1278993
Sun-Hyuk Kim, Naked Portrait 4. 2015. Sculpture. South Korea.
First Reader: Dr Annette Freyberg-Inan
Second Reader: Dr Afsahi Afsoun
Word Count: 49,300
The Politics of Meaning
&
The Existential Vacuum at the Heart of
the Contemporary
Niall. J. Hopkinson - 12178993
2019
Dedicated To:
My Mother and Father
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Annette Freyberg-Inan. For her support, keen eye for
detail and wisdom throughout the thesis project. Her contribution has been invaluable
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
1
Chapter 2: Constructing Meaning
5
I) Existential Nihilism
5
II)The Will to Meaning
8
III)Noö-Dynamic and Noögenic Neurosis
10
IV)The Existential Vacuum
13
V)Societal Noös and Existential Vacuums
16
VI)Overcoming the Existential Vacuum
18
VII)Rational versus Irrational Actorship
20
VIII)Phenomenology of Meaning: Individual and Collective Meaning
22
Chapter 3: Structuring Meaning
23
I)Meaning and Power
26
II)Meaning and the Social Contract
37
III)Meaning and Ideology
41
IV)Meaning and Self-esteem
42
V)Raison d’être
47
Chapter 4: Clashes of Meaning
52
I)Global Clashes of Meaning
52
II)Micro-clashes of Meaning
57
III)Past Clashes of Meaning
60
Chapter 5:Recognising Meaning
64
I)The Thymotic Nature of Humans
64
II)The Struggle for Meaning
68
Chapter 6: Contemporary Struggles of Meaning
75
I)The Arab Spring
75
II)The World Beyond the End of History
80
III)The British EU Membership Referendum 2016
82
I)Narratives and Myths
91
II)The Subjectivity of Meanings within an Economy of Narratives
94
III)The Graveyard of God and Others
102
IV)The Last Consumer Man
106
V)The Invisible Man
116
VI)The Future of Politics
122
Chapter 8: Conclusion
127
1
Chapter One
Introduction
“All societies are factories of meaning.”1
Meanings are the central point of the political, and political change is maintained through a process of construction and deconstruction of meanings. The
contemporary political upheaval that has plagued the global stage in recent years is rooted in a deep sense of meaninglessness - a crisis of meaning. This is the proposition I shall be defending throughout this thesis.
I will be arguing throughout the thesis that meanings are the central tenet in political development. Even more fundamentally, meanings are the central motivator of all human action. The will to meaning is the central motivating force ontologically incorporated into the human condition.
Today we live in a time of deep polarisation and political upheaval, from the backsliding of democratic states to frequent protest marches on the squares of European cities. In this thesis I address the causes of this political upheaval through an analysis of meaning. From movements such as Occupy Wall Street, to Brexit, the election of President Trump, the development of a multi-polar world order, and terrorist attacks on the world stage, I argue that while all of these issues are in many ways completely different, they have linked causes. I will argue in this thesis that the link that runs through contemporary political events is the crisis of meaning.
I have constructed an analytic study of meaning which I have called meaning analysis. Meaning analysis rests on understanding meaning as the prime motivational force inside of human beings. Human beings are constructors and deconstructors of meaning, a process which moves history. Our politics are a reflection of ever-changing meanings. I argue based on an inter-disciplinary perspective that human
1
2 beings have a will to meaning by which they strive after their constructed meanings and these meanings are legitimised through communal recognition.
My thesis is an inter-disciplinary piece of critical theory. It begins by developing a theoretical framework on which the rest of the thesis is founded. Chapter two, “Constructing Meaning”, borrows many ideas from branches of existentialist philosophy as well as psychoanalysis. It develops a form of psychological analysis to interpret political events. It borrows particularly heavily from the works of the renowned psychotherapist Viktor Frankl, the developer of the Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy. I extract some of Frankl’s main principles in relation to the psychology of meaning and apply them to the contemporary political landscape throughout the thesis.
In chapter three, I start to apply the theoretical approach described in chapter two, blending the
psychological into the political. I explain how meaning analysis is crucial for analysing political events because political structures, which govern social interaction, are embedded in and run on constructed meanings and are rooted in political all political institutions. I develop meaning analysis further through incorporating the concepts of power, the social contract, ideology, self-esteem and raison d’être.
In chapter four I then escalate to the geo-political realm to show how politics functions through sets of meanings that make up nation states and shift geo-political activity, through clashes of meanings between geo-political civilizations. This helps demonstrate the relevance of meanings in all political activity. I then continue by digging into contemporary trends in domestic politics that show how meanings are becoming even more salient in a post-needs society. I argue that we have not seen an end to ideology, by politics being transformed into a technocratic process, but nor have we witnessed the proliferation of political ideologies in the traditional sense. Rather, contemporary politics revolves around meanings, as it becomes defined by micro-clashes between meanings invested in identities and cultures, which are hunting for societal recognition. The chapter demonstrates how meanings are incorporated into political practices and have become even more salient in the contemporary political context, therefore supporting my primary claim that contemporary political upheaval is rooted in a crisis of meaning.
3 I follow this logic through chapter five, where I expand on the human desire for recognition, which is recognition of one’s or one’s collective’s meaning. I argue that history moves through this pattern, based on humanity’s perpetual will to meaning. This is a new concept of historical motivation. I argue that historical movement is based on a struggle for recognition, and that humans require such struggles to facilitate mental hygiene. This also means that there can never be an end to history, as humans will always construct and deconstruct meaning, and will struggle for recognition and legitimisation of their meaning.
I continue in chapter six by exemplifying how the struggle for recognition of meaning is the prime driver of contemporary political change. I do this through examining the Arab Spring, including aspects of the war in Syria; through describing the current democratic recession taking place across the globe; and, finally, through a study of Brexit. I argue that while all of these events are entirely different, they all have one link connecting them, that is they are based on a struggle for meaning. Thus, contemporary political upheaval is rooted in meaning.
In the final main chapter I explain why political upheaval is taking place today. The politics of meaning is the routine movement of history. The construction and deconstruction of meanings, due to the will to meaning, fosters normal historical change. Yet certain historical periods are plagued by mass neurosis, from a deepened feeling of meaninglessness. I argue that we live in such a period of change, a period characterized by morbid symptoms, where the old is dying yet the new cannot be born, where political chaos results from deconstruction of meaning associated with fluid modernity, mixed with a consumerist socio-economic structure. This political situation has resulted in psychological anxiety due to a loss of meaning, which is also a loss of authentic struggle, as the struggle for meaning itself has become deeply commodified. I assert that our meanings are carried through myths as social narratives, which have failed to come to fruition, building up an anxiety that is a spectre across our political landscape. An anxiety that is founded in alienation and atomisation which our social structure proliferates. It is this mix of symptoms that has brought contemporary political upheaval, by moving the politics of meaning from healthy
4 struggles of recognition seen throughout history to a crisis of meaning, in the form of contemporary nihilism. However, at the end of this chapter I also give a glimpse of how this situation can be resolved and how fluid modernity can be turned from a negative to a positive state of affairs, thus transcending the morbid symptoms of our era.
