Renaturalizing Humanist Spiritual Counselling
Nanni Kuling Date: 01-03-2018 Master’s Thesis
Summary of Master’s thesis, submitted 01-03-2018: Renaturalizing humanist spiritual counselling
Nanni Kuling, Humanistic Studies, University for Humanistic studies
In this thesis, I propose a renaturalization of humanist spiritual counselling through Spinoza’s naturalism. I argue that humanism faces problems concerning its anthropology. The
anthropocentric character of humanism together with the ecological crisis creates a conceptual helplessness within humanism as a worldview that humanists want to overcome. This problem is linked to humanist anthropology not being fully explicated. Humanists do not want to propose universal principles. This creates a weak foundation for its worldview and core values. Part of viewing human beings as standing at the centre of the world is that they are equipped with exclusively human features: rationality, consciousness and autonomy are viewed as part of human nature. Because of the special place it assigns to human beings, humanist anthropology shows traits of rationalism, a one-sided focus on consciousness, anthropocentrism and individualism. I argue that because of these problems, humanism falls short as a source for inspiration, exploring or deepening perspectives or visions. This is problematic because humanist spiritual counsellors focus precisely on these elements within their counselling practice. They support clients in finding inspiration, meaning and
articulating their worldview.
Reflecting on the humanist anthropological presuppositions through Spinoza’s
naturalism could be of value for humanist spiritual counselling, as it provides perspectives on how to surpass the problems humanist anthropology faces. By proposing a world in which God, Nature and substance are one and everything exists and acts by virtue of the natural laws of cause and effect, human beings are positioned amongst non-human beings. This can be understood as the renaturalization of human beings: the strategic reversal of human exceptionalism.
Renaturalizing the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling through Spinoza’s naturalism implies that humanist spiritual counselling 1) can work with not only rationality but also corporeality as an opening to one’s spiritual life; 2) cannot
presuppose the client to be self-aware but can support the client to self-awareness; 3) can support the client to feel part of the totality of nature and find inspiration within this experience; and 4) can work with influence instead of protecting the client against it.
counsellors to surpass the problems within humanist anthropology and to use Spinoza’s naturalism in order to further improve humanism and humanist spiritual counselling. Acknowledgments
This thesis is the jewel of my Master’s Humanistic Studies. It forms a closing chapter of six and a half years of life changing studies. Special thanks go out to Colombia, the country where half of the thesis has been written, where – in Spinoza’s terms – I was affected by so many new natural and cultural beauty and by special individuals.
I am grateful to my assessor Hanne Laceulle, who supported me in using everything I got to come to this final version. Moreover, I thank Hielke Bosma and Lex van den Oever for their feedback. Lastly, I thank my friends and family who gave me silence when I needed it and who gave me empowering joy when I needed it most.
To D.
For if (…) two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly.
Contents
1. Introduction 8
1.1 Blind spots within humanist anthropology 10
1.2 Humanist spiritual counselling 11
1.3 Spinoza’s naturalism and its value for humanism 12
1.4 Research aim 14
1.5 Research design 16
2. The anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling 21
2.1 Humanist ontology 21
2.2 The humanist anthropological presuppositions 22
2.2.1 Existential freedom 22
2.2.2 Self-actualization 23
2.2.3 Self-awareness 24
2.2.4 Rationality 24
2.2.5 Moral awareness and individual responsibility 25
2.2.6 Autonomy and interrelation 26
2.2.7 Uniqueness 28
2.3 The blind spots within humanist anthropology and humanist spiritual counselling 29
2.4 Humanist anthropology 33
3. Spinoza's naturalism 37
3.1 Contextualisation 37
3.2 The foundational concepts of Spinoza’s naturalism 39
3.2.1 God or Nature 39
3.2.2 Parallelism 40
3.2.3 Conatus and Affect 41
3.3 Implications of Spinoza’s naturalism 43
3.3.1 We think and feel in interrelation 43
3.3.2 We do not control our tongues 45
3.4 Reason over passions 45
3.4.1 Passions 46
3.4.2 Imagination, rational and intuitive thought 47
3.4.3 Aiming for rational and intuitive knowledge 49
3.5.1 Freedom in determination 49
3.5.2 Amor intellectualis Dei 51
3.6 Spinoza’s naturalism: cosmology, ontology and anthropology 54
4. Synthesis 56
4.1 Parallelism 56
4.2 Human beings are initially unaware 57
4.3 Human beings are inside nature 59
4.4 Human beings are interrelated with all beings 61
4.5 Renaturalizing the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling 63
5. Conclusion 66
6. Discussion 69
References 72
1. Introduction
Humanism is accused of anthropocentrism (Kunneman, 2005). It not only wears an anthropocentric name but also places human beings at the centre of the world and views human beings as the measure of all things – also of their own spiritual life (Kunneman, 2005; Wissenburg, 2007). Human beings are eulogized as being rational, conscious and
autonomous, which causes blind spots within humanist anthropology (Kunneman, 2005; Schuhmann, 2015). Wissenburg (2007) states that in order to understand ourselves, to accept our freedom, to be autonomous and responsible – all core values of humanism – we have to understand our relation with, and our place within nature. Getting a clear view on our relation with, and our place within nature becomes more pressing against the background of the current ecological crisis. Moreover, questions are raised concerning the desirability of the anthropocentric character of humanism, within and outside humanist circles (Manschot, 2010; Wissenburg, 2007). Another question that rises is whether this characterisation of humanism is still accurate compared with present-day humanists (Bolsenbroek, 2008, pp. 53-57). In short: the anthropocentric character of humanism together with the ecological crisis creates a conceptual helplessness within humanism as a worldview that humanists want to overcome (Kunneman, 2005, 2017; Manchschot, 2005, 2010, 2016; Nussbaum, 2011; Wissenburg, 2005).
Reflecting on and possibly resolving the problems within humanist anthropology is important for the humanist practice called humanist spiritual counselling. This practice is developed by the Dutch Humanist Association. One of its principal duties is to guarantee that the humanist worldview really forms the foundation upon which the counselling practice of humanist spiritual counsellors is built (Bolsenbroek, 2008). The unfortunate reality is that humanist spiritual counsellors often cannot find sufficient inspiration and identification within humanism as articulated by the Dutch Humanist Association. Because humanist spiritual counselling is focussed on supporting the client towards finding inspiration, experiencing meaning and developing a worldview, humanist spiritual counsellors need a source for exploring or deepening perspectives or visions and cannot find this in humanism (HV, 2012, p. 19; Van IJssel, 2007). This is related to the problems within humanist anthropology, which express a bigger problem. Humanists do not want to propose foundational thoughts, because they argue that universal statements are always contextual (Derkx, 2011). As a result
an individual level, foundational presuppositions about human beings, world and cosmos do exist (Elders, 1999, p. 11). With humanism falling short in this perspective, humanist spiritual counsellors have to turn to other sources for inspiration, identification and exploration. The overarching objective of this thesis is to formulate a clear anthropology. For this, I turn to Spinoza.
Spinoza is included in the Dutch Humanist Canon1 – a gathering of works that is viewed as being part of the creation of Dutch humanism. The Canon focusses on Spinoza’s rationalism, stating that his Ethics is a disciplined exercise in reason, which is a particular interpretation of Ethics. His concept of ‘naturalism’, however, is not mentioned, while in my opinion this part of his philosophy could be the most important contribution to humanist thought.
