Shifting the Fight to ‘the Right’? German Decision Agenda-Setting in the Fight Against Right-Wing Extremism.

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Shifting the Fight to ‘the Right’?

German Decision Agenda-Setting

in the Fight Against Right-Wing Extremism

Name: Freya Katharina van Ellen Student Number: s1366394

University: Universiteit Leiden

Faculty: Governance and Global Affairs Program: Crisis and Security Management Assignment: Master Thesis

First supervisor: Dr. I.L. Elias Carrillo Second reader: Dr. T. Abbas

Date: 14 June 2020 Word count: 23.995 words

(excluding title page, abstract, table of contents, list of abbreviations, list of figures, list of tables, reference list, footnotes & appendices)

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Abstract

Right-wing extremism is not a novel phenomenon in Germany. Ever since the end of the Second World War, the growing and constantly changing right-extremist movement has continuously presented the federal government with new challenges. However, even after the rapid increase in the number of identified right extremists after 1990, the federal government had at first not taken legal measures explicitly addressing the fight against right-wing extremism. This legislative approach changed in 2012, when laws that directly addressed the phenomenon were introduced and right-wing extremism emerged on Germany’s decision agenda. This thesis aims to explain the occurrence of this decision agenda change and to identify its (particularly powerful) driving forces. To this purpose, the research adopts Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework and uses a case study design based on a qualitative causal process-tracing analysis. Tracing back the emergence of Germany’s decision agenda change, this thesis concludes that general and specifically strong driving forces behind agenda change, namely impactful events, organized interest and the value of democracy, in combination created a momentum for agenda change. In this momentum, federal government representatives could show the need and possibility to legally counter right-wing extremism and accordingly place right-wing extremism on Germany’s decision agenda.

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List of Abbreviations

AfD Alternative für Deutschland Alternative for Germany

BfV Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution

BMFSFJ Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands

Christian Democratic Union of Germany CPT Causal process-tracing

CSU Christlich-Soziale Union Christian Social Union FDP Freie Demokratische Partei

Free Democratic Party

GBRH Draft law on the fight against right-wing extremism and hate crime GDR German Democratic Republic

MBRH Package of measures for the fight against right-wing extremism and hate crime

MSF Multiple Streams Framework MP Member of parliament

NPD National-democratic Party of Germany NSU National Socialist Underground

NSU-CoI NSU Committee of Inquiry

NSU-G Law on the implementation of the recommendations of the German Bundestag’s NSU-committee of inquiry

RED-G Law on the improvement of the fight against right-wing extremism RWE Right-wing extremism

SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Social Democratic Party of Germany USA United States of America

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List of Figures

Figure 1 The processes underlying policymaking according to Kingdon Figure 2 Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework

Figure 3 Causal configuration along Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework Figure 4 The emergence of the RED-G on the decision agenda in 2012

Figure 5 The emergence of the NSU-G on the decision agenda in 2015 Figure 6 The emergence of the GBRH on the decision agenda in 2020

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List of Tables

Table 1 Overview of the operationalization

Table 2 Overview of the operationalization (continuation)

Table 3 Proposals in the policy community between November 2011 and March 2012 to address right-wing extremism

Table 4 Proposals in the policy community between November 2011 and March 2012 to address right-wing extremism (continuation)

Table 5 Proposals in the policy community between March 2012 and November 2014 to address right-wing extremism

Table 6 Proposals in the policy community between March 2012 and November 2014 to address right-wing extremism (continuation)

Table 7 Proposals in the policy community between June 2015 and October 2019 to address right-wing extremism

Table 8 Proposals in the policy community between June 2015 and October 2019 to address right-wing extremism (continuation)

Table 9 Focusing events preceding the RED-G, NSU-G and GBRH

Table 10 Temporal proximity between stream alignment and focusing events Table 11 Policy entrepreneurs in the federal government

Table 12 Overview of the similarities and differences between the emergence of the RED-G, NSU-G & GBRH on Germany’s decision agenda

Table 13 Overview of the similarities and differences between the emergence of the RED-G, NSU-G & GBRH on Germany’s decision agenda (continuation) Appendix 2 List of German terminology, its translation and explanation

Appendix 3 Overview of the operationalization Appendix 4.1 Evaluation of causal inferences (RED-G) Appendix 4.2 Evaluation of causal inferences (NSU-G) Appendix 4.3 Evaluation of causal inferences (GBRH)

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since Germany’s reunification in 1990, right-wing extremism (RWE) has regained strength in the country (BfV,1991, 2019; Koehler, 2016). Indeed, following Germany’s most prominent manifestation of RWE during the Nazi-rule between 1933 and 1945 (Gabriel, 1996; Koehler, 2017), the country had witnessed merely moderate support for RWE – until 1990, when the number of identified right extremists increased rapidly (Koehler, 2019a; Schellenberg, 2011). It is estimated that in 2018, 19.840 people were part of the right-extremist movement, which marks a rise by 361% since 1990 (BfV, 1991, p.71; BfV, 2019, p.50).

This increased presence of supporters of RWE, defined in this thesis as an ideology based on racism, anti-democracy, nationalism and xenophobia, which strives to achieve system change outside of the political system and is tolerant of violence (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019), has created a climate of hostility and fear especially among minority groups. Beyond contributing to an ideological expansion, this climate is predicted to lower the threshold for radicalised individuals to employ violence to achieve their aims (Europol, 2019). In Germany, RWE supporters in 2018 committed 18.321 non-violent and 1.088 violent crimes, which constitutes the largest number of offences committed by any German extremist faction (BfV, 2019, pp.25-43). It is estimated that in total 64% of known right extremists are oriented towards and willing to use violence (BfV, 2019, p.50).1_{Indeed, as recently as February 19, 2020, a right}

extremist killed ten people in Hanau, marking the most recent incident in a series of increasing right-extremist attacks in Germany (Hille, 2020; Koehler,2018, 2019b; Tagesschau, 2020).

1.1.Research Puzzle and Question: From Governmental to Decision Agenda

Irrespective of this rise in supporters and offences, over the last 30 years (1990-2020) the Bundesregierung2_{(hereinafter: government)}3_{had at first not taken legal measures explicitly}

addressing the fight against RWE (DB, 2020b; Schellenberg, 2008,2017). Even after 1990, it relied on legislation enacted during the 1960s and 1970s, which, for instance, criminalized

1_{This percentage is based on the categorization made by the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution}

(hereinafter: BfV): 12700 of the 19.840 right extremists in Germany are identified as oriented towards violence (BfV, 2019, p.50).

