A green Bretton Woods Compromise : embracing the nation-state

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A Green Bretton Woods Compromise:

Embracing the Nation-State

Mark Louwrier 10547738

mark.louwrier@student.uva.nl Political Theory (Political Science) Assessor 1: Paul Raekstad

Assessor 2: Marcel Maussen 29 June 2018

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Student name: Mark Louwrier Student number: 10547738 Word count: 17235

Course: Alternatives to Capitalism: Models of Future Society Degree program: Political Theory (Political Science)

Faculty: Social and Behavioral Sciences University: University of Amsterdam College year: 2017/2018

Place and date: Amsterdam, 22 June 2018 Tutor: Paul Raekstad

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1. Introduction

Environmental problems need to be addressed. On this much green political theorists agree (Eckersley 2004: 2; Davidson 2009: 47-48; Clark & York 2005: 391-392). In the Paris Agreement 2015, nation-states agreed to try to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. This, in turn, 'would require either sucking back greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere with technologies that are, for all practical purposes, non-existent, or achieving a near-complete decarbonization of the world economy in the next couple of decades' (Oksala 2016: 51). Though a hopeful step, the Agreement is not binding and does not set out how to limit the temperature increase.

Whereas green political theory used to draw heavily upon anarchist thought, the past two decades have seen a 'statist turn' within green political theory (see 2.1.1, 2.2). It is argued that the (nation-)state is necessary in order to 'green' economies and societies and ultimately limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Rather than drawing heavily upon anarchist ideas, the state has gained prominence within green political theory. Only by employing the state, the argument goes, can environmental problems be effectively addressed.

In addition to ecology, green political theorists generally attain great value to democracy (2.1.1) and social solidarity (2.1.3). In this thesis I therefore address the following question: does green political theory

need to embrace the nation-state in order to satisfy environmental, democratic and social demands?

My answer is yes, green political theory needs to embrace the nation-state in order to satisfy these demands. I thus defend the statist turn in this thesis and argue that green political theory ought to abandon its anarchist heritage, at least to an extent.

Economic globalization plays a key role in my argument. I argue that economic globalization is

compatible with satisfying environmental, democratic and social demands, but only if the nation-state is again made the locus of politics. I will first argue that - in the contemporary global economy - satisfying these demands is conditional to economic globalization. Simply put, the latter is prioritized, while environmental, democratic and social demands are merely satisfied to the extent that it does not interfere with economic globalization. I argue that this political-economic model (the 'Golden Straitjacket') is undesirable for green political theorists (3.2).

I subsequently explore two other political-economic models: the Bretton Woods Compromise and Global Governance. Proponents argue that these models can satisfy aforementioned demands and make economic globalization conditional to them, rather than the other way around. I will argue that the

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Bretton Woods Compromise is indeed capable of making economic globalization conditional to aforementioned demands, while Global Governance is not, and will not be for the foreseeable future. Global Governance – which revolves

around transcending the nation-state - is infeasible, while the Bretton Woods Compromise is feasible (3.5). Importantly, the nation-state plays a central role in the Bretton Woods Compromise (3.3). Hence I will argue that green political theory ought to embrace the nation-state, if it indeed wants to satisfy its environmental, democratic and social demands.

It is important to note that this does not mean that green political theory should abandon Global Governance ideals altogether. In this thesis, I focus on the stance green political theory ought to take in the short- and medium-term future. Though setting up Global Governance is infeasible for the

foreseeable future, the normative relevance of Global Governance remains intact.

Embracing the nation-state and the Bretton Woods Compromise has several implications for green political theory and green parties (5.2, 5.3). First, it means that green political theory and green parties would not directly challenge the existence of capitalism. It would 'merely' mean that they would (potentially heavily) curtail and discipline capitalism. Second, it means that green political theory and green parties ought to embrace centralism and abandon anarchist principles, at least to an extent. In conclusion, in this thesis I seek to make a contribution to green political theory. First, I will define the concepts of the nation-state and feasibility, because my argument cannot be properly understood without understanding these central concepts. In the second chapter I give a survey of green political theory. Dani Rodrik's political trilemma of the global economy (Rodrik 2002; Rodrik 2011) features in the third chapter; there I argue that the Golden Straitjacket is undesirable, Global Governance desirable but infeasible, and the Bretton Woods Compromise both desirable and feasible. In chapter 4, I give a modest account of what a distinctively green Bretton Woods Compromise could look like. I there argue in favor of 'eco-cosmopolitanism', which takes the nation-state as the locus of politics and the

fundamental building block where other political entities (multilateral agreements in particular) can be

build upon. Chapter 4, moreover, can be seen as an extension of the discussion of the Bretton Woods

Compromise in 3.3 and 3.5. In chapter 5, I assess the implications embracing the Bretton Woods Compromise and the nation-state has for green political theory and green parties. In this chapter, I draw heavily on the survey undertaken in chapter 2. I end this thesis with the conclusion. Besides summarizing the thesis, I there discuss the limitations and implications of the thesis and suggest ideas for further research.

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The nation-state plays a central role in this thesis. I use the term 'nation-state' to refer to 1. 'a state power that possesses both internal and external sovereignty, at the spatial level over a clearly delimited terrain (the state territory) and at the social level over the totality of members (the body of citizens or the people) (Habermas 1998: 237)'; and 2. 'a political community shaped by common descent, or at least by a common language, culture, and history (idem: 238)'. The coming together of the 'state' and the 'nation' has a very specific history. For the purposes of this thesis I will not explore this history, see for example Habermas (1998: 237-239) for more on this.

Understanding the concepts of 'sovereignty' and 'centralism' are important for the purposes of this thesis. I will therefore briefly define them in relation to the nation-state.

The term 'sovereignty' refers to the capability of a state to 'maintain law and order internally and protect its borders against external threats (idem: 238)'. For the purposes of his thesis: these threats may be of a traditionally military nature, as well as a 'democratic' nature; for instance when economic globalization reduces the policy-making space of national governments. Economic globalization is then considered to be an 'external threat'. I will discuss the concept of sovereignty throughout this thesis.

As we will see (2.1.1), decentralization is an important concept in green political theory. The nation-state, however, is by its very nature a centralist entity. I define centralization as decision making by the central government, which is often part of a nation-state. This stands in contrast to decentralization, which concerns decision making by a local government. (Strumpf 2002: 208) Crucially, centralization requires a local government to abide by the decision made by the central government, if the latter wishes this to be so. One can for example think of the national government of Spain, which recently decided to aggressively shut down the Catalonian call for independence and decentralization.

1.2 Feasibility

In 3.5, I discuss the feasibility of the Bretton Woods Compromise (BWC) and Global Governance (GG). In order to properly understand what 'feasibility' means, I will briefly discuss the concept and use the definition of feasibility outlined by Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith.

