Diverging Identity and Political Grievance: an Examination of Brexit’s Impact on the Movement for Scottish Independence 

Diverging Identity and Political Grievance:

an Examination of Brexit’s Impact on the

Movement for Scottish Independence

Alice Pleasant

Master thesis Political Science

International Relations

Graduate School of Social Science

University of Amsterdam

Supervisor: Dr. Mike Medeiros

Second Reader: Dr. Daphne van der Pas

Student Number: 12721425

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June 2020

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Abstract

The fight for Scottish independence has become increasingly salient in recent decades. Whilst the 2014 independence referendum was lost, it was closer than expected and nationalism now frames the political landscape in Scotland. The Scottish Nationalist Party have become an increasingly dominant force in the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments. The 2016 Brexit referendum, where the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, but Scotland voted to remain, has revitalised the debate around independence. Scottish nationalists have taken this opportunity to highlight and exploit potential identity divergence and political grievance arguments. This paper seeks to answer the research question “Has the Brexit referendum led

to greater support for Scottish independence?”, using a framework of Social Identity Theory

and political grievances, with a mixed methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data was collected from the British Election Study, whilst the qualitative data consisted of sixteen interviews with political operatives from Scotland. The results showed that there was a stronger identification with Scottish identity post-Brexit, with a positive and distinctive identity juxtaposed with negative stereotypes of British and English identity. There was also a clear dissatisfaction with British democracy post-Brexit, shown through frustration aimed at the Westminster Parliament and perceptions of democratic deficit. Ultimately, there was not enough evidence to show whether Brexit has led to greater support for independence, however it has acted as a catalyst to renewed nationalist discourse and strengthened the secessionist argument, opening the door for a second referendum.

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Acknowledgements

I want to acknowledge and thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Mike Medeiros, who supported and encouraged me along the entire process of this paper. His assistance helped me through many moments of doubt and gave me solutions to my worries.

I want to thank my parents, as I could not have written this thesis without their support and encouragement. I want to thank them for all they have done for me to reach this point in my academic career. I would also like to thank my friends from across Scotland, who helped to inspire my interest in this topic and answered my questions, no matter how small.

Finally, I would like to thank everybody who took time from their lives to answer questions for the qualitative research of this paper. I really appreciate the effort that was made and the valuable insights this gave me.

Alice Pleasant June 2020

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Table of Contents

Abstract ... 2

Acknowledgements ... 3

List of Figures ... 6

List of Tables ... 7

Chapter One: Introduction ... 8

Chapter Two: Literature Review ... 12

2.1 Themes of the Scholarship ... 12

2.1.1 Nationalism ... 12

2.1.2 National Identity ... 15

2.1.3 Economic and Political Grievances ... 17

2.1.4 Cleavages and Party Identification ... 18

2.1.5 Power-Sharing and Autonomy ... 20

2.2 Case Presentation ... 21

2.2.1 Scotland and the Union ... 22

2.2.2 The Rise of Scottish Nationalism ... 22

2.2.3 Thatcherism and the Conservative Party ... 23

2.2.4 Devolution... 25

2.2.5 The Independence Referendum and Aftermath ... 26

2.2.6 Brexit and the Current Situation ... 28

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework ... 31

3.1 Social Identity Theory... 31

3.2 Scottish Nationalism and Brexit: Social Identity Theory ... 33

3.3 Political Grievances and Democratic Deficit ... 36

3.4 Hypotheses ... 39

Chapter Four: Methodology ... 41

4.1 Quantitative Data ... 41 4.1.1 Dependent Variables ... 42 4.1.2. Independent Variable ... 43 4.1.3 Control Variables ... 44 4.2 Qualitative Data ... 45 4.2.1 Sampling Strategy ... 45

4.2.2 Interviews and Analysis ... 46

4.3 Ethics... 47

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5.1 Quantitative Data ... 48

5.1.1. Identity ... 48

5.1.2 Satisfaction with UK Democracy ... 50

5.1.3 Support for Independence ... 52

5.1.4 Quantitative Conclusion... 54

5.2 Qualitative Data ... 55

5.2.1 Support for Scottish Independence ... 55

5.2.2 Identity ... 56

5.2.3 Satisfaction with UK Democracy ... 60

5.2.4 Qualitative Conclusion... 64

Chapter Six: Discussion ... 65

6.1 Identity ... 65

6.1.1 Social Comparison and English Stereotypes ... 65

6.1.2 A Distinctive Scottish Identity ... 66

6.2 Political Grievances ... 67

6.2.1 Frustration with Westminster ... 68

6.2.2 Brexit and a New Case for Democratic Deficit ... 69

6.3 Brexit and a Second Referendum? ... 70

6.4 Research Limitations ... 71

Chapter Seven: Conclusion ... 73

Bibliography ... 77

Appendices ... 89

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List of Figures

Figure 2. 1 Comparison of 2010 and 2015 General Election results in Scotland ... 28

Figure 5. 1 British Identity and its relationship to Brexit……… 49

Figure 5. 2 Scottish Identity and its relationship to Brexit……….. 49

Figure 5. 3 Satisfaction with UK Democracy and its relationship to Brexit………51

Figure 5. 4 Support for Scottish Independence and its relationship with Brexit……… 52

Figure 5. 5 Support for Scottish Independence and its relationship to Brexit. Moderated by Scottish Identity………53

Figure 5. 6 Support for Scottish Independence and its relationship to Brexit. Moderated by Satisfaction with UK Democracy ………54

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List of Tables

Table 5. 1 Overview of Sample by Gender... 48

Table A. 1 Determinants of Identity ... 89

Table A. 2 Determinants of Satisfaction with UK Democracy ... 90

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Chapter One: Introduction

“The Westminster system of government does not serve Scotland’s interests, and the devolution settlement, in its current form, is now seen to be utterly inadequate to the task of protecting those interests. In other words, the status quo is broken. Brexit has exposed a deep democratic deficit at the heart of how Scotland is governed."

- Nicola Sturgeon, First Minister for Scotland.

(BBC, 2019)

‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’. This was the question that greeted voters on the ballot in the referendum for Scottish independence on the 18th September 2014 (GOV.UK,

n.d.). Over the past several decades Scottish nationalism has plagued the British state. Dardanelli and Mitchell (2014) argue that ‘Scotland’s bid for independence is one of the most prominent cases of secessionism in today’s Europe, and indeed the Western democratic world’ (p.88). The United Kingdom (UK) is made up of four separate nations, each with a distinct history and culture, however it is dominated by the English. The ancient history of the nations is illustrious for its internal power struggles, encapsulated in popular culture through films such as ‘Braveheart’, however the case for Scottish nationalism is relatively new.

