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Western representation of the Muslim

Brotherhood as a political actor in the

aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian

Revolution

The extent to which US newspapers made use of Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives and neo-orientalist frames to report on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, Morsi’s 2012 constitutional declaration and the 2013 intervention by the Egyptian Armed Forces

June, 2015

Eva Huis in ‘t Veld, 10000576

Supervisor: Dr. V. Matthies-Boon | Second reader: Dr. M. Maussen 18,962 words

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction 1  

2. Western media reporting on the Middle East; a discourse that includes

propaganda, stereotyping and conflict 4  

2.1. Functioning of the US media system 5  

2.1.1. The US market-based news model 5  

2.1.2 The issue of representation when reporting on the Middle East 6   2.2 Discourse analysis; the relation between language, discourse and power and the effect it has on the increasing politicization of Middle Eastern studies 8  

2.2.1. Discourse analysis as a theoretical approach 8   2.2.2. The politicization of Middle Eastern studies 9   2.3 Dominant discourses in reporting on the Middle East 11  

2.3.1 The Western liberal capitalist democratization narrative applied to a

Middle Eastern context 12  

2.3.2. Neo-orientalist frames in Western media 14   3. Egypt; its political relation to the US and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 15   3.1. The US-Egyptian historical relationship 16   3.1.1. Authoritarianism in Egypt and the US as a political and financial partner 16   3.2. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, political Islam and its relation to

democracy 18  

3.2.1. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its democratic ability and

legitimacy 18  

4. Detecting neo-orientalist and Western liberal democracy frames through

quantitative and qualitative analyses 21  

4.1. Quantitative study: data collection and codebook 22   4.1.1. Data collection: determining the timeframes 22  

4.1.2. Data collection: quantitative sample 23  

4.1.3. Codebook quantitative study 24  

4.2 Qualitative study: data collection, discourse analysis and structure 25  

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4.2.2. Discourse analysis and the relation between language, power and

discourse 26  

4.2.3. Structure of the analysis 27  

5. Quantitative analysis of the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood during the

aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 28  

5.1 General information about news articles on the aftermath of the 2011

Egyptian Revolution 29  

5.1.1 Use of sources 29  

5.1.2. Style of news articles 31  

5.2. Use of language in news articles on the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian

Revolution 33  

5.2.1. Quantitative measurement of neo-orientalist language 33   5.2.2 Quantitative measurement of Western liberal capitalist democratization

language 36  

6. Qualitative analysis of the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood during the

aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 38  

6.1. Timeframe one, reporting on the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections 38   6.2. Timeframe two, reporting on Morsi’s 2012 constitutional declaration 41   6.3. Timeframe three, reporting on events leading to the 2013 intervention 45  

7. Conclusion and discussion 49  

8. References 52  

Appendix I: Codebook quantitative study 60  

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1. Introduction

The 2011 major protests that are now referred to as the Egyptian Revolution, in which the Egyptian people asked for ‘bread, freedom and social justice’, eventually led to the downfall of former dictator Hosni Mubarak. With pressure from Western

diplomats, who were quick to reduce the demands of the Egyptian Revolution to a call for formal democracy (Matthies-Boon & de Smet, 2013), elections were held fast. As a result of these parliamentary elections that were held between November 2011 and January 2012, a majority Islamist parliament was installed. After this, presidential elections in June 2012 forced the Egyptian people to choose between the two

candidates from the political parties that were actually able to organize themselves on such short notice: Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, who represented the Mubarak regime. Even though the parliamentary and presidential elections were thus procedurally correct, they did not necessarily represent the will of the people or the revolution (Hamoud, 2013; Matthies-Boon & de Smet, 2013). The Brotherhood’s economic practices, which were in line with neo-liberal reform but framed in traditional Islamic terms, did not pay any real attention to decreasing poverty and inequality. Besides this, Morsi issued his controversial

constitutional declaration in November 2012, in which he sought to unite all branches of government under his control. Deep dissatisfaction with Morsi led to major protests in 2013 and eventually to the army intervening and removing Morsi from office, motivated by providing a human solution and a prevention of further escalation of street violence. Even though the military may have had other motivations to

intervene, the Egyptian people might perceive the intervention as a second revolution rather than a coup against a democratically elected president (Matthies-Boon & de Smet, 2013).

