Benefits and Barriers to Information Sharing in the Security Network RIEC OB

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Leiden University – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Benefits and Barriers to Information Sharing in the

Security Network RIEC OB

Further research on the evaluation by the Inspectorate of Safety and Justice

(2016) utilizing interviews with stakeholders of a NAO type security network

Program: Master Crisis and Security Management Student: Alister Kloosterman

Student number: s1997629 Date of admission: 15-01-2019 Thesis Supervisor: Dr. S.L Kuipers Second Reader: Dr. W.G. Broekema

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Introduction

Modern societies are becoming increasingly complex through developments on all possible fronts, ranging from socio-economic and political to technical developments and changes (Dupont,2004;Whelan,2012;Terpstra,2005;Karlsson,2017). The problems that societies face are increasingly more complex as well (Dupont,2004;Whelan,2012;Terpstra,2005). The usual manner by which problems were faced, was through a mono disciplinary approach, for instance the police would aim to prevent or apprehend criminals. However, it is increasingly recognized that in order to combat more complex problems a mono disciplinary approach is neither sufficient or as efficient enough. Multidisciplinary approaches to the multi-dimensional problems however are increasingly successful (Whelan,2012;O’Toole,1997).

The understanding that multi-dimensional problems, or ‘wicked’ problems, desire a multi-disciplinary approach is growing (Gil-Garcia,2009;Pardo;2004). Wicked problems are difficult to define, as they are comprised of multiple causal connections and interdependencies. This makes them unique due to the complex structure of connections and aspects of the problem and specific social context (Brinkerhoff,2014). One of the ways multi-disciplinary approaches are realized is through the use of a network approach (Whelan,2012;O’Toole,1997). Security and crime problems are prime examples of ‘wicked’ problems as crime that is undermining society is multifaceted, ranging from money laundering and drug trade to human trafficking. Security networks are increasingly formed to tackle the wicked crime and security problems (Terpstra,2005;Kenis,2009). This trend of tackling complex crime policy issues by means of security networks is as also apparent in the Netherlands. The first security networks were formed in the late 1980’s and the number of security networks has been increasing since (Terpstra,2005).

Crime that undermines the society is a growing problem in the Netherlands, crime such as organized hemp growing, white collar crime, the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMG’s), human- and drug trafficking and more of these issues are on the rise (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016). Crime that undermines society expands and affects the society beyond the criminal underworld into the civilian society (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016). In order to combat these types of criminal activity, multiple governmental organizations such as the Police, Public Prosecutors Office (OM), municipalities and the Tax and Customs Agency cooperate through an approach, Integraal, tenzij… , that aims to integrally combat organized crime.

In order to cooperate together effectively, ten Regional Expertise and Information Centres (RIEC’s) have been created in 2011 to coordinate the flow of information and process between the

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governmental partners and to act as a central hub in combatting the society undermining crime. As with most governmental organizations and programs reviews and research into the effect of these cooperation’s is conducted. The Ministry of Justice and Security’s Inspectorate investigated the functioning of the ten RIEC’s and presented their findings in the 2016 report De aanpak van

ondermijning. Door Regionale Informatie- en Expertisecentra en het Landelijke Informatie en Expertisecentrum.

Within this rapport it was concluded that the RIEC’s overall function as intended. The report introduced three main points where the RIEC’s and the programmes could be improved. One of the main issues for improvement was the sharing of information (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:9). Specific attention to improve the information sharing within RIEC- construction should be focused on:

- the internal information position of partners (especially smaller municipalities) (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:11)

- enlarging the knowledge regarding what information is or is not to be shared

- enlarging the trust between the partners and the introduction of a mandatory screening of all employees of all the partners that come into contact with sensitive information

For an approach that aims to combat undermining crime utilizing a multi-disciplinary approach through a network, information sharing is crucial (Pardo,2004;Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie,2016). The level and way of information sharing affects the overall effectiveness of a network and is at the base of the failure or success of a network (Pardo,2004). The sharing of information increases the trust between the different organizations and actors and this will further increase the sharing of information even more (Yang,2011). Inter-organizational information sharing can be difficult to achieve. Three categories of possible barriers can be identified: technical, organizational and political (Dawes,1996;Gil-Garcia,2009;Pardo,2004). Each of these three main categories of barriers consist of more subcategories of barriers.

The identification of the areas of improvement for the functioning of the RIEC’s is important. Better information sharing leads to a more effective security network (Karlsson,2017). Identifying whether the information sharing within the RIEC’s has been improved since the release of the rapport of the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Security and Justice is beneficial. Identifying the barriers that prevent or complicate inter-organizational information sharing within the RIEC structure is crucial in order to tackle these barriers. Knowing more about how these barriers obstruct information sharing in practice is relevant as it can show what barriers are more dominant in their obstruction in reality. The analysis of the implications of networks for individuals and organizations can be an addition to the theoretical understanding of these networks (Whelan,2012). Especially as these types of security networks are

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increasingly used in societies (Whelan,2012;O’Toole,1997). Tackling these barriers will lead to improved information sharing, which will improve the overall functioning of the network, which is beneficial considering the task of the RIEC in battling society undermining crime. This research will focus on the following two-folded research question: What are the benefits and barriers to information

sharing that NAO’s are likely to experience? Does the RIEC Oost-Brabant experience these information sharing benefits and barriers and how does that relate to the network design?

It is to be expected that information sharing is hindered if organizations in the network do not see the benefits, or if the organizations face specific barriers to share information. This study will concentrate on a specific network type (the NAO: Network Administrative Organization) and focus on benefits and barriers related to this network design in the study of one particular case: the RIEC Oost-Brabant.

First this research will explore the theoretical understanding of the concepts of security networks and information sharing (chapter 2). The theoretical background will provide the base to understand what type of network the RIEC’s are and what possible benefits and barriers to information sharing these specific network types may encounter. The research will further utilize an exemplifying case study strategy and utilize interviews to be able to analyse what benefits and barriers to information sharing the RIEC OB cooperation experiences (methods and design elaborated in chapter 3). The 2016 report of the Inspectorate for Security and Justice indicates that current information sharing in RIECs is still sometimes problematic. This thesis aims to probe into how problems with information sharing within one RIEC (Oost-Brabant) are the possible result of perceived barriers and perceived (lack of) benefits that exist in collaborative networks (chapter 4). The barriers and benefits of information sharing related to NAO type of networks in the literature form the theoretical framework for analysis. The thesis will reflect in the conclusion (chapter 5) on whether the empirical findings on perceived barriers and benefits in the case indeed seem to relate to the particular network type, and whether such factors can also be expected to be of influence in other networks of the same type (such as the RIECs in other regions).

