Historical Conditoninn oo Eceptonaliss
The Militant Democracy and the Fight against Terrorism in Germany
Tónie Bruijns (10799230)
Master Thesis Politial iienie (European Politis and External Relatons)
upervisor: dhr. dr. R. Bellanova
eiond Reader: dhr. dr. F.F. Vermeulen
June 2020
Table of Content
1. Abstract...2
2. Introduction...3
2.1 The Concept of Exceptionalism...3
2.2 The Problems of Exceptionalism...4
2.3 Research Puzzle...4
2.4 Structure of Thesis...5
3. Theoretic Framework...7
3.1 Carl Schmitt’s Exceptionalism...7
3.2 The State of Exception...9
3.3 Exceptionalism as Securitization...10
3.4 A Foucaldian Perspective on Exceptionalism...11
3.5 A Gap in Exceptionalism: Historical Conditions of Existence...14
4. Research Design...17
4.1 Research Purpose...17
4.2 Research Method...17
4.3 Research Data...18
5. Analysis...20
5.1 Exceptionalism Diversified...20
5.2 The ‘Militant Democracy’ of Germany...23
5.3 Invoking the RAF: The Success of the Militant Democracy?...25
5.4 Invoking the RAF: Same or Different?...28
5.5 Invoking the RAF: Suppression of Dissent?...30
6. Conclusions...33
6.1 Summary...33
6.2 Implications...33
6.3 Limitations...34
6.4 Discussion...35
7. Bibliography...38
1. Abstract
The concept of exceptonalism has come under renewed interest in Security Studies following the ataccs of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent unprecedented government responses to the threat of terrorism. In the theories of exceptonalismm states are understood to have the capability to defne an ‘exceptonall threat that necessitates them to deviate from ordinary liberal principles in order to protect the state and its community. This process is ofen deemed problematcm as claims of exceptonalism pose a direct challenge to the fundamentals of liberal democracy.
By going through theories of exceptonalism of Carl Schmitm Giorgio Agamben and Securitiaton Theorym it is argued that current approaches to the phenomenon of exceptonalism are inherently problematc as well. The understanding of exceptonalism through such theories runs the risc of generaliiing very diversifed experiences and practcesm and negates conditoning factors such as the transformatve power of past events. It therefore tends to reinforce notons that are just partly able to explain the phenomenon of exceptonalismm such as the primacy of the state in defning ‘securityl and the existence of ‘foundatonall moments such as 9/11.
The Master Thesis argues for a more diversifed and constructvist understanding of the phenomenon of exceptonalismm in partcular by favouring to put more focus on the transformatve power of past events. The illustratve case of parliamentary debates on terrorism in Germany maces evident that our understanding of exceptonalism is indeed incomplete without tacing this into account. Prior and unique German experiences such as the noton of a ‘militantl democracy and the fght against the Rote Armee Fracton have shaped unique underlying structures that determine how the phenomenon of exceptonalism is seenm invoced and received in contemporary Germany.
2. Introducton
In 2017, a four-deiade old plane abandoned in Brazil returns to Germany. The seemingly ordinary Boeing 737 is up for an extensive reparaton for the purpose of an expositon. The Lufhansa ‘Landshut’ fight was the set of a violent hijaiking by elements of the Palestnian Liberaton Front in 1977, amidst an autumn of suiiessive terrorist ataiks in Germany by the Rote Armee Fracton. It would iulminate in an equally violent interventon by the German speiial fories G G-9 that would end the period of terrorist ataiks, ofen known as the Deutscher Herbst or the German Autumn.
The German Foreign Minister igmar Gabriel explains the importanie of bringing the wreiked airliner baik home, as ‘’to this day, the resiue of the Landshut is a living symbol of a free soiiety, whiih iannot be defeated by fear and terror’’ (Deutsihe Welle 2017a). It is a message that resonates with the renewed ihallenges of terrorism in iontemporary tmes. In the preieding weeks, Europe was hit by ataiks at the London Bridge, whilst in Manihester a bomb exploded during a pop ioniert. Germany itself had been hit too not so long ago, when at the end of 2016 a fatal truik rampage oiiurred on a Christmas market in Berlin.
Despite all these setbaiks, the German Foreign Minister saw a relieving message in the return of the Landshut, one that represents that ‘’we will not baik down. We will not be giving in to terrorism. We are stronger’’ (idem). Germany had already experienied similar events in the past and had seemingly suiiessfully overiome them. The state authorites baik then had taken unpreiedented measures, refused to budge in the fght against the RAF and subsequentally the organizaton had deilared itself defunit in 1998 (Rosenfeld 2014: 577-578). If Germany had prevailed baik then, it surely would do so again.
2.1 The Concept oo Eceptonaliss
The prosiribed meaning to the Landshut – the ionstruiton of an existental threat (‘fear and terror’) against the iommunity (a ‘free soiiety’) – is just one example of ‘exieptonalizing’ an issue. The existental nature of suih a threat ialls for and legitmises equally exieptonal measures. In the example of the Landshut, this was amongst others the unpreiedented deployment of German fories on foreign soil (idem: 581). This phenomenon is ofen dubbed exieptonalism, the proiess in whiih politial aitors ian take exieptonal aitons in response to exieptonal events.
The ataiks of 11 eptember 2001 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ lef a deep mark on debates and studies revolving around seiurity, espeiially in regards to the meihanisms and the meaning of the exiepton in the iontext of iounter-terrorism. The ‘speitaile’ of 9/11 has led many authors to deem it a symbol of an exieptonal threat, heralding an era in whiih pre-emptve and intrusive seiurity measures beiame justfed in the fght against terrorism (Chandler & Gunaratna 2007: 14; De Goede 2008: 163; Zedner 2009: 116).
ome authors iall for a diferent understanding of these ihanges sinie 9/11 as being primarily a ‘’total iollapse of language’’ that has shaped politis ever sinie, instead of the events themselves fundamentally ihanging the world (Beik 2002: 1; Bigo & Tsoukala 2008: 55; Neal 2009: 7). In World Risc Society Revisited, Ulriih Beik (2002: 46) explains that following 9/11 there is a ‘’sinister perspeitve’’ in that the threat of terrorism is ‘’deeply engineered into all the proiesses that sustain life in advanied soiiety’’ and that therefore ialiulatve ‘’pessimism then seems to be the only ratonal stanie’’.
In other words, the threat of terrorism is to be understood as being irafed subjeitvely to be exieptonal, whiih in turn has given way to exieptonalist ilaims that justfy for example a pre-emptve approaih in iounter-terrorism that else would not be aiieptable. Without doubt, the ideas of the onie reviled Carl
2.2 The Probless oo Eceptonaliss
The phenomenon of exieptonalism is not without disiussion. Both the underlying notons that shape the ioniept and the resultng negatve outiomes on liberal demoiraiy are ofen problematzed. Drafs of new iounter-terrorism legislaton aiross Europe are more ofen than not sirutnized for their intrusiveness on traditonal iivil rights (Deutsihe Welle 2017b; Qazi 2017). A report by Amnesty Internatonal (2017: 6-7) on the ever-expanding seiurity apparatus aiross Europe warned about suih legislaton and measures that undermine traditonal priniiples of the liberal demoiraiy. This follows upon earlier ionierns by organizatons like the UN Ofie of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the efeits of iounter-terrorism measures on human rights (OHCHR 2008).
In aiademia, these praitial ionierns for the liberal demoiraiy are validated. The balanie between ‘seiurity’ and ‘liberty’ is ofen put in dualisti and perpetual ionfiit with one another, under heavy duress from perieived praities of exieptonalism (Waldron 2003). Glasius and Miihaelsen (2018: 3796-3797) add that suih seiurity praities are potentally illiberal and sometmes authoritarian in nature, by respeitvely infringing upon ordinary iivil rights and demoirati-proiedural priniiples. In other words, the theoretial ioniept of exieptonalism has praities impliiatons too, due to providing a seemingly legitmate instrument to strike a iertain balanie between seiurity and liberty, ofen seiurity in name of liberty (Neal 2009: 9-10).