2_{This thesis includes German terms. When a German term is used more than once during the thesis, an English}

translation and, where possible, an abbreviation, to which the thesis will refer thereinafter, is provided in brackets behind that German term. A list of all German terminology used throughout the thesis, its translation and explanation can be found in Appendix 2.

3_{Given Germany’s federal structure, numerous institutions exist on a federal and state level. This means that there}

is one federal and 16 state institutions. This applies, for instance, to the government, parliament, ministries, constitutional court and Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Whenever this thesis refers to these institutions, unless otherwise indicated, it refers to those on the federal level. Additionally, where the context requires it, the thesis also indicates that it refers to institutions on the federal level.

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specific expressions of right-wing ideologies (Koehler, 2018; Schellenberg, 2008), and it adopted ‘soft’ interventions, including de-radicalization programs or public relation campaigns, to deconstruct right-extremist narratives (Minkenberg, 2017; Schellenberg,2006, 2008,2012). In the legal realm, measures against RWE were primarily passive and focussed, for example, on defining RWE (Schellenberg, 2008). Furthermore, with regards to active measures, RWE was exclusively addressed as a ‘side-effect’ of general legislation (Schellenberg, 2008,2013b). RWE was thus on the government’s agenda. It formed part of a list of issues, to which the government and those associated with it attributed serious attention (Kingdon, 2014; Koehler, 2017; Pfahl-Traughber, 2019; Range, 2013; Schellenberg, 2008,2013b). However, a distinction must be made, since the ‘agenda’ is constructed by two components – governmental and decision agendas (Kingdon, 2014). Governmental agendas are lists of issues, to which the government dedicates attention. Decision agendas, however, are lists of topics, within governmental agendas, which are considered for authoritative, active choice, such as legislative enactment (Kingdon, 2014). Compared to governmental agendas, they are narrower and include fewer subjects, which are more likely to pass through the policymaking process (Kingdon, 2014). To be exact, it must then be stated that since 1990 in Germany RWE was situated on the governmental agenda, while it did not reach the stage of active decision-making – the decision agenda (Koehler, 2017; Pfahl-Traughber, 2019;Range, 2013; Schellenberg, 2008,2013b).

This categorization changed in 2012, when the government adopted the ‘law on the improvement of the fight against right-wing extremism’ (RED-G)4_{(RED-G, 2012).}5_Contrary

to previous measures, this law explicitly addressed RWE, as it proposed a shared database between police and intelligence services to improve their fight against RWE (RED-G, 2012). Ever since, the federal government adopted four laws and currently discusses two further legislative packages explicitly focussed on RWE. RWE accordingly reached the stage of active decision-making within the government – for the first time since Germany’s reunification in 1990 (Koehler, 2017; Schellenberg, 2017).

4_{For the laws analysed in this thesis, official and/or known academic abbreviations are used throughout the thesis.}

This approach mirrors the approach by scholars publishing on German legislation. Furthermore, it is used to ensure the recognizability of the law both within and outside of this thesis and to secure the comparability with other scientific and political publications, which address these laws (see Bohm, 2016; Ziekow, Katz, Piesker & Willwacher, 2017).

5_{All translations from German to English with regards to German discourse, (draft) legislation, legal}

documentation and legal definitions were made by the author. Whenever a translation relating to German discourse, (draft) legislation, legal documentation and legal definitions is included into the thesis, it is accompanied by a footnote providing the original wording in German. Furthermore, an overview of all translations, including the German wording and the English translation, can be found in Appendix 1.

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As this transformation indicates a change on Germany’s decision agenda, it is relevant to examine the question:

How can the emergence of right-wing extremism on Germany’s policy decision agenda after 2012 be explained?

To examine this question, this thesis takes a focussed approach. Firstly, it directs its attention to the federal government. In Germany, the government is the main legislative actor, since it prepares and proposes the majority of federal policies and laws (DB, 2020d). As the government thus retains large influence on agenda-setting, the thesis’ focus makes its findings more specific and meaningful.

Secondly, this research addresses only legal measures, which have to pass through the federal law-making process. It investigates three (draft)laws. The RED-G (2012), the ‘law on the implementation of the recommendations of the German Bundestag’s NSU-committee of inquiry’ (NSU-G)6_{(NSU-G, 2015) and the ‘draft law on the fight against right-wing extremism}

and hate crime’ (GBRH)7_{(GBRH, 2020), are employed as case studies, exemplifying decision}

agenda change after 2012. These laws are chosen for analysis, since they, in contrast to previous legislation, address RWE explicitly and they implement unprecedented changes into the existing legal framework (Berthel, 2020; Bohm, 2016; Jungbluth, 2015). They consequently have a significant impact on Germany’s legislative approach to RWE and have been an “important organisational step towards better cooperation” against RWE in the country (Bohm, 2016, p.98). Furthermore, these laws, introduced respectively in 2012, 2014 and 2019, allow the thesis to not only study the emergence of RWE on Germany’s decision agenda in 2012, but also its manifestation on the decision agenda to date.

Thirdly, the thesis draws on J.W. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). This model provides a theoretical explanation of why some items become prominent on policy agendas, whereas other topics are disregarded. Furthermore, it examines why people within and outside of government attend to certain policy alternatives at the expense of other options (Kingdon, 2014). In other words, Kingdon aims to explain decision agenda change as the one witnessed in Germany with regards to RWE. Specifically, the MSF is based on the notion that previously independent problem, policy and political streams must merge to create a ‘policy

6_{Original wording: Gesetz zur Umsetzung von Empfehlungen des NSU-Untersuchungsausschusses des Deutschen} Bundestags (NSU-G, 2015).

7_{Original wording: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität}

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window’, a momentum for change, in which a subject can be placed on the decision agenda (Kingdon, 2014). The MSF consequently allows this thesis to conduct an in-depth examination of those political and societal developments, which contributed to the emergence of RWE on Germany’s decision-agenda after 2012. Moreover, Kingdon (2014) also considers various potential factors that can transform policy agendas, such as political and societal actors, which is important for the analysis of agenda change in a German context, given the country’s diverse, democratic stakeholder structure on federal and state level (Pfahl-Traughber, 2019). In this way, the MSF provides theoretical guidelines to structure and analyse the complex reality of Germany’s decision agenda change and enables it to answer the research question.

Lastly, this thesis employs causal process-tracing (CPT) to analyse the three laws. CPT assumes that outcomes result from a combination of causal factors and attempts to explain how these factors relate to the outcome “by tracing the links of the causal” configuration (Toshkov, 2016, p.150). As it is outcome-centred, with CPT the thesis can trace back the origin of Germany’s agenda change along the MSF. Hence, CPT helps to understand whether an influence on agenda-setting mattered and “how exactly it influenced the outcome” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.85).