5
Chapter Two
Constructing Meaning
This chapter will develop my theoretical framework for meaning analysis. I will take ideas predominantly from Viktor Frankl’s psychotherapeutic school, logotherapy, in order to understand and develop meaning as an analytical term. The chapter focuses on building the framework for meaning analysis as a
methodological approach, in order to understand contemporary political events and set the foundation for the rest of the thesis. It will begin with an analysis of the concept of existential nihilism, demonstrating how meaning is constructed from this philosophical starting point. The chapter then turns to address Viktor Frankl's ideas concerning a ‘will to meaning’ and his ontology of existence. After developing the fundamentals of Frankl's philosophy, the chapter develops insight into Frankl's interpretation of noögenic neurosis and existential vacuums, and how these concepts help explain larger political trends of mass neurosis. Here I start to break away from describing Frankl's psychotherapeutic ideas, and instead develop my own political analysis building from Frankl’s concepts. The chapter shines light on how meaning is constructed through experience, and what this means when seeing humans as political animals. I will propose that humans are not rational or irrational political actors, but rather actors that will ultimately pursue their subjective logic derived from meanings. This chapter will cover the most basic theoretical terminology and intellectual foundations for meaning analysis. Its contents will be carried throughout the rest of the thesis, to show how meaning analysis can be transposed into analysing political processes and develop new understandings of contemporary political phenomena.
Existential Nihilism
To start as we must from the beginning, my framework for meaning analysis is based on the concept of existential nihilism, which declares that there is no direct meaning to life, life has no prescribed objective meaning. This sounds like a depressing place to start. However, it is rather the opposite. Existential nihilism does not claim that there is no meaning to life, nor does it claim that there was no intended meaning to life. What it does claim is that there is no prescribed or fundamentally known meaning to life.
6 Therefore, it has always been a human pursuit to construct meaning, and it is in human nature to construct meaning; otherwise humans will perpetually stay in an existential nihilist state of being - a state that, I argue, is inherently negative and repressive in itself, a state that is damaging to the human psyche and ultimately gives rise to mental health issues. I justify arguing this point of view by incorporating Viktor Frankl’s psychotherapeutic ideas into my own argumentation throughout the thesis.
How can the construction of meaning be interpreted, and what is meant by meaning construction? Construction could mean either an empty construction, as if we were building a structure from scratch - a view which atheist existentialist philosophers such as Camus or Sartre would propose.2 Alternatively, constructing meaning can be viewed as if it were a jigsaw, with the blueprint already in place, but we are constructing from a position where we do not know the final picture, or how the jigsaw pieces will connect. This is an interpretation Viktor Frankl would favour, as he asserts that “the meaning of our existence is not invented but rather detected.”3
This dispute is fundamentally a theological question, which I do not wish to discuss in this thesis. The usage of the term construction, I argue, can satisfy all thinkers, even determinists, as human beings always construct meaning in whatever form this
construction process takes place. Therefore, in this thesis I will refer to the construction and deconstruction of meaning, rather than the creation or destruction of meaning.4
Thus, we can begin from the observation that humans are ultimately constructors of meaning, from their experiences. This creates societal concepts. Constructing meaning occurs parallel to constructing the concepts of society, ethics and civilization, as forms of implementing constructed meanings. Thus, politics is the discussion, recognition and implementation of meanings. Politics, too, is something that is always constructed. As humans have multiple subjective meanings, politics is constructed as a forum to
2
I refer to Camus in regards to the interpretation of his philosophical absurdist position, described in the Myth of
Sisyphus (London: Penguin, 2005). Frankl refers to Sartre adopting this position in The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy (Plum, 2014), p.60.
3
Ibid, p.60.
4
Additionally, the notion of a destruction of meaning has inherently negative overtones, in modern politics on both the left and right, in arguments against postmodernism, or in cultural Marxism, as destroying meaning with
radicalised and sensationalist opinions. I would rather attempt to embolden the nuanced ground taking meaning to be an analytical rather than a charged concept.
7 discuss and deliberate from these subjectivities and co-ordinate group action based on subjective meanings. This was the purpose of the ancient agora and is the purpose of parliaments today. Meaning construction is an active process.5 Therefore, politics, too, is an active process. Humans construct meaning away from an existential vacuum, and they prescribe their own meaning to life. The active process of recognition of meanings will be elaborated on in future chapters.
To recapitulate, we start with the notion that meaning is something that is actively constructed from no meaning or nothingness (nihilism). This construction of one’s meaning both builds on and builds values, beliefs, habits, and one’s identity, as well as societal narratives, myths and ideologies. Thus, meaning must be conceptualised as the point in between one’s experiences forming non-material ideas, and what drives humans to practical material action. All human action must have a form of meaning as its prerequisite.
Meaning analysis also stands in contrast with Camusian Absurdism, which would suggest that there is no point in attempting to construct meaning, because doing so would be ultimately meaningless.6
Throughout this chapter it will become clear why humanity needs to construct a sense of meaning. Yet, on the reverse side of not constructing meaning, problems arise as well with the over-construction of meanings. This is a dangerous path to tread, and can lead back to nihilism. As Frankl argues, the over-construction of social meaning starts to form masks of meaning, which are compensation for underlying neurosis. The neurosis that Frankl alerts us to can be captured by the notion of living through inauthentic meanings. I argue that societies with oppressive or rigid social structures form masks of meanings, which compensate for their underlying social neurosis. This was, for example, true in the ostentatious and rigid nature of Imperial Russia in the late nineteenth-century, which only demonstrated its fragility and consequently led to a revolution out of a form of societal paradoxical intention.7 Rigid social meanings
5
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).
6 Albert Camus, Myth of Sisyphus (London: Penguin, 2005). 7
Paradoxical intention is a logotherapeutic theory devised by Frankl, which essentially holds that “what you resist persists”. He treated his patients by allowing them to stop repressing noological habit or thought. The habit would then more naturally fade from the surface of their mind and would eventually be stopped.
8 are often the result of humans reinforcing inauthentic meaning, to avoid an existential vacuum. They do this because they have a will to meaning.
