Morality of Humanitarian Intervention
Casper Verma - 10020675
Global Justice
Table of Contents
Summary 3.
1. Introduction 3.
2. Key Concepts and Definitions 4.
3. Protection of Human Rights 6.
4. Beneficence 8.
5. Common Morality allows Humanitarian Intervention 9.
6. Locating the Threshold 10.
7. Just War Theory and Humanitarian Intervention 13. 8. Dealing with International Law and State Sovereignty 16.
9. Syria 18.
10. Conclusion 21.
Summary
In this thesis, I will answer the question why humanitarian intervention is morally permissible. To do this I shall clarify the concept and importance of human rights. I must also be clear in the question when an intervention is permissible. With the use of Just War theory, we could judge whether an intervention is a right decision and create a certain threshold. My arguments will be based on moral assessments, which sometimes conflicts with international law. Nonetheless, I will show and explain how intervention is possible without the violation of treaties made. In the end, my theory will be applied to the case of the civil war in Syria.
1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, nearly 2,8 million Syrians fled their homes (website UNHCR) and a staggering amount of 6 million Syrians are internally displaced in the country itself, trying to escape the violence they are confronted with daily (website UN). Besides these millions of refugees, who are in great need of primary needs such as food and shelter, the people who remain home, sometimes face grave violations of their human rights. Several international organizations have reported that the Syrian regime has used rape as a targeted weapon and that innocent people, often women with children, are used as human shields (website BBC). Furthermore, the use of chemical weapons by several combating parties against innocent civilians has been proven by the UN and other organizations (website Washington Post). The footage of all these shocking events are broadcasted nearly every day and are known to every person, but still there seems to be no change in the current situation.
The main reason for me to sketch this sad and dismal situation in Syria, is the fact that I believe it is unacceptable that, in some cases, human rights are abused or violated in horrible ways and the international community does not respond in a sufficient way, while we do have the means to intervene adequately. I light of this, I argue for the need for the international community to act upon these atrocities and to stop the suffering of millions of innocent people by the use of humanitarian intervention.
In my thesis I will argue why morality allows us to perform humanitarian intervention under some circumstances. I will emphasize the fact on why it is permissible to perform humanitarian intervention, instead of other practical questions such as: who has to pay the costs or has to bear the burden regarding humanitarian intervention, what should an intervention look like, on whose side should the intervention take part of and what should happen after the conflict.
First of all I will clarify the key concepts of this paper, to make sure that there will be no confusion regarding the definitions of the important elements of this paper. After this, I will present my main arguments for the need of humanitarian intervention, followed by the main objections given by criticasters of humanitarian intervention. Finally, my arguments will be applied to the case of Syria and I will explain why a humanitarian intervention should be performed and afterwards a conclusion of my thesis will be given.
2. Key concepts and definitions
Humanitarian Intervention
The first concept that is to be dealt with is humanitarian intervention. Creating a definition is, in this case, not an easy task. This is because the fact that any definition of the concept contains certain normative assumptions within it, basically meaning that it is a contested concept (Hehir, 2010:11). If we accept the existence of the word (thus without looking for an definition), we automatically assume that there are interventions legitimized by certain moral standards, which make them subjective and contentious (Hehir, 2010:12). This is due to the fact that there are no global moral standards and thus no consensus about the content and even the existence of word ‘humanitarian’. In my thesis I will, obviously, accept the fact that there are humanitarian grounds for intervention, I will elaborate my view later on. Now it is important to make clear what I mean when I write about humanitarian intervention.
In my thesis I will use the following definition, designed by Hehir and is based on parts of several other definitions: “Military action taken by a state, group of states or non-state actor, in the territory of another state, without that state’s consent, which is justified, to some significant extent, by a humanitarian concern for the citizens of the host state” (Hehir, 2010:20). Important to note here, is that humanitarian intervention in this thesis entails military action which is justified on the basis of humanitarian concerns for the citizens of the host state. But what are these humanitarian concerns exactly? I will answer this question when I clarify the concept of human rights in the next paragraph.
Human Rights
Humanitarian concerns, in this thesis, is closely linked to the concept of human rights. As the abuse and violation of human rights is my main argument for humanitarian intervention, it is of great importance to make clear what I exactly mean when I write about these rights.
Just like humanitarian intervention, the content of the concept of human rights is contested. Even if you used a narrow concept of the word human rights, the international
community wouldn’t agree fully on the normative content on many of these rights (Murphy, 1996:8). In addition, if we assumed that there is an universal agreement on certain core human rights, there would be another problem, namely in assessing whether these rights are threatened and should be protected. This question, in its turn, raises another question about who is competent to make these decisions (Murphy, 1996:9). I want to deal with these issues later on. For now, let us concentrate on the main question here: what exactly are human rights?