Scottish nationalism, fronted by the Scottish Nationalist Party (the ‘SNP’), has been increasingly successful since the 1960s. It has exploited political and economic grievances within Scotland, such as a perception of democratic deficit and feelings of under-representation in an English-dominated Parliament, whilst emphasising differences in identity between the two nations. They claim there is a divergence in political identity with a narrative that portrays Scotland as international, socially democratic, progressive and left-wing, stuck with policies tailored for an English population with right-wing, isolationist, neoliberal tendencies. This combines to create a perception that the two nations have different political interests and values and should be separated. This narrative has historical foundations, most significantly from the Thatcher government’s attacks on manufacturing industries and the welfare state in the 1980s, which left a disproportionate level of inequality and unemployment in Scotland, tainting the Conservative Party with an anti-Scottish brush.

9 Nationalism in Scotland has become increasingly left-wing in nature (Gall, 2005). Regular elections of Conservative governments in the Westminster Parliament with little Scottish representation, whilst Scotland favours left-wing socially democratic parties, has allowed an argument of ‘democratic deficit’ to build. Nationalists argue Scotland is stuck with governments it didn’t vote for, which push unpopular policies such as austerity and nuclear weapons upon them. Additionally, since the introduction of the Scottish Parliament in 1997, and the astute leadership of nationalist politicians Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP have been given a platform to articulate and exploit grievances against the Westminster government. In the past decade, the SNP have gone electorally from strength to strength, gaining a majority government in the Scottish Parliament in 2011, which granted them a mandate for a referendum on Scottish Independence in 2014 (Johns & Mitchell, 2016). Despite this referendum being lost, it was much tighter than predicted. Instead of closing the door on the question of secessionism, it allowed deeper reflection on the Union, whilst highlighting grievances and cleavages between the two nations, especially towards the unpopular Conservative government at the time. Nationalism gained momentum, and in 2015 the SNP won a landslide victory in the General Election which ruptured the landscape of Scottish politics (Johns & Mitchell, 2016).

Then, as if one ground-shifting referendum was not enough, in 2016 the British government held a referendum on European Union (EU) membership and the UK voted to leave (Thompson, 2019). Whilst the UK voted 52% to 48% to leave the EU, Scotland voted over 62% to remain (Thompson, 2019). In the 2014 independence referendum, ‘Better Together’, the pro-Union campaign, used the UK’s EU membership against nationalists, claiming that losing this membership would be detrimental to Scottish citizens economic and political security. Additionally, the SNP have stated they would not ask for another referendum unless there was a material change in circumstance. Brexit is the change needed to open the door for a second referendum on independence. The SNP have, since the 1980s, used the idea of EU membership for an independent Scotland as a way of lessening the costs for secession. Euroscepticism in Britain is mainly an English phenomenon (Henderson et al, 2017). Whilst Brexit has sent political shockwaves across Europe and led to substantial academic research into Euroscepticism, populism and English nationalism, its impact on support for Scottish nationalism is under-represented within the scholarship, subsequently this is the gap this research will aim to fill.

10 Ultimately, Brexit has presented the perfect example for Scottish nationalists of the democratic deficit and identity-based narrative they portray. Scotland is being forced to leave the European Union, despite overwhelmingly voting against it, in a referendum supported by a Conservative government they didn’t vote for. The Conservative Party were trying to appease Eurosceptics, who make up a significant part of the English public (Marr, 2013). Many Eurosceptics in England argue for a British patriotism which is synonymous with English nationalism (Henderson et al, 2017). Brexit has come to symbolise a populist vote, based on right-wing and isolationist politics, which is anti-immigration and often xenophobic (Henderson et al, 2017; Thompson, 2019). Brexit is used by Scottish nationalists to portray differences in political identity and interests between the two nations. Adding to this, since Brexit, Westminster has been ruled by Conservative governments with little representation in Scotland and have struggled to push past parliamentary gridlock over such a divisive issue, leading to Scots seeing the Westminster political system as incompetent and unrepresentative (Harvey, 2020).

This paper will seek to answer the research question ‘Has the Brexit referendum led to greater

support for Scottish independence?’. For the first time since 2015, support for secession has

recorded leads in polling (YouGov, 2020). This coincided with the December 2019 election of Boris Johnson on a pro-Brexit platform, despite only winning six seats in Scotland (Harvey, 2020). The SNP argue Brexit is an example of democratic deficit that shows that the Westminster government is not aligned with Scotland’s interests, and that Brexit reflects the divergence of the two nation’s political identities, making them incompatible. Therefore, this paper will explore whether this argument has truth to it, and if Brexit has led to greater support for independence.

This paper will use Social Identity Theory and political grievances to build a theoretical framework and hypotheses for testing the research question. These hypotheses will be tested using a combination of statistical analysis and interview data. The results show that, although there is a relationship between Brexit and support for Scottish independence, it is not significant. However, Brexit has been a catalyst to the current nationalist discourse. There is evidence that identification with Scottish identity grew after the Brexit referendum. This identity is portrayed as left-wing and progressive, juxtaposed against negative perceptions of English identity. Additionally, the results also show that satisfaction with UK democracy decreased after the Brexit referendum, and this dissatisfaction is split into frustration with Westminster and perceptions of democratic deficit. Therefore, this paper will contend that

11 Brexit has strengthened the case for Scottish independence, supported by evidence in both identity and political grievances. However, whilst the case may be stronger, whether this is enough to increase support for the independence movement does not have enough evidence. Nevertheless, this paper argues that underlying issues exacerbated by Brexit should not be left unnoticed.

This paper will first cover a review of the scholarship which will split into a section on general important themes within the literature, followed by a historical overview of the case, before situating the research question in the current context. The next chapter will present the argument of this paper using Social Identity Theory and political grievances, before presenting the hypothesis of this research. Then a methodology section will explain the process of collecting and analysing the quantitative and qualitative data used. After this, a subsequent chapter will present the findings and results of this analysis, before discussing them in relevance to the research question and hypotheses. Finally, this thesis will conclude with a summary of the aims of its research and the results, applying them to the research question before deliberating over limitations and potential for further research.

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Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter will outline a review of the literature relating to the movement for Scottish independence. It will first outline five fundamental themes within the scholarship; theories of nationalism, national identity, economic and political grievances, party cleavages, and finally power-sharing agreements and autonomy. The second section of the chapter will then give a historical overview of the rise of Scottish nationalism since the mid-20th century, before

presenting the case since 2010 and the impact of Brexit.

2.1 Themes of the Scholarship 2.1.1 Nationalism

Ernest Gellner, one of the most recognised academics on nationalism, argued that it is ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (1983, p.1). Therefore, nationalist sentiment is anger at violation of this principle or satisfaction sustained from fulfilling it (Gellner, 1983). This explanation adds to a wide range of scholarship which defines nationalism as the emotional attachment to one’s people and ethnonational group (Connor, 1993), that can be recognised as a type of identity politics involving an outlining of national collective interests and desire for self-determination (Lecours, 2000; Kedourie, 1960). This national self-determination focuses on being able to participate in the government that has authority over them. It can be divided into an internal self-determination, which relates to self-government and the right of a particular group to have its own characteristics and its own will reflected in autonomous institutions, and also external self-determination, which demands that the group becomes a sovereign, involving a form of independence and secession (Lecours, 2000). Ultimately, nationalism links together identity, interests and mobilization (Lecours, 2012).