Based on this approach, the thesis aims to retrace those societal and political developments, which preceded and potentially contributed to the emergence of RWE on Germany’s decision agenda after 2012. Thereby, it does not only strive to generally explain Germany’s agenda transformation, but also to identify whether and which driving forces had particularly strong agenda-setting powers.

1.2.Research Relevance: Linking Agenda-Setting and Multiple Streams Framework

This examination of the federal government’s decision agenda is both scientifically and socially relevant. Firstly, within this study the MSF is embedded into a context of rising (violent) tensions of the “greatest threat in” Germany (BMI, 2020b, para.4),8_{which transfers the model}

from its traditional political science into a crisis and security management realm (Wolfe, Jones & Baumgartner, 2013). As Jones et al. (2016) show the MSF has frequently been used for academic investigations. However, according to the authors, research mostly focussed on environmental or health policies, while crisis and security topics remained unaddressed. This present investigation can consequently contribute to the awareness for the theory beyond its established context. Secondly, the MSF, although discussed in academia, has only rarely been

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fully applied to case studies (Ackrill, Kay & Zahariadis, 2013; Béland & Howlett, 2016). Authors frequently address separate components of the model (Herweg, 2013). As the MSF was developed based on case studies from the United States of America (USA), especially in those cases outside of this geographical sphere the MSF remains largely only partially applied (Ackrill et al., 2013; Brunner, 2008). This research thus offers the possibility to comprehensively examine the MSF and to understand its value outside of its traditional geographical context.

Beyond the scientific relevance, socially the research is essential to investigate the changes on Germany’s decision agenda, which have been recognized as unprecedented since the reunification (Schellenberg, 2017). Indeed, due to the laws’ recent implementation, they have heretofore only been examined regarding their practical implications (Bohm, 2016; Ziekow, Katz, Piesker & Willwacher, 2017), impact (Ziekow, Piesker, Katz & Willwacher, 2015) and effectiveness (Cremer, 2017). The analysis of the chosen laws through the MSF is thus essential to understand their origin and nature. Accordingly, this research contributes to the wider exploration of and knowledge about (the enactment of) German counter-extremism legislation. Given the recency of the expansion and increasingly violent turn of RWE in Germany, this knowledge is relevant, as the laws not only have long-term consequences, but are also predicted to be followed by more legislation (Schellenberg, 2017; Zeit Online, 2020). For policymakers, this examination is then interesting to discern the driving forces behind changes in agenda-setting and the underlying reasons explaining why the government responded to RWE as it did.

1.3.Research Structure

On this basis, this thesis is divided into eight parts. Following the introduction, the second chapter reviews existing literature on RWE (in Germany) and agenda-setting theory. On the foundation of the identified research gap, this same chapter introduces Kingdon’s MSF as the thesis’ theoretical framework. In a third step, the thesis outlines the methodology. The fourth chapter provides insight into Germany’s historical and current RWE exposure. Against this background, the fifth, sixth and seventh chapter respectively analyse the three chosen laws along the MSF. The findings of these examinations are discussed in an eighth chapter, which also concludes this research. As such, it answers the research question, presents the lessons learned from the analyses and identifies possibilities for future research to provide new insights into the fight against ‘the Right.’

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Chapter 2: From Academic Foundation to Multiple Streams

Framework

As outlined in the introduction, this research’s aim is to understand the developments explaining the presence of RWE on Germany’s decision agenda after 2012 and to thereby study agenda-setting in a crisis and security management realm. Already in 2001, Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort (2001) argued that the traditional crisis management approach, focussed on (the response to) crises as exceptional events, is no longer appropriate and must be broadened to address novel security challenges. Following this appeal, the ideology and potential for violence of extremism caused radicalization studies and by extension RWE to emerge as a field of study in crisis and security management (Wimelius, Eriksson, Kinsman, Strandh & Ghazinour, 2018). Given the consequent, vast accumulation of research in this realm, this literature review relies on publications chosen for their thematic RWE focus, connection to Germany and publication language (German/English). On this basis, this section presents the existing scholarly knowledge to firstly establish an understanding of (responses to) RWE and secondly provide the thesis’ theoretical framework.

2.1.Deconstructing the Far-Right: Radicalism and Extremism

RWE is a contested concept (Bjøgo & Ravndal, 2019). Indeed, although it is not a novel phenomenon, to date there is no broadly accepted RWE definition (Bouhana, Corner, Gill & Schuurmann, 2018). While, according to Lombardi (2015), the challenge for a universal delineation originates from the concept’s wide scope, according to Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019), this lack of a definition relates to the interchangeable use of RWE’s numerous components in academia and politics. Carter (2018) warns that the indiscriminate application of the concept threatens its meaningfulness, as clear delineations are necessary for analytical quality.

On a basic level, in academia it is agreed (see Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018a) that an RWE definition is rooted in Bobbio’s (1996) distinction between left-wing ideologies, which strive for social equality, and right-wing notions, which perceive social inequality as natural, unavoidable and desirable. On this foundation, the far-right is understood as an overarching ideology, aimed at “preserving the homogeneity of a society” (nativism) (Ahmed & Pisoiu, 2019, p.24) and achieving ‘oneness’ between the country and people (authoritarianism) (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018a). The far-right according to Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019) and Stöss (2013), however, has two components, among which this thesis distinguishes: right-wing radicalism and right-wing extremism.

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Right-wing radicalism and RWE are among the terms most frequently used interchangeably (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019). According to Schmid (2013), a reason for this conflation is the concepts’ broadly similar focus and categorization “in terms of distance from moderate […] positions” (p.8). Similarly, Pfahl-Traughber (2019) states that to some scholars, RWE is “a container concept for all political understandings and actions, which reject the basis of modern democracy and open society based on the elevation of ethnic identity,” thereby adopting a definition that resembles that of the far-right generally (p.24).

Applying both concepts interchangeably, however, has been criticized as misleading, since this approach obscures differences. According to Ravndal (2017), exemplary, right-wing radicalism, in contrast to RWE, does not reject democracy and advocates system change within this political framework. Simultaneously, right extremists, contrary to radicals, are tolerant of and willing to employ violence (even terrorism) to their aims (Stöss, 2013). Within this understanding, Schmid (2013) and Ravndal and Bjørgo (2018a), however, highlight the need for differentiation, as not every right extremist is a perpetrator and “not all right-wing extremists or violent perpetrators are terrorists” (p.7). While, according to Koehler (2017), this distinction depends on the national legal system, Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019) distinguish between hate crime, right-extremist violence and terrorism.