Human rights are rights that people possess to control their own lives. I regard these rights as universal, because the ground of human rights is membership of humanity (Hooker, 2010:194). In other words: human rights are fundamental rights which a person is entitled due to the fact that that person is a human being (Sepúlveda et al., 2004:3). Furthermore, they are inalienable because of the fact that one can not stop being a human being (Donnelly, 2013:10). Although there seems to be some exceptions to the last phrase, for example when someone is sentenced to a life time of imprisonment when that person committed a terrible act (like giving orders to perform genocide). In that case the right to freedom is taken away justly, because that person violated human rights of others in a horrible way and thus gave up his or her right to freedom. However, when there is no justification for sentencing someone to a life time in prison, the right to freedom is taken away unjustly and someone’s human right is being violated. The idea that people forfeit their rights will described in greater detail later on. So besides the idea to make clear what human rights are, it is also important to explain which rights are important in this thesis.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains over thirty articles with different rights ranging from the right to life, to the right to rest and leisure. In this thesis I will concentrate on a central core of rights – such as the right to life and freedom from torture – because these rights have been the most accepted as universal rights, and not simply rights associated with a particular political ideology or system. In addition to this argument, these rights have been widely institutionalized in international treaties that countries have ratified (Risse-Kappen et al., 1999:2-3).
I wish to conclude this section of the conceptualization of human rights by stating that even though there isn’t (and most likely never will be) a consensus about human rights in the international community, I do believe that there is a notion called common morality. This concept of common morality entails the idea that there are basic standards by which everybody ought to live, despite the fact that there are differences in mores, cultures, values and standards around the world (Donagan, 1979:1). For example, there is a difference in the
stance towards homosexual persons all around the world, regarding the possibility of these people to marry one another, for instance if you would compare the Netherlands with certain conservative states in the United States. But despite these different views towards homosexuals, I want to make the point that they still have certain basic rights (such as the right of free movement), although they this is a shortfall to the rights they should have. Of course, in other countries, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, being gay or lesbian could lead to punishment at the level of death penalty. I regard these countries as outliers and not representative for my point, because of the fact that these countries are one of the few that implement these punishments and have an extremely negative stance towards gay people. A second example of common morality is the following: in general there is a negative sentiment in the stance towards low skilled migrants in migrant-receiving countries all around the world. Despite these negative sentiments, mainly due to the thought that they are more involved in criminal activities or don’t contribute much to society, there is still the idea that these migrants are entitled to basic rights and that these rights need to be protected. My point with both examples is that despite there are different (and sometimes negatives) views toward certain groups of people, there still is a moral call for basic standards that people have a right to.
But why are human rights so important? I shall give the answer when I make clear what the grounds are for humanitarian intervention, as we will see in the next section.
3. Protection of human rights
Now the main concepts of this thesis are defined, I can start to explain why I think it is morally permissible for external actors to deploy military means to alleviate the suffering of people abroad. My argument will be focused on the protection of human rights, the moral reasoning behind the importance of these rights and thus the idea that it is unacceptable that these rights, in some cases, are violated to an extreme extent.
From a moral point of view, human rights are of significant importance, namely because they are seen as moral rights of the highest order. These moral rights are necessary to protect our “moral agency” (i.e. the human capacity to pursue the conception of a decent life) (Barry & Southwood, 2011:4). This agency is crucial, because it distinguishes humans from other beings and provides us with the dignity of human standing (ibid.,:5) As Donnelly puts it: human rights demand the social changes required to realize the underlying moral vision of human nature. In other words, human rights makes sure that everyone is able to live the life that is thought of as a decent and humane life (Donnelly, 2013:11-16). Also human rights are
tools to protect human beings form cruelty, oppression and degradation (Ignatieff, 2001:xi). When this is not the case, humanitarian intervention is sometimes allowed. I point out the fact that not everywhere where there is a case of human rights violations, the use of humanitarian intervention is right, because this is contrary to the proportionality principle of the Just War tradition (which will be explained and dealt with entirely later in this thesis). For example, imagine a country where every person’s rights are respected, except for one, namely the freedom of movement. In this case, the use of military means would be disproportional in respect to the anticipated benefit of granting everyone the right of free movement. Yes, the right of free movement is important indeed, but not worth killing people and waging war. A solution could be offered by setting up more lenient sanctions to the country. Instead, I argue that humanitarian intervention is allowed when the standards of leading a decent life are not met. In addition, there are other criteria’s to be met, this is something I will deal with later on when introducing the Just War theory. For now, I will continue to elaborate my point of view of how morality allows people to determine their own lives. Do to this, I will have to make use of common morality again, which was described earlier in the concept section of this thesis.