These definitions follow a modernist approach to nationalism which is the most relevant to this research. In this line of thinking, nationalism is a modern phenomenon, not denying that there was an existence of some form of national consciousness or identity before the modern era but seeing nationalism as a product of the democratic and industrial revolutions of 18th

and 19th century (Gorski, 2000; Whigham, 2019). There are several different variations to

13 the final goal for nationalist movements is to establish state sovereignty. They argue the nation-state is used by individuals to achieve self-determination and sovereignty for the collective group which they identity with (Ichijo, 2009; Kedourie, 1960). Another modernist approach is seen from Nairn (1977) and Hechter (1975) who focus on economic and social inequalities between regions within a state, arguing that this creates nationalist movements. Hector (1975) specifically focuses on the United Kingdom in his argument of ‘internal colonialism’, which reasons that increasing contact between ethnic groups within a state brings about ethnic conflict because of the inequalities that exist between regions within the same polity consisting of different ethnic groups. The regions suffering with this inequality will be relegated to inferiority, and the core region becomes dominant resulting in nationalism (Hector, 1975). However, this application to the UK can be criticised because inequality between England and the other nations (e.g. Scotland) is not dissimilar to regional inequalities with England, such as that between the north and south-east.

Moving on from the definitions and approaches to nationalism, there is also substantial focus within the scholarship on sub-state nationalism. As Whigham (2019) points out, although the starting point for modernist approaches is based on the nation-state, there are examples of ‘submerged nations’ within wider state systems (p.1213). Inhabitants of ‘submerged nations’ possess awareness of their ‘existence as a distinct nation on a social, cultural and political level’, despite their lack of sovereignty (Whigham 2019; p.1213). Many states around the world consist of more than one nation, the UK being one example. Sub-state nationalism confronts and challenges existing political, constitutional and institutional orders (Lecours, 2012). It is exemplified by prominent cases such as the Basque region and Catalonia in Spain, Flemish nationalism in Belgium, Quebec in the Canadian federal system, and Scottish nationalism in the UK (Lecours, 2012). Bechhofer and McCrone (2009) argue sub-state nationalism highlights why national identity matters, as it contrasts the principal national ideologies that the state provides to imagined alternatives, making explicit what is taken for granted.

Lecours (2012) outlines six reasons why sub-state nationalism is gaining such support within liberal democracies. First, they argue that it is because self-determination retains such a fundamental place in modern politics, carrying powerful legitimacy. They then state that the construction of decentralised arrangements with autonomous political structures helps institutionalise national identity and nationalism (Lecours, 2012). Additionally, they believe

14 that multinational societies can also have historic narratives involving oppressors and humiliation which fuels nationalist mobilisation (Lecours, 2012). Moreover, at the heart of sub-state nationalism, there are often significant constitutional questions that have been left unsolved over time or have only been patched up with a band-aid worth of compromise because of their sensitive nature (Lecours, 2012). They also argue that nationalist movements are involved in important policy debates that reach citizens more concretely. Finally, they reason that continental integration such as the European Union has helped nationalist movements argue for increased autonomy and secessionism because they can suggest it will lessen the costs, economically and politically, of independence (Lecours, 2012). These six reasons are important to consider when examining a case of sub-state nationalism in a liberal democracy, as they highlight significant reasons for civil conflict. Ultimately, sub-state nationalism gains wide-ranging support if distinct interests are added to a distinctive defined identity. These national interests become strongly political as they involve exaggerating or fabricating internal unity of a specific group and potential differences with another outgroup (Ichijo, 2009; Lecours, 2012).

Within the scholarship on nationalism there is debate about different shapes nationalism can take, most notable for this research is the comparison between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. Ethnonationalism is examined through modernist arguments such as Connor (1993), who discusses the emotional importance of language. Civic nationalism, also known as neo-nationalism, highlighting the civic and territorial over the ethnic and tribal. It is described as small ‘n’ nationalism, supported by rationality, focusing on policy practicalities and institutional changes (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012). Aughey (2010) argues that civic nationalism separates the kind of people they are, and the qualities people share, involving psychological temperaments and dispositions. It is a matter of collective self-definition to a political community.

On the other hand, birth, parentage and accent remain the strongest markers of national membership in survey data (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012). Despite political entrepreneurs sophisticated articulation of civic nationalism, this is not always shared by the wider public (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012). Moreover, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism has been criticised (Brown, 1999; Brubaker, 2004). This is because examples of civic nationalism are based on characteristics such as historical heritage and common values which

15 one might associate with ethnic conceptions of nationalism (Yack, 1999). Additionally, academics which prescribe to the ethno-symbolist school of nationalism have argued that the formidable mixture of ethnicity and symbolism found in such movements resonates with people throughout time no matter where they are (Guibernau & Hutchinson, 2004; Smith, 1986). Henderson (2007) questions whether civic and ethnic should be replaced, when looking at the nature of nationalism, as inclusive or exclusive instead.

This segment will end on scholarship around nationalism and sovereignty within an increasingly globalised world. Modernist theories on nationalism are based around self-determination and achieving independence in the form of sovereignty (Ichijo, 2009). This can be argued within the doctrine of popular sovereignty, which dictates that the state and government are created and sustained by the consent of its citizens (Yack, 2001). This doctrine has arguably led to a renewed politicisation of national identities. Ichijo (2009) states that, following classical nationalist doctrine, full self-realisation of the people comes from freedom of the nation. However, with modern multi-national institutions such as the European Union, absolute sovereignty is no longer tenable (Ichijo, 2009; Lecours, 2012). This creates a complex relationship between political nationalism and sovereignty (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Ichijo, 2009). Yet, although sovereignty is limited, it is still valued and important because it holds the power to decide whether to be a part of such international organisations. It is the ability for the state to make its own decisions, including whether to cede their sovereignty (Ichijo, 2009).

2.1.2 National Identity

Smith (1991) argues that nationalism is a form of identity politics. Therefore, scholarship on national identity is central to this research as it is fundamental to a secessionist movement gaining momentum. Henderson et al (2017) argue that national identity is a ‘complex social phenomenon, particularly in pluri-national states’ (p.631). It has a significant power which permeates through individual, social and political relations within a society (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012).

