Radboud University Nijmegen
Escaping the Technocratic Paradigm
Introducing transformative learning to structured deliberation
Author Malu Verkuil
Student number s3032728
E-mail m.verkuil@student.ru.nl Specialization Political Theory
Supervisor Dr. R.B.J. Tinnevelt Second reader Dr. B.R. Van Leeuwen Version date August 19, 2015
Acknowledgements
The writing of a thesis is considered to be, first and foremost, an individual project. However, it would be wrong not to express my sincere gratitude to all those who have helped and inspired me in this academic adventure. As Isaac Newton (1676) so famously expressed, ‘[i]f I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants’1. Therefore, I would like to thank all the giants I have come
across, starting with all the professors and teachers of the Political Science department and especially those of the department of Political Theory. With their enthusiasm and love for Political Science, they are, in part, responsible for my academic achievements and personal development in the last year. To name them, prof. dr. M.L.J. Wissenburg, dr. B.R. Van Leeuwen, and dr. M. Verschoor, who now teaches philosophy at Leiden University. Although he is not part of the Political Science department, it goes without saying that I am greatly indebted to my thesis supervisor, dr. R.B.J Tinnevelt, as he provided me with useful feedback and enlightening discussions.
In my view, an academic department is only as strong as the students who take part. The academic debates, philosophical conversations and lunches with this year’s Master group where inspiring and motivating. Therefore, I would like to thank all my fellow master students of this year’s graduating class. One of them, Laura Maas, in particular. She has, without complaining, edited every single paper and assignment for me. Moreover, I would like to thank Sophie Lauwers, who has been the editor of my master thesis. Last but not least, I would like to thank all my friends and family who have (always) been so patient and supporting while I was hiding at the university library. My love goes out to them, and especially to my partner Dimitri Langereis, who has been the one constant factor in my life.
1 As quote in: Brewster (2009) Memoirs of the life, writings, and discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton. The Newton project. September 2009, http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/OTHE00101, accessed 19 August 2015.
Abstract
The role of experts in society and decision-making processes becomes increasingly important. Experts have become so important, that they seem to change the character of democracy. Instead of democratic decision-making, decision-making seem to become technocratic. Moreover, society as a whole seems to be captured by a specific rationale, one that is part of a technocratic paradigm. Notwithstanding the important instrumental value of experts, the increasing importance of and dependence on them carries several disadvantages. These disadvantages are, however, not accounted for in theories of deliberative democracy. This is unfortunate, since deliberative designs could at the same time provide a way to withstand the technocratic paradigm, because they emphasize the importance of including citizens in the decision-making process. In order to assess whether deliberative democracy could withstand the technocratic paradigm, this thesis investigates the role of experts in deliberative democracy. It will show that deliberative democracy has the theoretical potential to counter the technocratic paradigm, but that structured deliberation in its current form sustains the paradigm instead. To overcome this problem, I will argue for including transformative learning, through an explorational dialogue and with a facilitator who guides the structured deliberation process.
Keywords: technocratic project, technocratic paradigm, structured deliberation, expert positioning, transformative learning.
Table of content
Acknowledgements...2
Abstract...3
Table of content...4
Chapter 1: Introduction...5
Chapter 2: The Technocratic Project and the Technocratic Paradigm...9
Introduction...9
2.1: The Origins of Technocratic Thought...9
2.2: The Technocratic Project: A Democratic Challenge...17
2.3: A Paradigm Sustaining the Technocratic Project...20
Conclusion...26
Chapter 3: Designing Self-legislation by Citizens...29
Introduction...29
3.1: The Inspiration for the Ideal of Deliberative Democracy...30
3.2: The Deliberative Democratic Ideal and its Institutional Designs...34
3.3: A Design Challenge for Deliberative Democrats...42
Conclusion...45
Chapter 4: Considering Experts in Structured Deliberation...47
Introduction...47
4.1: The similarities of the structured deliberation process in minipublics...48
4.2: Considerations regarding the use of experts in structured deliberation...50
4.3: Withstanding the Technocratic Project and the Technocratic Paradigm...58
Conclusion...64
Chapter 5: Conclusion...66
References...71
Chapter 1: Introduction
Western societies are increasingly aspiring to become ‘knowledge societies’ (Stehr, 1994a; Fischer 2009). Expert advice, and dependency on it, thereby becomes more and more important. The implications of the knowledge society are a highly debated topic(Stehr, 1994b). However, it is safe to say that expert knowledge, and its products, can have a great impact on the organization of modern society. As Fisher (1990) explains, central features of today’s modern society ascribe increasing importance to technological and scientific knowledge and thereby modern society seems to have become dependent on it. Expert knowledge, it is argued, is needed because it sustains and stimulates economic growth, addresses complexity, and grasps organizational interdependence. Thereby, experts obtain a dominant position, since they are given the possibilities to influence and shape governance along the lines of feasibility and effectiveness (Fischer, 1990).
There are numerous examples of when and how technical and scientific inventions are intertwined with the organization of society. Consider for example the inventions of new communication technologies such as the Internet, which has changed the way in which we communicate with each other and acquire information. Other examples are genetically modified food, which allows for an efficient way of producing food, or the search for a sustainable alternative for energy reserves to avoid environmental degradation. Each of these examples is connected to a complex specialized field of knowledge that can have (or already has) a major impact on the organization of society (Fischer, 2009).
Yet, society is ambiguous about expertise and its influence on the organization of society. On the one hand, the (increasing) dependence on experts is regarded with a negative attitude, since expert knowledge and the proposed solutions for societal problems are often incomprehensible to ordinary citizens. On the other hand, the rise of experts is welcomed, since their knowledge-based expertise gives individuals access to information that enables them to reach their own goals (Stehr, 1994b). Most of the time, people call upon experts without questioning their opinions. As Frank Fischer (2009, 139) points out, ‘[e]xpertise may not be what it is thought to be, but most people think that only a fool would not want some expert advice in technical matters’.
The question is whether the dependency on expert knowledge and experts in general poses a problem for the democratic organization of society. I believe so, because, as experts knowledge intertwines with society’s organization, the role of experts becomes very important, especially when it comes to democratic decision-making. If experts solely serve an instrumental role, giving advice and realizing societal goals, democratic decision-making and expert dependence do not necessarily conflict. Yet, if policy options are increasingly proposed and controlled by experts, then both the public and their representatives lose control of the decision-making process. This is problematic,
because it does not embody the idea of democracy, namely a ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’ (Lincoln, November 19, 1863). If decision-making becomes controlled by experts, then society could (indirectly) become ruled by expert elites. This defines technocratic, rather than democratic decision-making. And as James S. Fishkin (2009) explains, technocracy, at best, could be a form of government for the people but not a government by the people, as government would be performed by experts. When we conceive democracy as striving for a direct form of governance which includes citizens into the decision-making process, then technocracy seems to aim for quite the opposite, namely excluding the people and including the expert elite.
