The EU and conflict resolution in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

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Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations

The EU and its Neighbours: Politics, Policies, Challenges and

Opportunities

The EU and Conflict Resolution in Northern

Ireland and Cyprus

Eoin Watts

11695714

Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

Seconder Reader: Dr. Farid Boussaid

Word Count: 24, 204

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June 2018

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Dimitris Bouris for guiding, encouraging and reassuring me throughout this process. Secondly, I wish to extend my gratitude to Dr. Farid Boussaid for agreeing to be my second reader.

Also I extend my warmest thanks to all my interviewees. I will always appreciate the time and effort you offered me over the last few months. Without my family and friends this would not have been possible. Your constant unwavering support is greatly appreciated. Finally, to Jeske for advising and believing in me from the beginning.

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Abstract

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the impact that that the European Union, through the integration and accession process, has on identity in conflicts. The case studies of Northern Ireland and Cyprus are utilised as they have both experienced, and still experience, this subtle form of EU conflict resolution. In order to achieve this, this thesis incorporates two theoretical positions. Diez et al.’s (2008) conflict transformation theory is used to establish the impact that the EU has had on identity in the two conflicts. It is found that in both cases, EU integration and accession has not been the catalyst for the emergence of a shared identity which transcends the traditional conflicting identities. However, this thesis does demonstrate that EU integration has been more effective at encouraging a rapprochement between Nationalists/Catholics and Unionists/Protestants in Northern Ireland, than between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in Cyprus. Whitman and Wolff’s (2012) conflict management theory is subsequently used to demonstrate that this is the result of a combination of internal and external factors. Firstly, Northern Ireland and Cyprus are extremely different conflicts, with one twenty years into a successful peace process and one conflict frozen in time. However, as witnessed in more conventional conflicts, internal decisions by the EU has also contributed to its ultimate success in softening the identity divide in Northern Ireland and Cyprus.

Key Words: Conflict transformation, Cyprus, European Union, identity, integration and

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List of Abbreviations

DUP Democratic Unionist Party EEC European Economic Community

EOKA National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston)

EU European Union

IEF Integrated Education Fund IFI International Fund for Ireland IRA Irish Republican Army

NILTS Northern Ireland LIFE & TIMES Survey

PEACE Special European Union Programme for Peace and Reconciliation ROC Republic of Cyprus

RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary

TMT Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı) TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK United Kingdom

UNDP-ACT United Nations Development Programme- Action For Cooperation and Trust

UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) is increasingly being acknowledged for its conflict resolution capabilities. In 2012 the EU was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for over six decades of

contribution “to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Peace Prize 2012). While this award partly recognises the increasing

involvement in conflicts in the European Neighbourhood through traditional conflict

resolution means, it also acknowledges the more nuanced integration and accession process. The integration and accession process sees the EU impact conflicts through EU membership and the promise of this membership. In particular, EU integration is widely regarded as bridging the gap between long-time adversaries France and Germany in the wake of the Second World War (Diez et al., 2008: 28; Wallensteen, 2002: 33). Importantly, despite the EU’s adoption of more traditional and visible conflict resolution tools, it is this integration and accession process that remains the most effective tool in which the EU can impact conflicts (Blockmans, 2010: 77; Tocci, 2010: 57).

It is through this integration and accession process that the EU engages with two of the longest running conflicts on the periphery of Europe, in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. At a first glance, it may appear that the EU has little role in these conflicts. In Northern Ireland, which represents the British military’s longest ever military engagement (Operation Banner 1969-2007), it was the United Kingdom (UK) which managed the everyday aspects of the conflict (Wolff, 2002: 42). In Cyprus, the United Nations (UN) takes centre stage, through the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The UNFICYP has manned the demilitarised Green Line on the island since 1964, making it the UN’s longest ever peacekeeping deployment (UNFICYP, 2018).

Although, the EU clearly does not take the leading role in the resolution of these conflicts, scholars have long recognised that the EU does play an important role through the integration and accession process. Demetriou (2008) and Ker-Lindsay (2007) examine the role of the EU in the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus, focusing on the short-to-medium term effects of the EU on the conflict. In Northern Ireland the importance of the EU in supporting the peace process has long been recognised (Byrne et al., 2007; Diez and

Hayward, 2008; Hayward and Wiener, 2008). Tannam (2012) and Zink (2008) even present a comparative study of the EU’s role in the two conflicts.

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Despite the conflicts being extensively studied in relation to the integration and accession process, the role that the EU plays in transforming identity relations in the two conflicts has long been neglected by the literature. Therefore, the EU’s impact on identity relations in Northern Ireland and Cyprus warrants further exploration. The link between the integration and accession process and conflict resolution is developed by Diez et al. (2008) who offer a useful theory explaining how the EU’s integration and accession process can act as a ‘perturbator’ for peace through four interconnected pathways; compulsory impact, enabling impact, connective impact and constructive impact. Although pioneering, this framework needs to be further built on. This is particularly the case when it comes to the fourth pathway, the constructive impact. This pathway focuses on how the EU inspires peace by “changing the identity scripts” of the conflicting parties (Diez et al, 2008: 28). Identity has long been characterised as playing a fundamental role in both the escalation of conflict and subsequently its de-escalation (Cook-Huffman, 2009; Rothman and Olson, 2001). Despite the recognition that this pathway, “if successful”, represents the “most persuasive mode of

transformation”, the field has left it warranting further, in-depth, exploration (Diez et al., 2008: 28).

Methodology

Research Questions

Therefore this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by answering the following research question:

To what extent has the European Union’s integration and accession process impacted identity in the resolution of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus?

In order to answer this question a number of sub-questions are proposed:

 Has the European Union constructed a shared identity in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

 Has the European Union transformed existing identities to become less conflictual in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

 Has the European Union entrenched existing, conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

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To clarify, for the first sub-question, the construction of a ‘shared identity’ is recognised as the emergence of an identity which transcends the old identity divides. This could be a broad European identity or a more specific local identity. The first three research questions address ‘how’ the EU, through the integration and accession process impacts identity in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. They can essentially be broken into three Hypotheses:

H1. The European Union has constructed a shared identity in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

H2. The European Union has transformed existing identities to become less conflictual in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

H3. The European Union has entrenched existing conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

The final question addresses ‘why’, if found, there is a disparity between EU engagement in the two cases. This question can be broken down into two hypotheses:

H4. The internal capabilities of the European Union explains the disparity between the two cases.