Gellner (1983) points out that nationalism is taken for granted as an ideology that attaches citizens to the state, and national identity is an essential condition of citizenship. National identity involves the individual and who they think they are, who they think others are, and who they think are similar to them and not so (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009). Ritchie (2017)

16 argues that constructing a national identity entails a process of legitimising a political community through influential social sources such as churches, unions, political parties and civic groups. Geography, religion, history and ethnicity can all be part of this, but the articulation of a distinct national identity is fundamental to secessionist movements (Ritchie, 2017) National identity can also involve social, economic and political issues such as policy legitimacy, social inclusion and exclusions, discrimination and prejudices, what is judged to be in the national interest or the collective interest, and who is defined as ‘we’. It can dictate what actions are seen as legitimate, what type of policies are endorsed, what goals are pursued and who is accepted or excluded (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009). It is consistently being re-defined and re-invented by experiences of citizens, as well as actively constructed by the state itself (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009).

Nationalism only exists if the population has a distinctive and shared national identity (Curtice, 2001), as it sets about portraying differentiation in identities and articulating distinctive interests which are often politically juxtaposed against other specific ideologies, values and identities (Lecours, 2012). For example, Canadian nationalism frames Canada as a tolerant, open-minded, progressive society, whilst contrasting itself with a portrayal of America as a conservative, individualistic society (Lecours, 2012). In the case of sub-state nationalism, it is about framing these national identities against that of the state that they wish to separate from. For example, Quebec and Scottish nationalist leaders make a similar argument about being progressive and tolerant in comparison to other regions within Canada and the United Kingdom (Andersen & Heath, 2003). The expression of national identity politics influences group status significantly as individual citizens see treatment of their group as a reflection of themselves.

Additionally, the existence of contested and alternative forms of national identity, such as that seen in sub-state nationalism, is often envisaged in a state of comparison, implicitly and explicitly, against those seen as ‘others’. This may be asserted in similarities, but also it can be contrasting, by referring to who and what they are not (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009). In an increasingly globalised world, we are living in a time of heightened identity salience (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009). However, national identity is a weak indicator of political action (Aughey, 2010), and the existence of a distinctive national identity does not equate to a nationalist movement (Curtice, 2001). Therefore, the appeal of nationalism is only partially explained by identity (Lecours, 2012). How strongly an individual aligns with an identity, such as ‘Britishness’ or ‘Canadianness’, is not a definite sign of their constitutional preferences

17 (Bond, 2009). Ultimately, there are other factors such as grievances and interests that are crucial to the success of nationalist movements.

2.1.3 Economic and Political Grievances

Gurr (1993) argues that grievances, and the conditions they respond to, are critical in the primary stages of group mobilisation. These grievances are often highlighted and exploited by political entrepreneurs (Gurr, 2000; Medeiros, 2019). Nationalists argue the current state of affairs is unjustly oppressing those with a particular ethnic identity, whilst convincing individuals that their social status and material success is tied to the nation (Giuliano, 2011). Consequently, grievances are created through a sense of outrage about the status quo ignoring a groups interest. It cannot be purely rhetorical and for the sake of creating distrust, there must be a degree of plausibility in individuals everyday experiences and realities. There must be genuine frustrations which have potential to be exploited by political entrepreneurs (Giuliano, 2011).

Grievances within nationalist mobilisation are often in opposition to something, either the current political state of affairs, the state or an ‘other’. There must be a strong sense of grievance, resentment or dissatisfaction towards significant parts of their current situation as a collective group (Anderson, 2007; Giuliano, 2011). Group grievances often reflect social structures, historical events, and political and economic conditions (Giuliano, 2011). Political entrepreneurs, such as nationalist politicians, will use grievances to gain or sustain political power, using strategies such as blame avoidance and generating, and credit claiming (Béland & Lecours, 2018). Grievances are blamed on the central government, allowing nationalist politicians to avoid criticism and mobilise citizens within the ethnic group towards the increased autonomy or secession they are pursuing (Béland & Lecours, 2018).

This paper will focus on economic and political grievances, which are quite familiar in the world of traditional politics (Simon, Mommert & Reininger, 2018). A significant political grievance is dissatisfaction with democracy and political alienation. This can be defined as a prolonged sense of estrangement from the existing political institutions (Giuliano, 2011). This is often fed from a feeling of dissatisfaction and frustration with the central government. Yet, despite nationalism being credited to cultural identity and grievances by many, Béland and Lecours (2019) argue that economic grievances such as poverty and inequality can be

18 mobilised successfully by nationalist movements. Anger towards austerity since the 2008 recession has been a significant economic grievance tied to poverty and inequality (Giugni & Grasso, 2015; Worth, 2013). Austerity politics allows claims of economic victimisation towards the minority national community (Dalle Mulle & Serrano, 2019). Radicalisation of self-determination claims occur if there is a belief that economic policies are discriminating or hurting the interest of national communities, austerity can be a significant part of this (Béland and Lecours, 2019).

Grievances are an essential element within the propaganda of a nationalist movement (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012). Individual and group grievances formed in the present or from memories continue to stoke the flames of nationalism (Anderson, 2007). However, whilst they can account for decisions to make changes to the status quo, they cannot explain why some groups choose secessionism and others choose more conventional paths of grievance amendment such as electoral politics, civil war or pressure groups (Anderson, 2007).

2.1.4 Cleavages and Party Identification

This section will outline scholarship on social cleavages which impact Western democracies and party identification (Andersen & Heath, 2003). Cleavages divide members of communities and sub-communities into groups with important political differences (Rae & Taylor, 1970). These lines of division are where conflict can potentially exist. Social class, age, race, religion and gender are just a few of the different cleavages that can affect voting and political behaviour to varying degrees.

There is a wide range of literature detailing different types of cleavages. Rae and Taylor (1970) suggest three cleavage types: (1) opinion cleavages such as ideology, (2) ascriptive cleavages such as race, and (3) behavioural cleavages such as voting and organisation membership. Daalder (1966) prescribed to a more detailed set of divisions, insisting on five cleavages: (1) class interests, (2) religion, (3) geographical conflict, (4) nationality or nationalism, and (5) regime. They argued that the level of intensity along these cleavage lines allowed the creation of political conflict to manifest into differences and divergence between European countries (Daalder, 1966). Finally, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) put forward one of the most significant sets of divisions, reasoning that there are four significant cleavages which dominate Western

19 modern political systems: (1) centre versus periphery, (2) church versus state, (3) land versus industry, and (4) workers versus capitalists. They claimed these cleavages stemmed from the industrial and the democratic revolutions (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). This is similar to how modernists believe nationalism also stemmed from these revolutions.

Focusing on cleavages of an ideological nature, Andersen and Heath (2003) identify two main dimensions that feature in Western democracies; left and right attitudes, and liberal and conservative attitudes. The former refers to the role of the state in the economy with the left desiring more government intervention, welfare and social spending, and wealth redistribution, whilst the right want more individualistic free-market economic policies (Anderson & Heath, 2003). The latter pertains to views towards personal freedoms, associations and lifestyles. Liberals are more likely to be tolerant, while conservatives favour more traditional structures and values, disliking social change (Andersen & Heath 2003). These ideological dimensions can be seen as reflections of identities relating to social structures and group memberships such as social class (e.g. working-class citizens support more redistributive economic policies). Yet, if group interests are not clearly represented by a political party, they may vote on the basis of other identities (Andersen & Heath, 2003). For example, if a voter is more inclined to vote left-wing but the left-left-wing party is nationalist and they are not, they may vote for a right-left-wing party which opposes nationalism.