In Ethics Spinoza proposes a naturalism that explains the place of human beings within, and their relation to nature. He states that human beings, like the rest of nature, operate according to the same universal rules of cause and effect (Elwes, 2009). I call Spinoza’s philosophical system naturalism, for naturalism is the philosophical belief that everything arises from natural properties and causes, that ethical statements can be derived from non-ethical ones, like the laws of nature, and that supernatural or spiritual explanations are excluded or discounted.2 Thereby, Spinoza’s naturalism is a strategic reversal of human exceptionalism (Sharp, 2011). And so, Spinoza’s naturalism could be of value to humanism by providing it with a clear ontology, anthropology and a view on how to understand the relation with, and the place of human beings in nature. In doing so, the problems within humanist anthropology could be surpassed. The research aim of this thesis is to articulate a renaturalization of the anthropological presuppositions underlying humanist spiritual counselling through Spinoza’s naturalism.
In order for me to succeed at this aim, I will first discuss in more length that humanist anthropology focusses on rationality, consciousness, freedom from natural law, autonomy and independence, which causes blind spots within humanist anthropology. These blind spots are the focal point of this thesis. Afterwards, I briefly introduce humanist spiritual counselling. Lastly, I argue less condensed why Spinoza’s naturalism could be of value for humanism.
1 The Dutch Humanist Canon gives an overview of humanism: its origin, its different trends, its development in history and its actuality (www.humanistischecanon.nl).
1.1 Blind spots within humanist anthropology
According to Ten Kate (2016), humanism originates from the time in which the monotheistic religions came into existence. These monotheistic religions replaced polytheistic religions wherein everything that happens is explained through the presence of hundreds of gods. Ten Kate (2016) argues that when monotheistic religions came around, these gods disappeared and made room for one almighty God. This God was not acting within the human world, like the previous gods; he was not the sun, the rain, the storm, nor the night. He withdrew from the human world and left a space to fill: a space within which human beings received freedom to develop themselves on earth, but simultaneously a space in which human beings could lose themselves. Along with the withdrawal of God, the world – and nature – lost its mythical, godly foundation and became ‘empty’. Within this emptiness, human beings, mighty yet insecure, questioned: what is this world and who am I? According to Ten Kate, with the rise of these questions, humanism was born (2016). Within this humanist world, human beings feel no longer subjected to nature. Instead, nature is subjected to them (Ten Kate, 2016).
But since the end of the twentieth century, humanism has been exposed to heavy criticism on just this anthropocentric relation to nature (Kunneman, 2005). From this critique, Kunneman (2005) – an influential philosopher in the field of Dutch humanism – distils three blind spots within humanism as a worldview. Firstly, humanism views human beings as rational beings, capable of critical thought. This is reflected in the focus on culture, ‘spirit’ and dialogical development, by which humanism tends to neglect human corporeality. Secondly, humanism ascribes consciousness to human beings, revealed in emphasising moral awareness, reflection, dialogical competency, reason and empathy (Kunneman, 2005, p. 204). This view on man is not representative for human beings as the possibility to strive towards self-development along the lines of reason and dialogical competency are not a given; this possibility is socially unevenly distributed. Thirdly, human beings are viewed as free from natural law. They have the freedom to shape (their own) existence while nature is subjected to natural law and (the use of) human beings. This creates a dichotomy between nature and human beings and accounts for an anthropocentric worldview (Kunneman, 2005, p. 206, also: Manschot, 2010, 2016). Fourthly, Schuhmann (2015b) identifies another blind spot within humanism. Human beings are viewed as unique and ends-in-themselves. This is reflected in emphasising autonomy and independence and the tendency to neglect the importance of human interrelatedness (Schuhmann, 2015b).
Recent humanist thinkers try to overthrow the conviction that human beings stand at the centre of the world, as supreme beings. For example, Manschot (2016) searches for a new
ecological ethic with the motto ‘remain faithful to the earth’ which originates from Nietzsche, stating that we have to keep in mind our planetary responsibility. Kunneman (2017) points at the work of biologist Frans de Waal to emphasize that intelligence, empathy and philanthropy are no exclusively human traits. Nussbaum (2011) advocates a cosmopolitan humanism in which animals are seen as ends-in-themselves as well. These efforts form hopeful responses to the anthropocentric character of humanism, but the question remains whether these efforts accomplish to surpass the view that human beings are supreme beings. As, in a way,
Kunneman and Nussbaum argue that human beings are not the only special creatures in nature and Manschot argues that human beings are special to such a degree that they are even responsible for (the rest of) nature.
In this section I explained that in a way anthropocentrism lies at the start of humanism: Ten Kate (2016) argues that humanism came into being when humanity started to believe that God is not part of the earth. In turn, this lead to human beings thinking of themselves as almighty and free on earth, and of nature as empty of godly spirits. From this
anthropocentrism, Kunneman (2005) identifies three blind spots within humanism as a worldview that follow from the one-sided focus on human beings as rational, conscious and free from natural law. Schuhmann (2015a) identifies a fourth that follows from the one-sided focus on human beings as autonomous and independent. In light of the ecological crisis and the post-modern times in which we live, the anthropocentric character of humanism becomes more pressing. In spite of attempts to surpass this anthropocentrism, the question remains how we can develop a present-day humanism in which human beings are viewed as inhabitants of the earth. According to Manschot, humanism has to explicitly adjust its anthropocentric presuppositions (2005, p. 11). But after such an adjustment, can we still call it human-ism and what are the effects of such a shift on humanist spiritual counselling as ‘humanism in
practice’ (Robbesom, 2017)?
1.2 Humanist spiritual counselling
Within the socio-religious compartmentalization of Dutch society, humanist spiritual counselling3 formed an alternative to religious pastoral counselling, provided in Dutch state 3 Although the term humanistic spiritual care is the more literal translation of the Dutch humanist practice I refer to, I choose humanist spiritual counselling. The term humanistic is changed into humanist, because the first term refers to a specific psychological movement with Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers as key figures. Humanist spiritual counselling, as practiced in the Netherlands, enhances much more than only this specific psychological movement (Schuhmann, 2015a). Although pastoral care is used in English literature for naming the overall practice of pastoral care, regardless of world-view or religion, I use the word ‘spiritual’, as the term
institutions like the military, hospitals, psychiatry and prisons (Kunneman, 2017; Van Praag, 1953, 1996). Humanist spiritual counsellors support clients in dealing with and reflecting on existential questions and conditions which are often provoked by residing or working in the above-mentioned institutions. This kind of counselling does not solve problems on the basis of an objective standard; it focusses on how to bear human hardships such as guilt, illness, loneliness and death. The aim of this counselling practice is to encourage a reflective dialogue on values, thoughts and practices, in order to explore, expand and solidify the clients’
personal worldview through which one can find meaning, purpose and orientation, acceptance and closure to deal with one’s own situation (Van Praag, 1953). Counsellors approach their clients in a sphere of safety and empathy and aim at activating meaning-making4 processes, orientation and self-determination. In this approach, humanist spiritual counsellors depart from and subscribe to the underlying humanist anthropology (HV, 2012, p. 4; Jorna, 2014; Van Praag, 1996). This suggests that humanist spiritual counselling reflects the blind spots present within humanist anthropology. This will be addressed in chapter two.