H5. The external context of the conflicts explains the disparity between the two cases. Research Design

In the pursuit of the answers to the above questions a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative techniques, will be employed. This method allows an

approach to the research question which includes “creative possibilities” (Brannen, 2005: 6), distinguishing this work from previous endeavours. There is a theme in studies concerning identity in conflicts for scholars to rely too heavily on quantitative means, such as censuses, polls and surveys, for measuring identity shifts. For instance, this trend is witnessed in a number of studies involving identity in both Cyprus (Psaltis and Cakal, 2016; Sirin, 2012) and Northern Ireland (Garry and McNicholl, 2015).

Although these studies are extremely useful in understanding identity in the conflicts, in reality identity is more complex than can be expressed by a simple tick of a box in a census, election or survey. Therefore, while incorporating these existing quantitative studies

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into the framework of this thesis, the core of the analysis will be drawn from qualitative, semi-structured interviews with individuals who have first-hand expertise and insight into the respective conflicts. The flexible nature of semi-structured interviews is useful as it

encourages interviewees to speak more freely of their experiences of identity in the conflicts (Tansey, 2007: 266). Similarly, “the open-ended, discursive nature of the interviews

permitted an iterative process of refinement” where ideas proposed by earlier interviewees could be presented in following ones (Beardsworth and Keil in Bryman, 2012: 472).

However, with the conflicts being so broad, unstructured interviews have been discounted, as some form of guide is essential to keep the interviewees on topic. Tables 1 and 2 introduce the interviewees selected to address the research question.

Table 1: Northern Ireland Interviewees

Interviewee Position

Colette FitzGerald (Field Visit- Belfast) Head of the European Commission Office in Northern Ireland.

Louise Warde-Hunter (Field Visit- Belfast) Head of Housing, Urban Regeneration and Local Government at Department for Communities at Northern Ireland Civil Service.

Samuel Fitzsimmons (Field Visit- Belfast) Head of Communications at Integrated Education Fund (IEF).

Bronagh Hinds (Field Visit- Belfast) Participated in the 1996-98 Good Friday Agreement negotiations for the Women’s Coalition. Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Equality Commission for N Ireland (1999-2003). Stood on PEACE programme monitoring committee.

Claire Hackett (Field Visit- Belfast) Senior member of Falls Road Community Council. Coordinated EU funded projects such as the Oral History Archive.

Dr. Jonathan Tonge (Field Visit- Manchester) Professor of Politics, Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool.

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Table 2: Cyprus Interviewees

Interviewee Position

EU Official (Phone Interview) Political Officer at the EU Commission Office in Cyprus.

Marios Epaminondas (Phone Interview) Officer for European and International Affairs at Ministry of Education and Culture (Republic of Cyprus).

Founder of ‘Nicosia Walks’, a cross-community peacebuilding project. Turkish Cypriot Official (Field Visit-

Brussels)

Political Officer at Turkish Cypriot Representation in Brussels.

Antigoni Michael (Skype Interview) Founder of ‘Nicosia Photo Walks’, a cross-community peacebuilding project.

Contributor to Cyprus Community Media Centre.

Dr. James Ker-Lindsay (Skype Interview) Senior Visiting Fellow, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. Former advisor to the United

Nations Development Programme in Cyprus.

These interviewees were selected as they offered expert and diverse, not readily available in the literature. The European Commission officials in Belfast and Nicosia, offered a unique top-down insight into the perspective of the EU on the conflict. Government

officials, in sensitive departments such as housing (Warde-Hunter) and education (Epaminondas) allowed for an understanding of how governments approach everyday

identity issues. Similarly, Fitzsimmons, of the IEF, had first-hand experience dealing with the controversial issue of shared education in a divided society. Crucially, local peacebuilders present a more grass roots understanding of identity and the EU’s involvement. For Northern Ireland it was ensured that individuals with experience of the PEACE programme would be targeted. In this case Hinds, Hackett and Warde-Hunter (in a previous capacity) had all been recipients of such funds. In Cyprus, Michael has contributed to the partly funded Cypriot Community Media Centre (CCMC) and worked on projects which exist without EU funding.

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The academics Ker-Lindsay and Tonge were chosen not just for their academic pedigree, but because of their on the ground experience. Ker-Lindsay has worked as an advisor for the UN and the UK government on the Cypriot conflict and Tonge is a regular voice for the BBC on Northern Ireland issues.

Although these interviews clearly underpin this thesis, they cannot be used in

isolation to completely and comprehensively answer questions concerning identity. As Soss (2006: 132) points out interviewees “might interpret a single interview question in different ways and that a single phrase might mean different things when spoken by different people”. Therefore, this thesis will also be utilizing a number of primary official documents from the EU, the UN and state governments. Moreover, existing academic literature on the EU’s involvement in the conflicts will be used to supplement this, along with general literature on the conflicts themselves. When merged together these methods can alleviate a significant portion of their individual shortcomings. Ultimately, Webb (1966) sums this up perfectly stating that “the most fertile search for validity comes from a combined series of measures, each with its own idiosyncratic weaknesses” (in Davies, 2001: 75).

Overview

In this introduction a research problem has clearly been identified. Despite the widespread recognition of the importance of identity to conflicts and their peaceful resolution, there exists a substantial gap between studies of EU conflict resolution and the impact of identity. In chapter 1 this gap in the literature will be examined further. Furthermore, in this chapter the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that will be adopted in this study will be

established. This will see the conceptualisation of the terms conflict and identity. Similarly, the broad field of conflict resolution will be explored and the relevant tradition will be decided on. In chapter 2 the case study of Northern Ireland will be explored in more depth and the impact of the EU’s involvement in relation to identity will be analysed. In chapter 3, the same will be completed for Cyprus. These two chapters, will address the first three hypotheses. In order to do this, EU involvement will be separated into direct and indirect measures. In chapter 4, comparisons between the two cases will be drawn, addressing both external factors and internal capabilities, to determine ‘why’ the EU is more successful at transforming identity in certain conflicts. In the final chapter, the empirical evidence gathered

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will be discussed and the hypotheses conclusively answered. Furthermore, the implications of these findings will be indicated.

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1. Literature Review

In this chapter, the literature surrounding the vast field of conflict resolution will be

examined. As will be displayed there exists a substantial portion of literature examining the EU’s increasing role in the resolution of conflicts. However, this literature largely focuses on conflicts in the European Neighbourhood, neglecting conflicts closer to home. This gap is particularly prevalent when it comes to understanding the effect that the EU’s integration and accession process has on identity. This literature review will establish the theoretical and conceptual framework underpinning the overall discussion. Before moving on, it is important to note that this thesis subscribes to the idea that conflict resolution is a broad theory,

incorporating a number of more specific and nuanced traditions. As Beriker notes “conflict resolution is not a homogeneous field in terms of its assumptions issues, and methodologies” (2009: 266). Therefore, this chapter will discuss the various traditions of this theory. With the ultimate aim of applying which one best explains the role of the EU’s integration and

accession process in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Despite conflict resolution’s reputation as a conceptual minefield, there tends to be a shared constructivist sense of how to define key concepts. Therefore, prior to explaining which strand of conflict resolution will be utilised to pursue the research question, the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘identity’ will be conceptualised.

