Terrorist cosmopolitans : comparative framing analysis and ideological variation in contemporary jihadi propaganda : a case study of Dabiq and Inspire magazine

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Terrorist Cosmopolitans

Comparative framing analysis and ideological variation in contemporary jihadi propaganda:

A case study of Dabiq and Inspire magazine

Master thesis Political Science Author: W. P. J. Noldus

Specialisation: Political Theory & Behaviour Supervisor: Dr. P. van Praag

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Introduction

Over the course of the civil war in Syria we have seen the emergence of the next major Islamic terrorist organisation, the Islamic State (IS). Formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), IS has been subject to many name changes since its foundation in 1999 as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. The organisation now holds large territories in both Syria and Iraq, and on 29 June 2014 declared their territories a worldwide caliphate under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or 'Caliph Ibrahim'.

In many ways IS represents a new and interesting breed of jihadist organisations. Formerly an ally, and founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who also led al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group separated from al-Qaeda in February 2014. One of the key differences between IS and more traditional jihadist organisations such as al-Qaeda, appears to have to do, perhaps surprisingly, with the timing of their respective endgames. Whereas al-Qaeda’s “...grand

strategy does include an eventual, apocalyptic clash between Islamic forces and Westerners, the organization currently believes itself to be at an earlier phase in its plan. Rather than all-out battle with infidels, AQ’s current strategic stage involves executing spectacular terrorist attacks on the West.”(Gambhir 2014: 3). IS, on the other hand, already seems to believe itself

to be in the closing phases of this plan, viewing the young caliphate as a springboard to worldwide domination, and, as we shall see, a means of bringing about the apocalypse. This suggests a strategical difference between the two groups: for al-Qaeda the battle with the West is now, inside every country al-Qaeda holds accountable for perceived injustices. For IS, the real battle with the rest of the world will eventually, and inevitably, arrive at its doorstep in the form of clashes at their ever increasing borders.

Modern jihadi organisations show a strong presence in new media that is prompted by their need to generate support, and necessitated by the inaccessibility of traditional media outlets, who tend not to offer these organisations a platform. This ‘media jihad’ now exceeds the actual military or physical jihad, and, with its sophisticated designs and high production values, disproportionately contributes to perceptions of these organisations’ legitimacy (Awan 2007, 2012). According to Corman and Schiefelbein (2006) the media strategy of jihadi organisations revolves around three elements. Firstly, these movements—and their violent tendencies—must be legitimated by establishing social and religious norms congruent with their actions. The second aim is to propagate the movement by spreading messages to

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sympathisers. Thirdly, opponents must be intimidated. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic state employ deliberate and sophisticated media strategies like these. In attempting theirs, Al-Qaeda’s grasp of the potential of new media technologies is impressive, showing “…strategic

sophistication. They apply message discipline. They are flexible, adaptable and move quickly. They know how to forge, project and drive messages that strike a responsive chord. The tactics basic to any political campaign translate powerfully into tools for winning the ‘war of ideas’”

(Farwell 2011: 127). In an article about al-Qaeda’s use of new technologies Brachman (2006: 149, 162) even goes as far as to suggest that because of their leveraging of new information and communication technologies, the organisation has transformed itself into “an organic jihadi

movement that can adapt to environmental changes, including enhanced counterterrorism policies.” A sophisticated media strategy like this also plays a key part in the operations of IS.

According to Ingram (2015), IS’s “information warfare” can be characterised by three traits: “the use of a multidimensional, multi-platform approach that simultaneously targets ‘friends

and foes’ to enhance the reach, relevance and resonance of its messaging; the synchronisation of narrative and action to maximise operational and strategic ‘effects’ in the field; and the centrality of the Islamic State ‘brand’ to its entire campaign.” Aside from the organisation’s

official media output, there is also a steady stream of propaganda being produced by the Islamic State’s foot soldiers, representing bottom-up initiatives of individual members (Nissen 2014: 4). The way the Islamic State operates and coordinates its media output and propaganda effort is so shockingly adroit, modern and tech-savvy, that it almost comically contrasts its antiquated notions and ideals about society. When comparing IS’s media effort to al-Qaeda’s it “…stands

apart for its sophisticated use and understanding of social media to achieve its goals. Its communication strategy aims to persuade all Muslims that battling to restore a caliphate is a religious duty. The group’s narrative portrays ISIS as an agent of change, the true apostle of a sovereign faith, a champion of its own perverse notions of social justice, and a collection of avengers...” (Farwell 2014: 49). Coordinating IS’s media output is al-Furqan, the production

company of the Islamic state that was created in 2006. According to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s rapport What is audio-visual jihadi propaganda?, even as early as 2010, when hardly anyone in the West could tell you who or what IS was, al-Furqan was already responsible for 9 percent of all jihadi videos, compared to a share of 13 percent for al-Qaeda. The fact that IS’s output was already comparable to al-Qaeda’s at this early stage should be taken as an indication of just how serious they take this “war of ideas”.

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In thinking about jihadi media strategies we also need to consider the significance of the so-called foreign fighter for militant Islamists. Involvement of these, mostly unpaid, combatants in conflicts in the Muslim world has become extremely important to terrorist organisations. Even though they are joining with “…no apparent link to the conflict other than religious

affinity with the Muslim side. Since 1980 between 10,000 and 30,000 such fighters have inserted themselves into conflicts from Bosnia in the west to the Philippines in the east” (Hegghammer

2010: 53). According to Hegghammer, having these foreign fighters volunteering for war may also serve a key stepping-stone into involving them in attacks in their home countries later on. The importance attracting foreign fighters is also affirmed by the effort expended by both al-Qaeda and IS into enlisting them to their cause. Prime targets are marginalised youths in the West, and English language jihadi propaganda has become commonplace. Since 2010 Al-Qaeda has published a digital, glossy, Western-style magazine called Inspire, aimed at this foreign audience. According to Sivek (2013), the magazine’s usage of Western pop, youth, and celebrity culture inspired designs and narratives is likely to resonate with this kind of audience. Furthermore, the magazine medium, has the “…ability to unify audiences through the

construction of communities around topics and through the medium’s distinctive mode of address” and to “…draw readers into their content and … encourage lifestyle changes” (Sivek

2013: 588-589). Not to be outdone, IS has of summer 2014 been releasing its own—even glossier and more professional looking—magazine Dabiq. These two magazines will provide the cases to be examined in this thesis, the topic of which is to compare issue framing used by the Islamic State to issue framing used by al-Qaeda in their respective magazines. The question driving this paper is to ask whether or not the Islamic State and al-Qaeda use specific ways of framing certain topics that propagate their presumed ideological preferences, and whether or not both organisations differ from one another on these topics.

