in this chapter should be considered to be preliminary, but useful as background knowledge for chapter three. However, at the beginning of chapter four we will return to the subject of Hayek’s liberalism and conservatism, and consequently we will give a more definitive reading of Hayek’s position in light of the knowledge we gained in chapter three.

2.1 Hayek and Liberalism

Although Hayek can quite uncontroversially be, and often is, called a ‘liberal’ it is instructive and unfortunately necessary to give some preliminary clarification on the relation between Hayek and liberalism. As Hayek (2007 [1944]: 174; 2007 [1956]: 45; 2011 [1960]: 519-520; 2013 [1973]: 60) himself regretfully observes time and time again liberalism seems to have lost it original meaning in many modern Western states. In United States liberalism is usually related to progressive politics often associated with the Democratic Party. Or as Hayek (2011 [1960]: 519-520) describes it, the word liberalism has been co-opted by ‘radicals and

socialists’. In America liberals generally advocate for policies which lead to more governmental intervention in the economy.

However, liberalism as we will be using it throughout this thesis, and as it is used by Hayek (2007 [1956]: 45) throughout his work, is liberalism in its ‘original, nineteenth-century sense’. Liberalism in this sense is what we nowadays would most often call ‘classical

liberalism’. It is the liberalism which is inspired and adhered to, according to Hayek (1984 [1967b]: 363) – although in some instances somewhat anachronistically - by the likes of David Hume, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Lord Acton, Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and James Madison. Unlike modern

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American styled liberalism, classical liberalism generally is in favor of a minimal and neutral government which safeguards a large individual private sphere, and a mainly capitalistic economy based on private property and free markets (Haar, 2011: 35, 39-41, 44, 48).

It is quite uncontroversial to claim that Hayek is a liberal in this sense.7 Hayek (1984 [1948]: 141, 151; 2013 [1976]: 221; 1984 [1978]: 358-359) generally defends that

governments should keep their interventions to a minimum, holds that governments should be value neutral and not commit to supporting some purposes of individuals over others.

Additionaly Hayek (2011 [1960]: 206; 1984 [1967b]: 365-366) defends a large private sphere and seems to have some form of methodological individualism at the basis of his theories (Nishiyama, 1984: xliii). Furthermore, Hayek (2007 [1944]: 86; 1991 [1988]: 94-105) argues that a ‘just’8

and efficient economy is capitalistic, based on private property and free markets.

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Thus, characterising Hayek’s work as containing many elements of classical liberalism seems to be fair.

2.2 Hayek and Conservatism

Although Hayek (2011 [1960]: 519) explicitly denies being a conservative many modern interpreters acknowledge that Hayek’s political philosophy contains many conservative elements and should be considered conservative in at least some respects (see for example Scruton, 2006; Haar, 2011). Roger Scruton (2006: 209) for example argues that ‘Hayek’s core arguments and ideas belong to the conservative tradition (…) and arrives at conclusions, which align him with Burke against Paine, de Maistre against Saint-Simon, and Hegel against Marx.’ Additionally, it can be convincingly argued that at the time Hayek made his most

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Hayek himself suggests that the liberalism which he adheres to should be called ‘Whiggism’, the reason being, as we have mentioned, that the original word liberal has been tainted, especially because in the United States liberalism is a form of progressivism. This classical liberalism was the political ideology of the English Whigs (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 530). Thus, Hayek (2011 [1960]: 531 ) states: ‘Whiggism is historically the correct name for the ideals in which I believe.’

8_{Although Hayek (1984 [1967b]: 374; 2013 [1973]: 134; 2013 [1976]: 198-199) argues that the results of}

markets cannot be described as being either just or unjust in a ‘social justice’ sense. Only the direct results of human action can be called just or unjust according to Hayek.

9_{Although to be fair there are some critics – of the libertarian persuasion - that claim that Hayek’s defense of}

free markets is ‘lukewarm’ at best. A good example is Walter Block (1996: 365) who states that ‘[t]here is little doubt that Hayek deserves his reputation as a defender of economic freedom—but only compared to his contemporaries who, with only a few honorable exceptions, were almost totally immersed in interventionistic philosophy. However, when compared either to some ideal standard, or to numerous modern commentators, it is clear that Hayek falls short of a clear unambiguous advocate of the free marketplace.’

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explicit denial of being a conservative – his 1960 postscript ‘Why I Am Not A Conservative’ to ‘the Constitution of Liberty’ - it was legitimate stance for him to take on the basis of ‘an understandable distrust of European conservative parties (Scruton, 2006: 208)’. As we will see a convincing case can be made that Hayek had a confused and deeply flawed

interpretation of the conservative political philosophical tradition.

The central tenets Hayek (2011 [1960]: 520-522) ascribes to conservatism are that it is an essentially backward-looking doctrine fearing change and the new, and as a result ‘cannot offer an alternative direction to the direction in which we are moving’. Additionally

conservatism, as perceived by Hayek (2011 [1960]: 522-523), is fond of authority, lacks proper economic understanding, and more fundamentally ‘does not object to coercion or arbitrary power so long as it is used for what he regards as the right purposes.’ Furthermore, the conservative is also not fundamentally opposed to too much governmental power and intervention, as long as the right person yields that power for the right purposes (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 525). Additionally, the conservative does view religious ideals as the proper objects of coercion and believes that that are superior persons in society who ought to be protected and should have greater influence in public affairs (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 524). Furthermore, conservatism according to Hayek (2011 [1960]: 526) is obscurantist, it denies scientific facts if it regards the consequences as being unwanted. Lastly, Hayek (2011 [1960]: 526-527) associates conservatism with nationalism, imperialism and the resulting forms of collectivism.