Specifically, violent offences, committed based on extreme-right ideologies against a ‘matching’ target (for instance: minorities/immigrants), can be characterized as right-extremist violence. To qualify as terrorism, these violent acts must be premediated and directed at creating fear in the broader population to influence political outcomes (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018a; Ravndal, 2016). On this basis, hate crime encompasses offences that can also be categorized under right-extremist violence or terrorism, but it also entails non-violent acts motivated by right-extremist ideologies (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019). Acknowledging these distinctions, Heitmeyer (2003) then defines RWE with two elements, as including “ideologies of inequality on the one hand, such as exaggerated nationalism, racist denigration, and totalitarian views of the law, […] associated with varying levels of acceptance of violence on the other” (p.401).

Beyond the differentiation in the use of violence, attention must also be paid to those identifications that constitute RWE. These include, among others, Nazism and Neo-Fascism (Pfahl-Traughber, 2019; Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018b; Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2014). Neo-Nazism is RWE’s most traditional expression (NCTV, 2018). It draws on the National Socialist German Workers’ Party’s ideology and emphasizes traditional Nazi-positions, such as biological differences between people and the belief that it is impossible to integrate

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foreigners into the ‘original’ society (Kundnani, 2012; NCTV, 2018; Pfahl-Traughber, 2006). Neo-Fascism encompasses ideological and political groups that emerged after 1945 and are inspired by the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy during World War Two (WWII). In contrast to Neo-Nazism, Neo-Fascism does not have a nostalgic outlook onto the past or draws on a “’reassuring’ nationalist or statist version” (Bull, 2010, p.586). Rather, it stresses the revolutionary approach of fascism (Bull, 2010). A certain overlap, however, occurs between Neo-Nazism and Neo-Fascism and renders it difficult to easily distinguish not only these RWE components, but also RWE and right-wing radicalism (Ahmed & Pisoiu, 2019; Schmid, 2013).

This thesis focusses on RWE. Based on the reviewed delineations, it defines RWE, as an ideology based on racism, anti-democracy, nationalism and xenophobia, which strives to achieve system change outside of the political system and is tolerant of violence (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019). This definition captures several components of RWE highlighted in the literature (for instance: Neo-Nazism) and the delineation adopted by the German government, which underlies the documents this thesis analyses. Specifically, in Germany, RWE is defined as an ideology in which “the ethnonational and nationalistic mindset is highly distinctive and […] has been compressed into one integrated and closed worldview, which is diametrically directed against the defining principles of democracy” (Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2014, p.5).9

The thesis’ working definition thus allows the best understanding of German laws and addresses a wide spectrum of academic definitions.

2.2.Right-Wing Extremism in Germany: Researching an Ideology

In the European Union, Germany is the country most affected by RWE (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018a). Given its legacy of National Socialism since World War One, the presence of RWE supporters in the country has been and is prominent (Koehler, 2017). Still, according to Pfahl-Traughber (2019) and Koehler (2017) research on RWE remains limited.

Existing research mostly focusses on the far-right generally, investigating radicalization, political parties or youth cultures (see Möller & Schuhmacher, 2007; Pisoiu, 2015;Virchow & Dornbusch, 2008). Those studies, addressing RWE explicitly, examine scene-specific topics and products, including the role of gender, publications and music (see Birsl, 2011; Hajok & Wegmann, 2016; Pfeiffer, 2002) or examine the presence of right-extremist perceptions and movements in society (see Kiess, Decker & Brähler, 2016; Pfahl-Traughber,

9_{Original wording (based on Stöss, 2013): “[…] das völkische und das nationalistische Denken jeweils stark} ausgeprägt sind und sich […] zu einem integrierten und geschlossenen Weltbild verdichtet haben, das sich

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2019; Schellenberg, 2011). Kiess et al. (2016), for example, research the increase of identified right extremists after the reunification. Furthermore, Schellenberg (2013b) studies the fundamental role of social and demographic change after the collapse of German Democratic Republic (GDR), globalization and unemployment in causing support for RWE. More recently, increasing attention has been paid to right-extremist violence and terrorism (Koehler, 2017). A focus thereby emerges with regards to the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a German right-extremist terrorist group, and right-extremist vigilante groups (Koehler, 2019a; Pfahl-Traughber, 2013).

The limited amount of research on RWE in Germany has been explained in several manners. Firstly, according to Kiess et al. (2016), the lack of a coherent RWE definition inhibits the incentive to study the phenomenon and the comparability with other studies or across borders, rendering findings study-specific and hardly generalizable. Secondly, Koehler (2017) states that research worldwide more prominently focusses on jihadist extremism, an ideology based on “extremist currents within Islam” (Bouhana et al., 2018, p.153) and left-wing extremism, an ideology pursuing the establishment of a communist or anarchist system (BfV, 2020b). This focus has simultaneously been caused by and has contributed to a lack of especially English sources on German RWE, leaving RWE in Germany understudied (Glaser, 2012; Karakayali, Liebscher, Melchers & Kahveci, 2017; Makovec, 2019).

2.3.Countering Right-Wing Extremism in Germany: The State of Research

Due to this lack of academic investigations, scholars have attempted to broaden RWE research in Germany. One novel focus has been the examination of countermeasures (Makovec, 2019). Some studies, for instance, evaluate the effectiveness of countermeasures (see Widmer, Blaser & Falk, 2007), while others present specific legal and political responses to RWE. Koehler (2019b), for example, investigates the judiciary’s response by comparing the development of extremist attacks with the Federal Prosecutor General’ proceedings against right-extremist activists and Schellenberg (2008) examines the country’s constitutional provisions against anti-constitutional forces.

However, Schellenberg (2008) and Minkenberg (2017) also underline that, especially since 1990, the government’s RWE approach remained superficial. RWE was mostly addressed through ‘soft’ measures, such as de-radicalization programs and prohibitions of organizations, or as a ‘side-effect’ of other, more general laws, such as citizenship law (Logvinov, 2013; Schellenberg, 2008). The term ‘soft’, in this regard, can be misleading. Yet, it is used to describe measures, which are predominantly situated outside of criminal law. Indeed, as Schellenberg

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(2008) describes, most of Germany’s countermeasures mirror a “traditional German perspective of the problem” (p.4) and can be found, for instance, in association law. Criminal law is often only employed in a second step, when ‘soft’ measures are not complied with. Furthermore, should criminal law apply in a first step, this applicability mostly results from general laws, which address a wide range of extremist ideologies, not RWE exclusively (Range, 2013;Schellenberg, 2013a, 2017).