Now let us focus on why and how Spinoza’s naturalism could be of value in surpassing the blind spots that follow from the anthropocentric character of humanist anthropology.
1.3 Spinoza’s naturalism and its value for humanism
Spinoza (1632-1677) outlines a comprehensive worldview within his work Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. It comprises a clear cosmology, ontology and anthropology, through which the place of human beings within, and their relation to nature is explained. Spinoza has an extremely naturalistic view on God, the world, human beings and knowledge (Nadler, 2016). His philosophical system contradicts the view that human beings operate according to uniquely human laws and norms by which human beings have absolute power over their actions, and that they are determined only by themselves (Suchtelen, 2008, p. 125).
He proposes a naturalism, according to which everything is nature, and nothing is outside of nature. Everything exists in a community of universal interaction; each being acts upon every other being and is, in turn, acted upon by every other being. Human beings operate according to the same rules of cause and effect as does the rest of nature. This means counsellor) is the knowledgeable expert of her life, as will be clarified later on.
4 The term ‘meaning’ refers to coherence. Van Praag (1996) states that ‘meaninglessness’ is incoherence and pointlessness; it is the absurd. As the opposite, meaning can be understood as coherence and organization. Meaning-making refers to the humanist idea that there is no obvious meaning that presents itself to us. We have to actively search for it, create it (Van Praag, 1996).
that they differ only gradually from other beings and need to be influenced by many diverse powers in order to act and blossom (Koistinen, 2009; Sharp, 2011). As his naturalism advocates an existence in the awareness of oneness with the whole of nature, Spinoza’s naturalism can be of value for humanism in proposing a view on the relation of human beings with and their place within nature. It may offer answers to the anthropocentric character of humanism and answers to the blind spots within humanist anthropology.
Hasana Sharp is a researcher in the field of the history of political philosophy with a focus on Spinoza. In her work ‘Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization’ she examines the implications of Spinoza’s denial of human exceptionalism for politics and ethics, also taking into consideration recent arguments of feminist and race theory. According to Sharp (2011), Spinoza is engaged in a strategic reversal of the particular form of spiritualization gaining momentum in his own time. This spiritualization advocated that the mind has a free will which operates in an entirely different way than does the body (Sharp, 2011, p. 23). Sharp uses the concept of renaturalization to define this process of strategic reversal. I examine the possibility of redefining the anthropological presuppositions underlying humanist spiritual counselling in order to surpass its anthropocentrism and the blind spots related to it. Therefore, using the concept of renaturalization seems suitable for the aim of this thesis.
Humanism and Spinoza’s God and Nature
Spinoza’s naturalism proposes the existence of a God. Humanism does not presuppose the existence of a God and lots of humanists are hesitant to mix humanism with the idea of a God – for the core values of humanism like self-determination, responsibility and autonomy have to be protected. Although there needs to be room within humanist spiritual counselling for religious interpretations of reality, it is crucial for humanism that the fate of human beings does not lie in the hands of a God (Van Praag, 1996). I argue that Spinoza’s notion of God is not problematic for humanism for two reasons.
Firstly, we have to put Spinoza’s image of God in its historic context. I argue that Spinoza needed to refer to a God within his philosophy in order to be understood by his Jewish and Christian contemporaries – and not be exiled or worse. His immanent and amoral God was already way too revolutionary for his time (Naess, 1993). In applying Spinoza’s naturalism to current times, I argue that we can interpret Spinoza’s image of God as nature, within which nature is understood as a living entity; the totality of being (Suchtelen, 2008).
Secondly, Spinoza’s God is not a transcendent God with moral judgement, but an immanent and amoral God that equals Nature5 (Suchtelen, 2008). Therefore, his God is not almighty and does not command. God is not outside but inside the world. Thus, the fate of human beings does not lie in the hands of an almighty transcendental God (see also: Kunneman, 2005).
1.4 Research aim
In order to surpass its anthropocentric character, Manschot (2005) argues that humanism has to explicitly adjust its anthropocentric presuppositions (2005, p. 11). Therefore, a reflection on the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling departing from Spinoza’s naturalism may offer interesting insights and/or answers to the anthropocentric character and the blind spots within humanist anthropology. With the term anthropological presuppositions I refer to the presuppositions about the nature and essence of humankind.
Sharp (2011) defines the process of changing the view on man from standing above, to standing inside nature through Spinoza’s naturalism as renaturalization; connecting rather than opposing human beings to their nature. In this thesis I reflect on the possibility of a renaturalization of the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling. In order to realise the aim of this thesis, the following overarching research question and sub-questions are formulated:
How could a renaturalization of the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling, formulated through Spinoza’s naturalism, take form?
1. What are the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling?
2. What is Spinoza’s naturalism?
3. What are the implications of Spinoza´s naturalism for the anthropological presuppositions underlying humanist spiritual counselling?
The scientific and humanistic value of this thesis lies first and foremost in the identification of the anthropological presuppositions of humanism and humanist spiritual counselling.
Secondly, it lies in the application of Spinoza’s naturalism to humanism and its counselling practice. Within the theory on humanism little attention is given to Spinoza’s philosophy. The only work connecting the two is a thesis that discusses Spinoza’s philosophy in relation to 5 Because God equals Nature – and thus Nature equals God, when referring to this all-encompassing entity, Spinoza writes Nature with a capital letter.
humanist spiritual counselling, focusing on Spinoza’s image of nature and the themes of ‘acceptance’ and ‘freedom’ therein (Ooijen, 2012). Due to her specific focus, I do not use this work for my thesis.
The societal value of this thesis lies in articulating the humanist anthropological presuppositions that mostly remain undefined. This makes it insightful for humanist spiritual counsellors what the foundational thoughts of humanism are, that form the basis of their profession. Moreover, the societal value lies in the tentative statements on a renaturalized humanist spiritual counselling practice within which I try to surpass humanist
anthropocentrism. Through this, it may form a counselling practice that is up-to-date and relevant for the future. Or, as Naess (1993) puts it:
It is the main body of the Ethics which had, has, and will in the future inspire those who, on the basis of their fundamental beliefs and attitudes, try to contribute, however modestly, to the solutions of the ecological crisis. (p. 15)
Cosmology, ontology and anthropology
In this research the focus lies on the anthropology of humanism and Spinoza’s naturalism. Anthropology is the study of human beings. Together with a cosmology and ontology it creates a total view or worldview. Cosmology is the science of the order of the universe, its origin and its development and can contain references to transcendent powers. ‘Transcendent’ can be defined as explaining the world by referring to something which lies outside the range of normal or physical human experience.6 Ontology zooms in on life on earth. It is the study
of the nature of being. In order to discuss the anthropology of humanism and Spinoza’s naturalism, I sometimes have to refer to its ontology or cosmology.7
1.5 Research design
In this section I discuss the method of this thesis, the chosen literature, its shortcomings, normativity of the researcher and the sequence of my argumentation.
Method
6 Oxford Dictionary (2017). Transcendent. Retrieved on 15-11-2017, from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/; Online Etymology Dictionary (2017).
