What went wrong with the IDF

(1)

What went wrong with the IDF in the Lebanon War of 2006? Operation Change Direction

XXXXX XXXXXXXX BA XXXXXXXX University of Amsterdam Department of History 13 May 2017 The Hague/Amsterdam

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the

Masters degree of War Studies (Military History/Operational Art & Science) Thesis supervisor: Prof.Dr. Wim Klinkert, Professor of History

(2)

Approval

(3)

1

Introduction

Abstract

On 12 July 2006 two IDF soldiers, Sergeants Regev and Goldwasser, and were abducted in an ambush by Hezbollah while returning from patrol duty along the Lebanese border. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert called it an act of war and declared that Lebanon would pay dearly as a consequence. Israel was convinced it could bring Hezbollah to its knees quickly and decisively by using airpower alone, but as it turned out, the IDF was ill-prepared to cope with the type of hybrid warfare prevalent in Lebanon when hostilities commenced that would last from 12 July until 14 August 2006. When it became apparent to Israel that a ground offensive was necessary it was unpleasantly surprised by the tenacity, skill and determination of Hezbollah’s fighters as their campaign would reveal a number of deficiencies as a result of Israeli failure to adapt and its flawed ‘Effects Based’ doctrine. Only after the war did Israel make significant adjustments to its military apparatus and succeeded in reinventing itself.

There is little consensus in the debate about Operation Change Direction with basically one side claiming that the operation ultimately led to a pyrrhic victory at best, while others challenge this proposition and defend the argument that Israel won the war in the strategic realm and the outcome of battle was more than such due to evolvements in the longer term. We shall look at OCD from a critical perspective and draw our own conclusions.

Regardless the nature of military failure, it is essential to understand them in order to benefit from the hard lessons learned and develop systems to prevent the reoccurrence of similar failures. A detailed critical analysis of Operation ‘Change Direction’ [OCD] is required to avoid emotionalism and the natural tendency to seek a simple cause for the failure. Clausewitz emphasized the need to know what kind of war will be fought and advocated detailed analysis of a battle in order to understand it in its totality and complexity, rather than analyzing many battles in only a superficial manner. His advocacy of critical analysis is just as valid for today’s hot spots as it was for the fields of battle in his day. As military professionals we need to reflect on battle and identify any possible mistakes that were made in order to learn from them so they can be taken into account.

Approach

The central research question for this thesis focuses on what went wrong with Operation Change

Direction [OCD] during the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War. We will operationalize this question by

addressing the following topics in 4 respective chapters; Hybrid warfare as a concept, Hezbollah as an opposing force; the strategic culture of the IDF; and results, reception and recommendations.

(5)

3

In the first chapter we will explain the definition of hybrid warfare because it is essential to our specific understanding of Hezbollah’s strategy and profile. In more broad terms it is also important to elaborate in depth on the meaning of hybrid warfare due to the fact that hybrid spectrum threats are becoming ever more proliferated in our time, and discussing hybrid warfare theory as such is relevant for the field of modern military study.

In the second chapter, which closely overlaps with those matters previously discussed, we shall describe how Hezbollah classifies as a hybrid organization, and more specifically in what ways this is evident from its modus operandi against the Israeli military. By going in to strategy, operations and tactics as well as the means used we shall give an accurate and comprehensive description of Hezbollah as an opposing force.

The third chapter deals with the strategic culture of the IDF as it existed prior to and during OCD. We shall explain what the root causes for the unsatisfactory performance of the entire IDF were by researching long-term trends, policy decisions as well as more structural problems. Their identification helps us with our explanation of the IDF’s subsequent failures and mishaps. Among the subjects touched upon in this chapter are the IDF’s operational methods, doctrine and -as it turned out- handicaps.

The fourth chapter explores what the net overall outcome of the conflict was for Israel. We shall look at the results from a military performance perspective, hold a discussion whether or not the IDF failed and if so: how and why? Other subjects will be the lessons that were learned and how they were received by various individuals and institutions, how they were reflected upon as well as what recommendations might apply and have already been implemented in order to revitalize and fundamentally change the entire IDF.

These subsequent topics are relevant because after OCD the IDF was urgently forced to reinvent itself as a result of this particular conflict. The 2006 war proved to be crucial in the lessons learned realm and called for significant overhaul of the IDF based on alarming deficiencies in 1) the role and overestimated expectations of airpower, 2) the field of logistics, training, support, materiel readiness and ill-preparation 3) the conduct of operations and inability to adapt to the realities of hybrid spectrum combat, and 4) failure to anticipate and adapt to the enemy. Although being of importance in any war, what we shall not discuss in this thesis are those events that occurred at the top political decision-making level, as our time and space frame is limited and our aim is not to deliver a political science paper but to keep this thesis a purely military study that deals only with the military domain of warfare.

(6)

4

In our conclusion we shall recap on the matters we have discussed and determine if the IDF has learned from its mistakes and whether Israel ultimately gained a favorable or unfavorable overall strategic outcome from the conflict in the long run.

Sources

We shall be using a variety of sources that will often have overlap between the chapters. We therefore decided it is more practical to alphabetically list the authors and describe their contributions separately rather than introduce the works in the account of our methodology. The latter is not ideal as many of the sources cover a multitude of topics and are used across multiple chapters.

Arkin’s ‘Divining Victory’ deals specifically with airpower. Arguing whether disproportionate or not, Hezbollah being responsibility for opening hostilities or not, OCD clearly had a different character than previous Israeli-Hezbollah incidents that had occurred since the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Escalation took place from the air. Airpower came under great scrutiny during and after OCD because of economy of effort, flawed design and inefficiency. Arkin used a 900 page chronology for his research on the 34-day conflict and because of the openness of Israeli society he had data in abundance. Many major Israeli and international media had reporters at the scene and recorded what was happening. The IDF issued statements regularly and both the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s office established web sites to post press materials, photographs, daily briefings and fact sheets. Most of it was incomplete and extremely random. Arkin claims that despite his efforts, his study remains a weak one because of the fact that the Israeli State was extremely sparse with details of either its ground activity or air campaign. As such, his study provides only a ‘quick look’ in that regard.

With ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the future of warfare: Implications for Army and

Defense Policy’ Biddle and Friedman position themselves in a debate that is gaining in importance.