According to Pfahl-Traughber (2019), the government’s ‘soft’ approach can largely be ascribed to the politically dominant focus on left-wing extremism after the Red Army Faction attacks and the general reluctance to hear those, who have previously warned against RWE. There is academic agreement that as RWE was left largely unaddressed by the government, it remained one subject, among others, situated on Germany’s governmental agenda (Pfahl-Traughber, 2019; Range, 2013; Schellenberg, 2008, 2013b).

Yet, Koehler (2017) and Schellenberg (2017) detect a transformation on the decision agenda. While Koehler (2017) states that the increase in RWE after 1990 caused an upsurge in attention for this societal group, Schellenberg (2017) perceives a more far-reaching development, in which the uncovering of the NSU in 2011 opened a window of opportunity “which enables the development and implementation of new, effective strategies against racism and right-wing extremism,” thus which placed RWE on Germany’s decision agenda (p.721).

2.4.National Agenda-Setting: Theoretical Applications in Academia

In academia, the study of national policy agenda-setting emerged in the 1970s (Dowding, 2018). Situated predominantly in political science, over the years this research gained prominence. According to Wolfe et al. (2013), this prominence emerged due to the importance of agenda-setting in political systems. Indeed, according to Capella (2016), the agenda-setting process is a critical moment in policy creation, since it determines which results can be achieved within a political system.

The definition of a policy agenda is largely uncontested and refers to “a collection of problems; understandings of causes, symbols and solutions; and other elements of public problems that come to the attention of members of the public and their governmental officials” (Birkland & Schwaeble, 2019, p.2). While summarized under the term ‘agenda’, two different types are normally distinguished: (1)systemic agendas, which encompass a set of subjects that attract the society’s attention and are perceived as matters under governmental responsibility and (2)institutional agendas, which entail those issues that are decided upon by decision-makers (Capella, 2016). Consequently, policy agenda-setting describes the “process by which groups

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compete to move issues from the systemic agenda to the institutional agenda” (Birkland & Schwaeble, 2019, p.2).

Beyond the definition, debate, however, emerged regarding those issues that can reach the agenda. Dahl (1956), exemplary, claims that any issue can attract governmental attention, whereas Schattschneider (1960) upholds that not all topics can do so. In line with this author, Stone (1989) and Baumgartner and Jones (2009) state that not all unwanted societal issues or phenomena necessarily form a problem for a government. Problems must be recognized as such for an agenda-setting process to start.

Agendas are consequently not static. They change over time, as topics enter and leave the agenda or issues rank ‘low’ or ‘high’ on it. Indeed, different degrees of attention can be attributed to an issue in the policymaking process (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Several theoretical models attempt to explain agenda-setting processes.10

Examples include Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’ (1993) ‘advocacy coalition framework’ and Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) ‘punctuated equilibrium model.’ Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) illustrate the policymaking process as an adversarial contest, in which actors create and maintain coalitions, participate in analytical debates, and advocate their favourite policies. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) outline political decision-making as relatively long periods of stability, which are suddenly disrupted by upsurges of imbalance and policy change. Influential as two of the most complex frameworks heretofore presented (Herweg, 2013), both models have attracted criticism, as they seem descriptive and based on oversimplified assumptions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith) (Dowding, 2018) or they are unable to claim causal status (Baumgartner & Jones) (John, 2015). Both models have thus been described as restrictive in their understanding of complex agenda-setting processes (Dowding, 2018; Soroka, 1999). To circumvent these constraints, research has attempted to adopt different perspectives by explaining why certain issues do not reach the agenda (Capella, 2016) or examining parts of theoretical models (Birkland & Schwaeble, 2019). Such approaches have, however, also been contested, as they highlight isolated parts of agenda-setting processes and leave analyses incomplete (Ackrill et al., 2013).

Considering these limitations, this thesis does not draw on the presented models. This research takes an analytical approach to investigate agenda-setting comprehensively along causal connections between societal and political developments prior to the outcome of decision agenda-setting. As such, it requires a theoretical approach, which firstly, addresses various

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influences on agenda-setting, instead of isolated or oversimplified parts, and secondly, enables this thesis to construct a causal configuration, along which the analysis can draw causal inferences to explain Germany’s agenda change. Therefore, this thesis draws on the MSF, which is introduced in the following sections.

2.5.Linking Right-Wing Extremism and Agenda-Setting

With such an investigation, this thesis contributes to existing academic knowledge, which currently still includes several open research avenues. Indeed, examinations linking agenda-setting with RWE are currently limited. Research highlights that heretofore agenda-agenda-setting studies have addressed a variety of issues on local, regional and national level in different countries (Ritter & Lancaster, 2018). Yet, with regards to far-right ideologies research rather focussed on radical right-wing parties and movements as actors in agenda-setting and thus on right-wing radicalism (Koehler, 2017).

In this way, research on the far-right has predominantly been confined to the political science realm, although other approaches, for instance, in social science emerged (Karakayali et al., 2017; Makorev, 2019; Mortensen, 2010; Wolfe et al., 2013). Pfahl-Traughber (2013) states that the examination of political and legal far-right activities, thus research linked to political science, is advanced. Yet, studies that focus on RWE, thus on the far-right outside of the political realm, are limited. Following a review of existing literature, both Pfahl-Traughber (2013) and Karakayali et al. (2017) discover gaps in the literature regarding RWE, especially in Germany’s legal approach to RWE. To fill these gaps, Makorev (2019) proposes to profit from the insights of other academic perspectives and sees potential in an approach to the far-right that stretches beyond political parties to RWE.

To address the unfulfilled potential of RWE research, this thesis adopts a crisis and security management lens. This lens takes into account that a crisis or security threat, especially when it is the currently “greatest threat in” a country (BMI, 2020b, para.4),11_causes

policymakers to face different agenda-setting circumstances. They frequently act under time constraints and must make highly consequential decisions, given public expectations that threats will be addressed (Boin, t’Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2005). During the analysis, this thesis consequently considers that a security situation potentially changes the nature and operational processes of agenda-setting (Boin et al., 2005). From this perspective, it investigates why RWE became prominent on Germany’s decision agenda and what driving

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forces (particularly) contributed to this agenda change after 2012. This examination is executed along Kingdon’s MSF, which combines insights from political science, evolutionary biology, organizational theory and other agenda-setting models (Zahariadis, 2016b).