This thesis is a theoretical, thematic research: it discusses the theme of renaturalizing humanist spiritual counselling. A hermeneutic circle approach is used – interpreting the literature through an on-going circle movement, zooming into details and zooming out to the entire theory – in order to get a thorough understanding of Spinoza's naturalism. A
synthesizing approach is used in order to bring together the theory of humanist spiritual counselling concerning its anthropological presuppositions and Spinoza's naturalism.
Chosen literature
Although Spinoza was way ahead of his time, a lingering danger in using Spinoza’s Ethics for analysing contemporary issues is that his work was published in 1677. The danger lies in translating his philosophy to our current context without looking at the differences in meaning of his words and thoughts. This undertaking could mean a malformation of his philosophy. But at the same time it would be a waste to use the great history of philosophy only to put it on shelves where it is out of reach and thus unable to affect us. There would not be a
conversation between contemporaries and their predecessors. Surely, I am not the first using his work; Spinoza is being rediscovered and highly appreciated by successive generations, resulting in a richness and diversity of interpretations of his texts. According to Naess (1993, p. 7) there cannot be a most plausible interpretation of a text of a great philosopher like Spinoza. We can only try to reconstruct part of his system rather than finding out “what Spinoza in a certain period of his life intended to mean by his words and sentences in that period” (Naess, 1993, p. 7). Reconstructing part of his system is the best use of his work that can be found. In order to answer the questions that we find urgent and inevitable in our situation, we have to reconstruct his work, not create detailed interpretations (Naess, 1993). More current writings on moving beyond anthropocentrism use Ethics as core literature, which shows that Spinoza (still) has authority concerning this subject– examples are Sharp (2011), Deleuze (1988) and works on Deep Ecology (Drengson & Inoue, 1995). Moreover, within interpreting Ethics I aim at taking into account the historic context within which it was written and I use several recent interpretations of the Ethics (Deleuze, 1988; Koistinen, 2009; Scruton, 2002; Nadler; 2016; Naess, 1993). Next to these interpretations of the Ethics, I choose to use Sharp (2011), as she explicitly focusses on renaturalizing humanity starting from Spinoza’s naturalism, which resembles the aim of this thesis. Another danger lies in the translation of Ethics, as it was written in Latin. Therefore, I use three translations of Ethics: two Dutch editions by Van Suchtelen (2008) and Krop (2008) and an English edition by Elwes (2009).
In order to identify the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling, I firstly use works that are central to the philosophy and worldview of Dutch humanism (Derkx, 2009; 2011; Duyndam, 2011; Kunneman, 2005; Manschot, 2016; Ten Kate, 2016; Todorov, 2009; Van Praag, 1996). The Humanist Canon is leading in the authors I include as being humanist. In his book ‘Foundations of Humanism’ (Grondslagen van humanisme) Van Praag (1996) formulates ontological and anthropological postulates in order to propose a coherent world- and thought system. These postulates have become guiding principles for humanist theory and practice in the Netherlands and are advocated by the Dutch Humanist Association. Therefore it only makes sense for Van Praag’s book to provide the anthropological presuppositions of humanism in this thesis. The question remains whether or not all humanists subscribe to these postulates (Bolsenbroek, 2008). But that is a question I cannot answer here.
Secondly, aside from the theoretical and philosophical literature on humanism, I use literature on the theory of humanist spiritual counselling (Van Praag, 1953, 1996, 1997; Jorna, 1997, 2005, 2008; Mooren, 1999, 2010, 2013; HV, 2010, 2012). Van Praag wrote a book on the theory of humanist spiritual counselling for the first seminar on humanist spiritual counselling in 1953. After this, no other works were published on the matter, and so counsellors drew inspiration from humanist psychology, with Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers as its main figures (Mooren, 1999). In 1999, Mooren published a comprehensive book on the theory of humanist spiritual counselling, followed by Jorna in 2009. Of course I also use the guideline on humanist spiritual counselling, drafted by the Humanist Association (HV, 2010, 2012). Next to these sources I use literature from courses on humanist spiritual
counselling, provided at the University of Humanistic Studies (Bohm, 1996; Ellis, 1973; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Mcclure, 2010; Mearns & Thorne, 2008; Rogers, 1959; Romanoff, 2006; Schuhmann, 2015a, 2015b; Vlug, 2011).
Normativity of the researcher
Within research on worldviews the question raises how the researcher positions him- or herself in relation to the worldview the research is about. In my case, I am a humanist spiritual counsellor and thus to some extend an ‘insider’, doing research about the worldview I am part of. Can research on a worldview be adequately executed from the insiders-perspective and still be called scientific?
In my case, while being an insider, I also feel I am an outsider because I criticise humanism as a worldview for being inadequate. Its anthropocentric, rationalistic and
individualistic character creates a gap between my existential experience of life and life explained by humanism. In this thesis, I try to fill this gap by referring to Spinoza’s
naturalism. In showing that I can critically reflect on the self-evident content of humanism, I show I am capable of conducting research on this worldview.
Furthermore, in line with Maso and Smaling (1998) I argue that the idea of
methodological objectivity within which the researcher has to strive towards a neutral position in relation to normativity is an illusion. A reseracher cannot be free from normativity.
Therefore, the inescapable normativity of the researcher has to be included within research in order to reflect on it and to be able to positively apply it. In order to positively apply one’s normativity, the researcher has to be able to put his or her prejudices to test (Maso & Smaling (1998). At the end of this thesis, I will return to this through reflecting on my normativity within this research.
Shortcomings
My interpretation of Spinoza and the interpretations I use serve the research aim: the articulation of a renaturalization of humanist spiritual counselling. I am aware that my explanation and interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics is not at all complete.
Another shortcoming of this thesis concerns the chapter on the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling. Humanism is founded on a multifaceted, diverse and long existent philosophical tradition of the West. It draws its presuppositions and belief system from this tradition, mixing different streams of thought, and it is characterized by an on-going development and intangibility: defining humanism means reducing it. As I try to identify the anthropological presuppositions of humanism, I reduce humanism to a few statements and thinkers that not fully represents its whole tradition. Moreover as the aim of this thesis is not to explore the tradition of humanism I only point out the obvious references that are needed to identify the anthropological presupposition.
The last shortcoming is that because I first have to identify the anthropological
presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling and afterwards choose to thoroughly discuss Spinoza’s naturalism, little space is left to concentrate on applying the outcome to humanist spiritual counselling.
Chapter overview
In Chapter Two the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling are identified. Afterwards I reflect on how these anthropological presuppositions cause the above
mentioned blind spots within humanist anthropology and the way in which these blind spots are reflected in humanist spiritual counselling.
In Chapter Three Spinoza’s naturalism is described. Firstly, I discuss the core
concepts of his naturalism. Secondly, I discuss the concepts and themes of his naturalism that are of importance for the renaturalization of the humanist anthropological presuppositions.
In Chapter Four Spinoza's naturalism and the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling are brought together, in order to see what the value of
Spinoza’s naturalism could be for the problematic humanist anthropology. This chapter forms the synthesis, merging the previous two chapters. Firstly, I discuss which answers can be found within Spinoza’s naturalism to surpass the blind spots within humanist anthropology. Secondly, I turn to what the implications are of renaturalizing the humanist anthropological presuppositions through Spinoza’s naturalism. Thirdly, we turn to what this renaturalization implies for humanist spiritual counselling.