Central tenets of conservatism according to Hayek 1.Backward-looking, no alternative vision

2. Authoritarian, doesn’t object to arbitrary power 3. Big government

4. Religion proper area of coercion 5. Inequality between persons 6. Obscurantist

7. Associates with nationalism, imperialism and collectivism

First of all one can question if Hayek doesn’t possess at least some of the conservative tenets even on his own terms. For example Hayek’s view of tradition can be said to have

obscurantists tendencies to the effect that he argues that we will not always be able to know the function of certain traditions other than they are presumed to have a function.

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society. However, it should be admitted that using Hayek’s definition of conservatism he does indeed seems to be very far removed from that ideal since his works consistently and strongly is authoritarian, pro-small government, pro-private sphere, and

anti-nationalistic/imperialistic and collectivistic.

However, we should note that Hayek’s description of conservatism seems to be deeply unfair and out of touch with the movement as formulated by some of the most influential philosophical proponents of the movement in the second half of twentieth century. Hayek even admits that at the time of writing and publishing his last great completely self-written work ‘Law, Legislation and Liberty’10

he didn’t as yet read arguably the most important and influential conservative political treatise of the 20th century Michael Oakeshott’s 1975 ‘On Human Conduct’ (Hayek, 2013 [1979]: xxi). Thus, it might be instructive to see how some prominent conservatives themselves define the core principles of the movement.

Influential conservative political philosopher John Kekes defines conservatism in such a way that it seems on many points to be contradictory to Hayek’s definition.11 The

conservative political philosophy rests according to Kekes (1998: 28) on four basic beliefs, which all are in a way reminiscent of Aristotle, as in constituting the middle between two extremes. First of all conservatives are sceptics. They do not believe that rational access can be had to knowledge of the perfect society. However, they are also not fideists in that they repudiate the possibility of rational knowledge about society completely. Useful knowledge of political arrangements can be acquired by critically studying the historical record (Kekes, 1998: 31).12 Second, conservatives do not believe in either the complete absoluteness or

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The authorship of The Fatal Conceit is highly disputed, some claim Hayek wrote most of it himself or at least most of the ideas in the book are Hayek’s, others have argued that the editor W.W. Bartley made major additions himself and a number of chapters are completely from his hand (Website Liberty Unbound). As a result

references to The Fatal Conceit are limited to the parts which are undoubtedly in line with Hayek’s previous thoughts. However, it should be noted that judgments pertaining when new thoughts in The Fatal Conceit are a natural development resulting from Hayek’s previous thoughts are highly contestable. Thus, the reader is advised throughout this thesis to be critical, cautious and sceptical in regards with any references to The Fatal Conceit.

11_{Although it should be noted that much of modern conservative thought has been shaped and influenced by}

Hayek’s work (Scruton, 2006: 209). Speculatively, it could be possible that Hayek might have been more correct in his description of conservatism of his time. However, to give a complete answer to such a possibility requires an extensive discussion and excavation of the history of conservatism which falls outside the proper subject of this thesis.

12_{See on this point also Michael Oakeshott’s (1991 [1962]) attack on the presumed excessive rationalism in}

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relativity of values. Conservatives are pluralists, ‘there is a universal and objective standard, but it is only applicable to some values (Kekes, 1998: 34).’ Thus, there is a minimum to which a society must conform if they want to provide its people with the possibility of good lives. However, outside of this realm there can be a plurality of values. Third, conservatives do not argue that either the individual or society is of central importance. Conservatives adhere to traditionalism, individuals autonomously choose to take part in all kinds of

traditions. However, the framework of traditions provides individuals authoritatively with the relevant choices (Kekes, 1998: 39).13 Fourth conservatives adhere to a realistic pessimism (Kekes, 1998: 42). They neither do believe that humans can be moulded into perfect beings or are that they are corrupted to the bone.14

These four main points of conservatism – scepticism, pluralism, traditionalism and realistic pessimism – seem to be shared ideals in one form or another by other prominent conservative political philosophers (see for example Nisbet, 1952; Oakeshott,1991 [1962]; Scruton, 2002 [1980]).

Hayek also seems to share these four central tenets of conservatism. First of all Hayek seems to have a fundamentally sceptic attitude. He states time and time again that human reason is not all-powerful and that our knowledge of society and its function will always be necessarily limited (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 130-131). This fact leads Hayek (1981: 82-83) to conclude that comprehensive planning of our society is an epistemological impossibility. Additionally, knowledge of a perfect or utopian society – in both its ethical and political sense – is impossible according to Hayek. There is no perspective of reason outside our own

conceptions. Only immanent criticism is possible.

Hayek's main point is that no one can attain a point of Archimedean leverage on and distance from society such that any synoptic knowledge of it is available to him. The planner himself is the meeting ground of many intellectual and moral traditions, and his criticism of them can only be an immanent criticism, invoking one part of the stock of inherited notions and standards to appraise the rest. (Gray, 1981: 82-83).

