Contemporary
Salafi-jihadism in The Netherlands
A study into the roles of Dutch jihadists in
contemporary Salafi-jihadism through the judgements
of Dutch terrorism court case since mid-2013
Charlotte Renckens s2075946
Crisis and Security Management
Supervisor: Dr. B.W. Schuurman Second reader: Prof.dr. E. Bakker Wordcount: 15562
Abstract
This thesis argues that contemporary Salafi-jihadism presents a game-changer in global jihadism due to its state-building aspirations. Police and judicial information on Dutch jihadists was examined for the period between 2000 and 2013 to analyse the activities these jihadist undertook and what roles they fulfilled. However, there has not been a systematic analysis of police and judicial information for the period since mid-2013, which saw the first court case of an individual wanting to join the jihad in Syria. However, studying police and judicial information can be highly insightful, as the police and the judiciary have different mandates than researchers. This thesis aims to be a starting point for further research into police and judicial information, and to that end it examines the content of 71 court cases of Dutch jihadists since mid-2013. The research question is thus: what does a systematic analysis of Dutch court cases of jihadist terrorism suspects since mid-2013 reveal about the roles they played in contemporary Salafi-jihadism? The thesis has an exploratory research design, and uses a content analysis with preconceived codes to examine the 71 judgements. The results of the content analysis shows two strands of answers that address the research question. First, the analysis gives an insight into the prevalence of certain roles. Second, the first part of the analytical section reveals a more in-depth context with regard to each role, which may create starting points for further research. Indeed, this thesis concludes that it is only a first step in uncovering what the police and the judiciary have established with regard to contemporary Salafi-jihadism.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ... 1
1.1 Opening ... 1 1.2 Academic relevance ... 1 1.3 Societal relevance ... 3 1.4 Research goal ... 4 1.5 Methods ... 4 1.6 Lay out ... 62. Literature review ... 6
2.1 Historical background ... 6 2.1.1 History of Salafi-jihadism ... 62.1.2 History of Foreign Fighters ... 7
2.1.3 History of al-Qaeda ... 8
2.2 Contemporary Salafi-jihadism ... 8
2.2.1 The state-building aspirations of contemporary Salafi-jihadism ... 8
2.2.2 Contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups ... 9
2.2.3 Manifestations of Salafi-jihadist groups in The Netherlands ... 11
2.2.4 Characteristics of Dutch jihadists ... 12
2.2.5 Motivations for becoming a foreign fighter ... 12
2.3 The roles of Dutch jihadists ... 13
2.3.1 The general roles of men within contemporary Salafi-jihadism ... 13
2.3.2 The roles of men within caliphates ... 14
2.3.3 The general roles of women within contemporary Salafi-jihadism ... 16
2.3.4 The roles of women within caliphates ... 17
3. Methods ... 19
3.1 Research design ... 19
3.2 Methodology ... 20
3.3 The coding process ... 21
3.4 Definitions ... 24
3.5 Limitations ... 26
4. Analysis and reflection ... 27
4.1 Introduction ... 27 4.2 Roles ... 30 4.2.1 Advocacy ... 30 4.2.2 Fighting ... 30 4.2.3 Financing ... 31 4.2.4 Household ... 31 4.2.5 Leadership ... 31 4.2.6 Military (non-combatant) ... 32 4.2.7 Professional ... 32 4.2.8 Recruitment ... 32 4.2.9 Training ... 34 4.2.10 Violent ... 34
4.3 Implications regarding the literature ... 35
4.3.1 General roles of Dutch jihadists ... 35
4.3.2 Roles of Dutch jihadists within a caliphate ... 37
4.4 Addressing the research question ... 39
4.5 Reflection ... 40
5. Conclusion and recommendations ... 41
5.1 Conclusion ... 41
5.2 Recommendations ... 43
6. Reference list ... 45
1. Introduction
1.1 Opening
Since approximately 20121 the world has been confronted with a new phenomenon in global jihadism: the existence of state-building groups that strive to establish states built on Islamic foundations (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 7). The best-known example of this is, of course, Islamic State (IS), but several al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria and Iraq also have some state-building characteristics (Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 6). Both groups originate from an organisation originally called al-Qaeda in Iraq, and both hail from contemporary Salafi-jihadism. There are also differences between the groups, however. In this thesis, contemporary Salafi-jihadism is defined as an ideology that combines a Salafi desire to go back to the ‘root of Islam’ with a jihadist violent call to action, particularly to use violent means to establish a caliphate. The ideology can be propagated both in a caliphate as well as from any other place, for example, The Netherlands. This is further explored in the literature review and methodology section.
These groups have attracted a new wave of (western) foreign fighters since approximately 2012, including approximately 300 Dutch individuals who left for Syria and Iraq to join the struggle there (Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 39; NCTV, 2018, p. 3). Other jihadist terrorism suspects chose to be active for these groups within the Netherlands, for example by plotting terrorist attacks or recruiting people to join the groups in Syria and Iraq. Many of those individuals have been tried for a number of different crimes in Dutch courts, even some who are currently still residing in Syria or Iraq. Their court cases give an insight into the functioning of contemporary Salafi-jihadism, and the roles the suspects played in advancing that ideology.
1.2 Academic relevance
The surge of state-building groups has heralded a new chapter in global jihadism; it is a ‘game-changer in the global jihadist arena’ (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 9). The rise of this new ideology has had grave consequences, both for geopolitical constellations as well as for individuals suffering under the yolk of contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups. Thorough analysis of this new chapter in global jihadism is
1 The start of the Syrian uprising was in 2011; the Syrian regime’s response and the backlash this evoked proved a trigger for this new manifestation of jihadist terrorism (Saltman and Winter, 2014: 8).
thus necessary.