Chapter Five forms the concluding chapter. Here, I formulate an answer to the overarching research question.
In Chapter Six I reflect on the consequences of the outcome for future research and return to my normativity as a researcher.
In order to guide the reader through this philosophical and theoretical research, I inserted a diagram that puts the information into a schematic overview to which I return at the end of chapters two and four, building on the foregoing, towards a complete schematic overview of this research.
2. The anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling
In this chapter I identify the humanist anthropological presuppositions. To this end, I first briefly describe humanist ontology, because ontology forms the foundation of anthropology. Secondly, the anthropological presuppositions I identified are discussed. Thirdly, I reflect on why these anthropological presuppositions are problematic by discussing how they cause blind spots within humanist anthropology and how these blind spots are reflected within humanist spiritual counselling. Lastly, I conclude by answering sub-question one: ‘What arethe anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling?’
Humanist presuppositions refer to rationalist, existentialist, liberalist, feminist, Marxist and (post-)structuralist philosophies. These form part of the humanist philosophical tradition and humanist anthropology. Due to the scope of this thesis I only refer to the philosophies that are necessary to identify the presuppositions.
2.1 Humanist ontology
Humanist ontology is defined by what human beings can know of the world, not by what the world is (Bolsenbroek, 2008). This follows from the fact that humanism tries to understand life and world exclusively through human capacities (Derkx, 2011, p. 77). According to humanist thought, the world exists without an obvious cause and functions without an obvious goal; it is accidental. The world does not reveal meaning. The only meaning of the world is what human beings give to it. A lot of humanist spiritual counsellors do not agree with this postulate (Van IJssel, 2007, p. 432). They do not view the world as a sequence of accidental events. Nevertheless, the Dutch Humanist Association advocates Van Praag’s view
(Bolsenbroek, 2008). Van Praag also states that the world does not refer to a world beyond this one or a world yet to come; it is complete (Van Praag, 1996, pp. 99-100). This postulate also refers to the thought that human beings can discover more of reality, but they have to live with the already discovered part, which for them is reality (Bolsenbroek, 2008). Humanists state that the only meaning that life has is the meaning that human beings experience and give to it; the world is experiential. Within this ontological proposition, causality is viewed as the coherence of human experience, instead of a factual law of nature. This statement refers to the philosophy of Hume, who stated that the only thing we can observe is either things happening simultaneously or after one another (coexistence and succession), and certainly not as a result of one another (Störig, 2000). The coherence experienced in the world is thus viewed as a result of the connections we see and impose while interpreting the world. Therefore, the world (we are able to know) is always the world-interpreted-by-human beings (Van Praag, 1996, pp. 101-111). Naturalistic humanists do not agree with this postulate as in their view reality lies not in the experience of the world but in the existence of the world itself. They presuppose that the world develops itself through natural evolution and operates along the lines of natural laws. According to them, human beings arise from natural evolution (Darwin) and the
universe can be known and explained through human reason on the basis of natural causes (De Wit, 2000; Kurtz, 2007). This view is not represented within humanism as a worldview
(Humanist Association, 2012). Next to viewing the world as experiential, complete and accidental, humanism views the world as dynamic: it is an everlasting natural becoming. But after stating this, Van Praag (1996, p. 101) reminds the reader that human beings experience the world as being a natural becoming. In conclusion, Van Praag’s ontology emphasises reality as related to human experience (Bolsenbroek, 2008).
Within this accidental, complete, experiential and dynamic world, human beings are viewed on the one hand as inheritors of natural evolution, by which they are interconnected with nature. On the other hand, they are viewed as different from the rest of nature’s
creatures. Instead of being subjected to it, they experience and co-create the world in action and reflection.
2.2 The humanist anthropological presuppositions
The anthropological presuppositions I identify in this chapter are: human beings are 1) condemned to be free; 2) naturally striving towards self-actualization; 3) self-aware; 4) rational; 5) morally aware and individually responsible; 6) autonomous and standing in relation with other human beings; and 7) a unique part of the cosmos. Although I discuss these presuppositions separately, they are actually all intertwined and therefore overlap to a great extent.
2.2.1 Existential freedom
The first anthropological presupposition is closely connected to existentialist philosophy (Kaufmann, 1975). The main question of existentialist philosophy is what it means to be human. To answer this question it aims not at collecting general knowledge, but at the
individual experience of existence (Kaufmann, 1975). Looking at the universal characteristics of this experience, existentialism concludes that essentially, human beings are completely undefined, and they will only become what they make of themselves (Kaufmann, 1975). Consequently, human beings are ‘condemned to be free’, as Sartre puts it (Sartre, 1943). Analogous to existentialism, humanism seems not to be interested in the question whether or not we are actually free; instead, it focusses on the inner perspective: human beings need to live with their existential (experienced) freedom. According to Van Praag (1996, pp. 93, 113) we have to presume that human beings are undetermined, because when faced with a decision they have to make a choice.
2.2.2 Self-actualization
Inspired by philosophers like Rousseau and Aristotle, humanism proposes a worldview in which this life in freedom becomes worth living by striving towards self-actualization. This presupposition is reflected in the following citation of Van Praag (1996, translation: NK):
The world as a whole is terrifying rather than idyllic, overwhelming rather than fortifying, and absurd rather than comforting. Therein, human life unfolds itself as an experiment, a
seemingly impossible adventure of realizing something that is worthwhile. Worthwhile is a life that reconciles with the human situation, therein finding meaning; amidst contradiction and finitude, but focused on the actualization of being human, at the same time supported and threatened by this world. (p. 101)
In comparison with animals, humanism views human beings as exhibiting a relatively undetermined way of life. Derkx (2011, p. 90) cites Erasmus, stating that human beings are not born, like animals; they become in the conscious and endless development of themselves and their lives (Derkx, 2011, p. 90). Human nature defines only potency and capacity which asks for actualization and is realised within actual decisions. As human existence is nothing in itself, human beings have to form their existence by making decisions (Van Praag, 1996, p. 94). Humanism thus presupposes that within every human being there is a fundamental orientation towards growth, by which human beings naturally strive towards self-actualization (HV, 2010; Van Praag 1996).
According to Van Praag, the highest humanist truth concerning human beings is that all that is true, good and beautiful in freedom has to be conquered. The message beneath this thought is to believe in the possibility of a humane life. This means first and foremost that human beings have to use their freedom to develop inborn capacities. Human beings have to answer the natural striving towards self-actualization (Baalen, 1997, pp. 53-54). Within humanism, self-actualization is understood as growing to a fuller self, actualizing the potency of body, mind and soul, controlled by moral awareness and responsibility – these
presuppositions will be explained later. This process is constantly interwoven with the lives of others and is interpreted as a moral objective which provides human beings their lives with meaning (Van Praag, 1953, p. 31). The idea of self-actualization can be traced back to philosophers like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle (Loenen, 1938). In conclusion: humanism views human beings as naturally striving towards self-actualization and in answering this natural striving they find a moral objective which provides their life with meaning.