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2.Theoretical Framework

A clear definition of security networks, the different typologies of security networks and what these typologies entail are necessary to comprehend what type of security networks the RIEC’s exactly are and how information within them is distributed. Security networks and networks in general do not have a universally accepted definition as most concepts within social sciences do not have universally accepted definitions (Whelan,2012:15). There are, however, multiple definitions that share the same theoretical base and differ in emphasis on certain parts of elements of security networks. This means that a definition must be utilized that approaches the confinements of the type of security network the RIEC’s are. An understanding of information sharing and specifically the benefits and barriers to information sharing will also be necessary. The theoretical framework first explores the definition of security networks and the typologies of security networks after which information sharing and the benefits and barriers to information sharing will be explored.

2.1 Security networks

Whelan (2012) provides a broad definition of a network. A network is defined by Whelan as “a set of actors or nodes that are linked by various relationships or ties” (Whelan,2012:11). Actors can be either individuals, units within organizations or organizations and relationships can occur between any of these possible actors (Whelan,2012:11). O’Toole (1997) defines the relationship between actors as follows: ‘networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts of these organizations where a unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement (O’Toole,1997:45).

Dupont (2004) also provides a more specific definition compared to Whelan (2012) and states that a security network is ‘a set of institutional, organizational, communal or individual agents or nodes that are interconnected in order to authorize and/or provide security to the benefit of internal or external stakeholders’(Dupont,2004:78). This definition acknowledges the different backgrounds actors of networks can have. Both O’Toole’s and Dupont’s definitions are useful for this study in order to take in account the multidisciplinary organizational composition of the RIEC’s and the relation between these multitude of actors.

Security networks differ depending on the kind of safety or security problem that the network is supposed to focus on. They differ in form, as different agencies and actors are suited for different types of problems (Terpstra,2005:39;Kenis,2009:446). The network itself is also shaped by its goals, organization, methods and cooperation within the network (Terpstra,2005:39;Kenis,2009:449). Goals

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of (local) security networks can be diverse: they may not focus solely on a safety issue. A holistic approach to security can include goals such as the promotion of the ‘quality of life’, ‘economic strength and potential’ and ‘civilian participation’ (Terpstra,2005:39). To analyse and understand networks and their underlying structures, networks can be characterized in different typologies.

2.1.2 Security Network models

Dupont (2004) identifies four types of security networks: local security networks, institutional networks, networks without borders and informational networks (Dupont,2004:97-82). These abstract and analytical distillations provide a framework to comprehend the composition, working and orientation of security networks as these typologies function as a simplification of the complexities that security networks can entail (Dupont,2004:79;Terpstra,2005:45). Dupont (2004) distinguishes the typologies on basis of citizen participation, whether a network consists of partners of multiple nations or whether the network is mainly digital in nature (Dupont,2004:97-82).

Terpstra (2005) distinguishes security networks based on two dimensions: the kind of partners that are involved and the orientation of the network (Terpstra,2005:40). The first dimension differentiates between networks that include citizen as actors versus networks with merely formal organizations as actors (Terpstra,2005:40). The second dimension differentiates whether the network is either preventive or reactive in nature (Terpstra,2005:40). Utilizing the two dimensions, Terpstra (2005) distinguishes four types of local security networks: participatory networks; mixed enforcement networks; preventive institutional networks; and re-active institutional networks (Terpstra,2005:37).

Both Dupont (2004) and Terpstra (2005) provide insight in security networks. However, the distinction regarding citizen involvement and the scope of the network as a basis for typologies is less relevant for this research, as the RIEC’s consist of governmental agencies and are regional in nature (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:26). More relevant for this research is the distinction between the type of government networks that exist and the typologies of Terpstra (2005) and Dupont (2004) only partly focus on the governmental aspect.

Kenis and Provan (2009) identify three basic network governance models: (1) shared or participant governance, (2) lead organization governed and (3) network administrative organization governed (Kenis,2009:446). The structural form of a network is determining what the network can achieve, as different actors and roles of actors, boundaries and certain links within the network create both possibilities and limitations (Kenis,2009:446). The three models Kenis and Provan identify all differ in a way that distinguishes network models that occur often, especially in governmental contexts and structures. This makes the distinction useful for this research.

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Table 1. Forms of network governance adapted from Kenis and Provan(2009)

a. Shared governance network b. Lead organization network

c. Network administrative organization network

A shared or participant governance network is considered by Kenis and Provan (2009) to be the simplest form of a network. This form consists of multiple organizations that cooperate as a network without a distinct governance entity (Kenis,2009:446). The participants or partners of the network manage the network activities and decisions without a distinct administrative entity that directs the network (Kenis,2009:446). Depending on the scale of the network some of the coordination and administration can be executed by a small part of the network (Kenis,2009:446). This model stimulates inclusion of the network partners as well as flexibility, yet this model can simultaneously be somewhat inefficient due to the participants themselves making all the decisions and the managing of the activities without a distinct leading government entity (Kenis,2009:446).

The lead organization governance network form consists of vertical relationships between the

Lead organization

Network Administrative

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organizations, which Kenis and Provan illustrate by providing the example of funders and recipients common in a business context (Kenis,2009:446). In this network there is a single powerful or large organization and smaller and less powerful organizations. This model however can cover horizontal multilateral networks, where one organization is more powerful and larger due to sufficient resources and the legitimacy to obtain a leading role (Kenis,2009:447). Partners in these networks share the common goal of the network and simultaneously maintain their individual goals. Important decisions are coordinated by one of the actors, usually the largest partner, that acts as the leading organization of the network (Kenis,2009:448). The strength of this model lies in the already established position of the larger partner that can add to the legitimacy of the network. The dominance that the lead partner can have in this model can be problematic for the network as other partners resist this dominance. This dominant position of the lead partner can also result in the smaller organizations losing interest in the network as their role may be diminished by the larger partner (Kenis,2009:448).