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See for example also the claims made by influential conservative sociologist Robert Nisbet (2000 [1975]: 7) in his work ‘Twilight of Authority’: ‘Ethnicity is, along with family, locality, and religion, among the most ancient and powerful of bonds for mankind.’

14_{Which is also related to the rejection of the so called ‘politics of perfection’, see Oakeshott (1991 [1962]:}

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Second, Hayek seems to adhere to some form of pluralism. Hayek (2011 [1960]: 87) is deeply committed to the idea that individuals in a free society can pursue their own goals. Hayek (2013 [1976]: 270) calls this fact that ‘the Great Society (…) is merely

means-connected and not ends-means-connected.’ Furthermore, the goals which we set for ourselves are not fixed, what we consider ‘good or beautiful is changeable (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 87).’

However, Hayek (2011 [1960]: 87; 2013 [1976]: 272) also seems to suggest that some values are ‘universal’ in the sense that they provide the necessary basis for a liberal society in which individuals are free to pursue their goals. Although Hayek (1984 [1948a]: 149; 1958: 234-235; 2011 [1960]: 500, 524) rejects state coercion of religious and moral ideals, he does consider it necessary that certain (liberal) values are acknowledged as being indispensable.

Third, traditions play a central role in Hayek’s political philosophy. Hayek considers common traditions and values as being necessary for a society to exist at all. Communication on values presumes a stable background. People from different backgrounds cannot even really discuss their differing values. ‘There is a need for certain common standards of values, and, though too great emphasis on this need may lead to very illiberal consequences, peaceful common existence would be clearly impossible without any such standards (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 500).’ Additionally, Hayek (1958: 235) believes that ‘freedom has never worked without deeply ingrained moral beliefs, and that coercion can be reduced to a minimum only where the individuals can be expected as a rule to conform voluntarily to certain principles.’ Furthermore, and maybe even more important, Hayek (1958: 233) believes that traditions are the result of a complex evolutionary process. The traditions which have survived this process of evolution are presumed by Hayek to have had utility – although he admits that this

presumption could be proven wrong on a case by case basis – and should therefore be adhered to, unless a particular tradition is proven to lead to negative results.

However, Hayek is also quite critical of a too strict adherence to traditions. ‘[T]he belief in integral freedom is based on an essentially forward-looking attitude and not on any nostalgic longing for the past or a romantic admiration for what has been (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 532). Additionaly, Hayek (2011 [1960]: 531) wants to free tradition ‘from the overrationalistic, nationalistic and socialistic influences.’

Fourth, although not Hayek’s main concern, he does not seem to believe in the perfectibility of humans. This is clear from the observation which we have already made that he doesn’t believe in the all-powerfulness of human reason. Furthermore, there does not seem to be an underlying current in his works that human beings can improve their moral

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Thus, we can conclude that Hayek’s political philosophy contains many elements of mainstream conservative political philosophical thought, at least in the form of a commitment to scepticism, pluralism, traditionalism and realistic pessimism.

We can provisionally conclude that Hayek’s work contains both liberal and conservative elements. Hayek is a liberal in the fact that he is in favour of a minimal and neutral

government, sees it as the main task of the government to safeguard a large private sphere, and lastly that he is a defender of a capitalistic economy based on private property and free markets. Hayek’s conservative tendencies can be found in his scepticism, pluralism,

traditionalism and realistic pessimism. We will return in chapter three to this point and give a more complete and in depth overview of these tendencies and Hayek’s way of connecting the two said ideologies. But before we can undertake such a task we will need to get a more precise understanding of Hayek’s political philosophical outlook, especially in relation to the role of traditions in society. This will be the central theme of chapter three.

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3. Traditions and Evolution

Hayek’s social theory builds on many different strands of previous liberal and conservative thought. In this chapter we will analyze Hayek’s theoretical framework which bases his social theory. We will start in the first part of this chapter by discussing Hayek’s theoretical

framework and its implications. First we will explain Hayek’s views on human reason. Hayek argues that reason is not as powerful as it is often made out to be by constructivist

philosophers and social scientists. Reason is a limited instrument and we should be modest in our pretensions about our intellect and the possibility of using reason to plan and construct traditions and institutions. After this we will show that Hayek has a strong conviction in the idea of spontaneous order. Many of our traditions and institutions are not the result of conscious planning, but have evolved spontaneously over time. The resulting traditions and institutions are the most successful. Hayek differentiates between three levels of evolution: biological, intellectual and cultural. Central to every evolutionary process is its selection mechanism. Hayek suggests three selection mechanisms: population growth, conquest and imitation. We will end the first part of the chapter by considering the implications of Hayek’s theoretical framework. Two important implications follow: there is a presumption in favour of existing traditions and institutions, and when change is needed it should be slow and

incremental change, not radical or revolutionary change.

The second part of the chapter will be devoted to several criticisms which have been and can be raised against Hayek’s theoretical framework and its implications. First of all Hayek’s view on reason will be critically analyzed. Here it will be shown that Hayek’s view on reason is shared by other influential thinkers of the 20th century. Though it will be

suggested that Hayek doesn’t delve deep enough into the role implicit knowledge plays in the successful working of society. Second, it will be shown that all three selection mechanisms have their own faults. Furthermore, it will be suggested that a fourth selection mechanism might be added: immigration. Third, we will relate Hayek’s evolutionary framework of traditions to game theory. It will be shown that evolution from a game theoretical perspective can lead to stable though suboptimal outcome, thus necessitating external intervention – something which is problematic for Hayek. And lastly, we will analyse Hayek’s problematic stance in relation to moral relativism. Hayek’s theory does seem to lead to moral relativism, something which is problematic in relation to his defense of liberalism. Furthermore, Hayek could be construed as adhering to several different and contradictory moral theories.