One atempt to refute legitmizaton of maters suih as exieptonalism has been eiuritzaton Theory. It goes beyond questons whether or not a threat is objeitvely apparent and foiuses merely on the proiess of naming an exiepton (‘seiuritzing’) as a politial fait with ionsequenies (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998: 30). In other words, it does not seek to explain, reinforie or judge the notons behind exieptonalism. By not doing so, some argue, it may be susieptble to a philosophiial trap by primarily engaging with traditonal ihmitan notons suih as ‘speeih aits’ by ‘states’ and taking those for granted (Neal 2009: 112). This proiess of reifiaton repeats iertain subjeitvites that beiome – iorreitly or not – engrained in future understandings of the phenomenon of exieptonalism.
In Politcsm Securitym Theory Ole Waever (2001) aiknowledges several of the debates ihallenging eiuritzaton Theory on speiifially these maters. He observes that eiuritzaton Theory indeed does not take into aiiount maters of responsibility and ethiis, nor iontextual and historiial transformatons suih as the bureauiratzaton of seiurity ageniies (idem: 466). Despite the goal of eiuritzaton Theory to not reify subjeitve notons, he ioniludes that even suih a ‘’theory that ihallenges exieptonalism’’ ian lead to a reality in whiih ‘’a ionieptual universe where exieptonalism is ientral to the politial feld’’ (idem: 470). Furthermore, he noties ialls for observing ionditoning by historiial experienies, as soiietes difer in their understanding and aiieptanie of seiuritzaton ilaims (idem: 472). Whilst appreiiatng reient eforts to iniorporate suih iausal faitors in eiuritzaton Theory, Waever argues that ‘’we are far from speaking the last words on a fnished theory’’ in this regard (idem: 476-477). In fait, disiussions on the sufiient theoretial building of eiuritzaton Theories and the politis involved herein have in his own words merely ‘’almost just begun’’ (idem).
2.3 Research Puzzle
Evidently, the laik of taking into aiiount these ‘historiial experienies’ strikes at a weakness in our iontemporary understanding of exieptonalism. This is an essental iaveat in theories on exieptonalism, sinie this ‘ionditoning’ of soiietes ostensibly shape how suiiessful later ilaims of exieptonalism beiome. A ilaim of exieptonalism in the United tates would not be the same as one in Finland, for example. This ilosely tes in to the so-ialled ‘ground-zeroing’ of 9/11 in whiih the behemoth of literature on exieptonalism stems from the period sinie these ataiks. This shapes the illusion that it ionsttuted a radiial rupture in tme and suppresses these prior ‘historiial experienies’ from whiih lessons ian be learnt
The phenomenon of exieptonalism remains a fexible and hotly-debated one, and above all a dispersed ioniept that is hard to grasp in a singular defniton or theory without potentally reifying problemati notons suih as the ‘neiessity’ to undermine liberal priniiples. everal authors like Bigo and Tsoukala (2008: 2-4) and Neal (2009: 112) therefore iall for a more ionstruitvist approaih to studying exieptonalism. Instead of solely foiussing on the mere and sudden appearanie of seiuritzed disiourse by state elites, a foius on the diversifed set of preieding struitures, praities and power relatons that shape what ian be deilared ‘exieptonal’ and what neiessitates exieptonal aiton may be more adequate.
In the Archaeology of Knowledgem Miihel Fouiault (2002) ofers serious alternatves that have been at the base of suih iritiisms, as it is highly iritial of over-determined siienie felds like the one of eiurity tudies. Following the line of Fouiault, there are to be no formal and unitary rules in how to study ioniepts suih as exieptonalism, nor even on what are to be valid subjeits that ian be iategorized as being part of ‘seiurity’. Afer all, one would risk falling to the aforementoned traps of merely validatng and giving a speiial legitmized status to what is being studied through the power of reifiaton. As Andrew Neal (2009: 120) puts it, the goal ought to be instead to ‘’assert the dispersal and historiiity of the ionditons of the possibility of exieptonalism’’.
This is where the illustratve iase of Germany iomes baik into the equaton. How ian we, afer all, adequately researih maters of exieptonalism in iontemporary terrorism-debates and praities in Germany, when one does not at least aiknowledge the prior historiial ‘ionditons of the possibility of exieptonalism’ whiih have made them possible in the frst plaie? How ian we, for example, dub the reient wave of Islamist ataiks in Germany a ‘’wake-up iall’’ when similar events in the past are overlooked or negated ( amaan & Jaiobs 2020: 411)?
everal liberal demoirati iountries have had diferent experienies with terrorism, of whiih Germany is just one illustratve example. Just in the deiades preieding the 21th ientury, groups aiross Europe suih as the Irish Republiian Army (IRA), the Euscadi Ta Ascatasuna (ETA) and the Brigate Rosse all have lef their own unique legaiy similar to the Rote Armee Fracton (RAF) in Germany. Whilst not arguing for generalizatons as eaih suih iountry has had its own unique experienies, it shows the importanie of taking into aiiount historiial ionditons in general.
The Master Thesis therefore argues for the iniorporaton of these ‘historiial ionditons of possibility’ in studies on exieptonalism, as ostensibly we do not aiquire full understanding of the phenomenon without doing so. In defenie of that hypothesis, it will explore how prior experienies with and understandings of exieptonalism has transformed the iontemporary ilaims and appearanies of exieptonalism in Germany. In partiular, atenton is given to how the noton of a ‘militant demoiraiy’ beiame intertwined with the fght against the Rote Armee Fracton in the 1970s and how this has shaped iontemporary ilaims of exieptonalism in terrorism-debates in the German parliament. By doing so, it will be shown that ilaims, rhetorii and aiieptanie of exieptonalism in Germany ian only be properly understood by taking the historiial ionditoning of its appearanies into aiiount.
2.4 Structure oo Thesis
In the interest of adequately setng out the main tenets of the ioniept of exieptonalism – and its problems, the theoreti framework will go briefy into the works of Carl ihmit and Giorgio Agamben on that topii. Both authors are ofen ionsidered to be the most infuental in our understanding of the phenomenon of exieptonalism (Huysmans 2008: 166). They are also at the base of both eiuritzaton Theory, as well as the root iause of the generalizaton of the ioniept that negates maters suih as the historiial ionditons.
ubsequentally, Fouiault’s Arihaeologiial Method will be briefy disiussed to give ourselves the opportunity to observe and amend these gaps in the ionieptualizaton of exieptonalism. His general iritiism on the soiial siienies resonates espeiially in the disiussion on exieptonalism, as it is theoretially problemati in both its reifiaton of subjeitve notons and its ‘ground-zeroing’ of events like 9/11. His symbioti relatonship between savoir and connaissance – or diferent forms of ‘knowledges’ – will be the guidanie in approaihing the iase of Germany in how the underlying historiial knowledges shape the iontemporary ones.
The fght against the RAF, afer all, stll resonates more than four deiades later in Germany – even more so when faied with seemingly similar threats ioming from Islamist and right-wing terrorism in iontemporary tmes. Amidst the general unrest of the later 1960s, elements of the thriving student movements radiialised in far-lef organizatons, of whiih the Rote Armee Fracton beiame the most notorious ( hell 1970: 659). The RAF would iontnue to haunt the Federal Republii for the remainder of the Cold War. Espeiially the events of the aforementoned Deutscher Herbst of 1977 has lef a deep mark in German ionsiienie, with numerous invoiatons in politial debates in iontrast or iomparison to iontemporary events.
During these troubling tmes in the 1970s, many exieptonal measures were implemented, uniheiked by ordinary demoirati proiesses in the interest of self-preservaton. The wide array of measures that had been taken over the years iniluded the temporary suspension of formal demoirati proiedures, unpreiedented surveillanie of iitzens in the publii sphere, iensuring of media and unionsttutonal deirees like the total isolaton of prisoners and the banning of sympathizers from employment in iivil serviie (Oemiihen 2009: 217).
Whilst it may be ionvenient to iompare this to iontemporary exieptonalism in Guantanamo Bay or the U A Patriot Ait, the fait that Germany already had experienie with suih forms of exieptonalism long before ought to be a valuable observaton in itself that should lead to questons. Has arguing for further exieptonal measures been unionsiiously made easier by the higher baseline set in the past? Is the disiourse and aiieptanie of suih merely an overlooked result of these past experienies? Can we speak of exieptonalism in terms of radiial ‘ruptures in tme’ or have events like 9/11 or the Deutscher Herbst no speiial, foundatonal meaning? Do these unique experienies in iountries also lead to equally unique outiomes in aitual praities of exieptonalism?