2.2.3 Self-awareness
Humanism presupposes that human beings are self-aware. Self-awareness means to perceive oneself as an individual, different from one’s environment and others.8 It is conscious
knowledge of one’s own character and being and the capacity for introspection.9 It is not to be confused with consciousness. While consciousness means being aware of one’s environment, body and lifestyle, self-awareness is the recognition of this awareness (Jabr, 2012). When discussing self-awareness, humanism refers to conceptual thinking, language and culture. Self-awareness creates the capability to not only be subjected to the situation in which we are placed but also to reflect on it. Human beings can create (rational) distance by which they can see the world and their situation from afar and afterwards return to it (Van Praag, 1996, p. 89). From this self-awareness, human beings can act. As a consequence, human beings are viewed as initiating their actions and shaping reality/their own life (Van Praag, 1996, p. 89). In conclusion, humanism presupposes human beings to be self-aware, which flows from capacities like conceptual thinking, language and culture and accounts for their ability to reflect on themselves and the world and to initiate their actions from this self-awareness.
2.2.4 Rationality
Above I explained that humanist anthropology presupposes existential freedom, self-actualization and self-awareness as human character traits. This implies that humanist anthropology ascribes an important role to human rationality.
Although some remarks are made in humanist literature about the body, the emphasis is put on the ratio. The only source in this study on humanist theory that explicitly speaks of the body is Van Praag (1996, pp. 113-117). He explains that humanism views ‘body’ and
‘awareness’ as a unity that can be distinguished in its elements, but cannot be separated. This statement is not further explained, but in another section, he refers to the existentialist view that being human is being body-awareness (Van Praag, 1996, p. 60). The fact that Van Praag characterizes humanism as focussing on this life on earth – presuming that there is no life after death – substantiates the idea that the body and mind are in fact one, as in that way when the body dies, the mind does too. At the same time, however, Van Praag understands
awareness as conceptual thought, language and culture, by which he refers only to the mind, 8 Online Etymology Dictionary (2017). Aware. Retrieved on 19-12-2017, from https://www.etymonline.com/ 9 Oxford Dictionary (2017). Self-awareness. Retrieved on 19-12-2017, from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
not to the body (Van Praag, 1996, p. 89). Further suggestions to doubt the oneness of body and mind that Van Praag proposes can be found in the presuppositions explained above. Most of the presuppositions seem to refer to the mind and the body being two different entities, within which the mind is conscious, pure and intentional and can command the body.
Therefore, I conclude that although Van Praag refers to human beings as body-awareness, the majority of the remarks refer to a rational conception of the mind-body relation.
This conclusion is strengthened by the definition ‘humanist spiritual counselling’. According to Van Praag ‘spiritual’ refers to ‘the contemplative return of the psychic to the self’ and manifestations of spiritual life are meaning-making, sense of identity, ability to orientate, self-awareness and self-determination (Jorna, 1997, pp. 20-22). As these character traits are assigned to the spirit or psychic, it seems that no exclusively human traits – in comparison with non-human beings – remain to be assigned to the body. Therefore, I conclude that because humanism presupposes human beings to be capable of
self-actualization and self-awareness they are first and foremost understood as rational beings.
2.2.5 Moral awareness and individual responsibility
According to humanist thought, human beings naturally strive not only towards
self-actualization but also towards living a morally just life (HV, 2010; Van Praag, 1996, pp. 198, 202). Within humanism, self-actualization is understood as actualizing the possibilities of body, mind and soul, controlled by moral awareness and responsibility. Responsibility is reflected in the humanist presupposition that the ability to respond to a choice can never be taken away and it is wholly up to the individual to choose. No one else can do it for him/her. In other words, everyone is individually responsible (Van Praag, 1996, pp. 94, 115). This seems to refer to Kant, who states that as nothing has the power to determine what human beings reason to do, we have to presuppose that human beings have authority over their own actions. Even if in fact their actions are determined, human beings have to reach their own conclusions and act accordingly (Buss, 2013; Jordan, 2012). Along with the responsibility to choose comes the idea that human beings focus on living a morally just life. This is reflected in the presupposition that human beings are characterized by their moral awareness. Kant states that moral law is based within us, within our reason. All humans can find this
categorical imperative (general moral law) when they listen to the voice of their conscience and try to discover its pure principle (Störig, 2000). According to Kant, the categorical imperative is a pure autonomous will because it is untainted by the influence of the desires
and interests that an agent may have in relation to a particular situation (Buss, 2013). In conclusion, human beings are characterized by their moral awareness and are individually responsible.
2.2.6 Autonomy and interrelation
Humanism focuses on the self. This is demonstrated by the many terms used in its literature containing the word ‘self’ – reflection, clarification, realization,
self-development, sense of self, and so forth (Mooren, 1999, 2010, 2013). At the same time, humanism is sometimes called anti-egoism, as self-development has to be situated in relation with others (Baalen, 1997, p. 53). These two stances come together in the relational autonomy humanist anthropology presupposes.
Safeguarding the autonomy – and thus also freedom, self-actualization and
responsibility – of the individual is a core-value of humanism. It implies denying that anyone else has the authority to control one’s activity and that any exercise of power over this activity is illegitimate, unless the person authorises it (Todorov, 2009). When discussing
self-actualisation, Derkx (2011, p. 93) states that influence of others is no problem, as long as one’s freedom of choice is maintained and one is not manipulated. Everyone is individually responsible for one’s own life. Taking this responsibility away from someone would be unethical (Derkx, 2011, p. 102). This is strongly related to Kantian philosophy and to Marxist and (post-)structuralist philosophy. The latter two address the individual powerlessness in relation to social structures, pointing at the power of social institutions to control individuals in such a way that their autonomy is affected. Humanism advocates equality of all people and states that all human beings are ends-in-themselves (Todorov, 2009). To be an end-in-oneself means that one may never be seen or used as a means to another (one’s) end. Within
humanism, equality means that human dignity is accredited to all human beings by the fact that they are ‘human’, defined by their exclusively human capacities (Derkx, 2011). The fact that we have the same biological structure makes humanists state that we are all equal in worth (Bolsenbroek, 2008; Derkx, 2011, pp. 82-83). For humanists, this implies that nobody can take away another one’s individual freedom – and responsibility (Derkx, 2011). It is a constant challenge for the individual to make life worth living in one’s own authentic way (Van Praag, 1996, p. 176). In other words: we have to view others as autonomous individuals to prevent viewing them – and consequently treating them – as abstract categories.
Next to emphasising that human beings are autonomous individuals, togetherness is a central value within humanism and a benchmark for humanist spiritual counselling. It is the answer to the loneliness of the client. When the humanist spiritual counsellor constructs a relation with the client, it means that the client is no longer left alone in her current situation (Jorna, 2008, p. 179). Togetherness refers to the presupposition that the individual is
interconnected with other human beings (Todorov, 2009). According to Van Praag (1996, pp. 89-90) human beings are interconnected because they arose from the world together. This accounts for the fact that they are together in the world, and depend on each other for their development. As individuals we can only actualize ourselves in relation with others. As in relation with others our visions and insights come to the fore, making it possible to enjoy, comfort and inspire each other. Human beings discover their ‘selves’ by means of other human beings (HV, 2012; Van Praag, 1996, p. 177). In this respect, Duyndam (2011) speaks of ‘social ecologies’ to emphasize that individual resiliency depends on the resiliency of the social relations in which an individual is situated. Moreover, Derkx states that not only are human beings related to each other, they exist within each other. An example thereof is loss. When we lose a person that is very dear to us, we mourn not only for her loss, but also for losing who we were with that person. By losing the other, we lose a part of ourselves. In our mourning the interrelatedness of our selves comes to the fore in the question that rises: who am I without you? The example of loss shows us that we are not only related to others, but we are in this interrelation: I am within you and you are within me; our self is relational (Derkx, 2011, p. 100).