Dutch jihadists have been the focus of extensive research already (see for example De Poot and Sonnenschein, 2011; De Bie and De Poot, 2016; Bakker and Grol, 2017; Weggemans, Peters, Bakker and De Bont, 2016), focusing both on earlier manifestations of jihadist terrorism (such as the Hofstad group) as well as on the current manifestation of it. Many of these Dutch studies make use of primary sources, which is line with the broader development of increased use of primary sources in terrorism studies (Schuurman, 2018, p. 10). However, when the current manifestation of global jihadism is discussed, the focus usually lies on those who chose to become foreign fighters rather than on those who propagate the ideology in The Netherlands. It is not uncommon for Dutch authors to conduct interviews with respondents (for example Weggemans et al., 2016; Bakker and Grol, 2015) to gain information about their time in Salafi-jihadist groups or about relatives or acquaintances that were part of such groups. Indeed, interviews with respondents are important primary sources and its use should therefore be commended. Nevertheless, to a certain extent verifiability is a trap here; these respondents do not necessarily tell the whole truth. Subsequently, it is difficult for researchers to establish what exactly happened, even if respondents are frank. This problem is not unique for researchers; for the police and the public prosecutor it is also difficult to establish what happens within Salafi-jihadist groups, especially when it concerns acts within a caliphate (Lingsma, 2017). However, the police and the public prosecutor have investigative mandates that researchers do not have. For example, under certain conditions they can tap phones, bug buildings, or use undercover agents, as part of ‘far-reaching investigative measures’ (bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdheden in Dutch). This means that the police and the public prosecutor sometimes have access to information that a suspect never wanted to share, whereas in voluntary interviews respondents will only share what they want to share. The findings of the police and public prosecutor are thus potentially a valuable source to gain more insight into Salafi-jihadist groups (although some more critical remarks are made about this below).
the need for both the study of police and judicial material as well as ‘other empirical material’ (p. 5). It is important to note that the classified police files of Dutch jihadists have been studied up to 2013 by De Bie and De Poot (starting in 2000) (De Bie and De Poot, 2016, p. 582). I would argue that for the new chapter in global jihadism (identified here as starting around mid-2013), there is valuable ‘other’ empirical material, mainly in the form of interviews with respondents as discussed above. However, there is no systematic analysis of court judgements to research the roles of Dutch jihadists within contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups as of yet.
This is surprising, as an analysis of that information can give valuable insights into the functioning of contemporary Salafi-jihadism, and the roles Dutch suspects played in advancing that ideology.What makes this even more surprising is that some legal data is freely available, and so accessibility should not be a problem (Schuurman and Eijkman, 2013, p. 4). Perhaps the lack of systematic analysis of judicial information can partly be explained by the fact that most social scientists are not also lawyers, but nevertheless it is high time that this information is taken into account. Court judgements since mid-2013 constitute a fairly large amount of data: 71 judgements have been identified so far with potentially valuable information about the roles of Dutch jihadist terrorism suspects within contemporary Salafi-jihadism. These judgements potentially form an important source of information, especially given the fact that research into the roles of Dutch jihadists ‘is scarce and findings widely diverge’ (Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 66).
1.3 Societal relevance
The research also has societal relevance: now that individuals that joined jihadist groups in Syria and/or Iraq are (slowly) returning to the Netherlands, the question of their potential danger is more pertinent and urgent. In addition, Salafi-jihadist groups seem to be rapidly evolving now that most (or all) of their territory has been lost (NTCV, 2018, p. 3). This could potentially strain the Dutch national security climate; Dutch society and the intelligence services tasked with keeping it safe are confronted with yet another rapid transformation of the threat posed by Salafi-jihadist terrorism (NCTV, 2018, p. 2-4). It is therefore important to establish as complete a picture as possible of the functioning of contemporary Salafi-jihadism, and the roles Dutch suspects played in advancing that ideology.
Despite the fact that research on the roles of western and Dutch jihadist terrorism suspects is already available – although Bakker and Grol argue limitedly so (2017, p. 66) – a potentially important angle is missing. To concur with Poot and Sonnenschein: police and judicial information provide ‘a unique view of the world of jihadism and makes a valuable contribution to the development of our empirical knowledge in this area’ (De Poot and Sonnenschein, 2011, p. 5). First, this insight into ‘the world of jihadism’ is important for possible legal steps against individuals who commit crimes in the name of that ideology, and second it is important to create transparency and clarity for the Dutch public about the possible risks connected to contemporary Salafi-jihadism. The potential danger of the ideology leads to societal unrest and has political implications, which necessitates solid research into the ideology and the acts of individuals acting in support of it. A better insight into the jihadist scene ‘could contribute to an earlier identification of potential terrorists and that authorities can intervene before it is too late’ (Bakker, 2017, p. 54).
1.4 Research goal
The goal of this thesis is to systematically analyse Dutch terrorism court cases since mid-2013, in order to complement the current research data that exists on the new state-building chapter in global jihadism. This timeframe is chosen because October 2013 saw the first Dutch court case of an individual who was found to have wanted to join the ‘jihad’ in Syria2, and can thus be seen as the starting point of litigation with regard to contemporary Salafi-jihadism.
1.5 Methods
As mentioned on the above, no systematic analysis has been conducted of police and judicial information over the period since 2013, which roughly coincides with the onset of contemporary Salafi-jihadism. For that reason, a systematic analysis is all the more crucial. For feasibility purposes and out of accessibility considerations, this thesis focuses on publicly available judicial information: the judgements of the
2 This is the case of Mohammed G. (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:8265), who was acquitted from prosecution because he was found not to be criminally responsible due to a psychiatric disorder. Instead, he was ordered to spend a year in a psychiatric hospital. This case was not analysed in this thesis due to the acquittal, but it nevertheless forms the starting point of the timeframe.
terrorism court cases. Contact was sought with the public prosecutor’s office to request the police files of a smaller sample of Dutch jihadist terrorist suspects, but unfortunately access to these files is in principle not given for thesis purposes. Therefore, this thesis conducts a directed content analysis on 71 judgements, the first one dating back to 23 October 2013 and the last one to 18 April 2018.
In total there are 82 judgements of jihadist terrorism court cases taking place in the Netherlands during that timeframe (to the extent that this could be determined through publicly available information). However, when the court could not establish that a terrorism-related offence was committed, this thesis omits those judgements. Of the 11 cases that were omitted, eight ended in an acquittal, one was sent back to a Court of Appeal by the Supreme Court, and two ended in a conviction for crimes that were not linked to terrorism. Some judgements concern the same person, as sometimes either the defendant or the public prosecutor appealed decisions. This is not a problem for the analysis, since the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court often highlight different information. In addition, this fact was taken into consideration when counting the prevalence of certain roles: tables were made manually with the knowledge that the 51 cases that contained relevant information concerned 38 individuals.
In 40 of those 71 cases, the court was able to establish that the individuals participated in a terrorist organisation in the legal sense. In the other 30 cases, suspects were convicted for terrorism-related offences, such as preparation of terrorist crimes, incitement to commit terrorist crimes, training for terrorism, and financing of terrorism. This thesis takes the liberty to include those latter judgements in the analysis too, since the terrorism-related offences were committed in the context of contemporary Salafi-jihadism and the existence of IS and al-Qaeda affiliates. Often the judgements in which terrorist crimes were discussed are in itself a richer source than those cases where the court had to decide whether a suspect had participated in a terrorist organisation or not.