The current mainly commercial US media system functions in a way in which journalists are considered to take on a dominant role by providing entertainment and act cynical (Brants & van Praag, 2006). In terms of reporting on the Middle East, this behavior often leads to journalists using neo-orientalist frames that are inspired by historical narratives and colonial reasoning. They depict the inferiority of the East, opposed to the superiority of the West (Tamboukou, 1999), or in other words: the

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struggle between primitivism and civilization (Tuastad, 2003). This depiction of primitivism often results in portraying Arabs as irrational, hotheaded and disorganized in their practicing of politics, opposed to Westerners, who practice politics in a more organized and institutionalized manner (Regier & Khalidi, 2009). Within this neo-orientalist framework, especially since 9/11, Islam is often presented through a discourse of securitization (Kumar, 2006) in which it is depicted as a political threat in terms of it being dangerous, undemocratic, violent and that it should only be practiced in the private and not the political sphere (Mavelli, 2013). Opposed to this Middle Eastern primitivism stands Western civilization, which is often portrayed through Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives. This narrative, that promotes a constructed notion of Western experience as a universal ideal to be mirrored by the rest of the world, can also be called Westocentrism (Mikula, 2008). Attention is primarily paid to the superiority of liberal democracies and free-market economies instead of factors like social justice and economic rights, while it seems to be the latter that people actually protested for during the Arab Uprisings (Hanau Santini & Hassan, 2012; Moghadam, 2013; Teti, 2012; Teti, Thompson & Noble, 2013).

Apart from the more general negative stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims and the promotion of liberal forms of democracy through Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives, it is of high importance to mention the relationship between the US and Egypt under authoritarian rule. For several decades, the US has been offering economic and military aid to the Egyptian regimes, in exchange for stability and Egypt’s commitment to join the US war on terror (Brownlee, 2004; Sharp, 2015). The good relationship between the White House and Egypt’s

authoritarian leaders, and the amount of influence it gave them, might give the idea that the US was not excited to witness Mubarak’s downfall in 2011. What followed was the earlier mentioned push by Western diplomats for quick democratic elections (Matthies-Boon & de Smet, 2013), which eventually installed an Islamist parliament and brought Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi to power. Academics differ highly on the Brotherhood’s ability to be part of the democratic order and the legitimacy of its ruling, before as well as after the 2013 intervention by the Egyptian Armed Forces. Whereas opponents emphasize on the Islamic character of their politics and how this

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clashes with democratic principles before the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Khalil, 2006; Servol, 2003), it seems to be the illegitimacy of their rule, backed by Western governments who pushed for democratic elections after the downfall of Mubarak in 2011, that characterizes this debate after the 2013 intervention (Hamiltion, 2013; Hamoud, 2013; Matthies-Boon & de Smet, 2013). Proponents on the other hand emphasize Morsi’s legitimacy, since he was a democratically elected president (Bennis, 2013).

Besides the fact that it is interesting to see how the media moves behind portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as on the one hand violent and undemocratic Islamists and on the other hand Morsi as a democratically elected president, it is also interesting to see how neo-orientalist frames are used to negatively stereotype the Arab world in general, and Egyptians in particular. This is why three timeframes in which key events took place are examined, being the November 2011 to January 2012 parliamentary elections, the issuing of Morsi’s November 2012 constitutional declaration and the May 2013 buildup that eventually led to the intervention by the Egyptian Armed Forces. They do not only represent the three periods in which the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood gained, tried to exploit, and lost power, but possibly also give a good indication of the US’ changing interests. Initially, during the parliamentary elections and the issuing of Morsi’s constitutional declaration, neo-orientalist inspired attitudes towards Islamic rule are more likely to be found. When the US eventually realized that they could in fact profit from the Muslim