The structure of this thesis will be as follows: chapter 1 will compare the ideology and policy preferences of al-Qaeda and IS on a variety of subject matters, and provide the theoretical basis for operationalizing four issue frames that we expect both organisations to use quite differently in their magazines. This, as well as a brief introduction to framing theory, and the way the theory is used in researching Islamist terrorist movements, will be treated in chapter 2. In chapter 3, our research question and hypothesis are formulated, and the methodology for analysing Dabiq and Inspire on the usage of these four frames is discussed. The results of our analysis will be the topic of chapter 4, while chapter 5 is reserved for further discussion and conclusions.

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Chapter 1, Comparing al-Qaeda and the Islamic State

§1. Introduction

Comparing al-Qaeda to IS a complicated affair. On the one hand the groups appear to be rather similar. Both are radical, anti-Western, Salafi jihadi terrorist organisations claiming privileged access to God’s will. Both are confident enough in this knowledge that their members are willing to stake their—and our—lives on it, and both envision a utopian future in which humanity submits to a global caliphate. Despite these similarities though, both groups behave rather differently. Al-Qaeda’s priority seems to be to focus their efforts on the morally and spiritually corrupt West, attacking the Western countries inside their own borders in an effort to damage them, signify their own emergence as the new virtuous leadership of Muslims, and provoke the United States into attacking those areas of the Islamic world associated with its organisation and affiliates (Blanchard 2007: 5). Opting for a different path, the Islamic State

“…invokes a specific utopian imagination of the resurrection of the Muslim ummah (nation) and the Caliphate (Islamic empire). It rejects the modern nation state and the states created during the colonial period and instead calls for a return of the Caliphate of the Islamic ummah…” (Jabareen 2014: 52). A caliphate which it promptly declared in June 2014 in large

areas of war-torn Iraq and Syria. In this section I will discuss certain key ideological differences and similarities between the two groups.

§2. Salafi jihadi ideology

Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share a common creed, that of the Salafi Movement. The Salafi Movement is a faction within Sunni Islam that has become synonymous with a strict, puritanical, and literalist approach to Islam that shuns innovation by rigorously mimicking the model of the prophet Muhammad. According to Wiktorowicz (2006), three factions can be distinguished within this movement: the purists, who are primarily concerned with maintaining and promoting the purity of Islam as outlined in the Quran, Sunnah, and consensus of the companions (the contemporary followers of Muhammad), but who believe that any political action will likely lead to injustice and corruption until the religion is purified. Then there are the politicos who argue that they have a better understanding of contemporary issues and are

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better suited to implement the Salafi doctrine in a modern context, but who generally stop short of revolutionary action. Finally there is the jihadi faction, who support the use of violence to establish Islamic government and argue that the purist—as knowledgeable about Islam they may be—are either ignorant about the current state of affairs in the world, or are consciously hiding the truth from the people. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State exemplify the Salafi jihadi political universe. A universe that Bhatt (2014) argues is aesthetically and culturally dominated by a linkage between innate violence and political virtue. Al-Qaeda and IS embody a movement that champions the unchanging nature of Islam, so it may seem curious that both arrive at very different ideological positions on how to act in the world. As I will argue, this has a lot to do with their different interpretation of the modern context to which to apply the Salafi creed, and to a much lesser extent with true dogmatic differences of opinion.

§3. Tawhid and the dismissal of rationalism

The central tenet of the Salafi movement is the concept of tawhid, the oneness or unity of God. Tawhid has three components. First, central to all monotheistic religions, it states that God is the sole creator of the universe. Secondly, only God has the right to be worshipped. The third tenet, finally, may seem somewhat inconsequential but actually has some of the most pervasive real-life ramifications. It states that God is supreme, entirely unique, and does not share any characteristics or powers with humans. This has far-reaching implications for humanity’s authority to legislate because as “the Qur’an mentions God as the supreme legislator, humans

are obligated to follow the shari’a in its entirety. To do otherwise is to imply that humans can legislate, a power clearly reserved for God alone. This view of tawhid leads Salafis to reject secularism and the separation of church (or mosque) and state, because these suggest the supremacy of human-made laws and institutions over divine governance.” (Wiktorowicz 2006:

208). In order to safeguard tawhid, Salafi Muslims must strictly follow the Quran and adhere to the purity of Muhammad’s model (the sunnah and hadith). As the supreme example of practising tawhid in this world, his actions and instructions must be emulated in every detail. Finally, Salafis are to be guided by the prophet’s companions (the Sahabah), who are said to have learned from the messenger of God directly. Wiktorowicz argues that for Salafis this makes applying human logic and intellect to these original sources perhaps the most significant and dangerous challenge to pure Islam. What follows from this line of reasoning is a sort of

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for any philosophical system of logic, critical thought, or God forbid, a scientific approach or a historical reading of the sacred texts. The all-encompassing truth is already out there, written down in the Quran, sunnah, and hadith, and the function of religious scholars is to simply see these truths through training and knowledge of the texts. What is more, hard-line salafis believe that whatever Islamic understanding of these sources the Salafi method produces is the correct one by definition. This has to do with a certain favoured and frequently cited hadith. It prophesises that the Muslim community will eventually divide into seventy-three sects, but that only one of those sects follows the true way of the prophet and will be saved; the other seventy-two are said to be hell bound. The salafis believe themselves to be this chosen sect which, ipso facto, means their readings and understanding are undisputable. Of course, forbidding human logic and non-literal interpretation of scripture is far easier said than done, and different Salafi groups still tend to end up with very different ideological positions. The answer to this “…lies

in the inherently subjective nature of applying a creed to new issues and problems. This is a human enterprise and therefore subject to differing interpretations of context.” (Wiktorowicz

2006: 214). So, even though there may be no disagreement on the interpretation of a specific verse whatsoever, it may still prove almost impossible to agree on who or what it is meant for in a modern context. And it is by way of this complication that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State arrive at their diverging ideologies, despite professing the same creed. An excellent example of the difficulties arising from contextual interpretation, and one of the most divisive issues within the Salafi movement, is the debate over takfir, or excommunication.