A brief note about the content of these judgements is warranted. If there was no other information available and the judgements would be stand-alone information, the data would be lacking: it is neither necessarily complete nor neutral. After all, the
information in the judgements was acquired with the aim of prosecution (Schuurman and Eijkman, 2013, p. 5). In addition, a judgement in itself only presents the final stage of the entire investigative and judicial process. Finally, the information that flows out of these judgements is not only a result of what suspects did or did not do; it also depends heavily on the charges, what court handles with the case and the extensiveness of the published judgement. A judgement is therefore not a complete overview of all information that arose during that process (De Bie and De Poot, 2016, p. 595).
Nevertheless, despite this partial incompleteness, the information in these judgements combined with the already available information about Dutch jihadists gained from extensive research and the use of interviews, together provide ‘a unique view of the world of jihadism’ (De Poot and Sonnenschein, 2011, p. 5). This thesis should be regarded as a first step in mapping a source of information that is under explored by researchers: judicial information.
1.6 Lay out
The research question that this thesis addresses is:What does a systematic analysis of Dutch court cases of jihadist terrorism suspects since mid-2013 reveal about the roles they played in contemporary Salafi-jihadism? The unit of analysis is thus jihadist terrorism suspects since mid-2013. The unit of observation is the judgements of 71 Dutch terrorism trials since mid-2013. To address the research question, first an overview of the relevant literature is given, focusing on the functioning of contemporary Salafi-jihadism, and the roles Dutch suspects played in advancing that ideology. Next, the methodology is laid out. A directed content analysis is conducted, with codes that emanate from the literature review. Finally, the results of the directed content analysis are discussed in the analysis.
2. Literature review
2.1 Historical background
2.1.1 History of Salafi-jihadism
Salafi-jihadism stems firstly from the broader ideology of Islamism. This ideology was developed at the end of the 19th century and believes that ‘by applying Islam to
social and political life, removing it from its otherwise private function as a religion and using it to guide ‘social and political as well as personal life’, a utopian Islamic society could be brought into existence’. Jihadism then should be seen as a ‘violent subcategory of Islamism’ (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 13).
It was the Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam who radically transformed the notion of jihad in the 1980s. Traditionally jihad is perceived as a collective obligation in Islam (with a distinction between jihad as an inward versus an outward struggle), but influential Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj posited that it was in fact an individual obligation. The ‘lesser jihad’ or outward struggle, which ‘sanctions the use of violence’, thus became an individual duty of each and every Muslim according to these thinkers (Bakker, 2006, p. 1-2). Abdullah Azzam subsequently used this thinking for actual mobilisation, calling for Muslims in 1979 to join the fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet invaders to defend the global Muslim community (ummah) (Van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, 2014, p. 2).
In the ideology of Salafi-jihadism, this notion of jihad is coupled to the ideology of Salafism. Salafism is a strand within Islam that aims to experience and live the religion the way it was done by the first generations of Muslims in the seventh and eighth century; Islam should be brought back to its roots (Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 44). The combination between violent jihadism and Salafism is one of the characteristics of contemporary Salafi-jihadism.
2.1.2 History of foreign fighters
As explained in the introduction, some Dutch jihadists are inspired by contemporary Salafi-jihadism to leave for Syria or Iraq to join the fight there, while others propagate the ideology in The Netherlands. Just like the current strands of Salafi-jihadism did not just appear randomly, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is also far from new. Generally, foreign fighters are as old as ‘human history’ and therefore far from a uniquely Muslim phenomenon (Mendelsohn, 2011, p. 189). Foreign fighters inspired by jihadism first appeared in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion (from 1979 onwards), following the call of Abdullah Azzam. Conflicts that consequently drew Muslim foreign fighters eager to defend the ummah were Bosnia (from 1992 onwards) and Somalia (from 2006 onwards) (Van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, 2014, p. 2).
In many cases these foreign fighters did not simply return home after the fight was fought; instead, there are a number of pathways that can be taken. These pathways can broadly be divided into staying in the conflict country, leaving the conflict country or death (Van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, 2014, p. 10).
2.1.3 History of al-Qaeda
In order to understand contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups affiliated to al-Qaeda, it is important to briefly go over al-Qaeda’s history and its development over the years. Al-Qaeda’s founding documents were published in the late 1980s against the backdrop of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Its organisational predecessor was Maktab al-Khadamat, an organisation founded by Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden to channel donor funds to the fighters in Afghanistan. It was only in the 1990s that al-Qaeda became a truly global movement, when Bin Laden launched his ‘declaration of war’ against the United States and its allies. Of course the height of its anti-US actions was formed by its attacks on the World Trade Center’s towers on 9/11. However, the soon ensuing US ‘war on terror’ marked the beginning of al-Qaeda’s ‘unravelling’: it was forced to decentralise and to disperse. This created leeway for al-Qaeda affiliates to rise to the surface. Indeed, ‘without a doubt, the greatest threat al-Qaeda presents today originates from its affiliates, not the “Central” branch’ (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 15-22). These affiliates are discussed below.
2.2 Contemporary Salafi-jihadism
2.2.1 The state-building aspirations of contemporary Salafi-jihadism
In the methodological section contemporary Salafi-jihadism is defined in more detail, but a few perspectives on the state-building aspirations of the ideology is shared here. The new chapter in Salafi-jihadism came with the rise of so-called ‘state-building groups’. Recent research by Khelghat-Doost developed an interesting new typology for jihadist groups by making a distinction between groups that are in the first place operational and groups that focus on state building. Operation-based groups are principally concerned with committing violent acts; ‘the main political objective of such organizations is to remove Western powers from Muslim lands and to fight local authorities … and ultimately restore Islamic law’. These groups do not hold territory, and as such ‘their internal structure is based on clandestine cellular networks, which minimize “damage due to interdiction by counterinsurgents by limiting information
interface and distribution with other members of the organization.”’. The central branch of Al-Qaeda should for example be seen as such an operation-based group (Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 4-7).
State-building groups are groups that ‘use violent means to establish their “states” (i.e., caliphates)’ and that actually hold territory, although their territory can be fluid. Since the objective is to establish a state, the organisational structure resembles that of a state in terms of hierarchy. For example, ‘the governing structure of ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham are comprised of several councils, including military, consultative, defense and intelligence, and judiciary’ (Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 4-7).
Saltman and Winter concurred with Khelghat-Doost that the state-building aspirations of contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups is a truly novel feature for global jihadism: What we can be sure of is that the failed uprisings in places like
Syria and Libya have laid fertile ground for a sort of renaissance for al-Qaeda-linked jihadism. However, this same instability has also been an incubator for something else, a new adaptation of Islamist-motivated terrorism and what is best described as a departure from the al-Qaeda norm, an evolution from it (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 25).