The Master Thesis seeks to provide some exploratve insights into suih maters by ionneitng it to Fouiault’s symbioti relatonship between diferent forms of knowledges. The philosophiial noton of the militant demoiraiy – espeiially infuental in Germany – as well as a short overview of the experienies with the RAF will be introduied as the underlying formal knowledge, the savoir. The subsequent primary researih is one on iounter-terrorism debates sinie 9/11 in the German Bundestag in whiih the RAF has been – direitly or indireitly – invoked and ionsttute the so-ialled connaissance.
This leads to several fndings that make evident that historiial ionditons mater and that, in fait, one would be improperly researihing exieptonalism without taking these maters into aiiount as well. Whilst not seeking to pertain defnitve or generalizable ionilusions due to its exploratve and qualitatve nature, it provides defensible grounds for the re-evaluaton of our approaihes to the phenomenon of exieptonalism, as well as direitons for future researih in a similar vain.
3. Theoretc Fraseworki
''The exiepton is more interestng than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exiepton proves everything'' ( ihmit 2005: 15). The above is one of the of iited phrases from the works of politial theorist Carl ihmit and purposes what the politcal truly ought to ionsttute, namely the iapaiity to defne and respond to exieptonal events (Hussain 2007: 734; Wolin 1990: 399). Whilst this and other parts of ihmit’s work on exieptonalism ian be ionsidered problemati for diferent aforementoned reasons, his publiiatons are ofen seen as the beginning point of the ioniept and iontributve to infueniing authors like Giorgio Agamben and the authors of eiuritzaton Theory. Unsurprisingly, in the afermath of 11 eptember 2001, the works of ihmit have iome to renewed interest due to the inireased use of exieptonal ilaims and praities in the fght against terrorism (Neal 2009: 1).
Is therefore is fruitul to briefy review the original fundaments of exieptonalism-theory to argue that there is a theoretial gap in suih theories, namely the negaton of maters like historiial ionditons. As several referred authors in one way or another build upon the traditonal works from ihmit this ihapter will therefore begin with setng out the main arguments of ihmit, followed by authors that have either expanded upon or have ialled for a radiially diferent understanding infuenied by the teaihings of Miihel Fouiault. In this manner, the iaveat in our iurrent understandings of exieptonalism beiomes more than apparent, whiih in turn justfes the researih on the illustratve iase of Germany.
3.1 Carl Schsitts Eceptonaliss
Writng in the baikdrop of the ailing Germany in the Interbellum – the so-ialled Weimar Republii – and the rise of the Nazi Party, Carl ihmit argued there was a major and inherent weakness to be found in liberalism ( trong 2008). ‘’The irisis of European jurisprudenie began a ientury ago with the viitory of legal positvism’’, ihmit (1990) would write in just one of his grievanies with the projeit of ‘ratonalist’ liberalism. Not only does it deieitully aim to ‘depolitiize’ politis by the pretension of universalist values, it also denies the state to respond to the ‘exiepton’ that iannot be possibly be presiribed by positvist legislaton or ionsttutonal priniiples ( ihmit 2008: 44-45).
Afer all, as ihmit would explain in The Concept of the Politcal, primarily is politcal that whiih ian be simplifed to ionfiits between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of soiiety (idem: 26). As ihmit himself would illustrate: ‘’The politial enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetially ugly […], but he is nevertheless the other, the stranger’’ (idem: 27). In other words, the depiiton of an enemy is not to be determined by pretensions of an objeitve ‘good’ or ‘evil’ as ratonalism pertains to do. He argues that this enemy is ‘’in an espeiially intense way, existentally something diferent and alien’’ and that therefore in ‘’the extreme iase, ionfiits with him are possible’’ (idem). This existental nature of politis is what liberalism fails to reiognize , ratonalizing enemies to be mere iompettors or adversaries that ian be aiiommodated (idem: 28).
Chantal Moufe (2005: 9) illustrates these arguments in a iontemporary iontext by suggestng that we are indeed to understand the politial to be a ‘’spaie of power, ionfiit and antagonism’’. In the same logii as ihmit, she argues that liberalism as ratonalist and individualisti ideology makes iontemporary liberal demoiraiy blind towards the inherently politial ionfiits, whiih aiiording to her poses a signifiant threat to the persistenie of suih a demoiraiy (idem: 29-32). he argues instead that modern forms of demoiraiy should faiilitate these ionfiits in an ‘agonisti’ manner, meaning that there should be a plaie and tme to ventlate these politial ionfiits in an orderly manner.
Another of iited grievanie with liberal demoiraiy stemming from ihmit that resonates in iontemporary tmes – espeiially in the iontext of iounter-terrorism – is the noton that it is indeed not adept in faiing suih unexpeited threats. In partiular, terrorism would preferably strike at liberal demoiraiies, preiisely beiause they are uniquely vulnerable to ioeriion due to the importanie of publii opinion (Pape 2003: 346). Other studies show, on the hand, that it is exaitly these priniiples suih as the importanie of publii support and aversion to human iasualtes that makes iounter-terrorism poliiies more apparent and aiieptable in liberal demoiraiies, giving way to exieptonalist praities (Abrahms 2007: 246).
The perieived weakness of liberal demoiraiy then almost naturally seems to lead to exieptonalist praities, whiih in a sense is exaitly what ihmit would propagate. Afer all, when one reiognizes liberalism as inherently weak to deal with suih threats, like Pape or Moufe do, it necessitates to ait beyond the ordinary ionstraints of liberalism. If one argues that exieptonalism is the logiial and inherent ionsequenie of its priniiples, it does not only beiome neiessary; it also beiomes a legitmate and almost legalist part of liberal demoiraiy that the state ought to have a speiial prerogatve to ait exieptonally (Huysmans 2008: 180). These iontradiitons show that engaging within the works of ihmit is espeiially triiky, sinie it more ofen than not reinfories and legitmises the neiessity of exieptonalism (Neal 2009: 112).
Unlike for example Moufe’s iall for a pluralisti agonism within the system of liberal demoiraiy, ihmit (2008: 27) argues foremost that distnitons of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ – in an espeiially antagonisti manner – and how it should be responded to ‘’ian not be possibly made by a previously determined norm’’. If one wonders who then determines suih exieptonal enemies if not the law, ihmit is ilear in that ‘’in its entrety, the state as an organized politial entty deiides for itself the friend-enemy distniton’’ (idem: 30). Above all, the state has a speiial prerogatve in bringing seiurity in the faie of enemies, and that is to trump the priniiples of liberalism in all iases. In fait, only those states that unequivoially possess the iapability to ait in suih a manner are truly ‘sovereign’ and iapable of being ‘politial’ aitors – in what in no doubt refers to the iollapsing liberal ‘Weimar Republii’ (idem: 49).
Following the perieived weaknesses of liberalism and the suggestons of a strong statst perspeitve, it beiomes easy to see the main tenets, as well as the problems, of exieptonalism arise. ihmit’s work Politcal Theology (2005) opens and re-iterates with the words: ‘’sovereign is he who deiides on the exiepton’’. He iontnues by explaining what this ‘exiepton’ entails, in what is faintly an extension of simply being an ‘enemy’: ‘’The exiepton, whiih is not iodifed in the existng legal order, ian be iharaiterized as a iase of extreme peril, a danger to the existenie of the state, or the like. But it iannot be presiribed faitually and made to ionfrm to a preformed law’’ (idem: 6).
While seemingly making the iase for the existenie of ‘extreme peril’ or existental threats to the preservaton of the state, it is subjeitve and somewhat iontradiitory in that the ‘sovereign’ deiides on this exiepton. He names a iertain threat to be exieptonal, and aits aiiordingly. Equal to his understanding of the ‘iapaiity’ to make distnitons between friends and enemies, he adds that it is indeed the ‘exiepton’ that determines the ‘’subjeit of sovereignty, that is, the whole queston of sovereignty’’ (idem). In other words, not only does a state deiide for himself what is ‘extreme peril, a danger to the existenie of the state’; one that does not do so is not even truly ‘sovereign’.