The Will to Meaning
It was the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard who first postulated the idea of a ‘will to meaning’. Kierkegaard believed that human beings fundamentally strive after meaning above all other pursuits.8 Pursuits such as fame, economic wealth or even the Epicurean idea of happiness are all secondary to a human’s striving for meaning.9
The individual pursuit of one's meaning can be seen as the ultimate satisfaction. These thoughts are agreed upon by the psychotherapist Viktor Frankl, who incorporated the concept of meaning in his psychological theory. Frankl’s logotherapy places ‘meaning’ at the very core of the human psyche. His work conveys the idea that meaning is at the centre of a person's psychological drive.10 It is here that we move from discussing foundations of meaning analysis to the role of meaning within the human psyche.
Understanding the importance of meaning for human action, Frankl published Man’s Search for Meaning in 1946 - a work he pursued writing by jotting down various ideas on scrap pieces of paper, while
interned in five Nazi concentration camps over a period of three years, between 1942 and 1945. The work demonstrates his intimate knowledge of the human condition in regards to nihilism and a person’s search for meaning; even in the most inhumane environments. There is a great deal which contemporary society can understand from Frankel's work. I assert that it can help us understand how meaning can be
interpreted as a political concept, through assessing how human beings fundamentally have ‘a will to meaning’. This is in contrast to the wills proposed by Freud in his ‘will to pleasure’ or ‘will to power’, as Adler and Nietzsche have described them.11 I will be looking at the ways in which Frankl’s work is able to help us understand how meaning acts on the human psyche. Frankl argues against the other schools of
8 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment of Life (London: Penguin, 2004). 9
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).
10
Ibid.
11
9 thought as “nothing but defence mechanisms, reaction formations and sublimations”.12
Rejecting the notion that meaning is simply a “secondary rationalization” of instinctual drives, Frankl argues that one cannot live and even die for such instinctive reactions.13 In contrast, man is clearly aware of his ability to live and even die for the sake of ideals and values.
I should note here in respect to Frankl that, while my thesis builds on many of his ideas, there are some differences in the ways I and Frankl use the will to meaning concept. Frankl clearly states that the will to meaning is not a driving force, rather something that pulls individuals.14 Frankl constructs much of his argumentation at a spiritual/theological level, particularly in his earlier work; however, he cannot disconnect his thought from many of the life events that inspired much of his writing, events that are wrapped up in the political. Additionally, his later works, such as A Will to Meaning, do draw focus to the contemporary post-war political environment. Despite these differences, I argue, Frankl's interpretation of the human condition is congruent to mine. My work is inspired by Frankl's work, and uses his concepts to structure and justify what are many of my own claims and thoughts.
Frankl's psychotherapeutic school, logotherapy, has been credited to be the Third School of Viennese Psychotherapy, after Freud's first wave and Adler’s second wave. Frankl had been a part of both, but left due to disputes over his emphasis on will to meaning as the central tenet of human psychology.15 Frankl asserted that logotherapy is a form of existential analysis. The name ‘logos’ comes from the Greek for ‘meaning’16
. Thus, this is a meaning-oriented approach to existential analysis. Frankl argues that the term ‘existential’ is made up of three elements: (1) ontologically, existence itself is the human mode of being; (2) there is meaning to existence; (3) the striving to find a meaning in personal existence is the will to meaning.17 This position is important because it argues that the will to meaning is incorporated existentially in the human condition and therefore not something external but something innate. 12 Ibid, p.121. 13 Ibid, p.121. 14
Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy (Plum, 2014), p.60.
15
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.121.
16
Ibid, p.121.
17
10 Noö-Dynamic and Noögenic Neurosis
Frankl asserts that a frustration of the will to meaning produces existential frustration. Moreover, he explains that this existential frustration can lead to neuroses.18 What I wish to explore here is the concept of noögenic neurosis. This term coined by Frankl explains neuroses that are not psychological in nature, but formed in the existential dimension. Thus, they are not conflicts that emerge between instinctual drives, but conflicts between values.19 These can be moral conflicts, or conflicts based on contradicting beliefs. An example Frankl gives of a noögenic conflict at an individual level is of a high-ranking American diplomat residing in New York. The diplomat was seeking psychotherapeutic treatment. His problem was that he was discontented with his career and found it difficult to comply with American foreign policy. Previous psychotherapists had argued that the discomfort was a result of a problematic relationship between the diplomat and his father: He projected an image of his father onto his superiors, making his work insufferable. However, cures for this Freudian analysis had not worked. It was only when Frankl suggested that he change his occupation that the solution was found, and the patient was cured. Frankl pointed out that the occupation had frustrated the diplomat’s will to meaning.20
Therefore, noögenic conflicts are not conflicts that can be treated through pharmaceutical or
psychoanalytical measures, but rather through relaxing the noölogical frustration that has countered the individual's will to meaning. I argue that the relaxing of noölogical tension is firstly an individual's responsibility to themselves, but at a deeper level is also a social responsibility, because noögenic neurosis deals with issues of beliefs, values and morality. It is here then that I start to incorporate the psychological into the political.
While it is not directly mentioned by Frankl, there could also be conflicts between one’s ideological values, due to exposition to alternative ideology, ideas or experiences. Frankl describes how the causes of noögenic neurosis are less contained inside the unconscious than those of traditional neurosis. However, 18 Ibid, p.123. 19 Ibid, p.121. 20 Ibid, p.123.
11 that is not to say that many of the values associated with noögenic conflicts are not rooted in the
subconscious. In particular issues of ideology are very much constructed through epistemic links that are subconsciously present, ideas that we are not necessarily aware of but that play out sub-consciously.21 These ideas can be ideological, and conflict between ideologies is, I argue, also a noögenic conflict. As noögenic conflicts can play out both consciously and subconsciously, subconscious ideological conflicts can be noögenic conflicts, too.
Logotherapy attempts to discuss and discover that meaning which is longed for in the depth of a person's being.22 Thus, it asks what are the values a person is to focus on if they are going to overcome the suffering of existential frustration, and instead pursue a fundamental will to meaning through actualizing those particularly values.
An important part of Frankl’s research was to describe the dynamics of meaning that he sees as
imperative for mental hygiene.23 Frankl coined the term noö-dynamics, to discuss the movement between an inner tension of values and an inner equilibrium of values. Frankl favours a slight degree of the former, as he states that such tension is an indispensable prerequisite of mental health.24 Thus, some tension between values is healthy in an individual. I will explain throughout the thesis how Frankl’s
acknowledgment of the benefits of a slight tension between values contradicts the argument that we can have an end to history.25 I assert that an end to ideology and to clashes between values would be a futile stance for the human condition, incompatible with the insights of meaning analysis and humanity’s need for construction of meaning. I argue that noögenic tension comes in the form of what I describe as necessary noögenic struggles, which are both personal and political. This will be looked at much more closely in chapters five to seven.