They argued that IS represents a ‘game-changer’ with its establishment of a caliphate. However, IS in itself is not necessarily an entirely new phenomenon according to the authors; its rise is rather ‘something of a natural progression’ from the development of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in the 1990s and 2000s, as a consequence of the political turbulence in the region (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 9-11). Interestingly enough, there are recent indications that with the loss of territory of these two groups, these state-building groups are now progressing towards a more operation-based nature (NCTV, 2018, p. 2).
2.2.2 Contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups
Al-Qaeda in Iraq is the birth mother of both IS and al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria and Iraq. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was founded as Tawhid w-al-Jihad in 2004 by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 23-29). In January 2012 Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) was founded as a sub-affiliate of Al-Qaeda in Iraq to fight against Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Soon, however, the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Syrian branch (JaN) started to fight, which in 2014 resulted in a split between the central branch of al-Qaeda and its affiliate al-Qaeda in Iraq, the latter being under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After the split, al-Qaeda in Iraq was renamed as the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The leadership of JaN remained loyal to Qaeda (Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 36). Saltman and Winter identified IS and al-Qaeda affiliated as ‘different branches of the same ideology’, they also note how their strategies are considerably different (2014, p. 4).
The aim of JaN was to establish an Islamic state in lieu of the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Weggemans et al., 2016: 44). In July 2016 JaN took the name of ‘Jabhat Fateh al-Sham’ and officially split from al-Qaeda (Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 42; Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 2). However, in January 2017 the group merged into a collective called Tahrir al-Sham, which is generally perceived as an al-Qaeda affiliate. Despite its territorial losses, estimates in March 2018 suggest that ‘in Syria alone, al-Qaeda now has upwards of twenty thousand men under arms’ (Hoffman, 2018).
Although IS originally grew out of an al-Qaeda affiliate, its strategy is markedly different from traditional al-Qaeda doctrine: ‘while al-Qaeda developed an outward-looking strategy under Osama bin Laden that focussed on destabilising the West before trying to establish a “caliphate”, IS has looked inwards first in establishing a state’. As such, IS reversed al-Qaeda’s strategy (Winter and Saltman, 2014, p. 9-17). Tracing the foundations of IS back to Sunni movements within Iraq, Whiteside discerns five phases in the group’s development: building (2002-2005), expansion (2005-2007), preserving (2008-2011), second expansion (2011-2013), and decisive strategic offensive (2013-2016) (Whiteside, 2016, p. 8-13). Reaping the results of the political chaos in both Syria and Iraq, on 29 June 2014 IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a caliphate, spanning Syria and Iraq (Winter and Saltman, 2014, p. 32).
The state structure of IS is hierarchical. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was first its emir and then its caliph, leads the group together with the Consultative Council. Ministries
were gradually established, with a total of fourteen ministries in the summer of 2014. Five of these ministries concern themselves with the implementation of the sharia (Islamic law), which is regarded as the ‘raison d’être’ of the caliphate. At the height of its territorial span, the caliphate was divided into a number of different provinces (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 35-40). Given the recent and severe territorial losses of the group, it is unclear how much of the organisational structure still stands.
Despite the relatively recent nature of the IS caliphate, IS quickly became notorious around the world. Beside the obvious novelty of having established a caliphate, there are two other main reasons for this: its use of online tools, and its use of extreme and theatrical violence. According to Saltman and Winter, its use of online tools was innovative in four distinct areas: ‘centralised propaganda, global dissemination of threats, developing new coding and apps, and decentralised messaging’ (2014, p. 38). Youtube and Twitter were important platforms for the group to spread its propaganda and messages. Research found that although the posts appearing on these platforms seemed spontaneous, they were often strictly managed (Klausen, 2015, p. 17-19). Telegram, a peer-to-peer network known for its encryption and security measures, is also one of IS’ favourite online tools to spread propaganda and to recruit people (Bloom, Tiflati and Horgan, 2017, p. 1-5). These online tools were in part used to spread notoriety for IS’ other distinct feature: its use of indiscriminate extreme violence such as beheadings, crucifixions, drowning and burning (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 31).
2.2.3 Manifestations of Salafi-jihadist groups in The Netherlands
In 2014 the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) noted a number of transformations in the Dutch manifestations of Salafi-jihadist groups heralded by the new state-building chapter in global jihadism. First, Dutch networks professionalised themselves and improved their modus operandi. Second, jihadists came out in the open to provocatively voice their opinions and their beliefs. Third, Dutch jihadists took to the internet to spread messages – much like their global counterparts. Fourth and finally, the structure of the jihadist movement changed into a swarm-like nature: ‘it is a strongly decentralised network, moving fast and being very flexible’ (AIVD, 2014, p. 2). This decentralisation was a result of both external pressure as well as internal strife (Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 51). The openness and
provocation described by the AIVD in 2014 changed mid-2015, when the National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security (NCTV) noted that Dutch jihadists started to keep a low profile both online and offline (NCTV, 2017, p. 3).
With the recent loss of most (or almost all) of the jihadist groups’ territory, the NCTV noted that the Dutch jihadist movement is rapidly transforming again. Since travelling to Syria and Iraq to join the fight there is no longer an option, the Dutch jihadist movement has reverted to what were its main activities pre-2012, focusing on preaching and social activities. In the first months of 2018 the NCTV also noted an increase in online IS propaganda, after a gradual but steady decrease in 2017 (2018, p. 3).
2.2.4 Characteristics of Dutch jihadists
There is no ‘standard-type’ Dutch jihadist. Their different characteristics make it difficult to pinpoint exactly what turns one into a jihadist. A study into the lives of Dutch jihadists observed a couple of key elements that many of them share: amongst others, traumatic experiences in (family) life, difficulties
at school or work, confrontations with charismatic persons, personal disappointments, trouble with the authorities, a change of home address, developments at school, (new) friendships, and an increased interest in religion (Weggemans et al., 2014, p. 104).
Additional research points to other shared characteristics among Dutch jihadists. For most of them chances on the labour market are limited, and they have few friends and/or limited contact with their families. Many have romantic or even utopian ideas about caliphates, rather than big ideas about martyrdom. In addition, ‘there is a strong – often persistent – conviction that travelling to Syria is necessary or may become necessary again, now or in the future. This conviction can be based on ideals or on specific personal arguments and it is often a mixture both’ (Bakker and Grol, 2015, p. 13).