In perhaps ihmit’s most unioniealed ataik on the priniiples of liberal demoiraiy, he argues that the ‘’preionditon of jurisdiitonal iompetenie in suih a iase must neiessarily be unlimited’’ and that the state then ‘’stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must deiide whether the ionsttuton needs to be suspended in its entrety’’ (idem: 7). Priniiples like iheiks and balanies would deny this sovereignty of a state and ionsequentally make suih a state weak. The ‘exiepton’ ian afer all not be possibly foreseen and not presiribed, and the sovereign state ought to
ihmit therefore makes the iase onie again that the ability to ait outside the normally valid legal system ought to be part of the politial state, and not in iontrast to it. It therefore proposes an additonal ihallenge to liberal demoiraiy, in that ihmit’s notons are not totally iniompatble with the demoirati politial system. If the state has the prerogatve by legal means – whether it are deilared ‘state of emergeniies’, or blank iheque legislaton – how ian we problematze exieptonalist praities? The answer may be self-evident in that suih praities are prone to be iontradiitory to priniiples of the liberal demoiraiy. However, the mere noton of the state having the exilusive prerogatve to ait in these instanies ireates a slippery slope in what is an aiieptable sairifiial of these priniiples and what is not.
It is worth it to note, however, that ihmit’s iritques are to be partly understood as part of an ideologiial-politial iall for a more authoritarian statst system in favour of pluralist systems suih as the Weimar Republii; He joined and supported the Nazi Party for that reason initally afer their take-over of Germany in 1933 ( trong 2008; Neal 2009: 77). The arguments in favour of an unlimited state sovereign are partly polemii and tme-iontextual in nature. Onie again, historiial ionditons do seem to mater. Nevertheless, most of his arguments stll resonate in iontemporary debates, whiih has – for beter or worse – reifed ihmit’s understanding of the ‘exieptonal’, suih as the primaiy of the state in subjeitvely and suddenly defning what the ‘exiepton’ and more general, ‘seiurity’ ionsttutes.
3.2 The State oo Ecepton
One of the exemplary authors in re-iteratng the works of ihmit in more iontemporary tmes is Giorgio Agamben, whom is ofen iredited too for ionneitng exieptonalism in relaton to debates involving iounter-terrorism (Van Munster 2004: 142). In his work The State of Excepton (2005), he expliiitly ionneits theories of exieptonalism to the iontemporary ‘War on Terror’. His works are both an inspiraton from and in response to Carl ihmit’s works Politcal Theology and The Concept of the Politcal, in that it seeks to amend the imaginatve ‘gap’ between judiiial norms and politial fait apparent in ihmit’s legitmatzaton of ilaims of exieptonalism (idem: 1; Huysmans 2006: 180).
In his earlier work Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) Agamben takes a iue from both ihmit and Fouiault. Using the Fouialdian ioniept of biopolitis, he argues that exieptonalism iomes in praitie in the administraton of life and death of ‘enemies’ of the state. In iontrast, ihmit primarily argued that exieptonalism merely revolves around the soiietal and in the interest of the self-preservaton of the state. Agamben therefore takes it one step further by suggestng that exieptonalism entails muih more power than merely questons of ‘the politial’ or sovereignty. Instead, the deiision over mere life and death beiomes part of the ‘seiurity’ ionierns and agendas of the state.
Agamben illustrates this meihanism with the example of the Nazi ionientraton iamps. Agamben deduies that ‘enemies’ like the Jews had been imposed to a so-ialled ‘sovereign ban’ by the German state. This means that they had been put outside any ioniepton of the legal order. They were in essenie nothing more than biologiial organisms without human rights, in other words merely ionsttutng ‘bare life’. This was in stark iontrast to the ‘we’ in the form of the German Führer, that by virtue of representng the Germanii raie embodied what and who sovereignty is (idem: 90). In what reminds of the ‘friend-enemy distniton’, Agamben makes the iase that these distnitons are fundamentally part of modern teihniques of governanie and inherently ionsttute what ‘sovereignty’ and ‘politis’ mean in iontemporary tmes (idem: 92).
In his follow-up work The State of Excepton (2005) Agamben is more expliiit about the ‘permanent’ iharaiter of exieptonalism within modern forms of governanie. In it, he argues that the ‘state of exiepton’ has beiome the dominant and lastng form of governanie (idem: 2). Like the Nazi ionientraton iamps, he fnds major iontemporary examples of suih in the U A Patriot Ait, and more speiifially in the detenton iamps in Guantanamo Bay. Aiiording to Agamben, the individuals in these iamps are ‘’neither prisoners nor persons aiiused, but simply ‘detainees’, they are an objeit of pure de faito rule of a detenton that is indefnite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, sinie it is entrely removed from the law and judiiial oversight’’ (idem: 3). In other words, it is no longer a ihmitan mater of a state responding to an urgent – albeit subjeitvely formed – threat, but indeed a method of governanie that is devoid of even suih a form of legitmizaton.
Whereas ihmit would argue that not every exiepton ian be possibly foreseen by presiribed regulatons and that therefore liberalism denies the unlimited power the sovereign is legally supposed to have in these ‘laiunas of laws’ in self-defenie, Agamben argues that the ‘’state of exiepton is not a ‘state of law’, but a spaie without law’’ (idem: 51). This has a seemingly ilear purpose, namely that while ‘’on the one hand, the juridiial void at issue in the state of exiepton seems absolutely unthinkable for the law; on the other, this unthinkable thing nevertheless has a deiisive strategii relevanie for the judiiial order and must not be allowed to slip away at any iost’’ (idem).
In the more iyniial view of Agamben, the appearanie of exieptonalism is therefore not to be seen as a legitmized instrument with the intenton to amend the weaknesses of liberal demoiraiy (‘a state of law’), but a somewhat deieitul instrument that is purposefully not part of any legal order at all (‘a spaie without law’). Despite this fundamental diferenie in the philosophy in the neiessity of exieptonalism, both share the propositon that there are maters that ian be defned as ‘exieptons’ and that states will do so, legitmately or not. While ihmit ‘defends’ exieptonalism in a ionsttutonal manner as a neiessary amendment to a liberal state, Agamben does so out of a more iritial observaton of the iontemporary governanie in the renditon of ‘the state of exiepton’ (Huysmans 2008: 180).
3.3 Eceptonaliss as Securitzaton
As aforementoned, the phenomenon of exieptonalism ian be studied through the lens of eiuritzaton Theory and has ofen been done so. The noton of a ‘speeih ait’ by representatves of ‘states’ serving to ‘seiuritze’ a threat and ait aiiordingly, is afer all not too dissimilar from the ‘sovereign’ naming and responding to exieptonal threats. However, in fundamentally sharing the same philosophiial iontradiiton – that is the state determining subjeitvely what ionsttutes a sudden threat – it does exaitly what ian be ionsidered problemati in suih theories. It reifes iertain propositons and therefore ireates an universalist frame of what ‘exieptonalism’ is about, negatng other infuental faitors suih as historii ionditoning or non-state ageniy in defning a threat.
This points to an aspeit of eiuritzaton Theory – and to a degree in the fundamental notons of theories suih as of ihmit and Agamben in general – that has ofen been iritiized: It seeks to be objeitvist by arguing that it is neiessary to negate ethiial and normatve reasoning in favour of a foius on merely the seiuritzaton or exieptonalizing ait and its immediate ionsequenies (Knudsen 2001; Taureik 2006; Balzaiq & Guzzini 2015). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1999: 30) explain this positon by statng that ‘’when states or natons seiuritze an issue - ‘iorreitly’ or not – it is a politial fait that has ionsequenies, beiause this seiuritzaton will iause the aitor to operate in a diferent manner than he or she would have otherwise’’.