21
Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2nd Edition, 2008), p.5.
22
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.120.
23
Ibid, p.126.
24
Ibid, p.126.
25
This mostly refers to Fukuyama's concept in The End of History and the Last Man (London Hamilton, 1992), but it can also be applied to Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
12 Frankl maintains that mental health is based on a certain degree of tension, between what one is and what one should become, between achievement and that which ought to be achieved.26 Thus, tension is inherent in the human condition. He maintains that human existence is not designed for self-actualization and achieving goals, including that of an ideological end state, but for self-transcendence, and that the more one strives for self-actualization the farther away from self-transcendence one strays.27 I argue, following this line of thought, that man is constantly in a process of construction towards what ought to be, and thus should constantly maintain a healthy form of tension and overcoming. This is a process with active agency, as Frankl’s ideas concretely oppose a biologically deterministic standpoint which would prescribe a permanent state of homeostasis. A tension-free state would be damaging to man, and would be in contrast to the principles of noö-dynamics, which stress the agency of an individual in deciding between values. A tensionless state is similarly the basis of Nietzsche's ‘Last Man’, which is an individual plagued by nihilism.28
Contrary to Frankl’s discourse on the importance of agency, and his impassioned critique of pan-determinism, he does affirm that there are certain elements to life out of an individual's control.29 Therefore, while his views affirm agency over structure, I argue that his thought lies in the realm of soft determinism. I argue this position as he states that: “Man’s freedom is no freedom from conditions but rather freedom to take a stand on whatever conditions might confront him.”30
The idea of dynamics is important, as, in my eyes, the notion of the will to meaning does not just come from construction (eros), but also from destruction/deconstruction, described as thanos, incorporating the work of Sabina Spielrein’s 1912 thesis: Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being, where she argues for “a destructive drive as well as a drive for coming into being.”31
The dynamic of destruction and
26 Ibid, p.126-127. 27
Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy (Plum, 2014), p.30.
28 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A book for everyone and for no one (New York: Barnes
and Noble, 2012). p.5.
29
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.154.
30
Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy (Plum, 2014), p.16.
31
S. Spielrein (1994), Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 39: 155-186.
13 construction is not uncommon in political philosophy. Hegel's dialectics, of a thesis clashing with an antithesis forming the synthesis, can be argued to be an extension of the eros and thanos dynamic, projected into the world from individuals through a collective consciousness. I will assert in subsequent sections that history moves in the direction of constructed meaning through the will to meaning, a movement in which meaning is constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed, predominantly through subjective struggles of meaning and recognition.
The Existential Vacuum
What happens when an individual feels that they have no meaning? Frankl portrays a psychological realm called the ‘existential vacuum’. He developed the notion of an existential vacuum to capture a common experience among his patients, who felt as though their lives were haunted by the experience of inner emptiness. Frankl claimed the existential vacuum to be “a widespread phenomenon of the twentieth century.”32
It reflects the predictions made by Nietzsche in the Gay Science: “God is dead... and we have killed him”, prophesying a decline of European Christianity and the ethical nihilism that would follow to encompass the 20th century.33 Frankl was a reader of Nietzsche, and Nietzschean philosophy was integrated deeply within Alfred Adler’s Second School of Viennese psychotherapy - an intellectual movement Frankl was briefly part of before being ostracized for posing different interpretations of humanity’s prime motivation. Adlerian psychotherapy favoured the will to power concept coined by Nietzsche, while Frankl constructed the will to meaning concept derived from Kierkegaard. Frankl does, however, quote Nietzsche several times throughout his numerous works, and Nietzschean philosophy does still influence some aspects of Frankl's thought.
Frankl's concept of the existential vacuum originates in the idea that man is, as Sartre, too, postulates, ‘condemned to be free’.34
He believes that there is an underlying theological point underpinning this freedom: that mankind lost its animalistic behaviours by which it was ultimately secured. Now mankind
32
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.128.
33
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay Science (Vintage Books, 1974), p.181.
34
14 is rejected from such securities as that of Paradise, and so is forced to make decisions.35 However, Frankl also points out that there is a second loss that underpins an existential vacuum, a loss of traditions of meaning which secured behaviour. Thus, there is no deterministic factor ruling what man is to do, but neither is any tradition apparent to tell him what he ought to do.36 Consequently, according to Frankl, man may not know what he wishes to do. Therefore, man can at this point fall into two traps, that of adopting the wish to do what other people do (conformity) or that of doing what other people direct him to do (totalitarianism).37 In either situation there is a loss of freedom and authenticity.
Frankl sees the existential vacuum as manifesting from boredom. It is within the environment of boredom that noögenic neurosis starts to form.38 As stated previously, these conflicts between values occur due to existential frustration, which is the inability to pursue one’s meaning. Frankl proclaims that existential vacuums appear under a number of masks, most notably through a will to power, will to money or sexual compensation.39 Elements of an existential vacuum are referred to in popular culture. For example, take the dystopian setting in Aldous Huxley’s A Brave New World.40
This is a world where the wills to power and pleasure disguise an abundant existential vacuum.
Frankl began to interpret the societal impact of an existential vacuum during the middle of the twentieth century in his book Man’s Search for Meaning. He writes: “boredom is now causing… more problems […] and these problems are growing increasingly crucial, for progressive automation will probably lead to an enormous increase in the leisure hours for the average worker. The pity of it is many of these will not know what to do with all their newly acquired free time.”41
He describes existential vacuums to be causes of alcoholism and juvenile delinquency as well as being traced to “not a few cases of suicide”.42
35
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.128.
36 Ibid, p.128. 37 Ibid, p.128. 38 Ibid, p.123. 39 Ibid, p.130. 40
Aldous Huxley, A Brave New World (Rosetta Books, 2010).
41
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.129.
42
15 These thoughts are echoed in Kierkegaard’s philosophical analysis. He states: “a person needs only to ponder how corrupting boredom is for people”.43 I argue that boredom as a corrupting force refers to psychological corruption, mirroring Frankl’s medical analysis. Kierkegaard continues to state: “Boredom is the root of all evil. [...] Since boredom advances and boredom is the root of all evil, no wonder, then, that the world goes backwards, that evil spreads. [...] When the boredom reaches its maximum, [people] either die of boredom [the passive category] or shoot themselves out of curiosity [the active category].”44 Frankl’s notion that boredom is a root cause of existential vacuums and mass neurosis is also echoed in Eric Hoffer’s 1951 work A True Believer, where he states: “There is perhaps no more reliable indicator of a society's ripeness for a mass movement than the prevalence of unrelieved boredom”.45
I agree that boredom can be seen as the root of all evil, because it represents the characteristic of meaninglessness. This is a powerful and dangerous state of affairs, both for a society and for an individual. Boredom is the manifestation of an existential vacuum. By frustrating the will to meaning, boredom becomes a corruption that spreads from being passive to being dangerously active. The evil of boredom can turn into mass neurosis that, I argue, can transform into mass political upheaval. Take, for instance, the advance of automation and particularly artificial intelligence technology, which are much closer to today’s doorstep than they were during Frankl's writing in 1946. If automation is developed and implemented unwisely it will take over the spaces of work which once gave many people their sense of meaning and belonging. Without the ability to adapt to the changing environment, these changes will combine in large scale boredom through mass unemployment, fostering atomisation and alienation; that will have long lasting social consequences, making society ripe for mass political movements. The point is, the threats of an existential vacuum and noögenic neurosis are at least as relevant today as they were in the 20th century.
