A perspective on the Chinese investments in Africa from a Chinese and Western perspective
Bob J. W. ter Horst St. No. 10122966 bob.terhorst@gmail.com
Masters Graduation Thesis
Political Sciences – International Relations
Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences
Research Project: Food production and Natural Resources use Graduate School of Social Sciences
February – June 2014
Supervisor: Dr. R. J. Pistorius Second reader: Dr. R. M. Sanchez Salgado
ABSTRACT
The goal of this research is to understand what the Chinese grand strategy entails and to what extent this could help understand the Chinese investments in Africa. Chinese investments in Africa are seen as controversial in Western media as China is accused of solely ‘grabbing’ African resources. As the Economist (2006) states for example: ‘’China just wants Africa’s oil, ores and timber – plus its backing in the UN’’.
This research finds that the Chinese grand strategy, to the extent it appears to exist, is far more complicated and multifaceted than depicted by Western media. It is over simplified to state that China ‘just wants resources and political backing’.
In order to understand what the Chinese grand strategy does entail in Africa this thesis uses Western international relations theories and – as Chinese international relations theories do not exist – the Chinese core concepts of thought to understand the Chinese grand strategy and the Chinese investments in Africa. The plurality of Western international relations theories and Chinese core concepts of thought are used as ‘lenses’ in order to view the spectacular phenomenon the Chinese investments in Africa is.
Chapter 1 – Chinese investments in African resources 1.1 Introduction ... 3
1.2 Thesis outline … 4
1.3 Objectives behind the Chinese presence in Africa … 4 Chapter 2 – On China’s foreign policy
2.1 Chinese investments in African resources from a Western perspective … 7 2.2 A historical background on Chinese foreign investments … 8
2.3 Chinese investments in the traditional IR framework …10
2.3.1 Chinese involvement in Africa placed in the (geo)political spectrum …11 2.3.2 Variations on realism and China’s balancing efforts? … 13
2.3.3 Liberalism and structuralism: the explanatory power and weaknesses … 17 2.4 The (neo) realist Chinese strategy in Africa? … 19
2.5 Conclusions … 22
Chapter 3 – The unique Chinese grand strategy
3.1 China’s foreign policy on Africa from a Chinese perspective … 24 3.2 The absence of Chinese international relations theory … 25
3.3 The core cultural concepts of Chinese thought … 26 3.3.1 The core cultural concept of Shi … 27 3.3.2 The core cultural concept of Identity … 28 3.3.3 The core cultural concept of Strategy … 28 3.4 Chinese ‘aid’ or investments? … 29
3.4.1 Chinese ‘aid’ and Western aid; differences and parallels … 29 3.4.2 The purpose of Chinese investments labeled ‘aid’ … 31 3.5 conclusions … 32
Chapter 4 – The Chinese grand strategy in Sudan and Angola 4.1 Chinese investments and aid in Sudan and Angola …33
4.1.1 The controversial relationship between China and Sudan … 33 4.1.2 The Angolan-Chinese relationship … 33
4.2 Sudanese and Angolan policy regarding Chinese investments and aid … 36 4.2.1 The mutual interest of Sudan and China … 36
4.2.2. Angolan efforts to attract Chinese investments … 38 4.3 The differing perceptions of Chinese investments … 39 4.4 Sudanese and Angolan stakeholders and interests … 42 4.5 Conclusions … 45
Chapter 5 – Conclusions
5.1 The explanatory power of the realist and neorealist theories … 46 5.1.1 Adding ‘Chinese characteristics’ – The case of Sudan … 46 5.1.2 Adding ‘Chinese characteristics’ – The Angolan Case … 48
5.2 The Chinese grand strategy confronted with findings from the case studies … 49 5.3 Revisiting the Chinese grand strategy … 50
Chapter 1 – Chinese investments in African resources 1.1 Introduction
One of the most significant events in the last few decades globally has been the rise of China. Since the Chinese economy opened up under the economic liberalization policy of Deng Xiaoping thirty years ago, the Chinese economy grew approximately 10 per cent a year on average (Carmody, 2013: 27-33). The scale of China’ s transformation is vast. Between 1978 and 2005 the Chinese trade volume increased 70 fold and the Chinese share in world trade increased from 0.8 per cent to 7.7 per cent (Zhao, 2006: 4). In 2002 China overtook the United States (US) as the biggest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Breslin, 2007). As of 2011, China consumes 53 per cent of the world’s cement, 48 per cent of the world’s iron ore and 47 per cent of world’s coal.
Illustration 1: China’s commodity consumption 2000-2007
(Sebastian, 2008: 2)
As seen in the illustration above, the need for resources and energy seems to increase with time. In order to meet Chinese demand for resources and commodities, China is increasingly focusing on the African continent and its abundant resources. The Chinese interest in Africa translates into investments in African resources, the subject of this thesis. The increasing involvement of China on the African continent is a manifestation of the remarkable transformation of China’s foreign policy over the last 10 to 15 years (Tull, 2006: 460). Although there is a debate on the scale, scope and nature of the Chinese involvement in Africa most experts agree that China has been seeking a more active role in the international
system. China has intensified and deepened existing ties and has expanded its bilateral ties around the world. Some argue that this strategy is part of China’s so-called grand strategy. This thesis will elaborate on the Chinese grand strategy and analyze Chinese investments in African resources. In order to understand Chinese investments in African resources this thesis combines the traditional Western international relations theories with the Chinese foreign policy and its Chinese characteristics. To what extent could this help to understand Chinese practices in Africa? On the basis of case studies in Angola and Sudan this thesis will answer the question: What does the Chinese grand strategy entail in Africa? How can it help to analyze Chinese investments in Angola and Sudan?
1.2 Thesis outline
In order to provide an answer to the research question this thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter will introduce Chinese investments in African resources and provides a background on the subject. The second chapter introduces the Western perspective on African investments, the traditional international relations theories and tries to analyze to what extent the Chinese foreign policy could be labeled as (neo) realist. The third chapter introduces the Chinese grand strategy, the Chinese core concepts and Chinese ‘aid’. The fourth chapter projects these theories on the cases of Angola and Sudan. The Western and Chinese theories and perspectives are combined in order to understand the Chinese grand strategy and how this grand strategy could help to analyze Chinese investments in African resources. The fifth and final chapter presents the synthesis and revisits the traditional Western international relations theories and their explanatory power on this particular subject and confronts the Chinese grand strategy with findings form the case studies.