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3.1 Traditions and Evolution Explained 3.1.1 Reason

Hayek (2011 [1960]: 108) differentiates between two strands in Western political thought. First of all there is the so called ‘French’ or ‘constructivist’ tradition. This tradition has great faith in the power of human reason, and it might be said that it is deeply committed to idea that human reason has almost unlimited powers. Human reason is interpreted as being a-historical and existing ‘independently and antecedently’ of its environment (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 112). This powerful property called reason should, according to the constructivists, be the basis of our traditions, social arrangements and institutions. But many constructivists go even further and claim that we should not only use reason in the creation of rational

institutions, we should also use reason to aim ‘at the construction of a utopia (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 108).’ Thus, reason can be used as the basis upon which a utopia can be created. This belief in the unlimited power of reason is coupled with the violent rejection of traditions and old institutions because these are considered to be irrational and/or the result of privilege of certain classes. Only by using our reason can we construct a reasonable, and as a result, a just society. Important to note is that Hayek does not view constructivism as a merely ‘left-wing’ phenomena. Both the left and the right, socialists and liberals - in the contemporary American sense - have been infected with constructivism. Furthermore, even some influential

conservative philosophers are identified by Hayek as belonging to the constructivist tradition. Thus, Hayek names as prominent constructivists as diverse group of people including, but not limited to: Francis Bacon, Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, Auguste Comte, Rene

Descartes, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Voltaire (Diamond Jr., 1980: 356). Together, these philosophers cover most political positions in Western history: social contract theory, utilitarianism, communism, socialism, liberalism, conservatism, authoritarianism and democratic theory are all

represented among these thinkers. Thus, constructivism according to Hayek is a widely held view not contained to one, or a few, political movements, but influencing almost all modern political ideologies.

Opposed to this tradition of political philosophy stands the ‘British’ or the ‘critical rationalist’ tradition – the tradition which Hayek himself embraces. A central element of the British tradition is that human reason is viewed as being fundamentally fallible, incomplete, imperfect and the result of historical evolution (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 112; 2013 [1973]: 17-20). Reason is not all powerful, and more fundamentally it is the product of an ongoing

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developmental process.15 Reason itself evolves and ‘is itself a system that constantly changes as a result of his endeavor to adopt himself to his surroundings (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 74).’

The conception of man deliberately building his civilization stems from an erroneous intellectualism that regards human reason as something standing outside nature and possessed of knowledge and reasoning capacity independent of experience. But the growth of the human mind is part of the growth of civilization; it is the state of civilization at any given moment that determines the scope and the possibilities of human ends and values (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 75).

Thus, it is of fundamental importance to note that according to Hayek reason and human intellect are not properties which are independent of the development of our society – as the more extreme supporters of the constructivist tradition suppose – but are the result of it (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 17-18). Although it should be noted that this is a two way street: reason is not only a passive recipient of culture but it also shapes culture (Gaus, 2006: 251). The philosophers who are identified by Hayek as being part of the critical rationalist tradition are almost exclusively what we now consider classical liberals or conservatives. The list includes Lord Acton, St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, Edmund Burke, Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Bernard Mandeville16, Carl Menger, Charles de Montesquieu, Karl Popper, Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville (Diamond Jr., 1980: 356).17

Hayek uses his theory of reason to criticize the idea of governmental planning. In the ‘Road to Serfdom’ Hayek (2007 [1944]: 86-87, 117) gives a variety of normative and political reasons why economic planning should not be done. One prominent reason is that it will lead to the destruction of the rule of law. However, arguably one of his most important arguments against planning is not normative but economic: planning, according to Hayek, is

economically inefficient and inviable. Efficient economic planning falls outside the scope of

15_{Hayek goes even further and ‘insists on the changeability, or even the mutability, of the basic framework of}

the apparatus of our cognition (Nishiyama, 1984: xli).’

16_{Hayek attaches special importance to the work of Dr. Bernard Mandeville which is viewed by him as having}

made possible the work of his other intellectual hero David Hume. For an in depth discussion of Mandeville’s thoughts on evolution and spontaneous order see Hayek’s (1984 [1978b]) excellent essay on this highly original, revolutionary and frequently underestimated Dutch philosopher.

17_{Hayek also identifies some significant figures in the history of philosophy as belonging to neither group. The}

following philosophers contain elements pertaining to both traditions: Alexander von Humboldt, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer (Diamond Jr., 1980: 357).

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human reason – it is a limit of reason – because it is impossible to acquire all knowledge necessary. Hayek (2007 [1944]: 86-87) shows that economic planning is inefficient since economic efficiency, among other things, is reliant on the workings of the price

mechanism.1819 The price of a product relates information between producers, between producers and consumers, and consumers themselves. This information which is dispersed among millions of individuals cannot be made available to a central planner or planning organ (Hayek, 1984 [1982]: 56-57 ). Thus, efficient economic planning, according to Hayek, is epistemically impossible.