The third network form that Kenis and Provan (2009) identify is the network administrative form. They present this alternative for the other two forms, since it recognizes the potential flaws of the two other network forms, either inefficiency of the shared governance model or dominance and resistance of the lead organization model. For this type of network, a separate administrative entity, a network administrative organization (NAO), is formed specifically to coordinate and manage the network and the activities of the network (Kenis,2009:448). The formed NAO plays a key role in coordinating and sustaining the network, similar as in the lead organization model. Different from the lead organization model however is the purpose of the NAO as it is not another network agency that provides its own services but it is designed to govern the network (Kenis,2009:448). The scale and form of the NAO can vary, ranging from an individual who acts as a facilitator or broker to much more complex and formalized forms, depending on the needs of the networks. Government networks with an NAO usually have the NAO formed in the period when the network is created, to stimulate the network’s growth, facilitation of funds and resources and to ensure the goals of the network can be achieved (Kenis,2009:448).

2.1.2 General problems that can occur in security networks that impact information sharing

Security networks can face diverse and multiple problems. These problems can be fundamental as well as more pragmatic in nature. These problems can stem from the network typology or the combination of typologies within the network (Terpstra,2005:43). There are also general problems, referred to by Terpstra (2005) as ‘genera problems’ that can occur in any type of security network despite its typology. Problems that occur within networks have a negative impact on the function of the network, which can include the information sharing. Terpstra(2005) identifies three general problems of local security networks: co-ordination, informality and consensus (Terpstra,2005:43).

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Many networks have incomplete or seriously troubled co-ordination arrangements (Terpstra,2005:43). A lack in co-ordination results in problematic adjustment and integration of activities, especially between network partners (Terpstra,2005:43-44). Co-ordination is in this case established by having a partner within the network, which in the Netherlands often used to be the Dutch Police within local security networks. This type of partner is responsible for the functioning of the network and can provide structure and direction for the partners (Terpstra,2005:43). If partners refuse to surrender autonomy or disagree on who is responsible within the network, this disagreement hinders the co-ordination between the partners. Furthermore, there can be disagreement of whom is responsible for the coordination of the network or if a coordinating partner is absent (Terpstra,2005:43). A troubled co-ordination will hinder the efficiency of the network, as an incomplete or troubled co-ordination hinders the adjustment and integration of activities between partners (Terpstra,2005:43).

Depending on the scaleof security networks an informal character is possible, which can result in a difference between the formal rules or formulated guidelines and the actual co-operation, for instance regarding the exchange of information (Terpstra,2005:43). When there is a more informal cooperation between partners there is a possibility of certain rules to be sacrificed for the sake of effectiveness (Terpstra,2005:43). The informal relations in combination with the complex structures of security networks can negatively influence the transparency of the networks (Terpstra,2005:43). If relations become too informal, the roles of the partners regarding their responsibilities within the network can grow blurred and interchangeable. This affects not only the transparency of the network but leads to shifts in blame when problems occur because the responsibilities of the actors have been blurred (Terpstra,2005:43). Limited transparency of a security network can have consequences for the public accountability of a network. Which is especially problematic for security networks as these networks are protecting a public good, security, and are accountable by the public (Terpstra,2005:44).

The last general problem of security networks is a lack of consensus among the partners of the network (Terpstra,2005:44). This lack of consensus can pertain to the problems the network should focus on, the utilized methods and the structure and way of cooperation within the network or a combination of these matters (Terpstra,2005:44). This can stem from the different positions and the professional and organizational backgrounds the partners have (Terpstra,2005:44). This may jeopardize the cooperation between partners and thus the network itself.

Both the typology of security and problems that can occur in security networks influence the functioning of these networks. A very important part of most networks is information sharing. For

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security networks this is especially important as missing information can be of consequence beyond the network itself.

Regarding information sharing, it can be expected that each of the three network types is more suited, or has more ideal conditions for the sharing of information between the network partners. As the participant governance network functions without a distinct governance entity and is managed by the partners themselves, it can be expected that, depending on the difficulty of the network’s goal, information sharing could face difficulties similar to the way in which the network can be somewhat inefficient (Kenis,2009:446). This as there is not a partner overarching organization that oversees the workings of the network and with that its information sharing.

The NAO network form is expected to have the ability to share more information between partners, as the NAO is formed specifically for the network to coordinate and manage the network, amidst the participating partners. The expectation is the NAO is a partner that is separated in a way from the other organizations, as it does not provide its own agency service but to govern the network. However depending on the type of network and the participating partners, information sharing can still face barriers. A potential weakness of the NAO model is that the participants of the network may rely to much on the governance entity as a leading entity. A second potential weakness is that the NAO model may adopt decision-making processes and programs that can be perceived as bureaucratic (Kenis,2009:448).

The lead organization governance network is expected to face the least difficulties with information sharing, primarily due to the authority within the network of the lead partner. As the lead that coordinates and makes the most important position it will presumably also be in a position where it can direct the flow of information. A weakness of this model is that the lead organization can have its own agenda and can easily dominate the network due to its size and authority. The dominating position the lead organizations has can result in other network partners losing interest in the goals of the network (Kenis,2009:448).

2.2 Information sharing

Because they need to tackle complex problems increasingly in networks, public organizations have changed from an emphasis on information protection towards a model that aims to share information across organizations (Gil-Garcia,2009:3 Yang,2011:164; Pardo,2004:1). This change from information protective towards information sharing is not an easy change for organizations, as it involves complex interactions concerning different or conflicting work cultures regarding information and how to handle information, rules and other challenges (Karlsson,2017:567).