Societal Noös and Existential Vacuums
43
Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment of Life (London: Penguin, 2004). p.285.
44
Ibid, p.286-289.
45
16 It is at this point where Frankl's ideas can be dissected from the field of psychology and embodied into political literature, distancing ourselves from Frankl’s individual client level of analysis and reformulating his views to fit a macro-level of analysis. This is the commitment of meaning analysis, to develop the analysis of the construction and deconstruction of meaning on the societal and political strata as well as the micro individual level.
Attempts to synthesise political with psycho-analysis have revolved around ideas of the collective conscious first promoted in Durkheim’s 1893 work The Division of Labour in Society46
as well as the collective unconscious coined by Carl Jung.47 However, the majority of political psychology work is epistemically linked to Freudian schools of thought, and what is currently missing is an interpretation of political events using Frankl’s terminology and ideas, including the notion of humanity’s will to meaning. I have called this approach Meaning Analysis. Such a framework is readily applicable to political
analysis. I note that Frankl's term noös, used by him for its translation from the Greek to mean mind or understanding, is also the French word nous, meaning: we (derived from the Latin nos). Thereby, the Greek for mind and understanding has turned into the term we in French, demonstrating the importance of the collective in psychology in general and in noögenic neurosis in particular.
Noögenic neurosis, caused by conflicting values and beliefs, can also be interpreted on a social level. Collective neurosis, Frankl believed, was a phenomenon that every age could experience, and every generation is prone to its own collective neurosis. Existential vacuums become the mass neuroses of the present time,48 and every generation must overcome this threat in their construction of meaning. Large political shifts present in the twenty-first century can be argued to be the mass neurosis Frankl was pointing to, making them not mere economic or social conflicts, but more fundamentally crises of meaning.
46
Emile Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.64.
47
Carl Gustav Jung, Symbols of Transformation (Princeton University Press, 1976), p.408.
48
17 It is clear that Frankl’s concept of mass neurosis comes from his own time, writing as he did in the aftermath of the Second World War and after experiences in concentration camps including Auschwitz. However, societal neurosis has not only plagued this part of history, but other periods as well, for example periods that have been plagued with ennui, a French word translated to mean a feeling of utter weariness and discontent resulting in boredom.49 This has been expressed as part of the encompassing spirit of Fin de siècle (end of a century, or of an era).50 The end of the 19th century, in particular, is an era responsible for expressionist paintings such as Edvard Munch’s 1893 painting “The Scream”51 , which captured the sense of nihilism and angst of the epoch. The era was associated with decadence but also with antagonisms towards liberal democracy, rationalism and materialism. It has been argued that this psychological climate produced proto-fascist ideals, such as the idea of the Lebensraum as a call to a noble struggle.52 It was in this period that Freud had become captivated by Vienna’s mental state, at a time when Vienna was experiencing an unexplained rise in suicides, despite being arguably the cultural hub of Europe and economically strong.53 This state was also described as Mal du siècle (sickness of the century).
Kierkegaard had expressed the idea of angst in his own society during the mid-nineteenth-century, a period he referred to as the “Apathetic age”.54
This demonstrates that societal neurosis is not simply a once a century phenomenon but a recurring theme. Also Weltschmerz, translated from German as world pain, a theme with strong connotations of the German Romantic movement, exemplifies the concept of
mass neurosis based on frustration or boredom. Additionally, Spielrein argues that even the pre-Socratic philosopher “Anaxagoras sought the source of Weltschmerz (mass neurosis) […] believing it to be when each seed of our being longs for re-transformation, so that new coming may emerge”.55 Similarly,
49
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ennui [Accessed 1/6/2019].
50
Talia Schaffer, Literature and Culture at the Fin de Siècle (New York: Longman, 2007), p.3.
51
Edvard Munch, The Scream. 1893. National Gallery, Oslo, Norway.
52
Zeev Sternhell, Crisis of Fin-de-siècle Thought. In Rodger Griffin Eds, International Fascism: Theories, Causes
and the New Consensus (Oxford University Press 2002), p.169.
53
Bright Lights, Brilliant Minds: A Tale of Three Cities 1. Vienna 1908. Dr James Fox. BBC. 2014.
54
Søren Kierkegaard, Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and The Present Age. A Literary Review (Princeton University Press, 1978), p.84.
55
S. Spielrein (1994), Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 39: 155-186.
18 Hegelian dialectics may not be a violent struggle, particularly in a liberal society, but might still be psychologically painful. I argue as an overarching point through chapters five to seven that it is this sense of psychological world pain that underlies many contemporary political upheavals in the world today.
Further to the previous point, these arguments are the reason why throughout the thesis I study meaning as pivotal when addressing current political phenomena. And why history has not come to an end, due to man's constant construction and deconstruction of meaning based on experiences. In terms of noögenic-conflict and contemporary politics it seems that we have been in a similar state before, although perhaps not on a globalised scale. The spirit of Fin de siècle can be applied to the twenty-first century as much as to the last century or prior ones.
Overcoming the Existential Vacuum
In his 1962 work The Will to Meaning Frankl writes: “The Existential vacuum is not only increasing but spreading.56 Therefore the question needs to be posed: how are the various forms of existential vacuum overcome, and how is human meaning constructed? To Frankl people do not simply exist, but existence is an active process of deciding what will be, thus what they will become in the next moments.57 Therefore, humanity is ontologically fluid. He postulates that mankind discovers meaning through three routes: (1) by participating in action, such as doing a deed; (2) by experiencing a value; (3) by suffering.58 Doing a deed in Frankl's analysis can be committing oneself to an ethical action, as well as work, being part of a cause, or creating something.59 The leading interpretation of Frankl's comment on experiencing a value refers to an aesthetic value, such as experiencing an item of culture, or nature, as well as experiencing human social pleasures such as friendship or love. Frankl is keen on the latter of these themes. I argue in the last section of this thesis how politics can borrow some of these themes to construct a society with less existential vacuum, but still with a state of healthy tension through struggle and overcoming.