There has been contested debate over cleavage voting and its relevance. Inglehart and Flanagan (1987) argued that potential declines in cleavage voting to individual based voting is because of post-materialist values replacing more traditional ideological dimensions due to economic security in recent decades. Arguably, the correlation between socio-economic status and political beliefs between the left and right have become blurred (Dirk de Graaf & Evans, 2013). Cleavage patterns can alter as society changes (Rae & Taylor, 1970). However, often post-material issues are incorporated within the traditional framework of the two ideological dimensions, and then national issues exist within this. For example, the ‘SNP’ in Scotland and ‘Bloc Quebecois’ in Quebec both run nationalist agendas on social democratic platforms (Andersen & Heath, 2003; Dirk de Graaf & Evans, 2013).

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2.1.5 Power-Sharing and Autonomy

The final part of this section will examine scholarship on power-sharing arrangements, focusing on devolution and their role in civil conflict. Autonomy is a device to ‘allow ethnic or other groups that claim a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them’ whilst the state deals with powers that cover common interests (Ghai, 2000; p.484). It is constitutionally entrenched and can include federal models (e.g. Canada and Switzerland), and regional autonomy models such as devolution, the subject of this research, which includes countries such as Scotland in the UK and Hong Kong in China (Ghai, 2000). Autonomy has been used for accommodation of linguistic and ethnic diversity, such as in Quebec (Lecours, 2012). It is a compromise between the competing claims of the state and the nationalist group, facilitating a middle ground. It accommodates some self-determination within this, for example differences in bank notes, flags, and postal stamps (Ghai, 2000)

Gurr (2000) has argued that negotiated autonomy such as devolution has been an ‘effective antidote for ethnonational wars of secession’ (p.366). Although a change to the status quo, it is a tool for conflict reduction which promotes integration and provides a foundation for satisfactory interaction between the centre and the region which appeases both sides and enables them to live together (Ghai, 2000). However, devolution is driven by people of the autonomous region thinking of themselves more nationally than within the state (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009). Even though power-sharing and autonomy granting arrangements can reduce the chances of secession, they may increase the chances of ethnic groups mobilising (Lustick, Miodownik & Eidelson, 2004).

There is a large body of scholarship which doubts the effectiveness of power-sharing and autonomy. Ichijo (2012) argues that devolution is a ‘double-edged sword in the management of multiple national identities’ (p.35). Autonomy is feared because it is viewed as a ‘springboard to secession’ (Ghai, 2000; p.501). Devolution means acceptance that nationalism has been successful and can likely become a slippery slope (Curtice, 2001). The quasi-federal structure that devolution holds can make nationalist parties seem more legitimate, whilst exacerbating territorial conflicts which may have been previously successfully managed within the unitary state (Curtice, 2001). It can also bring into focus often ignored differences between groups within the unitary state (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012).

21 Another important point is that, with more distinctive political institutions developed as a part of devolution and power-sharing, people may come to feel more distinct in their national identity as well (Curtice, 2001). There is a possibility that setting up autonomous institutions can help citizens identify more with that ethnic group and nation (Bechhofer and McCrone, 2009). Cornell (2002), in particular, expressed little confidence that these power-sharing and autonomy structures eliminate or even mitigate conflict. They state that it is actually conducive to nationalism and secessionist arguments because it promotes a separate identity and increases the groups cohesion, as well as giving the group a platform and increased capacity to act within distinct political institutions (Cornell, 2002). In the long run, it may ‘augment rather than reduce the potential for ethnic conflict’ between the central government and the ethnic group/territory (Cornell, 2002; p.275).

2.2 Case Presentation

This section of the chapter will present a historical overview of Scottish nationalism and the case in current context, including the impact of the Brexit referendum result. There has been a wealth of scholarship and research dedicated to Scottish nationalism, specifically focusing on devolution and the 2014 referendum. Additionally, since the European Union ‘Brexit’ referendum there has been a renewed academic focus on English right-wing nationalism, populism and Euroscepticism. However, the impact of the recent Brexit referendum in 2016 on the support for Scottish nationalism is relatively under-explored, and this gap is what this research will cover. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) have been on the forefront of the anti-Brexit movement, and with Scotland voting in majority to remain, and England voting in majority to leave, it is an area that deserves exploring.

This section will start by contextualising the case of Scotland and its relationship to the Union, before examining the rise of Scottish nationalism in the 20th century. It will detail how this rise

coincided with the decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland and the consequences of Thatcherism. It will then explore devolution, and consequences of the 2014 referendum, situating the research question within the current context. It will present the case by examining the potential impact of the Brexit referendum and the renewed vigour in the fight for secessionism.

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2.2.1 Scotland and the Union

Scotland and England were joined in the ‘Treaty of Union’ in 1707, having been united under the same crown since 1603 (Marr, 2013). Before this, Scotland was an independent nation, with a unique history and heritage rooted in the Gaelic language and culture, clans, and famous struggles against the English, immortalising Scottish King Robert the Bruce and knight William Wallace (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012). Historical moments such as the Battle of Bannockburn and the Declaration of Arbroath are the foundations of the symbolism and mythology seen in elements of the Scottish nationalist movement today.

Since the beginning of the Union, there has been no effort on the part of the British state to impose uniformity in Scotland (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). While sovereignty is located in the Westminster Parliament, a vibrant and distinct civic society has continued within Scotland (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). It retains a different education system, a separate Church and a distinct judicial system (Mycock, 2012). Scottish institutions and features of life and society have been left alone, enabling citizens to enact Scottish ways of being (Paterson, 1994; Soule, Leith & Steven 2012). Therefore, Scotland has a long tradition of autonomy, and this has allowed Scottish national identity to exist in the United Kingdom (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014; Dalle Mulle, 2016).

2.2.2 The Rise of Scottish Nationalism

Nairn (1977) contends that Scotland was ‘too much of a nation, had too different a civil society, to become a mere province of the UK’ (p.146). The Scottish Nationalist Party (‘SNP’) was formed in 1934 yet stayed on the political fringe until the 1960s (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). Their breakthrough came in a ‘sensational’ by-election win by Winifred Ewing in November 1967 in Hamilton, Lanarkshire (Devine, 2012, p.574). This victory put the SNP on the map, winning one of the safest seats of the Labour electoral heartland (Devine, 2012). Success at the expense of traditional Labour left-wing votes is a pattern that has continued for the SNP. Labour rely on votes from Scotland and Wales to counter the strong Conservative vote share in England, but this is threatened by nationalism. After 1967 Scottish politics was never the same, as the SNP rivalled Labour in seats across Scotland (Devine, 2012). A vote for the SNP was regarded an act of protest, and a manifestation of Scottish discontent with the Westminster

23 government rather than commitment to secessionism (Devine, 2012). The SNP rise was seen as an effective way of drawing attention to grievances from Scottish constituents.