Information sharing and Interorganizational Information Integration (III) is an important and complex aspect of interorganizational cooperation and thus security networks(Pardo,2004:1). Public

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organizations increasingly need to cooperate and yet inter-organizational information sharing appears to fail often (Karlsson,2017:567;Gil-Garcia,2009:2;Pardo,2004:3). Failure regarding inter-organizational information sharing can be social and inter-organizational, but also technical, as for instance due to the information technology (Karlsson,2017:567,Gil-Garcia,2009:3;Pardo,2004:4-5). As integrated information at all governmental levels becomes increasingly more important and an integral part of governance, the understanding of interorganizational information integration gains importance as well. An intuitive understanding of the manner in which a government or network operates does not suffice to comprehend the complexities of interorganizational information integration (Pardo,2004:1). Understanding the benefits and especially the barriers to information sharing makes it possible to understand the problems a network has. By identifying the problems a network has regarding information sharing, the problem can be addressed more directly (Dawes,1996:393).

2.2.1 Benefits of information sharing

Information sharing can be viewed as interoperability (Landsbergen,2001:206). Interoperability or information sharing is however more than merely ‘sending’ information, either analogue or digitally. The goal of interoperability is persuading or getting organizations and people to share information within an technology environment (Landsbergen,2001:206). The literaturepresents multiple beneficial aspects of information sharing, especially within the context of the so called ‘fourth generation networked technologies’ (Landsbergen,2001:208;Gil-Garcia,2009:3). Limited access to information is a problem for organizations in addressing complex problems. Having access to more information, especially from other sources can create the ability and capability for organizations to develop solutions for problems (Yang,2011:164).

Dawes (1996) categorizes the benefits and barriers of information sharing into three different categories. The three categorizations for the benefits and barriers that are associated with interagency information sharing are technical, organizational and political (Dawes,1996:378-379). As both the technical benefits and barriers focus on data-centres and types of software and hardware the technical benefits and barriers do not fit within the scope of this research. Therefore, the technical category will not be touched upon as this would not add to the aimed research. It is, however, part of the table that provides the overview of the benefits and barriers for an elaborate overview.

Table 2. Categories of benefits and barriers associated with interagency information sharing

Category Benefits Barriers

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Contributes to information infrastructure

Inconsistent data structures

Organizational Supports problem solving Organizational self-interest Expands professional networks Dominant professional

frameworks

Political Supports domain-level action External influences over decision-making

Improves public accountability Power of agency discretion Fosters program and service

coordination

Primacy of programs

Organizational benefits

Dawes distinguishes two subcategories regarding the organizational benefits of information sharing:

(1) more comprehensive and accurate information for problem solving and (2) broadened networks of

professional contacts.

More comprehensive and accurate information for problem solving. Problem solving and

pressure to solve internal problems is a strong incentive for interagency cooperation (Dawes,1996:379). Information is the most important tool and currency to solve problems, thus cooperation is beneficial for agencies as this increases their data. The acquired external data can improve the overall quality of the internal data, as information from multiple sources is more comprehensive than information or data from a singular source (Dawes,1996:379). The increase of data and more specifically the increase of the quality of the data puts an agency in a stronger position to achieve the agency objectives (Dawes,1996:379).

Broadened networks of professional contacts. An agency also benefits on the organizational level from a broad network of professional contacts (2). The separation of powers creates a system that is both complex and has potency for stalemates and conflict between the three branches (Dawes,1996:379). In order to prevent conflict, stalemates and minimize the complexity a level of collaboration and a constantly working relationships is imperative for the government to function (Dawes,1996:379). Experts within governments and agencies build and maintain relationships and networks, with the currency within these networks consists of information on politics, programs, ambitions on the policy level and other information (Dawes,1996:379;Pardo,2004:5). The process of

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maintaining these networks consists of providing information as well, in order to reinforce the established network (Dawes,1996:379).

Political benefits

The political benefits of information sharing are divided by Dawes (1996) in three categories: (1) a broader economic and demographic context for programs, (2) more public accountability and more comprehensive information for public use and (3) integrated planning and service delivery.

A broader economic and demographic context for programs is a political benefit that is reached by an increase of information sharing. A good collective base of information provides agencies and the government as a whole with information that is utilized to comprehend broader economic and demographic trends (Dawes,1996:379). Identifying and understanding these trends results in an agency wide understanding and more appreciation of the policy goals of the government as a whole (Dawes,1996:379).

More public accountability and more comprehensive information for public use is the second

category of political benefits that Dawes (1996) identifies. If program information is shared with the public, the government is automatically more accountable for the program as well as the decisions surrounding the program (Dawes,1996:379). As the sharing of information makes information more complete and comprehensible, the quality of the information that is shared with the public will increase as well. This increased quality will also benefit the public recipients of the information (Dawes,1996:379).

Integrated planning and service delivery revolves around the comparing and combining of the

information of the multiple organizations involved which shows overlaps, gaps, interactions and other valuable data that a single organization may not have (Dawes,1996:379). One shared base of information reduces the work and time of organizations to share the information separately to each organization that is part of the network (Dawes,1996:379).

It can be concluded that there are multiple benefits of inter-agency information sharing within a network and within government. Said benefits are one of the reasons why networks are created, such as the RIEC’s.

2.2.2 Challenges to information sharing

Successful information sharing within a network and between different agencies or partners can be difficult to achieve (Dawes,1996:379;Pardo,2004:3). An integration process usually entails new processes, organizational change as well as evolving interorganizational relations (Pardo,2004:3). Dawes (1996) presents an overview of the three main types of barriers similar to the classification of benefits: technical, organizational and political (Dawes,1996). Gil-Garcia (2009) adds legal barriers as

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a category where Dawes(1996) considers legal barriers part of the political barriers category. The distinction Dawes makes will be further explored. Each of these main types of barriers consist of different aspects and an overview is presented in the following table. This is explained in the next paragraph.

Table 3 . Barriers to information sharing

Technical barriers Organizational barriers Political barriers

Incompatibility Organizational self-interest External influences over decision making

Mismatched data structures Dominant professional networks

The power of agency discretion

The primacy of programs

Organizational barriers

On the organizational level Dawes (1996) identifies two barriers that hinder information sharing: (1) organizational self-interest and (2) dominant professional frameworks.