Brotherhood’s implemented liberal economic policies, these negative attitudes are likely to slowly become more positive. Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives are then more likely to be used to emphasize Morsi’s democratic legitimacy and to condemn the intervention of the Egyptian Armed Forces as a coup. The aim of this dissertation is hence to examine to what extent US newspapers make use of Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives and neo-orientalist frames to report on the Muslim Brotherhood during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Answering this question will first of all give us more insight into the extent to which colonial reasoning, expressed through neo-orientalist frames, is still used in reporting on the Middle East, and the extent to which liberal democracy promotion is used to underline the superiority of the West. But beyond the

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stereotyping, bias and framing, this paper will also provide insight into the relation between neo-orientalism and Western liberal capitalist democratization, and how these narratives might be tied to the political interests of the US in Egypt. This paper tries to find evidence that might state that the Muslim Brotherhood served these interests, if not because it in the first place served their own interests in terms of electoral success.

This paper is divided into seven chapters, from which the first chapter is this

introduction. Second, chapters two and three provide insight into the Western media’s reporting on the Middle East in terms providing a discourse that consists out of propaganda, stereotyping and conflict, and on the US-Egyptian relationship under authoritarian rule. In these chapters attention will also pay attention to the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic ability, and the academic debate on this before and after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Third, chapter four will elaborate on the methodological underpinning of the quantitative and qualitative analyses that were performed during this study. The results of these analyses will be presented in chapters five and six. The conclusion and discussion will be presented in chapter seven. In this chapter, the theoretical and practical implications of this study will be elaborated on. Last, a reference list is provided, followed by several appendices to clarify some methodological decisions.

2. Western media reporting on the Middle East; a

discourse that includes propaganda, stereotyping and

conflict

To gain more insight into how the Muslim Brotherhood is portrayed in US news media during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, a discourse analysis will be performed. Before further going into detail on patterns that can be found when reporting on the Middle East and Arabs in general, and Islam an the Muslim

Brotherhood in particular, it is important to first gain some basic knowledge in how the US media system functions. After this is explained, the issue of misrepresentation

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in terms of the sources that are being used to report on Middle Eastern news is elaborated on. Third, discourse analysis as a theoretical approach, and the relation between language, discourse and power is explained and applied to the Middle Eastern context. Attention in this section is also paid to the politicization of Middle Eastern studies, and who profits from this. Last, the effects that this development has on the use of narratives and frames currently used in news reports on the Middle East is elaborated on.

2.1. Functioning of the US media system 2.1.1. The US market-based news model

To gain more insight into the functioning of the North American, or in this case US media model, McManus (1995) provides a broad overview of what this market-based model looks like. It contains four big players, being investors, advertisers, sources and consumers. In accordance with capitalist logic, the idea is that the market will work effectively and benefit all when a certain amount of preconditions are met. The buyers, or in this case consumers, need to be aware of the quality of the product that they are buying and real choice among competing products needs to be available. Furthermore, rational self-interested behavior on the part of both the sellers and buyers is required. This is where the first few weak spots of this system can already be detected. According to both McManus (1995) and Bagdikian (1985), advertisers have become increasingly important in media systems to provide a source of income, because the public is not willing to pay for the costs of news production. This,

combined with the increasing media ownership by conglomerate mass-media firms, funded by investors who are primarily profit oriented, gives advertisers and investors a great amount of control over news content (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McManus, 1995). Furthermore, the rise of the internet even further increased the prioritization of low costs newsgathering (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), meaning that fewer political journalists are under greater time pressure because they have to fill more pages in less time. Besides this leading to less critical news reporting, since political journalists have less time to check facts, it also leads to more copying from news and public relations agencies, meaning that news becomes less independent (Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008).