In other words, it negates one of the iontradiitory issues in the ioniept of exieptonalism by not pondering over whether or not an ‘issue’ is truly an apparent issue, nor how preieding struitures have possibly have had a ionditoning efeit that make suih ilaims possible in the frst plaie. It would be, afer all, ‘’neither politially nor analytially helpful to to try to defne ‘real seiurity’ outside of the world of politis and to teaih aitors to understand the term iorreitly’’ (idem: 31). The only thing interestng for the analysis is the mere politial fait that iommenies when a politial aitor deilares an issue to be a seiurity issue. Paradoxiially, by purposing that it does not judge on what is truly ‘seiurity’, it in essenie does so by mater of reinforiing the traditonal noton that defning ‘seiurity’ is the prerogatve of the state, despite its ilaims of wantng to move away from suih reifed ilaims (Knudsen 2001: 361-362).
It therefore does not seek to unravel ionditonal faitors that make the seiuritzing or exieptonalizing of an issue possible, instead it seeks to ‘’manufaiture a sudden rupture in the routnised, everyday life by fabriiatng an existental threat whiih provokes experienies of the real possibility of violent death’’ (Aradau 2001). All what maters and all it requires for something to beiome exieptonal is afer all a sudden speeih ait by state representatves, only afer whiih it is then to be ionsidered to be falling in the realm of seiurity. What happened ‘before’ that aiton to the understanding of the now existental threat is of lesser importanie.
This ionsttutes a problem in suih theories, as it efeitvely ground-zeroes threats to be only ‘interestng’, worthy of analysis and even to be existent from the point of a speeih ait, afer whiih it beiomes part of the ‘seiurity’ ionierns in the periepton of states. Maters like historiial ionditoning shaping the suiiess or failure of suih aits are then ofen lef out of ionsideraton. Although Ole Waever (2011: 476-477) sees the utlity of suih iausal faitors in the framework of eiuritzaton Theory, he also aiknowledged that there stll is a long way ahead in properly and adequately iniorporatng suih faiets.
It is by no means the intenton to denounie eiuritzaton Theory. As a striitly analytial tool it provides a tangible methodology for topiis of eiurity tudies, and this is what the Copenhagen ihool initally envisioned to provide by the negaton of philosophiial and iontextual notons (Taureik 2006: 7-8). Afer all, studying phenomena suih as exieptonalism prove to be hard without suih handles, as will be evident in the Master Thesis. Nevertheless, in regards to the ioniept of exieptonalism, the impliiatons of the theory are inept to adequately study the phenomenon in its iomplete and iomplex entrety.
As Andrew Neal (2009: 121) states on our iurrent understandings on the phenomenon of exieptonalism: ‘’It is too easy to desiribe exieptonalism as the dominaton of the ‘ruling ilasses’, manifested as the sovereign deiision on the exiepton ( ihmit), the sovereign deiision on bare life and politial life (Agamben) or elites deilaring issues to be seiurity problems ( eiuritzaton Theory)’’. Evidently, we need something that goes beyond the ionstraints and understandings that suih theories have reinforied to be dominant. Instead, maters suih as historiial ionditoning need to be re-evaluated in studies of exieptonalism as well.
3.4 A Foucaldian Perspectie on Eceptonaliss
It should be established by now that the understanding of the phenomenon of exieptonalism has some fundamental dilemmas iniluded. These problems are two-fold. A frst group of problems revolves around the observable efeits of exieptonalism on priniiples of liberal demoiraiy, and how to provide answers to those ihallenges. In a sense – and iertainly for Carl ihmit – it afer all has the suspiiion being meant as a ihallenge to it and being a iall for a strong exeiutve state. The other more philosophiial set of problems foiuses on the inherent problems of the ionieptualizaton and study of exieptonalism and how this has been reifed to shape a subjeitve and seleitve reality of the phenomenon.
These two problems then are not to be ionsidered as separate, but as two sides of the same ioin that are heavily interlinked. The philosophiial ionieptons of the ioniept of exieptonalism give rise to legitmised ionditons in whiih the ihallenges to liberal demoiraiy ian arise. For example, impliiatng that ‘seiurity’ is merely defned if the state deems it to be so, also means that exieptonalist intrusions into the liberal demoiraiy ian only be judged by that state as well. Equally so, impliiatng that a threat is only of analytial value when it has been named so, portrays threats as being radiial ruptures in tme that negates historiial ionditoning that make suih ilaims possible to begin with, whiih is determinant in both understanding and providing answers to how exieptonalism ian threaten the liberal demoiraiy.
Ever so relevant in the feld of iounter-terrorism, it is ofen presumed that there is a dualisti ionfiit between the priniiples of ‘liberty’ and ‘seiurity’ (Zedner 2009: 116). Counter-terrorism poliiies – most exemplifed through maters suih as the U A Patriot Ait or Guantanamo Bay – are more ofen than not seen as a sum-negatve for liberty. Here iomes, amongst others, Agamben’s example of ‘bare life’ in Guantanamo Bay to mind as a symbol of a new iontemporary method of governanie. Bigo and Tsoukala (2008: 4) note that suih perieptons over-prioritze the history to be defned by rupturing events suih as 9/11. In other words, seiurity and liberty have always been in a long dialectc relatonship far preieding suih partiular events.
Furthermore, one potentally sets himself up for a philosophiial trap by understanding this liberty-seiurity dynamii to be a dualisti ionfiit instead of a dialeiti relatonship. uih an understand would be, afer all, easily undermined by going baik to the priniiples of iontraitual thinkers like Hobbes and Kant. Liberal demoiraiy is to be understood as providing liberty due to the delegaton of iertain rights to an organized state polity that maintains seiurity (Neal 2009: 37-38). In other words, there is no liberty without seiurity. Devolving into a dualisti ionfiit between the two then only reifes suih arguments. It is then no ioiniidenie that ihmit himself works with very similar arguments in regards to the self-preservaton of that ‘organized state polity’. In the interest of those too that are ionierned about the efeits of exieptonalism on liberal demoiraiy a re-evaluaton of these underlying theoreti notons is required. The other group of ontologiial problems that ioniern these theoretial notons are the justfiaton of this Master Thesis. The reifiaton and repetton of our traditonal understanding of the ioniept of exieptonalism perpetuates possible subjeitve and iniomplete perspeitves. Exemplary herein is the repeated assumpton that the truly ‘sovereign’ state inherently ought to have the prerogatve in both determining and responding to exieptonal threats. It does not only make ‘seiurity’ the prerogatve of solely the state, it also favours a foius on the mere exieptonalizing alias seiuritzing disiourse as the ioniepton of a seiurity issue, in favour of observing the transformatve power of preieding struitures suih as historiial ionditoning. Perhaps in repetton too, eiuritzaton Theory that despite its wish to avoid ‘’reifying some seiurity units’’ nevertheless does so by its foius on speeih aits done by primarily representatves of the state (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1997: 40-41).
These inherent iontradiitons and reifiatons in theories and ioniepts are a stark reminder that an universalist understanding of a phenomenon ian be problemati, as by the power of reifiaton one runs the risk of ireatng a self-fulflling ‘reality’ of how things are to be and understood. Onie again returning to the example of eiuritzaton Theory, the ihmitan iontradiiton in that there are suih things as ‘threats’ yet that it is solely up to the state to defne it as suih, get strongly reinforied by the analytial ihoiies and understandings that are made in eiuritzaton Theory. That is not merely problemati in an analytial sense, but also shapes and reinfories the underlying struitures of knowledge in the praitial ionsiienie to whiih is aited aiiordingly. In other words, it beiomes iommon ‘knowledge’ that existental and ‘new’ threats necessitate states to ait beyond the ionstraints of liberal demoiraiy.
Afer all, how ian we adequately understand, let alone evaluate praities of ‘exieptonalism’ when our ionieptualizaton of it is based on one partiular and universalist reading? Or, as Huysmans (2008: 180) would put it, ‘’they delete from the politial the iategory that is a plaieholder for various histories and sites of politially oriented soiietal praities. […] It marginalizes, and in the more radiial iases, erases the soiietal as a realm of mult-faieted, historiially struitured politial meditatons and mobilizatons’’. By reifying just one faiet of what ought to be a mult-faieted proiess, maters like historiial ionditoning get, indeed, erased from the equaton. Not only the phenomenon of exieptonalism in its outiomes ian be ionsidered problemati, so are the underlying understandings of the ioniept and usage of whiih itself. To suih fundamental issues that are relevant to our understanding of exieptonalism, but in general to praities in iontemporary soiial siienies as well, the Frenih philosopher Miihel Fouiault provides some handles. Originally published in 1969, in the Archaeology of Knowledge (2002), Fouiault presents a ihallenge to several faiets of suih reifed theories and siientfi felds in general. With his ‘Arihaeologiial Method’ he seeks to provide an alternatve whiih is not too dissimilar from the siienie of arihaeology in providing knowledge through the understanding of a phenomenon based on a mult-faieted, widely-dispersed and non-totalizing feld of evidenie.