Organizational self-interest concerns of individual agencies self-interest which can be a huge

barrier to information sharing (Dawes,1996:380;Pardo,2004:5). Maintaining an interorganizational relationship is crucial in order to share information (Pardo,2004:5). So in order for the network to function, the relationships between people from different organizations need to be maintained and nurtured. If these relationships are neglected the sharing of information is hindered as well. Organizations usually engage in cooperation when there is a reasonable expectation to achieve something that is of interest for the own organization (Dawes,1996:380). The differences in both the expectations and goals of organizations can result in conflict as partners can have different views on the sharing process (Pardo,2004:5). These types of conflict can undermine the trust between the partners and shift the focus of the partners away from their respective collective goal.

Dominant Professional frameworks. The second organizational barrier on information sharing

regards the professional expertise of organizations (Dawes,1996:380). The focus within bureaucratic organizations on expertise can be predominant and result in what is called the ‘professional state’ (Dawes,1996:381;Mosher,1982). Law, medicine, social works and other types of so the-called traditional professions defined the standards in their respective fields for the professional staff. This occurred though education and performance and shaped and continues to shape agencies (Dawes,1996:381). This process defined and continues to influence an agency’s vision towards the

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world: the agency is formed through the profession that forms the agency and its programs (Dawes,1996:381;Lewis,1980). The expertise within and of an agency forms the agency’s status and power (Lewis,1980). Professionals within agencies will work according to the models of thinking and operating that fits the core of the agencies. This reinforces the foundations of the agency, resulting in a closed system where specialists will not easily operate outside the direct program operations of the agency (Dawes,1996:381;White,1989). This becomes a barrier when an agency is required to cooperate with other partners, especially when the other partners have a vastly different origin and thus professional frameworks. The professional expertise of an organization can result in disagreement between the partners about the nature of the problem, but also have an effect on the manner in how to approach and solve the problem (Pardo,2004:6).

Political barriers

Dawes (1996) identifies three types of political barriers from the literature on the barriers of interagency information sharing: (1)external Influences over decision-making, (2) the power of agency discretion and (3) the primacy of programs (Dawes,1996:381).

External influences over making. (Political) influence over decisions and the

decision-making process of public agencies originating from multiple different sources is one of the three political barriers to information sharing (Dawes,1996:381). Decision-making and implementation powers concerning agencies are shared by actors originating from the legislative branch, interest groups, profession representatives to different officials on multiple governmental levels (Dawes,1996:381). The interorganizational policy systems are loosely linked networks of both public and private organizations and actors that are dependent on their peers in the network for resources. (Dawes,1996:381). The multitude of relationships and networks both internally and especially externally create a constant pressure on agencies to ‘attend to their direct constituencies’ (Dawes,1996:381). This is time consuming and can result in less time to spend on the issues that transcend the traditional boundaries of the organization or to maintain the relationships with partners outside the traditional network (Dawes,1996:381).

The power of agency discretion. The second political barrier is the need to protect the

policymaking abilities of (administrative) agencies. The executive departments of agencies amassed powers that shape and influence policy and the policy making processes (Dawes,1996:381). This presents agencies with policy shaping power that circumvents the traditional three branches of government. Especially as most programs are the result of a form of political compromise and present the opportunity for agencies to implement forms of policy themselves (Dawes,1996:381). This ability to shape and formulate decisions is possible as information is power and symbol of authority. Thus agencies resist sharing information as information is both currency as well as an symbol of authority

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(Dawes,1996:381;Yang,2011:165).

The Primacy of programs. The third political barrier is the ‘primacy of programs’ a term

provided by Rainey and Milward (1983). Government activity is usually determined through legislation that formulates and creates specific programs, responsibilities and parameters for the programs and the agencies involved (Dawes,1996:381;Pardo,2004:6). The parameters formulated through legislation however, whilst providing structure, can also provide barriers between agencies within a single level of government or even divisions within agencies that have multiple programs (Dawes,1996:382). The provided structure can lead the agency to focus on its primary programs and less on the issues that are part of programs with other organizations whom have a different legislative formulated program (Pardo,2004:6).Which can result in public officials viewing information as part of the programs and less of being part of agencies and other cooperation partners. This view restricts information to the program and not as an valuable part of the agency, network, government and even the public in general(Dawes,1996:382).

The literature provides a clear overview of what security networks entail, how they can me modelled and what general problems can occur within security networks. A clear overview of both the benefits and barriers to information sharing provides a good theoretical framework, which will provide the base for research design. From the review of the literature, it can be expected that some network types have more information sharing problems than others.

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3. Research Design

The review of the literature provides an understanding of both security networks, information sharing and the benefits and barriers to information sharing. This provides the base to answer the two-folded research question: What are the benefits and barriers to information sharing that NAO’s are likely to

experience? Does the RIEC Oost-Brabant experience these information sharing benefits and barriers and how does that relate to the network design?

To comprehend what benefits and barriers appear and how these affect the information sharing within the RIEC Oost-Brabant a research design must be formulated. In order for this research to be conducted in a clear manner the research design will be discussed, including the choice for the case RIEC OB, method of data collection, coding, validity and the reliability of the research.

3.1 Research Design

As stated before this research consists of a case study design, to study the Dutch Safety Region Oost-Brabant (OB) regarding the battling of undermining crime and the barriers that hinder information sharing between the partners of this security network. The case would qualify as an exemplifying case. The objective of this research and the accompanying design is to ‘capture the circumstances and conditions of an everyday situation’ (Bryman,2012:69). This is the case for this research as it aims to understand and exemplify the relationship between benefits and barriers to information sharing and the sharing of information between partners within a security network. This study looks into whether similar or different barriers to information sharing exist and persist, that can be related to characteristics of the network.

A case study allows for the coverage of contextual conditions from multiple sources (Yin,1994:13). For this research it provides the opportunity for coverage of the multiple partners that are part of the RIEC OB cooperation. The research question poses the question whether the RIEC Oost-Brabant experiences information sharing benefits and barriers and how that relates to the network design?

Naturally it is not possible to infer whether these barriers are typical for the network type since this study does not include a comparison to other network types. But in-depth study into problems common to a network of a certain type can be a first step into that direction and can inform other networks of the same type of what type of problems they can encounter.