But the economy isn’t the only institution which cannot be adequately planned for according to Hayek. The limits of reason apply to all ‘traditions’ – a term which is taken to include, unless otherwise specified, institutions, law, morality, values, habits, customs and language (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 112). Planning and creating a successful society from scratch is an impossibility because it requires more knowledge than can be acquired by one individual or any group of human beings. Because society as a whole is so immensely complex it is according to Hayek impossible ‘for rationally constructed systems of social and economic interaction to achieve the complexity characteristic of spontaneously emerging orders (Witt, 1994: 181).’ In ‘Law, Legislation, and Liberty Volume 1 Rules and Order’ Hayek (2013 [1973]: 14-15) stresses the fact we are largely ignorant of most facts of society. No one institution or individual can have all the information needed to successfully run a society because information is dispersed throughout society. However, it is precisely this

fragmentation of knowledge throughout society which makes the successful and smooth running of society possible.

18

See also Hayek (1984 [1978a]; 1984 [1978e] and 1984 [1982]) for a more in depth analysis of the reason why according to Hayek market competition leads to the most efficient economy.

19_{Although almost no one would deny that the price mechanism plays an important role in any efficient}

economy, the extent of the effect of the price mechanism on the efficiency of an economy is controversial. While the experience of the Soviet Union seems to have proven that a centrally planned economy without any price mechanism at all is doomed to be particularly inefficient, many proposals have been made in which the price mechanism is included within a socialist economy, see for example Caren (2003) and Roemer (1992).

Additionaly, as Ronal Coase (1937) already observed in the 30’s corporations and firms seem to work efficiently even though they do not rely upon an internal price mechanism. Furthermore, the distinguished political

philosopher Gijs van Donselaar (2009) has shown that the price mechanism only works as a source of information about already existing markets. True entrepreneurs, the ‘Bill Gates’ of this world, create new markets on the basis of insights which cannot be the result of prices, since for these innovations there was no price to begin with.

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[T]he success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can possibly know. And our whole civilization in consequence rests, and must rest, on our believing much that we cannot know to be true in the Cartesian [constructivist] sense (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 13).

Additionaly, planning is not only made difficult by the inherent complexity of social phenomena, but also by the fact of the fundamental mutual interrelatedness between social phenomena. Changing a part of our social world will have many expected and unexpected consequences in other parts of the social world (Nishiyama, 1984: xlvi).20 It should also be noted that Hayek sometimes seems to suggest that planning might not be possible because ‘unquantifiable variables are often far more important than quantifiable ones in the field of socio-human phenomena (Nishiyama, 1984: lx).’ Furthermore, the planner is always a part of society itself and can never, as John Gray (1981: 82-83) describes Hayek’s position,

attain a point of Archimedean leverage on and distance from society such that any synoptic knowledge of it is available to him. The planner himself is the meeting ground of many intellectual and moral traditions, and his criticism of them can only be an immanent criticism, invoking one part of the stock of inherited notions and

standards to appraise the rest. Thus comprehensive planning is, first and foremost, an epistemological impossibility.

However, Hayek would not deny that one can have valid criticisms of traditions, or that one can plan small parts of a society, but one always has to, in the process, take some traditions

20_{Hayek, also uses the ideas of complexity and mutual interrelatedness to criticize the modern ‘positivist’}

conception of the sciences. Segregating economics, political science, sociology, biology, anthropology, etc., has led to the fact that ‘the social sciences have been able to establish only monocausal interrelationships among the phenomena analyzed by the different disciplines and not the resultant general interlinkages that emerge out of multiple causes (Nishiyama, 1984: xlvii).’ Thus, Hayek wants the social sciences to move in the direction of integration between the different disciplines to get a better understanding of social phenomena. Although it should be noted that a complete understanding and overarching predictive model of social phenomena will always be out of our reach according to Hayek.

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for granted.21 Effective changes can only be made piecemeal, and moral criticism can only be immanent criticism.

As we have already mentioned the limits of reason also apply to the individual himself in his daily life. Individuals also cannot have access to all relevant knowledge relating to his own life. ‘[T]he success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can possibly know (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 13).’ To be efficient in our daily dealings within society we rely for the most part on following rules in the form of customs, habits, and practices. Furthermore, the logical reason behind these customs, habits and practices often eludes us. However, they do contain knowledge, in the form of the experience of many generations, which might not always be explicitly state-able, and be only implicit in our custom, habits and practices (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 12).

Important to note in this context is that Hayek’s (1984 [1983]: 318-319) scepticism of the power of reason also leads too his scepticism of reason’s role in morality. He concurs with David Hume in the fact our morals are not the result of our reason. Our morality, norms and values cannot be and are in fact not the result of reason using some Archimedean perspective to come to some once and for all fixed system of morality. A Kantian approach to normative theory – which in our time is followed by John Rawls - in which a whole system of morality is based on some pre-existing reason is thus bound to fail. As we discuss in 3.2.4 this might lead to some difficulties in Hayek’s normative framework, since it might lead to moral relativism, which of course might strike down Hayek’s normative prescriptions.

Thus, although Hayek himself doesn’t always makes this explicitly and sufficiently clear, his conclusion in relation to the limitations of reason are twofold. First of all since the planner cannot gain sufficient knowledge of the workings of society, efficient societal

planning for specific results is doomed to fail. Second, individuals rely on traditions, customs, habits and practices for their successful and efficient performance in society.