Additionally, this rise coincided with the decline of the empire, the aftermath of the Suez Crisis and growing hostility towards nuclear weapons being placed on the river Clyde in Glasgow (Devine, 2012). Jackson (2014b) argues that Scotland had benefited from the Union as the junior partner in the British imperial project, whilst being afforded a high degree of autonomy with distinctive institutions and culture. However, the decline of the empire meant that Britain was a less prosperous Union. The crises of the 1960s and 70s left Britain far behind other countries, and ‘as the ship of British imperialism began to list after the Second World War, it was only rational for the Scots to make for the lifeboats’ (Jackson, 2014b, p.51). The correlation is between post-war economic decline and the SNP’s growth into a mainstream party is evident (Pittock, 2008).

2.2.3 Thatcherism and the Conservative Party

The rise of the SNP coincided with another major change in the landscape of Scottish politics, the decline of the Conservative Party. It had always been a ‘powerful vehicle north of the border for expression of British patriotism’ (Devine, 2012; p.578). They had been successful in reaching beyond the middle-class to sections of the working-class as a symbol of unionism, Protestantism and imperialism. However, with the empire fading, as well as the ebbing influence of the kirk and economic crisis, they became depicted as a remote out of touch elite (Devine, 2012). Meanwhile, the discovery of oil in Scotland gave nationalism new credibility to show that Scotland could survive on its own.

The most significant factor in the decline of the Conservative party in Scotland was the leadership of Margaret Thatcher (Marr, 2013; Devine, 2012; Leith & Steven, 2010). There is an agreement within the literature that Thatcher and her government polarised the political climate between Scotland and England. Thompson (2019) goes further, stating Thatcher openly pressed the political differences between the two nations that were bubbling at the surface.

The Heath Conservative government before Thatcher had begun a radical assault on the post-war consensus of interventionist economic policies, including crushing the trade unions,

24 cracking down on welfare provision, and abandoning struggling industries in favour of increased economic competition (Devine, 2012). Thatcher intensified these policies in a fashion that was catastrophic for whole sectors of Scotland (Devine, 2012; Marr, 2013). Between 1979 and 1987, manufacturing in Scotland lost a fifth of jobs and 11% of output (Devine, 2012). Whilst manufacturing capacity took a hit across the UK, especially the north of England and Wales, Scotland was hurt the most, losing over 30% (Devine, 2012). Unemployment rose sharply as the traditional pillars of Scottish industry, such as shipbuilding and textiles, disintegrated. These industries had been the main stalwarts of the Scottish economy and many citizen’s livelihoods. Additionally, Thatcher launched the infamous poll tax, which was regarded as an uncaring out-of-touch ‘imposition by an alien government’ (Johns & Mitchell, 2016; p.174). There became a growing divergence between the politics of Scotland and England as deprivation, social exclusion and poverty became embedded within modern Scottish society (Marr, 2013; Paterson, 2015).

These policies gave the impression that the Conservative Party were attacking Scottish society itself (Thompson, 2019). Thatcher’s governments were accused of having little sympathy for Scotland, and only caring about the southern and middle regions of England where they had electoral success (Devine, 2012). Thatcher was widely loathed and accused of being anti-Scottish (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). The Conservatives have been tainted with this since, punished in subsequent General Elections (Anderson, 2016). They are often perceived as an English party which lacks political legitimacy in Scotland (Jackson, 2014a; Thompson, 2019). This lack of legitimacy has continued to form the heart of the current constitutional question (Thompson, 2019).

The SNP exploited hatred of Thatcher to create a new unifying force, contrasting a Scottish compassionate society with a desire for a social democratic agenda, and the neoliberal conservativism embodied by Thatcherism that is still present within the Conservative party and England today (Johns & Mitchell, 2016). These experiences also injected left-wing politics into Scottish nationalist thinking (Gall, 2005; Jackson, 2014a). To understand Scottish nationalism, it is important to understand the desire that secessionism is, in elements, focused on freeing Scotland from the ‘neoliberal shackles imposed by the need to win over English voters’ (Jackson, 2014b; p.53). The dominant political mood in Scotland favours principles of a strong state and welfare system (Marr, 2013). Nationalism is less based on emotional symbolism, but

25 instead on a preference for left-wing and pro-welfare social democratic policy (Marr, 2013; Gall, 2005). The SNP argues that it promotes a civic, territorial, non-ethicized nationalism with what they say are ‘Scottish values’ such as decency, equality and humanity, at the forefront (Keating, 2009; Mycock, 2012).

2.2.4 Devolution

Within the Scottish nationalist movement there are two significant factions; fundamentalists and gradualists (Johns & Mitchell, 2016). Gradualism has proved more successful, with the SNP fighting for increased autonomy over time, asking for more powers in stages until it has support for independence (Dalle Mulle, 2016). After their success in the 1970s, nationalists were granted a referendum on ‘Home Rule’ in 1979, which fell short of meeting the threshold of 40% of registered voters needed (Devine, 2012). This was blamed on the fact that citizens were more concerned about the economic situation than constitutional reform (Devine, 2012). However, in 1997 a second referendum was granted in which Scots voted overwhelmingly in support of devolution in the form of a Scottish Parliament (Johns & Mitchell, 2016). Arguably, memories of the Thatcher government and political grievances were successfully exploited by nationalists to win this referendum (Devine, 2012; Dalle Mulle, 2016; Marr, 2013).

The Scottish Parliament (or ‘Holyrood’) is built in Edinburgh outside the Holyrood Palace and was opened by the Queen in a clear message that power still rested with the British state (Marr, 2013). However, it is arguably designed in criticism of the Westminster Parliament. Westminster has two chambers with opposing sides, based on adversary politics with the politicians elected under a ‘First Past The Post’ (FPTP) system. Holyrood is elected through proportional representation and FPTP, allowing smaller parties to gain seats. Committees hold more power and voting is done electronically, additionally it is shaped in a semi-circle to promote consensus. Funding available to Holyrood is allocated from the state through the Barnett formula (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). There is no obligation for the Scottish government to fund services according to money allocation, which has led to policy divergence such as high tuition fees for university in England and no tuition fees in Scotland (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014).

By design, it was expected that no party could win a majority, instead there would be coalitions and minority governments. It was presumed that Labour and the Liberal Democrats would

26 likely be the governing parties, and it would prevent the SNP from getting a majority (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). For the first two parliamentary terms this happened, however in 2007 the SNP took the reigns as a minority government after becoming serious threat under the leadership of Alex Salmond (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012). Labour were accused of being too London-centric and the unpopularity of the Iraq war was exploited by the SNP (Ritchie, 2017; Leith & Steven, 2010).