1.1 Conflict

Conflict is synonymous with traditional International Relations theory. Realists (Hobbes, 1651), Liberals (Kant, 1991) and even Marxists (Marx, 1847) accept conflict as natural to, at least, the current world order. In the same sense, conflict resolution scholars recognize that “conflict is a normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships” (Lederach 2003: 15). Thus echoing classical realist assumptions on human nature (Hobbes, 1651; Morgenthau, 1947). However, despite some similarities, conflict resolution scholars tend to define conflict as a much more complex and diverse phenomenon.

Rather than merely peering at conflict from an inter-state perspective (Mearsheimer, 1990), they interpret conflict in a much broader sense (Beriker, 2009; Galtung, 1996). Beriker states that “the field is interested in conflicts at all levels of human interaction… with the understanding that conflicts are subjective phenomena” (2009: 266). As Lederach notes the effects of conflict are felt on a personal, relational, structural and from a cultural viewpoint

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(2003: 24-6). As conflict resolution possesses a much deeper understanding of conflict than traditional state-centric theories it explores conflicts which are regularly diminished and overlooked in International Relations. Essentially, attempting to understand internal, ethnic and protracted conflicts where no “quick military fix” is readily available (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 5-6). This is important in a world where there has been a “shift of conflict from the interstate realm to the intrastate”, as can be seen in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

(Ben-Yehuda and Sandler, 2002: 1).

For all intents and purposes, conflict resolution scholars hold a more fluid and constructivist definition of conflict, embracing the assumption that “all conflicts can be reframed given that the perceptions of parties can change” (Beriker, 2009: 266). Nonetheless, “conflict resolution is not the elimination of conflict” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 30). As Galtung notes conflict is an “ever-changing, ever dynamic” concept (1996: 88), where “[T]he way is the Goal” (Galtung and Vidyapith’s, 1992).

1.2 Identity

Another key concept underpinning this thesis is identity. It is regularly asserted that “in conflict, identity matters” (Cook-Huffman, 2009: 25). This is particularly true of intrastate conflicts, which are notoriously “entangled in webs of identity” (Rothman and Olson, 2001: 289). Unsurprisingly then, in Northern Ireland and Cyprus issues of identity have long found themselves attached to the conflicts narrative. I will examine these identities in depth in the following chapters. In this sub-section, the concept ‘identity’ will be defined, along with how it relates to conflict and ultimately its resolution.

Essentially, “identity refers to a sense of a self, a way individuals know and

understand themselves” (Cook-Huffman, 2009: 19-20). In society, social groups are formed by individuals sharing “a common social identification” (Stets and Burke, 2000: 225), and exist only through “the imposition of otherness” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Walker, 1988: 85). Importantly, individuals possess “deep value commitments” to these social groups (Bilgrami, 2004: 183), and they will “act together to preserve, defend and enhance their common identity” (Bloom, 1990: 26). Huntington’s renowned work ‘The Clash of

Civilisations’ is based on this hypothesis, with civilisations representing the highest form of identity groupings (1993: 24).

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However, as witnessed with conflict, identity is not a simple or static concept. All agents, at various points, possess a number of identities (Levi, 2007; Sen, 2006). There is an “immense richness” in the “multiple identities that human beings have, given their diversity of affiliations, attachments and affinities” (Sen 2008: 6; Stets and Burke, 2000: 225). For instance, one can be Dutch, of Indonesian origin, heterosexual, Libertarian, a fan of Ajax etc. all at the same time, “without any contradiction” (Sen, 2008: 7). This conceptualisation of identity contrasts with Huntington’s clash of civilisations theory, as this conceptualisation is much more fluid and dynamic than the identity he proposes. This is not to say Huntington does not recognise identity as a multi-level concept (1993: 24). However, in his inescapable clash of civilisations, civilizational identities trumps all else. This assumption is rejected by this thesis, as this is a too entrenched conceptualization of identity. In reality as expressed above, “identity is not a rigid, static phenomenon” (Lederach, 2003: 55). Therefore, the idea that there exists an all-encompassing identity is incompatible with this more nuanced

interpretation.

However, although identity is defined here as largely a constructed concept (Cerulo, 1997), it does not mean that “issues of identity are not at the root of most conflicts”

(Lederach, 2003: 55; Walsh, 2016: 286). While the fatalist clash of civilisation stance is rejected in this thesis, one can still recognise that “identity plays a vital role in conflict” (Cook-Huffman, 2009: 19). For instance, Sen a vocal critic of Huntington’s work, still finds “that reductionist cultivation of singular identities has indeed been responsible for a good deal of what we can be call ‘engineered bloodshed’ across the world” (2008: 7). Essentially just because identity is in essence fluid and dynamic, it does not mean that in the heat of conflict it is not experienced as a very real and rigid social marker. Correspondingly, in conflict, it is regularly these more national, religious and ethnic social markers which determine “what we value and how we behave” (Sen, 2006: 20). Therefore this conceptual framework dismisses Huntington’s static and hierarchical understanding of identity, while upholding the assumption that conflicts are overwhelmingly defined by issues related to identity.

1.3 Conflict Resolution

As was made clear at the beginning of this chapter conflict resolution is an umbrella theory. Within this field there exists a common understanding of terms, such as identity and conflict.

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However, the field can be divided into a number of distinct traditions. These traditions are mainly distinguishable by the types of conflicts in which they examine. Moreover, the various scholars present a host of different methods in which they suggest that conflict resolution should be best pursued. In this sub-section these cleavages will be examined. This task can be difficult as “considerable confusion exists within the field over how to describe these approaches” (Persson, 2009: 3), where “different authors have used each term to embrace the others” (Miall, 2007: 3). Yet, after consideration the main traditions are: conflict management, interactive conflict resolution and conflict transformation. I have purposely left out conflict prevention because although it is a significant tradition, it aims “to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (UN, 2011: 2), whereas this thesis is exclusively examining cases where violent conflict has already broke-out.