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The broader consequences of all this are that the probability of an issue or event becoming news is inversely proportional to the harm it might cause these advertisers, investors and sponsors and the costs of uncovering and reporting it, and directly proportional to the expected breath of appeal that the story has to the audience that advertisers are willing to pay for (McManus, 1995). Due to the fact that a friendly buying environment has to be created for advertisers their commercial messages, themes that disregard or threaten advertisers are thus more likely to be disregarded and avoided (Bagdikian, 1985) while the amount of offered entertainment or sensationalism in political news increases due to the fact that this attracts viewers (Arbaoui, 2013). As earlier mentioned, one of the prerequisites to make a market-based media system function well, is public awareness of the quality of news being offered to them. And, even more important, whether they in fact require a certain quality standard for it. Since entertainment is one of the leading news values at the moment (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001), and issue oriented news does not sell anymore (Iyengar, Norpoth & Hahn, 2004), it does not seem surprising that commercial broadcasters provide more sensational news (Arbaoui, 2013). This leads to political news being replaced by infotainment and thus a declining quality of news supply (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). This development is also called media logic, meaning that the media identifies with the public, addresses them as consumers and reporting is based in interpretation and is less substantive. Journalists are considered to take on a dominant role, by providing entertainment and act cynical (Brants & van Praag, 2006). In terms of reporting on the Arab world, this primarily leads to the

stigmatization of Arabs and Islam (Kumar, 2006; Mavelli, 2013; Regier & Khalidi, 2009), opposed to emphasizing on the superiority of the West and Western culture (Mikula, 2008).

2.1.2 The issue of representation when reporting on the Middle East

Now that the functioning of the Western media system has been elaborated on, it is important to take a closer look at the influence that sources have in McManus’ (1995) model on the outcome of the news process. It is thus interesting to determine what political views are dominant in news reporting, who represents them, and who profits from them. According to Hillgartner and Bosk (1998), different actors have different

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interests in getting their social construction of a problem into the news. Constructing a certain definition of a problem is also called framing, which is described by Entman (1993, p.52) as “(…) to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal impression, moral evaluation, and/or treatment

recommendation for the item described”. In US political news, governmental sources are significantly included more than other types of sources (Bennett, 1990; Gans, 1979; Livingston & Bennett, 2003; Molotch & Lester, 1975; Tuchman, 1972). When it comes to foreign polity related news, more than three quarters of the sources that political journalists use are US officials, foreign or international officials and US state or local officials (Bennet, 1990). Besides the dominance of official sources, the US media is also found to primarily echo the US government its perception of events in foreign news reporting. Furthermore, official sources in culturally similar and allied international environments have a higher chance of getting media attention. These chances seem to even further increase when a political sponsor supports the frame (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009).

Bennett (1990) describes the overreliance on official sources in US media and the consequences of this in his indexing theory. He states that when covering routine news, journalists will only index a wide range of views expressed in mainstream governmental debate when elites conflict. When they do not, journalists thus only include the official governmental view. This is problematic on multiple levels. First, because only hearing official sources will keep certain subjects or sides to an issue out of the news. Bennet (1990) illustrates this by stating that from the small quarter of used sources that is not governmental or official, only ten percent are

non-governmental organisations. Second, it gives the government too much power, while they need to be under constant investigation by the media (Trapel & Maniglio, 2009; Tuchman, 1972). When applying this knowledge to US news articles written about the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, it seems likely that US officials will be used as sources more often than other types of sources. This is why during this research special attention will be paid to what sources are used, and to what the implications of this are in terms of the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood is portrayed.

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2.2 Discourse analysis; the relation between language, discourse and power and the effect it has on the increasing politicization of Middle Eastern studies 2.2.1. Discourse analysis as a theoretical approach