§4. The debate over takfir

Takfir refers to the practise of excommunication of apostates in Islam. In jihadi Salafism—as

practiced by al-Qaeda and IS—if a Muslim commits apostasy, the only course of action is excommunication, followed by the transgression’s prescribed sanction of the death penalty. However, it is of course difficult to determine whether or not someone has in fact committed apostasy. He or she may act sinfully and live counter to God’s commands, but as long as this individual continues to believe in Islam, he or she remains a Muslim. But should a Muslim stop believing in Islam altogether, there is no saving them and takfir is the only course of action remaining. So the trick is to determine whether someone is a mere sinner, or an apostate. Salafis generally allow for three reasons, short of disbelieving, why a Muslim might commit a sin, thereby distinguishing between belief and behaviour, namely ignorance, coercion, or

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intentionality. The reason why this is such a touchy subject is that “…the practise of takfir is

theologically perilous. “If a man says to his brother, ‘You are an infidel,’ ” the Prophet said, “then one of them is right.” If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation” (Wood 2015). The peril of course lies in the death sentence that

accompanies a false accusation. Al-Qaeda tends to side with the more moderate factions of the Salafi jihadi movement, in distinguishing between belief and behaviour when determining whether or not a Muslim no longer believes in Islam. For al-Qaeda a Muslim who does not act like a Muslim is not necessarily an apostate; he may still believe in Islam, which would make him a mere sinner. IS, on the other hand, seems to take the position that Muslims who act contrary to their interpretation of Islam, or who oppose them, have stopped believing in Islam altogether and are therefore not sinners but apostates. For instance in the article The Fight

against the PKK, these perceived enemies are consistently referred to as “apostate soldiers”

, such as voting, shaving, being a Shiite, or running for office in a foreign government (Wood 2015)

, and the article goes on to talk about “negotiations between the apostates Erdogan and Ocalan”, without going into any signs or proof indicating these people have in fact apostatised. 1_Instead,

their apostasy is treated as self-evident; a highly unusual move, even among fanatics. This, however, has become common practise for IS, who are now reported to declare fellow Muslims to be apostates—and mark them for death—for a stunning variety of offenses

. It would seem the Islamic state has a great deal of killing left to do in the world, and the utter extremism of their position on takfir has caused a considerable rift between al-Qaeda and IS. It eventually led Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor, to distance himself from his former protégé. Al-Malqdisi, “By all measures … the key

contemporary ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual universe…”, according to the 2006

Combating Terrorism Center’s Militant Ideology Atlas, and whose website Tawhed functions as “al-Qa`ida’s main online library”, even wrote al-Zarqawi and urged him to be more prudent and “not issue sweeping proclamations of takfir” or “proclaim people to be apostates because

of their sins” (Wood 2015).

§5. Territoriality and international relations

Another key difference between al-Qaeda and IS revolves around the importance they attach to territory. Al-Qaeda, as an organisation, has no specific need for territorial control of their own as their focus is on “…encouraging lone-wolf Western-based terrorists to attack the West”

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(Gambhir 2014: 1). In principle, this can be done from any country, provided their host imposes no insurmountable constraints on their ability to operate. Furthermore, even though al-Qaeda would eventually see all Muslims rally to their cause and unite in a worldwide caliphate, as a political actor the organisation at least seems to operate as though the current system of world politics, with its nation states and borders, is a political reality which they are not actively seeking to dismantle. In the United States’ Congressional Research Service’s 2007 report Al

Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, Blanchard cites The Liberation of the Homelands

as one of the three foundations of al-Qaeda ’s political ideology, as outlined by their current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Even though the first foundation is The Quran-Based Authority to Govern, and supports the creation of an Islamic state governed by sharia law, the aforementioned foundation has Zawahiri argue “…that reforms and free elections will not be

possible for Muslims without first establishing “the freedom of the Muslim lands and their liberation from every aggressor” (Blanchard 2007: 11), thereby implying that there ought to be

such a thing as free elections. In the final foundation, The Liberation of the Human Being, “Al

Zawahiri articulated a vision of a contractual social relationship between Muslims and their rulers that would permit people to choose and criticize their leaders but also demand that Muslims resist and overthrow rulers who violate Islamic laws and principles” (Blanchard 2007:

11). This, in combination with the organisation’s well documented support of the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, demonstrates al-Qaeda’s tacit endorsement of at least the concept of the nation state, and its inherent characteristics such as territory and borders.

Not so for the Islamic State. Conceptually, to even be considered an Islamic state, let alone The Islamic State, having your own territory is of paramount importance. It would be impossible for IS to operate as an organisation in the way it manages today if it wasn’t for the large territories under their control in Iraq and Syria. However, territory has an even more fundamental place in IS’ ideology, challenging the very concept of modern territoriality and offering a striking “…contrast to modern states in its rejection of the validity of borders.

Modern states seek to control their bounded territories, which are acknowledged by the international community and the UN. However, the Islamic State … seeks to control territory that it believes to be unbounded and elastic and that will expand based on the occupation or ‘‘opening’’ of countries … it does not limit its practical activities to specific or even general borders but rather aspires to continue expanding the Islamic Caliphate until it encompasses the entire world…” (Jabareen 2015: 54). It is important to note that this applies to Western

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instance, tomorrow France were to declare democracy obsolete and replace all its laws with the sharia, IS would certainly approve of their decision. But it wouldn’t quite go far enough for theirs tastes, as France would still be France. The reason this would be insufficient to placate IS has to do with the religious implications of declaring not a, but The Caliphate, and the concept of bay’ah, or the oath of allegiance, to its caliph. This revolves around the rather tricky affair of choosing a legitimate caliph, who “…must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law—

being a Muslim adult man of Quraysh descent; exhibiting moral probity and physical and mental integrity; and having ’amr, or authority” (Wood 2015). In IS’s view, the positioning of

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the one and only legitimate caliph, puts all Muslims and Muslim rulers in a position in which they need to seriously consider pledging allegiance to this man. This is because the hadith Sahih Muslim 1851 states that “one who dies without having bound

himself by an oath of allegiance will die the death of one belonging to the days of Jahiliyyah”.

Jahiliyyah means ignorance, or disbelief, and in IS’s view this means that anyone who fails to offer bay’ah to the one true caliphate and its caliph will die a death of disbelief, and be denied access to paradise in the afterlife. Bay’ah to IS, and therefore the dismissal of the concept of the nation state, has thus become an obligatory requirement for all Muslims. In fact, for those who are able, hijrah (referring to the migration or journey of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina) to the Islamic State is seen as obligatory as well, and “a call for

emigration was published in… Dabiq, affirming that hijrah to the Islamic State is a literal requirement for all Muslims, not just a symbolic request.” (Gambhir 2014: 4). Interestingly,

al-Qaeda and IS may of course not be in disagreement about bay’ah as an Islamic concept at all, but if one does not see the existence of a true caliphate as a reality at this point in time—which al-Qaeda doesn’t—then bay’ah to it becomes a moot point.