Subsequently, I will propose the reasons why conflict transformation, through its long-term and comprehensive nature, represents the best tradition to examine the impact that the EU’s integration and accession process has had on identity in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. 1.3.1 Conflict Management

Conflict management constitutes the oldest form of conflict resolution (Paffenholz, 2009: 3). It is inherently short-term in nature, focusing exclusively with stemming the violence

associated with conflict. These short-term missions neglect the structural and social

foundations of violent conflict. As Ramsbotham et al. emphasises “the root causes of conflict may persist without either war or a peace settlement doing anything to address them” (2005: 159). It is often termed ‘crisis management’ (Juncos and Gross, 2011), but this is an

inaccurate comparison. As in reality crisis management represents an even shorter-term endeavour than conflict management. As Amesi and Amaewhule point out, “the word crisis could be seen as an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending” (2015: 6). Blockmans and Weasel note that “in the international context, the word ‘crisis’ is widely understood as an acute situation in which armed force is (likely to be) used”, whereas ‘conflict’ is much “broader… where there is a threat or breach to priority values, interests and goals” (2009: 5). Although, still short-term in nature, conflict

management, in relative terms, involves deeper and longer involvements from the third party, such as peacekeeping (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 13).

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This crude form of conflict resolution sees mediators rely on “traditional foreign policy tools”, such as military, economic and diplomatic action (Colombo and Huber, 2016: 12; Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 13). Conflict management, utilizes these more traditional tools “to influence the attitude and behaviour of other actors” (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 27-28). Ultimately, these more traditional tools reserve conflict management as almost

exclusively a top-down affair (Paffenholz, 2009: 3). In this regard, the EU’s role in

Afghanistan is best understood from this perspective (Blockmans and Wessel, 2009; Gross, 2011). However, the inherent short-term nature of conflict management makes it

incompatible with the role that the EU’s integration and accession process has played in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Although there is nothing fundamentally wrong with this “instant coffee approach” (Volkan, 1997: 226), the EU’s involvement is in reality much longer term in nature. Moreover, as will be explained below, the mechanisms utilised by the EU in these two cases, are fundamentally more diverse than the elitist/top-down tools that conflict management is built around.

1.3.2 Interactive Conflict Resolution

Interactive conflict resolution, on the other hand, recognises the need for a bottom-up and long-term approach to solve the underlying identity issues related to conflict. As Paffenholz states interactive conflict resolution aims to “solve the underlying causes of conflict and rebuild destroyed relationships between parties” (2009: 4). Interactive conflict resolution is very much centred on the belief that imposed, top-down solutions to conflicts fail to address the underlying issues surrounding conflicts (Francis, 2002). Therefore in the long-term, conflicts which are only managed are always susceptible to backslide back into violent conflict. Essentially, there is a recognition that “while walls can be knocked down as quickly as they are constructed, so too doors can be slammed shut as easily as they are opened” (Newman, 2003: 19). In this regard, if a conflict is to be resolved there needs to exist a more inclusive and grassroots peace process. As Richmond notes this tradition has “attempted to bring the individual… back into the realm of the significant when it came to understanding and ending conflict” (2001: Para 1).

This grassroots approach sees “the role of an impartial third party” as reserved to organising and facilitating “small-group, problem-solving discussions between members of the conflicting party” (Fisher, 1993: 123). This is derived from the belief that, the conflicting parties themselves are the “only parties that can effectively resolve their dispute” (Pearson,

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2009: 331), through creating “mutually acceptable solutions” (Fisher, 1993: 124). This “controlled communication” (Burton, 1996), brings together conflicting parties in “problem-solving workshops” (Kelman, 1992: 65). These workshops bring “those two parties whose relationships are most affected into a facilitated interactive situation in which relationships are analyzed in depth” (Burton, 1996: 24).

This may seem more conducive to the longer-term, more indirect role that the EU plays through the integration and accession process. However, interactive conflict resolution has its shortfalls. This tradition is inherently too narrow and self-constricted in its focus on the grassroots to adequately and wholly explain the various approaches the EU utilizes through the integration and accession process. Although, the integration and accession process can work through the grassroots, it is also more diverse and complicated than this. Working through member states and local elites.

1.3.3 Conflict Transformation

Comparable to interactive conflict resolution, conflict transformation is by its very nature a long-term process. It is based on the assumption that in order to “prevent a recurrence of violence, root causes have to be tackled by structural transformation” (Jeong, 2005: 4). However, unlike interactive conflict resolution, it accepts that conflicts can be resolved through a number of diverse measures. Lederach, the father of the tradition, proposes three lenses in which to view conflicts. One looks at the immediate situation, one the underlying patterns and context and the third brings them together (2003: 11). In the shorter-term, much like conflict management, third parties can “provide adaptive responses to the immediate and future repetition of conflict episodes” and in the longer-term they “address the deeper and longer-term relational and systemic patterns that produce violent, destructive expressions of conflict” (ibid: 47). Intrinsically, these lenses “not only promote short-term solutions, but also build platforms capable of promoting long-term social change” (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7). Ultimately, this three lens approach captures the EU’s integration and accession process in a more complete manner.

Miall, another strong advocate of this tradition, emphasises that conflict

transformation does not simply seek the end of conflict, but a “change in the fundamental relationships, social structures and contextual conditions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place” (2007: 3). Miall also argues that to achieve this, conflict transformation accounts

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for the fact that a “variety of actors may play important roles” in the resolution of conflicts (2004: 4). Thus the individualistic and grassroots interactive conflict resolution can be incorporated, along with the more traditional and elite conflict management actors, allowing for a deeper explanation of the “deep-rooted structural factors behind conflicts” (Persson, 2009: 4).

There has been much debate as to whether conflict transformation, should be defined within the confines of conflict resolution or whether it represents its own breakaway theory. Lederach insists that this tradition justifies its own theory (2003). Conflict transformation scholars are particularly concerned with the term ‘resolution’ which, they argue, implies that there is a fixed end-point in conflicts (Lederach, 2003: 29; Miall, 2007: 3-4). Lederach maintains that the term ‘transformation’ more coherently describes the long-term process that parties engaged in conflict must go through in order to improve relations (2003: 30).

Although this thesis accepts the framework offered by Lederach as the most conducive for understanding how identity relates to conflict and its resolution, the notion that conflict transformation is a stand-alone theory is rejected. Conflict transformation certainly “aims for deep and profound changes in conflict situations that go beyond the limitations of traditional approaches” (Ryan, 2009: 304). Nevertheless, the transformation of conflicts is still

ultimately based on the “resolution of the underlying causes of conflict” (Paffenholz, 2009: 4). In this sense conflict transformation is “the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition” (Ramsbotham, 2005: 8-9). Ultimately, it would be unhelpful and unavailing to break up the umbrella theory of conflict resolution, which Lederach admits himself is the “well known and widely accepted term in both practitioner and research communities” (2003: 29).