Autonomy together with interrelatedness accounts for a relational autonomy. This term originates from feminist thought, within which the individual is viewed as socially and historically embedded instead of isolated, and shaped by these factors (Stoljar, 2013). To conclude, humanism presupposes human beings to be autonomous beings that stand in relation to other human beings. Human beings are understood as individuals,
ends-in-themselves, that depend on other human beings for their development. This can be defined as relational autonomy.
2.2.7 Uniqueness
As can be read in the citation of Van Praag given above, humanism views human
self-actualization as simultaneously supported and threatened by the world (2.3.2). As descendants of natural evolution, human beings are interrelated with other human beings and with the
cosmos. To explain this interrelation with the cosmos, humanism refers to the biology of natural evolution; the theory that human beings descend from the ape. In science, however, evolution theory is still up for discussion as there is a ‘missing link’ to come to agree upon the development from ape to human being (Bolsenbroek 2008; see for example Tomasello, 2014). It also refers to the proposition that human beings are dependent on nature in order to survive (Van Praag, 1996). It may also refer to spirituality; to feel oneself part of a bigger, cosmic whole. This feeling can arise when we experience that the boundary between our being and the bigger whole becomes blurred. This spirituality is still immanent as it acknowledges man and nature being reflected in one another; a depth and gloss within itself, not beyond it
(Bolsenbroek, 2008, p. 56; Fowler, 1981). Van Praag (1953, translation NK) seems to refer to spirituality, stating:
The humanist worldview proposes the possibility for human beings to feel at home in the adventure of life with their shortcomings and flaws (…). Through which they know
themselves organically related with the totality of being, and are able to (…) become rooted in existence. (p. 38)
When Van Praag says human beings can ‘become rooted in existence’ he seems to refer to the experience of a feeling of life ‘that grants depth to insight, power to moral awareness and glow to art’ (Kuijlman, 2001). According to Van Praag, such an experience inspires social and natural engagement and personal growth and moves people away from nihilism (Kuijlman, 2001).
Although Van Praag emphasises the importance of experiencing some kind of
interrelation with nature, this does by no means imply that human beings equal nature. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, human beings are interconnected and dependent on each other for their development because they arose from the world together. This argument does not clarify why the rest of nature is excluded from this interconnectedness – does not all of nature arise from the world together? The proposition that human beings descend from nature means that they are subjected to its powers like all other beings. At the same time, however, nature is subjected to mankind.
Humanism views human beings as rising above, and in fact very different from nature. In the first manifesto of the Dutch Humanist Association (1946), humanism is understood as a worldview that is based on respect for human beings as a special part of the cosmos
beings occupy a special place within the world by means of their self-awareness, intentionality and individual responsibility (Van Praag, 1953, p. 31, 1996, p. 89).
Here, we stumble upon the anthropocentric character of humanist anthropology. The relation humanism proposes between human and nature seems ambiguous. On one hand, human beings are viewed as interrelated with and dependent on nature, on the other they are viewed as different to such an extent that they rise above (the rest of) nature, capable of shaping it to their will. In conclusion, the humanist view of human beings is one where they are a unique part of the cosmos, at the same time depending on and rising above nature.
These are the seven anthropological presuppositions that I identified within the
literature I consulted. All presuppositions are connected with each other and overlap to a great extent. In the introduction I argued that humanist anthropology was problematic because it contains four blind spots. Humanism has the tendency to neglect human corporeality, unconsciousness, interrelatedness and creates a human-nature dichotomy. In the above identified humanist anthropological presuppositions, these blind spots are recurring.
2.3 The blind spots within humanist anthropology and humanist spiritual counselling Now let us reflect on how these anthropological presuppositions cause the blind spots within humanist anthropology discussed in the introduction and the way in which these blind spots are reflected in humanist spiritual counselling. Identifying the problems these blind spots cause within the practice of humanist spiritual counselling is out of scope of this research. Moreover, there is insufficient scientific work concerning humanist spiritual counselling to identify problems through literature. Nevertheless, the literature that does exist, suggests that the blind spots within humanist anthropology, are reflected within humanist spiritual
counselling as a humanist practice. In the following I will briefly discuss how this is so.
Neglecting corporeality
The focus on rationality and the tendency to neglect corporeality is reflected in presupposition four: human beings are rational.
The blind spot of corporeality that this anthropological presupposition creates is reflected in the practice of humanist spiritual counselling in the strong emphasis on the role of language, conversation and story. The presumption is that, through reconstructing the life story of the client in light of the themes autonomy, control and self-development, themes like
helplessness, determination and stagnation or deterioration can be overcome (Jorna, 2008; Mooren, 1999). The role the body plays in these themes is not incorporated within the
counselling practice. By focussing on this mental capacity of story-creating and story-telling, humanist spiritual counselling tends to neglect the fact that there is always a body that feels and bears these difficulties of life (Ellis, 1973, p. 28; Mooren, 1999).
Neglecting unconsciousness
The one-sided focus on consciousness and the tendency to neglect unconsciousness is reflected in the anthropological presuppositions three and five: human beings are self-aware, have moral awareness and are individually responsible.
The blind spot of unconsciousness that these anthropological presuppositions create is reflected in the aims of humanist spiritual counselling, which are: acceptance, self-awareness, meaning-making and world-viewing. These aims presuppose that human beings are conscious, reflective beings (Van Praag, 1997, p. 173). Humanist spiritual counselling focusses on dialogical communication in order to stimulate clients to think critically and rationally (Derkx, 2011; HV, 2012; Schuhmann, 2015a; Van Praag, 1996). But what does it offer human beings for whom these capacities are un-/underdeveloped?
Creating a human-nature dichotomy
The conviction that human beings are free from natural law and the anthropocentric character that is shaped therewith is reflected in the anthropological presuppositions one, two and seven: human beings are condemned to be free, naturally strive towards self-actualization and are a unique part of the cosmos.
The blind spot of creating a human-nature dichotomy that these anthropological presuppositions create is reflected within humanist spiritual counselling in the thought that whatever the situation human beings find themselves in, they have the ability to make sense of their lives by responding actively to their existential situation. They have the freedom, and thus the responsibility, to give meaning to their situation, to create new possibilities with their own capacities (Schuhmann, 2015a, p. 10; Van Praag, 1997, p. 178). Therefore, the humanist spiritual counsellor views clients as human beings who, no matter how confused or depraved they feel, are personally responsible for their life and have to solve its riddles. Humanist spiritual counselling thus accentuates the human situation in which human beings are free to such an extent that they can deal with their situation and creates the possibility to talk about and address this space of freedom and responsibility (Schuhmann, 2015a; Vlug, 2011, p. 96).