Kingdon’s MSF is among the most cited agenda-setting theories (Herweg, 2013). It has been applied to various subjects, such as tax or privatization policy, and countries, including Australia and Brazil (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016; Ritter & Lancaster, 2018). Furthermore, scholars have used the MSF to examine agenda-setting in different institutions, such as hospitals and international organizations, and on diverging levels (federal/state/others) of policymaking (Jones et al., 2016; Ritter & Lancaster, 2018). Based on this broad applicability, the MSF has been modified and shaped to the requirements of case studies (Ritter & Lancaster, 2018) and it has been remarked that this adaptability renders the framework vague and overly adaptable (Herweg, 2013). However, this flexibility has also been described as an advantage. Capano (2009), for instance, states that the model’s applicability “provides a highly original, counterintuitive tool with which to construct and interpret reality” (p.21). Moreover, Ritter and Lancaster (2018) underline that the MSF has been one of the most complex and comprehensive models, which not only accounts for a variety of influences on policy agendas, but also for the reality of complex contemporary agenda-setting. Still, the model has largely only been applied in parts (Ackrill et al., 2013; Herweg, 2013) and although there has been an expansion of studied policies, these predominantly remain focussed on health, environment and welfare legislation (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016; Ritter & Lancaster, 2018). Along Jones et al. (2016) crisis and security topics remained unaddressed.

This agenda-setting model and the position of RWE in research hence leave several research possibilities open, to which this thesis contributes (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016; Makorev, 2019; Ritter & Lancaster, 2018). It does so, firstly, by adopting a crisis and security management perspective to RWE and secondly, by applying the full MSF to recently implemented German (draft)laws addressing RWE, which have to date predominantly been investigated from other perspectives (see Bohm, 2016; Cremer, 2017; Ziekow et al., 2015).

2.6.Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework

The MSF was originally presented in the 1984 book Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies as the outcome of Kingdon’s longitudinal research into the development of American public transportation and health policy. With his study, Kingdon aimed to explain why some items become prominent on policy agendas, whereas other topics are disregarded and why people

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within and linked to government attend to certain policies at the expense of other alternatives (Kingdon, 2014, pp.4& 196).

2.6.1.Foundations of the Multiple Streams Framework

According to Kingdon (2014), policymaking can be understood as a set of processes. These include, as Figure 1 demonstrates from left to right, (1)agenda-setting, (2)alternative specification, (3)authoritative decisions among those alternatives and (4)decision implementation (pp.2-3). These processes are chronologically interdependent but must still be considered as separate entities, since success in one of these processes is, on the one hand, a pre-requisite for the next step, but, on the other, does not guarantee success in another step or the implementation of a policy. Kingdon (2014) focusses on (1)agenda-setting and (2)alternative specification (p.3).

Kingdon (2014) defines the agenda as a set of topics, to which the government or associated actors attend at a certain time (p.3). This delineation provides the thesis’ working definition of ‘agenda.’ Yet, the term is, as in agenda-setting research generally, also in Kingdon’s (2014) study and therefore in this thesis divided into two parts. Firstly, there is a governmental agenda, which incorporates a list of issues that receive attention. This list differs for the various parts of government, since diverging levels of power and topical focuses direct attention to different issues (pp.3-4). Secondly, there is a decision agenda, a list of themes from the governmental agenda that are considered for active decision, such as legislative enactment. Compared to governmental agendas, decision agendas are narrower and include fewer subjects, which are more likely to pass through the policymaking process. When an issue reaches this stage, policymakers consider alternative proposals for governmental action to address problems (Kingdon, 2014, p.4). Both agendas are thus “affected by somewhat different processes” (Kingdon, 2014, p.4).

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Before these processes can be explained below, this thesis must highlight three theoretical assumptions underlying the MSF. Their explanation is important, since these assumptions describe the MSF’s practical applicability and positioning among existing agenda-setting theories (Kingdon, 2014, pp.71-89). Firstly, Kingdon (2014) highlights that the origin of agenda change diverges on a case-to-case basis. Yet, due to ‘infinite regress’, the origin of a proposal can never be ultimately specified. Subjects do not advance from one actor to another along regular patterns. Within the re-tracing process, there is therefore no logical place to halt an investigation, so that a study’s aim is to trace back histories of agenda change to a set moment (pp.72-73). Secondly, Kingdon (2014) argues that policymaking is not based on rational-comprehensive decision-making. This understanding originates from the observation that people are incapable of gathering and systematically comparing alternatives, while they also tend not to formulate clear goals. In reality, decision-making is therefore predominantly not neatly ordered, but rather has “a messy quality to” it (Kingdon, 2014, pp.77-79). Lastly, Kingdon (2014) emphasizes that incrementalism, a perception of the policy process formulated by Lindblom, does not describe agenda-setting properly. While an incremental model suggests that interest in a topic increases steadily, Kingdon highlights that the majority of agenda changes occurs through sudden hits (pp.79-83). The origins of these hits are what Kingdon aims to discover through the MSF.

2.6.2.Deconstructing the Multiple Streams Framework

The MSF emerged from Cohen, March and Olsen’s ‘Garbage Can Model’ (Kingdon, 2014, pp.84-86). This model focusses on decision-making processes in universities and demonstrates how four independent streams (problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities) move through an organization and come together in a ‘garbage can’ to create change (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). Kingdon (2014) uses this ‘Garbage Can Model’ as a point of departure to theorize agenda-setting in political settings (pp.86-89).

2.6.2.1.Point of Departure: Participants and Processes

According to Kingdon (2014), there are two distinct factors that must be considered when examining agenda-setting: Participants and processes (p.15). The MSF encompasses several participants from inside and outside government. Governmental participants include the administration (President/presidential staff), civil servants and Congress, while outside actors comprise interest groups, researchers, academics, consultants, election-related participants, media and public. These players vary across jurisdictions and can influence agenda-setting at

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different moments and in different ways (Kingdon, 2014, pp.21-70). Indeed, participants can be embedded in one or several processes, which influence agenda setting and are outlined in the following sections (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 86-89).

2.6.2.2.Problems, Policies, Politics: The Three Streams

According to Kingdon (2014), the starting point of the MSF are three processes: problem, policy and politics. These processes are defined as streams. They comprise different characteristics and develop along different lines, which cause them to progress mostly independently (Kingdon, 2014, pp.86-89).