We are thus confronted with a problem. The technocratic project (which will be defined in chapter 2) challenges the inclusive nature of a democratic decision-making process. Nevertheless, in order to deal with society’s complexity, we need to incorporate expert knowledge into the decision-making process. The need for expert knowledge is further strengthened by the fact that society itself seems to have a specific rationale that contributes to the necessity of expert knowledge. Nowadays, we seem to live in a “technocratic paradigm”. Given the anti-democratic impulse of this paradigm (which will further be explained in chapter 2), the question should be asked how we can control the authority of experts and how we, eventually, can withstand the technocratic paradigm.
The solution may lie in theories of deliberative democracy, since these explicitly promote the inclusion of citizens in the decision-making process. These theories are inspired by the discourse model of Jürgen Habermas. He argues that self-legislation, a government by the people, requires that citizens, who are the addressees of laws, can simultaneously understand themselves as the authors of those laws. In order to achieve legitimate lawmaking, his discourse model promotes the idea of a deliberation between citizens. This idea has profoundly influenced developments in the field of deliberative democracy. Advocates of deliberative democracy have developed several ways to institutionalize a deliberation which, as Lynn M. Sanders (1997, 351) expresses, ‘aspire[s] to replace a faceless and possibly corrupt technocratic elite with informed, considerate and just, reasoning and reason-giving citizens’. To guide deliberation among citizens in practice, several conditions and rules have been proposed in the deliberation designs. However, the use and role of experts hardly receives any attention in the designs that structure the deliberative process.
It is precisely this underexposed role of experts in designs of deliberative democracy that I will draw attention to in this thesis. I will evaluate several deliberative designs and their use of expertise.In light of the greater technocratic challenge, this seems to be a marginal research topic. However, there is a good reason for looking at these specific deliberative designs. If experts are gaining legislative power as a result of the technocratic project, then exposing why and how this power is attributed to them, is crucial. In order to evaluate this, I will look at the specific role that
experts play and the theoretical justification for the use of expert knowledge from a deliberative point of view. This requires consideration because, at first glance, using expert knowledge seems to be at odds with deliberation’s aim of emphasizing the role of citizens in legitimate decision-making procedures. An analysis of the role of experts in deliberative democracy allows me to investigate the existence of a technocratic paradigm in an empirically informed way.
Using an inductive approach, this thesis will contribute to two scientific debates. First, by evaluating the deliberative framework and the role of experts within it, the scientific and philosophical debate about deliberative democracy will be further deepened and specified. Relating deliberative democracy to technocracy will shed further light on the specific pitfalls in institutionalizing deliberative democracy. Second, this thesis will make a contribution to the discussion about whether it is possible to overcome the technocratic paradigm that seems to be omnipresent in society. My thesis offers a possible solution for overcoming it. To realize these goals, I have formulated the following main question:
How, if at all, can structured deliberation withstand the technocratic project and transcend the technocratic paradigm sustaining it?
I will proceed to answer this main question by starting at the origin of the problem, namely technocratic thought. Unfortunately there is no full developed account of technocratic theory (Fisher, 1990; Dusek, 2004). Therefore, in chapter 2, the aim is to retrace the development of technocratic thought and the “system of belief” that seems to accompany this perspective. I will do so by discussing its most important advocates: Plato (429 BCE–347 BCE), Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and Auguste Comte (1798–1857). After defining the technocratic project, I will dive into the question of how it challenges democracy. By using the works of Frank Fischer (1990), Herbert Marcuse (1989-1979) and Jürgen Habermas ([1981] 1997a), here I will define the concept of the technocratic paradigm. Moreover, I will identify how the technocratic project and technocratic paradigm challenge the democratic idea on two different levels. The first level is that the role of experts in society could challenge core democratic values. The second level is that the technocratic paradigm may contribute to accepting the status quo by inhibiting critical evaluation of society’s organization.
Since the technocratic project and paradigm pose a problem to democracy, we are in need of finding a remedy for it. Deliberative democracy might be such a remedy. Chapter 3 will therefore discuss the development of the deliberative idea and is guided by the question: what kind of deliberative models are there and what does the deliberative procedure entail in practice? B y addressing the discourse model of Jürgen Habermas, I will first elucidate the deliberative ideal which gave impetus to the development of deliberative theory. After this rather abstract theoretical
examination, a more general discussion of the theory of deliberative democracy will follow. For this, I use the works of the main advocates of the theory, namely Joshua Cohen (1997), Jon Elster (1998), Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2004), and James S. Fishkin (2009). In this chapter I will define the deliberative project, highlight some specific institutional designs, and reveal a significant blind spot within the current body of literature, namely concerning the role of the expert in deliberative designs.
In chapter 4, I will dive deeper into the specific role that experts play in deliberative designs. The role of experts in the structured deliberation processes of the citizens’ jury, deliberative polling and deliberation day designs will first be discussed. This will draw attention to several considerations that seem to influence the expert-citizen relation, but that seem to be overlooked by deliberative democrats. Lastly, I will return to the main question of this thesis and evaluate the ability of deliberative designs to withstand the technocratic project and transcend the technocratic paradigm sustaining it. This evaluation will lead me to conclude, in chapter 5, that structured deliberation has the theoretical potential to withstand the challenges posed by technocratic thought. I say theoretical, because thus far the ignorance about the role of experts and how they can in fact maintain the technocratic project and paradigm, has prohibited this. To overcome this ignorance and to strengthen the potential of structured deliberation, I will propose certain alterations to deliberative democratic designs.
Chapter 2: The Technocratic Project and the Technocratic Paradigm
Introduction
Technocracy is traditionally defined as the centralization of power placed upon the technically trained and specialized experts. Technocracy is grounded in a claim that experts are better suited to make informed decisions than citizens. Simply put, the idea of technocracy is rule by experts. Although the idea of technocracy is rather straightforward, the underlying justification why experts are fit to rule differs greatly among its advocates (Dusek, 2006). The aim of this chapter is to retrace the development of technocratic theory and the system of beliefs that accompanies this perspective. Moreover, this chapter aims to discover whether technocratic theory challenges democracy in modern society.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In section 2.1, I will describe the historical evaluation of technocratic theory as expressed by its most important advocates: Plato (429 BCE–347 BCE), Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and Auguste Comte (1798–1857). In section 2.2, the tensions between technocratic thought and the idea of democracy will be described, as they follow from the classical works explored in section 2.1. In section 2.3, I will draw from the work of Herbert Marcuse (1989-1979) and Jürgen Habermas ([1981] 1997a) and explore whether the appeal to technocracy is sustained by a specific rationale. Concluding, I will line out a technocratic paradigm which, in my view, challenges modern democratic society.