3.1.2 Evolution and Spontaneous Order

The difference between the respective views of the constructivists and the critical rationalists on reason is related to their conception of how traditions and institutions came into existence. According to the constructivists most institutions are and should be the result of human

21_{Hayek applies the same logic of reasoning to his understanding of science. ‘”Facts” are “facts” only in the}

context of the paradigm that allows the development of those hypotheses that are to be examined. This means that when the paradigm changes, facts may no longer be facts (Nishiyama, 1984: xlv).’ Clearly Hayek thoughts on this point relate to Thomas Kuhn’s work in the philosophy of science.

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planning. On the basis of our reason we can create institutions which are rational and

efficient. Of course we still have many traditional institutions and these are considered by the constructivists to be irrational and based on superstition, and should be replaced by rationally created institutions and traditions (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 108, 126; Hayek 1984 [1983] 321, 325, 329). However, as we have seen Hayek criticizes such a view by claiming that it is impossible to efficiently plan whole traditions and institution complexes.

Hayek (2011 [1960]: 122; 2013 [1973: 40; 1984 [1983]: 329) and the philosophers who belong to the critical rationalist tradition have the conviction that traditions are far from being irrational. Traditions and institutions are the result of an evolutionary process in which the most ‘successful’ traditions and institutions have survived. Thus, the resultant institutions and traditions are perceived by Hayek as being the result of the experience and

experimentation of many generations. Due to this fact they contain more experience ‘than any one man [can] possess (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 122).’ And while we might not always know why a particular tradition is successful, it is reasonable to assume, since it did survive an evolutionary process, that it has use (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 125-126). Although Hayek (2011 [1960]: 131-132) keeps open the possibility that the use of a tradition can be disproven.

At this stage it is important to note a few things. First of all the evolutionary model of traditions and institutions adds a third possibility for the origins of social arrangements. Traditionally it was thought that traditions could either be natural or artificial. However, according to Hayek (2011 [1960]: 115), and other critical rationalists, traditions, institutions, morals, language, laws, etc., can be the result of either (1) nature, (2) conscious invention, and/or (3) evolution. Furthermore, the evolutionary model can also explain the complexity of traditions and institutions. ‘One of our main contentions will be that very complex orders, comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be brought about only through forces inducing the formation of spontaneous orders (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 37).’ Traditions, institutions, morals, language and laws evolve by a process of cumulative growth and a process of trial and error (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 125-126). Traditions are the result of many generations of experience of an uncountable number of individuals. The resulting order of many hundreds of years of evolution is a spontaneous order, not a thoroughly consciously planned order (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 12).

Second these evolved traditions and institutions are often imperfectly understood and often have functions which are not immediately clear and perceivable. We may not know why some traditions are successful, necessary or useful (2011 [1960]: 125-126). The knowledge which is solidified in institutions and traditions is often times not explicit but only implicit

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(Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 12). Thus, a particular tradition might be wiser than any one individual. While we might not know the function of a particular tradition this does not mean that it serves no function, and it is this point which clashes with the constructivist tradition. The constructivist tradition is deeply committed to the idea of the ‘power of reason’ and is deeply ‘hostile’ to traditions, especially if they are not based on any apparent reasonable reasons (Hayek, 2013 [1973]:10-12). While the constructivist tradition views all institutions and traditions which are not demonstrably ‘true’ as being ‘false’, Hayek on the other hand doesn’t accept the view that ‘we ought to believe only what has been demonstrated to be true (Hayek, 2011 [1960]: 125).’ In fact Hayek might as well make the claim that many of the current institutions and traditions have already shown their use by having survived as the seemingly most ‘fittest’ form of social organization and social relations. Thus, understanding why a particular tradition is useful is no precondition for the tradition being in fact useful, and absent evidence to the contrary there is a presumption in favour of existing traditions and institutions. Thus, Hayek (2013 [1973]: 36-46) argues that the complex societal order is and should be a spontaneous order which gradually evolved over many generations. The archetypal constructed order is for Hayek the socialist order which in his time was personified in the Soviet Union. Such an order is regulated by the rules of an organization. Laws of such a society are based to get specific results for specific individuals. However, the rules of a spontaneous order are not purposeful in the same sense, in the sense that they are constructed to achieve a specific result for a specific individual. The rules of a spontaneous order are mainly focused on making a peaceful order possible (2013 [1973]: 48, 119). A spontaneous order has rules of just conduct, rules which only apply to the actions of individuals.

Two nuances need to be made however. First of all Hayek isn’t arguing that we cannot have any knowledge of the resulting order following from particular rules. In his Nobel Memorial Lecture ‘The Pretence of Knowledge’ Hayek (1984 [1978: 275] compares this idea to a sports game. While we might know the general structure of a sports game based on the knowledge of the rules of the game and some general properties of the players involved, specific predictions of the outcome or the game itself are impossible to give due to its immense complexity. Analogous we can know some general results of some societal rules, however we cannot predict specific outcomes. Hayek (2013 [1976]: 267-290) couples this idea with his support for a catallactic order. While we cannot predict the specific outcome for specific individuals in such an order, we can predict that the overall outcome will lead to highest possible welfare and the most freedom. A contention which is of course highly controversial.