56
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.129.
57
Ibid, p.154.
58
Ibid, p.133.
59
Frankl’s definition of a deed in terms of ethical action is rather vague. It may include any form of struggle that a person perceives as ethical. Therefore, being part of a political struggle is also included.
19 The final process through which meaning can be constructed is suffering. This part is controversial and shows Frankl's thought to mirror that of Nietzsche. Many totalitarian thinkers have also used the concept of suffering to offer meaning, as a way to unite identities against other identities and people into groups. This has been done in attempts to grow the power of a nation, or to legitimise the imposition of their ideologies onto others. Additionally, many throughout history have presented war as a valid rite of passage, promoting suffering as enabling growth. Frankl’s ideas have even been criticised as problematic as they could have been used by National Socialists to justify their ideology.60 However, I argue that Frankl’s own interpretation undermines much of this criticism. Frankl sees suffering as an inescapable situation, not to be glorified in its own right; instead, emphasis is placed on how a response can be formulated in situations of suffering. Meaning is constructed through responding to suffering, not the suffering itself.61 This idea has been studied at length, and a form of post-traumatic growth has been empirically measured, supporting the hypothesis of a relationship between growth and suffering.62
From the political perspective of meaning analysis, as a project, it is important to understand how all meanings are constructed. Therefore, it is just as important to understand how National Socialists constructed their meanings as how people placed in concentration camps constructed theirs, even at their most bare state of existence. As previously stated, all humans have a will to meaning, and this basic fact is not subject to circumstances in a particular situation. Rather, the will to meaning, as previously stated, is ontologically incorporated into the human condition; hence it becomes a part of the driving force of human history. This will be important when analysing the relationship between meaning and power. Meaning will be shown to be at the root of all power, as it is the fundamental driving force for action (as explained in the outlined conceptualisation: meaning is the point in between one’s experiences forming non-material ideas and what drives humans to practical material action). Yet, it is of prior importance to understand more fully how meaning is constructed before moving on to how it is integrated into other political concepts.
60
Pytell, T. (2000), ‘The Missing Pieces of the Puzzle: A Reflection on the Odd Career of Viktor Frankl’, Journal
of Contemporary History, 35 (2): 281–306.
61
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.135.
62
Tedeshi, R.G & Calhoun, L.G. (2004). Posttraumatic Growth: Conceptual Foundation and Empirical Evidence.
20 Rational versus Irrational Actorship
What does this concept of a will to meaning mean for the political nature of human beings? I have argued already that people are not primarily beings driven by instinctual values of pleasure, power or even happiness, but instead by a quest for meaning. What does this mean for the debate on whether humans are rational in social situations or not? Rational in the sense of being driven by logical, calculated actorship as a utility maximising force associated with enlightenment rationality; or driven by emotions and not always optimising their perceived advantages?
Meaning analysis disposes of the rational versus irrational dichotomy that is often discussed when focusing on the nature of human action. I propose that man is neither a rational actor nor an irrational actor. Instead, man is a political actor who acts on behalf of pursuing meaning, in particular the meaning he has inscribed for himself in a subjective manner, as well as within collective groups, both built through experiences. Therefore, it is likely that people will act rationally when their chosen meaning can be acknowledged and they work within a system where that particular meaning is recognised as maximising utility. Thus, the determination of what is rational and what is irrational is subject to the status quo of that particular cultural surrounding. A subject will be seen to act irrationally if his meaning is not understood. As Bauman explains: “Mad are only unshared meanings, madness is no madness when shared.”63
This has much relevance for civilizational and cultural disparities. For example, what may seem irrational or illogical to one civilization may seem rational to another, because they are pursuing different
meanings, based on subjective experiences which are built into socio-cultural structures and political cultures. Humans as meaning maximisers may seem either rational or irrational, depending on others’ cognitive framing. This is important also when analysing the differences between economies, to understand what influences economic decisions and choices for individual actions, and why countries
63
21 show large economic disparities.64 For example, the notion that capitalism is epistemically embedded in Protestant ethics means that North European countries developed capitalist economies much more easily and earlier than many other nations, because Protestantism was integrated into the will to meaning for those citizens. Similarly, a heavily free-market nation would find cultural barriers and resistance in reforming to a social market economy, because its economic system is built on a set of meanings that would reinforce a free market economy, such as constructing rigid ‘common sense’ narratives attached to economic thinking. These are examples of how meanings affect the economic course of nations, and economies are rooted in cultural meanings.
Thinking in terms of meaning also has relevance for seemingly irrational political action. What is seen as irrational or illogical political action, such as suicide terrorism, will be based on prior, culturally shaped reasoning rooted in one’s experiences. The reasoning behind why actors commit seemingly illogical acts, such as suicide bombings, is not explained by a rationality versus irrationality dichotomy. These events can more readily be explained through a form of meaning analysis to trace cultural epistemic links and psychological factors and uncover the ways in which actors are pulled by ‘a will to meaning’ to commit this type of action.
However, I should also add that for some seemingly irrational actions, such as suicide bombings, there are also prior forces pushing and manipulating, particularly some very young people, into committing these acts. Also, I would not count people with serious mental health issues, such as those suffering from schizophrenia, as agents that conduct action based on a will to meaning. In these examples the individuals do not have agency over their actions and therefore do not act based on their own will to meaning. In cases where people are externally controlled, they will conduct action based on someone else’s will to meaning. If they are mentally ill, they lack agency and so cannot act based on their own will to meaning.
Phenomenology of Meaning: Individual and Collective Meaning
64
Annette Freyberg-Inan and Rüya Gökhan Koçer, (2012) “Gone Fishing” Modeling Diversity in Work Ethics.
22 Frankl argues that meaning is constructed through experience, be it from participating in action, experiencing a value, or from suffering. Meaning construction always occurs on the basis of individual experience, hence meaning is subjective to each individual based on their specific experience. Each individual must pursue his or her own meaning.65 This links with the idea of existential phenomenology that experience of phenomena is at the centre of a human’s construction of meaning. It is through
experiencing the world that values, beliefs and ideas are constructed. These are historical and develop and change as the world an individual lives in changes. This constructs subjective meaning, forming
individual identity as it forms one’s will to meaning. I argue that one’s subjective will to meaning is what largely characterises one’s individual identity.