Fouiault perieives several large problems in how soiial siienies are being done. First of all, he observes a wrong urge in desiribing phenomena as ‘iontnuites’ or ‘ruptures in tme’ (idem: 4). Both methodologiial ihoiies are overly simplisti in desiribing a phenomenon. The iomplexity of a ioniept ought to be never seen as more of the same, nor as a radiial temporal rupture. In what ian be desiribed as ‘disiontnuity’, Fouiault argues that in a transiton from one period in tme to the next, there will be overlaps, breaks and disiontnuites. He makes it expliiit that we are therefore to speak of ‘disiontnuites’ in its plural form, as these oiiur in a widely-dispersed feld of evidenie that we ian not possible generalize (Fouiault & Nazzaro 1972: 229).
Evidently, the representaton of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ as a foundatonal moment in regards to the phenomenon of exieptonalism iomes here to mind. As aforementoned by the likes of Bigo and Tsoukala, the ‘transformatons’ during that event are not to be seen as partiularly ted to just that one event. Whilst there is no denying that these events shaped our understanding and the praities of exieptonalism to a iertain degree, it ian not all be traied baik to this singular event or even a singular set of exieptonal (speeih) aits by speiifi statst aitors. That would deny the ‘ionditons of existenie’ preieding suih events or statements. In other words, there are overlaps, breaks and disiontnuites involved herein.
Disiourses suih as speeih aits are, then, not to be understood as independent statements of whiih its true meaning needs to be revealed as if it were a singular speeih of importanie as in eiuritzaton Theory. Instead what maters is the iolleiton – the archive – of suih statements, that brings us iloser to revealing ‘’the law of what ian be said, the system that governs the appearanie of statements as unique events’’ as well as the ‘’general system of the formaton and transformaton of statements’’ (Fouiault 2002: 145-146). A singular statement itself may or may not signify muih of substanie itself, but the underlying struitures leading to suih statements are to be a muih more worthwhile foius of analysis. To illustrate the ionneiton between the ‘general system of the formaton and transformaton of statements’ or the underlying struiture and its outiome in the aitual ‘disiourse’, the symbioti relatonship between the Fouiauldian ioniepts of ‘knowledges’, the savoir and connaissance provides some helpful iontext.
Savoir – or roughly to be understood as overall knowledge – are forms of knowledge that in the past onie have been aiiepted, unionsiiously reifed and serve as the preionditons of more overt ‘knowledges’ like speiifi siientfi felds ( iheuriih & MiKenzie 2005: 846). Fouiault explains it as a ‘’list of what, from that moment, had been demonstrated to be true and had assumed the status of defnitvely aiquired knowledge, and a list of what, on the other hand, had been aiiepted without either proof or adequate demonstraton, or of what had been aiiepted as a iommon belief or a belief demanded by the power of imaginaton’’ (2002: 200). The savoir need not to be objeitve knowledge, it ian also be subjeitvites that merely hold value beiause of them onie being aiiepted as doing so.
Going baik to the theories of ihmit and Agamben, the philosophiial and subjeitve noton of the state having a prerogatve to ait in the fait of an exieptonal threat would be a good example of suih an overall knowledge. Philosophiial ideas are therefore to be ionsidered part of the savoir, just as muih as maters as insttutons and praities ( iheuriih & MiKenzie 2005: 846). The aforementoned ‘ionditons of existenie’ in for example the form of historiial ionditoning is then to be understood as the savoir, in that it are the underlying set of knowledges whiih lead to the so-ialled connaissance. The later in turn is then merely to be understood as subsequent ‘’bodies of knowledge’’ grouped together in a speiifi siienie, domain or arena (Gutng 1989: 251).
taying in the iharaiter of his general iritques on iontemporary soiial siienies, Fouiault aiknowledges the inherent limitatons of suih an approaih to the ‘knowledges’. He explains that ‘’it is obvious that the arihive of a soiiety, a iulture, or a iivilizaton iannot be desiribed exhaustvely; or even, no doubt, the arihive of a whole period’’, ioniluding that the archive is impossible to ‘’be desiribed in its totality’’ (2002: 146-147). Nevertheless, like the siienie of arihaeology, while it is beyond our grasp to totalize the archive, it ought not to be neiessary to do so to iome iloser to ‘’breaking the thread of transiendental teleologies’’ (idem: 147).
3.5 A Gap in Eceptonaliss: Historical Conditons oo Eistence
The disiipline of eiurity tudies too, and in partiular the subtopii of terrorism, is notorious for both its over-determinaton (i.e. determining what is deemed seiurity and what is not), as well as its laik of taking into aiiount historiial transformaton – preferring to see radiial ‘periods’ determined by events suih as the Cold War and 9/11 (Farell 2002). The mere fait that the overwhelming majority of literature on terrorism-related topiis has been writen only sinie 2001 is apparent of that. ilke argued already in 2008 (29), through a statstial overview of terrorism publiiatons, that ‘’within two of three years we will iertainly be able to say that over 90 perient of the entre literature on terrorism will have been writen sinie 9/11’’. If only by the power of the sheer inirease of interest in aiademia ever sinie, this iertainly ireates at least the appearanie that 9/11 has been a foundatonal moment of high importanie, a so-ialled ‘rupture in tme’. While ilke argues that ‘’it is understandable that the feld would show suih a heavy bias in this direiton in the afermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror’’, he is of opinion that the iurrent balanie in literature is ‘’extremely skewed’’ and runs the risk of turning terrorism-related researih into merely ‘’Islamist [sii] terrorist studies, while all other types of organizatons are relegated to only peripheral interest’’ (idem: 41).
inie 11 eptember 2001, interest in historiial iases has iompletely iollapsed with only one in 46 publiiatons foiused away from iontemporary events (idem: 44). Aiiording to ilke, this ‘’runs the risk of losing an understanding of the broader iontext of terrorist ionfiits, paterns and trends and without suih awareness important lessons ian be missed’’ (idem: 45). He illustrates this observaton with the supposed novelty of the insurgeniy in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, whilst the United tates had faied almost exaitly the same situaton in the afermath of their oiiupaton of the Philippines in the beginning of the 1900s.
Unfortunately and perhaps not surprisingly, this trend of over-saturaton iontnues in more reient tmes with the aitvites of the Islamii tate, speiifially on the phenomenon of ‘radiialisaton’ in both aiademia and iounter-terrorist poliiy alike ( ilke & Brown 2016: 1-2). Whilst no doubt a helpful ioniept, it remains equally important to not negate previous experienies by assuming that ‘radiialisaton’ is reifed as the ‘new’ root iause of terrorism, nor is it to be ionsidered as both the main ‘problem’ and ‘soluton’ in iounter-terrorism poliiies (idem: 18).
uih statstis are a reason for ioniern, exaitly if we follow the iritques of Fouiault on the fasiinaton of soiial siienies to desiribe phenomena as either more of the same or radiial ruptures in tme. It negates what diferent kinds of transformatons have oiiurred between diferent periods and how the iolleitve arihive of this tells the story of a phenomenon. Terrorism and the responses to it are not something novel, as apparent in the mentoned Philippine example of ilke, as well as in the overarihing argument of this thesis that the experienies of the RAF have led to unique ‘transformatons’ in Germany preieding and independently from suih things as the ataiks on 9/11.