What is feasibility? Gilabert and Lawford-Smith define it in the following way: 'Very roughly, some state of affairs is feasible if there is a way we can bring it about' (2012: 809). Secondly, there is binary feasibility and scalar feasibility. The function of binary feasibility is 'to rule out political proposals on the grounds that they cannot be implemented in practice'. The function of scalar feasibility is to enable 'comparative assessments of various proposals' (idem: 812, emphasis in the original; Lawford-Smith 2013: 258).

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In line with this is the distinction between hard and soft constraints. Simply put, 'Hard constraints rule out; they are crucial to feasibility in the binary sense' (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012: 813): if there is a hard constraint, a given state of affairs is by definition impossible. Hard constraints concern state of affairs that are impossible in a logical, conceptual, metaphysical, or physical way (Lawford-Smith 2013: 252). Mankind, for instance, cannot stop the earth from heating up at least one degree Celsius, for there is already too much CO² in the air. A hard constraint like this cannot be overcome.

Soft constraints concern scalar feasibility: they 'do not rule out, but they make outcomes comparatively less feasible' (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012: 813). Soft constraints are economic, institutional, cultural, or religious of nature. A consequence of this is that they are malleable: they can become less (or more) of a constraint over time, i.e., they are to be found on a scale (Lawford-Smith 2013: 258; Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012: 814). A consequence of this is that actors can 'imagine ways progressively to overcome those [constraints] that block the pursuit of morally desirable goals' (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012: 815). It might, for instance for a green political party, seem impossible to overcome the economic, institutional and cultural constraints that stand in the way of ecologically sustainable policies. These constraints, however, are malleable, and therefore soft. They can be overcome.

There are three more features of feasibility. First, accessibility: there must be an accessible way 'to bring the state of affairs about'. In other words, there must be a route from where an actor is now 'to the state of affairs whose feasibility is being assessed' (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012: 811).

Second, stability: this concerns the context in which a desired state of affairs is to be brought about. This context has to be so that the new state of affairs 'is likely to remain in place', i.e., stable (Gilabert 2009: 668). Extensive environmental policies, for example, might in a capitalist society not remain in place, rendering the context unstable.

Third, ability, which is separated into three different categories: synchronic, direct diachronic, and indirect diachronic.

'A person has a synchronic ability if he or she can perform an action now, a direct diachronic ability if he or she can perform an action now or later and an indirect diachronic ability if he or she can perform an action later, provided that he or she performs another action first (enabling the later action).' (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012: 811, emphasis in the original)

Actors have indirect diachronic ability 'not only if they have the ability to bring it about, but also if they have the ability to get themselves into a position to be able to bring it about' (ibid., emphasis in the original). A state of affairs may thus be feasible, even when currently no actor has the ability to bring the state of affairs about. One may for example think of drastically reforming the financial sector of the United

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States. Nobody who desires to do so currently has the ability to do so, but, let's say for dramatic effect, that Bernie Sanders is able to get himself into a position to be able to bring this state of affairs about. He has the indirect diachronic ability.

The final characteristic of feasibility consists of momentum and inevitability. To clarify this, we need to look at historical events; some of these have such 'a momentum and inevitability that make it fantastical to assume that they could have been otherwise' (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012: 810). I believe we need an example to clarify. After Rachel Carson had published her book Silent Spring in 1962, it can be said that there was such a momentum that it was inevitable that green movements and green political parties originated. It was bound to be the case that green movements and parties would come into existence. It could, given the circumstances, not have been otherwise. Subsequently, it may now be said that there is such a momentum that at least some 'greening' of the state and society is inevitable (though it remains the question whether it will be 'enough').

It should now be clear what feasibility entails. In 3.5 I will assess the BWC and GG with regard to feasibility and argue that the BWC is feasible, while GG is not.

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2. Green Political Theory and the Nation-State

In the introduction (1.1) I gave a definition of the nation-state. In this chapter, I explore the position of the nation-state in green political theory (GPT). This is relevant because in this thesis, I seek to make a contribution to GPT by arguing that GPT needs to embrace the nation-state in order to satisfy its social, environmental and democratic demands.

It needs to be said beforehand that GPT is, unsurprisingly, no coherent whole. Green theorists disagree with one another on the importance of particular goals, the way those goals should be reached, or even about which goals to pursue at all. I will lay out this tension within GPT, and asses it in chapters 3 and 4 with regards to both Global Governance (GG) and the Bretton Woods

Compromise (BWC). In chapter 5 I discuss the implications opting for the BWC has for GPT.

Let me finally say that there are two things green theorists agree about: the need to satisfy social and environmental demands. Of course, green theorists differ about how and to what extent to satisfy social and environmental demands. I will discuss this in the following subsections, with a clear focus on the nation-state. I will end this chapter with a discussion of the statist turn within GPT.

2.1 The Nation-State

The position of the nation-state is contested within GPT. On the one hand, there are theorists who take a critical stance of the nation-state and argue for the far-reaching decentralization of society. There are simultaneously theorists who argue for GG and abandoning the nation-state as the locus of politics. Yet others argue in favor of embracing the nation-state in order to satisfy social, democratic and environmental demands. (Dobson 1992: 25, 84, 119-127; Goodin 1992: 147-153, 182-184; Barry 1998: 6; Davidson 2009) Importantly, the past two decades have seen a 'statist turn' within GPT: many green theorists now argue that the state is necessary in order to 'green' society (Melo-Escrihuela 2015: 322). In chapter 3, I will argue in favor of this statist turn because it is best suited to satisfy green demands. But first, I will discuss GPT in relation to decentralization and participation. We need to understand both concepts when we want to understand the role of the nation-state within GPT.

2.1. 1 Decentralization and Participation

GPT generally argues for decentralization (1.2). It is in favor of the 'radical participation' of citizens: they should ideally have as big a role in the democratic process as possible and determine their own fate (Dobson 1992: 24-25). Hence greens' wish to decentralize and organize democratic life on the smallest scale possible. There, people would be able to 1. directly influence what happens to them, and 2. would

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be able to 'comprehend the issues facing the polity' (idem: 130, 147-150; Goodin 1992: 128). This translated in the domination of anarchist ideas within GPT in the first decades following the

establishment of the modern green political movement. The nation-state, at that time, was cast aside in favor of 'stateless, relatively small, self-governing communities that are self-sufficient and ecologically sustainable' (Oksala 2016: 52). I will return to this point in 2.2 and 5.2.

In order to satisfy decentralist ideals, green theorists generally argue that people should feel part of their community, be confident that their participation makes a difference, and be able to estimate the consequences of proposed policies. Many green theorists are therefore skeptical towards centralized political bodies such as the nation-state (though not necessarily hostile, see 2.2). They are moreover skeptical because institutions associated with centralized political entities - for example those of the nation-state - are generally very centralized and representative bodies themselves. It should be clear that such institutions do not satisfy green demands of 'mass participation in political life' (Dobson 1992: 135). Organizing society in a decentralist way, it is argued, is the only way to ensure such mass participation.