In his article “The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention” Terry Nardin describes how every human being is a moral agent, meaning that a person is a rational, thinking, choosing being and that “morality presupposes the freedom inherent in that agency” (Nardin, 2002:13). Morality also presupposes that every person has a right to enjoy the freedom inherent in the agency. He then refers to Kant’s principle of respect, which means that the first principle of morality is that each person must respect the agency of others (Nardin, 2002:13). Common morality thus regulates our choices that influence our own behavior and behavior toward others. Basically it lets us choose they way we want to live, without disrespecting the life or activities of others. Interfering in the life of others coercively, by using force without good reason for example, violates the principle of respect. This illustrates why we can’t murder, suppress or enslave people, but it is also a justification of self-defense or self-defense of others who are in need of help (Nardin, 2002:13-14). Using force as self-defense seems contradicting with common morality, because using force, in every way, implies that someone’s integrity is being violated. Let me explain how this is not the case when we talk about self-defense. We can state that every person has the right not to be injured, unless they have lost this right, because of some acts he or she performed. For example, if someone tries to reach certain ends with violence, may be forcibly restrained because they cease to satisfy the premise of this right to immunity (Nardin, 2002:14). In other words, the person gave up
his or her rights, because the person violated rights of innocent people. This reasoning also explains the example given earlier about justifying the act of sentencing someone to a life time imprisonment because the same person committed a genocide. In the end we can conclude that common morality has certain constraints, next to permissions (Nardin, 2002:13).
4. Beneficence
I believe that next to this “negative obligation” not to disrespect other people’s rights, common morality gives us another “positive obligation” to help other people who are in need, or as Nardin calls this: the idea of beneficence (Nardin, 2002:14). Common morality is not limited to certain constraints not to harm other people, it could also be applied to the idea to improve the well-being of others in a correct way, without too much of costs. Thus common morality demands us to act and help others when they are in need of help, because they face danger, either by accident of by acts committed deliberately. I am in favor for this type of duty to protect others from grave harm, something philosophers call “natural duty” (Nardin, 2002:15). Important to note here is the fact that it concerns a moral duty instead of a permissible act and thus this idea contains a certain degree of pressure to act. For example if someone is attacked by an unjust aggressor and the only way to stop him or her is by using force, this would be required for a bystander to do.
Furthermore, morality requires us to help others in grave need, not only because their rights are violated, but also because we would probably ask for help if we were to be in a similar situation. Let me explain the last sentence more clearly: imagine a socially unstable country where there are two different ethnic groups. At a certain moment, tensions are at its highest point and hostilities break out between your own ethnic group, which form the minority in the country, and the considerably larger ethnic group. The state is unable to control the violent outbreak and reports soon follow that there are ethnic cleansings executed by the larger ethnic group. In a matter of days your hometown is surrounded by people of the other group and the only way your life could be saved, is through the intervention of a military convoy of a neighboring country that passes by coincidentally. I speak for myself and most likely for everyone else who is asked whether you want your life to be saved, that I would allow the convoy to save my life with any means necessary. It would be highly irrational to reject a certain intervention, because it is your life that is at stake. The primary reason to give this example is to make clear that there is a certain degree of hypocrisy when we do not help people abroad, when we (in all probability) ourselves would call for help if we were in a situation equivalent of theirs.
5. Common morality allows humanitarian intervention
I have just explained how morality permits the conduct of humanitarian intervention. Now, I will have to elaborate the context of when the use of military action is permissible. As there are a lot of human rights which people are entitled to, they differ from degree of importance, I believe. As to repeat the earlier example: the right of free movement is important, but not worth waging a war and killing people. In other words, there is a threshold when the violation of rights becomes so serious that humanitarian intervention and thus the use of military action becomes permissible. It is now of importance to locate this threshold. To do this I will start at the point where I think the need of humanitarian intervention is obvious. Then I will introduce a theoretical framework which will help us locate the threshold.
The most clear cases when humanitarian intervention is needed, are the most horrible cases of violations of human rights. Even criticasters of humanitarian intervention are sometimes in favor of intervention, for example R.J. Vincent stated: violations of human rights are a matter of international concern, but they must not necessarily lead to humanitarian intervention, except when horrible conduct shocks the conscience of mankind (Vincent, 1990:255). Acts that “shock the conscience of mankind” is a key concept in the debate of humanitarian intervention. Although not always clear, because of it’s subjectivity, I, and most likely the majority of all people, believe that there were some cases in history that shocked mankind and thus allowed humanitarian intervention to be performed. For example, if we look at such as the Nanking massacre, the Armenian genocide, the Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust, we can only reach to a consensus regarding the horrible and inhumane acts performed in all of these cases. If we look at less “severe” cases (i.e. cases where there are violations of human rights, but these violations don’t necessarily shock the consciousness of mankind), such as aggressive acts or piracy, we sometimes should allow humanitarian intervention and sometimes not, this depends on the context. But how do we determine then when to intervene?