2.2.5 Motivations for becoming a foreign fighter
‘potential foreign fighters’, suggested a number of motivating factors for leaving to Syria. These are: the idea of having a ‘new beginning’, religious motivations, a sense of duty to support people in need, and admiration for the jihad against the Assad regime. Government intervention seemed to have had mixed effects on these individuals; sometimes they withdrew into the jihadist scene even more but sometimes they also felt supported in making future plans in the Netherlands (Bakker and Grol, 2015, p. 14). Other research suggested additionally that leaving to Syria might provide a ‘sense of purpose’ and belonging to individuals who did not feel that in the Netherlands (Weggemans et al., 2014, p. 107). Often (a perception of) social injustice with regard to the own position in western society and perceived or actual discrimination makes people feel that they are not allowed to be part of western society, and therefore they sometimes decide that they do not want to be a part of anymore (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 22).
The next section describes the roles of Western and Dutch individuals within contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups. These groups are known for their rigid and orthodox ideas about the role of men and women (Saltman and Smith, 2015, p. 5). Therefore, the next section is divided among gender lines: first the roles of men are discussed, and then the role of women.
2.3 The roles of Dutch jihadists
2.3.1 The general roles of men within contemporary Salafi-jihadism
When the current manifestation of global jihadism is discussed, the focus usually lies on those who chose to become foreign fighters rather. However, not all men decide in favour of leaving to Syria or Iraq to contribute to the jihadist group there. In fact, some stay in the Netherlands and ‘find other ways of supporting Syria / Muslims in need’ (Bakker and Grol, 2015, p. 13). Bjørgo proposed three types of jihadists: the ideological activists, the drifters and followers, and socially frustrated youths (2011, p. 280-284). This is an interesting typology, because it presents dynamic categories and is not just inspired by jihadism but by militant extremism more broadly.
The ideological activists play ‘leading roles in terrorist cells’. They are usually charismatic, most ideologically convinced and often driven by a sense of justice. The drifters and the followers are not primarily motivated by ideology; instead they are
more motivated by the fact that ‘being part of a powerful group provides a powerful identity’. Whether they would use violence depends on group dynamics, as it is mostly a sense of belonging that they seek. Bjørgo presented converts as a special breed of drifters, as they often need to put in more effort to feel as belonging to the group. Finally, the socially frustrated youths feel disadvantaged and are attracted to militancy because it can be a powerful outlet for the frustration they feel (Bjørgo, 2011, p. 280-284).
Unfortunately, hardly any literature describes specifically how men interact with contemporary Salafi-jihadism (articles specifically on women are more common). For more information on this, recourse is thus to be had to general research on Dutch jihadists regardless of gender. In their research on Dutch jihadists, De Poot and Sonnenschein generally distinguished four kinds of activities Dutch jihadists take place in. The first is conversion, education, training; basically the sustainment of the ideology. The second kind is attacks, threats and the preparations necessary to carry those out. The third kind of activity is facilitation of those two ‘jihadi core activities’. Finally, the fourth kind of activity Dutch jihadists partake in is protection from law enforcement: for example, using encryption programmes to ensure secrecy (De Poot and Sonnenschein, 2011, p. 93).
2.3.2 The roles of men within caliphates
The roles of men within caliphates is more widely documented, especially with regard to the IS caliphate. When western foreign fighters want to join the IS caliphate, they must undergo a specific procedure when they cross from Turkey into Syria (the usual route). Usually, a contact person brings them to an IS safe house, where men and women are separated and have to hand in all their possessions. During a maximum of three to four weeks they are questioned about their background and motivation to join IS, and they are continuously guarded. Despite this caution, it seemed relatively easy to be admitted into the group especially in its early days; this changed later when a recommendation became required (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 46-47).
After this period in the safe house, the men are sent to training camps. While in the safe houses the men were clustered according to geographical background, this is no longer the case in the training camps. Here they are taught the Arabic language, and
they receive classes in theology and military matters. The camp takes on average two months, and the participants need to pass a religious exam in order to be admitted into IS. However, during their time in the camp they can be tasked with guarding duties. In some cases it seems that the safe house phase and the training camp occur almost simultaneously (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 47-49).
After having been admitted into IS, a great variety of positions await the men depending on their skills and knowledge. However, all men, regardless of whether they will fight or not, are distributed among battalions. Although most men become fighters after the training camp, there are also many alternative options. Some of those are, for example: ‘media or communication, engineer, technician, hacker, doctor or nurse, member of the religious police or sharia court’. In addition, if someone is found to be unfit for the battle, he can be employed as a cook, driver or gravedigger. Taking up these alternative professions does not mean that one will never have to fight; often life within IS entails a combination of fighting and other jobs. There are also indications that IS has a military draft, with those who are not fighters still being reservists. Some reports state that boys join the fighting when they are 14 years old, when other sources mention boys as young as 12 years old participating in the fighting. Rising in the ranks seems to be associated with the use of violence (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 49-55).
As it is known that some Dutch jihadists are in relatively high positions, it can be assumed that they have executed violent acts during their time with IS. There are also photos of Dutch individuals working in sharia courts posing with dissevered heads. In general, it seems that most foreign fighters are employed as fighters. Nevertheless, they do not seem to be fighting continuously, on the one hand because they also conduct other military actions (such as guarding) and on the other hand because they do receive time for leisure activities (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 51).
It seems that upon having finished the training camp, foreign fighters are presented with a choice whether they will perform a supporting role, or will fight, or will commit a suicide attack. According to the AIVD, most Dutch men choose a role as fighter. It adds that it is not uncommon for fighters, meaning including some Dutch fighters, to perform executions, torture and rape when they conquer new areas (AIVD,
2016, p. 7-8).
Gates and Podder noted that the use of foreign fighters present an important advantage to IS. Whereas local fighters are very much embedded in local structures and therefore are ‘more inclined to settle grievances and work to achieve particularistic goals’, foreign fighters are usually not in Syria for personal vendettas or other ‘petty’ issues. Foreign fighters are thus more ideologically motivated and can mitigate some of the issues caused by local fighters (Gates and Podder, 2015, p. 109-110).
It is important to note that the above information applies specifically to IS, as it is difficult to find specific information on the roles of western and/or Dutch foreign fighters within al-Qaeda affiliated groups. This can partly be explained by the fact that less is known about the caliphate of, for example, JaN and its successors because governing its territory was not its main concern. This does not mean that it did not control territory, but rather that its primary focus always laid on the battle and not so much on governance (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 43-44). However, the roles of men and women within JaN and affiliated groups do not seem to differ fundamentally from those within IS (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 86). Since al-Qaeda affiliated groups are focused more on the battle against Assad than on the establishment of a caliphate, foreign fighters usually end up as fighters in those groups. However, there are also other jobs available, which are comparable to those within IS (i.e. ‘professional’ jobs) (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 78-79). In addition, most Dutch foreign fighters joined IS rather than JaN or its successors (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 83; Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 44).