To give one potent example of a decentralist theorist: ecological anarchist Murray Bookchin (1964: 10-11) is skeptical, to say the least, about the ability of centralized societies to provide energy in a ecologically sustainable way. Maintaining large cities simply require too great of entities of polluting fuels. Decentralized societies could, in contrast, provide enough energy in a sustainable way, as long as the different societies coordinate their energy policies 'as a mosaic' and use new technologies

intelligently.

This is just one example of a green theorist arguing that decentralization is necessary for the establishment of an ecologically sustainable society (see for example Davidson (2009) for more on this subject). For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is important to stress that there is no green consensus concerning decentralization and participation.

There are indeed those theorists who argue against decentralist ideals. Decentralist societies, the argument goes, will not do much for the coming about of an ecologically sustainable world, because decentralist societies are by definition small in size (Davidson 2009: 52). The positive effect of environmentally benign policies will for therefore be marginal. These green theorists take a more 'pragmatic' approach. As Goodin (1992: 150) puts it: 'More and more of what really matters will now ordinarily cut across communities' and therefore lie 'in the hands of those who are to be responsible for negotiations with other communities'. As a consequence, it would be wise to be pragmatic and 'recognize' the important role nation-states play in international relations, if indeed green theorists wish to ground environmental degradation to a halt (Davidson 2009: 50). See 2.2 for more on this statist turn within GPT.

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'feeling part of their community'). There are ecoanarchists who argue that 'our cultural and economic practices have come to be at odds with the maintenance of the ecological systems we rely on for the provision of our material life' (Davidson 2009: 50). The size of contemporary nation-states and the centralized nature of their governments are the main cause of environmental degradation – these ensure that 'it is insufficiently responsive to the idiosyncratic needs of specific ecosystems'. These ecoanarchists subsequently argue that – in order to be able to handle with care a given ecosystem – bioregions ought to contain between 1,000 and 10,000 people, not more. Statist green theorists, in contrast, deem it possible for citizens to feel part of national communities consisting of hundreds of million of people (Eckersley 2004).

2.1.2 Capitalism and More

I will briefly discuss several other important characteristics of GPT. In chapter 5, I will return to these points when discussing the implications opting for the BWC would have for GPT.

First, there is a divide between so-called anthropocentric (human centered) and ecocentric thinkers. The first views the environment, or the nonhuman world, 'as no more than a means to human ends'; the latter views humans as 'merely' one aspect of the planetary ecosystem, in which no species takes a central or superior role (Eckersley 1992: 8-9, 23).

Second, green theorists generally share the idea that there is a 'crisis of culture', i.e., a crisis of the ideas, beliefs, values and knowledge that underpin contemporary societies. They question the extent to which humans need the polluting energy sources, industries, technologies and modes of

transportation that are being used in contemporary societies (Eckersley 1992: 20). It is argued by some that the emergence of a 'green public sphere' is needed to overcome this crisis. Such a sphere ideally serves as 'an arena of unconstrained discourse or deliberation', and as 'an arena for empowering the citizenry vis-à-vis both private economic power and states' (Eckersley 2007: 330). This can for instance be done by 'greening' discourses and public debates about the polluting nature of energy sources, industries, etc. This greening of the public sphere would be nursed by civil-society actors such as NGO's, journalists, scientists or ordinary citizens, rather than the state. I will return to a discussion of the public sphere in 5.1 and 5.2.

Another green view concerns capitalism, which is generally argued to lead to 'widespread ecological degradation and social hardship'. Eckersley (1992: 121) explains this view:

'One of the most basic reasons for this is that the profit motive demands that firms 'grow or die'. This imperative for continual economic growth does not respect physical limits to growth or ecological carrying capacity. The upshot is that there are many situations in which market

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rationality gives rise to 'negative externalities' such as resource depletion and pollution, which are unintended side-effects of capital accumulation.'

In short: when it is not subordinated to environmental concerns, capitalism causes resource depletion and pollution. Secondly, capitalism leads to potentially problematic socio-economic inequality between and within nation-states by way of economic globalization. As we will see extensively in chapter 3, economic globalization causes environmental degradation and social inequality when it is not curtailed and disciplined. Finally, capitalism prioritizes short-term interests over long-term interests, thereby harming future generations (of human as well as non-human life) (idem: 121-122).

There is no agreement on the solution to this problem. There are theorists arguing that capitalism is inherently incompatible with ecological sustainability (Oksala 2016: 60-66). Replacing the market with a 'nonmarket-allocative system that ensures ecologically benign production for genuine human need' would then for example be a solution (Eckersley 1992: 30). Other green thinkers argue that capitalism can be made compatible with ecological sustainability. They argue in favor of the market, as long as it is subordinate to 'ecological and social justice considerations' (ibid.).

The idea that the whole of humanity cannot attain the standard of living enjoyed by the average person in the West is another characteristic of green thought: this would be 'an intolerable ecological strain on the planet' (idem: 126). Considering that the West is using much more of the planet's resources than developing countries are, the greening of societies needs to begin in the West.

Furthermore, the redistribution of wealth between the West and developing countries is advocated: the people in the latter ought to have equal chances to pursue their preferred lifestyle, as long is it is 'within Earth's carrying capacity'. Overall (resource) consumption and production therefore need to be

brought down (Melo-Escrihuela 2015: 331), especially in the West. Though this is argued to be desirable, green theorists generally recognize that this is a very challenging task.

2.1.3 Social Solidarity

Before discussing the role of the state and the statist turn more extensively, let me briefly give some background on why why green theorists generally attain great value to social solidarity. This is relevant because I discuss how social demands can be satisfied best throughout this thesis (especially in 3.5).

First, social solidarity is important because of the finite amount of natural resources and thus the finite amount of material wealth the earth can give (Dobson 1992: 93). As there are limits to the distribution of material wealth (at least according to green thinkers), a 'fair distribution' of it is urgent. This does not mean that green thinkers generally argue for absolute material equality - equality of opportunity is often taken to be sufficient, as long as it is 'fairly' arrived at.

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A second argument in favor of social equality concerns democratic politics. For Goodin (1992: 130), 'rough' socioeconomic equality serves as a premise for establishing democratic politics. 'For then and only then will people have the sort of rationally well-grounded sense of political efficacy that is required for them to bother participating at all'. When a given society is rather socially unequal, those at the bottom of the ladder will lack a sense of political efficacy. Mass participation in politics will then prove to be impossible.

Given the scope of this thesis I will not explore the redistribution debate amongst green theorists further. It suffices to say that 'rough' social equality is taken to be of great importance for reasons outlined above. I discuss the point of satisfying social solidarity throughout this thesis.

2.2 The Statist Turn

I have thus far discussed green values and discussed the tension that exists between some of these values. In this subsection, I discuss the role of the state and the 'statist turn' within GPT in more detail. This is relevant because I defend the statist turn throughout this thesis. In 5.1 specifically, I argue why GPT ought to embrace the statist turn.