In the 2011 Scottish Parliament election, the SNP won a historic majority, something thought to be an impossibility. Whether this was down to support for independence was another question, the SNP had proved themselves to be competent in government and showed a desire to stand up for Scotland in disagreements with the London central government (Johns & Mitchell, 2016). Their time in Holyrood gave them a platform to show that they were a legitimate centre-left party (Johns & Mitchell, 2016), whilst Scottish civil society and media increasingly ‘facilitated a distinctly national conversation’ (Mycock, 2012, p.55; Rosie & Petersoo, 2009). This impossible majority meant that a referendum on independence had a mandate (Thompson, 2019; Ritchie, 2017).

2.2.5 The Independence Referendum and Aftermath

The independence referendum took place in 2014 on the anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn (Marr, 2013). With a turnout of over 84% it was a huge political event, with 16/17-year olds allowed to vote (Henderson et al, 2017). It was split into two sides; ‘Yes’, represented by the SNP, and ‘Better Together’ (‘No’), made up of a combination of the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats (Paterson, 2015). In the end, Scotland voted remain in the Union, with 55% voting no, but it was a substantially tighter result than expected (Thompson, 2019; Ritchie, 2017). Although Better Together won the day, the feeling was that the Yes campaign had outmanoeuvred them (Marr, 2013; Harvey, 2020).

The economy was a significant issue of division, with Better Together nicknamed ‘Project Fear’ because of their perceived scaremongering around Scotland’s ability to survive if it left the Union’s economic security (Paterson, 2015). A significant part of this security was the UK’s EU membership, and if Scotland voted for Independence there would be no guarantee they would be allowed to re-join the EU (Thompson, 2019). On the ‘Yes’ side, the notion of

27 democratic deficit was regularly raised, the SNP argued that Scotland was being governed against its will, citing austerity and economic privatisation as examples (Thompson, 2019). The Yes campaign picked up most of its support from left-leaning voters, arguing on behalf of a civic nationalism, wanting to give Scotland democratic self-determination (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Thompson, 2019)

The independence referendum shook up British politics by rocking the constitutional boat to the point of capsize (Johns & Mitchell, 2016). The secessionist question was far from over. In the 2010 General Election the SNP had just under 20% of the vote in Scotland, in the 2015 General Election the SNP won 50% of the vote (Ritchie, 2017) The heightened salience of the referendum spilled over into this election encouraging many who had not supported the SNP previously, or even voted previously, to do so (Henderson & Mitchell, 2018; McHarg et al, 2016). The SNP swept away opposition in Scotland, with a landslide victory (Ritchie, 2017). They went from being:

‘a marginal force often ridiculed, patronised, and caricatured by opponents to a force

which is both respected and feared, and which has defined and reshaped Scottish politics, brought the Scottish dimension centre stage and forced other political parties to respond on their terms’ (Hassan, 2009; p.1)

The biggest casualties of the post-independence referendum earthquake were the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats. The Labour Party suffered the most, credibility tainted by sharing a platform with the Conservative Party in the referendum (Harvey, 2020; Ritchie, 2017). They were accused of being complacent and arrogant over their support in Scotland, whilst being unclear on their stance to the constitutional question (Johns & Mitchell, 2016; Anderson, 2016). Even the promise of a manifesto rooted in traditional left-wing values from leader Kezia Dugdale could not prevent their unpopularity leading to electoral Armageddon in Scotland (Anderson, 2016). As for the Liberal Democrats, as soon as they accepted the ‘poisoned chalice’ of coalition with the Conservatives, their support and popularity has plummeted (Anderson, 2016; p.560). As seen in Figure 2.1, it is clear how much the electoral map changed in the 2015 election. In a stunning set of results, Labour and the Liberal Democrats lost a combined 50 seats to the SNP, keeping only one MP each. In both the 2017 and 2019 General Elections the SNP kept their majority, however the Scottish Conservatives have made small

28 gains due to their stance as the only strong party on the Union (Anderson, 2016; Thompson, 2019; Harvey, 2020).

Figure 2. 1 Comparison of 2010 and 2015 General Election results in Scotland (The Irish Times, 2015)

2.2.6 Brexit and the Current Situation

Just when the British government thought one big constitutional question was put to bed, another arose. A rising Euroscepticism and English nationalism had been putting pressure on the government to hold a referendum on EU membership, led by UKIP and political entrepreneur/former banker, Nigel Farage (Henderson et al, 2017). UKIP was siphoning off votes from the main political parties, however they posed the greatest threat to the Conservative Party. In an attempt to nullify this threat, the Cameron-led government allowed a referendum on EU membership in 2016. The campaign was dominated with rhetoric on English nationalism and British patriotism (Henderson et al, 2016). In Scotland, UKIP gained low levels of electoral support (Henderson et al, 2017) and when Farage did visit, he was regularly abused and protested against, even being called a Nazi by some (Marr, 2013). Yet, in a result that sent shockwaves across the world, Britain voted to leave, by a slim margin of 52% to 48%, (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). Britain finally left the EU in 2020, after years of failed and chaotic negotiations under Conservative governments, gridlock in Westminster, and two fiercely

29 contested elections which have split the United Kingdom apart between leave and remain, left and right-wing, and between the four nations (Harvey, 2020).

The UK on the whole was a Brexit marginal, however, whilst England and Wales voted to leave, Scotland voted over 62% to remain and Northern Ireland nearly 56% to remain (Henderson et al, 2016; McHarg & Mitchell, 2017). Additionally, every single council in Scotland brought back a remain vote (BBC, 2016). In the independence referendum, the topic of EU membership was utilised by the Better Together campaign to argue why Scotland should stay in the UK. Without this membership, the unionist side has a weaker campaign and is accused of broken promises (Thompson, 2019). The argument of stability is also weaker, considering the economic battering the UK has endured since the Brexit referendum, combining with a decade of austerity measures (Harvey, 2020; Thompson, 2019).

The SNP have positioned themselves against Brexit, arguing that there is a democratic deficit and Scotland is being governed against its will (Whigham, 2019). They argue that Brexit is an example of how England and Scotland are on diverging paths, with different political identities and interests (Thompson, 2019). Brexit is just the flagship example of a wider set of political grievances where Scotland doesn’t get what it has voted for (Thompson, 2019). Additionally, for the SNP, the desire for an independent Scotland to be a member of the European Union is central to their nationalism (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). Since the 1988 campaign policy ‘Independence in Europe’, it is evident that the SNP sees Europe as a way for Scotland to survive on its own, and potentially decrease economic reliance on Britain (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014; Ichijo, 2009; Mycock, 2012).