§6. Sharia

Declaring the caliphate has brought to light another, albeit subtle, difference between al-Qaeda and IS, in the way both organisations communicate the nature and application of sharia law. As Salafi jihadists there isn’t a lot of disagreement between them on Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh, let alone on the interpretation of sharia law. It is curious and fascinating then, how much more violent and brutal IS seems compared to al-Qaeda. From al-Qaeda we have come to expect— aside from terrorist attacks, obviously—the occasional beheading. But it is nothing like the obscene outpouring of violence IS has unleashed. And it is not just the sheer savagery that

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shocks, it is the unapologetic nature of IS’s violence. Not content in merely carrying out barbarisms, IS shows the need to revel in violence, considering it a cause for celebration. Never before have we witnessed such a steady stream of self-made videos, reports and justifications of these acts. Atrocities like beheadings, amputations, crucifixions, mass rape, acts of stoning, and burning people alive, are acted out with a demented gleefulness that is beyond disturbing.

, because they truly mean business when they say this.

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This high level of violence could be directly related to the act of declaring a caliphate, and what this action means for the implementation of sharia law. In his article What ISIS Really Wants Graeme Wood interviewed Anjem Choudary, a British Muslim and activist who expressed his support of IS. Choundary explained that before the caliphate was established, “…maybe 85

percent of the Sharia was absent from our lives” and that “These laws are in abeyance until we have khilafa and now we have one.” The argument is that “Without a caliphate, for example, individual vigilantes are not obliged to amputate the hands of thieves they catch in the act. But create a caliphate, and this law, along with a huge body of other jurisprudence, suddenly awakens” (Wood 2015). The caliph then, is required to enforce sharia in its entirety, and any

deviation from this duty is grounds for his replacement. And it is precisely this unhappy state of affairs that is now taking place within the territories of the Islamic State, and which is leading to medieval levels of violence. Now, all aspects of law, covering both personal status issues as well as criminal proceedings, and any and all legal disputes must be judged, settled, and if necessary punished, in full accordance with sharia law, as IS chooses to read it. Today, there are only a handful of countries that claim to apply sharia law in full. 3_{However, most of even}

these outliers still maintain codified penal and civil codes that contain elements from other legal traditions. So even among the members of this dubious shortlist IS would instantly stand out and be considered as extreme when it states that it “…actively works to educate its citizens,

preach to and admonish them, enforce their strict adherence to Islamic obligations, judge their disputes, implement the sharia hudud [crimes against God and their associated punishments], eradicate all traces of shirk [idolatry] and heresy…”

4_{For example, in an article called “Clamping Down on Sexual Deviance” IS}

offers us an insight in what everyday life becomes once the sharia hudud is enforced. According to IS homosexuals, or even people who have had nothing more than consensual sexual relations outside of a marriage, may count on little leeway or sympathy. This position “…was

demonstrated recently in Wilāyat Ar- Raqqah, where the Islamic State carried out the hadd

[punishments associated with hudud crimes] on a man found guilty of engaging in sodomy. He

was taken to the top of a building and thrown off, as was one of the traditions … with those who committed this filthy deed. Also in Wilāyat Ar- Raqqah, a woman was stoned after being found

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guilty of zinā [unlawful sexual relations].”5_{For IS then, God’s law has now been firmly}

established within their territory, and with that task completed, their concern has shifted towards its implementation; a shift marked by violence.

So again, disagreement over whether or not a true caliphate has indeed been established may be the reason for this apparent behavioural discrepancy between al-Qaeda and IS. There is no particular reason to assume al-Qaeda would be any less brutal in its preferred enforcement of sharia law than IS, and in an interview with Abu Nasir Wuhayshi, the leader of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, he indeed stated that “Our objectives are driving out the

occupiers from the Arabian Peninsula and purifying its land from them, establishing the law of shariah, the establishment of khilafah…”6_{But since they currently recognize no caliphate and}

the organization formally controls no territories, al-Qaeda is also not obliged to enforce sharia at this point in time. This may enable the organization to refrain from things like cutting people’s hands off for theft, and outright alienating potentially sympathetic Muslims, who may shudder at the thought of such sanctions. Other unpopular actions can thus be refrained from as well, or as Wood puts it “If al-Qaeda wanted to revive slavery, it never said so. And why would

it? Silence on slavery probably reflected strategic thinking, with public sympathies in mind: when the Islamic State began enslaving people, even some of its supporters balked.” (Wood

2015). In 2014 IS began enslaving and selling Yazidi women, girls 10 years and older included.7 These Yazidis were considered infidels and are therefore fit for enslavement according to sharia law. And this decidedly unpopular course of action was not something that was optional for IS, it was obligatory (on pain of death no less, as to not do so would for them be akin to apostatizing). In an article called The Revival of Slavery before the Hour IS explains to the “weak-minded and weak hearted” that “…one should remember that enslaving the

families of the kuffar and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Sharī’ah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Qur’ān and the narrations of the Prophet … and thereby apostatizing from Islam.” 8_So,

whereas sharia enforcement for IS something they have to do, public sympathies be damned, sharia to al-Qaeda is something they would like to do. Something to be aspired to in the future, to make the world a better place once there finally exists a true caliphate. This distinction then, may just be what makes Al-Qaeda a much less explicitly violent organization than IS.

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§7. Liberating sacred lands or ushering in the Apocalypse

Although, as mentioned above, the eventual establishment of a caliphate and establishing the law of sharia is definitely a feature of al-Qaeda’s ideology, it can hardly be called one of their operational objectives. As an organisation, al-Qaeda is much more concerned with Salafi reform in Muslim societies and the necessity of armed resistance to those who, in their view, occupy Muslim lands. “In the early 1990s, Bin Laden emphasized his desire to secure the withdrawal

of U.S. and other foreign troops from Saudi Arabia at all costs. Bin Laden criticized the Saudi royal family publicly and alleged that their invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian peninsula constituted an affront to the sanctity of the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the global Islamic community.” (Blanchard 2007: 2). A position al-Qaeda, according to Blanchard, has

associated with the Islamic principle of ‘defensive jihad’, which entails the (obligatory) Islamic tradition of defending Muslim communities when they are attacked. Al-Qaeda then, has its eyes on worldly goals like expelling non-Muslims from the holy land, ending support for dictatorships in Muslim countries, and—of course—eradicating the state of Israel. They view the plight of Muslims as the result of a “…so-called “new crusade led by America against the

Islamic nations…” and emphasise a belief “…that an emerging conflict between Islam and the West would be fought “between the Islamic world and the Americans and their allies.”

(Blanchard 2007: 3). Al-Qaeda therefore seems to operate much like a secret and subversive political resistance movement.