Some primarily classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization utilizing information age variants of asymmetric warfare seen as typical for non-state actors, and aim to transform state armed forces into lighter constabulary type formations designed to engage in light infantry, civil affairs, special operations, military police and alike warfare as opposed to regular or symmetric combat operations. Others however see the 2006 Lebanon War as a significant departure from traditional terrorism and guerilla warfare, and as a shift towards conventional military methods traditionally used by state militaries. What Biddle and Friedman want to explain in their account is how much the 2006 conflict actually differed from terrorist or guerilla warfare -information age or not- and how conventional and state-like the fighting was. This view of Hezbollah as a conventional army weakens the case for the ill advise of ‘lightening’ the armed forces. The authors argue that neither of the schools is fully consistent with Hezbollah’s modus operandi in the 2006 war yet the latter is closer than the former.

(7)

5

In ‘The 2006 Lebanon War: A short history’ Chadwick gives a short but meticulously detailed narrative and technically rather descriptive account of the 12 July Hezbollah attack, Hezbollah’s political objectives, a rather lengthy part about the Israeli political deliberations at the cabinet level, and the planning prelude to the inevitable war as well as both Hezbollah and IDF doctrine and tactics, and the Israeli defense policy and consequences that predated the war. His main argument is that Israel went to war against Hezbollah completely unprepared due to the lack of both proper training and critical technology as well as realistically attainable objectives.

Cordesman c.s. ‘Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War’ addresses criticism on sources such as the Winograd and Brodet Commissions, post-war statements, media reports. think tanks, research centers and interviews because of speculation, politics, ideological alignment and inaccuracies. Points made are that high-tech forces designed for symmetric conflicts against regular opponents are vulnerable to asymmetric attack and create political problems that offset initial military advantages. The bottom line of this source is the discussion about what the war accomplished and did not accomplish for Israel.

Donahue’s ‘The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War: Israel’s Grenada’ classifies the IDF’s OCD experience as a conflict akin to the US military’s Grenada intervention. His main claim is that the EBO inspired doctrine created by the IDF led to their failure because it is a fundamentally flawed concept and it enabled Hezbollah to prepare for an effects based operations design. It combined EBO, Systematic Operational Design [SOD] and the use of precision munitions into a new Israeli doctrine at the expense of ground maneuver forces. Their overreliance on this doctrine was one of the primary reasons for aggravate failure. The Israeli’s did not understand that the object of EBO is to prepare the way for ground forces, instead they replaced ground forces and used them only as a means of last resort. Hezbollah successfully predicted the IDF modus operandi and prepared well to defeat them. The SOD language and methodology language created problems as well, because it seemed nearly incomprehensible to those charged with its implementation. When Israel launched a ground campaign into Lebanon, it found itself unprepared and faced a well-prepared and determined enemy.

In the FilmAt11tv documentary ‘The Lebanon War 2006’ veterans of the war provide valuable first hand insights as they give accounts of their combat experience. Focusing mainly on the Army’s deplorable state, the lack of effective political leadership and planning, insufficient supplies and worn out equipment, and the absence of specific goals for the missions they undertook.

Henriksen contributes a very interesting argument in his article ‘A misapplied and

overextended example’ stating that United States Air Force General Mattis’s criticism of EBO being

misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations in this particular conflict is an inadequate example because the nature of the conflict is unsuitable as an empirical foundation for criticizing EBO. This is due to various reasons: The most important of which

(8)

6

are the absence of a clear, identifiable Israeli strategy to attain specific political goals, and the fact that the variable (i.e. EBO) played a subordinate role in the negative outcome for the IDF. Henriksen seeks to analyze the empirical foundation of General Mattis’s conclusion regarding EBO as a concept, not the concept itself. Henriksen claims that the Israeli 2006 campaign does not provide sufficient evidence of flaws in EBO challenging his assertions regarding that concept. His article aims to determine whether or not EBO was a part of Israel’s limitations in strategic thinking.

The IDF’s ‘Response to the Winograd Commission Report’ states that it considers the Winograd Report to be an important and useful document as it provides the force with a constructive critique, which in turn enables it to reflect and act accordingly to rectify shortcomings. Yet the IDF did not wait for the Winograd Commission to bring forward its findings and initiated its own enquiry right after the ending of hostilities, which resulted in its own extensive list of lessons and conclusions.

Johnson’s ‘Balancing the Israeli Defense Force for Future Warfare’ is a lessons learned study that focuses on why the IDF was ill-prepared to face a hybrid threat and the resultant actions against Hezbollah. It rests upon the findings of US institutions and Israeli military personnel, including interviews. The Israeli self-assessment concludes that there exists strong disagreement between military leaders and government officials about IDF performance and the causes of its failures. Allegedly, two reviews of lessons learned provide information to this regard. The first is the Winograd Commission Report, and the other is an analysis by Avi Kober in which the focal point is that the IDF was lacking in its transition from low-intensity conflict to hybrid warfare and had too much faith in the abilities of air power.

Kober’s ‘The Israeli Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: why the poor

performance?’ is an excellent, in-depth and highly critical analysis of the war and the IDF’s structural

problems. In the past the IDF battlefield success had always compensated for possibly deterrent or warning errors but in the Second Lebanon War numerous capability and conduct problems had been exposed. He gives an explanation for this poor performance which he relates to limited capabilities at the time caused by the erosion of its standards as a result of the years of policing small scale Palestinian skirmishes since the Intifada and the false Revolution in Military Affairs-inspired theories. He also criticizes the IDF’s adoption of the notion of vaguely controlling rather than capturing territory, the incompetence of Israeli generals and inexperienced political leadership, and Israel’s late notion of war.

With his ‘Second Lebanon War Reconsidered’ Lambeth mainly positions himself on the optimistic side of the debate. In his considerations he focuses on what Israel ultimately gained despite the poor IFD performance, which he most certainly does not deny. He also elaborates on Hezbollah’s painful losses, especially those of the wider scope in the political long term. His insights are particularly useful in that they draw logical conclusions with regard to the ultimately positive and

(9)

7

negative security and political strategic outcome for Israel and Hezbollah respectively. Perhaps he is a bit too delighted and overestimating about IDF performance, but is right in the end because his arguments in favor of an ultimate Israeli strategic victory are indeed valid.

In ‘We were caught unprepared’ Matthews’ analysis of the war consists of both an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war and an overview of operational and tactical difficulties experienced by the IDF. His research claims that EBO was poorly understood and its reliance upon it hence ill-based, that the IDF has a poor understanding of SOD war fighting theories, and that the virtually sole reliance on airpower were the root causes of IDF problems. After years of policing the Gaza strip and West Bank in Counter-Insurgency operations the Israeli Army proved to be unprepared and untrained to fight a conventional battle against an opponent who put up a determined and fixed-position defense using hybrid tactics. For his research Matthews interviewed a group of prominent IDF officers and subject matter experts who had not been interviewed before.