2.1: The Origins of Technocratic Thought
While technocracy is often regarded as a product of modernity, the technocratic idea can be traced back far into Western history. Unfortunately, however, there is no account of a fully developed theory of technocracy (Fischer, 1990; Dusek, 2004). Therefore, this section provides an overview of the most crucial technocratic thinkers and the development of technocratic thought. Special attention will be given to the apparent progression of the technocratic idea. While the discussion of Plato’s philosopher king provides insight in the foundations of the technocratic idea, Francis Bacon is the first author to develop the concept of a “pure” technocracy. Saint-Simon develops the technocratic idea even further, presenting a “fully-fledged” technocracy. His followers, the Saint-Simonians, however, translate his works into a religious doctrine. This section aims to address the development of technocratic thought and to provide an overview of the different justifications why a society should be ruled by experts. To conclude, I will discuss the work of Comte. While his work seemingly presents a stop to the progression of the technocratic idea, I regard his work as important, because it addresses a modern conception of the relation between the role of experts and the democratic society. Yet, even Comte does not seem to be able to escape the “necessary” use of
experts as an instrument for societal progression and thereby reaffirms a technocratic system of beliefs.
2.1.1. Plato: The philosopher king
Plato was born in an aristocratic family around 429 BCE and died around 347 BCE (Reeve, 2009). He is considered to be ‘one of the most penetrating, wide-ranging, and influential authors in the history of philosophy’ (Kraut, 2015, sect. 1). Of special importance in regard to technocratic thought is his work the Republic (c.370 BCE)i. This work is about the search for the just city-state, because, as Plato
argued, the just state equals the good state. Thus, the ideal state is one in which the principle of justice takes centre stage. Plato’s particular concept of the ideal state and his utopian theory connects two theories. The first is the theory of the human soul and the character of man. The second is the theory of the ideal state. Since the ideal state is ruled by men, these two theories are connected (Reeve, 2009).
The theory of the character of man states that every soul has three kinds of desires. The desire to which someone is best adapted should determine his role in society. This idea is also known as the principle of quasi-specialization. To put it in his own words ‘man should practice one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted’ (Plato, [c.370 BCE] 2008, Book V, sect. II). A man, he argued, can have an appetitive desire, a spirited desire, and a desire for rationality. Every man possesses appetitive desires, which entail the satisfaction of appetites for food, drink, sex, and the money to acquire this. Some men, however, are also driven by spirited desires. These men strive for honour, victory and status (or reputation). Other men are driven by a desire of rationality, or love for wisdom (Reeve, 2009). The desire that rules the soul of a man, Plato argued, will determine his value for society. Here the connection between the theory of the character of man and the theory of the ideal state becomes apparent. Each of the three desires corresponds to a specific class in society.
In the ideal state, men who only want to satisfy their appetites should be the producers. They are “the working men” of the ideal state. Men who are guided by spirited desire, should be the guardians. They are the “the protectors” of the ideal state, assigned to the military body. Most important are those who love wisdom, they should be “the rulers”, Plato argued. He justified this division by arguing that men value what they desire most and different desires therefore correspond to different conceptions of what is valuable (Reeve, 2009). It is evident that Plato is not convinced that just anyone can be a ruler, even though all men possess some kind of knowledge. As Plato ([c.370 BCE] 2008, Book IV, sect. II) strikingly expresses, ‘[t]here is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?’. Certainly not, according to Plato.
But who are these men that love wisdom? According to Plato, only true philosophers are men who are lovers of the vision of truth. He emphasises that a man who loves wisdom is fundamentally different from the man who simply has an opinion. For him, the distinction between opinion and knowledge is an important one. Lovers of wisdom aspire to obtain knowledge and knowledge corresponds to something that “is”. Opinion, however, does not necessarily express what “is” but expresses a person’s own perspective or attitude. Therefore, knowledge and opinion belong to different faculties of which knowledge is the mightiest. Illustrated by the famous Allegory of the Cave, Plato argued that knowledge can only be obtained by people who are bound by their desire and love for wisdom. These men do not just see the images of the good but they see the good itself, thus they are free from illusion. By all means, he wants to prevent that society is ruled by opinion, more famously known as the tyranny of the masses. Therefore, only the philosopher should be king, since only a philosopher desires wisdom and is not guided by opinion. Thus, instead of governance by mass democracy, the ideal state should be ruled by the men who are capable of obtaining true knowledge.
It is because of the central importance ascribed to knowledge and truth that Plato’s philosophy can be related to the notion of technocratic theory. His argument is aimed at installing philosophers (those who strive to obtain knowledge and truth) as heads of state. It is argued that Plato’s work in the Republic contains the first origins and foundations of technocracy (Fischer, 1990; Dusek, 2009). Yet, it cannot directly be translated to the modern notion of expert rule. This is because Plato’s conception of knowledge is different from the modern one. In his definition, knowledge is based on
moral judgement rather than empirical verification. It is therefore argued that, while Plato described the foundations of the technocratic idea, it was Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who can be considered to be the first author of utopian theory of technocracy (Fischer, 1990; Dusek, 2006).
2.1.2. Francis Bacon: Technocracy as remedy for the fall of men
Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was inspired by the philosophy of Plato but held the opinion that a general theory of science (the empirical method) was lacking (Klein, 2014). When it comes to the organization of society, Bacon’s utopian vision shows strong similarities with Plato. Nevertheless, there are two major differences between these two authors. First, Bacon created his theory not for the sake of a just society but to reaffirm the power of Christianity. Therefore, the aim of his argument in New Atlantis ([1627] 1986) is to find a remedy for the fall of men. Second, since Bacon claimed that Christianity prescribed the just and true vision of morality, the philosopher was no longer necessary. The dimension of morality, according to him, was no longer in question, for it was established through the laws of God as expressed in the Bible. It is in Bacon’s work that we find the
first description of a “pure” technocracy and the foundation of modern technocratic thought (Dusek, 2006). Therefore, I now turn to his technocratic utopian idea of the good society.