1.4 The EU and Conflict Resolution

In this section the EU’s role as a conflict resolver will be examined in more depth. The EU has a long and unconventional history of involvement in the resolution of conflicts. It has been widely accepted that the EU is, by its very essence, a peace organisation (Birchfield et al., 2017; Diez et al., 2008: 13). Which was born out of a vision to prevent another deadly war breaking out in Europe, after the continent had been ravaged by such wars for the first half of the twentieth century. As French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman stated, when proposing the European Coal and Steal Community, that the resulting “solidarity in

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production” would make war between France and Germany “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (European Union, May 1950).

However, it is only more recently that the EU has stepped up its conflict resolution activity (Amora Dias, 2013: 341). The Maastricht (1992) and Lisbon (2007)Treaties, for the first time established the idea that the “promotion of peace” was “a key priority” for the EU’s foreign policy objectives (Tocci, 2010: 55). Since the conception of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy (2003) the EU has deployed thirty missions, both civilian and military, across three continents (European External Action Service, 2018: 1). Gross and Juncos put this exponential growth, in conflict resolution activity, down to the end of the Cold War and the “growing transatlantic pressures for the EU taking on a greater role in civilian crisis

management [uses this term as conflict management] in pursuit of more equitable transatlantic burden-sharing.” (2011: 4). Blockmans and Wessel add that the failure of Europe to stand up during “the hour of Europe” as Yugoslavia crumbled, shamed Europe into improving its short-term conflict management capacity and activity (2009: 266 & 271). There is no absence of academic works chronicling both the role and capabilities of the EU in the resolution of conflicts (Blockmans et al., 2010; Diez et al., 2008; Tocci, 2007; Whitman and Wolff, 2012). Much of these works focus explicitly on the role of the EU as a traditional conflict manager (Blockmans et al., 2010), rather than analysing the longer impact that the EU can have on the structural issues surrounding conflicts. However, they can still be useful to my thesis.

These works have helped establish the idea that, conflict resolution can prove to be a controversial endeavour. As has been well stated the EU is far from a unitary actor (Diez et al., 2008: 23; Keohane, 2011: 203). This makes the rapid responses associated with the short-term needs of conflicts difficult and contested, and the EU’s response often “cut down to the lowest common denominator” (Colombo and Huber, 2016: 12). As Diez and Pace state “some member states may quite possibly have an active interest in supporting one conflict party rather than another” (2011: 213). Here, a “zero-sum” relationship between member states and the EU develops (Hill, 1993: 319). EU action is also affected by internal “turf wars” between competing institutions (Juncos and Gross, 2011: 15). This again, negatively impacts how the EU manages conflicts. Although, this examination of internal factors has been developed by scholars examining conflict and crisis management (Colombo and Huber, 2016; Whitman and Wolff, 2012), it has largely been neglected by conflict transformation scholars.

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Whitman and Wolff (2012), present a vital work chronicling the EU’s involvement in the short-to-medium term management of conflicts. Although much of the empirical analysis conducted in their book covers the management of conflicts and therefore falls outside the scope of this thesis, their theoretical approach transcends this division. They propose that the success of the EU’s involvement in conflicts can be observed from two main positions. The first of these positions is defined as the internal capabilities of the Union, i.e. the “capabilities that the EU must possess in order to succeed in conflict management” (ibid: 11). These internal capabilities can be broken down into the following, overlapping, sub-sections: capabilities to act, capabilities to fund and capabilities to cooperate and coordinate. Essentially, capabilities to act is reliant on “political will”, amongst member states and the EU as a whole, to get involved in the conflict (ibid: 11-12). If there are “horizontal” cooperation issues (between member states) and/or “vertical” cooperation issues (between member states and institutions) then the overall coordination will be limited (ibid: 13). Ultimately, this ‘will’, translates to the extent in which the EU is willing to apply financial and political support for various mechanisms to deal with the conflict (ibid: 12-13). Although Whitman and Wolff present this from a short-term conflict management perspective, for instance examining tools such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (ibid), EU involvement in conflicts through the integration and accession process is subject to the same overall

constraints.

Second, according to Whitman and Wolff EU involvement is effected by the context of the conflict (ibid: 15). This context can be observed from four levels of analysis (ibid: 17), expanding on the two (national and regional) proposed by Brown (1996). Therefore fitting in well with the lenses Lederach offers (2003: 11). The first level of analysis, the local, inspects the sub-state factors which “are likely to have an impact” on the success of EU involvement (Whitman and Wolff, 2012: 15). These local actors include elites, rebel forces, NGOs and can equally be applied to people in general. The second level of analysis, the state, examines national factors, such as “the political, social, economic and cultural dynamics at the state level” (ibid: 16). In the case of conflict transformation this could be used to assess how receptive national governments are to the EU. Regional factors are described as the third level of analysis. Here they recognise the significance of neighbouring states with a stake in the conflict (ibid). For instance, the impact of the EU in Afghanistan cannot be

comprehended without an understanding of the role of the neighbouring state, Pakistan (Gross, 2011). The final level of analysis is the global. This global level of analysis looks at

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the impact that interaction with international powerful states, other international

organisations, such as the United Nations or African Union, and diaspora groups has on the EU’s role in conflicts (Whitman and Wolff, 2012: 16). For instance, EU involvement in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict cannot be analysed in a vacuum, which ignores the influence of the United States of America (US). As Bouris and Brown (2014: Para 1) state “Europe can at best only support American efforts” when it comes to the Middle Eastern peace process. As will explained in the analytical framework, the theory presented by Whitman and Wolff, although not intended to, can fill a gap in the conflict transformation literature. Which has proved incapable of explaining ‘why’ the EU experiences disparities in its involvement in conflicts.

1.4.1 The Integration and Accession Process and Conflict Resolution

The integration and accession process differentiates significantly from the traditional conflict management role the EU plays. As Diez and Pace find, through the integration and accession process “the EU plays a role both as a classical third-party actor and as an institutional context” in its pursuit of “conflict transformation” (2011: 212).The EU integration and accession process can be divided into two separate processes. The accession process can be defined as the relationship between the EU and states with membership prospects and has been the subject of a number of studies (Keil and Arkan, 2014; Sedelmeier, 2015).