2.6.2.2.1.The Problem Stream: Conditions Become Problems

The problem stream outlines how certain conditions receive attention and are converted into problems (Kingdon, 2014, p.90). Conditions attract the attention of participants inside and outside of government through three mechanisms: Indicators, focusing events and feedback. Firstly, indicators alert participants that potential problems exist. They include data and reports (exemplary: disease rates), which are assessed to grasp a potential problem’s magnitude, recognize changes in conditions and understand transformations in indicators, as these might represent changes in a system’s state (Kingdon, 2014, pp.90-94). Secondly, focusing events refer to disasters, crises and symbols, which direct attention to possible problems or indicators, if these are not obvious by themselves (Kingdon, 2014, pp.94-100). Yet, not every event is a focusing event. Focusing events are “conducive to agenda-setting,” “vivid and have a highly visual impact” (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p.98). Thirdly, feedback provides policymakers with information about the effectiveness of existing measures. It reaches officials via formal (systematic monitoring) or informal (complaints/casework/experience) ways and can alert officials to problematic conditions, including a measure’s failure to reach goals and increasing costs (Kingdon, 2014, pp.100-103). Taken together, indicators, focusing events and feedback underline conditions, but do not yet convert these into problems (Kingdon, 2014, p.109).

Indeed, a condition is not immediately a problem. Rather, conditions change into problems when officials believe that they must act on them (Kingdon, 2014, p.109). According to Kingdon (2014), this transformation occurs based on values, comparisons and categories. Specifically, problems might emerge when people recognize a divergence between existing conditions and their understanding of an ideal state (values) (pp.110-111). Furthermore, problems might be delineated through people’s comparisons of their current situation and that of others, causing them to perceive a relative disadvantage, or the manner, in which people

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categorize topics. The debate over a problem recognition depends on its appointed category, as categories determine how actors perceive problems (Kingdon, 2014, pp.111-113). Consequently, in the problem stream, indicators, focusing events and feedback draw attention to conditions, which are turned into problems through values, comparisons and categories.

2.6.2.2.2.The Policy Stream: Available Alternatives

The policy stream encompasses a collection of policy proposals, which present possible solutions to recognized problems (Kingdon, 2014, pp.116-122). According to Kingdon (2014), these proposals float around, combine and confront each other in various ways within a “primeval soup” (pp.116-125). Within this ‘soup’, proposals evolve as they are introduced, evaluated and revised (Kingdon, 2014, pp.200-201).

This evolution takes place within policy communities. Policy communities encompass specialists, who are located in- and outside of government, share concern for a policy area and interact with each other. They aim to solve dilemmas or intellectual puzzles and develop policy alternatives by discussing proposals and problems (Kingdon, 2014, pp.117-122). Whereas attention within these policy communities passes swiftly from one policy to another, feasible solutions require time to develop (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016). That is due to the fact that they pass through a ‘softening up’ procedure, a period of policy consideration, in which a proposal is introduced in different fora to ‘soften up’ change-resistant communities. By rendering societies used to and accepting of new ideas, they are more willing to support agenda change once the opportunity present itself (Kingdon, 2014, pp.127-131).

Those proposals that remain powerful during this ‘softening up’ process, fulfil certain criteria: they are implementable (technical feasibility), conform to dominant values (value acceptability) and foresee prospective constraints (anticipation of constraints) (Kingdon, 2014, pp.131-139). Hence, proposals that are ‘softened up’ in the policy community and fulfil the ‘survival criteria’ in the ‘soup’, are more likely to be successful in the policy stream.

2.6.2.2.3.The Political Stream: An (Un-)Favourable Environment

Independent from problem and policy, the political stream describes the political environment surrounding agenda-setting. To be conducive to agenda change, the political climate must be favourable to such a change. Three factors determine the favourability of the political climate: national mood, organized interest, government events (Kingdon, 2014, p.145).

Within this stream, the examination of the national mood is based on the assumptions (1)that a significant number of citizens think along comparable lines, (2)that changes within the

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political climate occur and (3)that these changes influence decision agendas (Kingdon, 2014, pp.146-149). Participants in- and outside of government attempt to sense the national mood to advance issues on policy agendas and achieve success for their proposals. The national mood does not inevitably develop from the mass public but is rather detected among various active societal factions. Hence, politicians sense the national mood predominantly from correspondence with constituents and spread them to non-elected officials. In this way, certain agenda items are promoted or halted (Kingdon, 2014, pp.146-149).

As a second element, organized interest is constituted by political elites, political movements and pressure groups (Kingdon, 2014, p.150). In the agenda-setting process, governmental representatives estimate the strength of consensus among organized interest though communication flows. If ‘relative’ agreement exists, officials either attempt to follow it or know what criticism they face. Organized interest, however, does not necessarily control outcomes. Diverging interests can be overcome, and change happens despite opposition (Kingdon, 2014, pp.150-153).

The third element of the political stream evolves along occurrences within the government, including key personnel turnover and questions of jurisdiction. Indeed, personnel turnover can create new agenda priorities, while the question of jurisdiction involves turf battles between parliamentary committees and administrative agencies. Turnover and jurisdiction, just as the stream’s other components, do not necessarily cause stalemates, but can also push action and promote agenda change (Kingdon, 2014, pp.153-159).

2.6.2.3.Stream Alignment & Policy Windows: Opportunity for Action

Although these problem, policy and political streams are mutually independent, there are occasions, at which they align and create a ‘policy window’ (Kingdon, 2014, pp.166-172). Policy windows mark the moment, at which “a problem is recognized, a solution is available, the political climate makes the time right for change and the constraints do not prohibit action” (Kingdon, 2014, p.88). Since all ‘ingredients’ for agenda change are present at this point, a momentum for change emerges (Kingdon, 2014, pp.166-168).

In this context, policy windows are more significantly influenced by the problem and political streams, while the policy stream impacts the alternative selection. Policy windows hence mostly open due to events in the political (exemplary: administration change) and problem (exemplary: crises) streams, which translate into political and problem windows (Kingdon, 2014, pp.173-175). These possibilities for agenda change can either be predictable or unpredictable, meaning that the streams are either willingly (exemplary: legislation renewal)

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or accidentally (exemplary: terror attacks) joined, policy windows opened and possibility for agenda change created (Kingdon, 2014, pp.186-190). These possibilities, however, do not last indefinitely. Policy windows merely open for short periods, after which they might not re-open for a long time (Kingdon, 2014, pp.168-170).

2.6.2.4.Policy Entrepreneurs and Coupling: Investing into Policy

Presenting fleeting opportunities for change, when policy windows open those who want to influence agenda-setting must use them. This means that within the momentum for change, advocates of certain proposals must, through the process of ‘coupling’, bring these to the attention of policymakers and highlight their potential to solve an existing problem within an environment favourable to the policy. (Kingdon, 2014, p.203).