Neglecting interrelatedness
The focus on individualism and autonomy and the tendency to neglect the (importance of) human interrelatedness is reflected in presupposition six: human beings are autonomous beings that stand in relation with other human beings. This presupposition emphasises the importance of human interrelatedness. Still, influence is viewed as potentially dangerous from which the individual has to be protected. Furthermore, the interrelatedness is limited to human beings. Non-human beings are excluded from the thought of interrelatedness. They are viewed as forming the surrounding within which human beings exist.
The blind spot of interrelatedness that this anthropological presupposition creates is reflected in the focus of humanist spiritual counselling on autonomy and independence. In favour of the autonomy of the client, humanist spiritual counselling emphasises that the client has worth, uniqueness and the capacity to determine herself (Schuhmann, 2015a; Van Praag, 1996). The client is seen as “the sole expert on the question what has to be changed in his situation and how to change it” (Schuhmann, 2015a, p. 7). To this end, the humanist spiritual counsellor has to constantly refuse the role of the expert and instead provide a relation in which the client can come to her own wisdom. For this purpose humanist spiritual counsellors engage in a dialogue without ever trying to provide final answers, as only the client can decide what counts as an outcome of the counselling session (HV, 2012; Mearns & Thorne, 2008; Rogers, 1959; Romanoff, 2006; Schuhmann, 2015a, p. 20; Van Praag, 1953, p. 19). A dialogue is a way of conversing that creates space to examine the meaning one gives to things in life and the differences with other one’s meanings. In this way, new meaning can be
created. In order to engage in a dialogue, a humanist spiritual counsellor needs to be able to listen freely, without judgements and without wanting to influence the other, with empathy and altruism in order to enter the client’s (perception of the) world (Bohm, 1996; Van Praag, 1996, pp. 170-171). It seems that humanist spiritual counselling presupposes that the self must be protected against suppression of the counsellor, others and social institutions, viewing relations and influence as a possible danger to the individual freedom of the client (McClure, 2010; Schuhmann, 2015a, p. 11). An argument in favour of the focus on autonomy and independence is that in the institutions where humanist spiritual counsellors work, autonomy is often damaged and the feeling of self-worth affected. At the same time, however, the presupposition that the feeling of self-worth is closely linked to the feeling of control over one’s own existence could be harmful considering powerlessness within one’s situation (Mooren, 1999, p. 124).
In this section I explained in what way the blind spots within humanist anthropology follow from the anthropological presuppositions identified in this chapter and in what way these blind spots are reflected within humanist spiritual counselling.
2.4 Humanist anthropology
In this part I identified seven anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual
counselling. Furthermore, I reflected on how the blind spots within humanist anthropology as explained in the introduction are caused by these anthropological presuppositions and how these blind spots are also reflected within humanist spiritual counselling.
1) Human beings are condemned to be free: from the individual experience of existence it follows that initially human beings are ‘nothing’. In existence they become what they make of themselves, thus they have to live with their existential freedom.
2) Human beings naturally strive towards self-actualization and in answering this natural striving, they can find a moral objective which provides their life with meaning.
3) Human beings are self-aware, understood as a capacity resulting from conceptual thinking, language and culture, making them able to reflect on themselves and the world and consequently initiate their actions and shape (their) existence.
4) The preceding presuppositions account for the following presuppositions that: human beings are rational beings.
5) Human beings have moral awareness and are individually responsible, as they have to reach their own conclusions and act accordingly.
6) Human beings are autonomous beings that stand in relation with other human beings. Human beings are understood as individuals, ends-in-themselves that depend on other human beings for their development. This can be defined as relational autonomy.
7) By virtue of all the presuppositions above human beings are a unique part of the cosmos, as they at the same time depend on and rise above nature.
In Figure 1 I brought the findings together in a schematic overview. It shows the focus and blind spots within humanist anthropology; in what way the blind spots are reflected within humanist spiritual counselling; and how the seven identified anthropological presuppositions form the foundation from which the above follows.
In identifying the anthropological presuppositions I found it striking how humanism as a worldview seems to be built up from its core-values, from which anthropological
presuppositions follow. Likewise, the anthropology that follows seems to define the ontology, instead of the other way around. This movement from values to foundational thoughts seems to cause the foundational thoughts to be not fully explicated, creating a rather weak system of thought. In order to not only identify but also explain the anthropological presuppositions, I had to scratch together convictions that are presented as self-evident within humanist literature. Still, the explanation sometimes falls short, because of the lack of argumentation present within the consulted literature.
As we will see in the following chapter, Spinoza’s system of thought is built up just in the opposite manner: it starts with a cosmology, from which the ontology follows, from which the anthropology follows, from which the ethic follows. This movement seems to create a more well-founded system of thought.
3. Spinoza's naturalism
Within this chapter I describe the philosophical system proposed in the Ethics. I first briefly contextualize Spinoza and the Ethics. Afterwards, the core concepts of Spinoza’s naturalism are explored, which forms the first half of this chapter (3.2). In the second half (3.3, 3.4 and 3.5), I focus on themes within Spinoza’s naturalism that are of importance for the articulation of a renaturalization of the anthropological presuppositions of humanist spiritual counselling. Therefore, the second half of this chapter is a preparation for the synthesising chapter that follows. Finally, the second sub-question is answered: ‘What is Spinoza’s naturalism?’
3.1 Contextualisation
Spinoza’s work influenced many philosophers throughout the ages, including Herder, Goethe, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson (Störig, 2000, p. 358). His magnum opus, Ethics, was published posthumously in 1677. Since then, it has been interpreted in many different ways: as a work on rationality, mystics, religion, psychoanalysis, materialism and as a bridge connecting western and eastern thought (Suchtelen, 2008, p. 7). The different interpretations may have been made possible by the diversity of influences in Spinoza's thinking. Spinoza was born in the Netherlands as a Spanish Jew. As his father wanted him to become a Rabbi, Spinoza enjoyed a lot of education. In Jewish school, Spinoza studied Jewish and Muslim writers of earlier ages, through which he also got acquainted with the works of Aristotle and other Greek and Roman philosophers. A liberal Rabbi also made him familiar with Dutch secular culture and its thinkers. After Jewish school, Spinoza learned about scholastic philosophy, the beginning of ‘modern science’ and Descartes (Scruton, 2002).
Later on, Spinoza began to sympathize with the unorthodox Dutch Christians and became dissatisfied with his Rabbi’s reading of the Torah. The Rabbis, on their turn, began to view Spinoza as a disobedient, annoying member of the community. Verifying that image, Spinoza started studying Latin and new works of political philosophy like Grotius and Hobbes. Ultimately, he left the Jewish community partly after receiving the writ of herem – ban or excommunication – and surrounded himself with secular Christian thinkers (Nadler, 2016; Scruton, 2002).
Deleuze connects Spinoza’s two occupations of philosophy and grinding lenses with each other in citing Henry Miller: “Someday the lens is going to be perfect and then we’re all going to see clearly, see what a staggering, wonderful, beautiful world it is” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 14). This resembles the aim of the Ethics: to see ourselves and the world, for what we really