The Islamic State, on the other hand, holds much more religiously motivated operational objectives, and as an organisation exemplifies the Islamic principle of ‘offensive jihad’. This entails expanding the realm of Islam (Dar al Islam) at the expense of the House of War (Dar

al-Harb). However, their objectives do not appear to stop with bringing the whole world to the

House of Islam. Instead IS seems positively obsessed with millenarian notions of the coming apocalypse. Their expansion is seen as a mere tool for ushering in this inevitable event. For instance, according to Wood, during the final years of the U.S. occupation of Iraq al-Qaeda complained that IS “…saw signs of the end times everywhere. They were anticipating, within a

year, the arrival of the Mahdi—a messianic figure destined to lead the Muslims to victory before the end of the world.” This even led to a reproach from Bin Laden himself when he was warned

in 2008 “…that the group was being led by millenarians who were “talking all the time about

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to arrive. “Al-Qaeda had to write to [these leaders] to say ‘Cut it out.’ ” (Wood 2015). These

apocalyptic notions are quickly confirmed when one reads Dabiq. The title of the magazine itself serves as the first hint at IS’s motivations. Dabiq is also the name of a small Syrian town IS has taken, and where “the Islamic State awaits the arrival of an enemy army … whose defeat

will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse.” (Wood 2015). In an article in issue four of Dabiq

called The Prophecies Regarding The Roman Crusaders IS informs us about this coming

“…final, greatest, and bloodiest battle – al-Malhamah al- Kubrā – between the Muslims and the Romans … This battle ends the era of the Roman Christians, as the Muslims will then advance upon Constantinople and thereafter Rome, to conquer the two cities and raise the flag of the Khilafah over them..” The confusing and bizarre prophecy thus goes as follows: after

their victory in Dabiq, the caliphate will expand to almost cover the entire world. At this point the story becomes even stranger and the Dajjal, or false messiah (the Islamic antichrist) will appear on the scene, and destroy most of the caliphate’s fighters until there are only 5000 left. Thankfully all is not lost, and after a highly effective bit of praying, Jesus will descend to save the day for IS. From the same article: “...when they are preparing for battle and filing their

ranks, the prayer is called. So ‘Īsā Ibn Maryam [Jesus] will descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt as salt melts in water… until ‘Īsā kills the Dajjāl … Thereafter, kuffar and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its justice will prevail on the entire Earth.” In this sense, even though the Islamic State can be mistaken for a country when

one looks at criteria like territory or armed forces, it in fact seems to operate and think much more like a religious cult.

§8. Conclusion

As we have seen, al-Qaeda and IS do share a common religious outlook, but differ substantially on how to interpret the modern context to which it applies. Most noticeable is the difference of opinion on whether or not a true caliphate has indeed been established, and the ramifications this has for applying the religion. Furthermore, IS does appear to take an overall much more extreme position on religious issues like takfir and the expected chronology of prophetic events. In this matter al-Qaeda and IS arrive at very different ideological positions on policy-making. These discrepancies are all the more interesting as ideology linked to Islamic terrorism is often treated in very monolithic terms, a practise that “...with respect to Islamic terrorist movements

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variation…”, and that, “Rather than conceptualize ideology as a fairly pervasive and coherent set of beliefs and values that functions in a programmatic and doctrinaire fashion, we are closer to the mark when we view ideology as a variable phenomenon that ranges on a continuum from a tightly and rigidly connected set of values and beliefs at one end to a loosely coupled set of values and beliefs at the other end…” (Snow & Byrd 2007). IS’s and al-Qaeda’s values and

beliefs appear to cover both ends of this continuum simultaneously; rigidly connected in their Salafi jihadi religious beliefs, and only loosely coupled in their ideas and values on how to apply these beliefs.

In the next chapter we will attempt to relate this comparison between both organizations to framing theory. Additionally, based on the comparison made in this chapter, four issue specific frames will be developed on which IS and al-Qaeda are expected to prefer different framing methods in Dabiq and Inspire magazine.

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Chapter 2, On Frames and Framing

§1. Introduction

This chapter will form the theoretical foundation of our research design. Before moving on to discussing our research methods in chapter 3, this chapter will treat the theoretical concept of framing theory, introduce our definition and usage of framing, and discuss the application of framing theory to Islamic terrorist movements. After this we’ll develop four issue specific frames. The four topics chosen for analysis are al-Qaeda’s and IS’s preferred frames for discussing enemy Muslims; international relations; recruitment for their organisations; and sharia law.

§2. Framing Theory

Framing is a powerful tool for discourse analysis, unfortunately however it has been plagued by theoretical and empirical vagueness. It is because of these vague conceptualizations that Scheufele (1999) argues that the term framing has been repeatedly used to label similar, but very different approaches to social research. Therefore, if we are to use framing in any research design, it is crucial to clearly define the concept, and operationalize it in such a way as to maximise reproducibility and consistency. Scheufele distinguishes between individual frames, which he defines as “…mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of

information…” (1999: 107), and media frames that organize everyday reality and shape its

perception. For the purpose of analysing the content of propaganda magazines like Inspire and

Dabiq, media frames are an obvious choice as this particular medium’s whole raison d’étre is

to perform the task of organizing and shaping reality in the way its authors desire.

One of the most clear and concise definitions of media framing, and the one we will adopt, comes from Robert Entman, who defines the process of framing as “…to select some

aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman: 1993: 52). The two main

aspects of framing then are selection and salience. The desired facets of a perceived reality are selected and made more noticeable and important so as to increase their salience. Furthermore,

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a frame must “…define problems—determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and

benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes—identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments—evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies—offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.” (Entman 1993: 52). For the purposes of this research design fulfilling all these

requirements should be seen as an ideal type frame; a frame need not necessarily contain all four elements. For instance, diagnosing a causal interpretation may be implied or even left out altogether; and the definition of a particular problem may be implied. Moral judgments and suggested remedies however, are required.

In framing research a distinction can be made between issue specific frames and generic frames. An issue specific frame applies to specific topic or event, whereas a generic frame is more broadly applicable, and suited to a variety of topics, contexts, and even timespans. Both approaches have their advantages: “An issue-specific approach …allows for investigation of …

particular events in great specificity and detail. It may capture specific aspects of selection, organization, and elaboration that are present … and pertain specifically to a well-defined issue … In contrast, generic frames … allow comparisons between frames, topics, and, potentially, framing practices in different countries” (De Vreese et al. 2001:109). Both

approaches have their downsides as well according to De Vreese. The disadvantage of generic frames simply being their inability to examine the framing of an issue of event in fine detail, whereas the issue specific frame’s higher degree of detail and issue sensitivity makes it harder to use for comparisons and generalisations, and therefore less suited as a basis for theory building. In the next paragraph we will look at how framing theory can be used in the study of Islamic terrorist movements.