As it is impractical to look at each violation of human rights one at a time and judge afterwards whether this is above or below the threshold I wanted to sketch, we need to introduce the Just War theory which could provide us of assistance. Why Just War theory? Because this theory gives us the means to create a logical threshold where we can justify humanitarian intervention in the context of a specific case. In other words, the Just War theory provides us with a certain framework to judge each case individually regarding the need of humanitarian intervention.
6. Locating the threshold
So what is this Just War theory exactly about? As I have just shown that humanitarian intervention is permissible when human rights are violated in a way that shocks the conscience of humanity, now I need to give a more detailed view of the threshold that makes humanitarian intervention permissible. It is out of the question that we need to consider performing humanitarian intervention when acts such as genocide or mass murder take place, in these cases I regard an intervention as a duty, because of it’s degree of evilness. But how do we deal with the fact that other rights are violated? Rights that are of lesser importance than the rights we speak of when genocide occurs. It is at this moment that the Just War theory could help us to give a satisfying answer. Firstly, I will explain what the content of the theory entails, afterwards I shall express my view about the several components of the theory.
Just War theory
This theory, advocated by Michael Walzer, focuses on three parts of warfare. Firstly, the right of waging a war (jus ad bellum), secondly the conduct of war itself (jus in bello) and finally the ending and aftermath of the war (jus post bello) (Begby et al., 2012:328-329). In this thesis, I shall focus on the jus ad bellum part, because I put emphasis on the question of why to perform humanitarian intervention, instead of exploring the means or ending of it. The jus ad bellum principle comes along with six criteria, namely just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, proportionality, reasonable hope of success and last resort, all of these will be discussed now.
Just cause
The first and most important principle implies that a state can only resort to the use of force when there are good reasons to do so, for example self-defence or the protection of innocents from tyrannical regimes (Orend, 2008). Walzer argues in his book “Just and Unjust Wars” (1977) that the only just cause to resort to the use of force is that of self-defence from aggression, thus using a very strict conception of the principle. I disagree with his view, because I believe that the violation of “core” human rights provides a just cause as well. I also think that the violation of other human rights, which are not part of the “core” human rights, for example the right to vote or the right of free religion, is a bad case, but performing humanitarian intervention then would violate the proportionality principle, as we will see later. My main point here is that the most important human rights, such as the right to live and the
protection of slavery and torture, should be respected and that violating or abusing these rights would imply a just cause for intervention.
Legitimate authority
This principle states that the only entity possessing legitimate authority can instigate war. In the contemporary debate regarding legitimate authority, this means that only states are justified in starting wars (Begby et al., 2012:331). This also means that there is not much written about the circumstances under which people suffering from human rights violations are allowed to fight against certain repressions, which I will discuss later during the analysis of the Just War theory. In the context of humanitarian intervention, many are in favor of the idea that the right authority resides with the UN, which is reasonable since international law prescribes that the Security Council is the only institution allowed to permit the use of violence (Nollkaemper, 2011:314). If the situation arises that the UN is unable to comply, the authority then should lie within able and willing bystander states, as long as they are guided by the right intention (Begby et al.,2012:331).
Right intention
The idea of right intention means that a state must fight a war only for the sake of the just cause. This means that having a just cause only, is not enough: the motivation behind engaging in a war must be in line with morality. Other motives, for example territorial expansion or solving an old dispute, are not permissible (Orend, 2008). A state, thus, may have a just cause, but could use this as a cover up to pursue other goals. This would mean that the state involved, is engaged in an unjust war, despite having a just cause. The opposite could also happen: if a state tries to prevent a genocide, it certainly has a just cause. If the same state tries to improve the democratic institutions that may help improve the status of human rights, in addition to the prevention of genocide, there is a right intention. However, this right intention does not provide a just cause in their own right (Begby et al., 2012:332).
Proportionality
The criterion of proportionality entails an assessment a state has to make. “A state must, prior to initiating a war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, against the universal evils expected to result. Only if the benefits are proportional to, or worth, the costs may the war action proceed” (Orend, 2008). It must be said that not only a states own costs should be
taken into this assessment, but also the costs of the enemy and other third parties. For instance, the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a just cause for Western powers to intervene, one can certainly say. But due to the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet union, because of the arms race and nuclear threat, an intervention could have possibly led to an even bigger war and consequently more casualties. Thus, the possibility of this scenario made an intervention disproportional (Begby et al., 2012:333).
Reasonable hope of success
The principle of reasonable hope of success does not allow states to undertake futile military actions. One of the aims here is to block mass violence which could be futile or unnecessary. Important to note here is that this principle is not included in international law, because it is seen as biased against smaller, weaker states (Orend, 2008). For example, if this principle was in effect during the second world war, most enemies of Nazi-Germany had no reason to fight, because of the greater power they were confronted with. Suarez (1944) puts this idea in perspective: he states that using force to aid others is only permissible when the reasonable hope of success is high, but that waging a defensive war against a stronger opponent (e.g. Netherlands during the second world war against Nazi-Germany) is always permissible, because the consequences of failure will probably be more severe.