Throughout the accession process the EU uses the ‘carrot’ of membership (positive) or the ‘stick’ of sanctions (negative), to influence prospective members. This is coined

conditionality, with prospective members having to meet certain conditions or “hurdles on the way to integration” (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003: 5). Although as Stivachtis notes “conditionality has been an essential feature of the EEC enlargement since the 1960s” (2018: 95), it is only since the 1993 European Council in Copenhagen that this criteria was enshrined in writing. The Copenhagen Criteria now ensures that prospective members have to fulfil the EU’s Acquis Communautaire, i.e. prove that they have:

achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (European Council, 1993: Chap 7, Point 3)

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It is widely believed, as former Commissioner Chris Patten (2003) states, that “over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership” (in Adler and Crawford, 2006: 31). On the other hand, the integration process occurs post-accession, once the state has achieved membership status. It is inherently based on liberal (Kant, 1991; Oneal et al., 1996) and neofunctionalist (Haas, 1958) ideas that integration can lead to interdependence and ultimately political transformation. This integration began as a relatively modest movement to integrate the economies of post-war Europe (Alter and Steinberg, 2007: 2; Peterson, 2008: 202). But as the years have progressed this integration has deepened and inherently became more political (Shore, 2001; Staiger, 2009). As Kouri finds, this has led to the promotion of a common European identity, with the EU attempting “to promote the integration of member states on cultural grounds, rather than by solely depending on economic, trade, and labor cooperations” (2014: 218). Theil argues that the integration of European states into a “intricate network of common trade, social, cultural, and other policies, represents one of the most important geopolitical events of the twentieth century” (2011: 1).

However, despite Diez et al. noting that “integration and association provide the EU with potentially powerful means to influence border conflicts” (2008: 12), the link between the integration and accession process and conflict resolution remains a much underdeveloped phenomenon. Although Blockmans recognises that “a peacebuilding process an sich, EU enlargement has been dubbed the most successful of the Union’s foreign policies, one of immense transformative power” (2010: 77), this book is limited to examining the role of the EU through a conflict management level of analysis. For instance, in this book Blockmans et al. (2010) focus on these more traditional conflict management missions that the EU has conducted in the Congo, Chad and the Western Balkans.

Tocci (2007) goes into more depth to establish this link between EU enlargement and conflict resolution. She proposes that the EU impacts conflicts in states with membership aspirations through three main strands: conditionality, social learning and passive

enforcement. Here conditionality is used as it is non-conflict scenarios, i.e. it “represents a deliberate effort to determine an outcome through external pressure” (Stivachtis, 2018: 95), with the EU “offering resources and legitimacy to some actors while constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals” (Dobbels, 2009: 14). Tocci points out that “unless the

candidates settled their most salient disputes, they would be prevented from opening accession negotiations” (2007: 13). Tocci uses the example of the border dispute between

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Slovakia and Hungary in 1990s as an example of the EU using conditionality as a conflict resolution tool (ibid). More recently, this conditionality is being used to force an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, where the EU has long made clear that before either achieve accession there must be a “normalisation of relations” (European Union, 2013: Title III; European Council, 2014).

Whereas conditionality is quintessentially short-term in nature, with “unchanged identities and interests” (Tocci, 2007: 16), social learning is less of a “cost-benefit calculus… as domestic actors voluntarily internalize the norms and logic underpinning the EU system” (ibid: 15). Checkel terms this ‘complex learning’ as through interaction with the EU, actors “acquire new values and interests” (1999: 15). This form of EU influence fits in more coherently with the long-term orientation of conflict transformation, as it strides for the “re-articulation” of identities (Diez, 2002b: 6-7). Whereas conditionality is defined by its “one-way method of condition setting” (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003: 15), social learning is a more symmetrical process with potential member states and their citizens exhibiting more agency. As Checkel notes, it is through “learning and social interaction, rather than political pressure and individual choice” that “lead to agent compliance with normative prescriptions” (2001: 559). Similarly, Risse and Sikkink term this ‘socialization’, and argue that this process sees states “internalize norms”, without “external pressure” (2001: 11). Ultimately, “domestic change occurs through a transformation of perceived interests” (Tocci, 2007: 15).

According to Tocci the final way that the EU influences conflicts is through passive enforcement. Tocci describes this as “rule bound cooperation” which in practice works “through inbuilt incentives” (ibid: 17). Rather than a cost-benefit calculation, as witnessed with conditionality, the rules associated with passive enforcement “must not be viewed by third parties as a cost, or it must be considered a necessary price that comes with EU engagement” (ibid). Tocci finds that “passive enforcement cannot be easily used for conditions that the EU simply considers politically desirable but have no legal standing” (2010: 70). For instance, when it comes to minority rights, “the EU has in fact promoted norms which lack a basis in EU law” and a lack of consensus between existing member states, therefore it is challenging for the EU to diffuse rules in this area (ibid; Sasse, 2005: 1). Whereas, with human rights, the European Convention of Human Rights grants the EU the necessary “legally-binding acquis” (Tocci, 2010: 70). Similarly, the change associated with passive enforcement is “based on a party’s own experience of respecting a rule, and

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‘rule application’, and explains how through this, “the dynamics of change take the form of mutual adaptation among co-evolving institutions at different levels and sectors of

governance” (2002: 941). Importantly, in order for this mechanism to be successful, it “requires that the third party feels a sense of belonging to Europe” (Tocci, 2007: 17).

Tocci offers a distinguished account of how the EU uses the accession process to influence conflicts, both directly and indirectly. However, Tocci’s theory is ultimately limited by its neglect of the continued influence on conflicts that the EU can have post-accession. For instance, Tocci analyses EU involvement in Cyprus but prematurely ends her analysis after the accession of Cyprus in 2004 (2007). Therefore, although Tocci offers an important understanding of the link between the EU accession process and conflict resolution, her theory is incapable of accounting wholly for the impact post-accession integration, into the EU, has on conflicts.

Whereas the above scholars fall short of offering a satisfactory framework for understanding the EU’s integration and accession process impact on conflicts, Diez et al. (2008) present an account which fills this academic gap. They propose four pathways in which the EU stimulates peace (Ibid: 26). These four, interconnected, pathways are

compulsory impact, enabling impact, connective impact and constructive impact. Again, Diez et al.’s framework fits in well with Lederach’s conflict transformation school as they address the various levels of analysis that Lederach proposes (2003: 11), therefore covering the “holistic and multi-faceted approach” that is needed to resolve conflicts (Duke and Courtier, 2010: 17). The framework offered by Diez et al. is seen as the go to text for scholars

interested in the role of the EU’s integration and accession process in the resolution of conflicts (Colombo and Huber, 2016; Hayward, 2006). The first pathway, compulsory impact, covers the three distinct mechanisms proposed by Tocci above. Diez et al.

particularly highlight the ways in which the EU can influence conflicting, non-member state, parties using “carrots and sticks” (Ibid). Interestingly Diez et al. note, as does Tocci (2007: 11), that the EU is in general reluctant to use sticks and “its most important stick is in the withholding of carrots” (2008: 27). The next three pathways cover the influence the EU can have on conflicts post-accession.