The New Atlantis ([1627] 1986) is a narrative and metaphorical story about the discovering of a strange new land named Basalem. Bacon described Basalem as a society that is ruled by efficiency and knowledge. Above all, this society is aimed to preserve God’s creation and moral law. True Christian morality, Bacon ([1627] 1986, 71) argued, can only be reinforced through the discovery of ‘the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things’. In order to obtain the knowledge of causes, Basalem makes use of a system that can be compared to the modern notion of scientific institutions supporting the social engineering of a prosperous society (Dusek, 2009). The transformation that Bacon proposed included a separation between classes and organized society on a basis of scientific progress. He thereby integrated science as the ruling principle of society, not justice, as Plato envisioned: justice was already prescribed through God’s laws (Fischer, 1990; Dusek, 2006; Klein, 2012).
Striking about Bacon’s utopian story is the fact that scientific institutions, not scientists themselves, would become the heads of state, ‘the very eye of the Kingdom’ (Bacon, [1627] 1986, 48). The expert, each in its own field, would effectively and objectively attribute to the perfection of society, but not rule. Because, ultimately, Bacon’s goal was to establish a society where God was the head of state and God’s laws would be the moral guidelines. The separation of classes and the organization of society based on scientific progress served the utopian ideal to live harmoniously with God and nature, like Adam and Eve did in the Garden of Eden. And thus scientific progress could remedy the fall of men.
Because Bacon makes a clear distinction between scientific knowledge and morality, it is argued that his utopian vision represents a “pure” technocracy. In a pure technocracy, science itself rules, not man. In a pure technocracy, the dimension of morality is not connected to knowledge. Knowledge, in Bacon’s conception, only relates to the empirical reality and the objective state of things, things that can be verified and falsified; confirmed and refuted. It was the idea of science as ruling principle that became the foundation for the development of the technocratic theory as Saint-Simon presented it.
2.1.3. Saint-Simon: Technocracy as solution to social and political instability
Technocratic thought gained popularity during the industrialization of the 19th century, mostly
through the advocacy of Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) (Fischer, 1990; Crossley, 1993; Dusek, 2006). He is regarded as the father of technocracy, because his views, ‘ unlike those of Plato and Bacon, present a fully fledged technocracy’(Dusek, 2006, 44). “Fully-fledged” because Saint-Simon used the utopian idea of pure technocracy and translated it into a new ideology that aimed to
overthrow the political system by explicitly granting legislative power to scientists. Rather than scientific institutions and science itself, the power to rule was granted to the experts.
Saint-Simon played an active role in politics during the French Revolution. France, at that time, was confronted with erupting industrial and political revolutions. As Ceri Crossley (1993) explains, there were roughly two responses to the social instability: the response of the Catholic Church and that of the non-Catholic intellectuals, such as Saint-Simon. The response of the Catholic Church was backward-looking, non-Catholic intellectuals argued, because it seemingly required a solution that promoted ‘a complete restoration of the principle of authority in throne and alter’ (Crossley, 1993, 106). The ‘paternalistic, anti-industrial, anti-technological society’ attitude of the Catholic Church did not seem to correspond with the ideas of Saint-Simon (Crossley, 1993, 106). Moreover, he was sceptical whether the violence of the mass movement would have the capacity to overcome social instability. Mass movements, he argued, seemed to produce social disruption rather than social unity. He argued that the crisis of the French revolution was a consequence of industrialization, which could only be resolved if society had a new religion, a new governing principle (Crossley, 1993).
Saint-Simon’s roots lie in the tradition of the Enlightenment. This tradition underlines the positive evaluation of mankind’s potential and natural equality. As Frank Fischer (1990, 67) explains, theorists of the Enlightenment tradition fundamentally believed ‘that human reason could free mankind from the errors and misfortunes of the past and lead to perpetual peace, perfect government, and a utopian society’. However, Saint-Simon deviated from this tradition because of his belief in natural inequality. He was convinced that ‘[e]galitarianism was an unsound idea which put into practice compromised social cohesion’ (Crossley, 1993, 111). Society, he argued, had to be divided into scientists, workers and artist and men of religion each with its own contribution to society (Crossley, 1993).
In his first published work, Lettres d’un Habitant de Genève à ses Contemporains (1802), Saint-Simon argued that science should be the new religion and thus scientists had to replace the priests in the social order. He claimed that the division in society, between the Catholic Church and the non-Catholic intellectuals, had altered the seemingly defining features of Europe’s political environment, namely the decline in intellectual and cultural unity. To regain stability and unity, a new, all-encompassing ideology based in science was necessary. Saint-Simon argued that society could live without clergy and nobility but without scientists, technicians and businessmen, society would collapse (Crossly, 1993). Saint-Simons vision of the new European social order can be described as follows:
technical experts would be needed “to run society”; the “unenlightened masses” would be controlled “in order to effect these changes”; there would be a need to establish a new European hierarchy “based not on social origins” but on “natural talent and society’s requirements”; and a “need to abandon mass democracy and, in turn, politics” (Segal, 1985, 62-63, as quoted in Fischer, 1990, 69).
The new state that Saint-Simon envisioned was called the administrative state. Its ruling body was called the council of Newton (Fischer 1990; Crossley 1993). This council was a ‘system of bureaucratic power directed by a hierarchy of experts’ (Fischer, 1990, 70). Power in the administrative state was no longer dependent on social inheritance or social status. The only prerequisite for upward mobility in the organizational hierarchy was knowledge itself. However, individuals could only join the technocratic elite by invitation of those who were already part of the elite group. Technocratic thought from Saint-Simon onwards became a way to explain and legitimize the emerging industrial society. Moreover, the technocratic idea of the administrative state became influential for those who strived for planned economies, such as the Saint-Simonians.
2.1.4. The Saint-Simonians: Consolidation the new religion of physicism
After the death of Simon, a new movement arose whose followers called themselves the Saint-Simonians. They gained popularity in 1825, but were dissolved in 1832, after the prosecution of its most prominent members (Crossley, 1993). As their name implies, they were inspired by Saint-Simon’s work. The original editors of the Saint-Simonian manifest where P. Enfantin, Ph. Buzchez, M. Rouen, P.M. Laurent and O. Rodriquez (Crossly, 1993). They envisioned a society where the members of the community where joined together as workers and producers, power was transferred to a technical elite, and the new forces of modernity (such as new technology) served the common good. They used slogans such as ‘“[t]o each according to his ability, to each ability according to its works”’ (Crossley, 1993, 106), ‘“[s]ociety as one vast factory” and “the organization of things not men”’ (Dusek, 2009, 44) to promote their new vision of society. Some of these slogans later found their way into Lenin’s and Stalin’s communism through the famous writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Dusek, 2009).
The Saint-Simonians presented an ideal vision of society where the needs of the community took centre stage, rather than the individual interest of citizens. The state, they envisioned, had to restore a sense of community by use of a new religion, named physicism, which took science as its God and its authority. With this new religion, they could create a state that ensured ‘union of intellectual life with collective passion, the fusion of mind and matter’ (Crossley, 1993, 129). In this definitive state the power to constitute a society should only be
accorded to those men who can find the bond between the past and the future of the human race, and are thus able to co-ordinate its memories with its hopes, in other words to attach tradition to predictions, and satisfy equally the regrets and desires of all people (Doctrine de Saint-Simon, 1831, 13, as quoted in Crossley, 1993, 126, emphasis in original).
By emphasizing the needs of the community rather than the individual interest, Saint-Simonians opposed the liberal and republican ideology. On the one hand, liberalism, in their view, wrongly claimed that social harmony in society could be achieved through the aggregation of individual interest. They argued that liberalism promoted division within society, since individuals were self-imprisoned by egoism. Republicanism, on the other hand, was discarded because of their false historical legitimization of the citizen as principle agent. Moreover, the Saint-Simonians considered ‘rights as abstract fictions and constitutions as a sham’ and argued that correct industrial planning could co-ordinate social relations by establishing brotherhood rather than individual competition (Crossley, 1993, 106–107).
Although the parallels between the works of Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians are clear, the similarities are not complete. Crossley (1933) argues that a core difference is the religious aspect. While Saint-Simon was an atheistic rationalist, the Saint-Simonians used his work to create a religious doctrine that went far beyond Saint-Simon’s ideal of positive science. Religion, Saint-Simonians argued, was intrinsic to society. In their opinion, it served as a power that would connect individuals to a community and to nature itself. Life in society, then, was subordinate to the overarching religion that contained the manifestation of collective truth, legitimized by science itself. Moreover, the Saint-Simonians had a far more totalitarian interpretation of Saint-Simon’s works. They were not in favour of any kind of judicious checks and balances, but aimed at establishing authority. Lastly, seen in historic perspective, the original works of Saint-Simon were aimed at transforming the regime and remedying the social instability during the French Revolution, rather than establishing a new technocratic doctrine. The Saint-Simonians thus differed from the original works of Saint-Simon (Crossley, 1993). Where Saint-Simon described a “fully-fledged” technocratic theory, his followers translated this theory into ‘a fully-fledged religious doctrine’(Crossley, 1993, 107).
2.1.5. August Comte: Instrumental value of scientific knowledge
So far the discussion of the works of Plato, Bacon, Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians has shown a progression of technocratic thought in which the rule by (scientific) experts and objective knowledge becomes more and more concrete. Plato provided a technocratic foundation by emphasizing the strife and love for knowledge as characteristics of the just ruler. Bacon presented a “pure” technocracy in which the scientific method and scientific institutions gained the most prominent position in regulating and engineering society. Saint-Simon took the technocratic idea a step further
and argued for transferring legislative power to scientists, presenting a “fully fledged” technocratic theory. His followers seemed even more radical and transformed his technocratic theory into a “fully-fledged religious doctrine”. Development of a theory of technocracy seems to progress by granting an ever more dominant and authoritative position to the knowledgeable, to the scientist, to the experts in society. However, Augustus Comte (1798-1857) seems to deviate from this progression. He acknowledged the necessary instrumental use of scientists for the progression of society. Yet, he argued for a system in which experts were not granted legislative power. He thereby represents a moderate version of technocratic theory.
Comte was a pupil of Saint-Simon. Although he is known mostly for his theory of positivismii,
he also developed a political philosophy that tried to find a balance between science and politics (Bourdeau, 2014). Of special importance in regard to modern technocratic thought is Comte’s idea of The Law of Three Stages ([1825] 1998) (Fischer, 1990; Dusek, 2009; Bourdeau, 2014). He argued that human intellect develops in three successive stages; the theological, the metaphysical and the positive stage. These successive stages are, in turn, related to three phases: the provisional phase, the transitory phase, and the definitive phase of society’s organizational form. Initially, Comte explained, people can only observe those objects that attract them, this is the theological stage. In
the theological stage, people are confronted with observations that will constitute the foundations of their beliefs. Hence, people are confined to the provisional phase of development. Next, in the metaphysical stage, people try to relate the initial observations from the theological stage to theories in search of first and final causes. This stage is invaluable, since it facilitates the development of reason beyond restrictions of theological convictions. Yet it is only a transitory phase, since it does not coincide with the idea of positivism and is still limited by theological notions. Last is the positive stage. In this stage, men are only concerned with ‘the general expressions of relations observed in their development’ (Comte, [1825] 1998, 145). The positive stage is the final phase of the development of human intellect. From Comte’s law of three stages, we can deduce that he grants superiority to the objective positivistic method.
Having established a theory for the development of human intellect, Comte claimed that this theory had to be consistently applied to social theory, or social physics, as he called it. What inevitably will happen, he argued, is that politics become positive. ‘Scientists, having at last succeeded in constructing their own philosophy, will again be incorporated into society to be its spiritual rulers, in a mode absolutely different from the technocratic mode’ (Comte, [1825] 1998, 181). The difference from the technocratic mode is that the government, scientists and engineers of society should all be granted a different position when it comes to legislative power. Comte envisioned that governments should be assigned the task to promote and sustain positive
development through general education, presumably given by scientist. Next to the class of scientists are the engineers. Their objective is to translate knowledge into social action and they are assigned the task of judging the scientist and his work. Scientists, however, should not aspire to have legislative power. As Comte ([1825] 1998, 183) states, ‘the scientists, far from having to restrain their profound sense of the dignity of theory, must on the contrary stubbornly resist all attempt which might be made – given the excessively practical outlook of our century – to reduce them to the simple functions of engineers’. In other words, scientists are of immense instrumental value for the progress of society, but should not become rulers.
2.2: The Technocratic Project: A Democratic Challenge
The previously discussed authors all presented different technocratic ideas. However, they do share similar characteristics. Plato, who objected to the tyranny of the masses, inspired all technocratic ideas to come. His idea of a separation of classes according to the quasi-specialization principle can be found in the works of Bacon, Saint-Simon and to some extent Comte. In all works, a negative disposition towards politicians and the unlighted masses dominates the justification for a technocratic system. It seems that all authors advocate a system of beliefs that supports the rationale that only those who can obtain “true” knowledge are fit to rule. Especially in the works of Plato, Bacon and Saint-Simon, we find opposition to the idea of democracy and the rule by politicians. Moreover, they present a deep-seated belief in technical decision making, technological progress and material productivity. Another striking resemblance among the authors is the acceptance of inequality between the members of society. Especially the religious doctrine of the Saint-Simonians might remind modern readers of a totalitarian regime. This results mostly from the Saint-Simonians’s attempt to directly connect power to knowledge and subject individuals to an absolute authority (Crossley, 1993). Lastly, all theories seem to be guided by a common and all-encompassing rationale, namely that truth and knowledge are only obtainable through the practice of science, a rather positivistic logic. Rationality itself legitimizes authoritarian legislative power. Only Comte seems to deviate from this idea by introducing the notion of the instrumental value of scientis. Rather than becoming social engineers aspiring for legislative power, the scientist has a profound educational purpose for society, he argued. However, what is striking about Comte’s work, as Val Dusek (2006) rightfully acknowledges, is the fact that his idea of the scientific method and role of experts attributed to a technocratic system of beliefs. By this, he means that Comte was convinced and confined to the belief that experts are essential to the progress of society.
The question then remains, what is the technocratic theory? Fischer (1990) rightfully argues that technocracy is more of a worldview than an ideology or political movement. In theoretical terms, technocracy should be interpreted as a project that aspires to transfer power to (scientific)
experts rather than a theory that develops a way of societal organization. It is not just the application of scientific and technical modes to societal problems that defines the technocratic idea. Technocratic thought encompasses a specific ethos, a specific form of reason that aims to ascribe legislative power to experts based on rational arguments. The technocratic project in political terms, thus, is ‘a “meta-phenomenon” geared more to shape and form governance than a specific content per se’ (Fischer, 1990, 21, emphasis in original). This means that the project of technocracy aims at establishing a form of governance in which experts rule, but does not necessarily aim for a certain kind of ideology or policy direction. Following Fischer (1990), I conceive the technocratic project aimed at shaping governance in such a way that power is (directly) connected to knowledge and granting legislative power to (scientific) experts.
On face value, it does not seem that the technocratic project has succeeded. In most of today’s advanced societies, representatives that rule are still the ones with legislative power. One could even argue that in some way, the technocratic project has failed. For instance, scientists today (no matter their discipline) are inherently dependent on the requests of society, since scientific research mostly receives funding based on societal relevance rather than scientific achievement (Fischer, 2009). Should we be wary of the technocratic project? Does the technocratic project pose challenges for today’s modern democratic society?
In order to answer these questions, we first must determine what the central features of modern society are. According to Fischer (1990), these are: (a) ascribing central importance to technological and scientific knowledge to sustain economic growth, (b) complexity of society, (c) organizational interdependence, and (d) rapid technological change. These features seem to lead to an ever growing dependence on experts, since each of these features can be attributed to the belief that expertise is required for societal advancement. However, today’s dependency of experts and politicians seems to be a two way street. On the one hand, policies aimed at sustaining economic growth, solutions to complex societal problems, understanding organizational interdependence and technical change require expert knowledge. This results in a dependency of politicians on consult experts. Yet, on the other hand, solutions and policies can only be adopted when political agreement is reached and a political mandate supports the advised policy (Lenk, 1972). This makes expert solutions and advice dependent on political agreement and political support. It thus seems that the technocratic project is just as dependent on the democratic project as vice versa.
One could therefore argue that although dependency on expertise is high, it does not mean that the democratic idea is challenged, since adoption of policies is still done by politicians who represent the public interest, enjoy a public mandate, and who may not per se have the expertise advocated by technocratic ideas. However, in my view, the interdependence of expert knowledge
and political agreement is not the end of this story. It ignores several relatively straightforward challenges that the technocratic project poses to the democratic society. First, because of the growing dependence on experts to grasp society’s complexity, ensure economic growth, understand organizational interdependence, and keep up to date with technological change, members of society become less and less able to understand policy options. The discrepancy between an expert and an ordinary citizen (or politician) in the level of understanding of and access to relevant information threatens the possibility of exercising political autonomy (leading a self-governed life) and political equality (the equal consideration of the political preferences of all individuals). Moreover, citizens become alienated from understanding policy options, which threatens the inclusive nature of the democratic process. Second, as Mark E. Williams (2006) indicates, the growing dependence on expertise risks that technocrats gain more autonomy, yet, it seems that there is no escape from an increasing reliance on experts and expert knowledge. Society is confronted with rapid technological advancement that brings about complex problems. Solutions to these problems can only be constructed with the help of experts. However, experts do not only provide the answer to problems, they are also the engine behind the technological advancement. Hereby, they are (to some extent) the creators of the problems to which they themselves appear to be the only solution (Williams, 2006). Third, as Fischer (1990, 15) expresses, a system of expert dependency
tends to generate goals and problems (economic properties, technical uncertainties and political requirements) that result in the curtailment of policy options and choices. Government essentially devolves to a consideration of what is “feasible” given the constraints of the system. Little room is left for meaningful debate, let alone the free play of political interest.
Yet it is essential, if we want to preserve democratic values of inclusiveness, political autonomy, and political equality, to only allow experts an instrumental role in supporting societal goals. As soon as experts overstep the instrumental boundaries and policy options become predetermined by experts, they undermine society’s democratic nature. Democracy, thus, loses its substance if and when experts gain decision-making power that cannot be legitimized and controlled by the public (Lenk 1972). Gaining decision-making power, however, is exactly the aim of the technocratic project. Moreover, in some ways the technocratic project already has a foot in the door: even though it still remains the responsibility of politicians to choose between policies, it are the experts and their prediction of feasibility that shape the boundaries in which the political debate can take place.
However, there seems to be an even greater challenge. It seems that we readily accept the system of beliefs that accompanies technocratic thought. This system of beliefs supports the idea
that the complexity of society can only be addressed by using expert knowledge and that (scientific) experts are essential for society’s progress and its just (or good) organization. It seems that this “belief” in expertise sustains our acceptance of expert authority. But why does society believe that scientific knowledge and the feasibility of solutions provides the right foundations to make political decisions? This seems to me a counterintuitive position, since political decisions are inherently normative and not objective decisions. Intuitively, we have accepted that objective scientific information and knowledge (exclusively) sustain reasonable arguments and informed decisions. Therefore, calling on experts to shape political decisions seems rational. Yet, this type of argument presupposes the existence of objective facts and the positivistic method as the only valid way of obtaining knowledge, a highly contested assumption. Moreover, this line of argument again shows that we are subject to a particular system of beliefs. It, thus, seems that the technocratic project is supported by a specific type of rationale that governs modern society. If this is the case, then there is another dimension to the challenges to democracy, apart from threats to inclusiveness, political equality and political autonomy, namely the existence of a specific rationally governing society that sustains the technocratic project, rather than democratic values. To examine this other dimension, I now turn to the works of Herbert Marcuse (1964; 1965).
2.3: A Paradigm Sustaining the Technocratic Project
Letting the expert decide seems to be a problem when one wants to preserve the democratic values of inclusiveness, political equality and political autonomy. Yet, there seems to be a certain appeal to technocratic rule. Even though it conflicts with democratic values and even though we know that giving legislative power to experts is constraining our own freedom to live a self-governed life. Growing up in modern society, we learn from early age to accept the authority of experts. For example, you accept the authority of a doctor because he or she knows better than yourself how to get better. Moreover, people often find it convenient to hand over responsibility and let the expert tell you what is best. As Fischer (2009, 139) puts it, ‘[e]xpertise may not be what it is thought to be, but most people think that only a fool would not want some expert advice in technical matters’. I wonder what can explain our need (and support) for experts and what brings us to sometimes surrender our judgement to those who are knowledgeable.
To answer these questions, the following section is split into two subsections. First, I will explore the works of Herbert Marcuse (1964; 1965), in order to find an explanation for the rationale that seems to support our need for experts. Marcuse was a prominent member of the Frankfurt School. He drew his inspiration from the works of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), of whom he later became an assistant (Farr, 2014). Second, using The Theory of Communicative Action ([1981] 1997)
by Habermas, I will formulate a suggestion how we can transcend the specific rationale that sustains the technocratic project.
2.3.1. Marcuse: the power of negative thought
Society, Marcuse (1964) argued, suffers from one-dimensional thinking. As he puts it at the start of his book the One-dimensional Man, ‘[a] comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress’ (Marcuse, 1964, 1). Here, democratic unfreedom means that individuals freely choose to accept suppression and domination and are unable to identify this behaviour as based on a false consciousness. As a critical theorist, Marcuse wanted to identify ways of distinguishing true from false consciousness in a way that emphasized the individuals own interests rather than the interest of the suppressor.
Before addressing Marcuse’s argument it is important to address the distinction he draws between the pre-technological stage and the technological stage. The pre-technological stage is what Marcuse (1964, 124) conceives to be a two-dimensional world in which ‘stabilizing tendencies conflict with the subversive elements of Reason’. By this, he means that the status quo (that what “is”) is questioned by reasoning and critical reflection (that what “ought”). For example, a two-dimensional world enables people to question a prevailing tradition of discrimination through a moral debate that questions discrimination itself. When a society transitions from the pre-technological to the pre-technological stage, the nature of subordination, or manner of organization and domination is fundamentally different. In the technological stage the contradiction between “is” and “ought” is lost, resulting in a dimensional world that only acts in accordance with one-dimensional thinking. But why is this one-one-dimensional thinking in the technological stage problematic?
According to Marcuse (1964), one-dimensional thinking is problematic because it does not include negative thinking, but only allows for positive thinking. Positive thinking refers to what he describes as thinking in terms of objective (and neutral) quantification of nature. It is a mode of behaviour that corresponds only to that what “is”. In other words, positive thinking is a mode of behaviour that corresponds to the idea of the objective order of things, supported by (empirical verifiable) facts. In contrast, negative thinking, Marcuse explained, is the ability to reason: a subversive power that can distinguish between what “is” and what “ought”. Reason, thereby, is the antagonistic comparison of concepts through which individuals can become what they are. Here Marcuse (1964, 171) followed Hegel in the sense that ‘“[t]he power of the negative” is the principle which governs the development of concepts, and contradictions become the distinguishing quality of Reason’.
Simply put, the loss of negative thinking means that society and its members are unable to reveal social contradictions. For example, one-dimensional thinking in a technological stage is problematic because a tradition of discrimination will not be questioned through moral debate, since the contradiction between the status quo (“is”) and moral reasoning (“ought”) is lost. Therefore, people will not be able to question a prevailing tradition since they have lost the power of the negative, the power to reason. As Marcuse (1964) explained, this power of the negative is lost through the transmutation of reason in the technological stage. This transmutation is supported by the establishment of a technological rationality that enables the blind acceptance of the suppression and domination by the established order and upholds the status quo. So what happens to a society that transforms from a pre-technological stage to a technological stage is the following: the rationality of the two-dimensional and antagonistic world sustained by the subversive elements of reason in the pre-technological stage transforms into a one-dimensional mode of thought sustained by technological rationality. As he describes, technological rationality in the one-dimensional world is immune to any other type of rationality, because only the power of positive thinking prevails. Moreover, he argues, because technological rationality is immune to any other type of rationality, it becomes impossible to transform the mode of thinking. This rationale thereby becomes internalized in modern society and thus the modern society is reproducing a false consciousness. As he put in his own words,
[t]echnological rationality reveals its political character as it becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this universe (Marcuse, 1964, 18).
There is a profound challenge for modern day society revealed by Marcuse’s analysis of the pre-technological and technological stage. By the prevalence of positive over negative thinking and the loss of the two-dimensional world, a new social structure is created: a social structure in which individuals are ‘unwilling and perhaps even incapable of comprehending what is happening and why it is happening, a mode of thought and behavior which is immune against any other than established rationality’ (Marcuse, 1964, 145). Problematic is not only that this new social structure creates individuals who are unable to recognize a false consciousness but that society has created a system that reproduces this very rationale, which leads to the technical utilization of the individual. This technical utilization leads to increased productivity of society, thereby creating a higher standard of living. Yet, simultaneously ‘and on the same grounds, this rational enterprise produced a pattern of mind and behavior which justified and absolved even the most destructive and oppressive features of the enterprise’ (Marcuse, 1964, 146). Thus, what is wrong with the technological rationale in the
technological stage is that it hinders true freedom and creates the grounds to rationally accept unfreedom. This idea was later developed by Marcuse in his essay Repressive Tolerance (1965).
Marcuse’s analysis of repressive tolerance starts with a distinction between two forms of tolerance, namely passive and non-partisan tolerance. Passive tolerance refers to ‘entrenched and established attitudes and ideas even if their damaging effect on man and nature is evident’ (Marcuse, 1965, 85). An example is the acceptance of discriminatory policies, while discrimination itself is condemned on moral grounds and because of its destructive impact on victims. Non-partisan tolerance is an active and official tolerance that is granted to all members of society or organizational groups. It is the tolerance in society that, for example, grants the right to extreme right-wing parties to demonstrate against the toleration of the Muslims religion while simultaneously tolerating Muslims to demonstrate against discrimination. However, by refraining to take a side, society ‘actually protects the already established machinery of discrimination’ (Marcuse, 1965, 85). Both parties in this example operate within a given freedom. By satisfying the need for freedom, the system itself represses true resistance. Rather, it sustains the already established system and upholds the status-quo. Both passive and non-partisan tolerance point to the presence of an all-encompassing form of tolerance. This is what Marcuse (1965) calls repressive tolerance. Repressive tolerance is the idea that through tolerance and freedom people wrongly accept an oppressive system. By being granted the freedom to oppose the system, people accept the rules of the game, even though the system itself can be repressive. As Marcuse (1965, 84) states ‘[i]n such a case, freedom (of opinion, of assembly, of speech) becomes an instrument for servitude’. Thus, freedom is not simply granting autonomy and self-determination to the individual but ‘creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning’ (Marcuse, 1965, 87, emphasis in original). Here Marcuse (1965) again points to the loss of a two-dimensional world in which the system reproduces positive thinking rather than creating room for negative thinking. What he tries to show is that when society already reproduces the grounds for the technological rationale, autonomy and self-determination will not enable individuals to distinguish true from false consciousness in a way that emphasises the individuals own interests rather than the interests of the suppressor. As he goes on, when society is guided by the objective state of things (and positive thinking), a pattern of behaviour is established in which ‘objectivity may fulfill a very different function, namely, to foster a mental attitude which tends to obliterate the difference between true and false, information and indoctrination, right and wrong’ (Marcuse, 1965, 97).
Another problem of relying on the objective order of things is that outside of this, a world of values exists. However, the world of values cannot be objectively evaluated. Through the eyes of scientific reason and the objective order of things, moral and ethical questions become simply a
matter of preference, rather than subject to logical and rational arguments. Morality, thus, seems not to have a place in a world relying on the objective order of things. Yet, scientific reason wrongly assumes that a society governed by the objective quantification of nature is able to deal with morality and ethics.
From Saint-Simon onwards, Marcuse (1964) argued, the discourse and behaviour of the positivistic approach has resulted in the instrumentalisation of the objective world. Scientific and technological progress has become obtainable and rendered the dimension of moral and ethical reasoning irrational and unscientific. It thereby attributed to ‘the ever-more-effective domination of men’ in the name of objectivity (Marcuse, 1964, 164). A technological rationale, thus, can be the logic behind the acceptance of a particular system of beliefs sustaining the technocratic project. It nurtures the idea that the moral and ethical dimensions of politics are no longer rational or meaningful. The objective order of things and the effective production of goods is what drives modern society and this can also explain the current dependency on expertise. As Marcuse (1964) argued, the danger is that technological rationality protects the established state of affairs which dominates and determines the life of the individual. But, as he rightfully addressed, transcendence beyond the technological rationality presupposes transcendence within technological rationality: as I discussed earlier, it seems to be immune against any other type of rationality, but not to its own logic, namely, positive thinking.
2.3.2. Transcending the objective order of things
Following Marcuse’s analysis, we can deduce that there is a prevailing power of positive thinking, supported by the technological rationale that governs modern day society. Rather than directly addressing the position of experts, I see this technological rationality as creating a technocratic paradigm. Here I follow Thomas S. Kuhn’s (1962) notion of a paradigm as an accepted system of beliefs regulating behaviour and restricting people to operate outside of that beliefiii. The
technocratic paradigm, in my view, (a) prescribes belief in the (exclusive) existence of objective facts and the objective order of things, (b) reaffirms the authoritative position of experts, and by merit of a technological rationale (c) inhibits the recognition of the destructive force of the technocratic project. It challenges the democratic idea on a fundamental level, as a society trapped in a technocratic paradigm and relying on the objective order of things may, wrongly, accept an oppressive system of technocratic ruling.
How, then, can we achieve the post-technological rationality that is needed for the liberation of this comfortable democratic unfreedom? How can reason fulfil its function to distinguish between true and false consciousness? There seems to be a relatively easy, yet paradoxical solution. As discussed earlier, technological rationality is supported by a one-dimensional mode of thinking,
namely, positive thinking. By reintroducing negative thinking, the domination of power of the positive and the objective order of things could be balanced out. Yet, how do we reintroduce a dimension that is lost and does not receive any consideration? According to Marcuse (1964), reintroducing the power of the negative requires a redefinition of needs. We have to move beyond individual, heterogeneous needs and reintroduce imagination beyond the scope of feasible possibilities. Reintroducing imagination can be a solution because ‘[t]he aesthetic dimension still retains a freedom of expression which enables the writer and the artist to call men and things by their name – to name the otherwise unnameable’ (Marcuse, 1964, 247). Reintroducing imagination is a solution, but hardly a satisfying one. Arguably, it could contribute to reintroducing the power of the negative, since art throughout history has had that potential. The problem, however, is that the general public still needs to “see” and acknowledge the reflective and critical force behind it. So by relying on such a solution, Marcuse seems somewhat out of character, as introducing art and aesthetics as a way to incorporate imagination presupposes the capability of people to think negatively. Moreover, in his essay about repressive tolerance, he seems to support the status quo he so fiercely attacked in the first place. He states that the question how to constitute effective control from below cannot be answered because, ‘[h]istorically, even in the most democratic democracies, the vital and final decisions affecting society as a whole have been made, constitutionally or in fact, by one or several groups without effective control by the people themselves’ (Marcuse, 1965, 104).
A potentially more successful way to enhance criticizability or the power of the negative within a given system is offered by Jürgen Habermas, a famous social theorist. The goal of Habermas’ theory of communicative action was not so much to find what was wrong with the present society, but to identify ways through which society could change for the better (Finlayson, 2005). He also emphasizes that rational expressions can only be rational if they possess the virtue of criticizability. As Habermas stipulates, rational expressions can only support societal improvement if we acknowledge flaws and mistakes in our argumentation and if we can admit failure (Kunneman, 1985). He therefore employed the use of immanent criticism, meaning that he aimed ‘to criticise an object – a conception of society or a work of philosophy – on its own terms, and not on the basis of values and standards that transcended it, in order to bring its untruth to light’ (Finlayson, 2005, 9).
When it comes to rationality, Habermas ([1981] 1997a, 8) states that ‘[w]hen we use the expression “rational” we suppose that there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge’. However, he claims, rationality has more to do with ‘how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge’ (Habermas, [1981] 1997a, 8, emphasis in original). According to him, rationality can be understood in two distinct ways. First, he distinguishes cognitive-instrumental rationality. Cognitive-instrumental rationality relates to the actions of the individual and the pursuit of its own