The wide-shared goal of getting rid of distributive injustices, exploitative social relations and environmental degradation is of great importance here, because these goals - in combination with GPT's stance towards the nation-state - creates a tension which is yet to be resolved. On one side, there are green thinkers who wholeheartedly reject centralized political bodies for reasons mentioned above and argue in favor of small, decentralized political communities (Bookchin 1964: 8; Goodin 1992: 154-155).

On the other side, there are those who argue in favor of centralized political bodies such as nation-states (though often still with a clear focus on combining (direct) democracy with those centralized bodies). They see these bodies to be the only actors capable of coordinating and planning the economy in such a way as to reach the aforementioned goals (Goodin 1992: 154-155; Eckersley 2004; Dobson 1992: 126-127). As Oksala (2016: 58) puts it: 'It is simply too difficult to imagine how the profound changes that are required (…) to our economies and societies might occur without active implementation, support, and even some coercion by the state.' Related to this is the 'statist turn' that has taken place within green political theory the past two decades. While 'greens long held a conception of the state as being inherently authoritarian and responsible for the unsustainable socio-political reality, today there is wide consensus that rejecting the state would limit the options available in the quest for the environment' (Melo-Escrihuela 2015: 322). A reason for the statist turn is that green organizations, activists and parties often advocate better state regulation of economic and social practices that harm the environment. Embracing the state may therefore be seen 'as part of an effort to

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bring environmental theory in line with its associated social movement' (Davidson 2009: 48). Anti-statist green ideas have thus lost ground to ideas in favor of the green state. Statist theorists do

however not want the state to merely dictate ecological policies to its citizens. They advocate 'the active involvement of green movements and ecological citizens acting together to trigger changes within state institutions, societies and the economy' (Melo-Escrihuela 2015: 323). The state should function as the site where ecological reforms culminate, rather than as an actor that unilaterally imposes policies. This is all not to suggest that anti-statist green ideas have been wiped of the earth, as for instance

ecoanarchist ideas continue to have traction (Davidson 2009).

On a side note: GPT sees embracing the free market not as a serious option, as it views the free market as paving the way for distributive injustices, exploitative social relations and environmental degradation (Goodin 1992: 154). This does not necessarily mean that the market is ruled out as a 'method of resource allocation', as long as, as previously mentioned, it is subordinated to 'ecological and social justice considerations' (Eckersley 1992: 30). Finally, some green thinkers argue for a 'centrally planned, authoritarian state capable of steering modern industrialized society through the convulsive process of de-industrialization into an ecologically sustainable, post-industrial society'. A large majority of green theorists however rejects this option given its authoritarian character (ibid.).

Lastly: a global, cosmopolitan perspective speaks to many green thinkers, as they argue environmental degradation can only be tackled on a transnational scale. Nation-states alone cannot control climate change (Oksala 2016: 53), and are therefore by some perceived as merely artificial political entities that stand in the way of a global entity (a world government or another form of global governance) or natural process dealing effectively with environmental problems. These green thinkers are anti-statist in the sense that they want to transcend the nation-state (Goodin 1992: 156-157).

In much of GPT it however remains unclear in what way environmental degradation should practically be dealt with. As Goodin concisely puts it: 'What makes it [the green stance] especially unsatisfying is that it provides no account – apart from the apparently vacuous suggestion to 'think globally' – as to how that concerted global action is to be achieved' (idem: 158). I will later argue that the nation-state is the most effective instrument green theorists and parties have at their disposal for reaching their goals and should therefore embrace it. In chapter 4, I will give a modest account of how concerted global action could be achieved while simultaneously embracing the nation-state.

2.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, green theorists differ when it comes to the nation-state. Many green theorists are skeptical about the state, whilst (sometimes simultaneously) it is argued that the state is a very useful

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instrument when it comes to satisfying social, democratic and environmental demands. The past two decades, moreover, have seen a statist turn within GPT, with many green theorists arguing in favor of the state taking on an proactive role when it comes to satisfying green demands. In the next chapter, I will explore the role of the nation-state in today's global economy on the basis of the work of Dani Rodrik. I will subsequently argue that the nation-state is the best instrument GPT and green parties have at their disposal for satisfying their social, democratic and environmental demands, whereby I defend the statist turn.

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3. The Political Trilemma of the Global Economy

Green theorists look at the state with skepticism as well as with hope. Green political parties share this hope, using parliament as an instrument to green politics from within. But how should green theorists and parties use the state exactly? Is the nation-state the most efficient instrument to satisfy their demands, or should they pursue the coming-about of a world government? Or is there an alternative? And how does economic globalization fit into all this?

To answer these questions, I will in this chapter discuss the political trilemma of the global economy, a model created by Dani Rodrik. I will start with an overview of his work on this trilemma , and argue in favor of the 'Bretton Woods Compromise', in which the nation-state plays a significant role. I will argue that the Bretton Woods Compromise is both desirable and feasible, while Global Governance is undesirable and infeasible. Because I will argue that the Golden Straitjacket is

undesirable, I will not assess its feasibility. After this, I discuss several critiques of Rodrik's work, but not before I discuss the role of the state in the global economy in more detail. The latter is relevant for both green political theory and economic theory, which are ambivalent about the role the state should take on.

The central conclusion of this chapter is that green political theory ought to embrace the Bretton Woods Compromise and the nation-state, if it wants to satisfy its democratic, social and environmental demands. If it does not embrace them, it will fail to 'solve' the political trilemma of the global economy in a green manner. I will in chapter 4 go on to describe what a green Bretton Woods Compromise could look like. In chapter 5 I discuss the implications opting for the Bretton Woods Compromise has for green political theory and green parties.

3.1 The Political Trilemma of the Global Economy

The trilemma of the global economy consists of three pillars: the nation-state (or national sovereignty (1.1)), democracy (or democratic politics), and hyperglobalization. In order to visualize this trilemma, let's take a look at it:

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Figure 1: Political Trilemma of the Global Economy (Rodrik 2016)

The trilemma is a result of the 'tension between national democracy and global markets', i.e., 'from the intrusion of the rules of globalization into the domestic policy-making arena'. As is shown in the trilemma, there are three options to choose from: restricting democracy (the Golden Straitjacket), limiting globalization (the Bretton Woods Compromise), or globalizing democracy (Global Governance). We cannot have all three at the same time. (Rodrik 2011: 200-204; Lester 2011: 2)

3.2 The Golden Straitjacket

In order to understand why this is so, let's take a look at the way in which the three pillars are interwoven. Let's start with hyperglobalization, which for Rodrik is synonymous with deep economic

integration. This is distinctive from shallow economic integration:

'Under shallow integration (…) the trade regime requires relatively little of domestic policy. Under deep integration, by contrast, the distinction between domestic policy and trade policy disappears. (…) Global rules in effect become the domestic rules.' (Rodrik 2011: 83)

The point is that, under hyperglobalization (or deep economic integration), these global rules

significantly decrease the policy-making space for national democracies. This translates, practically, into 'high labor, health and safety standards in some countries being undermined by low standards in other countries; and high tax rates in some countries being undermined by low rates in other countries' (Lester 2011: 2). To make this more clear: proponents of hyperglobalization strive towards 'a completely integrated market', which 'is characterized by the absence of any impediments in

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capital, labour and technology' (Schulze et al. 1999: 301). The international mobility of these is not to be restricted in any way, for it will only frustrate the efficient working of the free market. This results in a 'race to the bottom', because national governments will do everything in their power to earn the trust of international investors.