The second pathway, enabling impact, is ultimately an elitist/top-down conflict resolution mechanism utilized by the EU. Here local “political leaders use the EU framework to push through policies against the preferences of their electorate” (Diez et al. 2008: 27). In

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this regard the EU adds a new dynamic and fresh impetus to the resolution of conflicts. This new dynamic can be a catalyst for the resolution of conflict as it can “justify desecuritising moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate” (ibid). Essentially, the EU assists actors, looking for an end to conflict, to ‘sell the peace’ to their grassroots. Connective impact, Diez et al.’s third pathway, advances a bottom-up approach in which the EU can transform conflicts. The EU helps to connect the various conflicting parties through “direct financial support of common activities” (ibid: 28). This pathway is heavily reliant on a flexible and responsive civil society, which can facilitate these relations. Much of this connective impact falls under the field of interactive conflict resolution, with the projects financed by the EU resembling Kelman’s “problem-solving workshops” (1992: 65), where the EU keeps at an arm’s length. This pathway is unreservedly long-term. Where it is

envisioned that by connecting communities, with a striking trust deficit, eventually there will be a “broader societal effect in the form of social networks across conflict parties” (Diez et al. 2008: 28).

Diez et al.’s first three pathways have been extensively covered in the literature. In the following chapters of Diez et al.’s book, Hayward and Wiener, and Demetriou offer

distinguished overviews of how the EU works through these three pathways in Northern Ireland and Cyprus respectively. However, the same cannot be argued for the fourth pathway; constructive impact. Despite being labelled the “most persuasive mode of transformation” (Diez et al., 2008: 28), this pathway has largely been overlooked. This neglect can largely be attributed to the fact that it constitutes the most “indirect” of the four pathways (ibid), making it difficult to grasp, never mind measure. Before delving further into this gap in the literature, it is important to define this pathway. Constructive impact, is largely inspired by the peaceful transformation of Europe after the Second World War and “‘aims’ at changing the underlying identity-scripts of conflicts, thus supporting a (re-)construction of identities that permanently sustains peaceful relations between conflict parties” (ibid). Unsurprisingly, this is derived from the idea examined earlier, that although identity plays a significant role in conflict it is adaptable and subject to change. As stated above, the four pathways are inherently

interconnected, with EU mechanisms making an impact in a variety of pathways. In this regard, many connective impact programs have the potential to also “facilitate identity change as foreseen within the constructive impact” (ibid). This pathway’s focus on identity makes it the most relevant to the EU’s integration and accession processes relationship to the transformation of identity in Northern Ireland Cyprus.

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1.5 Analytical Framework

In this section, it will be explained more concisely how the above frameworks will be applied to this thesis. The research questions can essentially be divided into two distinct camps, the ‘how’ and the ‘why’. Scholars tend to look at these two separately, therefore in order to answer both of these questions this thesis needs to draw from two separate theories. Diez et al.’s framework is invaluable for measuring ‘how’ the EU has impacted identity through the integration and accession process. Their pathway model covers effectively the various levels of impact that the EU has on conflicts. Constructive impact, which remains the least

developed of the four pathways, is particularly relevant to this thesis. The connection between the EU’s integration and accession process remains underexplored and thus this thesis will address this gap in the literature, examining coherently the impact, if any, the EU has had on identity.

To answer, this three sub-questions have been proposed:

 Has the European Union constructed a shared identity in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

 Has the European Union transformed existing identities to become less conflictual in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

 Has the European Union entrenched existing conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

The first will look narrowly at whether the EU has constructed an identity in Northern Ireland and Cyprus which transcends the old divides and has ultimately led to a

transformation of the conflict. The second is more broad. Here the extent to which the EU has transformed existing identities to become less conflictual will be measured. Though the final sub-question will be looked at while answering the first two, it feels necessary to present it as its own sub-question, as it is important to highlight that not all EU involvement is positive (Noutcheva et al. 2004: 25). As Diez et al. note “the EU’s attempts in conflict resolution can have both intended and unintended consequences, not all of them beneficial” (2008: 4).

Although the framework offered by Diez et al. (2008) is ideal for answering the first three questions. It has shortcomings when it comes to analysing, in depth, ‘why’ there are

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disparities between the cases. They simply accept that the “success” of the integration and accession process “is often dependent on events outside the EU’s control and on local actors making use of the integration process in ways that are conflict-diminishing” (Diez et al., 2008: 3), without offering a framework or explanation as to what these “events outside the EU’s control” consist of. Therefore Diez et al’s framework cannot be used to address my final research sub-question:

 If a disparity is found between the two cases, what explains this?

While it may seem counter-intuitive, this thesis approaches this question from a conflict management stance. Essentially, Whitman and Wolff (2012), offer a more conclusive framework which can address, more appropriately, ‘why’ the integration and accession process can have more success in certain conflicts. As explained above, they look at the EU’s internal capabilities, such as capabilities to act, fund and cooperate. Crucially they also, address the “events outside the EU’s control”. Examining these ‘events’ from four different levels of analysis- the local, the national, the regional and the global. This sub-question will look at the context of both of the conflicts and establish the reasons why, if found, there is a disparity between the two cases.

It is important to note the “diversity” of conflicts when answering these research

questions (Diez et al., 2008: 10). Therefore, it would be misleading to look at these conflicts, Northern Ireland and Cyprus, from the same starting point. In this regard, it could be found that while one conflict has seen a deeper transformation, when it comes to identity, the EU’s integration and accession process may not necessarily be responsible for this. Importantly, Whitman and Wolff’s recognition of both external context and internal capabilities accounts for this. In addition, “conflict resolution very often does not lead to the disappearance of a conflict, but, at least as a first step, to its regulation through non-violent means” (Diez et al, 2008: 14). Therefore to be deemed a success, EU involvement does not have to end in the disappearance of conflict (Diez and Pace, 2011: 212). It is simply, looking at the impact that the EU has had on identity in the two cases. In order to be deemed to have a positive impact on identity, evidence must be found which shows that the EU has made “a contribution to the transformation of the very communication that constructs a conflict in the first place” (ibid: 7). In regards to identity, a “changing” in “the underlying identity-scripts” must be witnessed (ibid: 28).