The data is collected through the use of semi-structured interviews. These interviews are recorded and transcribed. The transcripts have been coded, utilizing the theoretical base provided by Dawes (1996) in order to perform a content analysis. The coding consists of identifying and then retrieving sections

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of the transcripts that correspond with the themes of interest for this study(Bryman,2012:557). The themes of interests, or indicators, are distilled from the benefits and barriers as identified by Dawes (1996) and given each a colour coding that will be utilized to analyse the transcripts of the interviews. The benefit of this method is the more accurate understanding and analysis of the data, as it is interpreted within the context and categorization provided by the literature (Bryman,2012:557).

3.2 Case selection

For this study the case is the partnership RIEC Oost-Brabant (OB). A more detailed description of the case is provided in the next section, after discussing the choice for this particular case.

In order to counter undermining crime a strategy has been developed in the Netherlands in which multiple governmental partners cooperate and are connected in a certain way where the partners are dependent upon the other partners (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:26). Multiple partners cooperate within ten Regional Information- and Expertise Centres (RIEC’s) which in total are overseen by the National Information- and Expertise Centre (NIEC) in effort to fight organized crime (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016). These ten regional centres and their respective networks are all NAO security networks that are geographically identical to the ten judicial and police regions within the Netherlands (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:19).

Because there are ten different RIEC partnerships, each of these ten RIECs have both overlapping and more unique properties due to their geographical location, problems and activities these regions experience. In Amsterdam there is an opportunity for internationally operating criminals to relatively easy live in animosity, due to the international character and scale of the city and the possibility to for instance, invest in real estate (LIEC,2014a:14). Whilst in the regions that are connected to the Dutch border and are less populated, the activities of OMG’s, human trafficking and the vulnerabilities of smaller municipalities are part of the focus of the RIEC’s (LIEC,2014a:26-31).

The RIEC OB is an exemplary case because of the following reasons. The RIEC OB aims to tackle both the problems that are being faced in bigger cities as well as the problems that arise within the more rural regions in the Netherlands. In addition, due to the region, they also need to cooperate with foreign authorities, on international criminals that are operating in the border areas, similar to other regions in the Netherlands that are part of the border need to do. Ranging from the criminal activities that are centred around bigger cities, as well as the problems that are experienced in the more remote areas of the Netherlands. This provides a case that has an overlap with every RIEC in the Netherlands to some extent, especially as the partners in the RIECs consist of mainly the same or similar organizations. This case is also interesting as the RIEC OB has been one of the four RIEC’s that has been part of the investigative report produced by the Inspectorate for Safety and Justice (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:22).

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The RIEC OB and the other RIEC’s all aim to disrupt similar problems. All RIEC’s are security networks based upon the NAO model and by identifying possible barriers to the sharing of information in the RIEC OB cooperation this may provide insight for the other RIECs. Whether they experience similar barriers and if this is the case whether the reasons cited appear to be similar or not. By being aware of the barriers and the impact that these barriers have, it may be possible to attempt to counteract on these barriers. Identified barriers pertaining to the NAO model are probably apparent in other NAO networks. Insight in these problems therefore creates an deeper understanding of the NAO model in practice.

3.3 Case description

The details regarding the cooperation, the rules of the cooperation as well as the structure of the cooperation have been formulated within the covenant ‘Het Convenant ten behoeve van Bestuurlijke

en Geintegreerde Aanpak Georganiseerde Criminaliteit, Bestrijding Handhavingsknelpunten en Bevordering Integriteitsbeoordelingen’ (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:19;LIEC,2014b).

The covenant is signed by all the provinces, almost all of the municipalities, nation broad actors and their regional representatives. The national partners include the police, the Netherlands Public Prosecution Office(OM), the Tax and Customs Administration, the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD), Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment (ISZW), Customs, Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee(KMAR). These partners are part of a singular or multiple systems, the administrative branch, the judicial system and the fiscal system(RIEC,2012:5).

The RIEC’s have been formed in 2008 with the goal to add to the managerial approach to combat organized crime (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:19). During the start of the involvement of the RIECs it appeared that they could fulfil an important role supporting and facilitating an integral approach to combat the organized undermining crime and as such were tasked with being the information hub and advisement of the integral intervention strategies (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:19). The core goal of the NIEC and the RIEC’s and their networks is supporting the integrated approach of multiple agencies that aim to disrupt organized crime (RIEC,2012:6;LIEC,2014b:4). This support is twofold, firstly the administrative capabilities are increased by increasing awareness, (stimulating) the information position, professionalism and developing administrative means to do so (RIEC,2012:6). This will increase the administrative resilience of municipalities against the presence and influence of society undermining crime. Secondly the NIEC and RIEC’s support the organized government functioning as information brokers- and centres (RIEC,2012:6).

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As the NIEC and RIEC’s are information centres and brokers for the network and its partners in order to disrupt organized crime the RIECs are clearly security networks (RIEC,2012:6;LIEC,2014b:4). Within the security network models as provided by Kenis and Provan (2009) the RIEC network is a prime example of a network administrative organization (NAO). This as the RIEC’s and NIEC were specifically formed to coordinate and sustain the network, functioning as an information hub and connection centre in the partnerships (RIEC,2012:5). The centre is the NAO, and the NAO and participating actors form the network. This raises the question whether the RIEC OB structure will experience the weaknesses NAO models can have, namely that the network partners rely too much on the RIEC and that its decision-making processes are being viewed as to bureaucratic.

In the 2016 report De aanpak van ondermijning. Door Regionale Informatie- en Expertisecentra en het

Landelijke Informatie- en Expertisecentrum the Inspectorate focussed on the battle against the

undermining crime by the RIEC cooperation and NIEC (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:5). It was concluded that in general the approach to combat undermining crime is organized in to the set terms and goals and is functioning as intended. However, three main categories of the approach could be improved in order to improve the networks and the approach in general (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:9). The sharing of information is one of the three main categories of improvement. More specifically, the internal information position of the partners, the enlargement of the knowledge of what and what cannot be shared and the enlargement of the trust between partners could and should be improved. These three recommendations and the consequences of these improvements as formulated by the literature are the starting points and focus of this research.