2.3.3 The general roles of women within contemporary Salafi-jihadism
Although some of the academic literature focuses specifically on the roles of women within caliphates, there is also a body of literature that focuses more generally on the role of women in jihadist groups, whether this is inside or outside an area controlled by jihadist terrorists. In a seminal article on the ‘female jihad’ Von Knop showed that there are usually three roles that women take up. She posits that ‘even when women are invisible for the world audience they play an essential role in the short- and long-term survival of the terrorist organization’. First, women act as facilitators: they
facilitate operations by, for example, doing accounting. The second role that women take up is that of supporter of male relatives, which, according to Von Knop, ‘gives women power and access to the public realm’. Finally, women are often given the role of ideological educator of their children, to ensure that the children grow up with the group’s belief system (Von Knop, 2007, p. 398-410). It is important to note, however, that Von Knop’s article dates back to 2007 and should thus be seen in the context of operation-based groups. The fact that Von Knop is nevertheless used here is a consequence of the mentioned lack of information on those who propagate contemporary Salafi-jihadism in The Netherlands.
In the above-mentioned typology of jihadist groups (state-building versus operation-based), Khelghat-Doost also identified different roles for women depending on what type of group they are part of. These roles do not necessarily have to be fulfilled inside a caliphate but can also be seen as broader roles regardless of where the woman is located. Khelghat-Doost posited that the ‘strategic logic of women’ depends on the kind of group they are a part of. In operation-based groups (such as the al-Qaeda central branch), given the violent nature of these groups, the roles of women fall within two broad categories: combat tactical roles and non-combat tactical roles. The first category is comprised of carrying out suicide attacks and providing physical cover for men, whereas the second category comprises messengers, financing, logistical support and recruiters (Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 4-8).
The roles of women within state-building groups fall into three broad categories: legitimacy, service and public good provision, and security. Legitimacy can be broken down into three sub categories: ‘hijrah’ (migration to Islamic territory), motherhood and family, and recruitment and advocacy. Service and public good provision is comprised of four sub categories: teachers and educators, doctors and nurses, tax collectors, and integration officers. Finally, security can be broken down into police force and military force (Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 12). Especially the first category can also be performed in, for example, The Netherlands.
2.3.4 The roles of women within caliphates
The literature shows that the role of women within caliphates is first and foremost that of serving men. This means that women are responsible for the household and for
taking care of the family (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 54; Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett, 2015, p. 22). Girls are seen as women from an early age onwards: according to the al-Khansaa brigade (a female unit within IS that oversees compliance with religious norms, mostly regarding dress codes) girls can be married from the age of nine onwards (Winter, 2015, p. 24). Marriage and procreation are crucial tasks of women within IS: they are primarily expected to have as much children as possible and to raise them according to the IS ideology (AIVD). They are seen as ‘mothers of the caliphate’ (Neurink, 2015, p. 28).
In addition to the caring role of the women as mothers and managers of the household, women are increasingly involved in recruiting others for their group (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 52; AIVD). In an online IS publication this is explicitly stated as the second obligation of the woman (Bakker en De Leede, 2015, p. 8). According to Neurink, since the summer of 2014 most western women in fact arrived in Syria as a result of the recruitment of other women already present (Neurink, 2015, p. 142). These new arrivals were mostly recruited by painting them a picture of becoming ‘the mothers of IS cubs’ (Neurink, 2015, p. 113).
In a role broader than mere recruitment, women are sometimes also relied upon to build legitimacy for the group, which fits well with what was described above as regards the distinction between operational and state-building groups. To provide an example, a western woman, ‘Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah’, wrote an essay in the ninth edition of Dabiq (an infamous online IS magazine) defending the enslavement of Yezidi women. The essay is called ‘Slaves or prostitutes’ and posits that sexual slavery was authorised by the prophet Mohammed and that ‘shrewd’ Yezidi women had disseminated negative stories. Supposedly, the essay had to counter negative publicity in response to the sexual slavery stories, which IS feared hampered the recruitment of western women (Neurink, 2015, p. 84-87).
In addition, in some instances it is allowed for women to take up a professional role and to work as a doctor or a teacher (Stoter, 2015). This is because in these domains men and women are segregated entirely (Neurink, 2015, p. 66). Moreover, it seems that some western women are active in the above-mentioned al-Khansaa brigade, which allows them to carry weapons (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 52). Mostly British
women are employed in this brigade, inflicting corporal punishment on those that do not strictly follow the religious rules (Neurink, 2015, p. 90-92). Indeed, carrying out violent acts (such as giving lashes) is a task apparently sometimes given to women (Weggemans et al., 2016, p. 51).
It is important to state that although western women publicly had a limited violent role in the caliphate, this was sometimes in stark contrast to what happened in the private realm. Research into Yezidi women who were held as sex slaves by members of IS reveals that they were not only maltreated by the men who held them, but also by the western women who were the wives of these men. Since the wives were home so often, they were often tasked with guarding the Yezidi women in their homes. Yezidi women report beatings, starvation and forced labor inflicted upon them by (western) women. The al-Khansaa brigade, mostly made up of western women, also played an instrumental role in oppressing Yezidi women: for example, the brigade once pushed a Yezidi woman’s face in a bucket of hot water and oil after her third attempted escape (Neurink, 2015, p. 88-91).
3. Methods
3.1 Research design
Methodological justification seems to be an often-lacking element of terrorism studies. De Bie and De Poot argued that often there is no explanation of ‘the data collection, measurement, and analyses’. This is, nevertheless, a vital part of any study as it is needed ‘to validate the findings and conclusions presented’ (De Bie and De Poot, 2016, p. 581). This section therefore aims to make visible what procedures were followed to address the research question of this thesis, and how the data was collected, measured and analysed.
First a literature review was carried out to establish what roles Dutch jihadist terrorism suspects fulfil within contemporary Salafi-jihadism according to researchers, to create context for the analysis. As was mentioned in the introduction, this thesis posits that an important source of information is missing from academic analyses: judicial information. What is missing more specifically for the current topic, is an analysis of information contained in Dutch court cases for terrorism-related
offences since mid-2013. For this reason, the research design of this thesis is an exploratory study into these court cases. As this is uncharted territory, this thesis is thus a first step in the analysis of judicial information, which can hopefully demonstrate where the focus of further research into judicial (and police) information should lie.
This thesis therefore uses an inductive approach: even though the literature review is taken as a basis for the directed content analysis (more on that below), no hypotheses are drawn on the basis of the literature. The analysis makes some observations on the basis of the results of the directed content analysis, although caution is necessary as the research design is exploratory.