An example might clarify this race-to-the-bottom effect. Say the Netherlands decides to lower its corporate tax, while Unilever is in the process of making a choice between setting its headquarters in London or Rotterdam. The pressures of hyperglobalization have then (seemingly) contributed

significantly to this Dutch decision, as a lower corporate tax makes it attractive for Unilever to settle in Rotterdam rather than London. Importantly, this decision might not sit well with the Dutch electorate, for example because taxes on their labor are maintained on a much higher level than domestic

corporate taxes. In other words, the goals of multinationals, big banks and investment ventures are placed above other economic and social goals (Rodrik 2015: 231). Regarding the trilemma, democratic politics is cast aside: national democracies have less to say over their own policies (i.e., their policy-making space becomes smaller), while (undemocratic) global economic actors get to dominate the policy-making space.

Though democracy falls victim to hyperglobalization, there are those that argue that hyperglobalization is a desirable development because it makes economies prosper in ways that are otherwise impossible. Hence, trilemma wise, the combination of hyperglobalization and the nation-state is called the Golden Straitjacket. Some proponents of hyperglobalization argue that surrendering democratic politics is worth the economic gains that are made in return. As one proponent, Thomas Friedman, explains, as summarized by Went (2004: 339-340, emphasis mine):

'When your country recognizes (…) the rules of the free market in today's global economy, and decides to abide by them, it puts on what I call “The Golden Straitjacket”. The Golden

Straitjacket is the defining political-economic garment of this globalization era. (…) As your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, two things tend to happen: your economy grows and your

politics shrinks. (…) (O)n the political front, the Golden Straitjacket narrows the political and

economic policy choices of those in power to relatively tight parameters. That is why it is increasingly difficult these days to find any real differences between ruling and opposition parties in those countries that put on the Golden Straitjacket. Once your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket its political choices get reduced to Pepsi or Coke – the slight nuances of taste, slight nuances of policy, slight alterations in design to account for local traditions, some loosening here and there, but never any major deviation from the core rules will see their investors stampede away, interest rates rise and stock market valuations fall.'

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argued that under the Golden Straitjacket (GS) global trade and global capital are put in a position to hurt people and the environment, as the pursuing of social and environmental goals only works to 'frustrate' the efficient working of the free market. Moreover, the predominance of multinationals, large banks and investment ventures in the policy-making space is democratically undesirable, as it disregards the wishes of the people in a given country (Rodrik 2015: 231).

Finally, the concept of neoliberal cosmopolitanism might elucidate the concept of the GS. Neoliberal cosmopolitanism 'defines global citizens as a community of self-starting entrepreneurs who function best when government regulations support market rationality' (Camicia & Franklin 2010: 94). This preference for market rationality also takes the form of an approach to political and economic reform, dubbed the logic of discipline by Alisdair Roberts (2010: 56). This logic is

'deeply skeptical about conventional methods of democratic governance, which were alleged to produce policies that were shortsighted, unstable, or tailored to suit special interests rather than the overall public interest. The aim, therefore, was to impose constraints on democratic

processes, often by transferring power to technocratic-guardians who would make difficult decisions that voters and legislators appeared to be incapable of making otherwise.'

Thus, democratic politics is constrained while 'technocratic-guardians' are empowered. Crucially, these technocratic-guardians – following the financial crisis of 2008 - proved they were unable to produce policies that were not shortsighted, unstable, or tailored to suit special interests (idem: 556, 561; Rodrik 2015: 231). Yet, neoliberal cosmopolitans still 'not only accept the 'golden straitjacket', but even often defend it as a good way to discipline countries' (Went 2004: 349). But rather than benefiting countries and their people, this disciplining has led to widening wealth and income gaps between and within countries (UNCTAD 1997: 6; Went 2002: 486). Moreover, free capital mobility, as advocated by neoliberal cosmopolitans, 'has no significant impact on countries' economic fortunes' (Went 2002: 486). In short, the GS has had detrimental social effects, while it remains unclear whether it has had

beneficial economic effects (in the sense that it has made the economic pie bigger).

As should be clear, the GS is undesirable for both democratic, environmental and social reasons. As Eckersley (2006: 133) poignantly writes about neoliberalism and indirectly the GS: it 'is a pernicious form of liberalism because, among other things, it seeks to roll back the state at precisely the period in history when we need to rescue, reshape and deploy it to protect public environmental goods'. I will follow Eckersley in arguing that we needed the state for environmental (and other) reasons in 3.5 and beyond. Considering that the GS is undesirable, I will not discuss it any further and will not discuss to what extent it is feasible. I will however discuss the second trilemma option which includes

hyperglobalization, Global Governance, down below. But before exploring Global Governance, let's look at Rodrik's preferred solution: the Bretton Woods Compromise.

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3.3 The Bretton Woods Compromise

The Bretton Woods Compromise (BWC) combines the nation-state with democracy, thereby limiting economic globalization (which, by limiting it, is no longer 'hyper'). He refers to this as the BWC, after the global economic system that was put in place after World War II. The key characteristic of this economic system is that it neither embraces nationalistic economic policies (as in the interwar period) or hyperglobalization. It does opt for economic globalization, but only to a limited extent (Ruggie 1996: 7). International trade is embraced but cross-border capital flows are restricted, leaving countries 'the room to decide their own economic and social priorities and development path' (Went 2004: 339). Importantly, cross-border capital flows are restricted by nation-states. Following World War II, nation-states proved they were capable of doing so. This subsequently led to prioritizing full employment, social security and domestic economic growth. Crucially, economic globalization was made conditional to pursuing these goals. This stands in contrast to the GS, under which such goals are conditional to economic globalization.

The concept of transformative global democracy might elucidate the difference between the BWC and the GS. Proponents of transformative global democracy argue for the democratization of transnational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More fundamentally, they argue for democratizing economic and social relationships of power on a global scale. This is argued to be impossible 'as long as global markets have the power to severely constrict countries and the choices available to populations in the 'golden straitjacket'' (Went 2004: 349). In contrast to neoliberal

cosmopolitanism and the GS, transformative global democracy makes economic globalization conditional to

democratic politics 'and more broadly on the social and environmental rights of all people in the world' (idem: 351,

emphasis mine). The IMF and the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, could not have the undemocratic character they have now, and could not prioritize the interests of the global market above everything else. What form transformative global democracy could take is up for grabs; I will discuss what a 'green' BWC could look like in more detail in chapter 4 and show how economic globalization can be made conditional to social, democratic and environmental demands.