While not all Scottish constituents voted to remain, as fishing communities made up a large Eurosceptic bloc, there is substantial evidence to support this democratic deficit argument using Brexit (McAngus, 2018). This is combined with the re-election of Conservative right-wing governments in the UK, whilst Scotland has consistently voted for political parties that support a more left-wing social democratic agenda (Whigham, 2019). In particular, the leadership of Brexiteer Boris Johnson, a figure of contempt in Scottish politics, is a sore spot for many after his election as Prime Minister on a platform of ‘Get Brexit Done’ (Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley, 2017; Harvey, 2020). The SNP said they would only seek a second referendum if something significant changed, Brexit represents this. It is evident Scottish

30 nationalism has renewed momentum since the Brexit referendum, with Holyrood passing a vote for a second independence referendum in 2017 (Thompson, 2019), and in January 2020 the first poll on Independence with ‘Yes’ in the lead since late 2014 was released (Curtis, 2020).

This all comes together to justify the research question this paper will address: ‘Has the Brexit

referendum led to greater support for Scottish independence?’. This question will attempt to

understand the impact of Brexit on the independence movement within Scotland, as well as identify reasons why the two nations voted in such different ways. It will also detail potential other reasons for secessionism which may have become increasingly salient.

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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

In order to examine the impact of Brexit on support for Scottish independence, this paper will use Social Identity Theory (SIT) and political grievances to build its argument and discussion. These will be used to explore two significant dimensions which surround nationalism; identity and interests. SIT has been used by academics to understand group conflict and will be central to understanding factors that explain the research question. However, as previously pointed out, identity can be a weak indicator of constitutional preferences. Therefore, it is important to also explore the political grievances which are fundamental when arguing about differences in interest and identity between two nations. This chapter will first explain SIT, before arguing how it can be applied to the case of Scottish nationalism and Brexit. It will then re-present political grievances, as seen in the literature, before reflecting how this can be used to explain the research question. Finally, this chapter will end on a presentation of the hypotheses that will be tested as part of this paper.

3.1 Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory (SIT) is a popular framework, developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979 to examine inter-group conflicts and understand biases, prejudice, stereotyping, and group grievances. The theory covers three significant components; social identification, social comparison and social categorisation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social identity refers to how individual’s conception of self is based on membership to groups which they categorise themselves in, SIT addresses how these identities influence individual’s behaviours and attitudes between groups (Mangum and Block, 2018; Turner & Oakes, 1986). Stets and Burke (2000) state that social groups are a ‘set of individuals who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the same social category’ (p.225). Those who are categorised with the individual are the ingroup, and those in a different category are the outgroup (Stets & Burke, 2000). Examples of these groups can be based on citizenship, ethnicity, social class or religion, to name a few.

Tajfel (1981) splits social identity into two dimensions: the belief that an individual belongs to a group, and the significance of the group’s membership to an individual’s self. Hogg and Reid (2006) argues that individuals categorise themselves in different social groups to build their

32 own identity, with attributes such as values, perceptions, norms and behaviours. Categorisation relies on an already named and classified world (Stets & Burke, 2000). The salient attributes within a state can determine these social categories, for example, religion in Ireland, race in America, or language in Belgium. These classifications are parts of a structured society and exist ‘only in relation to other contrasting categories’, for example black versus white skin colour (Stets & Burke, 2000, p.225; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Intergroup behaviour is related to these categorisations.

One of the key processes touched upon within SIT is social comparison in the form of intergroup biases, such as how an individual evaluates their ingroup to an outgroup. When an individual identifies with a group, it becomes part of their collective self-conception (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If there is a feeling that their status as a group is low or discriminated against, the collective may protest to correct perceived injustices and improve the status of the group (Abrams et al, 2019). Strong identification with a group can act as a barrier to prevent members from leaving, even when ingroup status is perceived to be low (Abrams & Grant, 2012). Vignoles et al (2006) argued there are different types of motivations behind identity; self-esteem, efficacy, belonging, distinctiveness and meaning. When these motivations are satisfied by a social identity, they become central to an individual’s sense of self, and affect their daily attitudes and behaviours (Vignoles et al, 2006)

Individuals think more positively about the group they identify with, and more negatively about groups they consider outgroups. Positive distinctiveness comes from these social comparisons (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A positive social identity is achieved by comparing an individual’s ingroup favourably to an outgroup (Bond & Hewstone, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT reasons that positive distinctiveness is the base for ingroup bias and desire to improve collective or individual status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

SIT argues that social comparisons between ingroups and outgroups are central to the value and meaning of their group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Ingroup favouritism can result in prejudice and stereotyping (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). The process of social identification and categorisation itself can encourage distinguishable characteristics, which may enhance stereotypical perceptions between an ingroup the individual belongs to and an outgroup (Tajfel, 1978). An example could be that Americans are portrayed as arrogant, superficial, and culturally unaware, whilst Canadians are portrayed as nice, friendly and

33 welcoming. Membership of a group can influence the behaviour of an individual and shape their identity, by encouraging individuals to match themselves and become similar with other members of their group (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Identity-based politics and group relations can simplify society, which in turn emphasises potential cleavages and differences between groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, identity is one of the lines of division that bubbles to the surface in times of inter-group conflict, and this group identification and categorisation can benefit nationalist movements (Tyrrell, 1996).

3.2 Scottish Nationalism and Brexit: Social Identity Theory

As seen above, SIT has proved a prevalent way of analysing identity and group relations. This paper will focus specifically on national identity, with the ingroup being those who identify with being Scottish and the outgroup being the British other, which is often used as a surrogate for English because of their domination of the Union. SIT is crucial to helping explain the growth of Scottish nationalism, and how Brexit has helped to exacerbate stereotypes towards British/English identity, and the development of a positive distinctive Scottish identity.

The United Kingdom is currently going through a period of heightened awareness over national identity (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009). The SNP strongly appeal to Scottish identity, especially juxtaposed to negative stereotypes of British/English political identity (Abrams et al, 2019). Ritchie (2017) argues that a distinct national identity is fundamental to secessionist claims, and that the SNP have taken great care in their development of Scottish national identity as a civic, liberal and inclusive outward-looking form of nationalism. Scottish nationalists want an independent Scotland to achieve a more egalitarian society (Jackson, 2014b). Even internationally, the SNP has attempted to build a conception of national identity to differentiate Scotland from the Union, with a positive vision of Scotland as a progressive nation committed to peace and nuclear disarmament, setting them apart from Westminster (Ritchie, 2017).

There has always been a strong national identity in Scotland, and a sense of a distinct community (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014). Additionally, Scots tend to hold dual identities between Britishness and Scottishness (Soule, Leith & Steven, 2012), however there is increasing contestation of Britishness, complicating ingroup and outgroup identity (Ichijo, 2012). Aughey (2010) argues that British identity is artificial and invented, therefore lacking the same substance for national identity, and it has become secondary in Scotland. England