3.2 Methodology
To address the research question a qualitative content analysis is conducted on 71 judgements, the first one dating back to 23 October 2013 and the last one to 15 May 2018. This timeframe is chosen because October 2013 saw the first Dutch court case of an individual who was found to have wanted to join the ‘jihad’ in Syria, and can thus be seen as the starting point of litigation with regard to contemporary Salafi-jihadism. With October 2013 as the starting date, the actions that the judgements deal with took place earlier. The earliest date in the court cases is November 2011 (case 1) and the case itself contains clear reference to Syria. This is something observed in all cases: the link to state-building aspirations becomes clear one way or another. For example, many suspects recruited others to join a caliphate, some disseminated images referring to a caliphate in Syria or Iraq, and some provided direct financial support to groups in Syria or Iraq.
In total there are 82 judgements of jihadist terrorism-related court cases taking place in the Netherlands during that timeframe (to the extent that this could be determined through publicly available information). However, as mentioned before, when the court could not establish that a terrorism-related offence was committed, this thesis omits those judgements. The judgements were identified by an extensive search in the Dutch governmental legal database, where an overview of all court cases can be found. The possibility of conducting interviews was also briefly entertained, but this was found not feasible. After all, this thesis only analyses those actions that could be
established by the court (more on that in the coding process section). Judges and other members of the court cannot comment on anything that is beyond the scope of the publicly available information. Interviewing the public prosecutor would not be analytically sound, as the public prosecutor also examines those actions that the court cannot establish.
This thesis thus conducts a qualitative content analysis, which is defined as ‘a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns’. It codes and categorises ‘either explicit communication or inferred communication’. In this thesis explicit communication is coded and categorised. There are three general approaches to conducting a qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed and summative (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1277-1278).
The current thesis uses directed content analysis, as this fits the research question and the research goal best: ‘sometimes, existing theory or prior research exists about a phenomenon that is incomplete or would benefit from further description. The qualitative researcher might choose to use a directed approach to content analysis’. The current thesis indeed posits that more solid research into the roles of Dutch individuals within contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups is necessary, as an important angle is missing from current research. The nature of the specific methodology of direct content analysis is thus in line with the reasons for having an exploratory research design.
Directed content analysis practically entails that the codes that are used are based on theory. It is more structured than a conventional approach, which would avoid initial and preconceived codes to leave room to derive these from the data. Although with directed content analysis initial codes can be drawn up, these can be revised during the coding process, or codes can be added if relevant information does not fit within any of the codes (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1279-1281).
3.3 The coding process
A coding scheme was used to systematically classify the information in the case files. This ensures the transparency and replicability of the coding process. After all, it is
important ‘to be clear about the foundation of a particular finding when reporting results’, so the reader knows how certain inferences were made (De Bie and De Poot, 2016, p. 582). The coding scheme has ten codes through which all information pertaining to the role of Dutch individuals within contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups can be classified. These initial codes are: advocacy, fighting, financing, household, leadership, military (non-combat), professional, recruitment, training and violent. These codes are based on the literature, and comprise all roles that western or Dutch jihadists have taken up according to earlier research. It was a conscious decision to code all roles and not just the most prevalent ones, to be as open as possible as to what may be found in the directed content analysis.
The coding scheme also contains descriptions of the different indicators pointing to a certain role. These indicators were also derived from the literature. For example, Khelghat-Doost observed about advocacy by state-building groups that the messages these groups convey ultimately generate ‘the legitimacy these organizations need to rule their populace’ (2018, p. 15). This was translated into the ‘advocacy’ indicator as: ‘carrying out activities to increase the legitimacy of contemporary Salafi-jihadism’.
There are two strategies that can be employed during the coding process: either the researcher begins coding immediately, or the researcher first highlights the parts relevant to the unit of analysis and then begins coding only as a second step (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1281-282). The latter strategy is a way to improve the trustworthiness by ensuring that the predetermined categories do not bias the classification of the researcher. For that reason the latter strategy was employed in the thesis. The directed content analysis was carried out through the program ATLAS.ti.
Although the preconceived codes were used to have a sense of direction, openness characterises the design of an exploratory study. Therefore, the initial codes were regarded as a first draft, to which more sub categories were added if necessary. It would have also been possible to add more codes during the coding process but this was not necessary, as they turned out to comprise all relevant information in the court cases.
The judgements contained multiple sections: for example, the charges brought by the public prosecutor are also part of the text, even when these charges are not always proven. For this thesis, therefore, only those actions that the court was able to lawfully and convincingly proof were coded. For example, if a witness testified that the suspect had been recruiting individuals for the armed struggle but the court could not establish this, then that segment was also not coded as ‘recruitment’.
However, the legal classifications of certain actions were not always followed to the letter. For example, training for terrorism is a specific legal classification in Dutch law that is markedly different from what one would understand as training in the regular sense of the word – and from the way in which training was defined as an indicator in this thesis: training to carry out jihadist activities. In Dutch law training for terrorism is expressed in article 134a of the Dutch Criminal Code, which criminalises ‘Any person who intentionally obtains or attempts to obtain for himself or another person means or information for the commission of a terrorist offence or a serious offence for the preparation or facilitation of a terrorist offence, or gains knowledge or skills for that purpose or imparts this knowledge or these skills to another person’. This includes obtaining information for oneself on how to commit terrorist crimes, whereas the code of training in this thesis implies training with or by others: it is either the provision or reception of training, implying a group context. In short: only those actions that could be proven by the court were coded, using the indicators that were derived from the literature rather than always following the legal classifications to the letter. Therefore some of the roles identified in the judgements can differ slightly from the legal actions that the court established.
In many instances certain actions fitted multiple categories. The text was then given multiple codes, to be as complete as possible and to acknowledge the fluidity of some actions. During the coding process often the same code was used multiple times in one judgement. This was done because the interplay of these segments together led to a certain conclusion; there were multiple elements to the established crime.
This section has explained how the data was collected. The subsequent analytical process is outlined in the introduction of the analytical section below.
3.4 Definitions
This section on definition narrows down and conceptualise all relevant concepts in this thesis, narrowing down from ideology to groups to individuals. Finally, the definition of a caliphate is discussed.
The research question examines contemporary Salafi-jihadism, so how would this be defined? It is an ideology that contains several building blocks: Salafism, jihadism and state-building aspirations. As discussed in the literature review, Salafism is an orthodox movement within Islam that aims to experience the religion in the way it was experienced in the time of the prophet Mohammed (Bakker and Grol, 2017, p. 44). Jihadism is a ‘violent subcategory of Islamism’ (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 13). Its origin can be traced back to Islamist thinkers like Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj who claimed that the outward jihad was an individual duty for Muslims (Bakker, 2006, p. 1-2). Abdullah Azzam translated this idea into (violent) mobilisation.