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1.6 Conclusion

In this chapter the frameworks (conceptual, theoretical and analytical) that will provide the foundations for my research have been established. As has been made clear conflict

resolution is a broad field which incorporates a number of traditions. These distinct traditions largely subscribe to the constructivist notion that conflict and identity are fluid and dynamic concepts. However, as has been presented they possess some vital differences in their application. Conflict management, defined by its short-termism and top-down tools,

inadequately explains how the EU, through the integration and accession process approaches conflicts. Interactive conflict resolution, on the other hand, appears to meet much of the criteria essential to the integration and accession process, i.e. it is fundamentally long-term and bottom-up in nature. However, upon further inspection Fisher (1993) and Burton’s (1969 & 1996) work is too restricted to appropriately cover the broad measures the EU undertakes through the integration and accession process. Ultimately, conflict transformation is the most suitable sub-faction of conflict resolution. Lederach and Miall sufficiently account for the long-term change that the EU strives for, while recognising that this long-term approach comes in a number of packages. However, when applying just a conflict transformation theory, such as Diez et al.’s, to the EU’s integration and accession process it is found that there is a need to borrow substantial ideas from the conflict management field. Especially when comparing the success of the EU in the transformation of conflicts. Therefore in the analytical framework it has been established that in order to address my fourth sub-question Whitman and Wolff’s (2012) framework will be applied.

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2. The EU’s Involvement in Northern Ireland

In the following two chapters the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, will be examined. These chapters will follow an identical structure. Beginning by giving a brief outline of these conflicts, on the periphery of the EU, which for many years looked intractable. As will be explained, the role of identity, particularly national identity, lies at the very core of these conflicts. Therefore in order to be effectively transformed away from violent conflict, these identity issues must be addressed. Finally, the role of the EU in these conflicts will be discussed. It will be demonstrated that this role is best framed through a conflict transformation perspective and can be divided into indirect and direct measures.

2.1 Historical Background

Northern Ireland was first established in 1921, through the Government of Ireland Act (1920), which also established the independence of the Irish Free State (from 1949 The Republic of Ireland). As Northern Ireland’s centurion approaches, it would be hard not to argue that its existence has been marred by identity conflict. Northern Ireland was formed against the backdrop of the Irish War of independence, where between 1920 and 1922, 267 Catholics and 185 Protestants were killed in violence across the city of Belfast alone (White, 1997: 30). However, it is important to note that this conflict between, Irish and British; Nationalist and Unionist, precedes the birth of Northern Ireland. Fundamentally, since

Norman/English forces invaded Ireland in the 12th Century, conflict has been present between so called ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ (White, 1997: 24).

2.1.1 The Orange State (1921-1969)

Besides from a low-scale, unpopular and ineffective Irish Republican Army (IRA) border campaign (1956-1962), the first fifty years of Northern Ireland’s existence remained largely free of violent conflict (Bruce, 2001: 28). However, it was in this period that the foundations for the intercommunal violence, that was to follow, were set. Harold Wilson (British Prime Minister at the time) stated that the violence witnessed in Derry/Londonderry was “the

culmination of nearly fifty years of the unimaginable intertia and repression of successive and unchallenged… Ulster Unionist government” (in Rose, 1999: 150). In this period, Unionists consolidated the state and built their nation (English, 2002; Reid, 2008: 420). In 1934 the

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then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir James Craig, infamously declared “All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and Protestant State” (in Bardon, 1992: 538-8).

Catholics were almost totally excluded from the higher positions of public employment, and in general were two and half times more likely to be unemployed than Protestants (Cameron, 1969: Para 138; Stevenson et al., 2007: 106; Whyte, 1983: Para 10 & 52). Similarly, in areas where Catholics were in the majority, gerrymandering was rife (Whyte, 1983: Para 17). This Unionist supremacy is enshrined in one piece of legislation in particular- the Special Powers Act (1922). This act allowed the civil authority in Northern Ireland to “take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order” (Article I, Para I).

Nonetheless, by the end of the 1960s, the Orange State had begun to crumble as the “international culture of protest” swept through Northern Ireland (Mansergh, 2006: 24). These civil rights demonstrations began peacefully, but after “heavy-handed reactions by the police touched off a spiral of violence”, which engulfed the province over the coming 30 years (Zink, 2008: 593). Essentially, in this period the identity division, which undoubtedly already existed, was exasperated further and set the tone for the coming violence.

2.1.2 The Troubles (1969- 1998)

By 1969 the British army had been deployed to deal with the intercommunal unrest and paramilitaries from both sides began to form and heavily arm. By 1971 internment, i.e. mass detention without trial, was introduced. This internment “happened to be almost exclusively” the preserve of “Nationalists” which escalated the conflict further (Wolff, 2002: 45). This led to the most violent year of the conflict, 1972, where nearly 500 people died, with atrocities committed by all sides, such as Bloody Sunday and Bloody Friday (McKittrick and McVea, 2000: 76; Wolff, 2002: 70).

There is a heated discussion on how to frame the conflict which claimed the lives of over 3,600 people, of which most were civilians (Tonge et al., 2011: 2). Bruce (1997) argues that the conflict is primarily a tit-for-tat sectarian killing campaign between Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, which has its roots in the intractable identity struggle between Catholics and Protestants. As former British Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, stated “[T]he history of their struggles is a long one, and they tend to cherish every moment of hatred in it”, where this hatred “had been handed down faithfully from generation to

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generation” (in White, 1997: 21). However, this thinking is rejected by White (1997) who argues this largely diminishes the significance of the constitutional question in Northern Ireland, i.e. that Nationalists desire the reunification of an independent Irish Republic and Unionists strive to preserve the Union with Britain. As Wolff states Northern Ireland is a “conflict about fundamentally different political aspirations” (2002: 41).

In reality, there is a middle ground to this. Although, the main aim of the IRA was clearly to achieve a United Ireland (Tonge et al., 2011: 4), the fact remains that “Irish nationalism is overwhelmingly Catholic and unionism is overwhelmingly Protestant and the violent factions of each are more so” (Bruce, 1997: 57). More importantly, their methods displayed a “wilful blindness to the sectarian effects of their violence.” (Patterson, 2010: 338). However, either way, the point remains that the issue of identity, lies at the heart of this conflict. Where, ultimately, any successful transformation of the conflict must address the underlying issue of identity.

2.1.3 The Good Friday Agreement (1998-present)

It was always going to be difficult for a peace agreement to develop which satisfied all sides in Northern Ireland. As Manergh suggests:

[T]he peace process has to resolve much more than the Troubles of the last twenty-five years: it has to address the whole legacy of history and the many unresolved problems inherited from the past (2006: 24).

Nevertheless, on the 22nd May 1998, four years after the IRA called a ceasefire, the people of Ireland (both North and South) voted in a referendum to accept the Good Friday Agreement (Ark Elections, 2018). In essence, however, this agreement wasn’t revolutionary. Many of the proposals, in its Three Strands, were not so dissimilar from previous proposals, made through the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) and the Anglo-Irish Agreement

(1985). This led Sean Mallon, deputy leader of the moderate Nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, to infamously declare that the Good Friday Agreement was simply “Sunningdale for slow learners” (in Tonge, 2000: 39).