However, for a political analysis of meaning it is also important to look at the collective aspect of the construction of meaning. This is elaborated on in more recent formulations of communal phenomenology, asking how societies construct and store meaning. These questions are important for understanding how identity is constructed as well as how ideology is formulated and externalised into action, through norms, customs and symbols, and how it is preserved through cultural memory.66 Humans construct meaning based on experiencing an environment, and have a will to meaning to understand their experiences. This infuses meaning into values and beliefs. This process is subjective, but going through similar experiences or the same experience creates a communal sense of meaning, and therefore will produce similar values and beliefs, in turn constructing a similar will to meaning. I argue this to be at the basis of collective identity. I conceptualise collective identity to be a collective sharing of a same/similar will to meaning. This also has the effect of producing a similar cognitive framing of political situations.
Examples of phenomena that are experienced collectively are events such as 9/11, or the financial crisis. While they were both experienced subjectively at an individual level, to some extent they were also experienced communally, in a more symbolic sense. Their reception was internalised into a collective
65 Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.162. 66
Burns, T & Churchill, S. (2016). The Curious Case of Collective Experience: Edith Stein’s Phenomenology of Communal Experience and a Spanish Fire-Walking Ritual. The Humanistic Psychologist, 44(4), 366–380.
23 identity and moulded that identity and the associated stories of peoplehood. Therefore, meaning was communally constructed from a communal experience of these events. These meanings were vaguely stored in cultural memory. I use the term vaguely because cultural memory is always at the mercy of present interpretation based on present meanings. I argue that meaning constructed from communal phenomena ultimately changes our political structures as meanings change. This is what I shall be arguing in the chapter on Structuring Meaning.
To sum up, meaning is constructed both individually and communally. Fixed identity characteristics such as passport nationality, place of birth, or age are testaments to the likely experiences one will have had, and therefore what social meanings one will likely have constructed into beliefs and values. Yet, no two individuals could ever share the same identity, because no two individuals could ever have the same experiences at both an individual and a communal level. The interpretation of communal experiences is furthermore always at the subjective mercy of individual cognitive framing, and the reverse. Therefore, no two individuals can have the exact same matrix of beliefs, values and meanings. This should be a signal for caution for social scientists not to treat human beings as overly predictable or similar.
The concept of identity will be discussed more in the following chapters, which show how meaning develops from existential nihilism towards collective meaning. This links back to the sub-chapter on existential nihilism, where I explained how meaning is created from no meaning, and its construction leads to the formation of societal concepts such as values, beliefs, habits, and identity, as well as societal narratives, myths and ideologies. For a political analysis I must now show in the next chapter how meaning is invested into political structures, thus how the psychological is synthesised with political structures to show later how the will to meaning is at the root of contemporary political issues.
24
Chapter Three
Structuring Meaning
The previous chapter laid out a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding
the relationship between human psychology, the individual, and the communal. Using Viktor Frankl’s psychotherapeutic discourse, the chapter demonstrated how meaning is a central part of human psychology and how these psychological themes are projected into communal relations. This was imperative, as human beings can neither be described as isolated individuals nor as purely communal actors.
This chapter will focus on the application of meaning analysis to political structures. I will argue how the ‘will to meaning’ is our prime motivational force, a force that not only takes form in the functioning of our political structures, but rather is a core component of their foundation. I will argue that our political structures are not alien to our psychological state. Rather they are a reflection of our psychology. In essence we project our psychology onto social structures. More precisely, we project our meanings into such structures and build political structures as projections of meaning, in order to satisfy our will to meaning. In this chapter, I thus argue for a logocentric analysis of the political. I do this in order to develop my overarching argument that contemporary political upheaval is rooted in issues of meaning and, more generally, that all politics is rooted in meaning construction. To do this I must dig into the fundamental concepts of political structures.
I will demonstrate the structural implications of Frankl's ideas and the importance of meaning analysis for the social sciences, for understanding core features of the political. I will first show how the concept of meaning should be a central force in how we conceptualise power. Power should be considered a currency in relation to our will to meaning. Secondly, I argue that power cannot operate in a society without meaning as a prerequisite. I argue that political institutions do not function objectively; instead, meanings are required for the operationalization of political structures. Without meanings we have no political foundation. I will demonstrate how political structures are inherently logocentic in nature, as
25 meanings are at the core of any political system. In sequence, the chapter traces the ways in which meanings are fused into our political structures through an analysis of their relation to power, the social contract, ideology, self-esteem and raison d’être.
Meaning and Power
To understand the role meaning has in shaping modern society, it must be analysed in relation to the concept of power, in particular to how power is built and operates. Power is conceptualised here as a force that drives action.67 This is contrasted with the previously stated conceptualisation of meaning, which is: the non-material quality that drives humans from an idea to action. Therefore, whenever power operates there must be a sense of meaning operating in addition, as there must be a prior non-material quality driving this force to action. If no prior non-material quality is present, then action cannot be reached, therefore no power. Thus, power is not a fundamental concept, since power cannot function
independently of meaning. Meaning is a prerequisite to power. This is what I will argue in this section.
Meaning is a fundamental concept, which can operate without power, while the reverse, power without meaning, cannot exist. Metaphysically, meaning can be procured without power, but the actability of a meaning always requires power.68 Power and meaning are synthesised at the point of action, therefore at the point of action meanings become power. Power can be either internal, through moving from an idea to action with the power to commit action. Yet power is also external: as an external force that drives one’s actions. Power as an external force is the conceptualisation of power that will be applied in the rest of this section.
External power can be separated into distinct categories, alluding to distinct ways in which power operates in the world. In its most basic form, power is a force of aggression, working as an external but
67
Power is external in this context, because while it can be invested inside people, its enactability must be external to another actor or group of actors. Additionally, the externality must be a conscious actor externally acting in relation to another individual. Otherwise a criticism of this conceptualisation would be that all events will have power because they drive the construction of meaning through experiencing them.
68
Meaning can be constructed without power, as power is (as conceptualised here) an external force that drives action. Meaning can be constructed independently.
26 direct force, in order to move objects or subjects and change their course of behaviour; this is achieved through the threat or act of violence. What I describe here is what I refer to as direct power. Direct power is the most primitive form of power. Albeit primitive, the threat of violence and even the act of violence still rest on some basic motivational force; therefore, a sense of meaning must still be conscripted into its enactment. However, the enactment of this type of power does not require a high level of sophistication of meaning. In other words, it does not require sociocultural models for its implementation, but rather can function from basic instinctual drives. Direct power is the weakest form of power, as it can easily be overcome by superior strength, through systems of power that provide sociocultural models for effective order and communication. This is why I asserted direct power to be a primitive form of power.