Recently, the world has witnessed ‘a new adaptation of Islamist-motivated terrorism’: the surge of groups with state-building aspirations (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 25). These state-building aspirations are propagated by state-building groups, which are groups that ‘use violent means to establish their “states” (i.e., caliphates)’ and that actually hold territory, although their territory can be fluid. Since the objective is to establish a state, the organisational structure resembles that of a state in terms of hierarchy. The definition of contemporary Salafi-jihadism is thus described here as: an ideology that combines a Salafi desire to go back to the ‘root of Islam’ with a jihadist violent call to action, particularly to use violent means to establish a caliphate. The ideology can be propagated both in a caliphate as well as from any other place, for example, The Netherlands. Contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups perpetuate this ideology.
In the thesis ‘Salafi-jihadist groups’ are defined as: ‘groups that engage in the violent jihad, the so-called “lesser jihad” or physical struggle against the alleged enemies of Islam’ (Bakker en De Leede, 2015, p. 1). Another interesting definition of jihadist groups is: ‘Salafi militant-religious movements, within Sunni Islam, that claim to
restore their own interpretation of the golden era of the dawn of Islam by using violent means’ (Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 3). The latter definition is interesting particularly because it specifies the religious backdrop of such groups, which is important, as this is a fundamental factor in the group’s very identity.
However, the first definition also encapsulates this religious element by mentioning the ‘lesser jihad’ (Bakker en De Leede, 2015, p. 1). The current research opts to stick to this first definition, as the distinction between the greater and lesser jihad ensures that the use of the term ‘jihad’ is not tainted. After all, the greater jihad ‘is inward-seeking: it involves the effort of each Muslim to become a better human being, to struggle to improve him- or herself and, as a result, to be a good Muslim’ (Bakker, 2006, p. 1). The lesser jihad, on the other hand, ‘sanctions the use of violence against an unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not, and can become the means to mobilize that political and social struggle’ (Bakker, 2006, p. 1-2). In order to have an analytically pure debate about Salafi-jihadism and to avoid unnecessarily tainting a concept important to many, it is critical that the distinction between the lesser and the greater jihad is incorporated in the very definition of Salafi-jihadist groups.
The relevant contemporary Salafi-jihadist groups in this thesis can be subdivided into two main categories: IS and al-Qaeda affiliated groups. With regard to IS, there is some debate on how researchers should name this group. After all, it is questionable whether IS should really be allowed to lay claim to the title ‘Islamic’, let alone ‘Islamic State’. However, Saltman and Winter convincingly argue that calling the group by any other name than the one it has given itself, can become ‘outdated or geographically misleading’. Their solution is therefore to refer to the group as Islamic State, and not the Islamic State, to not grant IS the legitimacy that it seeks (Saltman and Winter, 2014, p. 12). This thesis follows that reasoning by referring to the group as Islamic State (in short IS).
Al-Qaeda affiliated groups are defined exactly as the name suggests: groups that are not the al-Qaeda central branch, but are nevertheless affiliated with al-Qaeda. For Syria and Iraq, almost all of the literature about al-Qaeda focuses on Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and its successors. As was discussed, JaN transformed into Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in July 2016, which again morphed into a larger collective in January 2017:
Tahrir al-Sham. Tahrir al-Sham is generally perceived as an al-Qaeda affiliate (Hoffman 2018).
The research question focuses on Dutch jihadist terrorism suspects, since the judgements of those suspects are analysed in this thesis. Dutch jihadist terrorism suspects are defined here as individuals charged with jihadist terrorism-related offences. However, the literature review focuses on the broader category of western and Dutch jihadists. Not all of those can be regarded as suspects: after all, this is a status that only the police and public prosecutor can award. Jihadists are defined as those individuals who make a ‘contribution to the armed struggle being conducted by radical islamists against the West and against other perceived enemies of Islam’ (De Poot and Sonnenschein, 2011, p. 1).
In addition, the thesis refers to a ‘caliphate’, which is defined as state-like areas in Syria and Iraq where a Salafi-jihadist group controlled the area. Although ‘caliphate’ is usually understood to be IS territory, in this thesis it can also point to the territory of other contemporary state-building Salafi-jihadist groups. For example, the group then known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham had a fluid territory centring around the Syrian town of Idlib (Khelghat-Doost, 2018, p. 6), which would also be regarded here as a caliphate.
3.5 Limitations
The limitations of this research regarding the reliability and validity should be discussed. If the reliability of a study is high, this means that the instruments used to measure the data is reliable. In other words, with the same instruments other researchers would get the same results were they to repeat the study. The coding scheme in this thesis clearly describes what kind of actions are to be categorised under which code; the aim was to describe this as exact as possible (Long and Johnson, 2000, p. 30). Nevertheless, the decision to sometimes diverge from the legal classification may be scrutinised. This diversion flowed out of the directed content analysis approach: as academic literature was used to construct preconceived codes, these codes did not always correspond to the legal classification with that same name. One could argue that this harms the reliability of the instruments used to measure the data (the codes). However, this tension between social science terminology and legal
classification is probably inevitable if a social scientist is to study a legal matter. The internal validity of a study is high if the research ‘represents accurately those features of the phenomena that it is intended to describe, explain or theorise’ (Hammersley, 1992, p. 69). It asks: ‘how congruent are one’s findings with reality?’ (Merriam, 1995, p. 53). This is a tricky question in the current thesis. On the one hand, the information in the judgements is quite rich: often testimonies, documents and intercepted telecommunications provide great detail and allow for a close description of the roles that Dutch jihadist terrorism suspects played in contemporary Salafi-jihadism. Nevertheless, as noted in the introduction, a judgement in itself only presents the final stage of the entire investigative and judicial process. It is therefore not a complete overview of all information that arose during the judicial process. This is a limitation to the current thesis.
Finally, external validity concerns the extent to which the findings of a study can be generalised to a larger population (Drost, 2011, p. 120). This is a limitation of the current thesis: the aim of the exploratory design is essentially to conduct a mapping exercise. This means that any conclusion should be drawn with great caution. It is therefore not possible to claim that, for example, the results can be generalised to Dutch jihadists who were active before the timeframe of this thesis, or to future jihadists. This limitation is thus inherent in the research design, and a known consequence of choosing to conduct exploratory research.
4. Analysis and reflection
4.1 Introduction
In this analytical section, context is provided to discuss the results of the directed content analysis. After all, the research question asks what the judgements reveal about the roles that Dutch jihadist terrorism suspects since mid-2013 played in contemporary Salafi-jihadism. In order to examine this, it is imperative that first the general results are discussed. It is important to note that of the 71 cases, 20 judgements could not be coded. This was because the judgements contained no relevant information as to the roles the suspects had played. To provide one example: in the cases of 15 June 2016 the court establishes that the defendants planned their