§3. Framing Theory in the study of Islamic Terrorist Movements

The amount of studies done on framing in Islamic terrorist movements has so far been rather scarce. Most of this research has focussed on generic framing, drawing on the framing perspective from the study of social movements that uses the concept of collective action frames. In this section we’ll discuss three papers representative of this method and determine our own approach to our case study of Dabiq and Inspire.

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The research by Snow and Byrd (2007) exemplifies this framing perspective, which they argue “…focuses attention on the process of framing in relation to the development of

innovative amplifications and extensions of, or antidotes to, existing ideologies or discourses, which, in turn, are conceptualized as collective action frames” (Snow & Byrd 2007: 123).

The study looked for the generic diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing techniques that facilitate collective action, used by a variety of Islamic militancy and terrorist movements like a-Qaeda and the Iranian revolution in the 70s. Diagnostic framing was employed to analyse aspects of social life, event, or governmental system as problematic, while prognostic framing suggested specific remedies and motivational framing provided “prods to action”. The authors concluded that the amount of ideological variation and flexibility of these movements is such that one cannot view Islamic terrorist ideology as monolithic.

Research by Page et al. (2011) studied the media output of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Again, this article employed generic diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames for its study, which consisted of a systematic review of the organisation’s e-magazine Sada al-Malahim and was used to uncover and categorise its themes. The authors in this way identified AQAP’s “grievance narratives, ideological justifications for violent

actions, and means to strengthen its credibility among its intended audiences” (Page et al. 2011:

150), which revealed that “the magazine’s contributors are knowledgeable in a wide spectrum

of contemporary political and religious debates … they are also intimately familiar with local issues … and exploit this knowledge as part of their attempt to appeal to a number of different … social groups. The group also demonstrates acapacity for learning at the organizational level” (Page et al. 2011: 169).

Our final example represents a more issue specific approach, analysing the way in which Islamic intellectuals were discussed. In the article Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing

Contests and al-Qaeda’s Struggle for Sacred Authority Wiktorovicz (2004) looked specifically

at al-Qaeda and suggested the credibility of popular intellectuals as a point of contention between al-Qaeda and other non-violent Islamic fundamentalists groups. Wiktorovicz argues that social movements are all about persuasion, and that popular intellectuals are inseparably linked to persuasion attempts through framing processes. Using four issue frames: “(1)

vilification – demonizing competing popular intellectuals; (2) exaltation – praising ingroup popular intellectuals; (3) credentialing – emphasizing the expertise of the ingroup intellectuals; and (4) decredentialing – raising questions about the expertise of rivals” (Wiktorovicz 2004:

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supporting jihad were portrayed as religious experts that were logical, and of sound character and reputation, while opposing intellectuals were painted as uneducated about politics, naïve, corrupt and emotional.

How then, should we apply framing theory to our analysis of Inspire and Dabiq? The research discussed here showed a preference for generic framing. However, the outcomes of this type of research may prove too general for the purpose of our analysis. After all, we are interested in determining whether or not al-Qaeda and IS frame specific topics differently, a task which involves analysing these topics and their nuances in as much detail as possible. An issue specific approach to framing would appear to better allow for such greater specificity and detail. Therefore, even though the generic frame would be better suited for comparisons and generalizations, we will opt for issue specific frames that will be operationalized in the following paragraphs. In order to do this we should look for potential differences in contextual interpretation that could be transformed into variations of issue specific frames. That is to say we should look for specific issues on which both organizations might think and behave differently, and operationalize our frames accordingly. Building on the comparison made in the previous chapter we will design and discuss issue frames related to the four topics mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. These will be labelled: the Apostasy frame, the International Relations frame, the Recruitment frame, and the Sharia frame.

§4. The Apostasy frame

As may be expected, in many of the articles published by al-Qaeda and IS the enemies of both organisations are featured, and both organisations tend to using specific enemy frames when referring to their opposition. In this section we will attempt to formulate such an enemy frame. However, al-Qaeda and IS use very similar ways of referring to or addressing non-Muslim enemies. These are typically referred to as crusaders and infidels, and not much difference between the organisations is to be expected. The way IS and al-Qaeda treat Muslim enemies could prove to be very different though. In the previous chapter we discussed how the practice of takfir or excommunication has been a contentious issue for al-Qaeda and IS. In this section a so-called Apostasy frame (referring to the different criteria used to determine apostasy) is developed and operationalized to help determine whether or not this difference of opinion between al-Qaeda and IS will also be reflected in the frames both organizations use in Inspire and Dabiq when discussing enemy Muslims.

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As we have seen, taking the traditionally extremely laden step of declaring takfir has become a rather straightforward affair for IS. As they have established themselves as the one true caliphate, and the one true sect of Salafi Islam, it is with little difficulty that sweeping proclamations of takfir are made against almost every Muslim acting contrary to their interpretation of Islam. The considerable ire this has drawn from the rest of the Muslim world is ostensibly of no concern, which—considering the amount of sympathy and potential recruits lost—seems to suggest this behaviour goes beyond mere intimidation and may indicate the organization’s almost unparalleled level of sincerity in their fanaticism. If this is indeed the case we ought to expect IS to take a wholesale, indiscriminate approach to its use of takfir in Dabiq.

Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, tends to be much more cautious in their use of takfir, and prefers to label most fellow Muslims who do not conform to their wishes as misguided sinners. In addition to offering them a way to return to the fold, this also safeguards the leadership of al-Qaeda against being branded apostates themselves, should an accusation on their part prove false. Al-Qaeda may very well be completely genuine in its belief that is not their place to practice takfir indiscriminately without first carefully satisfying all prerequisite religious conditions. It may also be the case that al-Qaeda is concerned with the very real possibility of offending large sections of the Muslim world—potential recruits all—on which it relies to replenish its ranks. If either of these scenarios prove true, we should expect al-Qaeda to be cautious in its use of takfir in Inspire.

The Apostasy frame then, will be operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, named Wholesale apostasy framing will be assigned to an article if it features sweeping statements, declarations, or accusations of takfir regarding Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, without being supported by meticulous religious scrutiny and argumentation, or argues in favour of applying takfir in this way. Sub frame 2, labelled Cautious apostasy framing, will be assigned to an article if it features statements, declarations, or accusations of takfir regarding Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, that are carefully constructed through religious reasoning and argumentation, or argues in favour of only applying takfir in this way. Sub frame 2 can also be assigned if, despite statements, accusations, or declarations of actions committed against the organizations principles, the article refrains from declaring takfir, and labels the offenders as deviants or sinners instead. The hypothesis is that, when discussing opposing Muslims, IS will tend to liberally make use of sub frame 1 in Dabiq, whereas al-Qaeda will be inclined to use sub frame 2 in Inspire.