McCulloh and Johnson elaborate on the meaning of hybrid warfare. Their monograph ‘Theory

of Hybrid Conflict & Operational Approaches to Hybrid Warfare’ seeks to clarify the discussion of

hybrid organizations and hybrid warfare through the formulation of a theory suggesting principles of hybrid warfare. Their study consists of multiple in-depth chapters in the 13-4 Report of the US Joint Special Operations University. Their monograph attempts to answer the question of why hybrid actors aka threats function the way they do and sets forth a series of hybrid principles that are observable from historic trends that provide unified logic to hybrid behavior. Following his monograph McCulloh conducts a qualitative and deductive analysis of historical case studies in order to explore and validate his proposed theory of hybrid warfare. In doing so he attempts to parse examples of each principle to show its existence within the context of the 2006 Lebanon War. The analysis will show how Hezbollah functioned as a hybrid organization and manifested multiple synergetic advantages over the IDF. Johnson’s methodology uses qualitative analysis to build an understanding of operational approaches to hybrid threats. To develop explanatory fundamentals his research does not attempt to quantify hybrid warfare in a predictive fashion but focuses on the form, function and logic of unrestricted warfare, compound warfare, fourth generation warfare and hybrid warfare. To develop a working model for hybrid warfare an inquiry needs to evaluate the physical and cognitive traits of hybrid warfare and the stimuli that drive a threat to hybridize. Likewise, his research examines the theory, application and elements of operational art.

De Weger c.s. ‘Complex Operations - Study on Lebanon’ in the NL Arms Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies series will be used to compile what became publicly known about the Israeli Air Force’s [IAF] operations, raising questions about its effectiveness, the relevance of operations research and perspective on the IDF’s strategic culture as well as problems it encountered during the war and the transformation difficulties it faced afterwards.

(10)

8

The ‘Winograd Commission Report’ is essentially a press briefing and a difficult source to work with because it actually reveals very little and in many ways contradicts the findings of the other sources used. It lionizes the role and achievements of the IAF and is harsh in its criticism towards the ground forces, as it places much of the blame for the operation’s failure on the Army without elaborating much on the blunt statement. Though the bottom line of the report is its advocacy of far better politico-military cooperation and communication.

(11)

9

Hybrid Warfare Theory

Before we move commence describing Hezbollah and the IDF and interpret their respective modus operandi, we must first gain an understanding of hybrid warfare. This chapter will explain what hybrid warfare exactly is and what the criteria are to come to this nomenclature. We will explore and define its utility by asking ourselves the question what its contemporary relevance means.

In order to set parameters for a theoretical discussion we will first define the necessary terms pertaining to hybrid conflict. This means that we will consistently use one term for government-organized standing armed forces: regular forces. We have chosen this term because they operate, organize and deploy their capability according to commonly accepted and institutionalized standards, international law, norms, customs and what not. To summarize, they are a formally recognized legitimate entity. We deliberately and entirely avoid the term ‘conventional forces’ across the board because this term per se rules out special operations forces. In the epilogue of this paper it will become apparent why we do not want to exclude special operations capability from the discussion. We will use the term irregular forces for the kind of organizations that are the exact opposite of all this and hence do not conform to the standards in the same way regular forces do. The hybrid force though would be best described as an organization utilizing methods that intermix between regular and irregular establishment tables, resources and procedures in a unique setting and with the purpose of achieving synergistic effects in the -it must be emphasized- strategic realm. This description provides a good starting point for thinking about hybrid warfare in the post-modern age and would be in line with what McCulloh & Johnson claim to be based on previous research by hybrid theorists, and can add to the knowledge of hybrid conflict within the military community.1

From this brief, albeit broad definition of hybrid spectrum conflict we can make some observations. According to McCulloh and Johnson: “The hybrid threat uniquely focuses on organizational capability and will concentrate on the attempt of gaining an asymmetrical advantage over a purely regular opponent within a specific environment”2

They continue the argument by stating that their projection extends to the diplomatic, informational, economic, financial and intelligence realm. ‘These advantages generate the effect of transitioning the rules of war from those of regular conflict to those of the hybrid’s choosing –primarily in the categories of operational tempo, depth and intensity. This results in the weaker opponent being able to stand against the stronger for an indefinite period of time.3 Hybrid capabilities are a serious challenge for regular forces due to the fact that the large-scale traditional organizations were not primarily designed to cope with the hybrid threat.

1

McCulloh & Johnson 2, Joint Special Operations University Report 13-4, 2013 (JSOU Report)

2

Ibid.

(12)

10

Gaining a thorough understanding of hybrid capabilities offers valuable insight into predicting their methods.

McCulloh states that the persistent obstacle to understanding hybrid threats has been the inability to classify what it exactly is and why it coalesces in the first place. “The conflicting definitions for this construct have stymied the ability of military theorists and planners to properly envision a common set of hybrid threat motivations and possible actions”4

He further insists that the fundamental problem is the gap that exists between the cognitive logic ‘definition’ and the uniqueness of each context in which ‘hybrid’ manifests itself and no definition is applicable to each and every hybrid spectrum conflict over time, space and logic. This indicates the need for a theory suggesting recurring parameters for the nature and manifestation of hybrid entities in such conflicts. This is especially relevant in our time of emerging non-state actors in primarily the Middle-East. The problem with Western militaries is that their exponential increases in the trend to replace actual understanding with applied technology to discrete military problems, which causes a total loss of insights on the opposing hybrid force. But only a better actual understanding will provide the potential for a relevant response. McCulloh says that review of literature that addresses the fusion of regular and irregular warfare and the emergence of the idea of a hybrid kind of warfare presents principles that can inform a theory of this kind of warfare, and perhaps it is useful to point out the evolutionary stages of warfare.5 McCulloh uses The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century by Dr Hammes, a retired USMC Colonel, as his starting point on the evolutionary analysis of modern warfare. Generational war concepts hinge on transformation in military technology and its tactical, strategic and social effects in wartime setting.6 Hammes argues that first generation warfare is dominated by the nation-state and makes use of tactics of line and column in close order and relying on musket fire, prominent in the late 18th and early 19th century. ‘The generations of warfare construct began with the establishment of the Peace of Westphalia Treaty, which legitimized the use of organized violence by the nation-state’.7 The second generation built upon the first but added more movement and the use of indirect artillery fire that would remain prominent during the mid-to-late 19th century and the early 20th century. He described third generation warfare as the phase of emphasizing high operational tempo, swift maneuver and deep operations to collapse opposing forces by outflanking them and attacking them in rear areas, as well as targeting civilian objects, and the addition of the mature air arm. This kind of warfare was more or less the standard for most of the 20th century.8 Hammes concludes with a thesis on what he considers to be fourth generation warfare starting by stating it emerged in the mid to late 20th century and with state versus non-state actors being the most proliferated. His key observation