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Second, Hayek is not arguing against using reason. Hayek only wants us to realize the limitations of reason. Thus, while constructivists might argue that every action we take should be based on reason, Hayek (2011 [1960]: 131) on the other hand states that ‘an intelligent use of reason does not mean the use of deliberate reason in the maximum possible number of occasions.’ Hayek’s (2011 [1960]: 130-131) intention is to show that reason ‘is not all-powerful and that the belief that is can become its own master and control its own development may yet destroy it.’

Thus, Hayek is a fierce defender of the idea that society should be a spontaneous order. Society should be the result of a slow evolutionary process, the trial and error of many generations. Such a spontaneous order includes much more (implicit) knowledge than we can consciously know and use. Evolution not planning should be the basis of society according to Hayek.

3.1.3 Levels of Evolution

Before we get a deeper understanding of Hayek’s theory of the evolution of traditions by discussing Hayek’s evolutionary selection mechanisms, we have to take a step back and note that Hayek actually differentiates between three different levels of evolution: (1) biological, (2) human intelligence and its products, and (3) cultural and socio-economic evolution (Witt, 1994: 181-183). The biological level of evolution might also be said to be the level of human instinct. It has genetically fixed the ‘primitive forms of social behaviour, values and attitudes (Witt, 1994: 181).’ Human intelligence and its products are the second level of evolution. This level is about ‘knowledge and the numerous ways of recording, transmitting and processing it (Witt, 1994: 182).’ The third level of evolution is the cultural and socio-economic traditions, rules of conduct and morals. The third level is in between the first instinctive level and the second level based on reason. This is the level that induces ‘an order in culture, society and economy (Witt, 1994:182).’

We can make several important observations in regards to these different levels of evolution. First according to Hayek the genetic evolution has mostly finished since the pressure for biological natural selection has mostly relaxed (Witt, 1994: 182). Second, the genetically based normative predispositions might be partially outdated for contemporary human society. They were formed when humans still lived in small groups (Hayek, 2013 [1976]: 292, 305; Witt, 1994: 181). And Hayek (2013 [1976]: 292) considers socialism to be ‘a re-assertion of that tribal ethics.’ Third, it seems that the constructivists seem to centre their theories on the second level of evolution. The importance of the instinctual genetic makeup of

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humans – what some might call human nature – or the evolved traditions seem to be almost irrelevant or easily overcome obstacles towards a utopian society for constructivists. Fourth, the time scales for the different levels are hugely different. While the game of evolution plays itself out over thousands and even hundreds of thousands of years on the biological level, the evolution of our knowledge or social structures and traditions can relatively go much faster, fundamentally changing between a few generations. For example one only has to think of the enormous growth of our scientific knowledge since the scientific revolution of 16th century and compare this to the fact that our basic biology (almost) didn’t change at all during the same time period. Fifth, obviously there is a big difference between biological evolution and the two levels of cultural evolution. While biological evolution is mostly centred on

individuals – or so is the most commonly held view – cultural evolution is presumed by Hayek (1984 [1983]: 318) to be group based (Steele, 1987: 185). Thus, the practices which are selected for groups through evolution benefit the group and not (necessarily) the

individual (Steele, 1987: 173). Furthermore, while biological evolution is Darwinian, cultural evolution is Lamarckian in the sense that characteristics which are acquired during the

lifetime of one generation can be transmitted to the next generation, something which is of course impossible for evolution based on genes. And sixth, as we might have already observed, while Hayek differentiates between these three levels of evolution his attention mainly focusses on the third level, that of the spontaneous order of society.

3.1.4 Selection Mechanism

Hayek is not always completely clear on the selection mechanism that is used in his

evolutionary scheme. While in Darwinian evolution the selection mechanism is based on the production of offspring, Hayek seems to formulate at least three different selection

mechanisms for his central evolutionary process: the evolution of traditions. All selection, according to Hayek (1984 [1983]: 320), works by the ‘multiplication of individual lives.’ Particular traditions make that ‘the groups who practiced them were more successful and displaced others. (…) [They] secured that a greater number of the groups or individuals practicing them would survive (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 19). But unlike biological evolution this cannot only be a result from the fact that extra offspring is produced, but can also result from voluntary or involuntary conversion of individuals or complete groups into other groups. Thus, successful traditions may lead to the fact that a group can produce and sustain more

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offspring.22 However, successful traditions might also lead to the fact that a successful group is joined by many other individuals and others groups because of some perceived success. And lastly it might also mean that they can conquer other groups and extend their traditions through violence. Thus, according to David Ramsey Steele (1987: 175) Hayek references ‘population growth, conquest and imitation’ as selection mechanisms. However, as we will see in 3.2.2 they all have their own distinctive problems.

But Hayek’s theory of evolution is not only an external process – be it based on population growth, conquest or imitation. As Hayek interpreter Edward Feser (2003: 24) argues competition between traditions can be viewed both as an internal and external competitive process:

There are, then, really two processes of evolution going on in the history of systems of law, morality, custom and the like: the internal evolution by which the implications of the system are gradually developed, and the external evolution by which the whole internally evolving system competes with other internally evolving systems, and either out-competes them or is out-competed itself (Feser, 2003: 24).