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1 Apostasy frame

(1) Wholesale apostasy framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features accusations, statements, or declarations of takfir regarding Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, without meticulous religious scrutiny and argumentation, or argues in favour of applying takfir in this way, the variable is assigned.

(2) Cautious apostasy framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features accusations, statements, or declarations of takfir that are carefully constructed through religious reasoning and argumentation to Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, or argues in favour of only applying takfir in this way, the variable is assigned. The variable is also assigned if, despite statements, accusations, or declarations of actions committed against the organizations principles, the article refrains from declaring takfir, and labels the offenders as deviants or sinners instead.

§5. The International Relations frame

In the previous chapter we argued that the Islamic State and al-Qaeda think rather differently about territories, other countries, and their respective places in the current world system of politics. This could well have a profound impact on how both organisations view international relations. Here we’ll generate and operationalize a so-called International Relations frame to determine whether or not this difference in attitude towards the outside world is reflected in the way international relations are framed in Inspire and Dabiq.

As we have seen IS has, on the face of it, opted to ignore the concept of borders in favour of the idea that their caliphate will (presumably soon) envelop the whole world. Furthermore, because of the perceived obligatory nature of bay’ah or pledging allegiance to the caliph and the caliphate, IS apparently dismisses the concept of the sovereign nation state altogether. Non-Muslim territories are there to be conquered and absorbed, and Muslim territories are to pledge allegiance and join. In light of this attitude, if it indeed represents the way IS thinks, we should expect IS to be dismissive of traditional international relations as we know them in Dabiq.

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We have also argued that al-Qaeda at least operates as if the current system of world politics and nation states is in effect. Tacitly endorsing elections (albeit conditional on the liberation of Muslim lands), and historically openly endorsing other friendly nation states. Not only that, but if its exhaustive list of demands are met, al-Qaeda has even kindly offered the prospect of peaceful coexistence with the West. Al-Qaeda, even though it formally desires an eventual caliphate, does not necessarily act on this ambition. Instead, it seemed more comfortable as a subversive and violent political actor that strives for real political change. Al-Qaeda does not however, appear to have the inclination to do away with the idea of countries any time soon. If this attitude is reflected in Inspire magazine we should expect al-Qaeda to frame international relations in a more traditional way.

The international relations frame is operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, called Dismissive International Relations framing, will be assigned to an article if it features refusals to recognize borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or the legitimacy or existence of countries altogether, or if the article features unconditional dismissals of peaceful coexistence with the international community. Traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty is here defined as the idea that control of territory is the essence of a state and establishes the exclusive competence to take legal and factual measures within that territory, and prohibits foreign governments from exercising authority in the same area without consent (Malanczuk 1997: 75). Sub frame 2, which we’ll call Traditional International Relations

framing, will be assigned to an article if it (implicitly or explicitly) recognizes the legitimacy

of other countries, borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or offers the prospect of conditional peaceful coexistence with the international community. Our hypothesis is that IS will prefer the use of sub frame 1 in Dabiq, whereas al-Qaeda will tend to use sub frame 2 in Inspire.

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2 International relations frame

(1) Dismissive international relations framing

The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features refusals to recognize borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or the legitimacy or existence of countries altogether, or if the article features unconditional dismissals of peaceful coexistence with the international community as a whole, the variable is assigned.

(2) Traditional international relations framing

The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article (implicitly or explicitly) recognizes the legitimacy of other countries, borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or offers the prospect of conditional peaceful coexistence with the international community as a whole, the variable is assigned.

§6. The Recruitment frame

We have also speculated about the importance of religion for al-Qaeda and IS, and determined that religious motivations play a crucial role for both. However, we established that it al-Qaeda’s motivations may in large part stem from a desire to resist and combat injustices it perceives as being perpetrated by the West against Muslims. IS on the other hand, appeared to be solely motivated by religious fanaticism. In this section we contemplate how these distinctive motivations might relate to recruitment. A so-called Recruitment frame is formulated to help determine whether or not these differences in motivations are also reflected in the way recruitment efforts are framed in Inspire and Dabiq.

Looking at IS’s motivations, their cause appeared to be rooted in a deep-seated sense of millenarianism and apocalyptic thinking; the end of times are near and you had better join the cause while you still have the opportunity. Moreover, the perceived mandatory nature of the concepts of bay’ah and hijrah, suggest that the Islamic State views joining their ranks as the religious duty of all true Muslims, and as the only means of achieving salvation. Considering IS’s attitude towards religious obligations, and the importance it attaches to prophesies, it stands to reason that recruitment attempts ought to impart the grandiosity of the occasion on the

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would-be draftee. If this is indeed so, we should expect IS to frame its recruitment efforts in Dabiq in terms of religious duty and destiny.

Operating much like the self-appointed spokesman for aggrieved Muslims worldwide, we have seen that al-Qaeda is set on attacking the West and evicting the infidels who occupy Muslim lands and besiege Islam. For al-Qaeda there is a clear injustice being done to the Muslim world which has to be resisted and fought. In line with their religion jihad is seen as the religious duty of all Muslim, and a vehicle for getting into paradise, but the organisation’s emphasis appears to be on resistance. If this is the case, it again seems reasonable to assume that these motivations are reflected in al-Qaeda’s recruitment efforts. Because of this we should expect al-Qaeda to frame recruitment attempts in Inspire in term of religious duty and the language of the resistance fighter.

The recruitment frame then, is be operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, labelled Religious Recruitment framing, is assigned to an article if its recruitment efforts feature an appeal to a sense of religious duty, millenarianism, or celestial destiny. Sub frame 2, called

Resistance Recruitment framing, is assigned to an article if it tries to facilitate recruitment by

appealing to a sense of resistance to perceived injustices to the Muslim world. The hypothesis is that, when attempting recruitment in Dabiq, IS will frame these efforts using sub frame 1, whereas al-Qaeda will tend to employ sub frame 2 in Inspire.

3 Recruitment frame

(1) Religious Recruitment framing

The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features statements aimed at facilitating recruitment, appealing to a sense of religious duty, millenarianism, or celestial destiny, the variable is assigned.

(2) Resistance Recruitment framing

The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features statements aimed at facilitating recruitment, appealing to a sense of resistance to perceived injustices to the Muslim world, the variable is assigned.

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§7. The Sharia frame

In the preceding chapter we indicated that IS may appear more violent because of its self-imposed obligation to enforce puritanical sharia in its territories. Al-Qaeda on the other hand was argued to view sharia as more of a lofty, future objective, releasing the organisation from the burden of having to enforce cruel punishments all the time and potentially damaging its image. To help analyse whether or not this difference between IS and al-Qaeda is also reflected in the way both frame topics concerning sharia law, a so-called Sharia frame is operationalized.