4_{McCulloh & Johnson 3, JSOU Report} 5

McCulloh & Johnson 5, JSOU Report

6

7

Ibid

(13)

11

being reciprocity as both entities influenced each other with regard to deployment tactics as well as the non-state actor off-setting the state actors’ technological capabilities. The concept of guerilla, insurgency, people’s war and the long war fit the description of a kind of warfare where regular technological capability offset by irregular means has been coupled to with a unifying process aimed at bringing forth a desired military and political outcome. What is crucial to the fourth generation is that non-state actors use military influenced operations and in some cases strategic communications in conjunction with irregular methods to prolong the conflict as well as to attrite the regular force’s political and military support base.9 As a theorist, Hammes has made a very important and valuable contribution in explaining the evolutionary steps of the generations of modern warfare as he established a framework of generally recognized perceptions of the likely kind of warfare that occurred in a given timeframe and identified the logic of combining factors in the evolution of modern war.

Hoffman is credited by McCulloh as another important theorist that continued the theoretical evolution of warfare by contributing his ideas about hybrid warfare. He describes the term as a convergence of regular and irregular threats that use both simple and highly sophisticated technology via decentralized planning and execution.10 ‘Hoffman built this idea by positing hybrid warfare as the synergetic fusion of regular and irregular forces in conjunction with criminal and terrorist behavior which is oriented toward a desired political objective that simultaneously and adaptively unifies all the force’s elements.’11

Hoffman’s claim insists upon a state as well as a non-state entity can fight according to the hybrid principles at all levels of warfare. Be it at the strategic, operational or tactical. The blending effect of his theory is the combination of, or more specifically the optimization of not only regular and irregular warfare forms, but the effects of socially disruptive actions of crime and terrorism, and the result of their strategic messaging effect.12

Israeli military theorists however consider hybrid spectrum warfare to be a method of ‘social warfare’ which is unbound by social constraints and not only gains physical advantage through the combination of regular technological means and operating along irregular lines, as well as by their cognitive advantage and by not adhering to the rules of war consensus.13 From a legal perspective hybrid threats definitely have an advantage. What is also noteworthy is that the hybrid force operates as a network system that is faster than a regular force’s ability to respond to public opinion, shifts in support base and adapt as a result of internal feedback and lessons learned. According to the Israelis this is an orientation towards systems-thinking yet renders the placement of hybrid warfare in the evolution of warfare irrelevant because it requires a mere cognitive rather than material basis normally

9_Ibid 10

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

(14)

12

ascribed to a regular or irregular force. Israeli perspective also points towards an effects-based understanding of hybrid threat versus functionally based understanding, which leads to a universal vice, a tailored approach in responding to hybrid warfare. It does not focus on the synergy of hybrid components and their cognitive element in bringing about a military outcome rather than on the differences in functional capability within the hybrid force.14 According to McCulloh this raises questions in the utility and accuracy of a definition, or description, of hybrid warfare and points to a need for an understanding of the logic or theoretical nature of hybrid warfare rather than an overarching description that fails to transition from one case study to another. He cites Cowan’s model as described in ‘A Full spectrum Air Force’ In this model regular forces usually cover the middle to higher end spectrum in order to offset those of the most likely to be encountered opponents [other regular armed forces]. As Cowan further explains, because of the pressure of globalization, the use of global finance and wide proliferation of information technology hybrid threats gain access to conventional means that traditionally would fall within the realm of middle spectrum capabilities. Examples used by Hezbollah are for instance Kornet anti tank missile systems.15 These assertions are useful to a consideration of the rationale behind as well as an inquiry into factors that motivate and enable the hybrid opponent.

Another very good and brief example of a hybrid definition according to McCulloh comes from LtCol Lasica. According to the Lasica analysis ‘hybrid forces attempt to combine internal tactical success and information effects regarding enemy mistakes through deliberate exploitation of the cognitive and moral domains’.16

As such, Lasica considers hybrid warfare to be both a tactic and a strategy due to the combination of regular, terrorist, criminal and irregular means and methods. As a result, the hybrid force is able to compress the levels of war and thereby accelerate the tempo at the tactical as well as strategic levels in a way that is much faster than a regular force is capable of. According to Lasica’s analysis the hybrid actor will always gain a perceived strategic advantage over the regular force regardless of tactical results. This is what motivates and drives the hybrid force and how it performs.

Biddle and Friedman argue that neither terrorism nor guerilla warfare are the closest to hybrid warfare as they emphasize the ‘by the looks of it’ (semi-)conventional outlook and state-like type of fighting Hezbollah displayed. According to them, the latter is more consistent with Hezbollah’s conduct during the conflict. Key to this statement is that the methods used differ greatly from those usually associated with guerilla, irregular warfare or terrorism as Hezbollah did not hit and run but stood its ground and held on to territory without descending too much into a conventional extreme. On the one hand it fought concealed by means of terrain and concentrated forces, while on the other it

14

Ibid

15

(15)

13

deployed its forces in areas where population support existed and kept up a yielding ground defense by means of harassing fire and relying on unattended minefields, avoiding decisive engagement and thus acted in accordance to guerilla warfare while at the same time holding ground, which is usually associated with conventional warfare. Hezbollah’s methods were therefore somewhere between the guerilla and conventional concepts that have long been linked to regular standing armies. The biggest divergence though lies within the realm of proficiency in execution rather than the doctrine an irregular force tries to execute.17

Both authors point out that another school would describe Hezbollah’s profile as being that of an organization that, although terrorist in nature, fits very well in the information age because it’s prime objective is to make most use of the media and win an information war to rally public support within and beyond Lebanon and solidifying its position as a main political force and forerunner of Arab defiance against Israel. It tries to draw Israel into a guerilla kind of war and focus attention on Israeli escalation and civilian fatalities. The tactics implemented to this strategy are a high-tech version of blending classic guerilla warfare, sniping, the use of modern anti tank missile systems, ambushes, roadside bombing, mortar, –rocket –and harassing fire, as well as using the population as a shield to prevent massive firepower retaliation. What is new to all of this though, is the use of internet and sympathetic news media to publicize own actions as well as those of the state opponent to attract publicity for spectacle purposes.18 Coercion is not necessarily an insurgent’s or a regular forces tactic. That distinction is incorrect because its strategic logic does not apply to one or the other as both ultimately pursue political coercion against their opponents regardless of being a brute standing military force or a guerilla force. Thus asymmetry is only properly regarded as a feature for virtually any strategy rather than as a meaningful distinction between regular and irregular warfare.19 Though this does not mean guerilla and conventional warfare are ultimately the same thing, they are not, yet in the taxonomy of military behavior sense of the word, ‘hybrid’ warfare is their intermediate.