The RIEC’s and their mission statement

In order to effectively disrupt the opportunities for criminal endeavours in the Netherlands the RIEC’s and LIEC provide support the integrated approach that is formulated in the Integraal, tenzij… (2013) guidebook (Inspectie van Veiligheid en Justitie,2016:40). The guidebook has been produced by the

Stuurgroep Geintegreerde Aanpak Ondermijnende Criminaliteit (Inspectie van Veiligheid en

Justitie,2016:40). The approach is not solely focused on the pursuit and prosecution of criminals but also on the disruption of the economical positions and opportunities for both criminals and their facilitators (GOC,2013:5). In order to do so the approach targets the criminal enterprises by:

- Disrupting and breaking down the (financial) power of criminals and their networks in both the underworld and the legitimate world. This power of criminals is targeted by focussing on their financial assets, vital facilities, facilitators and the logistical facilities and processes (GOC,2013:5).

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- Combatting the abuse of legal economic and legal structures of the legal infrastructure. The abuse of legal structures present criminals with opportunities to invest criminal assets and operate criminal activities within the public sphere (GOC,2013:5).

Organized crime can operate beyond borders and yet invests and sprouts on the local level (GOC,2013:9). This makes the local level of analysis and operations an important level to detect signs of criminal activities, investments and operations both within the criminal underworld as well as in the legitimate world (GOC,2013:9). The basis for the integral approach combatting organized crime lies in four processes(translated from Dutch):

- Shared information position

- Choosing together and steering together - Execute and monitor

- Together accountable

These processes are being facilitated and supported by the RIEC’s. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice identifies that (potential) cases are being approached in three phases as described in the 2013 guidebook: (1) building an information position, (2) decision-making regarding interventions and (3) executing, monitoring and accountability.The RIEC’s also advise on the intervention strategies in addition to functioning as an information broker (GOC,2013:9). The National Information and Expertise Centre (NIEC) has an overview of these processes between the RIEC’s and provides support when necessary (GOC,2013:9).

Partnership RIEC Oost-Brabant

The case in this research is the partnership RIEC Oost-Brabant (OB).The partnership of the RIEC Oost-Brabant (OB) consists of: 39 of the 40 municipalities(at time of writing), the Public Prosecutions Office (including the arrondissementsparket, LP and FP), the police department Oost-Brabant, the Tax and Customs Administration and multiple of its agencies, such as the FIOD and the Anti Money Laundering Centre (AMLC), the Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment (ISZW), Customs, KMAR and the province Noord-Brabant (RIEC-LIEC,2015:46). All of these governmental organizations have different goals, success indicators, different methods and different measurements for input and output. Some, like the police departments, the Public Prosecutions Office, and specialized agencies like the FIOD and AMLC, are law enforcement or criminal law orientated, with the FIOD and AMLC focusing on financial related crime. Whilst others, like the municipalities, have a broader array of assignments varying from housing issues to public order and waste management.

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The RIEC OB is being directed by the Stuurgroep RIEC OB (RIEC-LIEC,2015:46). Part of the responsibilities of the Stuurgroep RIEC OB is holding regional information consultations where the signals about regional problems are being discussed (RIEC-LIEC,2015:46). In some cases the local

Driehoek (entity consisting of the mayor and representatives from the Public Prosecutions Office and

Police) present a case to the Stuurgroep RIEC OB (RIEC-LIEC,2015:46). Within the RIEC OB there are two case approaches: the regular case approach and the Interventie Plein Ondermijning (IPO). Cases that involve hemp, synthetic drugs and OMG’s are conducted utilizing the IPO method whereas the other themes are conducting through the regular case methodology (RIEC-LIEC,2015:46).

Within the partnership of the RIEC-OB there are multiple national and regional themes and problems (RIEC-LIEC,2015:46-47). As with most of the regions of the Netherlands drug production and related crimes, human trafficking and smuggling, as well as the presence of OMG’s are important focus points of the RIEC OB cooperation. In addition to these themes there are also a set of so-called ‘focus activities’ of the RIEC OB. Network forms of organization are effective to manage wicked problems as these problems entail more than a singular phenomenon that can be allocated to specific organizations to combat (Whelan,2012:15;Brinkerhoff,2014:337). The above problems are multifaceted in their nature and presence as crimes related for instance to OMG’s include: violent crimes, drug crimes, weapons and ammunition possession, racketeering, abductions and financial crimes (Politie,2014:192). Society experiences multiple outings of their existence, may it be from violent incidents, drug distribution or other forms of criminal conduct. This also means that multiple governmental organizations aim to disrupt these types of crimes depending on the nature and goals of the governmental organization and focus.

3.4 Data gathering

Interviews will facilitate the collection of information whether change has happened according to the individuals who work within the RIEC cooperation, which are the units of observation for this research method. The interviews will be semi-structured, in order for the researcher to be adaptive to possible new information. This allows for more detailed questioning in to specific situations that might prove to be interesting for the research because the interviewees have different functions and perceptions within the network, especially with regards to the perceived information sharing. The larger partners of the network are especially interesting to interview, as these organizations are part of all the ten RIEC cooperation’s which makes can make the results more relevant for other RIECS as well for NAO security networks in general that have larger governmental partners as part of the network.

The interviews are tape recorded since all the interviewees agreed to the recording of the interview. This allowed for more contact and a continuation of the interview. This also allows for an interviewee to keep speaking if desired, which can provide the opportunity to obtain more information. There are

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6 interviewees from the RIEC cooperation of the region Oost-Brabant, 1 person from the RIEC OB, 2 people from the Public Prosecutors Office, 1 person from the police, 1 person from the Tax and Customs Administration and 1 person from the municipality of Helmond. One of the interviewees (Interviewee 4) was not able to partake in a interview and answered the questions in writing. These interviewees are valuable in order to answer the research question as they are all from different network partners, have vastly different organizational structures, mission statements, work cultures and information sharing policies. In addition, there also has an interview been conducted with one person from the RIEC Noord Holland. The perspective of a person from another RIEC may provide an interesting comparison to the interviewee from the RIEC OB and the other interviewees in general, with regards to the cooperation and information sharing in general. Due to the requests of some interviewees for anonymity the interviews are anonymous and the transcripts are not included in the appendix. The prepared interview questions are included in the appendix.