IS has given the world an unapologetic insight in what could be viewed as “executive Sharia”. In proclaiming the caliphate the organization has committed itself to ruthlessly upholding and enforcing their interpretation of Sharia law. This action has brought a whole body of law into effect that was formerly mostly dormant, and brought sharia from the realm of philosophy and morality into the everyday world of specific rulings and sentencing. This would explain why IS seems positively obsessed with corporal punishments and executions. This, should it indeed be the case, would lead one to expect IS to frame issues relating to sharia law in Dabiq in an unapologetically violent and explicit way.

For al-Qaeda on the other hand, sharia law appears to be a much more philosophical topic of conversation. Much like most Jihadi organizations, al-Qaeda would welcome seeing Sharia implemented wherever possible. But for now, the organisation would appear to have the luxury of not having to unnecessarily offend those of more delicate sensibilities. Sharia was argued to be an eventual goal for al-Qaeda, viewed and presented as a God’s perfect set of rules for the life of man. If this assessment of al-Qaeda’s attitude is correct, we would expect Inspire to frame sharia law as a utopian goal, and a means of facilitating a moral life and a just society.

The Sharia frame is again operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, designated as Everyday life Sharia framing, is assigned to an article if it, when featuring sharia law or its implementations, focusses on specific instances of sharia rulings, or its violations and their associated punishments. Sub frame 2, named Utopian Sharia framing, is assigned to an article if sharia is referred to as a goal to be attained, or as a means of achieving salvation, morality, or divinely sanctioned social order. Our hypothesis is that, when mentioning issues relating to sharia law, the Islamic State is likely to use sub frame 1 in Dabiq, while al-Qaeda will tend to use sub frame 2 in Inspire.

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4 Sharia frame

(1) Everyday life Sharia framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features sharia law or its implementations, focusing on specific instances of sharia rulings, or its violations and their associated punishments, the variable is assigned.

(2) Utopian Sharia framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features the promise of sharia as a goal to be attained, or as a means of achieving salvation, morality, or divinely sanctioned social order, the variable is assigned.

§8. Conclusion

Now that we have operationalized our four issue specific frames, we can move on to our research methodology in the following chapter. In it we will discuss our research question and condense our expectations put forward for each frame into a generic hypothesis. Furthermore, we will discuss our data set, comprising of the bulk Dabiq’s and Inspire’s articles, and the research methods we shall adopt for our analysis.

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Chapter 3, Methodology

§1. Introduction

As mentioned in the introduction, our study will consist of an issue specific comparative framing analysis of al-Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s online propaganda magazines Inspire and Dabiq. Our methods will be qualitative in nature as they will involve in-depth analysis of articles, and, where appropriate, classifying these articles into either one of the variations of the four issue frames designed in the previous chapter. The research will in essence form a case study of the relatively new phenomenon of glossy online terrorists’ magazines that are aimed at Western, English speaking audiences. The object of this study is to determine whether or not our four issue frames are in fact being used in Dabiq and Inspire and if so, to what extent, and to see whether or not both magazines do indeed frame these issues differently. The relevance of this research lies in attempting to shed some light on several theorised issues of contention and differences in motivations and objectives between the two major Islamic terrorist organisations of our time, that on the surface may appear to rather interchangeable in terms of their ideology.

§2. Research question and hypothesis

Now that we have operationalized our four theorised topics of contention between al-Qaeda and IS into our four issue frames, we can rephrase the question we asked ourselves in the introduction to this thesis into the following research question:

Do al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use specific issue frames in their propaganda magazines Inspire and Dabiq when discussing Muslims that are perceived as enemies, international relations, recruitment, and sharia law, and how does their use of these frames compare?

To reiterate, these four topics for framing analysis were selected because they represent key issues for both IS and al-Qaeda, and because we theorised the expectation that both organisations may differ considerably in the way they frame these issues. As we have argued,

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al-Qaeda and IS appear to arrive at very different ideological positions despite their shared and connected Salafi jihadi religious beliefs. This is mostly due to their different interpretations of the context to which to apply these shared beliefs. In the previous chapter we developed four hypotheses—one for each frame—that for clarity may also be summarized in the following, more generic hypothesis:

Because of a different contextual interpretation of Salafi jihadi ideology, al-Qaeda and IS will tend to use different frames when discussing Muslims that are perceived as enemies, international relations, recruitment, and sharia law.

§3. Data & data selection

The data used for our analysis will consist of most articles from all nine currently available issues of the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine and most articles from all thirteen currently available issues of al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine. Dabiq is an obvious choice as it is the Islamic State’s flagship publication, and main source of ideological output. Inspire was chosen from a multitude of online al-Qaeda magazines as it represents the movement’s most ideologically driven effort, and—just like Dabiq—is aimed at a Western audience. Both magazines represent a similar propaganda tool; an online glossy magazine with a strong focus on ideology, both written in English. The nine issues of Dabiq magazine span a period from June 2014 to June 2015. The thirteen issues of Inspire cover a period from July 2010 until December 2014. Unfortunately there is therefore only a rather small period of overlap in their publications, which means that any potential shifts in the use of certain frames by al-Qaeda in response to its new competitor in IS, can only potentially be observed in the final issue of Inspire (published December 2014) and would therefore be of limited analytical value.

Both magazines feature elaborate artwork and graphic designs, giving them the slick appearance of modern, glossy magazines (see figure 1 for an example). Analysis of the symbolism and meaning of the artwork, pictures and photos in both magazines would no doubt provide further valuable insights into the propaganda operations, ideology, technical proficiency and media savvy of either organisation, but unfortunately this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

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As both Dabiq and Inspire are published as PDF files of varying quality, with some articles consisting of actual text that can be copied and used for queries, and others as image layers that are impractical for lexical searches, all articles included in the dataset have been converted to plain text to allow for consistent analyses. Furthermore, all articles of less than 150 words have been excluded from the dataset as these are deemed too short to be of any value for our framing analyses. Finally, some articles that did fit the 150 word criterion have been excluded as these where either meant solely as contact information, or featured purely technical instructions (mostly about weaponry) without any ideological content. What we end up with is a dataset consisting of 191 articles from Inspire magazine and 145 articles from Dabiq magazine. Article length varied considerably, but under current formatting the data consists of 413 pages of plain text for Dabiq magazine, and 478 pages of plain text for Inspire magazine, making the amount of data available from either organisation quite comparable.

Terrorist cosmopolitans : comparative framing analysis and ideological variation in contemporary jihadi propaganda : a case study of Dabiq and Inspire magazine