In conclusion it is safe for us to state that a hybrid force will be optimized to fit specific purposes within a clearly defined context and utilize means that are not contained in the regular force. A hybrid force is ultimately best described as an optimized force that combats a regular force with all available assets and in a unique context to produce tailor made results in a conflict against a regular force. Logic is a good indicator for a hybrid force to be formed as it would be constrained by both its readily available resources and the envisioned manner of deploying them to generate a calculated effect on an adversary. The hybrid formation process is based on seven principles that result in commonalities with regard to composition and effects. They are the following:

17

Biddle & Friedman XIV, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the future of warfare (The Lebanon Campaign)

18

Ibidem 4

(16)

14

The first proposition is that a hybrid force’s structure, resources and effects are proprietary to the organization’s own specific temporal, geographic and cultural context in which the armed conflict takes place. Secondly, a hybrid organization is driven by an ideology linked to its strategic context and in which it fundamentally believes. Third, the hybrid force will always perceive an existential threat to a potential adversary, meaning that it drives a hybrid force away from regular military thinking and focus on long-term survival instead. The fourth principle is that overmatching capabilities between hybrid and regular forces exist, be it that the hybrid force contains less regular spectrum resources and is thereby forced to be creative in order to offset the advantage in capabilities enjoyed by its regular opponent. The fifth principle is that any hybrid organization displays regular as well as irregular characteristics that are both often “accepted” military-specific hardware and non-military, guerrilla-type resources. Further elements may be –and are more often than not- the use of outright criminal and terrorist tactics and methods. All these capabilities combined are what is called the overall ‘asymmetric advantage’ of a hybrid force. The sixth principle proposes that a hybrid force inherently relies on a strategically defensive campaign because it seeks to ultimately preserve itself while including an operationally offensive element, which correlates to the seventh principle of using attritional tactics in the cognitive and physical domains. The objective of which is to wear, tear and chew away the regular force’s sheer will to use theirs.20

As a final summary, hybrid warfare is described as the conflict in which one belligerent has based its structure on an amalgamation of all available capabilities, regular as well as irregular, in a culturally unique setting to produce clearly defined, synergistic outcomes against a regular force based adversary. In the next chapter, we will more deeply explore how hybrid warfare is conducted by looking at Hezbollah as a case study.

20_{McCulloh & Johnson 16-17, JSOU Report}

(17)

15

Description and deployment of Hezbollah as the OPFOR

When Hezbollah prepared for war with Israel in 2006 the lion’s share of its operational design was based on the perception that Israelis were no longer willing to accept war and its unavoidable high price. Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah was convinced that Israeli society had become soft and unable to endure wars like it had in the past, and that with enough applied Arab pressure it could be brought to its knees. Building on this premise, Hezbollah predicted that in any future engagement the IDF would restrain from any large ground operations and rely on its air and artillery assets instead.21

Hezbollah planned to bring their combat operation well across Israel’s border while at the same time avoiding succumbing under the weight of Israeli standoff firepower. In order to accomplish this task, Hezbollah organized for several 122mm Katyusha rocket installations to be deployed south of the Litani River scattered across the numerous villages as well as open areas in the entire region. This so-called ‘Nasser unit’ controlled a vast arsenal of these rockets, giving Hezbollah the capability to strike deep into Israel. Its system was simple yet very effective. As soon as spotters determined that a particular area was free of Israeli aircraft, a small unit would prepare the launcher and rapidly leave. Then a second squad would move the rocket to the assembly and quickly retreat from the spot. A third squad would actually arrive and prepare the actual launch by remote control or by means of delayed timer devices. The entire process took only 28 seconds and made use of bicycles for transportation, and the vast majority of rocket supplies were carefully stored in deep underground caches and bunkers with the purpose of protection against precision air missile strikes and artillery bombardment.22

The second rocket unit deployed by Hezbollah utilized Iranian supplied medium range Fajr rockets and extended range Katyusha rockets which were fired from vehicle mounted launch assemblies. It was deployed both north and south of the Litani River. In the area between Beirut and the Litani they also deployed two units equipped with long-range Zelzal-2 and other long range systems. By 2006, Iran and Syria had delivered up 13.000 various range rockets and missiles. Hezbollah’s strategy depended on constant bombardment of Israel in the event of war, not discriminating between civilian and military targets.23 Its aim was to reach maximum disruption of normal daily civilian life in Israel, causing as much casualties as possible and creating havoc, as well as disruption and attrition of the IFD, by staging delaying actions and inflicting losses from its reinforced positions, avoiding loss of terrain to the Israelis and by using guerrilla tactics.24

21

Matthews 17, We were caught unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War. Kansas, 2008 (Caught unprepared) 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24

De Weger c.s. 126, NL Arms Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies - Complex Operations: Lebanon. The Hague 2009 (Complex Ops)

(18)

16

Hezbollah anticipated the most likely Israeli response: taking out targets within the cognitive domain (command and communication centers, logistics bases, key infrastructure etc) first before any proceedings. Therefore it disestablished all of these at the strategic and operational levels, while on the tactical level the exposure of missile systems was minimized by mobility, dispersion and concealment. To the South of the Litani as well as close to the Israeli border, Hezbollah had prepared an entire network of well spread-out, concealed and camouflaged bunkers, tunnels, anti tank warfare positions, storage caches and command –control –and communication [C3] facilities. All these objects were reinforced in order to withstand the impact of heavy weapons. Some of them had hydraulic doors, a myriad of entrances and exits, supply rooms and were equipped with cameras. Thus entire portions of villages were transformed into a fortress.25 Israel’s adversary proved to be particularly effective in understanding decentralized combat operations as it divided Southern Lebanon in three main areas, each of which was in turn split up in several sectors consisting of 12 to 15 villages. This system included an element of deception and operations security by the use of dummy positions and each Hezbollah fighter only knowing his part of the overall operation and the Lebanese civilian population generally being denied access to the areas where defenses had been prepared.26 They also conducted extensive terrain studies. According to De Wever ‘Hezbollah prepared ambushes for as many IDF approaches as possible. Southern Lebanon is mountainous terrain, canalizing because of the many wadis, with little and low growth, offering good possibilities for concealment. In the summer the heat and humidity make circumstances more difficult for maneuvering troops. The many villages offer excellent possibilities for fortification by concealment and cover, and the many hilltops in front of the villages give good fields of observation and fire, sometimes even deep into Israel. The villages consist of many narrow streets and alleys and all the roads lie within a few hundred meters distance from the villages and built-up areas. Because of these circumstances Southern Lebanon is infantry terrain par excellence and less suitable for mechanized units, as they lack the room for maneuver.’27