3.5 Operationalization

Through analysis of interviews and document analysis this thesis will identify what benefits and barriers are apparent or not apparent in the RIEC OB cooperation. The benefits and barriers need to be operationalized into measurable units that can be understood and coded and categorized correctly. The theoretical framework provides the base for the operationalization. Table 4 and table 5 provide the overview of both the benefits and barriers to information sharing, the operationalization of these benefits and barriers, their respective indicators and examples of these indicators extracted from the interview transcripts.

Table 4. Operationalization of the benefits to information sharing

Benefits information sharing – organizational

Operationalization Indicators examples

More comprehensive and accurate information for problem solving. Increase in interagency • An increase of (accurate) data increases the ability of agencies to succeed at their goals • References to the increase data and overall data quality • References to a causal

relation between access to information from other agencies

‘It adds to your abilities to deploy interventions’ (interviewee 1, pg2).

‘By sharing the information that we each have separately and by then approach affairs together

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cooperation and information sharing

and problem solving or achieving policy goals

we can do more than each of us separately. We just need each other’ (Interviewee 4,pg1). Expands and maintenance of professional networks • Increase relationships between professionals • Maintaining the contact between professionals • References to the increase in contact with professionals of other organizations • References to the reinforcement of the network

‘We pick up the signals, and there is often spoken with us, like hé, we have something. “Could you drop by to see what to make of this, could we do something with this?”’ (Interviewee 6,pg1).

‘Yes it is easier to reach each other, because we are regularly together to discuss the cases. Then you also call each other more easily and you know who to talk to when you need

information’(Interviewee,3,pg2). Benefits information sharing – political Supports and improves collective base of information within the government • An understanding of economic and demographic trends • References to an increase of information regarding economic and demographic/regional trends • References to or an outspoken understanding and appreciation of the

‘So all these mayors have said, lets together do something and choose what to do about the undermining crime’(Interviewee 5,pg.10).

‘And all those partners that you have in your team, they are really going for it. Then a lot is possible. And that is the

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policy goals of the network beautiful thing’(Interviewee 6,pg.4). Improvement of public accountability • The sharing and publication of information regarding the RIEC’s • Reference to information that is available for the public regarding the RIEC’s and the programme

• References to an increase in the quality and accuracy of the information that is shared with the public

No quote could be distilled from the interviews regarding the improvement of accountability with regards to the indicators

To foster program and service coordination / integrated planning and service delivery • The comparing and combining information of multiple organizations • References of comparing and combining the information that is provided by multiple agencies • Increase or mention of the overlaps, gaps and interactions of the information that is exchanged

• References to a shared base of information

‘And that strength mainly lies in the fact that you then are allowed to share information, but also that you can commit interventions in a certain order together’ (Interviewee 2,pg1).

‘They can however see that he has an expensive car to his name, and by combining that information we can

subsequently see that he has antecedents on the Opioid Law. And by combining that

information, you get the image of somehow is perhaps not

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partaking in legal work’ (Interviewee 3,pg1.)

Table 5. Operationalization of the barriers to information sharing

Barriers to information sharing – organizational

Operationalization Indicators Examples

Organizational self- interest

• Organizations expect benefits for their own organization, improvement of public image or expansion of influence over other organizations • References to the benefits for own the organization, not the network as a whole • References to how information sharing impedes the own organization

‘All the different partners…have their own interests, own priorities and a own view’ (Interviewee 6,pg1). Dominant professional frameworks • Professionals within organizations operate according to the models of thinking of the organization • Mention of disagreement between partners about the nature of the problem and/or the solution on how to solve the problem

‘It has to do with the background and the type of organization that you are. And I think that

municipalities, the Tax and Customs Administration are less, much more reactive oriented organizations. We are of course much more active right, we need to conduct our own research, that shapes how you approach your job’ (Interviewee 1, pg8).

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‘… people can then stay stuck in their own limited vision so to speak’ (Interviewee 6,pg4). Barriers to information sharing – political External influences over decision making • (political) influence over decisions and the decision-making process of public agencies • Reference to how external actors interfere with or influence the cooperation of the network

Regarding an external pressure directed at the cooperation, its methods and results: ‘Yes… well from the Driehoek. ‘(Interviewee 2,pg.7). The power of agency discretion • The need of (administrative) agencies to protect and maintain their policymaking abilities • Referencing to the (attempts) to shape the policy and policy making process by the organizations themselves • References to information as a currency of power and symbol of authority

‘”Where is my information going? To a municipality? To whom then? What are they going to do with that information? Where will it be stored?”… In the beginning it was almost the question if we were crazy’ (Interviewee 6,pg5). The primacy of programs • The focus of agencies on their original and primary program and less on • References to agency focus on primary programs of the own organization and less on programs

‘There are working 90 people at this municipality. You would expect one department to be aware of what another

department is doing. That is just not the case’(Interviewee 5,pg.4).

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programs that involve other organizations

that are part of

network ‘if it (organized crime) would be here, well then I think it would be a policing and Public Prosecutions matter. Not ours”’ (Interviewee 6,pg6).

3.6 Validity and Reliability

In order to establish and make an assessment of the quality of a study or research there are two important criteria that are utilized, validity and reliability (Bryman,2012:389). A good understanding of both concepts is important, especially in qualitative studies, as validity is a concept that carries connotations of measurement that is more aimed towards the quantitative methodology (Bryman,2012:389).

Validity

An important criterium for research is validity, which concerns the integrity of the conclusions of research. As this research is qualitative, both the internal validity and external validity are relevant and both important to discuss in general and with regards to this specific research (Bryman,2012:47).

Internal Validity

Internal validity concerns the question whether the causality, the apparent causal relationship, is genuine and not in fact influenced by something else (Bryman,2012:47). In other words, whether the independent variable, in this research the benefits or barriers to information sharing, actually affect the dependent variable, information sharing in the security network.

Due to the data collection method, conducting interviews, and case selection, a single case, the internal validity is high. The semi structured interview method provides the ability to continue to ask questions when a certain answer is given and the possibility to exercise control over the factors that interfere with the investigated causal relationships. The internal validity is increased as well by the variation of the interview subjects, as the combined data provides perspectives from multiple partners of the cooperation, which can clearly show what and how certain barriers influence the

Benefits and Barriers to Information Sharing in the Security Network RIEC OB

Leiden University – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs