Picturing the Leader: Self-Presentation Strategies and Right-Wing Populist Communication on Instagram

Picturing the Leader

Self-Presentation Strategies and Right-Wing Populist

Communication on Instagram

Graduate School of Communication Erasmus Mundus Master’s in Journalism, Media and Globalisation

Supervisor: Dr. Linda Bos

28 May 2020

Abstract

Over the past years, right-wing populist parties have been gaining traction and support all around Europe. Several studies have related this electoral success to their communication strategies centered around the political leader and the extensive adoption of social media as a marketing tool. While the use of Facebook and Twitter in populist communication has been broadly covered by different scholars, few studies have focused on Instagram which is quickly gaining in popularity among politicians. Through a hand-coded visual content analysis, this study compares the self-portrayal approaches of six European right-wing populist leaders by examining the visual techniques and populist narratives used in their Instagram postings (N=244) during the post- and pre-elections periods. Results indicate that right-wing populist leaders use the social network frequently as a promotional platform to spread their populists ideas. Based on the findings, seven different self-presentation strategies corresponding to seven leadership images and personalized narratives can be discerned: patriotism (Nationalist Leader), popularity (Leader of masses), anti-elitism (Contentious Leader), accessibility (Selfie Leader), competence (Flawless Leader), authenticity (Family-figure Leader) and compassion (Emotional Leader). This study also shows that right-wing populist leaders combine two or more image management strategies in their visual

Introduction

Right-wing populist parties have gained momentum across Europe. Their success in the polls has grown notably in the last years. This trend has been recently further confirmed in the 2019 European elections in which the right-wing populist parties secured a sizeable number of seats in the European Parliament. They strengthened their presence from 34 deputies in 2014 to 73 in 2019 (European Parliament [EP], 2019). Some studies have associated this electoral rise to two main determinants. On one hand, the economic insecurity as a

consequence of the 2008 financial crisis and, on the other hand the cultural backlash which has manifested itself in the form of intolerance toward multiculturalism and immigration (Bobba, Cremonesi, Mancosu, & Seddone, 2018; de Vreese et al., 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Other researchers have linked this success in the polls to the use of social media in the populist communication strategies. According to de Vreese et al. (2018), these tools are “as central as the populist ideas themselves” (p.425). In the last years, right-wing populist (RWP) leaders have been using social networks as a promotional tool in order to 1) position their ideas and ideology at the center of the public debate and the common people’s daily life (Bobba et al., 2018), and 2) bypass the media organisations and journalists (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). The adoption of social media by populist politicians is argued to have been triggered by Donald Trump’s successful use of Twitter (Block & Negrine, 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018; Jutel 2018). That said, political communication is increasingly shifting towards pictures (Archetti, 2017). The emergence of image-centered social networks, such as

Instagram, has also restored the central role of visual content in political communication and offered different approaches to presentation of self and image management (Muñoz & Towner, 2017).

Yet, the visual aspects of populist communication and the self-portrayal strategies of political actors, especially right-wing populists, remain one of the least studied areas in political communication. To my knowledge, there have only been few studies on the use of Instagram as a self-presentation tool by politicians and political parties. Some scholars have looked at Instagram image attributes of politicians. For instance, Muñoz and Towner (2017) have examined the political marketing in the 2016 US Presidential Primary Campaign by analysing the top seven primary candidates’ Instagram accounts, while Liebhart and

Bernhardt (2017) and Lalancette and Raynauld (2019) have focused on one specific political figure, respectively the Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellenduring and the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. In fact, this recent research represents a new body of work that has begun exploring the use of Instagram by politicians and their parties in order to produce an appealing self-presentation and to reduce “the psychological distance between themselves and their potential voters” (Filimonov, Russmann & Svensson, 2016, p.3). However, we still have little knowledge about the strategic staging of RWP leaders in this visual-centered platform and the approaches they use to manage their image. To add to our knowledge in this area and to contribute to the broader literature on populist communication in social media, this thesis seeks to address this research gap. I, therefore, propose the following research question: (RQ) What self-presentation strategies are used by European right-wing populists leaders on Instagram?

This study aims to answer this question by analysing and comparing the self-presentation strategies on Instagram of six RWP leaders in Europe. Through visual content analysis, this thesis seeks to examine the Instagram postings of these politicians in order to 1) identify the self-presentation strategies used to manage their image and 2) pinpoint the similarities and differences between the RWP leaders when they engage on Instagram.

Theoretical Framework

Populism and right-wing ideology

Populism is considered as a broad concept since it can be defined in different and various ways depending on the context (Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Büchel, 2016). The term itself has been recognised by Canovan (1999) as “notoriously vague” (p.3). However, populist

ideology, in its several tendencies, shares two main fundamentals. First, it leans on the opposition and hostility between the people and the elites (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). In other words, “the people” is a concept that embodies all those who are unsatisfied with the status quo and bound for fighting the elite and breaking the establishment (Block & Negrine, 2017).

Second key element in the populist doctrine is the out-groups (de Vreese et al., 2018), also called the dangerous others (Engesser et al, 2017). In order to determine the nature of out-groups, it is imperative to specify the type of populism. On the left, the term “dangerous others” is often used in reference to capitalists. While the immigrants are the ones in the right-wing populists' cross hairs (de Vreese et al., 2018). In fact, when right-wing ideology and populism merge together, the people are then pictured as a nation excluding the elite, foreigners and immigrants who are usually pointed out as the source of the people’s

difficulties (Wirz et al., 2018). For some scholars, the differentiation between the people and the “others” is a crucial factor in defining right wing populism. As argued by Pelinka (2019), “any kind of populism directed against an ethnically and/or nationally and/or religiously defined ‘other’ can be seen as ‘right-wing’” (p.7).

To create connection with their public, right-wing populist parties often adopt antagonistic and patriotic rhetoric. Their speeches usually invoke nationalistic pride and

(Block & Negrine, 2017). While the right-wing populist narrative brings together those sharing the same national and cultural background (the people), it diabolizes the others (the elite and out-groups) (Block & Negrine, 2017). In a recent study, Ekström, Patrona and Thornborrow (2018) came to the conclusion that the right-wing populist frame is a

performative style which uses “national myths and stereotypical identities” in order to reach its objectives (p.2). This is accurate in the case of Europe. For instance, the European populist right movements have a tendency to embrace and support Christian beliefs (Pelinka, 2019) against other religious identities (Schertzer & Woods, 2020).

Alongside the characteristics of the right-wing populist narratives, the success of parties that have adopted this ideology in recent years is also due to social media (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2017). Many scholars assert that populist politicians spread their ideas by using the powerful impact of social networks in shaping public opinion (Engesser et al., 2016). In point of fact, these platforms allow the use of strong verbal and non verbal expressions against ‘the elites’ and ‘the others’ without being perturbed by journalistic gatekeepers (de Vreese et al., 2018). This explains the populist actors’ preference for social networks over mainstream media (Ernst et al., 2019). This is also what Gerbaudo (2018) has called the “elective affinity between social media and populism” (p.746). The researcher goes even further by arguing that these platforms are used more frequently by populist than non-populist politicians due to their non-populist potential (Gerbaudo, 2018).

Right-wing populist narrative in social media

Among social media platforms, Instagram has become the fastest growing network in political communication (Hinsliff, 2019). Its attributes have granted populist actors with unprecedented advantages: affordance and absence of mediators which help populist

media interference offers a great spreading potential to populist narratives (Blassnig, Engesser, Ernst & Esser, 2019). Against this background, the first question that emerged is:

RQ1: To what extent do right-wing populists leaders use populist narratives on Instagram?

Timing also plays a critical role when it comes to populist communication. An evidence for this is Schmuck and Hameleers’s comparative analysis of populist

communication on Facebook and Twitter before and after elections (2019). Their study has revealed that populist narratives are highly present in the right wing populist parties’ communication during the electoral campaigns than post-election periods. Thus, the second question is:

RQ2: Do right-wing populists leaders use more populist narratives on Instagram during the electoral period than in normal days?

As a visual-centred platform, Instagram also provides a stage for populist leaders to manage their self-portrayals. Despite being a fertile field of research, Instagram has not been sufficiently studied regarding its use in political marketing and communication. Although some scholars have looked at the visual characteristics of politicians and political parties on Instagram (Filimonov et al., 2016; Liebhart & Bernhardt, 2017; Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019; Muñoz &Towner, 2017, 2018), none of them touched upon the novel use of this platform by populist actors. Like other social networks, Instagram gives room for politicians to prove their legitimacy and present themselves to the public. This is what Goffman (1959) labeled as a “performance” (p.8). He referred to social interaction as a theater where people are actors on a stage watched by other individuals who represent the audience. During this theatrical performance, the on-stage personae is engaged in the process of "impression management" (Goffman, 1959, p.70) which consists of carefully controlling the performance

in order to achieve a positive self-presentation. This concept is relatively similar to the

contemporary expression of self-branding. Liebhart and Bernhardt (2017) define this strategic self-presentation on Instagram as “the intentionality of selection and presentation routines” (p.16). The term intentionality refers to a well-thought-out strategy adopted by the politicians in order to create an appealing image to their electorate (Filimonov et al., 2016).

This self-presentation through Instagram allows populists actors to establish an

emotional bond with the people (de Vreese et al., 2018). In periods of elections, voters are not only attracted to the rhetoric, but also to the politicians’ image (Grabe & Bucy, 2011). The persuasive role of images serves the populist leaders who try to depict themselves as the representatives of the democratic sovereign as well as the spokespersons of the people (Canovan, 1999). Indeed, populist communication is usually focused on the populist leader, also viewed as a charismatic figure (Block & Negrine, 2017; Pelinka, 2019; Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2017). Furthermore, he plays a vital role in the upswing and fall of its party. The most notable example is the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF). After the murder of its leader Pim Fortuyn in 2002, the party experienced a significant decline and lost its bearings (Kitschelt, 2006). However, the charismatic leadership is an insufficient

explanation of the populist party’s rise. Van der Brug and Mughan (2007) have previously raised this observation. To support their claim, the two scholars conducted a study which focused on three Dutch elections (1998, 2002, 2003). They analysed the effects of charismatic leadership on right-wing populist parties. The findings demonstrated that the presence of a charismatic figure as leader of a party is not a convincing argument to justify its success in the polls. However, it is still one of the reasons behind a populist party’s electoral rise.

In addition to developing a charismatic self-presentation, today’s leaders face the necessity of creating connection with their voters in order to keep their partisan base (Kane and Patapan, 2012 cited by Mazzoni and Mincigrucci, 2019). This characteristic of leaders’ image is called responsiveness and has been defined by Aaldering and Vliegenthart (2016) as “being accessible, aware of the current problems in society, responsive to the wishes of the public, and approachable” (p.1879). This aspect of leadership image has been observed in the Facebook posts of some populist leaders such as the Italian Matteo Salvini, who stages himself as the “common man” (Mazzoni & Mincigrucci, 2019, p.15). However, the leader of the Italian Northern League is argued to be a distinctive case compared to other right-wing populist leaders (Mazzoni & Mincigrucci, 2019). Therefore, the third question is:

RQ3: To what extent do right-wing populist leaders present a responsive image of themselves on Instagram?

Self-presentation and personalization

In their research, Filimonov et al. (2016) have found that self-presentation of politicians inclines toward personalization. They referred to this latter concept as whether the politician is seen or not in the visual. An earlier study by Van Santen and Van Zoonen (2010) stressed that personalization consists of three main different narratives:“stories about the individual competence of politicians; stories about their private lives; and emotional accounts or reflections of political events and experiences” (p.49). These three narratives respectively refer to the concepts of professionalization, privatization and emotionalisation. While Van Santen and Van Zoonen (2010) focus on this process in mass media, these three types of personalization are also relevant to examine in social media. Metz, Kruikemeier and Lecheler (2019) have studied personalization in politics on Facebook. Their findings indicate that the three narratives are most often used in visual communication.

Research has shown that when political communication is personalized, it generates stronger involvement and interest from the online users (Kruikemeier, van Noort,

Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2013). To look at this another way, social media allows users to develop a more powerful interpersonal connection with the politicians (Lee & Jang, 2013). Aware of the impact of personalized communication, most populist parties (left and right) and their strategies have been based on the personalization of their leaders (Block & Negrine, 2017; Pelinka, 2019).

Looking back at Filimonov et al. (2016)’s study, the results of their research

demonstrated that politicians’ images on Instagram during elections is often professionalized. In other words, they are portrayed in a professional and political context, while the

personal/private side of their lives is rarely displayed during the same period. As such, I expect that:

H1: Right-wing populists leaders post more images in professional context than in a private setting during the electoral period.

In addition to professionalization and privatization, populist actors use a range of stylistic features in their communication including emotionalisation (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2016). In fact, populist communication has been designated as extremely emotional (Aalberg et al., 2017 cited by Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019). That said, the emotions’ visibility is assumed to differ between men and women. Following a survey about different traits that characterize adult Americans, Prentice and Carranza (2003) concluded that women are viewed as being more emotional than men. This assumption about emotionality and gender is also heavily present in the political sphere (Brooks, 2011). In order to test this supposition, Renner and Masch (2017) analysed the emotional expressivity of German

politicians in news broadcasts. The findings of their study were in line with the assumption of the strong emotionality of women. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: Right-wing female populist leaders show more emotionality in their Instagram posts than their male counterparts do.

The current study aims to build upon this body of work on the dimension of

leadership image in visual political communication on Instagram by specifically considering the use of this social network as a branding tool. This study seeks to go a step further in identifying the different forms of self-presentation and personalization used by the RWP leaders while engaging on Instagram.

Method

This study examines the Instagram postings of six right-wing populist leaders from six European countries. Since the research focuses on the self-imagery of these politicians, a visual content analysis following a quantitative approach has been conducted. This method aims to describe and predict the self-presentation strategies of the RWP leaders by “counting the frequency and the extent of various characteristics” of their image management (Reinard, 2006, p.7). The selected leaders are Matteo Salvini, from the Italian Northern League (Lega

Nord), Marine Le Pen from the French National Rally (Rassemblement National), Alice

Weidel from the German Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland), Norbert Hofer from the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), Geert Wilders from the Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) and Santiago Abascal from the Spanish Vox Party. Three criteria were applied in the selection of the politicians: (1) all of them are leaders of right-wing populist parties in Europe; (2) all of their parties are members

of the Identity and Democracy European Parliament group except for Vox Party1, (3) all of them have verified accounts on Instagram. The study focused on two main variations: gender of the leader (male/female) and time period (pre-election/post-election).

Data collection and sampling procedure

The Instagram data was drawn over a three months period: from 15th April till 31st May 2019 (electoral campaign before the European elections held between 23 and 26 May 2019) and from 1st June till 15th July 2019 (post-election/daily life). This time period aims to provide a diversified visual content from the electoral campaign and the daily routines of the politicians. For this study, the sampling strategy was based on a multistage approach. First, I looked at the Instagram postings of each politician over the studied periods, I then selected only still pictures. Each static image was sampled as a single post despite possibly being part of a “multiple pictures option”. Furthermore, videos were excluded in order to ensure

uniformity of comparison and analysis. For this first stage, the total number of posts gathered during both periods was 1618 posts.

However, the number of Instagram postings from the six politicians’ verified accounts varied considerably and depended primarily on how active they are on the social network (see Figure A1 in appendix A). While some leaders have a very active presence on Instagram (e.g. Matteo Salvini), others post very few pictures on the platform (e.g. Alice Weidel).

To ensure a relevant sample to compare the leaders, the following model has been adopted: the number of cells x the number of posts = sample size. For this study, the aim was to attain 300 posts as the sample size. Since the research focuses on two periods and six leaders, each cell was supposed to contain 25 posts [(6 leaders x 2 time periods) x 25 = 300].

1_{This party has been selected due to its significant rise in both regional (2018) and national (2019) elections,}

gaining seats in Spanish parliament. This achievement has shaken the country’s political system (Torres, 2018).

In order to reach similar size samples per cell, a systematic sampling depending on the number of observations per cell has been privileged. For instance, every 13th post from Santiago Abascal’s Instagram account during the campaign period has been selected, while every second post of Norbert Hofer has been gathered in the same period.

However, some leaders posted less than 25 pictures in some periods. This resulted in a limited number of posts in certain cells (see Table A1 in appendix A). Therefore, the

systematic sampling was not applicable in some cases which led to a sample size inferior to 300 (244). The posts selected were screen-captured and manually stored.

Coding procedures

Building on previous studies on visual communication and political branding on Instagram (Ekman & Widholm, 2017; Filimonov et al., 2016; Metz, Kruikemeier & Lecheler, 2019; Muñoz & Towner, 2017), the codebook (see appendix D) has been developed following a deductive approach. The coding scheme has also been drawn on some photography

techniques to capture the different aspects of the self-portrayal in terms of frame, perspective and setting. Taking into account the complex nature of analysing visuals in political

communication, the different sections of the codebook were modified and adjusted in order to examine the Instagram posts.

The first section of the codebook – populist narrative – consists of three variables: the variable people centrism (M=1.02, SD=1.11) measured whether an Instagram post showed references to specific symbols or not. Images were considered carrying symbols if they included religious symbolism (value 1) such as places of worship and crosses (Grabe & Bucy, 2011) or national symbolism (value 2) illustrated by flags and monuments (Elgenius, 2011) or cultural symbolism (value 3) represented through food and traditional attire.

I also operationalized the concept of the people with the variable mass appeal

(Erickson, 2000; Grabe & Bucy, 2009). This variable (M=0,29, SD=0.45) measured whether the images transmitted the idea of popular appeal or not. Instagram postings were coded as presenting this element if they contained scenes of the leader surrounded by an approving and visibly satisfied crowd.

The variable contentious populist attitude (M=0.14, SD=0.48) measured whether the post carried an explicit reference to the elite and out -groups or not. The images were

recognised as being confrontational if they illustrated a form of pejorative presentation of the two categories or showed negative emotions displayed by the leader towards them.

The second part of the codebook is dedicated to responsiveness. My

operationalisation of this concept was based on three visual indicators. First, the Perspective variable (M=1.73, SD=1.02) recorded the angle of the camera from which the image posted was taken. For instance, the Instagram posting was coded as a staged picture (value 1) if the image captured an artificially constructed scene. Another example is when the picture seemed to be taken quickly without a preset setting, then the post was coded as a selfie/snapshot (value 2).

Second, Frame (M=1.44, SD=0.95) refers to the type of shot. I distinguished between a close-up (value 1) and full body shot (value 2) . The Instagram posting was recognised as a close-up if the image was taken with the leader close to the camera or focused on the details of the leader’s appearance or gesture. When the picture was taken from a considerable distance and showing the leader’s surroundings (presence of people, location, etc.), the post was coded as a long/full body shot.

Thrid, the variable Interaction with common people (M=1.01, SD=0.61) measured whether an Instagram post demonstrated a certain closeness of the leader to ordinary citizens

or not. Images were coded interactive if they contained visual forms such as “rope-line greetings, handshakes, grips, or touches” (Grabe & Bucy, 2011, p.224).

The last section focuses on personalization as described by Van Santen and Van Zoonen (2010). Building on their classification and some visual techniques, I have identified three variables: context, appearance and emotionality.

The variable Context (M=1.10, SD=0.80) refers to the type of setting in which the leader is present in the posting. I distinguished between three contexts: professional/political (e.g. at a meeting or rally, media appearances, etc), private/personal (e.g. at home with family) and semi-professional (e.g.participating in a demonstration).

The variable Appearance (M=1.13, SD=0.69) considered the leader’s physical appearance as an indication of the degree of his/her professionalization and privatisation in the analysed picture. For example, the post was coded as a professional appearance when the leader was showing the formality of political attire. If he/she was photographed displaying casual attire (e.g. jeans, shirtsleeves rolled up, etc.), the image was then coded as a informal appearance.

Finally, the last variable focuses on the emotional personalization. Emotionality (M=1,36, SD=0.80) measured whether the Instagram post contained facial expressions and gestures reflecting the leader’s emotions or not.

Other indicators non related to the content of the pictures were also coded. This included the identification number of the posting, the leader’s name, his/her gender and the period of the posting. The images in the corpus constituted for this study were coded manually by one coder. To calculate intercoder agreement, a random subsample of 10% of the Instagram images selected for the study were coded by a second coder. This second coder

is a political communication student trained in content analysis and familiar with

photography/filming techniques. An interrater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters (see Table A3 in appendix A). The values of Kappa ranged between 0.62 and 0.78 across all issues coded.

Results

In this study, the research question seeks to identify the self-presentation strategies used by RWP leaders on Instagram. To come to a better understanding of their image management on this social platform, I conducted different analyses. The results revealed different tendencies that characterize the sample of Instagram posts examined.

Populist narrative

I start with answering RQ1. Table 1 demonstrates frequencies for the populist narrative’s indicators included in the Instagram posts. When looking at the variable people centrism, almost half of the analysed images contain references to the people (48%) and a majority of these pictures stage national symbols. Furthermore, Table 1 points out that a smaller

percentage of the Instagram postings carries cultural symbols (8.6%), while religious symbolism is nearly absent (3.7%). Taking a closer look at all images that have been

identified as being people centric, a significant contrast can be seen between the six leaders. The posts of Abascal, Salvini and Le Pen present notably more aspects related to people centrism, whereas this variable is totally missing in Alice Weidel’s images. Indeed, the data reveal that a significant difference exists between the means of the leaders [F(5, 238) = 4.9, p =0,00]. Since a statistically significant result has been found in this case, Post hoc

comparisons using the Tukey test have been performed. They point out that the mean score for Abascal (M = 1.3, SD = 1.07) did not significantly differ from Le Pen (M = 1.15, SD = 1.09) and Salvini (M = 1.32, SD = 1.11). However, Weidel (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00) is

significantly different from the other politicians (Table 2). Moreover , Figure 1 shows that the leader of the Spanish Vox Party display more nationalism in his posts than any other leader. Although this difference is not statistically significant, the overwhelming presence of Spanish flags in Abascal’s pictures was apparent while coding his Instagram posts. For instance, almost 30% of the analysed pictures that contain national symbols belong to him

.

Figure 1. People centrism in RWP leaders’ Instagram posts

Note: N=244

Another visual element used in the populist narrative is the mass appeal. This aspect of populist worship is almost invisible in Geert Wilders’ posts (93%), whereas it appears with significant proportions in other RWP leaders’ Instagram accounts. This explains the existence of a significant difference between the means of the leaders [F(5, 238) = 6.9, p =0,00]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey indicate that the mean scores for Salvini and Le Pen are identical (M = 0.48, SD = 0.50). While Wilders (M = 0.07, SD = 0.26) is significantly different from the two politicians (see Table 2). In fact, Salvini and Le Pen share a relatively important number of pictures where they are surrounded by a visibly attentive mass

movement. For instance, mass appeal is present in 48% of Salvini’s posts and 47.5% of Le Pen’s (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 . Mass appeal in RWP leaders’s Instagram posts

The analysis of the contentious populist attitude demonstrates an overwhelming absence of posts that include aspects of this narrative (91%) and a significant difference between the mean scores of the leaders [F(5, 238) = 16.7, p =0,00] . Table 2 and Figure B1 (see appendix B) indicate that Geert Wilders (M = 0.68, SD = 0.90) is the only leader who embraces this rhetoric, in particular against muslims (29% anti-out-groups as opposed to 10% anti-elite attitude). Three of the six analyzed leaders [Abascal (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24), Salvini (M = 0.06, SD = 0.31) and Weidel (M = 0.08, SD = 0.27)] hardly refer to the elite and out-groups in their pictures, whereas the posts of Hofer and Le Pen (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00) do not contain any mention of the contentious populist narrative.

Another intriguing finding is the contrast between male and female leaders regarding the use of contentious narrative. The results show that there is a significant difference in the scores for male (M=0.18, SD=0.53) and female (M=0.02, SD=0.13) leaders; t (242)=3.7, p =0.00. This suggests that male leaders share more posts with a contentious narrative than

female leaders do. This can be mostly attributed to Geert Wilders’s extensive use of this rhetoric in his Instagram postings.

In line with the objective of exploring more characteristics in RWP leaders’ self-presentation on Instagram, I conducted an independent-samples t-test to compare populist narratives during the electoral and normal periods. While people centrism t (242)=1.14, p = 0.25 and contentious populist attitude t (242)= -0.93, p = 0.35 variables show no contrast, there is a significant difference in the scores for the electoral (M=0.36, SD=0.48) and normal (M=0.21, SD=0.40) periods regarding mass appeal; t (242)=2.7, p = 0.007. A further

evidence for this are the percentages demonstrated in Table B1 (see appendix B). While mass appeal constitutes 36.4% of the images posted in the electoral period, it only appears in 21% of the postings published during normal days. These results suggest that the timing influences the presence of mass appeal in RWP leaders’ posts. To put it simply, the six politicians publish more pictures with mass appeal in the electoral period than in normal days.

Responsiveness

A close examination of the variable responsiveness reveals that of all analyzed posts, 82% are self-images. Figure B2 (see appendix B) shows that more than three-fourths of the leaders’ postings are personalized except those of Geert Wilders. The leader of the Dutch Party of Freedom employs less personalization in his posts. He is only visible in 36.6% of the pictures.

When analysing the visual aspects of the RWP leaders’ presence on Instagram, the perspective from which the images are taken is an important indicator. The data presented in Table 4 clearly indicates the leaders’ preference for informal and spontaneous pictures. For instance, 43% of the images in which a leader is visible are selfies/snapshots followed by action shots (24%). Furthermore, Figure 3 demonstrates that Salvini is the leader who uses

this category of pictures the most. 25% of selfies/snapshots belong to him. A third of the few postings that are presented in a form of staged pictures are found in Abascal’s account. Table 4. Frequency of responsiveness indicators in RWP leaders’ Instagram postings

Figure 3. Different visual perspectives present in RWP leaders’ Instagram posts

Note: n=200

Turning to Table 4, the Instagram postings are fairly diversified in terms of frame. There are as many close-ups (34%) as long/full body shots (33.6%). However, there is a

notable difference between the six politicians when it comes to the use of frames (see Table 2). The data analysis unveils that Geert Wilders stands out from the other leaders by employing fewer variations of frame. In regard to the framing categories, Salvini posted pictures that are majoritarily close-ups. They represent 60% of the postings in which he is pictured (Figure 4). In contrast, Abascal leant towards pictures taken from a considerable distance. Long/full body shots constitute more than the two thirds (72%) of his Instagram postings.

Figure 4. Types of shots present in RWP leaders’ Instagram posts

Note: n=200

Moving to the interaction with people variable in Figure B3 (see appendix B), more than half of the posts that contain interaction with ordinary citizens were found in Marine Le Pen (28.3%) and Matteo Salvini’s accounts (34.8%). In response to RQ3, the RWP leaders in the sample show responsiveness to varying degrees. In other terms, some leaders are

Personalization

The analysis of the context in which the leader is pictured shows an undeniable preference for pictures shot at a meeting or rally with other politicians, voters or journalists. Figure B4 (see appendix B) clearly demonstrates that the political setting is predominant (76.5% professional context as opposed to 12.5% private context). Regarding the semi-professional background, it is marginally displayed (11% of the analysed pictures) .

To investigate the presence of different contexts within the pre-election period, a paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare the number of posts in professional and personal settings during the electoral campaign. The results indicate that professional (M=0.74, SD=0.44) and personal (M=0.05, SD=0.21) contexts are significaltly different [t(128)=-14.08, p = 0.00] . These findings suggest that RWP leaders post more images in political context than in private settings during the electoral period. Therefore, the data results support the first hypothesis.

Although the professional environment is dominant in both periods, Table B2 (see appendix B) shows that the types of context differ according to the time period. One one hand, the number of posts referring to a professional setting decreased in normal days (63.7%) compared to the electoral campaign (87.1%). On the other hand, private contexts appeared in more postings in normal days (19%) than in the electoral period (4.7%). In point of fact, the results of paired-samples t-test confirmed the existence of a significant difference between the presence of personal settings in electoral (M=0.04, SD=0.20) and normal

(M=0.17, SD=0.37) periods; t (114)=-3.45, p = 0.01.

In regards to the leaders’ appearance, the results identifiy a significant difference between the scores for the professional (M=1.94, SD=3.07) and casual (M=1.70, SD=3.17)

observed in the post-election period: official (M=0.48, SD=0.50) and informal (M=0.31, SD=0.46) looks ; t(114)=2.02, p=0.046. The leaders’appearance is overall more formal (51,2%) than casual (30.7%) which confirms the RWP leaders’ inclination for the professionalization of their self-portrayals.

In addition to professionalisation, the RWP leaders tend to emotionalize their images on Instagram. To explore this aspect of personalization in terms of gender, I conducted an independent-samples t-test in order to compare emotionality between male and female

leaders. The results reveal that a significant difference exists between the mean scores of men (M=1.25, SD=0.82) and women (M=1.75, SD=0.58) leaders ; t (242)=-4.2, p = 0.00. These results suggest that gender influences the presence of emotionality in RWP leaders’ postings. The data analysis demonstrates that female leaders show more emotions in their Instagram posts than their male peers do which confirms my second hypothesis (H2). That said, male leaders also exhibit, to a lesser extent, their emotions in their Instagram postings. As shown by Figure 5, emotionality is visible in Hofer and Salvini’s pictures, 66% and 58%

respectively.

Discussion and conclusion

Instagramming has become a common practice among most politicians (Filimonov et al., 2016;; Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019; Liebhart & Bernhardt, 2017). In the last few years, the usage of the social network has increased in political communication, especially in electoral campaigning (Towner & Muñoz, 2018). In line with previous research, the current study demonstrates that RWP leaders make use of Instagram to promote and spread their populist messages. However, there are significant variations between the leaders in the sample, starting with the frequency of their Instagram use. Some of them have a very active presence on the social network such as Matteo Salvini, whereas others like Alice Weidel post very few pictures on the platform. As this study suggests, I argue that the amount of visual presentation depends on the leader’s position in the party network (Archetti, 2017). On one hand, the

Alternative for Germany has multiple leaders which means that Weidel is sharing the role of

public face of the party with other political members. On the other hand, Salvini is the head of the Italian Northern League and its major political figure; thus, he has a pivotal role in representing the party. Bluntly put, the more central the position of the leader in the party, the stronger the commitment for him/her to stage himself/herself and manage his/her

self-imagery. That said, the total number of posted pictures is not the only main difference between the RWP leaders. They also display many contrasts in their narratives. While all the six leaders use Instagram substantially as a populist communication tool, their visual

approaches have different focal points. I therefore distinguish between seven different image management strategies: the Nationalist Leader, the Leader of Masses, the Contentious

Leader, the Selfie Leader, the Flawless Leader, the Family-Figure Leader and the Emotional Leader. Each of these strategies is discussed in detail in the next paragraphs.

The Nationalist Leader. In the theoretical discussion, I emphasized the different

presentations of the people in populist communication, especially through nationalism. A multitude of studies have found that nationalist ideology strengthens populism around the issues of people centrism and national sovereignty (Block & Negrine, 2017; Mudde, 2019; Pelinka, 2019). The current study reinforces this conclusion. In fact, the findings pointed out that most RWP leaders address their followers on Instagram by extensively showcasing national symbols. They tend to present themselves as a nationalist leader by adopting a visual patriotic rhetoric and invoking nationalistic pride. Across the whole sample, Abascal stands out as the illustration of this type of leadership image par excellence. As previously

highlighted in the results section, over half of his posts contain national symbols. An example for this is Figure C1 (see appendix C) where the Vox party’s leader is pictured surrounded in the background by Spanish flags.

The Leader of Masses. Closely related to the people-centered image is the mass

appeal. As noted in several studies, the grass-roots support is seen as a sign of popularity and public approval (Erickson, 2000; Grabe & Bucy, 2009). In fact, the use of crowds is

considered as a persuasive tool. In the words of Schill (2012), “pictures with cheering supporters, packed speech halls, and autograph seekers act as a visual social proof ” (p.124). This suggests that the predominance of mass appeal in some of RWP leaders’ Instagramming behaviour is a strategy to promote their popularity. Furthermore, this aspect of populist worship is especially observed during pre-election period. This fits another finding about the major role that timing plays in strategizing the populist communication. Indeed, with rallies and mass movement events, the electoral campaign is the perfect opportunity to visually capture scenes of mass appeal. Therefore, posting images with mass appeal is an intended approach to seduce potential voters and ensure success in the polls. Looking back at the results, two RWP leaders adopt this strategy to a great extent. Salvini and Le Pen shared an

important number of pictures where they are surrounded by a crowd (see Figures C2 & C3 in appendix C). By emphasizing this aspect in their visual representation, both of them reinforce their connection with people and build their self-portrayal around the image of a leader of masses. Moreover, I speculate that Salvini and Le Pen are also seeking to consolidate the reputation of the Northern League and the National Rally as democratic parties in their respective countries (Bos & van der Brug, 2010).

The Contentious Leader. Right-wing populist narrative is not only built on the idea of

connecting with “the people”, but also on the adversarial relationship with the elite and out-groups (Block & Negrine, 2017; Hall, 2011; Kazin, 1995). However, this study denoted the absence of the contentious attitude in the visuals. Except Wilders who espouses a nationalist and anti-Islamic view (Oudenampsen, 2013) through his posts (see Figure C4 in appendix C), most of the five RWP politicians hardly referred to the elite or out-groups in their postings. This finding is in line with the study by Ernst et al. (2017) who suggests that anti-elitist narratives might be scarcely shared via “the personal and extremely direct channels of social media” (p.1359). One could argue that RWP leaders avoid being directly associated with the elite and the out-groups in the same visual. This might partly explain the limited number of self-images in Wilders’ Instagram account. Based on these findings, my study claims that the absence of the contentious populist rhetoric may be influenced by an overwhelming

preference of a personalized strategy by the majority of RWP leaders. Future research could delve into this by examining whether this contentious rhetoric is more present in posts from the party’s Instagram page.

The Selfie Leader. Populist actors embrace the aspect of responsiveness in their

leadership image in order to demonstrate their democraticness and willingness to adjust their actions with the people’s aspiration (de Vreese et al., 2018). In accordance with previous

studies, my findings showed that RWP leaders try to project “an image of democratic accessibility” (Marland, 2018, p.140) by posting informal and spontaneous pictures. The presence of selfie leader’s image in 43% of the analysed posts is a demonstration of

responsiveness. A further evidence for this is the significant use of close-ups by some RWP leaders. This type of frame accentuates the aspect of affability in their personalities.

According to Graber (1996), “the closer the camera, the more people like what the candidate says. Close-ups also make people seem friendlier and more approachable.”(pp. 12-13). Another element that emphasizes the likeability and approachability of a leader is when he/she is photographed in motion (Graber, 1996). By combining selfies, close-ups and action shots, Salvini highly illustrates the image of the Selfie Leader. Through Instagram posts, he is seeking to communicate his closeness to ordinary citizens. In the words of Mazzoni and Mincigrucci (2019), the leader of the Northern League succeeded in presenting himself as a ''type of politician close to the common people and that acts as the ''man of the street'”(p.15).

The Flawless Leader. Unlike Salvini, Abascal publishes well-framed shots and

appears strategically portrayed in most of his posts. In fact, the head of Vox Party has the highest number of staged pictures among all the leaders. They are accompanied with a substantial amount of mid/full body shots and emotionless facial expressions. This

combination of photos is probably aimed to project a professional and flawless image of the populist leader proving his ability to govern. This visual strategy might be triggered by Vox’s ambitions to consolidate its electoral base on a national level and, thus, to become an

established party in the Spanish political landscape.

The Family-Figure Leader. In my theoretical outline, I discussed the critical role of

visuals in mobilizing people in electoral campaigns. Previous findings (Filimonov et al., 2016) have demonstrated that politicians in general display professionalization in their visual

communication during the electoral period in order to foster an image of a hard-working, reliable and dedicated leader. My study confirms this conclusion and; therefore, corroborates the first hypothesis. I found that personalization manifests itself through the predominant presence of professional context and appearance in the RWP leaders' posts. However, this rhetoric is often complemented by some glances of the politician’s personal life (Ekman & Wildhom, 2017). An approach that aims to strategically bring more authenticity to the leader’s persona (Sampietro & Sánchez-Castillo, 2020) and create an intimate bond with his/her online followers (Ekman & Wildhom, 2017). Across the whole sample, Hofer emerges as the illustrative example of this visual strategy. In addition to his professional narrative, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party appears in some pictures as a family-figure (see Figure C5 in appendix C).

The Emotional Leader. The different leadership images mentioned in this section have

one aspect in common: emotions. In fact, populist communication is known for being

extremely emotional (Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019, p.5). The use of emotions helps to shape the leader’s image around responsiveness and authenticity creating an emotional connection with his/her digital followers (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019). This feature has been found in most RWP leaders’ posts. However, there is a widespread assumption within the literature that female politicians are more emotionally expressive than their male peers are. This study found evidence that this presumption holds true and therefore confirms the second

hypothesis. Female leaders tend to emotionalize their self-presentation on Instagram by displaying expressions of kindness, sympathy and warmth which also characterize the image of mother-figure leader (Gupta & Van Wart, 2015).

The present study sought to identify how RWP leaders stage themselves on Instagram and provide the foundation for future studies. However, there are some limitations that must

be addressed. A major shortcoming of the present research is the low sample size in terms of selected leaders. This methodological approach might not give the whole picture on how all European RWP leaders use Instagram in their visual communication strategy since some of the major figures of right-wing populism in the continent were not included in the sample (e.g. Viktor Orban, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, etc.) This might rule out some other leadership images that could characterise certain leaders. Therefore, further extensions of this current study should explore a larger sample of leaders. Another limitation is that only visuals have been investigated without their captions. This may exclude other aspects that would explain the leader’s communication strategies. For later research, it might be more insightful to combine visual and textual content analyses. This approach would clarify some nuances that were challenging to code in some Instagram posts.

To conclude, the rhetorical impact and persuasive power of images have been

described as indisputable (Schill, 2012). Being an image-centered social medium, Instagram provides a platform for RWP figures to lead by pictures and achieve success without any journalistic interference. Moreover, the ambiguous relationship between populism and democracy (Mudde, 2019) prompted RWP leaders to use the effectiveness of images to promote their own narrative in order to gain people’s trust and establish themselves as democratic leaders. This is what Mazzoleni (1995) defined as “videocracy” (p.315). This study confirms previous findings that Instagram represents a “virtual billboard” for politicians, including populists leaders, where they display a well-orchestrated image (Filimonov et al., 2016, p.8). Through each picture shared on Instagram, RWP leaders

ultimately intend to tell a promotional story and communicates a desired narrative: patriotism (Nationalist Leader), popularity (Leader of Masses), anti-elitism (Contentious Leader), accessibility (Selfie Leader), competence (Flawless Leader), authenticity (Family-Figure Leader) and compassion (Emotional Leader).