Booby-traps, minefields, anti tank systems, mortar fire coverage, emplaced obstacles and IED’s enhanced the positions and proved to be force multipliers because the IDF was effectively canalized, delayed and pinned down. Hezbollah skillfully deployed methodical tactics to combat mechanized type units by means of light infantry, anti armor ordnance and fire support from reinforced positions and ambushes that forced the Israelis to engage outside more obvious approach lanes and move through less favorable terrain. As a result they were constantly delayed.28 Hezbollah’s intent with this vast array was ‘to confront ground forces to a limited extent, to stall ground incursions, and inflict as many casualties as possible, which would wear out IDF forces, slow down their progress,

25

Ibidem

26

De Weger c.s. 127, Complex Ops

27

Ibidem

(19)

17 and allow continued rocket fire’.29

Each time the IDF could advance with its attack and the value of Hezbollah’s defensive positions was downgraded, Hezbollah fighters were able to easily fall back to rearward lines, disengage from IDF contact and melt into the civilian population. Only to counter-attack at its discretion and at any moment’s notice. Their fixed defense system was deliberately designed to assist in this manner. Room for maneuver was limited because of Israeli air superiority to smaller, dispersed units that could operate independently and fluidly reinforce weaker positions. Although simple and easily obtainable small arms made up the bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal, it was equipped with hundreds of heavy anti armor missile systems including TOW and Kornet in order to engage Israeli mechanized units.30 The veteran Hezbollah veterans operating these weapons had mostly received their training in Syria and Iran and were capable of conducting elaborate ambushes aimed specifically at heavy armor. They had trained relentlessly to orchestrate a mix of pre-sighted mortar and rocket fire on obvious Israeli approach avenues by means of perfecting forward observing procedures. In conjunction with minefields and IED’s this allowed for a formidable defense against Israeli armor.31

Apart of the vast geographical defensive preparations and supply of armaments, Hezbollah managed to set up a well-developed C3 infrastructure by means of underground glass fiber cables, listening devices, modern computers, GSM cell phones and encryption-capable radio’s. Through these means it was capable of waging electronic warfare against the IDF by tapping in on the Israeli communication network and cell phone traffic.32 Despite this more than adequate C3 system Hezbollah clearly realized it would not be able to control its high number of decentralized small units across the operations sectors if a large scale ground conflict with the IDF would arise. Along with the chosen strategy of a strategically defensive campaign mainly based on a fixed position concept was the downside of this overall arrangement. It implied that Hezbollah would not be able to react any faster than the pace of IDF decision making. Yet on the flip-side it did make possible to dictate the terms on which the IDF would have to operate, for Hezbollah decided when, how and where it would strike.33 ‘They compensated for lack of room for maneuver by sacrifice and resilience, attrition and having fighters operate as stay-behinds behind IDF lines’34 thus making sure that the Israeli troops could not devote their attention on directing a forward attack and had to divert some effort to guarding their rear area.

Hezbollah demonstrated to be extremely proficient in the use of human intelligence as well. Through working with Lebanese intelligence personnel and bribing Israeli agents in Southern Lebanon

29_{Matthews 18, Caught unprepared} 30

31

Matthews 18, Caught unprepared

32

33

(20)

18

into defecting it succeeded in effectively dismantling a sizable Israeli spy network. Deceptive intelligence was also played into the hands of the Israelis and Hezbollah agents were active in Northern Israel as well as the border region.35 The result of Hezbollah releasing quasi information was that the IDF mapped ‘key targets’ that didn’t exist at all.36

Matthews confirms that Hezbollah, being the highly evolved war machine it was, proved to be very adept at strategic planning. By the summer of 2006 they had accurately planned for a conflict based on well-grounded assumptions, and had adjusted its organizational structure. According to the observations made by the IAF Reserve officer in charge of campaign planning, Ron Tira, they designed a war in which Israel could only choose which vulnerable spot it would expose: either one whereby it should have to invade Lebanon and sustain heavy losses in an ongoing attrition facing a guerilla, in which Hezbollah’s trap would leave the IDF with two highly undesirable options. Tactically, Hezbollah addressed Israeli precision strike capability through the reduction of its own weapons signature and exposure time, and by constructing well-laid out, well-prepared fixed defensive positions. Hezbollah was very aware of the fact that Israeli might was out to generate ‘effects’ on its ‘systems’, so it established a network of autonomous sub cells who had very little, if any, inter-cell systemic interaction. Strategically, Hezbollah predicted that Israel would attack them long-range precision weaponry on its strategic centers of gravity and to counter this, they simply did away with them. In any future war with Israel, there would not be any critical assets to attack.37

Concluding this chapter we have come to learn that Hezbollah’s ‘new model’, a combination of regular and guerilla principals, in many ways mirrors the approach of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army during their long struggle with the United States. Matthews suggests that Hezbollah leaders were obviously inspired by and closely studied the Viet Cong’s advanced tunnel network and applied this to the Lebanese terrain, covering the main avenues of approach into Southern Lebanon. Hezbollah proved to be highly efficient in adjusting its tactics and operational design. Their planning was inspired, simple and seemed logical. As we shall see in the next chapter, Israel formulated a new doctrine as well, which unfortunately for them proved to be needlessly complex and ultimately played into the hands of Hezbollah.38

35

36

Matthews 21, Caught unprepared

37

Ibidem

(21)

19

Israeli strategic culture

From July 12, 2006 until August 14, 2006, after the Hezbollah attacks on Israel and the abduction of two of its soldiers, the Israelis retaliated by launching a massive counter attack into Lebanon based on a new doctrine that relied on ‘Effects Based Operations’ [EBO]. ‘Systemic Operational Design’ [SOD] and precision munitions at the expense of utilizing a significant ground forces component. The overreliance on this concept was a very important factor that contributed to the apparently inconclusive outcome of the conflict. EBO is a United States Air Force [USAF] concept that has its origins in the 1990 Persian Gulf War, where it gained joint and international recognition for preparing the way for ground forces. Israel however used ground maneuver as a last resort. Hezbollah successfully predicted this modus operandi and sought to defeat the Israelis through this Achilles heel. The language and methodology involved with SOD proved to be problematic as well as seemed nearly incomprehensible to those responsible for its implementation.