Advocates are called policy entrepreneurs. They are specialists concerned about a certain topic and as such are part of the policy community. While policy entrepreneurs do not inevitably reside at any unchanging location in the policy community, they must be “willing to invest resources […] in return for future policies they favour” (Kingdon, 2014, p.204). Based on this willingness, already before policy windows open, policy entrepreneurs advocate their preferred proposals in two manners. Either they promote a solution and attempt to find a problem, to which it can be attached, or they recognize problems and propose solutions to them (Kingdon, 2014, p.123). To ensure favourable outcomes for their preferred proposals, policy entrepreneurs employ techniques, like ‘softening up’ (Kingdon, 2014, pp.127-131).

When a policy window opens, policy entrepreneurs couple the three streams. As such, they connect proposals, political environments and problem conceptions (Kingdon, 2014, pp.179-182). Through this coupling, proposals become linked “to problems, problems to political forces and political forces to” proposals (Kingdon, 2014, p.205). Accordingly, the entrepreneur shows the need and possibility to take action on a recognized problem. Whereas governmental agendas can be set by each individual stream, coupling can move an issue onto the decision agenda (Kingdon, 2014, p.202). Consequently, the policy entrepreneur’s coupling does not mean that a proposal will inevitably be implemented (see 2.6.1.), but it brings it closer to active, authoritative decision-making and changes the decision agenda.

To provide a tangible understanding of the framework, Figure 2 depicts the MSF. From left to right, it highlights the existence of three separate streams (problem/policy/political) and their components, which through their alignment can open a policy window and encourage policy entrepreneurs to push proposals through these windows. As the policy entrepreneurs in

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this process couple policies “to problems, problems to political forces and political forces to” policies, the streams join and agenda change can occur (Kingdon, 2014, pp.196-208).

2.7.Kingdon’s Causal Configuration: What to Expect

Based on the presented theoretical framework, this thesis understands the MSF as a causal conjunction. A causal conjunction “is a causal configuration, in which” several causal factors work together to create an outcome (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.94). These causal factors are necessary, because the outcome cannot occur without them (Blatter & Haverland, 2012)

For agenda change (outcome) to occur, according to Kingdon (2014), a policy window must be opened by the merger of three previously separate problem, policy and political streams, while a policy entrepreneur couples the streams and advocates a policy. The necessary causal factors in Kingdon’s causal configuration are consequently the problem, policy and political stream as well as the policy entrepreneur’s coupling. These factors must be present and combine at one moment to create agenda change (outcome). If one these factors is not present, either a policy window cannot open and/or coupling does not occur, which means that policy agenda change will not occur (Kingdon, 2014). Indeed, Kingdon (2014) states that “the

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prominent feature of the processes under study here is the joint effect of several factors coming together at once” to create agenda change (p.77).

Furthermore, the causal factors must interact. This interaction does not suggest that streams are not independent, but rather that the causal power of each causal condition depends on the presence of the other conditions. In other words, even if one factor had more causal power, it cannot cause the outcome as long as the other factors do not exist. The causal conditions are thus not substitutable (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Through this lens of configurational thinking, the MSF is based on equifinality. This means that the composition of causal conditions can differ per case (exemplary: one time the problem stream includes more indicators, another more feedback), while the same outcome (agenda change) can be achieved (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Kingdon, 2014, pp.72-73).

Figure 3 summarizes this conjunction. From left to right, the three streams present necessary causal factors, which must interact (arrows between the streams) and align for a policy window to open. The policy entrepreneur, another necessary causal factor, then couples the three streams and advocates a policy, so that agenda change can occur.

Considering these causal connections, this thesis’ analyses (Chapters 5-7) are executed along a specific expectation. The three laws analysed in this research (RED-G, NSU-G, GBRH) are understood to represent decision agenda change. On this foundation, it is expected that before the respective moments that the RED-G, NSU-G and GBRH reached the decision agenda

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(respectively: 2012, 2015, 2020), all three streams aligned and created a policy window, in which a policy entrepreneur coupled the streams and advocated the respective law. Thus, before the three laws (RED-G, NSU-G, GBRH) reached the decision agenda, problems were identified, solutions were present, the political climate was permissive to change, and no constraints existed that kept the policy entrepreneur from successfully advocating a proposal to address RWE. Accordingly, all driving forces, defined by Kingdon, were in place and decision agenda change occurred.

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Chapter 3: Methodology

The application of Kingdon’s MSF, as presented in Chapter 2, enables this thesis to answer the research question of how the emergence of RWE on Germany’s policy decision agenda after 2012 can be explained. In the examination of this query, the research follows a specific methodology, for which this chapter elaborates research design, case selection, operationalization, data collection, data analysis, reliability and validity.

3.1.Research Design

This study adopts a deductive, qualitative case study design based on the decision agenda change in the German government’s approach to RWE. Case studies, defined as empirical in-depth investigations of current phenomena within their wider context, in which these phenomena and their contexts blur, enable the examination of complex and novel processes (Yin, 1984). Since Schramm (1971) highlights that “the essence of a case study […] is that it tries to illuminate […] decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result” (p.6), a deductive case-based design provides the most suitable option to apply the MSF and understand the driving forces behind agenda change. The case-based approach thus marks this study’s strength, as it enables three outcomes: (1)thoroughly understanding agenda change over time, (2)identifying what the dominant causal factors for the government’s agenda change regarding RWE are and (3)consequently answering the research question.

3.2.Case Selection

Although a rise in RWE and its countermeasures has been observed across several countries (Koehler, 2016), Germany was selected for investigation, for three reasons: (1)within Europe, Germany has historically and especially since 1990 been the country most affected by RWE (Koehler, 2016; NCTV, 2018), (2)within Europe, Germany has experienced the most recent and frequent violent manifestations of RWE (The Economist, 2020; Hille, 2020) and (3)Germany can be analysed along Kingdon’s MSF, as the country is, like the USA, federally organized and most of the MSF components, such as participants Kingdon describes as potentially influencing agenda-setting, are present in its political system (Deutsche Bundesregierung, 2020a). Its investigation is therefore of high social and scientific significance.

A differentiation must, however, be made, as this thesis addresses the federal government and three (draft)laws within the entire agenda change. Due to Germany’s federal structure, policies can be placed on the agenda by several actors, including the federal

Shifting the Fight to ‘the Right’? German Decision Agenda-Setting in the Fight Against Right-Wing Extremism.