Last resort
This last principle of the Just War theory implies that a state may only resort to war if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives in resolving the conflict at hand. This has to make sure that something as serious as war is declared only, when it seems the last practical and reasonable shot at effectively resisting aggression (Orend, 2008). For instance, when we take a look at the invasion of Iraq performed by the US-led coalition in 2003, some argue – myself not included – that the principle of just cause was present at that time. However, there was an ongoing debate whether the invasion came too soon, namely because some argued that more time should be given to negotiations and economic sanctions. According to these critics, the invasion had a just cause but failed to satisfy the idea of last resort (Begby et al., 2012:335).
Now it’s clear what the theory exactly entails, it is time to analyze the theory and apply it to the concept of humanitarian intervention.
7. Just war theory and humanitarian intervention
So what do we exactly make of the Just War theory in regard to the idea of humanitarian intervention? In this section I will reveal some of the weaknesses of the theory and argue that the Just War theory needs adjustments, depending on the context. I will first of all analyze each of the six principles, then I will locate the position of the intervention threshold.
I agree with Orend (2008) that the just cause principle is the most important rule out of all six. This is a logical assumption due to the fact that humanitarian intervention is performed, because of the suffering of people. This means that the main reasons for intervention are certainly to be of a humanitarian kind, implying the presence of a just cause. I also agree with the idea that armed force should never be deployed in absence of a just cause and that no other jus ad bellum criteria would come into play if there isn’t a just cause (Begby et al., 2012:329).
The idea of legitimate authority is a controversial one in international relations. In terms of legality, the UN emerged as a key player for reaching or providing a legal background for interventions. However this doesn’t mean that states abandoned the options of unilateral or regional actions (Roberts, 1993:444). Either way, intervening implies breaching the territorial integrity of states, which is inconsistent with multilateral agreements whereby territorial integrity was accepted as a golden rule (Zacher, 2001:245). So how should we deal with this paradox? I will come to this point in the objections part, where I will show that there are ways to avoid this legitimacy issue.
According to Bellamy (2006), right intention stands at the core of the Just War theory’s justifications for killing. He argues that if humanitarian intervention is undertaken for the wrong reasons, the intervention would be unjust even if a crisis, such as a genocide, was prevented by the intervention. On the other hand, Walzer states that: “pure moral will doesn’t exist in political life” and thus implying that there are always mixed motives present (Walzer, 2002:34). This is in line with statements made by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The members argued that mixed motives are “a fact of life” (ICISS, 2001:36), but that as long as the ratio of right intention is higher in comparison to other motives, there seems to be no problem. I agree with the ICISS, insofar it would be preferable that an intervention would be motivated by only one “altruistic” right intention, but it would be permissible when other intentions are present. For instance, the NATO intervention in Kosovo was primarily launched due to humanitarian concerns, but also “to prevent a wider war” (Hehir, 2010:150), meaning that there was a degree of security interest by NATO members. In this case, the intervention was permissible, due to the fact that
Yugoslavian troops were withdrawn from Kosovo and consequently that the end of the Balkan wars was reached.
The principle of proportionality is an important one regarding humanitarian intervention. As I have mentioned earlier, the protection of human rights is an important duty and we shouldn’t allow the violations of these rights to happen. Nonetheless, this is not a reason for us to perform an intervention everywhere where rights are violated. Intervening in some cases would be disproportional and thus violating this important principle of Just War theory. For example, intervening where the threat of genocide is imminent, seems logical, but performing intervention where the right of privacy is violated, is not. Thus, we have to separate the rights that guarantee a minimally decent life, with the rights that don’t necessarily influence the possibility of leading a minimally decent life. It is here that the proportionality principle provides the threshold, I have been trying to sketch. But what exactly is a decent life? A decent human life contains certain essential components which differ from society to society. Taken these different societies into account, we can set up “core” human rights which guarantee a minimal decent life (Miller, 2008:391). These are similar to the concept of common morality, mentioned earlier, which stated that there are basic standards by which everybody ought to live, despite the differences between people all around the world. In this thesis I define the threshold of a minimal decent life as: a life in which a person has the reasonable prospect of enjoying a “good number” of human rights (Archard, 2004:406). I acknowledge the fact that a “good number” is quite vague and that there are some rights more important than others. Nonetheless, there are clear cases where the conditions people live in are so poor, that they can not enjoy a significant number of the rights they are entitled to. Circumstances where this is not the case and where the Just War criteria’s are fulfilled, humanitarian intervention is allowed.
The reasonable hope of success principle raises questions due to its degree of subjectivity and vagueness. In some cases, this criteria clearly prevents humanitarian intervention from happening, for example in North Korea. In this case, I regard an intervention permissible, due to the violation of human rights on an extremely large scale. But intervening in North Korea will most likely unchain a new Korean war, resulting in millions of casualties and thus, diminishing the rate of success. However, in most other cases, it is not clear whether humanitarian intervention is likely to succeed or not. It then depends on the assessment skills of the intervening party to perform an intervention or not.
The last criteria of the Just War theory also has an issue regarding vagueness, this is best described by Walzer: “We can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we have
reached it. There is always something else to do” (Walzer 1992: 88). In addition, how do we apply this principle in practice, if people are faced with imminent danger? How can we exhaust all “plausible, peaceful alternatives” if a great danger needs to be prevented immediately?
In the end, the Just War theory provides us with good guidelines regarding the use of humanitarian intervention. But, as I have shown above, the theory comes with certain flaws. Identifying these flaws is one thing, the next step is to provide satisfying solutions to these problems. As I have mentioned earlier, it is unacceptable that certain human rights are violated and that it is our duty to help others in need. Thus, for now we have to re-shape the Just War theory, so that it matches the concept of beneficence.
Firstly, I disagree with Orend’s view that “for any resort to war to be justified, a political community, or state, must fulfill each and every one of the six requirements” (Orend, 2008). I want to make clear that the six criteria’s of the theory are, in fact, appropriate to decide whether or not to perform humanitarian intervention, but there is an exception to this procedure. This exception is comparable to Walzer’s idea of “supreme emergency” (1977). Walzer argues that under some circumstances (circumstances where an evil and imminent danger is about to happen) a defence of extreme extraordinary measures is allowed. In the line of this reasoning, I think it is allowed that some of the Just War criteria’s should not have to be satisfied, if there is an evil and imminent danger present (e.g. mass murder or genocide). In these situations, the principles of legal authority, reasonable hope of success and last resort are overruled by the necessity to intervene and to prevent grave danger from happening. It is then that the ends justifies the means.
Important to note is that the just cause, right intention and proportionality principles are most important in setting up the threshold for humanitarian intervention. I’ve argued that the violation of human rights provides a just cause and that the motivation behind stopping this violation should be sincere, guaranteeing a right intention. But, as not every right is worth performing a humanitarian intervention, the threshold of a minimal decent life must be maintained to satisfy the proportionality principle. So far, I have explained why and when I think humanitarian intervention is permissible. Now, we should move on and deal with the main objection in de debate regarding humanitarian intervention: international law.
8. Dealing with international law and state sovereignty
The idea of alleviating suffering abroad entails the activities of intervening in another state’s affairs, which clashes with several agreements incorporated in international law, for example
the treaty of Westphalia (Osiander, 2001:261) and the UN Charter (Watson, 1977:60). It is because of treaties like these that the sovereign state has exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders and that other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in internal affairs of a sovereign state (ICISS, 2001:12). But despite the sovereignty principle, states do have a responsibility to protect their citizens from avoidable catastrophe and if they fail to do so, the international community has the responsibility to protect the people who suffer (ICISS, 2001:XI). Thus, as humanitarian intervention could be performed for the right reasons, it is still seen as an illegal activity, especially when the decision is not made on behalf of the UN security council (Bajoria & McMahon, 2013). The main question now is how to deal with this dilemma. In this section I will show that there is a way to perform humanitarian intervention (when needed) and pass by the illegal issue of violating the state rights I mentioned above. Firstly, I will explain the importance of the sovereignty principle after which I shall put forward my solution.
Sovereignty indicates the legal identity of a state in international law. It provides order, stability and predictability in international relations where sovereign states are regarded as equals (ICISS, 2001:12) and a basis which facilitates non-violent international interaction and even cooperation (Hehir, 2010:55). Also, sovereignty points out the capacity to make decisions with regard to the people and resources within the territory of the state. A condition of maintaining the status of a sovereign state is the obligation to respect every other state’s sovereignty. Like I have mentioned before: it is the sovereign state that has absolute power within its territorial borders and other states have to respect this principle (ICISS, 2001:12). This prohibition of interference derives from the normative notion that citizens within states should be free to determine their own free political system. Furthermore it was a reaction against the historical trend whereby powerful states used military aggression against weaker states (Hehir, 2010:53-54). As I have just illustrated, sovereignty offers many benefits for states in the international system. But, as sovereignty helps protecting states from interference, it also meant that states are not required to adopt certain moral standards (such as respecting human rights) because of their independent status (Held, 1995:79). I argue that the sovereignty principle is of great importance in international relations for the reasons listed above, but I regard human rights as equally important. As Nardin points out: “The non-intervention principle is not a shield behind which an unjust government can hide while it violates the moral rights of those it governs. Such violations, if serious enough, permit humanitarian intervention and in some situations may require it” (Nardin, 2002:19). I agree
with his view, but also recognize the fact that sovereignty is indispensable for states. Thus, we need to find a solution for this dilemma.
Minimally just states
It is here, that the concept of minimally just states comes into play. First, I need to clarify this concept, after which I will show how this theory could help us with the sovereignty problem.
International law extends state rights, such as political sovereignty and territorial integrity, to all member states of the UN, regardless of how evil some of these regimes might be (Orend, 2006:35). This raises the question whether or not we should allow these regimes to possess state rights. If a state has a duty to protect and realize the human rights of its own people, but instead uses its power to violate, neglect or ignore these rights on purpose, why should we regard it as the legitimate authority? From a moral perspective, there seems to be no reason to believe that these kind of regimes possess state rights. It is only when states become minimally just, that they acquire state rights.
According to Orend (2006:35-40), states should possess three characteristics that make them minimally just, namely:
- States should be recognized as legitimate and minimally just by their own people and the international community. If we talk about internal legitimacy, we have to make sure that the people are not coerced to obey the regime, for example in police state dictatorships such as the former DDR or contemporary North Korea. External legitimacy is extended by the international community, for example by allowing the society to be part of international associations and events. Important to note here is that the state involved should not be the subject of criticism or skepticism about its capacity to organize life in its community. Neither should it be shunned on a widespread basis. If either is to happen, the legitimacy of the state is questionable. - States should avoid violating the rights of other countries (e.g. states should not
commit aggression towards other states unnecessary).
- States make every reasonable effort to satisfy the human rights of their own citizens. As we cannot demand perfection, because some states lack the resources to satisfy these rights, a serious effort with good intentions to satisfy human rights is sufficient. In this thesis, the emphasis is on this third feature.
So if a state has these characteristics we allow them to have the state rights I mentioned earlier and the regime in charge could then be seen as the legitimate authority. In fact most of all the
countries meet these requirements, but others don’t. The countries which do not satisfy all three characteristics, are not qualified as minimally just states and do not have state rights. This means they do not have the right to be politically sovereign or possess territorial integrity, which means humanitarian intervention could happen without violating international law. I am opposed to the contemporary policy that merely being a member of the UN allows states to be seen as legitimate rights-bearing states. As Orend posed the question: “Why should we shower national governments with rights if these governments lack basic moral legitimacy” (Orend, 2006:36). It is quite contradictory to allow an immoral government to have moral rights, such as the right to govern or the right to have state rights. The only way a government deserves state rights, is by earning it through the respect for, and empowerment of, the human rights of its citizens and those of others (Orend, 2006:37).
I want to make clear that states maintain the possibility to have state rights, but that there is a condition which must be met, before actually acquiring these rights. As I have mentioned earlier, every person is entitled to human rights which make sure that people live a decent life. Thus, governments should make efforts to satisfy these rights and if they don’t, they will never achieve their state rights or forfeit them if they acquired them at an earlier stage.
9. Syria
So far, I have explained why humanitarian intervention is permissible and determined the threshold at which we should actually perform it. Also, I have shown how to deal with the objection of international law. Now it is time to apply my theory to a case and to do this I must return to the situation in Syria, which I mentioned in the introduction part of this thesis. We must determine whether the Just War criteria are satisfied and if the Syrian state is minimally just, but first I will briefly outline the situation in Syria.
In the beginning of 2011 the Syrian people began demonstrating against the Syrian government and called for the removal of the regime. As these demonstrations grew in size, the Syrian government took drastic measures to maintain order. These actions taken by the Syrian government met the standards of Mass Atrocities Crimes (i.e. genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity). According to UN agencies, the Syrian government had used “artillery fire and chemical weapons against (unarmed) civilians, door-to-door arrest campaigns, the shooting of medical personnel who attempt to aid the wounded, raids against hospitals, clinics and mosques and the destruction of medical supplies and arrests of medical personnel”. In addition, the Syrian government during that time had “cut
off electricity, water and communications to demonstrating cities, as well as mass arrests and torture of protesters, and professionals such as lawyers, journalists, and human rights defenders” (Small, 2014:189-190). In the time that followed, several resolutions were created and introduced in the Security Council, unfortunately these were all vetoed by Russia and China (ibid.:191-192). As a result, Syria is still engaged in a civil war and along with this the atrocities have occurred.
Taking everything into account, there is a just cause for intervention in Syria. The acts committed by the government are truly grave and meet the standards of crimes against humanity and this implies the presence of a just cause. The right intention principle in Syria is more troublesome, because the international community seems to be at an impasse. Most states in the international community oppose the violence committed by Assad’s regime and are willing to intervene through the use of the Security Council. It is here, that Russia’s and China’s opposition to any kind of intervention blocks anything from happening (Buckley, 2012:97). This also means that the criteria of legitimate authority is not satisfied, because of the fact that the UN Security Council is the only institution that is allowed to use violence. But as the theory of “supreme emergency” allows us to ignore this feature due to the evilness of the circumstances, the legitimate authority could be overruled. The proportionality principle is likely to be satisfied in the case of Syria. As the civil war has been going on for over three years and doesn’t seem like it will come to an end, I regard an intervention to produce benefits which are worth the costs an intervention produces. I acknowledge the fact that a possible intervention comes along with an increase on casualties of each warring party, but I also take the fact into account that the conflict would most likely to end soon if an intervention took place. If we would compare a short, but intensive intervention with the current situation, whereby the amount of casualties has risen so high that the UN stopped counting them (website Huffington Post), it would be preferable to intervene, especially taken into account that the current situation is most likely to stay unaltered. If we look at the fact whether or not we have exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives in resolving the conflict, we can surely say that a number of measures have been taken by several parties to end the conflict, but none seemed to have worked so far. These include the resolutions created by UN members and the UN-Arab league special envoy led by Kofi Annan, which negotiated a ceasefire with the warring parties, but didn’t succeed in doing so (Buckley, 2012:89). If the solutions mentioned above did not work, we can then pose the question whether a peaceful solution is achievable. The last criteria is the most challenging to satisfy and is most likely to be the reason why intervention did not take place thus far. As the Syrian military is united and
committed to suppress the protests (Buckley, 2012:96), this seems to be the opposite when we take a look at Syrian opposition. There are over dozens of opposition group forces who fight Assad’s regime. All of these rebel units are distributed across a broad ideological spectrum with secular units at one pole and jihadists at the other, and most falling in between the two (White et al., 2013:7). Next to these ideological divisions there seems to be a disconnection from the political opposition, meaning that every group fights for its own political and ideological goal (White et al., 2013:1). Even if intervention took place, it would then be the question whom to support. Also, if Assad would be overthrown the international community would have to assist and facilitate the regime change, which is not an easy task. This is because Syria is full of sectarian divisions: 70 percent of the population is Sunni and the significant minorities, Christians, Alawites and non-Sunni Muslims each make up about 10 percent. In addition there are smaller minorities such as the Druze and Kurds (Buckley, 2012:89-90). The next problem then would be how to deal with choosing a new leader. Finally, as there are some jihadist groups fighting for the implementation of the sharia-law in Syria, this would pose a problem not only to a proportion of the Syrians, but also to Western countries, which see this as a breeding ground for terrorist organizations (White, 2013:28). Once Assad would be removed, the chances are high a new bloody conflict would soon start.
In the end, the odds for a humanitarian intervention seems poor, because of the unsatisfied criteria of hope of success. Nonetheless, it is our natural duty to help others in need, especially those whose rights are violated as in Syria. As we have just seen performing intervention seems unwise, but remaining passive is out of the question, how should we deal with this situation? In this specific situation, I regard the deployment of peacekeeping forces under the flag of the UN as the best solution. These forces are neutral and their aim is to stabilize the situation of an armed conflict. Furthermore, the use of violence is only permitted for self-defence, meaning that the intervention is nonviolent by nature (Nollkaemper, 2011: 323-324). As it is preferable that the state gives its consent to the use of peacekeeping forces, this should not be the case in Syria. As the regime under Assad forfeited their rights by the acts they committed, they are not qualified as a minimally just state and this clears the way for intervention. The peacekeeping resolution needs to be carried out by the Security Council, meaning that Russia or China could still apply its veto and block the intervention. I want to show that this should not be necessarily the case. As the troops deployed for peacekeeping missions are deployed voluntarily by states (Nollkaemper, 2011:323), Russia and China could still secure their interests in the country by contributing to the number of troops. I would even say that this would be in their best interest as the outcome of the conflict seems undetermined.
10. Conclusion
In this thesis, I have shown why morality allows the performance of humanitarian intervention. The essence of the argument entails the idea that human rights are important and should be respected because they ensure everyone has the possibility to live a decent life. When this is not the case and the people are not able to protect themselves, the natural duty of the international community comes into play and humanitarian intervention is allowed. In some cases, such as genocide, it is even required by law for the international community to prevent certain dangers from happening. In this thesis, I lowered the threshold for intervention to the point where people ought to live a decent life. This is because the moral agency everyone is entitled to, protects the dignity of all humans and thus needs to be protected. By performing humanitarian intervention the six criteria of the Just War theory also needs to be met. This is done to make sure that the context of a situation has been taken into account. The objection of international law and state sovereignty could be passed by, through the introduction of the concept of minimally just states. In this way, state sovereignty is guaranteed if a government satisfies the three features of a minimally just society. However, if this is not the case, the government forfeits its state rights and humanitarian intervention could be performed without the violation of international law. If we would apply this theory to the case of Syria humanitarian intervention seems to be allowed, were it not that an intervention does not have a reasonable hope of success. Thus a solution could be found in the deployment of peacekeeping force.
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