1.3 Objectives behind the Chinese presence in Africa
The ascent of China in the international system is of world historic importance and the increasing influence of China in Africa is arguably the most important development in the post-independence era (Arrighi, 2007; Taylor, 2009). Seventy-three of the 500 largest companies in the world are Chinese. While China’s economic growth has complex reasons and actors involved in it, its economic ascent is mostly a reflection of the power of Chinese transnational corporations (TNCs) which account for more than 50 per cent of the Chinese exports (Breslin, 2007; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005). The Chinese economy has undertaken economic liberalization as part of its efforts to join the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The power of the Chinese state to regulate transnational flows of trade and investment in TNCs domestically would therefore appear to be declining, confirming the dominant hypothesis of the decline of the state (Strange, 1996). However, as China is liberalizing for example agricultural tariffs and local content requirements, its efforts to promote overseas investments have gone global. Two years after China’s accession tot the WTO it officially introduced its ‘go out’ or ‘go global’ policy (Brautigam, 2009). Under this policy Chinese companies are encouraged through tax and financial incentives to invest overseas. Rapid economic growth fuelled China’s demand for resources, which are large sourced through Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and the imperative of opening up new markets. This strategy is very successful from a Chinese perspective; according to some sources China surpassed the US as Africa’s biggest trading partner as early as 2009 (African Business, 2009; van Dijk 2009).
Whilst for example the US and Brazilian trade with Africa experienced rapid growth as well, the Chinese growth is the most spectacular because of its vast growth, size and geopolitical importance. The Chinese interest in African markets is also increasing, and there are other motives for China in addition to resource access. Van Dijk (2009: 11-12) argues that there are eight different objectives behind the Chinese presence in Africa. These are to assure the supply of raw materials for China, including agricultural products, in order to:
- Create a market for Chinese products and services - Obtain land for agricultural purposes
- Channel migrations of Chinese people to Africa - Gain diplomatic support from African countries
- Present an alternative to the Western development model - Provide an alternative to Western development cooperation - Emphasize China’s status as a superpower
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNDTAD) (2007) report states as well that natural resources are at the heart of FDI flow to the African continent. Increases in investment flows are directly linked to global demand for energy and commodities such as oil, copper and zinc (UNCTAD, 2007). Trends in Chinese investments in African resources however, have to be placed in the broader context of globalization and the expanding economic relation between Africa and the rest of the world (UNCTAD, 2007). Information
on these trends also has to be treated with caution, as information and statistics in Western media tends to overstate the Chinese influence on the African continent as box 1 indicates. Where the general objectives of China to establish greater presence in Africa are stated above, the next chapter will place the Chinese objectives in a broader context and discuss the political and geopolitical implications of Chinese investments in Africa.
Chapter 2 – On China’s foreign policy
Africa has long been perceived as a region by-passed by globalization. Howeer, in recent years things changed in this regard. There is now a massively increased interest in Africa, especially from Asian countries and China in particular. Since the initiation of China’s ’go out’ or ’go global’ policy China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) has grown at a vast pace, reaching 246 billion US dollar by the end of 2009 (Brautigam, 2011: 752). How should these events be incorporated in the existing theoretical framework and what is the appropriate theoretical lens these events should be viewed with? This chapter will provide an overview of the relevant traditional theoretical international relations perspectives or lenses through which the Chinese policy is perceived by the West – realist, neo-realist, neoclassical realist, liberalist, structuralist – and further discusses the changing role of the state with regard to Chinese investments in African resources.
2.1 Chinese investments in African resources from a Western perspective
Chinese investments in Africa are met with mixed responses. Quotes on the Chinese-African relationship present an example of this. Xi Xiaoyan, the Chinese ambassador to Ethiopia and a permanent representative to the African Union (AU) characterizes the Chinese-African relationship as follows: ‘’ The unique features of Africa and China relationships are based mutual benefit, brotherly and equal respect; we will continue our friendship with Africa irrespective of the noise from outside’’ (Abebe, 2013). On the same Chinese-African relationship, the former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton stated that ‘’ Africans must not prepare themselves for second colonization’’ (Abebe, 2013). Hillary Clinton further told aid recipient countries in a conference on aid to ‘’ be wary of donors who are more interested in extracting your resources than in building your capacity’’ as an advise (Glennie, 2012). Chinese intensified cooperation with African countries is increasingly drawing the attention of the Western world. The question of why China is investing heavily in Africa, still regarded by some as the continent of famines and catastrophes, is often answered with China’s
increasing need for resources and commodities as a result of the Chinese economic growth. China ‘’just wants Africa’s oil, ores and timber – plus its backing in the UN’’ as the
Economist (2006) summarized China’s ambitions in Africa. The central point in criticism by Western countries is on China’s lack of political conditionalities in the awarding of loans or aid, the notorious non-interference policy, and the lack of transparency in which Chinese
investments in Africa take place, as box 1 indicates. How is this, and how should the Chinese practices in Africa be understood? This chapter provides a perspective from a Western point of view, starting in the next paragraph with a historical background on Chinese foreign investments.
2.2 A historical background of Chinese foreign investments
With the end of the Cold War, the US appeared as the World’s only dominant power, economically and militarily. Together with European and Japanese allies, the US promoted through the international financial institutions and trough bilateral diplomacy and aid programs a particular vision of what constituted ‘good governance’ in African states. This model of development essentially comprised a free market economy and liberal democratic policy and is in line with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ (Craig and Porter 2006). Both material interests and ideals informed this Western hegemonic geopolitical and economic vision. A free market economy allowed Western business and continued resource exploitation, while liberal democracy was to prevent excessive government intervention in the economy (Joseph, 2009). During the Cold War, Western powers supported African autocrats such as Mobutu in Zaire as anti-communist bulwarks. In the 90’s their supposed natural preference for democracy reasserted again (Sandbrook, 1993). While the Western promotion of good governance encountered limited acceptance and even resistance in Africa, its overall impact was to reinscribe Western dominance on the continent (Van de Walle 2001). This effort posed a challenge for Chinese actors in asserting their presence and influence as the 2000s progressed and as Chinese policy makers increasingly prioritized Africa.
From a Western point of view the Chinese ‘March into Africa’ is often presented as a threat to Western interests and to African states (Mawdsley 2008). However, China’s trade with Africa has to be seen as a part of its broader global expansion. Trade with Africa accounted for only 3 per cent of China’s total international trade in 2007. Nevertheless, Africa is very important to China, more than statistics might suggest. Angola, for example, is China’s single largest supplier of oil and Africa’s largest supplier of oil. Whereas the US imports 19 per cent of its oil from Africa, China imports 31 per cent of its oil from Africa making the continent in this respect far more important for China than for the US (Taylor, 2009). According to Tony Blair (2008), China has over the course of the last few years, gone from a ‘standing start’ to being the most influential player on the continent. China appears to have created ‘‘a systematic
coherent soft power strategy, and set of power tools to implement that strategy’’ (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6). Soft power however, appears to be something different for China than it is for the US. Kurlantzick (2007: 6) states that ‘’it means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations’’. It appears that the Chinese use mostly hard economic power but use it cautiously or ‘softly’. Joseph Nye (2008) states in this regard the possibly more appropriate term is ‘smart power’. China’s strategy in Africa is in line with the philosophy of heping juequi which translates to ‘peaceful rise’. The heping juequi strategy is the only realistic option for China to seek space in the international system given the US hegemony. With regards to the heping juequi strategy former Chinese Prima Minister Wen Jiabao stated that China’s ascent in the international hierarchy would ‘not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a treat to any other country’ (Kurlantzick, 2007: 38). China did not want to transform other countries as the US tried to do in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the US wanted to implement democracy with violence. China rather works through and with existing social relations and formations. The fact that China works trough existing social relations and formations such as networks is one of the reasons African state elites are so eager about Chinese investments. The Chinese approach in fact supported the existing distribution of power and corruption and also mirrors the structure of the African state itself (Bayart, 1993).
The Chinese government is much less prescriptive about domestic governance than Western governments are and has shown to be willing to work with highly authoritarian, repressive regimes and autocratic leaders as well as with more democratic states such as Zambia and South Africa.
The flexible and adaptive role, which China takes on in their approach of the African continent, which Western observers dubbed as ‘market-extremism’ or ‘neo liberalism with Chinese characteristics’ has been dubbed the term ‘flexigemony’ by Carmody (2011). The key elements of the Chinese flexigemony in Africa might be summarized as follows:
- China prioritizes economic over political and security concerns
- China uses a combination of economic, political and military levers in flexible strategic combinations in order to assure the continued supply of raw materials.
- China does not use direct military force to secure its interests, but rather uses economic power or proxy sub-contracting.
- China is domestic and international sovereignty strengthening its partner states. That is to say China is not normalizing or standardizing but rather works through extant institutions and state-society formations
- The Chinese flexigemony is reinforced by high-level visits as a form of public diplomacy in order to build inter-state trust.
Where the US hegemony is coercion tempered by consent to neoliberal standardization such as the Washington Consensus, a flexigemony is a more geographically differentiated and pragmatic strategy which varies the mix between these elements without attracting the wrath of the hegemon, the US (Carmody, 2011: 80). The Chinese flexigemony in fact approximates the British or Dutch colonial policy of indirect rule via existing networks.
To what extent is the Chinese flexigemony part of a larger, coordinated plan of the Chinese government? The following chapter goes deeper into the Chinese grand strategy and discusses the Chinese cultural core concepts and projects these concepts or Chinese characteristics on Chinese ‘aid’.
In order to understand and clarify the Chinese investments in Africa one could use the traditional, Western, theories from the international relations field. To what extent are these theories usable as lenses to explain Chinese practices in Africa? The next paragraph will deal with that question and analyze classical realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism, liberalism and structuralism and their explanatory power in regard to Chinese investments in Africa.
2.3 Chinese investments in the traditional IR framework
In order to understand and clarify the Chinese investments in Africa one could use the traditional, Western, theories from the international relations field. To what extent are these theories usable as lenses, in order to explain Chinese practices in Africa? This paragraph will deal with that question and analyze classical realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism, liberalism and structuralism and their explanatory power in regard to Chinese investments in Africa.
2.3.1 Chinese investments in Africa placed in the (geo)political spectrum
Chinese investments in African countries have come under heavy scrutiny. Investor states such as China perceive these investments not only as an answer to their need for raw materials but also as a way to gain political influence, as African states could provide investor states with diplomatic and political support as well. According to Sebastian and Warner (2013) these investments are one aspect of calculated FDI strategies and central to geopolitics.
Box 1 ‘Land grab’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo?
In 2007, Digital Congo a news website and radio station in Congo, reported that ZTE – a major Chinese telecom equipment and services company with investments in the DRC going back to at least 2000 – planned to invest one billion US$ in a joint palm biofuel venture estimated to cover 3 million hectares of land (Digital Congo, 2007) This would have been a enormous investment and concession which would, according to Digital Congo (2007) ‘create with immediate effect hundred thousand employments’’.
In August 2007 however, the DRC’s council of ministers approved the proposed project at 100.000 hectares. In a January 2008 interview with Le Potential the Chinese ambassador to the DRC said that the ZTE project would cover an estimated 300.000 hectares. Three months later, a report of the Associated Press however, stated that the project would still cover some 2.8 million hectares (Brautigam, 2010) News coverage on the figures kept fluctuating; in May 2009 ZTE stated it would invest 880 million US$ in 200.000 hectares of land ‘abroad’. In February 2010, Africa-Asia Confidential finally reported that the Congolese government had offered 250 hectares, not 2.5 million or 250.000, just 250 hectares. According to the Congolese ministry of Agriculture in 2010 ‘nobody talks about it anymore’ (Brautigam, 2010).
With regards to this exemplary case regarding the overstating and misreporting of Chinese land acquisitions Olsson (2010) states: ‘’There is a widespread misreporting on Chinese agricultural land acquisitions in Africa, hence there is a pressing need for reliable data and for claims of ‘land grabbing’ to be verified in authoritative sources’’. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), who themselves reported on this particular case of land acquisition, added: ‘‘there is a common external perception that China is supporting Chinese enterprises to acquire land abroad as part of a national food strategy. Yet the evidence for this is highly questionable’’ (FAO, 2009).
This paragraph will position the Chinese investments in African states in a geopolitical perspective in order to provide a framework in which the point of view of various stakeholders regarding these investments can be placed and in order to provide a better understanding of what the Chinese grand strategy in China entails. To be able to do so, first of all China’s ‘soft-power’ approach and ‘oil-diplomacy’ will be discussed.
The Chinese growth has required a concerted economic internationalization and with it changing foreign policy discourses. These changing foreign policy discourses bring China binationally and multilaterally closer to other countries and have great implications for the international geopolitical spectrum (Power and Mohan, 2010: 1).
Although China claims the closer ties with African nations and the economic interaction is based upon harmonious cooperation and is of a peaceful nature, part of China’s internationalization is and extension of a relatively new pragmatic vision of development. This vision of interaction based on development cooperation is growth-oriented and market-based leading some, mostly Western observers, to characterize it as ‘market-extremism’ or even neo-liberalism or neo-realism with ‘Chinese characteristics’ (Power and Mohan, 2010: 2-4).
In China’s pursuit of this growth-oriented strategy, a number of African countries, in particular those with endowed with natural resources, have occupied the center stage in China’s foreign policy as they are considered to be potential sources or raw materials to fuel China’s economic growth. This is considered by some, in particular by Western powers, as a shift from ‘ideology’ to business. With this business centered approach comes the ‘soft-power’ approach as introduced by Joseph Nye (Nye, 2004) Taylor and Alden (2007) add that this soft-power approach comes with China’s so-called oil-diplomacy in which unconditional aid, low interest loans and technical support are used to cement bilateral deals over important resources such as oil and trade agreements. The mostly Western critique on this approach is summarized by Tull as follows: ‘’Beijing uses the pillars of its foreign policy, notably unconditional respect for state sovereignty and its corollary, non-interference, in the pursuit of its interests, be they energy security, multipolarity or the “One China”1 principle. To achieve
1 The ‘one China’ principle refers to the view that Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a single ‘China’ (Tull, 2006).
these goals, Beijing is prepared to defend autocratic regimes that commit human rights abuses and forestall democratic reforms for narrow ends of regime survival” (Tull, 2006).
To strengthen the claim that China has made a shift from ideology to business and to underline the importance China attaches to regime survival, Wang (2011: 69) states that under former president Hu Jintao Beijing has formulated a new development and social policy. This policy is geared towards continuing the promotion of tenable economic growth with an emphasis on good governance, the stimulation of domestic consumption, perfecting the financial system, the lessening of social tensions and the improvement of the social safety net. As Chinese exports have suffered from the global economic crisis since 2008 the need for such economic and social transformation has become more urgent (Wang, 2011: 71). With this prospected changes in mind the Chinese leadership redefined the purpose of China’s foreign policy. As Hu Jintao announced in 2009, Chinese diplomacy should ‘’safeguard the interest of sovereignty, security and development’’. The state councilor for external relations, Dai Bigguo, further specified this announcement by stating that the core interests of the Chinese foreign policy are: first, China’s political stability, namely the stability of the CCP leadership and the socialist system; second territorial integrity, national unification and sovereign security; and third, China’s sustainable economic and social development (Wang, 2011: 71).
These claims seem to add up, as a unique feature of China’s leaders’ understanding of Chinese history is their persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats. From ancient times on, Chinese regimes have been brought down by a combination of internal uprisings and external invasions; something the current ruling elite wants to prevent by all means.
2.3.2 Variations on realism and China’s balancing efforts?
Political realism is a theory of political philosophy that seeks to clarify and model political relations (Moseley, 2005). Projected on the rise of China, realists caution that if China is to maintain its domestic economic growth and grows its international financial strength, the world will undoubtedly be confronted with significant security competition between the US and China, challenging the US hegemony (Waltz, 1979).
During the 1990’s there was a debate in the US foreign policy community about whether the US post-cold war hegemony could be sustained over a longer period of time, or if it was a
‘uni-polar moment’ (Layne, 2008). Realists argue that this uni-polar situation is currently the situation the world finds itself in. The uni-polar situation is however increasingly threatened by China’s ascent. The rise of China is likely to push the US out of Asia, as the US pushed the European powers out of the Western hemisphere (Mearsheimer, 2005). China’s defense budget has significantly increased the last two decades and, as realists argue, this demonstrates that China is indeed seeking to balance the US hegemony (Krauthammer, 2006).
Although the link between realism and international theory is still strong, it is less prevailing than it used to be, according to Donnelly (2000). Realism has many versions, but the central thought is that states are the main actors in world politics and that states primarily focus on their own survival and security (Jervis 1998). Realists argue that there is no overarching actor to regulate the interaction between states, states therefore are supposed to live in a power vacuum. International institutions, NGOs, TNCs and individuals are less influential in this view. The realist theory envisions man as self-oriented, hungry for influence and power. Relations between states are therefore mostly power relations determined by military and economic competences and experience. Thomas Hobbes argues even that ‘’human nature is egocentric and leaning towards conflict unless there are conditions under which humans may coexist’’ (Waltz 1979). Realists believe ‘’that a state must constantly have in mind the actions of the state around and must use a realistic approach to solve problems as they come’’ (Moseley, 2005). Realists such as Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1948) have the assumption that ‘’the struggle for power is universal in time and space’’ and ‘’the daily presence of force and recurrent reliance on it mark the affair of nations’’. Therefore, Waltz (1979) sees security as a factor that would guarantee ‘’a less dangerous and less violent world, rather than a safe, just, or peaceful one’’.
Realism’s focus on power is epitomized through the ‘balance of power’ theory. This foundational concept explains that the behavior of states is driven by the need of states to find stability or parity between competing force, typically through the formation of alliances and military power (Kurki et al, 2010). Realism sees world politics as a ‘zero-sum’ game and with the complexity of multiple actors, regardless of efforts to balance effectively, conflicts are and never will be far away (Kurki et al, 2010). These arguments and views from realism make that realism consolidates an overwhelmingly cautionary message. Essentially, realism emphasizes that states must exercise a proactive and pragmatic approach to security and world politics and have a healthy distrust of other states and their intentions. The balance of power theory,
in the classical sense, expects this to manifest itself as a security competition, in which the US hegemony is challenged by China. In reality, as paragraph 2.2 indicates, the flexible and adaptive role which China takes on, dubbed by Carmody (2011) as flexigemony seems to fulfill this role.
When realism is used a ‘lens’ to understand China’s foreign policy in Africa, it is only able to explain several parts of the China’s behavior in the international arena. One could argue from a realist perspective and state that China is indeed focusing on its (economic) survival by securing their future need for resources with investments in African resources. Glaser (2010) states that Beijing views American power and the relative position of China as a critical factor in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy. In this view, the Chinese foreign policy on Africa could be seen as a balancing effort of China, relatively to the US. Nevertheless would realism a lens only explain part of the equation. Why, for example, would China attach such great value to political support from African states in multilateral organizations such as the WTO? Clearly, the ascent of China in the international system underlines the importance China attaches to the international system, which is not compatible with the realist argument in which states are assumed to operate in a power vacuum.
Neorealism is based on the ideas of realism. The difference between realism and neorealism is that the realist focus primarily on the human nature and on individuals whilst neorealism has a broader scope and focuses primarily on the international system. Neorealist theory views state security as an objective and power as a tool to reach this (Drulak, 2003). Waltz (1979) takes over the idea of the violent, non-changeable nature of human beings and therefore of international relations, the concept of the power equilibrium and the importance of the security dimension of the international the international system. Waltz (1979) states that, although the state remains the most important, its behavior is influenced by the nature and rules of the international system (Drulak, 2003). Gilpin (2001) views that the security, strive for higher efficiency and the relations between the current global powers – the US, Western Europe, Japan, Russia and China – will continue to be the driver for the global economy. Gilpin sees changes in power between the global powers as a result of the hunger for supremacy and technological improvements (Drulak, 2010). Gilpin (2001) expects it to be ‘’highly unlikely that these powers will leave the distribution of the global production and the impact of economic forces on their national interest fully up to the market’’.
Gilpin presents in his study of War and Change in World Politics a model of the dynamics of changing political systems, based on five propositions:
- The international system is stable if no state believes that is profitable to change the status quo (Gilpin, 1987);
- A state will attempt to change the power balance if the expected benefits exceed the costs (Hummel, 2007);
- A state will seek change through territorial, political and economic expansion until the marginal cost of further change exceed of equal the marginal benefits. (Hummel, 2007);
- Once a balance between the costs and benefits of further expansion is reached, there is a tendency for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support this status quo (Gilpin 1987: Hummel, 2007);
- If the balance is not reached or interrupted then ‘’the system will be changed and a new balance reflecting the redistribution of relative capabilities will be established (Hummel, 2007).
The rate of economic growth and developments amongst states is therefore regarded by Gilpin (1987) as a major factor in explaining the rise and fall of great powers.
As with realism, neorealism as a lens to understand China’s foreign policy is insufficient because it only explains China’s practices partially. For example Waltz (1959) argument that international relations are violent is not applicable with China’s ‘non-interference’ policy or the Chinese heping juequi (peaceful rise) philosophy. Although with neorealism efforts have been made to include a wider variety of factors and move away from the purely realist interpretation, more needs to be done in order for realism to be a sufficient theoretical lens to understand China’s foreign policy in Africa. Areas such as religion and culture are overlooked whilst this would emphasize how a variety of factors are at work at different levels in the international system. Another issue of neorealism is that it is only able to explain several political outcomes whilst it is unable to explain the behavior of the state. In order to address this issue, neoclassical realism was developed.
Neoclassical realism is based on neorealist theory and developed in order to complete its view and can be seen as the third generation of realism. The key question for neoclassical realist is how we are able to explain foreign policy behavior that is different from the demands of the system structure (Lobell et al, 2009). The main issue with neorealism is that it only explained several political outcomes whilst it neglects the study of the state’s behavior. Therefore, neoclassical realism adds domestic intervening variables between systemic incentives and a state’s foreign policy decision (Schweller, 2003). Important areas such as culture and religion however, are still not addressed.
2.3.3 Liberalism and structuralism: the explanatory power and weaknesses
The ascent of China in the international system increased China’s involvement in numerous multilateral organizations (Nye, 1998). China’s initial passive participation has shifted to a proactive participation and an active contributor (Qianqian, 2010). Liberalists state that this demonstrates the increasing confidence China exerts in the international system. Beijing views forums such as the WTO as useful institutions and mechanisms fro moderating and managing relationships spanning economic, security and political spheres. This demonstrates in the liberalist view that Beijing sees institutions as a more feasible way to handle and protect its economic interest, than a drive for military power. Besides this, multilateral organizations restrain and moderate China’s foreign policy as it encourages cooperative actions and reinforcing norms amongst other member states (Qianqian, 2010). In the liberalist view the growing interdependency of states acknowledges that China’s preference is to resolve disputes through peaceful measures.
The roots of liberalism lie in the broader liberal thought which originated in the enlightenment. Liberalism presents a concept that includes enlightenment, development and rationalism. It comprises the concept of individualism, freedom and state restrictions. Liberalism draws upon the ideas of idealism as it rejects some of the aspects of idealisms, such as the possibility of changing human nature for the better. Liberal theorists believe that friendly cooperation and long-lasting peace is possible between nations. Liberalists believe that a democratic society is based on the protection of rights and that the free market mechanism will assure peace in al global merit (Burchill et al, 2001). In contrast to realism the liberal thought does see the state as the major player in the international system.
Institutions, TNCs, national corporations, individuals and public opinion are seen a major actors.
Liberalism gives a partial explanation for China’s economic policy. First of all, Deng Xiaoping’s policy of opening up the Chinese economy, and more recently liberalizations as part of China’s efforts to join the WTO and other multilateral organizations are to be viewed through the theoretical lens of liberalism. Apart from this, the dramatic increase in Chinese military spending over the last two decades and other important outcomes of the Chinese foreign policy other than economic cannot be explained sufficiently in this liberal frame.
Structuralism dominated development economics during the 1960s. Structuralism views development as a process of dynamic change. It suggests that when making decisions on investments, taking only the market mechanism in consideration is not reliable. Structuralism argues that there should be interventions in the market mechanism in order to support development. In particular if states try to catch up with more developed states, intervening in the markets mechanism is crucial (Gerschenkron, 1962). Where Gerschenkron emphasizes on state intervention in market when a state is catching up with more developed states, Keynes states that government intervention is desirable in other situations as well (Chu, 1998).
Structuralism applies in particular to the Chinese foreign policy. As the theoretical lens suggests, taking only the market mechanism in consideration is not reliable. This applies to the Chinese ‘go-out’ or ‘go-global’ policy where the Chinese government, via institutions such as the EXIM bank of China, stimulates Chinese corporations to invest outside of China. It applies as well to China as a developing state, as Gerschenkron (1962) states; the Chinese state should intervene in the market in order to catch up with more developed nations. Structuralism applies however solely to the Chinese economic policy and is therefore per definition not ‘the’ lens to understand the Chinese foreign policy with.
On the basis of the traditional International Relations theoretical lenses it is fair to say that not one theory or theoretical lens can explain the Chinese foreign policy or any country’s foreign policy. Consequently one must incorporate parts of the traditional theoretical International Relations lenses into a ‘plurality of lenses’ in order to get the most accurate understanding possible of the Chinese foreign policy in Africa and the world with these traditional, Western, lenses.
The (neo) realist lens seems to be the most popular lens for western observers of the Chinese grand strategy. To what extend could the Chinese grand strategy in Africa be characterized as such? The next paragraph will elaborate on this.
2.4 The (neo) realist Chinese grand strategy in Africa?
Only a decade ago when China was still defining its position in the international arena the Chinese influence in Africa was very limited. The current influence and importance Africa has for China is however tremendous. Muldavin (2012) argues that China’s importance should not be underestimated in terms of scale, scope and the speed of transformation.
China’s emphasis on (resources) security as an objective and the power China uses as a tool to reach this in the international system is a strong indicator that China operates on a neorealist bases. With regards to the Chinese growing influence in Africa, Jiang (2009) states that China has its resource demand externalized through global sourcing and production whilst attempting to decrease domestic – Chinese – environmental destruction and land losses. This ‘externalized resource demand’ has led to many international investments in, amongst other continents, Africa and is accompanied by Chinese Aid and FDI. Jiang (2009: 588) argues: “Such a heavy demand for energy and raw materials has led to two major structural imperatives for China. One is to find ever more energy and resources within Chinese borders and to develop them as fast as possible. Another is the call by central government for Chinese enterprises to “go out,” that is, to go around the world to explore and extract additional energy and resources. High energy and commodity prices prior to the recent world economic recession added urgency for such an external push. Given Africa’s rich endowment of energy, minerals and other key resources, it is only natural that Chinese enterprises would see the continent as a new frontier. In other words, a major structural requirement for China’s continuous industrialization drive is to enter Africa aggressively and extract energy and resources, very much along the lines of what it has been doing at home for decades." (Jiang, 2009: 588)
China’s continuing rapid economic growth and expanding influence and involvement in the global arena poses major implications for the power structure of the international system. Especially China’s growing industries are influencing China’s goals. Eisenman and Kurlanzik (2006) state that ‘’they (China’s growing industries) demand new energy, exporters want new perspective markets, the county needs backing in international organizations and its
propaganda seeks support from allies to progress Chinese interests’’. In this regard Kurlanzik and Eisenman, just as the before mentioned Van Dijk (2009: 11-12), characterize the Chinese interests in China not solely as a resource grab but also as a way of opening up new markets. In addition and to support this, Kurlanzik and Eisenman (2006) argue that China tries to spread the Chinese culture across the African continent, make the two-way tourism flow more attractive and attempts to create long-lasting relationships with ‘African elites’. Wang (2009) states that Chinese officials defend Chinese interests in Africa as a brotherhood between developing countries. Wang (2009) states that China’s interests in Africa are a combination of dynamic changes in the Chinese domestic market, Chinese aspirations to open up new markets and international political factors.
Sperbee (2009) notes that Africa is a crucial element in China’s grand strategy, mainly for ‘’its geopolitical importance, large untapped market and its natural resources – in particular oil and gas’’. The neorealist view is perceived by mainly western actors to be the most fitting for the Chinese approach to Africa in this respect. As Drulak (2003) states ‘’neorealist theory views state security as an objective and power as a tool to reach this.’’ This seems describes the way and motivation for China to get involved in Africa in a relatively precise manner. State security in this respect has to do with the access the Chinese state and Chinese businesses want to have to the African resources and the African markets. The power as a tool to reach this is expressed in the relationship, which China is able to forms with African states as part of their flexigemony. These relationships between China and African countries are formed and discussed at informal meetings and formal meetings such as summits and multilateral diplomatic congregations such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summits. In the last 2012 FOCAC summit in Beijing it was acknowledged that China has played a vital role in the recent economic development. With regards to Chinese investments in Africa and the Chinese ‘’go out’’ strategy the Chinese government stated at the FOCAC summit:
‘’The Chinese government will continue to encourage and support capable and reputable Chinese companies to invest in Africa, and guide Chinese companies to establish processing and manufacturing bases in Africa, help raise the added value of African exports, and increase investment in such service sectors as business services, transport, consulting and management to raise the level and quality of cooperation.’’ (FOCAC, 2012).
Further statements regarding the Chinese – African cooperation at the FOCAC 2012 meeting in Beijing include the statement that: ‘’The two sides continue to prioritize agriculture and food security in the China – Africa cooperation’’ and ‘’Facilitate access for African agricultural products to the Chinese market’’ (FOCAC, 2012). Regarding investments, China states that financial institutions are encouraged to support cooperation between China and African companies in agriculture, fishery and aquaculture (FOCAC, 2012). At the FOCAC (2012) meeting China stated that it viewed strong complementarity and cooperation potential between China and Africa in energy and resources and that the two sides will encourage and support joint development in this field. Because of the mutual interest in African energy and to emphasize the importance the establishment of a future specific forum on ‘’China – African energy exchange and cooperation’’ is considered.
According to Eisenman and Kurlanzik (2006) these meetings and conferences, that are regularly held to strengthen and deepen Chinese – African ties, give space for China to secure its position of an generous and benevolent actor and with it, secure China’s access to African strategic resources and serve its China’s (neorealist) goals.
Box 2 The Chinese Export-Import bank and the China Development Bank The Chinese EXIM bank and the China Development Bank (CDB) both are Chinese financial institutions and SOEs used for implementing the policy of the Chinese state. For example; the Chinese EXIM bank carries out the Chinese aid program and the CDB established the Chinese African Development fund that was the result of the Beijing summit of the FOCAC.
The focus of both institutions is to promote foreign trade and investment, as well as
development assistance and concessional funding. In contrary to other countries, the EXIM bank exists in a universe of other Chinese institutions (such as the CDB) with a similar mission. The EXIM bank distinguishes itself from these other institutions by being the sole provider of concessional loans. The amount of loans and aid provided by the bank is not exactly know as the bank does not publish figures. US officials estimate however that it finances more than the G7 group of industrialized nations does. The financial times estimated that the EXIM bank and CDB combined provided at least more than 110 billion US$ to countries and companies.
2.5 Conclusion
This second chapter provides an overview of Western international relations theories, which are projected on the Chinese investments in Africa. The first paragraph discusses Chinese investments in Africa from a Western point of view. The second paragraph provides a historical background on Chinese foreign investments. The third paragraph discusses realist; neorealist; neoclassical realist, liberal and structural theories and looked to what extent these are able to understand and clarify Chinese investments in Africa.
Realism introduced the ‘balance of power’ theory, which provided an interesting view as it stated Chinese investments in Africa and increasing military expenditure could be seen as counterbalancing the current US hegemony. However, realism as a lens to understand the Chinese investment in Africa is insufficient as a it is too unrefined and has several substantial flaws such as the undeniable importance of the ascendance of China in the international system. The same goes for neorealism and neoclassical realism, which are based on classical realism. Even though they follow-up classical realism and are more refined, neorealism and neoclassical realism prove to be insufficient lenses for viewing Chinese investments on the African continent as well. In the first place because factors such as religion and culture are overlooked, in the second place because neorealism explains only several political outcomes, but neglects the study of the state’s behavior (Schweller, 2003).
Liberalism as a lens turns out to provide only a partial explanation of the Chinese investments in Africa as well. In the first place because liberalism is mostly applicable on China’s
economic policy, which is only a part of Chinese investments in Africa. The same goes for structuralism. Structuralism only provides clearance on economic aspects of the Chinese foreign policy. On the basis of this analysis of traditional Western international relations theories, it is safe to say that not one single theory, school of thought or ‘lens’ is able to explain sufficiently the Chinese investments in Africa, the Chinese foreign policy, or any other countries foreign policy. One must incorporate the lenses in order to get the most accurate understanding possible with the traditional, western lenses. The fourth paragraph discusses perceived neorealist elements of the Chinese strategy. China’s growing influence and Chinese investments in Africa are in Western media commonly portrayed as neorealist. Chinese access to African resources is seen as China’s main objective in Africa and the Chinese power is seen as a tool to reach this. The fourth paragraph points out whilst this may be partially the case, (neo)realism, as mentioned before is only part of the Chinese grand strategy. The following third chapter will elaborate on the Chinese grand strategy.
Chapter 3 – The unique Chinese grand strategy
There is a debate amongst scholars whether and to which extent there is a coordinated Chinese ‘grand strategy’ for Africa. The Chinese government officially issued its policy on Africa in 2006 with a policy whitepaper (Zhaoxing, 2006). However, scholars such as Ian Taylor argue that there is no coordinated strategy on Africa. Taylor argues that outcomes on the ground are the result of the negotiation process and that the Chinese government most of the time does not know what individual Chinese businesses in Africa are doing. Others, such as Carmody and Owusu (2007) argue that while there may be no articulated grand strategy for Africa, there are structural imperatives for China in Africa, such as the necessity to secure access to resources and shape the Chinese engagement on the continent. Related to Carmody and Owusu (2007), Schuller and Turner (2005: 9) argue that Chinese companies are seen by the Chinese state as part of its ‘geopolitical positioning’ in Africa since SOEs contribute to an overall program of foreign economic policy yet many of the companies involved do not see their role in Africa as part of a wider geopolitical practice as there are multiple points of disjuncture between the activities of SOEs and this wider foreign policy. Chinese policymaking and its implementation are characterized by Lieberthal (1992) as a system of ‘’fragmented authoritarianism’’ wherein the social relationships between private and public actors are coordinated. Due to this coordination, an important aspect of the Chinese grand strategy, Wang (1998) argues that it is impossible to make a distinction between the public and private in China. Based on the officially issued policy paper in 2006 it is safe to state that China has a grand strategy and that China’s Africa policy is an important aspect of this grand strategy. Li Zhaoxing, (2006) the former Chinese minster of Foreign Affairs states that with this policy white paper the Chinese government ‘’wishes to present to the world the objectives of China’s policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them’’.
How should these objectives and measures of the Chinese foreign policy be interpreted in an international relations framework? This chapter starts with China’s foreign policy on Africa viewed from a Chinese perspective and answers the question why there is no Chinese international relations theory. As an alternative to the non-existing Chinese international relations theory the Chinese core concepts of thought and debates on these concepts are presented. The Chinese core concepts provide an insightful view on Chinese thinking, as will be demonstrated by projecting these concepts on Chinese investments or ‘aid’ in Africa.
3.1 China’s foreign policy on Africa from a Chinese perspective
The increasing involvement of China on the African continent is a manifestation of the remarkable transformation of China’s foreign policy over the last 10 to 15 years (Tull, 2006: 460). Although the nature, scale and the scope of the transformation and change China is going through is still debated, most China watchers agree that China has been seeking a more active role in the international system. China has intensified and deepened existing bilateral ties, has expanded its bilateral ties around the world and joined regional and multilateral institutions dealing with security and economic issues. As a result, China’s foreign policy is now considered more confident, dynamic, sophisticated and flexible than it was some 15 years ago (Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, 2003: 2). China’s policy towards Africa has it roots in the crisis surrounding the crackdown of the protests at the Tianmen Square on 4 June 1989 and the strong and persistent critiques by the Western world against Beijing’s human rights record ever since (Taylor, 1998: 2). The criticism resulted in an arms embargo imposed by the US and the European Union. The arms embargo and persistent criticism by the West induced China to seek closer ties to non-Western countries. Developing countries therefore became a ‘cornerstone’ of the Chinese foreign policy (Tull, 2006: 460). African states played an important role in the new Chinese approach, in particular because of their numerical weight. Many African states were under Western pressure to liberalize their political systems as well and therefore willing to go along with China’s claims that the Western criticism on the Chinese human rights was an imperialistic manoeuver to interfere in China’s domestic politics (Tull, 2006: 461). Perceived as an conflict between developed and developing states or as an North-South conflicts, this discourse proved to be an powerful glue whereby China constructed a common identity with African states against the paternalistic Western states. Together with this, China increased its financial and technical assistance to African countries substantially (Taylor, 1998: 450).
A second reason for China to seek a more active foreign policy course in the post 1989 period was the expected emergence of the uncontested unipolar hegemony of the US. Muekalia (2004:10) argues that China feared that uncontested US hegemony would hold back China’s ascendancy as a global political power. In order to find an answer to this problem, China advanced the concept of multipolarity, a concept very similar to the afore mentioned concept of flexigemony in which Beijing constructs more or less flexible relations to contain every form of hegemony and to construct a new and just international order (Tull, 2006: 461; Carmody, 2011). In order to bolster China’s international position Beijing reaches out to
non-Western states in its vis-à-vis with the US and uses its room to maneuver within international bodies such as the UN Security Council (Economy, 2003: 244).
In the late 1990s a third reason for China to view a global foreign policy as a sheer necessity occurred. China’s economic strength was to a fairly large extent based on its dynamic integration in the world economy and the 1997 financial crisis in Asia alerted the Chinese government to the risks of this interdependence and the vulnerability of China’s outward-oriented economy to external factors. Because of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, regional and international stability, mainly but not exclusively in economic terms, turned into an strategic objective for China (Weinstein, 2005). Therefore, China modified and broadened the conceptualization of its national and international interest. If external events could jeopardize China’s continued economic growth this could increase social tensions in the country’s already precarious domestic situation, which in turn could endanger the political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party. In response to this, Beijing regarded a more active global foreign policy the best strategy to defend and assert its national interest. This more active global foreign policy included the expansion of China’s bilateral relations with African states. Accordingly, China’s increasing engagement in Africa does not imply one specific policy toward the continent. Rather it is an important part of a larger policy trust, which includes the intensification of the Chinese engagement in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia as well (Tull, 2006: 462).
3.2 The absence of Chinese international relations theory
China currently has no Chinese international relations theory (IRT). As China has a long intellectual tradition and has always been a major player in the international arena, the fact that there is no major Chinese IRT is remarkable (Zi, 1998: 13). Yaqin (2007) states that three reasons for the absence of Chinese IRT stand out.
First of all, there is a lack of an awareness of ‘international-ness’. Chinese culture does not clearly define the world as an entity. The Chinese ‘world’ referred to everything under heaven and earth. China, specifically the emperor’s palace in Beijing was seen as the center point of this world. This traditional worldview was practiced in the so-called ‘tributary system’ – a system centering around and governed by the Chinese emperor, which lasted for nearly 2000 years until the 19th century. This system was not an international system because no legal equality existed between states. The tributary system was an enlarged system of the Chinese
domestic system and left no room for ‘international-ness’ and kept Chinese thinking very isolated (Yaqin, 2007: 324).
The second reason for the absence of Chinese IRT is the dominance of Western international relations theories. As China’s rich intellectual traditions could have provided China with Chinese IRT, this did not happen. China failed to modernize in the mid- and late nineteenth century when it met the West. The sudden realization by the Chinese of their backwardness changed ideas on their country, traditions and themselves. This realization, strengthened by the defeat in the second Opium War in 1860, created an unbridgeable fault in Chinese intellectual history, which eventually led to the collapse of the tributary system, the Chinese state and Chinese cultural traditions. Chinese culture was believed to be backward because of its conservative nature and neglect of sciences (Lui, 2006). The Chinese school of thought collided with the Western school of thought, which led to the Western school of thought gaining the upper hand and becoming the dominant discourse. Ever since, no matter what is theorized in scholarly circles about, the core is Western. Therefore, no specifically Chinese IRT has been established (Lui, 2006; Yaqin, 2007: 326).
The third reason why there is no Chinese IRT is the lack of a theoretical hard core. Social theory must have a hard core, but in the learning process, this is what is missing in China’s international relations community. The Chinese intellectual tradition used to have a core but with the modernization in the beginning of the 20th century this broke up (Yaqin, 2007: 328). As an alternative to the non-existing Chinese IRT, the Chinese core concepts are presented in the next paragraph.
3.3 The core cultural concepts of Chinese thought
The Chinese past is very important to the modern day Chinese society and state. Its rich past and many ancient, deeply ingrained, traditions exert great influence on the modern Chinese society. Yaqing (2012) and Liqun (2010: 15) argue that the Chinese society is characterized by these deep-rooted traditions together with rapid, modern, transformations in development and in China’s relation to the international society. The Cultural core concepts are, as the name implies, very important concepts in Chinese culture. The core concepts, in the absence of Chinese IRT, could be used as ‘tools’ to understand the Chinese foreign policy and be seen as the specific ‘Chinese characteristics’ noted by Mohan in paragraph 1.4. The core concepts provide an insight in Chinese thinking, on, amongst others, the Chinese foreign policy on Africa.
3.3.1 The core cultural concept of Shi
The post-1945 period can be divided into three periods according to dominant thought of Chinese leaders. The first period revolves around the confrontation between the imperialist and the socialist world, the second period around the three worlds theory and the third period around the relationship between the West and East and the South and North. These thoughts seem to derive from the Cold War structure, which is partially the case. The term derives from the overall structure and the Chinese occupation with the larger context wherein actions take place, which is a typical element in Chinese culture (Yaqing, 2012: 2). The meaning of the term in this context is ‘mega-trend’. (Yaqing, 2012: 3). The identification of the shi is a central concern in the Chinese global foreign policy. This is mainly because of Chinese holistic thinking and philosophy of change. The Chinese have always attached importance to the ‘bigger picture’ when taken decisions or in situations of change (Liqun, 2010: 17).
With regards to international relations, shi, the general situation in the world, involves two aspects: the international power structure and the distinctive feature of our times (Liqun (2010: 18). An understanding of the distinctive feature of our times is the starting point of fundamental change in the Chinese worldview. China could not have ascended in the international system since 1979 without altering its perception of the distinctive features of the modern era – no longer revolution and war, instead there is peace and development. Identifying these distinctive features of our times represents major considerations for Chinese scholars and their debates on China’s foreign policy. These debates focus on the characteristics modern times and the nature of the international system. Specifically, this concerns the Chinese relationship with the current international system and it provides a crucial window in China’s foreign policy and China’s perception of the international system. Guoji geju is contained in the concept of shi and reflects Chinese concerns on the global power structure and refers to the Chinese understanding of the international power configuration (Liqun, 2010: 18). As China used to occupy a central position in the regional structure in East Asia mainly through the use of soft power in its conduct of foreign relations, this resulted in a weak sensitivity to the emerging Western powers. China lost the confrontation with these powers, which resulted in a 100 years of colonization (Liqun, 2010: 18). This has learned China to attach great value to sovereignty and to acknowledge the significance of hard power. It has also made China become more sensitive to the global power structure. The understanding of the global power structure therefore naturally becomes the primary starting point of foreign policy debates conducted by Chinese scholars (Liqun ,
2010:180). Liqun (2010: 180) further states that the key question shi implies are: who is the dominant power? Can this power maintain the peace and stability in the world? What are the broad trends of development? In order to answer these questions and issues Chinese leaders attach great value to the mastery of broad trends in the current world situation.
3.3.2 The core cultural concept of Identity
The second cultural core concept in Chinese thinking is ‘identity’. In contrary to Western use of the term it does not derive from the ‘entity approach’ but rather from a ‘process approach’ in the Chinese way of thinking. According to traditional Chinese thinking there is no such thing as a single, fixed identity. Identities are rather perceived as fluid and changing all the time. Relations are the most important aspects of social live in the Chinese society. The Chinese believe identity and power are both defined within the network of relations (Liqun, 2010: 19). Yaqin states that rationality is the key concept in Western thinking and culture and became represented in China’s after its opening-up policy and the adaptation of reforms. Rationality is seen as individually based; people are perceived as selfish and working in their own interest. In the Chinese society people do not think in this rational, individualistic way, they rather think in a relational manner. Chinese believe actors maintain and manage relations in the international global power structure and that actors may enjoy multiple identities and relations, which may be complementary (Yaqin, 2012: 5).
China, it line with thought on identity, attaches great importance to its role and position in the global power structure and the international system. China regards its position in these systems as a major factor in defining national interest and formulating diplomatic strategies. The Chinese place a greater emphasis on the context than on independent individuals. Since relations define the context, the context of identity is closely related to the afore mentioned concept of shi (Liqun, 2010: 19).
3.3.3 The core cultural concept of Strategy
The third core cultural concept in the discourse of Chinese academics regarding the Chinese foreign policy is diplomatic strategy (Liqun, 2010: 22). Strategy in this context refers to the mastery of using various instruments and means in order to realize national interest and goals. Strategy is closely related to the cultural core concepts of shi and identity. China has a tradition of strategic, long-term thinking with an emphasis on the bigger picture to which the strategy applies. China is increasingly confronted with more complex diplomatic tasks related