As should be clear, from a green point of view the BWC is desirable for democratic as well as social and environmental reasons. But so is Global Governance, at least on paper.

3.4 Global Governance

The GS is deemed undesirable for reasons mentioned above, while the BWC, according to some (Lastra 2013: 812), is unable to deal with the complexity of the contemporary global economy. Moreover, the globalization of markets has gone so fast that regulation and governance of those

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markets has been unable to keep up (Went 2001: 485). Global Governance (GG) then emerges as a possible solution: it would enable the combining of the economic benefits of hyperglobalization with

global democracy and global regulation; i.e., combining the best of both worlds. As Habermas (1999: 54,

emphasis mine) puts it: 'Politics will succeed in 'catching up' with globalized markets only if it eventually becomes possible to create an infrastructure capable of sustaining a global domestic politics without uncoupling it from democratic processes of legitimation.' In other words, a global democracy is possible if a global infrastructure is created that can make global politics truly democratic. The global economy could then, in turn, be regulated and social and environmental demands satisfied by global politics. Policies that compensate the low-educated and low-skilled or minimize carbon emissions, could for example be implemented by global governing bodies.

Importantly, GG would entail 'that national sovereignty' (…) is 'sacrificed in order to solve the 'trilemma'' (Lastra 2013: 811). Central to this is that jurisdictions would be aligned with markets, in order to remove transactions costs that are the result of national borders. In a nation-state system, there are transactions costs when one wants to engage in cross-border trade. By aligning jurisdictions with markets, these costs would be removed. A consequence of this is that, as Lastra points out, national sovereignty is sacrificed. But indeed, 'Politics need not, and would not, shrink: it would relocate to the global level' (Rodrik 2002: 16).

In practice, this would mean that global institutions take over the regulating and governing role that national institutions have fulfilled thus far. And in turn, that nation-states give up their sovereignty in favor of 'supranational legislative, executive, and judicial authorities' (ibid.). It would also require, as we have seen in the previous chapter, a sense of global citizenship. Without global citizenship, global institutions will face legitimacy problems. Next, I will discuss to what extent GG is infeasible and why, in turn, green political theory ought to opt for the BWC.

3.5 On the (In)Feasibility of Global Governance and the Bretton Woods Compromise I will now discuss in what ways GG is infeasible and the BWC feasible. To remind us what feasibility roughly is: 'some state of affairs is feasible if there is a way we can bring it about' (1.2).

First of all, GG and the BWC are feasible in the binary sense, meaning that there are no hard constraints that make it impossible to bring them about. There are no logical, conceptual, metaphysical or physical obstacles.

There are however soft constraints, concerning scalar feasibility. GG is feasible, but less so than BWC. As we have seen, there are institutional and cultural constraints to GG. First, it is very unlikely that people will develop a sense of world citizenship, at least in the foreseeable future. According to the World Values Survey, people feel much more attached to their nation-state than to the world or to their continental or local community (Rodrik 2013: 4); in other words, citizens are by far most loyal to their

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nation-state (Eckersley 2006: 135). In the West, moreover, people have been identifying less as a global citizen following the 2008 financial crisis (Grimley 2016). This is relevant, because widespread

identification as a global citizen is required to give legitimacy to global institutions, be it a state or governing bodies such as the IMF. In other words, the world as a whole lacks the internal cohesion (Valentini 2014: 796) needed for legitimating global institutions.

GG is thus less feasible than BWC, because the desired state of affairs is less accessible. There could of course be a change in how people identify, but it is unclear how the route towards this desired state of affairs (people identifying as world citizens) could be established. In contrast, the state of affairs the BWC desires concerning identities has already been brought about. Attachment to the nation-state is by far the strongest attachment people around the world have.

In line with this are the historical examples of the United States and Europe. It has proven extremely difficult for the United States alone to 'establish and maintain a political union in the face of large differences in institutional arrangements and constituent parts' (Rodrik 2002: 17). A bloody civil war was ultimately needed to unite the states. The difficulty the European Union is facing in

establishing a political union is a contemporary example: even when nation-states are tied together by cultural, economic, geographical and historical bonds, they fail to unite politically. To do remotely the same on a global scale would prove to be infeasible, at least for the foreseeable future. It provides an institutional constraint. In contrast, the BWC does not face such a constraint because it merely requires nation-states to exist. Rodrik and the men behind the original Bretton Woods system certainly desire(d) international cooperation and are/were not hostile towards, for instance, a politically united Europe. But ultimately, nothing more is needed than the nation-state for the BWC to work (in chapter 4 I will however argue in favor of multilateral agreements on top of the nation-state).

A third reason not to expect GG to emerge concerns the legitimacy of global financial and trade organizations. As we have seen (3.4), global regulation and governance has not been able to keep up with the globalization of capital flows. As a result, the legitimacy of supranational institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO, which are supposed to regulate and govern on a global scale, 'has been increasingly challenged' (Went 2001: 485). This legitimacy has received another blow after the 2008 financial crisis, when not they but nation-states picked up the glove and rescued the financial sector (Mathiason 2008). The point for GG is that – even when these institutions attain a democratic character – they will lack legitimacy because there is no reason to assume they will then gain the ability to regulate the global economy. These institutions subsequently will remain unable to make economic globalization conditional to social and environmental demands.

It should be clear that GG faces another institutional constraint here: supranational institutions meant to regulate the global economy fail to do so, being unable to keep up pace with the growth of capital flows. They therefore face legitimacy problems. The BWC, in contrast, 'merely' needs national institutions for the global economy to function. National institutions have proven to be able to regulate

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and stabilize the economy under the post-war Bretton Woods system (Rodrik 2002: 4) and after the 2008 crisis. National governments moreover not only rescued the financial sector, but also took over the role of retreating private investors (Roberts 2010: 61). In sum, the BWC does not face institutional constraints, while GG does.

Of course, the fact that GG is infeasible for the foreseeable future does not mean that the constraints facing GG cannot be overcome in the future. Bringing the desired state of affairs about does however seem to lack momentum: as we have seen, people in the West have been identifying themselves less as a world citizen than before 2008. It could also be said that recent upheavals in Europe - the Brexit and tensions between the Southern and Northern states, and the French and Dutch 'no' in a referendum on a European constitution in 2005 - have made political unification less likely, raising concerns for political unification on a global level (Valentini 2014: 790). The 2008 financial crisis, finally, has seriously challenged the legitimacy of supranational institutions. It is unlikely that they will earn the legitimacy needed to justify an extend power grip in the foreseeable future. All in all, it seems all but inevitable that the state of affairs desired by proponents of GG will come about in the foreseeable future.