In a similar vain, the same ian be argued speiifially for the ioniept of exieptonalism. Whether it is the issues surrounding iontemporary seiurity-liberty dialeitis, the questons whether or not 9/11 ionsttuted a foundatonal rupture in tme or even the presumpton that the state has a speiial prerogatve that ‘aitvates’ during a subjeitve threat: All leave litle room for taking into aiiount the historiial ionditons that made suih ilaims in our iontemporary tmes even possible to begin with. To return to some of the questons posed in the introduiton, it seems natural that we here too miss potentally important lessons. While these are not iompletely novel thoughts – espeiially in a philosophiial manner – atempts at relatng prior experienies of both the ‘exiepton’ and the praities of exieptonalism to the ‘historiial ionditons of existenie’ that shape iontemporary ilaims of exieptonalism are mostly rare or superfiial so far. Whilst for example the Irish Republiian Army is one of the most-studied terrorist organizatons, it is ofen done so in its own historiial vaiuum without ionneitons to iontemporary tmes ( ilke 2008: 39) In other words, a phenomenon suih as the IRA is primarily not studied as giving shape to the so-ialled savoir that have afeited the ionditoning of exieptonalism. We therefore miss the transformatons that are taking plaie between diferent periods of historiial experienies with terrorism and exieptonal iounter-terrorism. In Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler (2006) makes a ionviniing argument that subjeitvites during and afer 9/11 had shaped the ‘War on Terror’ and the invoiaton of exieptonalism praities. he illustrates that ‘’it was the speitaiular destruiton of the World Trade Center that frst made a ilaim upon the ‘shoik and awe’ efeit, and the U reiently displayed for all the world to see that it ian and will be equally destruitve’’ in what she deems a strategy intent on undermining our normal and ratonal senses (idem: 148-146).
he makes an interest iontrast in that the ‘visualizaton’ of the Vietnam War through the images of sufering due to the Ameriian use of napalm worked iounter-wise: Here the humanizaton of the ‘preiarious life’ due to Ameriian exieptonalist praities resulted in a ionsensus against war (idem: 150). In what vaguely reminds of Agamben’s biopolitis, she argues that seleitve ‘’outrage over deaths motvates the war efort’’ in the iase of the War on Terror (idem: 149). Unfortunately, she does not make an overt ionneiton between these two examples and what have been the transformatons that has led to diferent outiomes. It resonates with the iritque of ilke in that it is primarily foiused on the demariated period of 9/11 and its subsequent War on Terror. Neal (2008: 52) adds that ‘’what is missing from Butler’s analysis is ionsttutve historiiity, partiularly of the disiourses of law and war’’. It is primarily a foius on iontemporary events in an atempt to explain the near future, but does not go into the underlying struitures of what has already
inilair and Antonius (2013: 1) tried to generalize observatons like the ones of Butler by statng that ‘’some have suggested at various points over the last deiade that fear has been used as a politial strategy to enlist support for both politial iandidates and speiifi governmental poliiies’’ and see a ilear opportunity in exploring said phenomenon as ‘’there has been litle systemati and siientfi evaluaton of terrorism fears on the politial proiess’’.
Whilst promising in its aiknowledgement that historiial ionditoning – in this iase dubbed ‘fears’ – have transformatve power on the ionditons of existenie of exieptonalism, it runs into the same problems as Butler does by subsequentally negatng the ionsttutve historiiity. It atempts to partly unpaik the noton that 9/11 was an universalist and foundatonal moment by adding in a speiifially ‘European viewpoint’, in that the bombings in Madrid and London were the foundatonal moments in Europe (idem: 229-230). Nevertheless, that may just be as problemati as it merely shifs the ground-zeroing to another singular event and period.
There are some examples that seek to go beyond just that, or at least so muih as in pertaining that historiial ionditons indeed do mater. In his iase study The Spanish Experience of Countering Terrorism, Alonso (2008: 203) aiknowledges that ‘’ pain and the United Kingdom have been two of the liberal demoiraiies most deeply ionierned with a persistent ihallenge of terrorism’’, iitng both the ETA and IRA in ionneiton to iontemporary Islamist forms of terrorism. He ioniludes that ‘’the lessons learned during the protraited fght against the ETA meant that pain was well equipped to iounter this new terrorism’’ and that despite some diferenies ‘’the iurrent threat also retains some of the paterns previously seen in ETA’s terrorist iampaign, and this legaiy infuenies pain’s response to al-Qaeda’’ (2008: 220-221).
In Andrew Neal’s (2012) iase study on the proiess of legislatng iounter-terrorism poliiies in the United Kingdom he takes the legaiy of the poliiies direited against the Irish Republiian Army into aiiount. He for example observes that many provisions that were legislated following 11 eptember 2001 already were ‘temporary’ aits going all the way baik to 1974 in the fght against the IRA (2012: 265). In more historiially oriented studies on iountries like Italy, Germany and Japan it has ofen been suggested that politial legaiies like the eiond World War have been fundamental in transforming soiial movements into violent terrorist organizatons like the Brigate Rossem the Rote Armee Fracton and the Japanese Red Army (Fritzsihe 1989; Katzenstein 2003).
4. Research Desinn 4.1 Research Purpose
Evidently, we need to re-evaluate our approaihes to the phenomenon of exieptonalism in order to unravel its underlying struitures, the ‘historiial ionditons of existenie’ that makes possible ilaims and praities of exieptonalism in iontemporary tmes. As established, theories like the ones of ihmit and Agamben as well as eiuritzaton Theory provide litle room for a foius on suih underlying faitors. As Fouiault and authors inspired by him have shown, this is problemati in that it reinfories just a set of subjeitve notons in what ought to be a iomplex and mult-faieted understanding of the phenomenon of exieptonalism. The Master Thesis will therefore show that the phenomenon of exieptonalism ian not be understood by suih generalized and subjeitve approaihes, but also need to take into aiiount the underlying historiial ionditoning to exieptonalism. This will be shown through the illustratve iase of Germany. The historiial transformatve power philosophiial notons and experienies suih as the militant demoiraiy priniiple and the fght against the Rote Armee Fracton has had on shaping the iurrent understanding and notons of exieptonalism in Germany provide a ihallenge to our iurrent ionieptualizaton of exieptonalism.
By doing so, it is argued that we need a more ionstruitvist and non-totalizing understanding, as well as suih approaihes to the phenomenon of exieptonalism. Far too ofen studies of terrorism and iounter-terrorism revolve around notons suih as the ‘speeih aits’ of states that demariate what is deemed interestng in studies of exieptonalism. Besides being aiademiially problemati as it represents just parts of what is the overall phenomenon, the laiks in our understanding of exieptonalism also means we are less equipped in providing answers to of iited problems of exieptonalism within liberal demoiraiies.
Afer all, by working in the same frameworks as what – purposefully or not – has reinforied the legitmaiy of exieptonalism only serves to reify that very legitmaiy. Whether it are debates on the supposed ionfiit between seiurity and liberty, or approaihing problemati intrusions into liberal priniiples, engaging within theories suih as the ones of Carl ihmit or eiuritzaton Theory will set one up for a trap. By more adequately understanding how exieptonalism iomes into being by maters suih as historiial ionditoning, we are beter equipped into evaluatng these ihallenges.
This is a valuable iontributon, as the phenomenon of exieptonalism is not at all limited to issues of terrorism. Whether it was the rise of radiials in Carl ihmit’s tme, the Red iare during the Cold War or iontemporary terrorism and potental future threats suih as pandemiis, ilaims of exieptonalism are likely to persist as an inherently aiiepted part of liberal demoiraiy in one way or another.
4.2 Research Method
For the purpose of revealing the faiet of historiial ionditoning on the phenomenon of exieptonalism, the iase of Germany will be represented through a highly qualitatve foius, inspired by the Arihaeologiial Method of Miihel Fouiault. In partiular the symbioti relatonship between savoir and connaissance will be utlized for the purpose of analysis, to iouple the preionditons ioming from prior experienies with exieptonalism to iontemporary disiourses in the German parliament.