Donahue claims that the Israeli Air Force was unable to destroy or inflict significant losses to Hezbollah but the latter could sustain its constant rocket barrage on Israeli soil. When the Israelis finally deployed a ground operation it became painfully clear that the Army was not prepared and faced a well-prepared and determined adversary.39 According to him, the EBO-based doctrine used by the IDF relied far too much on airpower and too little on ground forces. As a result, Hezbollah was able to marginalize the Israeli Air Force [AIF] by creating hidden fortified bunkers and decentralizing stockpiles of weapons. As soon as it became apparent that the Israelis had no choice but to bring their Army into the conflict, Hezbollah got exactly what it had planned for and could fight the IDF on equal terms, rendering the Israelis unable to achieve decisive military or political victory.40

IAF performance, according to criticism recorded by Donahue, was blamed on the EBO doctrine adopted before the start of OCD. More specifically, because the Israelis incorporated SOD and precision firepower. The original intent of EBO as it was envisioned, developed and executed in 1990 by the USAF was to approach an opponent as a coherent system and to determine the key effects that would achieve the desired military outcome. Utilizing advantages offered by high technology – especially airpower-, EBO sought the most efficient ways to achieve these goals and called for both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against the key elements within that system which as a result would strike the cognitive domain of the enemy, and thereby paralyzing the enemy’s ability to react. Its proponents argued that it had the potential to reduce the overall force requirement and footprint previously required to be victorious as well as reduce casualties and the duration of a conflict. They came to believe that surgical air strikes against critical assets would completely immobilize the enemy.

39

Donahue ii, The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War: Israel’s Grenada (Israel’s Grenada)

(22)

20

Additionally, Israeli advocates came to the conclusion that little if any ground forces would be required to destroy the enemy.41 This interpretation of EBO is fundamentally flawed. What the Israelis did not realize is that EBO, as conceived by the USAF, is a concept meant to be used in a joint campaign that makes use of airpower to prepare the way for ground forces, not replace it. Israel also failed to grasp how a non-state adversary such as Hezbollah was able to succeed in countering Israel’s ‘exclusively precision fires’ approach simply by dispersing and creating a decentralized, largely self-contained C3 system. Why is this crucial? The answer to that question is because we must keep in mind that there is nothing wrong with EBO as such. The problem lies with the Israeli alteration of it. As General Eiland, who was head of Israel’s National Security Council until shortly before hostilities erupted, points out,

“EBO was not the problem, but its fundamental lack of understanding, because the use of concepts –air force versus ground forces- depends on a large number of variables. It is not a matter of concept, or how to choose the right combination of answers depending on terrain, the enemy and other circumstances. The problem was the lack of understanding at the political level which did not provide the answer to key questions and answers one should have formulated: What are the strategic goals for this operation? What is the mission to achieve this goal? How should it be executed in order to achieve these goals? Without this, a sound military plan could not –and was not- devised by the IDF. “42

He always maintained his position that the Israeli government did not hold any real, serious, professional deliberation on how to properly respond to the abduction of the two Army Reservists but simply decided to ‘attack Lebanon or attack in Lebanon’ and then decide afterwards what should really be done. This kind of superficial decision making at the government level made it impossible for the military to develop and propose a coherent military course of action. The government limited itself to ‘approaching’ Hezbollah aggression instead of embracing a specific concept.43

Although, according to General Halutz airpower had become more important in Israeli society because of the general Israeli reluctance to deploy ground troops in Lebanon. Calling up the Reserves and sending in a large Army component was therefore not the obvious first choice according to General Ben-Reuven.44 “The [Israeli] government explained General Halutz in no uncertain terms that they were not interested in a ground campaign in Lebanon”.45 Both Generals noted risk aversion and the desire to keep casualties to a minimum. This factor heavily influenced both the military and political approaches to the war and from that perspective the Israeli political leadership was more inclined to

41

Donahue 1, Israel’s Grenada

42_{Henriksen 127, Air & Space Power Journal: A misapplied and overextended example – Criticism of EBO}

(Criticism of EBO)

43

Henriksen 126, Criticism of EBO

44

(23)

21

play the airpower card. Yet something very crucial stands out in the Israeli politico-military decision process because Generals Halutz and Ben-Reuven seem to disagree on whether or not Halutz in fact ‘sold’ Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Peretz on a new concept he conceived for fighting an exclusively Air Force performed war without the need for Army involvement, without casualties or far less casualties. Allegedly, the political leadership liked that idea a lot. Halutz disputes any such thought as well as the claim that such an approach was ever proposed to anybody in the Cabinet. He only would like to remark that airpower has become far more important in Israeli society than anywhere else due to the sensitivities surrounding casualties. Which, according to the General, implicates one is bound to using the means that are less exposed to the risk of losses and casualties. His statement about the Israeli version is that the notion that EBO is flawed is incorrect, and that Israel merely developed its own version to fit the unique needs of Israel and its situation in the Middle-East. EBO is not at all limited to airpower but encompasses land and sea warfare as well.46 General Ben-Reuven insists that EBO was not the problem either, but has been very vocal in his criticism regarding the political leadership and the chief of staff. In his own words:

“Unfortunately we had a trio at the strategic level that simply was not up to the job. We had a Prime Minister who had too little experience with national security issues, a Defense Minister who knew absolutely nothing about military matters at all nor anything about the Lebanon Theater, and a Chief of Staff that relied very heavily on airpower. We need far better people for decision making at the strategic level.”47

Systemic Operational Design has its origins in Israel when Brigadier Generals Naveh and Tamari created the Operational Theory Research Institute in the mid 1990s. Their initiative was based on the fact that the IDF seriously lacked knowledge and understanding of operational thinking. Naveh and those surrounding him embraced Systems Theory as a way to understand and affect Israel’s operational environment. “The leading advocates of SOD present it as a method that uses critical learning of a shared appreciation of systemic logic to form hypotheses relevant to unique and highly complex situations that evade easy or common sense solutions”.48

SOD attempts to provide commanders with the aptitude necessary to think critically, methodically and systematically about combat and focuses on the enemy while providing the tools to both conceptualize one’s adversary and the own force in order to design the appropriate campaign. SOD is however separate from operational planning due to the significant cognitive differences between the two. After all, operational design deals with the learning process whereas mission planning is about concrete action. But according to Donahue in the traditional operational planning process, design is not separate from the planning process and the vocabulary used by SOD advocates is unintelligible to individuals who are not

46

47

Ibidem

(24)