As shown above, neither culturally nor institutionally does GG's desired state of affairs seem accessible: it is unclear how a route towards that state of affairs would look like. There is also no actor with indirect diachronic ability, meaning that there is no actor who is able to get him- or herself in a position to bring the desired state of affairs about (bar an alien presence able to unite earth's people against a common enemy).

In conclusion, GG may be desirable. But even if it is, it is infeasible for reasons outlined above, at least for the foreseeable future. It faces cultural and institutional constraints, and, importantly, it faces issues of accessibility (it is unclear how the desired state of affairs could be brought about) and ability (there is no actor who can perform an action for the desired state of affairs to come about). Finally, GG seems to lack momentum.

The BWC, on the other hand, does not face cultural or institutional constraints: attachments to the nation-state are abundant, and the institutions necessary for the BWC are already in place. Neither does the BWC face issues of accessibility or ability, as the institutions are indeed already in place.

An implication of embracing the BWC is embracing the nation-state. There is good reason for this, as Rodrik (2013: 3) states: the nation-state 'has proved remarkably resilient and remains the main determinant of income, the primary locus of market-supporting institutions, and the chief repository of personal attachments and affiliations'. It would, in other words, be a shame to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Greens would do best to keep the nation-state close and use it to satisfy social, environmental and democratic demands. To give this argument more body, let's take a brief look at the role of the state in the contemporary global economy.

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3.6 The Role of the State

In this subsection I explore the role of the state in the global economy and argue why the state is valuable when it comes to satisfying social, democratic and environmental demands. This, in turn, is part of my defense of the statist turn within GPT.

Central to Rodrik's argument – and contrary to the market-fundamentalism of neoliberal cosmopolitans - is the relationship between markets and states: he argues markets need the state, and quite a lot of it, to properly function and be stable. Institutions external to markets are needed to provide infrastructure, communication networks, trust, law and order and the enforcement of contracts. In practice, these institutions are part of or in important ways linked to the state. This also means that markets need more of the state if they want to expand, because there will be more demand for (good) infrastructure, communication networks, etc.

It is moreover important (certainly for greens) that states provide social security. When people are increasingly confronted with globalization and thus economic competition, the more social security they will demand. Hence the bigger role of states in countries that have opened themselves up to economic globalization than in countries that have done less so. In other words, economic globalization generally leads to larger welfare-states (Rodrik 2015: 39, 46; Schulze et al.: 1999: 300).

This touches upon the (in)famous concept of the 'losers of globalization': large groups of people are not profiting of economic globalization, especially those without much education and skill (Rodrik 2015: 84; Schulze et al. 1999: 299). Take for example a call-center employee in the United States who, due to factors such as labor and income standards, is unable to compete with his counterpart in India. These 'losers of globalization' often face a long-term decline in income, which can only be neutralized by social policy implemented by states. In short, economic globalization always leads to larger economic inequality, which can only be remedied by states intervening in an extensive manner (Rodrik 2015: 84).

To highlight the role of the state, let's briefly visit the post-World War II Bretton Woods system, in which the state played a significant role: 'Capital controls were broadly considered to be necessary as a means to give governments a certain control over the national economy, to allow for the implementation of national policy goals' (Went 2002: 476). Today's situation stands in contrast to this: 'the idea that capital controls are an essential (though insufficient) policy tool to safeguard economies from becoming a plaything for financial markets has now largely disappeared' (idem: 477). Now that international capital controls have been largely abandoned, states have entered into a race to the bottom: 'Just as firms in the marketplace, they [national governments] become competitors seeking to attract mobile factors and to provide conditions favourable for making domestic goods competitive in

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in the contemporary global economy been exchanged for hyperglobalization (the GS), while the nation-state has remained. The nation-nation-state, subsequently, now first serves the needs of hyperglobalization rather than the democratic wishes of its people. By embracing the GS, democratic politics have become conditional to economic globalization, rather than the other way around. This, from a green

perspective, is undesirable.

It should now be clear why I defend the statist turn within GPT: the state can be used to satisfy social, democratic and environmental demands. In the next section, I counter several critiques of Rodrik's trilemma.

3.7 Critiques

There are several critical points to be made about Rodrik's work concerning his trilemma. One critique is that democratic governments chose to pursue GS policies themselves, they were not forced (Lester 2011: 3). This critique can be countered by applying Roberts' aforementioned logic of discipline: the decision to embrace the GS was made by technocratic-guardians, rather than by popularly elected officials. As we have seen, these technocratic-guardians did not manage to avoid policy-making that was shortsighted, unstable, or tailored to special interests. It is, furthermore, questionable to what extent democratic governments chose to pursue the GS 'themselves': technocratic-guardians lack the

democratic legitimacy that popularly elected officials enjoy. And when popularly elected officials made the decisions, they often fell victim to 'information symmetries', which I talk about in more detail down below.

As briefly mentioned, Lastra (2013: 811-812) argues that a return to the Bretton Woods Compromise is not the best solution to the trilemma. Rather, she argues 'that the dichotomy between international markets and national laws and policies can be best tackled by the internationalization of the rules and institutions governing global markets'. Embracing formal international law – emanating from international treaties - is the answer, as it has 'legitimacy and is in accordance with the principles of democratic politics'. Concretely, the IMF is to take upon the role of regulator of the global financial markets. In effect, Lastra argues for choosing GG over the BWC.

Lastra's objections fail to solve the problems already discussed (3.2). First, supranational organisations such as the IMF have proved to be incapable of regulating and controlling international markets. The nation-state has had to step in when these organisations and international markets failed, most visibly following the 2008 financial crisis.

Second, Lastra does not make clear why international law would not be subject to Roberts' aforementioned logic of discipline. As Roberts (2010: 56) writes about this logic: 'A variety of legal devices – new laws, treaties, and contracts – were adopted with the expectation that they would constrain the power of popularly elected officials and preserve the autonomy of technocrats'. Rather

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than strengthening democracy, legal devices tend to weaken it by constraining the power of popularly elected officials. As Howse (2013: 815) poignantly states about Lastra's case for embracing international law: it 'simply abstracts from the enormous agency costs and information asymmetries the public, and indeed even most elected representatives, face in the case of complex agreements that are negotiated, even today, often in secret by elite, technocratic agents'. Rather than strengthening democracy,

embracing international law hurts democratic politics by handing power to technocratic-guardians. Third, it is unclear how Lastra proposes a global political union – necessary to regulate contemporary international financial markets - to come about. She argues that international law emanates from international treaties and therefore is 'in accordance with the principles of democratic politics' (Lastra 2013: 812). Basically, she argues for installing a international-law regime. The problem with that is that the parameters for such a regime are not in place: there is a lack of a global public sphere (2.1.2), a lack of strong affiliations to the world as a whole (or even to Europe), etc. So while international treaties may be democratically legitimate, this will not be sufficient to satisfy legitimacy demands. A political constellation simply requires much more than the consent of (the technocratic-guardians of) national governments to be legitimate: a lively public sphere and strong social bonds are indispensable (2.1.2). Consequently, the coming about of democratically legitimate global regulators and governing bodies remains pie in the sky.