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Appendices

Appendix A: Tables and Graphs (Method Section)

Figure A1. Number of posts in right-wing populist leaders’ Instagram accounts by period

Note: N=244

Table A1. Systematic sampling according to the number of observations per cell

Table A2. Descriptives of different variables (means and standard deviations)

Note: N=244

Appendix B: Tables and Graphs (Results Section)

Figure B1. Contentious populist attitude in RWP leaders’ Instagram posts

Note: n=244

Table B1. Frequency of populist narratives in RWP leaders’ Instagram postings by period

Figure B2. Presence of the RWP leaders in the analysed Instagram posts (%)

Figure B3. Interaction with people in RWP leaders’ Instagram posts

Figure B4. Types of context in RWP leaders’ Instagram posts

Appendix C: Illustrations (Discussion Section)

Figure C12: Illustration of national symbolism in Abascal’s posts

Figure C23: Illustration of mass appeal in Salvini’s posts

2 _{Abascal, S. [santi_abascal]. (2019, April 19). “Entrevista con Maite Loureiro de @libertaddigital_:”No tengo}

motivos para dar un entrevista a quien nos llama borrachos como el Pais”

https://www.libertaddigital.com/espana/politica/2019-04-19/santiago-abascal-la-izquierda-nunca-ha-aceptado-la-democracia-1276636887/ Foto: @alonsorincon [Instagram photograph]. Retrieved from

https://www.Instagram.com/p/BwcnpMQgmvd/?igshid=g5d2cwfs1cer

3_{Salvini, M. [matteosalviniofficial]. (2019,June 3). “Sorrisi, affetto, tante famiglie, tanti giovani e giovanissimi}

Figure C34: Illustration of mass appeal in Le Pen’s posts

Figure C45: Illustration of contentious populist attitude in Wilders’ posts

4 _{Le Pen, M. [marine_lepen]. (2019, June 15). “ Après le marché de #Carvin ce matin, je me suis rendue au}

marché de #Rouvroy et à celui de #Méricourt avec notre tract sur l’accès à la santé: merci aux habitants pour leur accueil! :)” [Instagram photograph]. Retrieved from

https://www.Instagram.com/p/ByupTqSi1wg/?igshid=1ew420dquv752

5_{Wilders, G. [geertwilders]. (2019,June 5). [Instagram photograph]. Retrieved from}

Figure C56: Illustration of privatisation in Hofer’s posts

6_{Hofer,N. [norbert_hofer]. (2019,May 11). “Am Vormittag Rundflug mit Familie :-) #burgenland #pilotlife}

Appendix D: Codebook

Instagram Post ID : Coder ID:

The coder should start by looking at the Instagram post (picture) first. The next step would be going through the codebook and its variables. Make sure to use the examples given below the variables as additional guidelines on how to conduct the coding.

1. Populist narrative

Populist narrative mainly consists of three key elements: people-centrism, anti-elitism and hostility towards the out-groups.

Variable 1: PPCentrism

Reference to the dimension of people-centrism

This variable measures one of the key elements of populist narrative: people-centrism. It considers reference and appeals to the people as a nation and a monolithic group. In the case of right-wing populism, the People are usually presented as the nation, christians or the religion of Christianity.

● Does the picture include - Religious symbols? 0 = No 1 = Yes - National symbols? 0 = No 2 = Yes - Cultural symbols? 0 = No 3 = Yes

Note I: If there are no religious, national or cultural symbols, code 0. Note II: If the picture includes at least one religious symbol, code 1. Note III: If the picture includes at least one national symbol, code 2. Note VI: If the picture includes at least one cultural symbol, code 3.

Note V: If the picture includes more than one type of symbolism, code the most visible one. e.g:

- Religious symbolism includes places of worship, religious figures, or symbols such as crosses, candles, or religious scriptures (Grabe & Bucy, 2014).

- National symbolism represents nationhood and is used to glorify nations. It can be illustrated by national flags, days, monuments (Elgenius, 2011) and natural landscapes. - Cultural symbolism can be illustrated by food, traditional dress,...

Variable 2: MassAppeal

Presence of “Mass Appeal”

This variable measures one aspect of populist worship: mass appeal. It considers large and approving crowds as a visual expression of the populist leader’s popularity (Grabe & Bucy, 2014).

● Does the picture show any form of mass appeal? 0 = No

1 = Yes

Note I: If there is no visual expression of mass appeal, code 0. Note II: If there is a visual expression of mass appeal, code 1.

e.g: Mass appeal can be visually demonstrated by a large audience, leader surrounded by an approving and visibly satisfied crowd/ attentive mass movement coalescing around the leader….

Variable 3: ContAttitude

This variable measures the contentious populist attitude visible in the picture. By contentious populism, I mean aggressive and confrontational attitude against 'the elites' and 'the others' (Bobba & Roncarolo, 2018).

● Does the picture show a confrontational attitude towards elite and out-groups? 0 = No

1 = Yes if only anti-elitist attitude is present 2 = Yes if only anti-out-groups attitude is present 3 = Yes if both are present

e.g: In the case of right-wing populism, the elite can consist of the government, the European Union, the mass media and the journalists, while the out-groups include immigrants, muslims, foreigners and refugees.

e.g. The confrontational attitude against the elite and the out-groups can be visually illustrated in a form of pejorative presentation of these two categories or negative emotions displayed by the leader towards them.

Note: If the leader is not visually present in the picture, then the next questions should not be answered.

2. Responsiveness

A responsive image refers to “whether the leader is listening to public opinion and knows the concerns of the public” (Aaldering and Vliegenthart, 2016, p.1897). In other terms, is he/she approachable and friendly?

Variable 4: Perspective

Reference to the perspective of the camera

This variable considers the visual perspective from which the picture is taken. The angle of the camera can frame the leader’s image in order to offer different impressions to the viewers such as the impression of closeness.

● What is the type of picture where the leader is present? 1 = staged picture