22

familiar with this theory as the language traces its origin from French postmodern philosophy, literary theory, architecture and psychology.49 Obviously, no average IFD soldier had the time or the inclination to familiarize themselves with the new terminology. Separating design from planning inevitably causes problems due to misunderstandings anyway. It is also questionable whether most IDF officers were able to grasp Naveh’s theories and whether it made sense to replace a tested and tried system of keeping everything simple and basic with a theory that only a few understood in the first place and did away with the familiar terminology.50 Naveh believed that if the IDF officer corps would familiarize itself with post-modern, non-military theories it would equip the IDF with the skills necessary for dealing with the complex and evolving realities of warfare. Kober is right in his observation that as a result the IDF was studying the work of architects. During his lectures Naveh emphasized using diagrams that resemble ‘a square of opposition’ that plotted a set of logical relationships between military and guerilla operations. He labeled these with numerous phrases such as ‘Difference and Repetitions – The Dialects of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Maneuver’, ‘Velocity versus Rhythms’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists and Nomadic Terrorists’ et cetera and referenced the works of Deleuze and Guattari. These philosophers claim that ‘war machines’ are polymorphous, meaning that they are diffuse organizations characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of smaller groups that split and merge depending on the contingency and circumstances. The classic military thinkers became no more than names whose works would sporadically be cited, but not at all studied in-depth.51

Not only was the idea of ‘effects’ elusive, the IDF distanced itself from the simple notion of the center of gravity and the concentration of effort. “The ambiguity of the language used in reference to EBO was a serious problem. Terms like ‘swarmed, multi-dimensional, simultaneous attack’ came at the expense of simple and straightforward definitions of objectives and missions.”52 The new focus on precision fire power was a clear departure from Israel’s previous doctrine in which it aimed for a technological edge over its enemies by acquiring the most advanced weapon systems on the market. Despite the Israelis were well aware of the dangers of over-reliance on technology, their new operational doctrine was heavily technology orientated nevertheless. “Stressing the ascendancy of firepower over maneuver, it focused on achieving battlefield success via a combination of accurate precision fires, standoff fire and limited operations on the ground, the need to affect the enemy’s consciousness, and the diminishing role of large-scale ground maneuvers”.53

49

50_Ibidem 51

Kober 32, The Israeli Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: why the poor performance? (Poor performance)

52

Kober 33, Poor performance

(25)

23

The years preceding the conflict had seen massive budget cuts in the Army, with deteriorated training standards, lack of equipment investments and materiel readiness as a result. In 2001 Halutz even opted for the abolishment of land warfare altogether as he was an advocate of precision fires at the expense of ground maneuver.54 The new Israeli doctrine eliminated the Corps echelon and right before the war there were plans to abolish the Division as well because Halutz did not recognize the need for any formation larger than the Brigade. In fact he did not understand anything about land warfare in general and ground forces in particular at all.55 The severe lack of Army funding in the years leading up to OCD proved to have fatal consequences. As a result of Israeli style EBO, with its emphasis on airpower, the Army had no priority. Funding shortages would undercut personnel strength and degrade the quality of both equipment and training. These budget cuts stretched the Army to the limit as it downgraded itself to a policing force countering local Palestinian uprisings as war fighting skills such as the proper use of tanks vanished over the years with their crews performing merely patrol duties along the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. Armored warfare and ground maneuver training had seized to exist within the IDF. The Reserves, equipment purchase and maintenance were significantly cut with the overall budget allocated to the Army severely decreased. Training and readiness levels dropped sharply over 6 years with many officers feeling that subaltern level fighting quality being inadequate before and during OCD. Most Reserve units that were called up only received a week of rushed refresher training held during hostilities before they were sent into Lebanon. Veterans state that when the Army was brought into the conflict it was underequipped and lacked supplies.56

Many higher ranking Army Active Duty and Reserve officers had not gone through proper training in years either. Brigadier Generals and commanders above the Brigade echelon had not overseen training of their units for years. Skills had seriously watered away in the Army due to the lack of up-keep. The new doctrine did not foresee a role for ground forces above the Brigade echelon and the Army was in no condition to engage in any large-scale confrontation when it would really matter most.57 The Division and Brigade echelons suffered immensely from the post-2000 priority shifts as early in 2000 the Army focused its attention away from fighting a major war to engaging in little skirmishes and policing tasks against Palestinian mobs which they could easily outgun and outperform. Yet the Army was in no shape to confront an enemy as skilled, capable, determined and disciplined as Hezbollah. Tank crews had been retrained to perform guard and patrol duties instead of using their vehicles and fighting a maneuver battle in open terrain. Instead, tanks were to be used as pillboxes or bulldozers as personnel was spending more time doing foot patrols than training for armored maneuver warfare and did not gain any experience as tankers. This interwar reorientation on

54

55

56

FilmAt11tv, The Lebanon War 2006, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95LcFRfEzFk

(26)

24

tackling the Palestinians reduced the Army from the once formidable war machine to a conscripted and reserve constabulary at best. 58 In terms of equipment, much of it was undersupplied, worn out or outdated. Proper maintenance was not being performed and reliability and readiness suffered consequently. Equipment was even missing from stores and there were noticeable shortages of food, water and ammunition for units operating within Lebanon. This was most probably caused by the highly centralized logistical system that crippled the logistics autonomy of combat units, which runs counter to strategic logic.59 The Merkava Mk4 main battle tank needs an active protection system incorporating reactive armor countermeasures in order to survive Anti Tank Guided Missile [ATGM] attacks, but the Israeli government did not sufficiently upgrade the tank as a result of the massive Army budget cuts. Hence the machines were extremely vulnerable to Hezbollah ATGM fire.60 Because of the focus on Low-Intensity Conflict the IAF had not acquired heavy anti-structure munitions. After all, they were not useful against counterinsurgency operations against the Palestinians. What the Israelis did not realize is that in the meantime Hezbollah anticipated this and as a result would rely on the construction of deep underground structures to address the challenge of Israeli airpower.

We close this chapter by concluding that Israel had simply lost its entire ability to conduct high-spectrum combat operations. It is likely that the reason not to plan for any alternatives to the reliance on airpower and the IDF’s overall low quality in training, readiness and preparation for war might be related to the fact that Israel never wanted to fight any war in Lebanon ever again after the withdrawal in 2000, yet it somehow knew that it might have to face another conflict there someday. The entire IDF’s performance was diminished during the 2006 war as Hezbollah achieved its desired effects.

58

Chadwick 5, The 2006 Lebanon War: A short story, Small Wars Journal (The Lebanon War)

59

Kober 29, Poor performance

What went wrong with the IDF

Table of Contents

Introduction

Abstract

Approach

Sources

Hybrid Warfare Theory

Description and deployment of Hezbollah as the OPFOR

Israeli strategic culture