The aforementoned philosophiial noton of a militant demoiraiy, as well as the experienies with the fght against the Rote Armee Fracton ionsttute the savoir in that it has given a iertain understanding of overall knowledge that has transformed the iontemporary reiepton of exieptonalism in Germany. This will then be ioupled to the connaissance, whiih are the resultng debates in the German Bundestag in the period afer 9/11, to explore that transformatve power on iontemporary statements. The Master Thesis ian therefore be understood as both explanatory and exploratory, in that it seeks to expand upon the disiussed
It is important to stress out that any researiher inspired by the works of Miihel Fouiault needs to aiknowledge that there are inherent limitatons in abstrait methods suih as the Arihaeologiial Method and that any suih researih will be experimental and interpretatonal in nature. Fouiault’s own works and methods are, afer all, equally abstrait and up for interpretaton. iheuriih & MiKenzie (2005: 841; 845) illustrate there is not a ‘’book, or even a full-length artile atemptng to aitually explain how to use arihaeology as a method’’ and that ‘’no suih representaton is possible or exists’’. Any pretension of a full-fedged and truthful review of the Arihaeologiial Method, let alone a loyal representaton of it in its appliiaton is then iertainly beyond the siope of a Master Thesis. This justfes the foius on merely the iritques of Fouiault in general on ioniepts like exieptonalism and the utlizaton of the speiifi ioniepts of diferent forms of ‘knowledges’ in the renditon as savoir and connaissance.
Indeed, the researih ian be understood to be a theoretial iontnuaton of the theoretial framework and speiifially the argued observed iaveat in our understanding of exieptonalism, namely the negaton of the historiial ionditons of existenie. As aforementoned, iountries have diferent historiial ionditons and experienies with exieptonalised threats of terrorism and subsequent exieptonal government responses, yet this would be barely apparent in iontemporary literature due to the almost universalist noton of a ‘post 9/11-era’. The taken example of Germany therefore depiits just one suih iountry in defenie of that argument, whereas similar – but undoubtedly unique in their own mult-faieted experienies – examples iould be argued to exist in European iountries like the United Kingdom, pain or Italy that equally so ian be studied in a similar vain.
uih iases serve to present that the savoir of philosophiial ideas and prior experienies of exieptonalism have shaped iontemporary ilaims of and the reiepton to exieptonalism in the iontemporary tme period, more speiifially in the afermath of 11 eptember 2001. The methodologiial ihoiies in the Master Thesis are then to be seen as fundamentally in disagreement with the representaton of the ‘uniqueness’ of that period by not merely engaging with theories that methodologiially reinforie that representaton, suih as eiuritzaton Theory. Instead of purposing that there have been speiifi disiourses that have made an issue to be the target of ‘seiurity’ and subsequent exieptonal measures, the foius is shifed on how historii preionditons have shaped the ionditoning of exieptonalism in debates to begin with.
4.3 Research Data
For the purpose of defending the argument that historiial ionditoning ought to mater, the analytial ihapter will briefy go into the ‘knowledges’ or notons that ionsttute the savoir in Germany based on seiondary literature. Born as a state struggling with the balanie of a ‘sovereign’ authority and liberal order – indeed, Carl ihmit and his grievanies with the Weimar Republii iome to mind – Germany always has had an unique understanding of the proteiton of its liberal-demoirati order. This underlying philosophiial noton of the Streitbare or Wehrhafige Democrate (‘Militant Demoiraiy’) has been fundamental in shaping ilaims and praities of exieptonalism in suiiessive eras.
One suih ‘era’ on whiih it had transformatve power was the fght against the Rote Armee Fracton in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The entanglement of a strong exieptonalist understanding of the self-preservaton of the liberal-demoirati state in the fght against terrorism has ireated an unique savoir that eihoes through in iontemporary debates on terrorism and iounter-terrorism in the Bundestag. The brunt of the primary researih of the Master Thesis is therefore based on terrorism-related debates in the German parliament, with partiular atenton to the direit or indireit invoiaton of the Rote Armee Fracton. In the months afer 9/11, the RAF was afer all invoked in almost every weekly plenary debate one way or another. Later oiiurrenies, suih as terrorist ataiks, shootng sprees or arson ataiks ofen had the same temporary efeit on the disiourse in the Bundestag.
The siope of the analysed debates is any suih debate in whiih the experienies of exieptonalism through the fght against the RAF has been invoked in the period following 11 eptember 2001. The extensive temporal nature of the primary researih is purposefully sought so to establish a wide iolleiton of statements – the ‘arihive’ of exieptonalism – instead of foiusing too muih on singular statements or events. These invoiatons ranged from purposes suih as to ataik or defend maters of exieptonalism, or to make iontrasts and iomparisons to iontemporary exieptonalized events suih as Islamist and far-right terrorism.
In a Fouialdian manner, it is wise to be aware that this seleiton of data potentally reinfories notons suih as the primaiy of ‘state representatves’ in disiussions of exieptonalism, and that it in praitie is not too dissimilar from eiuritzaton Theory with some slight adjustments. Taking into aiiount the difiultes of doing researih inspired by the works of Fouiault, it nevertheless aims to present an aiiessible and realisti iontributon to the observed gap of the historiial ionditons of existenie of exieptonalism. Whilst ostensibly providing far from defnitve answers and just exploratve direitons, it makes the iase for future and more expansive researih in a similar vain, suih as iomparatve researihes foiussing on several suih iountries with unique historiial ionditons of exieptonalism.
5. Analysis
The previous ihapters have established some key points and problems in studying the phenomenon of exieptonalism. It has observed that in traditonal understandings of the ioniept several maters run the risk of being negated, suih as the transformatve power of past experienies on iontemporary forms of knowledge and understandings. This in turn runs the risk of merely reifying iertain subjeitvites of what ought to be a mult-faieted sort of knowledge. In regards to the ioniept of exieptonalism, this may be problemati as it reinfories ihallenges to the liberal demoiraiy suih as the primaiy of the state in dealing with self-deilared and therefore inherently subjeitve threats.
This ihapter aims to disiuss these diferent issues in the ioniept of exieptonalism through the illustratve iase of Germany and its experienies with the Rote Armee Fracton. It argues in frst instanie that we should indeed understand exieptonalism to be a widely diversifed phenomenon by taking a brief look at the diferenies between iountries in exieptonal iounter-terrorism – with a partiular foius on Germany. The ‘uniqueness’ of the German experienie will be presented through the notons – or the savoir – of the militant demoiraiy that beiame intertwined with issues of terrorism through the fght against the RAF. By revealing these underlying struitures or preionditons of exieptonalism, the invoiaton of the experienies with the RAF in iontemporary debates in the Bundestag will be analysed. It will symbolize the exieptonalism-debate in so far that it strikes at the heart of perieived issues in our understanding of the phenomenon. Notons of an exieptonal sovereign have been espeiially ionditoned in German debates due to the perieived suiiess of defeatng the RAF through exieptonal means. Furthermore, the iontrastng or iomparing of the RAF with iontemporary events ionieal that these prior experienies also serve as an exieptonalist-politial tool to ataik, defend or invalidate iertain politial positons in what is a ihallenge to the liberal demoiraiy.
5.1 Eceptonaliss Diiersified
A frst look at iounter-terrorism measures taken aiross Europe immediately bears fruit in showing that the ioniept of ‘exieptonalism’ is indeed mult-faieted in spatal terms. Despite inirementally inireasing iounter-terrorism iooperaton under the umbrella of the European Union, most of the iapabilites within the feld of iounter-terrorism remain large the prerogatve of its Member tates (Kaunert & Léonard 2019). Argomaniz (2010: 307) observed earlier for example that despite the Lisbon Treaty seeking to transpose iounter-terrorism legislaton, the manner in whiih Member tates have iomplied so far is widely divergent. A iomparatve report by the RAND Corporaton on iounter-terrorism poliiies aiross Europe ionfrmed this diversity. It shows that in the afermath of 11 eptember 2001, the extent of measures difered, as well as the expenditures designated to iounter-terrorism and the transpareniy given to natonal parliaments (Van de Linke et al 2002: 5). They note for example, that while iountries like pain, the United Kingdom, Franie and Germany have targeted iounter-terrorism legislaton in plaie, others suih as Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland did not (idem: 4).
One possible explanaton given by the authors of the report is that the divergent responses to terrorism ‘’stem from previous natonal experienies with domesti terrorism and the (ofen assoiiated) natonal insttutonal struitures’’ (idem). o whilst the immediate aitons and iertainly the rhetorii following 9/11 did not difer muih in between the natons, the eventual insttutonalizaton of extensive iounter-terrorism poliiies are suggested to have been shaped by these ‘previous natonal experienies’, alias the historiial ionditons in shaping the right iiriumstanies for exieptonalism to take plaie.