Direct power I argue to be a smaller branch of hard power, a concept developed by Joseph Nye.69 Nye’s conceptualisation of hard power takes note of the physical assets of direct power, the size of a nation's economy, the size of their tanks; it is the perceived ability to control through direct military strength, or coercion by the threat of collectivised violence.70 I argue that hard power is also direct power, yet not all direct power is hard power. Hard power is a collectivised form of power, meaning it is concentrated in a body of actors; most likely this body of actors forms into a state, and therefore the concept also tends to be state centric.71 This power, too, requires a sense of meaning: a state's interests; the level of cohesion and force to use; the reason to use force against another power, with the addition of a meaning that gives the soldiers and politicians a reason to come together to fight for the same cause. Therefore, hard power requires more developed and sophisticated meanings than other forms of direct power.
Soft power, on the other hand, separates the reality of most citizens living in stable states from
experiencing the results of direct and hard power. Soft power is the dominant form of power that operates in the twenty-first century. It is the most sophisticated and developed form of power, among Nye’s
69
Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Perseus, 2004), p.5.
70 Ibid, p.5. 71
The body of actors could be another type of body, such as a terrorist network, or private armed company. However, for the purposes of this thesis looking at political structures I have conceptualized the term in a state-centric manner.
27 concepts.72 Here the relationship between meanings and power becomes particularly relevant,
emphasizing the non-material quality of power. Soft power is based on non-aggressive co-optation in order to establish conformity through a set of habits, using strength through cultural persuasion, value exchange, dialogue and sharing of ideas.73 In essence, soft power rests on non-threatening aspects of diplomatic co-optation rather than brute force. What separates the functioning of soft power from hard power is that soft power works at a much more sophisticated level, achieving its goals much more easily and effectively. This, I argue, is because it works with meaning as its central force; soft-power hacks into shaping human behaviour through utilising humanity’s pulling mechanism, the will to meaning. I argue this because culture, values and ideas are all ways in which meaning is stored in society. This is why soft power is so effective: it strikes at the core of the human condition and guides our most fundamental driving force: our will to meaning. Soft-power works with the will to meaning rather than against it, so not frustrating the will to meaning. This is why, I argue, soft power is so powerful, particularly in the long term, as it starts to consolidate shared norms based on meanings.
Soft forms of power are powerful because they work in a consensual manner. This is a comment that is attributed to the French philosopher Michel Foucault, who has described consensual power as a
normalising force.74 This, I argue, is how soft forms of power start to consolidate meanings. Again, this makes hard power or, as Foucault labels it, repressive power secondary and less efficient than power that is normalising. For power to be a normalising and consensual force, I argue that it must give a reason for consent; that reason is ultimately meaning. Therefore, for power to operate in this fashion it must nourish people’s will to meaning. There must be a constructed meaning behind power.
To recapitulate, all power is to some extent logocentric, as meaning is at the centre of all power.75 This is even more true for forms of normalising power/soft power. Because societies function with this type of power at their core, it is clear that society operates logocentrically. That is to say that meaning (logos) is 72 Ibid, p.7. 73 Ibid, p.7-11. 74
Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power (University of Chicago Press, 1982), p.43
75
Logocentrism is a term coined by Ludwig Klages in 1920. The term is widely noted and used inside the field of linguistics. Philosophically, the term has its origins in Plato’s works and has been attached to the German
Lebensphilosophie movement. I argue that Frankl’s work has epistemic links to Lebensphilosophie. I have largely
28 at the centre of all societal structures. Meaning is at the core of political structures: from their foundation to their operation on a body of citizens. This argument will be justified throughout the rest of this chapter. On a wider scale, it means that political events are based in issues of meaning, due to the logocentric nature of power. This also means that contemporary issues of powerlessness are more symbolically rooted in a loss of meaning. These arguments will be incorporated throughout the rest of the thesis to show how contemporary politics is affected by issues of meaning.
A further implication of my argument is that, if an existential vacuum as previously mentioned opens in a society, the power structure of this system will also begin to crack. This sounds almost like a form of liberation. However, the problem is that then power will tie itself to more primitive meanings, and consequently use the secondary form of power: repressive power, in the form of hard and even direct power. This is the motif of a revolution without a strong theoretical plan, which sooner or later descends into chaos and internal bloodshed, only to then reinstate old oppressive structures or worse. Therefore, the solution is to construct meanings that must replace the old cracking meanings. As the pillars of society should be constructed as if they were to be hit with a hammer, the ones built on faulty premises shall crack and fall; the ones that do not shall remain standing, as they have authentic foundations of meaning. It is a collective political task not to mask the cracks in the pillars of society but to replace the decaying. To test the pillars with the hammer of dialogue. To do this, a society must be free and open, and the cracks within the pillars of society must not be masked by those who have an interest in masking them.
Normalising power, including Nye’s concept of soft power, is a form of conformism. It revolves around individual actors being led to conform to power, using constructed societal meanings. Frankl warns us of conformism, when individuals do not have sufficient levels of agency to construct and follow their own meanings. He suggests: “Unlike an animal, man is not told by instinct what he must do. And unlike man in former times, he is no longer told by traditions what he should do. Often, he does not even know what he basically wishes to do. Instead, either he wishes to do what other people do (conformism), or he does
29 what other people wish him to do (totalitarianism).”76
Writing in the 1960s, the conformism Frankl is warning against here are the soft power techniques employed in the Western world during the Cold War. On the other hand, the reference to totalitarianism is to the totalitarian power governing the Eastern bloc at that time, and also to the previous totalitarian fascist regimes of the 1930/1940s.77 Soft Power is neither good nor bad in its own right, but its morality depends on the meanings that construct the power, as power is a tool for meanings and meanings must precede the power.
This leads me to discuss another type of power that is employed with totalitarian regimes. I describe it as meaning implementing power. I designed this term to stress the difference between the excessive hard
power used by authoritarian states, such as those of the twentieth century in Latin America and the
Middle East, and the type of power used by fascist and totalitarian states of twentieth-century Europe. The power of totalitarian states works in a system of meaning implementing power. It gives those without status a badge, those without a church a rally; those without an aim it gives an adventure, and most importantly those without purpose it gives meaning. I argue that this is the strongest form of power. Meaning implementing power is exercised when a regime has created a specific ideological power dimension based on a meaning separate from and contrary to that of the status quo. This is done usually by one or very few people.
As Nietzsche points out, “the highest strata of human autonomy is not to just accept moral laws but to create the law for themselves. The highest form of artistic expression was value creation itself.”78
In a pluralistic society this ability is spread over many people, all having the ability of value creation, which can be argued to be meaning construction. This pluralistic attitude was exemplified in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling “Planned Parenthood v Casey” in 1992, stating that liberty is “the right to define one’s own concept of existence of meaning of the universe and the mystery of human life”.79
I argue that this
76 Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy (Plum, 2014), p.ii. 77
Ibid, p.64.
78 Francis Fukuyama, Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition (Profile books,
2018), p.5 4-55. In reference to: Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a philosophy of
the future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
79