Internally traditions within society compete in a process ‘where what is tacit becomes explicit and its consequences are drawn out, where the whole is made more systematic and consistent (Feser, 2003: 24).’ Even eventually radical change can leave the system basically intact. Thus, the socialist revolutions of the twentieth century might be considered as cases of radical revolutions in which all traditions were violently and suddenly abolished. On the other hand a good example of gradual internal evolutionary change can be considered the abolition of slavery in the West since it was ‘a natural outgrowth of the notion of political liberty and property (Feser, 2003: 25).’ Although it should be noted that it is highly contentious to argue that the liberal creeds of for example the ‘Declaration of Independence’ already contained the seed of the destruction of slavery.

Some important observations can be made in relation to Hayek’s selection mechanism. First it is important to underscore that Hayek (2013 [1973]: 19; 1984 [1983]: 318) talks about group selection and not individual selection. Traditions, customs, habits, etc., are acquired by

22_{An interesting, and likely controversial, example Hayek (1984 [1967a]: 167) gives is capitalism. According to}

Hayek capitalism created and sustained an immense population – in the form of the proletariat in the beginning – which would not have existed without it. Thus, capitalism played an important role in the expansion of the Western population.

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groups. Groups having the most successful traditions, customs, habits, etc., displace other groups having inferior traditions, customs, habits, etc.. Group selection suggests that the practices which are selected within the Hayekian model of evolution are to the benefit of the group and not necessarily to the benefit of the individual (Steele, 1987: 173). In Hayek’s theory it is thus not the survival of the fittest individual but the survival of the fittest group.

Second, the external competitive process is based on the survival or expansion of the group. However, internal evolution is a process in which the group slowly evolves and acquires new traditions. According to Hayek (2013 [1973]: 113) judges (may) play an important role in this process: ‘[t]he judge (…) serves, or tries to maintain and improve, a going order which nobody has designed.’ The judge discovers rules which are already implicitly part of a spontaneous order and makes them explicit and this is one of the ways in which a spontaneous order slowly evolves internally. ‘New’ rules ‘are discovered either in the sense that they merely articulate already observed practices or in the sense that they are found to be required complements of the already established rule if the order which rests on them is to operate smoothly and efficiently (Hayek, 2013 [1973]: 116-117).’ Thus, while the judge might ‘create’ new rules for a society with his rulings, this should not be considered to be a form of ‘legislation from the bench’, the judge is merely making explicit what is already being accepted in practice or a natural result of the overall order by ending internal contradictions.

Thus, Hayek’s theory of evolution consists of external evolution based on population growth, conquest and imitation and internal evolution based on making explicit what was already implicit practice and/or by making the whole tradition complex more internally consistent. Groups who have ‘successful’ traditions tend to grow by these mechanisms, while ‘unsuccessful’ groups disappear.

3.1.5 Implications

Hayek’s views on reason and evolution have several important implications in relation to the social order. If reason is fundamentally limited and evolution can lead to a fully functional spontaneous order, it doesn’t seem to be unreasonable to rely on the existing order of the moment. Traditions and institutions which are existing right now should be presumed to have a useful function for society since otherwise they wouldn’t have survived the selection process within a Hayekian framework – of course this only applies to the grown societies of the west and not to constructed societies. However, as we have noticed Hayek explicitly leaves open the possibility that some of our present traditions and institutions aren’t useful

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(anymore). However, we should not use radical reforms in changing these traditions and institutions because our reason is limited and we cannot foresee all possible consequences of our proposed reforms. Consequently we should opt for incremental and piecemeal change. Thus, due to the inherent impossibility of having complete knowledge of society

incrementalism is needed whenever changing traditions. Trying to completely dismantle traditions to replace them with a radical alternative based on reason cannot work because what is viewed as being completely reasonable and rational in fact consists of a highly fallible reason and incomplete practical information, which can in most cases only lead to disaster. A good example for Hayek of radical and disastrous change is of course socialism as is also observed by Hayek interpreter Feser (2003: 25):

The socialistic adoption of rules absolutely at odds with the fundamental principles of private property and contract that have governed Western society for millennia is a good example of a revolutionary change, something that is not a result of a natural evolutionary process, internal to the system.

Changes to traditions should take time and should consist of small changes between

generations which at first might seem only trivial, but which can eventually add up to be quite significant (Feser, 2003: 26). Thus, Feser (2003: 25) argues that within a Hayekian framework slavery is a good example of the latter form of change: ‘the abolition of slavery in the West was precisely an internal evolutionary process, a natural outgrowth of the notions of political liberty and property (in this case self-ownership) which had long governed Western society implicitly, but which awaited their full and consistent articulation and application.’

Additionaly, Hayek does not claim that experimentation and innovation should be limited and that we should blindly trust the results of evolution. The fact that our reason is a fundamentally limited instrument should not discourage us from experimentation. However, it should discourage us, as we will discuss in depth in chapter 4, from centralizing and

monopolizing experimentation and innovation (Hayek, 2011 [1960]:132).

Thus, Hayek’s theoretical framework has, at least, three important implications. First of all there is a presumption of the usefulness of existing traditions and institutions. Second, when changing traditions and institutions we should make incremental changes, slowly evolving them. Radically reforming existing traditions and institutions should be avoided. And third, while experimentation and innovation is a good thing, we should keep such efforts decentralized.

Hayek: between Tradition and Liberty