3.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is unclear how economic globalization can be made conditional to social and environmental policies

when GG is pursued. It is further not clear how demands of democratic politics can be satisfied under

GG. The BWC, in contrast, has proven to be capable of prioritizing the satisfaction of social, democratic and environmental demands to economic globalization, while the GS has proven to be undesirable for democratic, social and environmental reasons. Considering that the nation-state plays a central role in the BWC, I have argued that GPT ought to embrace the nation-state. In the next chapter, I will sketch a model of what a green BWC could look like. In chapter 5, I will analyze what the

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4. A Green Bretton Woods Compromise

After discussing green political theory (GPT), I discussed Rodrik's political trilemma of the global economy. I subsequently established that setting up Global Governance (GG) is infeasible for the foreseeable future, while setting up the Bretton Woods Compromise (BWC) is feasible. In order to make the BWC more tangible, I will in this chapter sketch a modest model of what a green BWC could look like. To what extent is there room for the aforementioned green ideals? To what extent, for example, is there room for multilateral agreements and supranational bodies that take away some of a nation-state's sovereignty? And above all, how could a green BWC satisfy social, democratic and environmental demands? This chapter, moreover, can be seen as an extension of the discussion on the BWC in 3.3 and 3.5, and is indirectly part of the defense of the statist turn within GPT.

In short, in this chapter I argue for the establishment of a 'transnational' state, which is to serve as a building block for other entities; one can for example think of multilateral agreements or supranational organisations. First, I briefly summarize the problems a green BWC is supposed to solve, after which I argue that the nation-state ought to assume a proactive role in bringing economic globalization to a halt. I then briefly discuss the 'all-affected principle', which I argue ought to be a cornerstone for a green BWC. I subsequently sketch a green BWC model, inter alia by briefly discussing 'transnational' democracy and multilateral agreements

4.1 Economic Globalization

The problem I am seeking to solve by sketching a green BWC concerns economic globalization, which is to be understood as the flexibilization of production, the more open character of trade (as opposed to protectionism or other trade-controlling measures), the more mobile character of capital (as

opposed to controlling capital flows), and the global integration of financial markets (Eckersley 2004: 65). Simply put, economic globalization threatens to diminish the political sovereignty of nation-states: it increasingly dominates the political decision-making of national governments (see chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion on this subject). The latter have increasingly less influence when it comes to shaping their own economies, dealing with environmental issues, and social solidarity. Considering that economic globalization can work to undermine democratic politics (3.2, 3.5), economic globalization is something greens should be skeptical about.

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should not come as a surprise that nation-states are an important part of the 'solution'. They are in a position to turn the table and ground economic globalization to a halt, in favor of satisfying

democratic, social and environmental demands (3.3, 3.5). In this section I will argue why GPT ought to embrace the statist turn within it.

There are three reasons to argue in favor of nation-states taking up a proactive role when it comes to curtailing and disciplining economic globalization. First of all, economic globalization is a choice, at least for developed nation-states. They are not 'passive victims of global change', but actively shape the globalization process through multilateral arrangements. They are 'the gatekeepers of the global order, the linchpin of the global governance network' (Eckersley 2004: 67), and are therefore very well suited to ground economic globalization to a halt. Developing nation-states, on the other hand, 'are increasingly victims of rather than agents of economic globalization'. They are not in a position to shape the globalization process.

Second, the legal and infrastructural systems of nation-states are essential to economic

globalization (3.4). Nation-states provide 'the basic stability, contractual certainty, and the protection of private property rights necessary for investment' (Eckersley 2004: 67). Considering this fundamental role for developed nation-states, they have the power to change the course of economic globalization and give nation-states back their sovereignty (1.1). As a result, nation-states would be in the driver seat and be able to discipline and curtail economic globalization in favor of ecologically sound and socially equalizing policies (3.3, 3.5).

Third, the state has become more valuable for satisfying green demands as economic

globalization has become more extensive. Its welfare services have become more valuable because they serve to protect the vulnerable members of society 'from the harsher consequences of economic globalization'. The same goes for the environmental regulatory role of states, as the state is one of the few actors able to resist the pressures of economic globalization (Eckersley 2004: 65-68). When economic globalization is conditional to the democratic practices of nation-states – as under the post-war Bretton Woods system - nation-states lack the incentive to lower their (environmental ) standards for potential capital investors (3.3).

In sum, the nation-state should assume a proactive role when it comes to discipling and curtailing economic globalization. In 4.5, I take this as a point of departure when developing a green BWC. But first, I will briefly discuss the 'all-affected principle'.

4.3 The All-Affected Principle

I will argue that the all-affected principle should be a cornerstone for the development of a green BWC (4.4). But what is it? In order to understand this, let me briefly reiterate how the nation-state is to be understood (1.2). The nation-state is defined as 1. an entity that possesses internal and external

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sovereignty over a delimited terrain and over the people within that terrain (i.e., the state); and 2. 'a political community shaped by common descent, or at least by a common language, culture, and history' (i.e., the nation). The all-affected principle has important consequences for the definition of the nation-state, and is defined as:

'All and only those who are affected by a decision should have a say in its making.' (Valentini 2014: 793)

One must thus have a stake in the decision in order to be counted as someone affected by a decision (ibid.). The all-affected principle differs from the all-subjected principle, which is defined as:

'All and only those who are de facto subjected to legal decisions should have a say in the making of those decisions.' (Valentini 2014: 792, emphasis in the original)

The difference between the two comes down to 'coercion'. The all-subjected principle concerns individuals within state territory, and are therefore subjected to legal decisions. If they do not comply, they face coercive measures by the state. The all-affected principle goes further. A person might for example be affected by a decision of a neighboring state, say when given state decides to build a nuclear plant near its border (idem: 793). The neighboring state cannot coerce that person to do anything, but might nonetheless have a significant impact on that person's 'ability to pursue their ends and goals'. The all-affected principle 'solves' this problem by including that person in the decision-making process. For the purposes of this chapter, I will not discuss the all-subjected principle in more detail. See for

example Valentini (2014) for a more extensive discussion on this subject. 4.4 Challenges

The all-affected principle brings with it several challenges for a green BWC. For instance concerning the representation of future generations and nonhuman species, since there is no way in which these groups can speak for themselves. For the purposes of this chapter it suffices to say that incorporating their voice into the decision-making process is important, because it will give counterweight to those actors pursuing short-term economic gains at the expense of nonhuman species and future generations (Eckersley 2004: 126). Obviously, this is to be done via human representatives in the here and now.

Another challenging aspect of the all-affected principle is the 'reversal of the burden of proof'. In order to carry out ecologically risky policies or activities, the state and private actors should publicly justify their actions to those at risk. If they do not satisfy the latter group, the policy or action should

A green Bretton Woods Compromise : embracing the nation-state