A discourse analysis is used to find out how the Muslim Brotherhood is portrayed in US news articles that report on the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. In general, discourse analysis tries to derive meaning from any type of communication, meaning that the analysis aims to go beyond the general study of language and more into semiotics (‘t Hart et al., 2009). Discourse analysis sets out to trace particular linguistic regularities in debates and illuminates particular discursive structures that may not be instantly obvious to the people that contribute to this debate. Discourse analysis also approaches a critical stance towards the truth, since it puts an emphasis on the communication through which knowledge is exchanged. Reality is socially constructed through the type of communication and language that we use, and the way in which topics are reported on influences how we think about them (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006). Or as Tamboukou (1999, p.202) states: “(…) truth cannot be separated from the procedures of its production”. When performing this type of documentary research, it is thus important to keep in mind that documents, in this case news articles, cannot be separated from the social and political context in which they are written. They do not blindly present reality, meaning that authenticity, credibility, representativeness and both intended and received meaning are important to take into account while analyzing these texts (May, 2011). When performing a politically oriented study like ours, it is important to pay attention to Foucault, who centralizes the relationship between language and power and states that it operates through institutionalized patterns of knowledge that become manifest in disciplinary structures. Because of this, discourse can serve as an instrument or justification of political acts (Foucault, 1980). He thus analyzes how various sources of power affect the social world through expressed language, and critiques forms of discourse

analyses that do not take political implications into account (Wooffitt, 2005).

By keeping Foucault’s relationship between language and power in mind, it is thus possible to elaborate on particular patterns of discourse that keep coming back when reporting on issues concerning the Middle East and Islam. By doing this, more insight

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can be gained into what these narratives consist out of, how they function, and who might profit from them. A powerful narrative in which the superiority of the West and the inferiority of the Middle East is emphasized on, has been present ever since the colonial expansion and the formation of Orientalist knowledge (Halliday, 193; Lockman, 2010; Regier & Khalidi, 2009; Said, 1979; Tuastad, 2003). According to Lockman (2010), the misuse of Darwin’s evolution theory led to the creation of a ‘Homo Islamicus’, or Arab essential man, which implicates that the Muslim constituted a distinct type of human being that was essentially different from the Western man. Tamboukou (1999), inspired by Foucault’s power of discourse, challenges these historical narratives of Western reasoning, and thus the disciplined interpretations of events concerning the Middle East.

2.2.2. The politicization of Middle Eastern studies

The just mentioned leading narratives that are used in the West to portray the Middle East seem to have been inherited from historical Western colonial reasoning. But who profits from keeping these narratives alive, and how is this done? In terms of the academic world, both Halliday (1993) and Lockman (2010) blame the current image of and debate on the Middle East on the research methods that academics use. According to Halliday (1993), Middle Eastern scholars focus too much on analyzing discourse while instead they should focus on studying complex social reality.

Lockman (2010) agrees on this and states that he rejects the current philosophical approach in Middle Eastern studies, in which the Middle East is primarily researched by elites that focus on textual readings of social reality. By not taking the culture and dynamics into account, he states that a large gap between elite scholars and ‘normal’ citizens was and is being created. Bill (1996) also critiques the research approaches that are often being taken in Middle Eastern studies, and states that this is due to a lack of understanding within the discipline, and of the discipline by outsiders. He emphasizes the struggle between advocates of fieldwork, whose research tends to be very specific and descriptive, and social scientists, whose results tend to lack

sufficient empirical evidence. He furthermore states that scholars their lack of knowledge on both language and religion are problematic, just like the fact that Middle Eastern specialists are often narrowly focused on a single country. Instant

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experts on the region also seem to appear out of nowhere which generally leads to simplification. An even more problematic trend that goes hand in hand with this is the increasing amount of academic experts that become involved in military intelligence work. According to Eyal (2002), this development in the first place leads to the creation of Middle Eastern scholars that put a larger focus on topics concerning security and terrorism, due to the fact that their research is used as an implication for policies. But besides this, universities become dependent on government funding, eventually leading to a dominant discourse within the field of Middle Eastern studies that primarily focuses on collecting academic evidence to implement policies and to gain public support. A good example of how discourse is used to justify policy

implementations is Kumar’s (2006) research on the reporting of the 2003 US invasion in Iraq as part of the ‘war on terror’. By developing a narrative in which Iraq was linked the 9/11 attacks, the possession of weapons of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda, the US government tried to ensure a dominance of pro-war arguments in the public sphere that gave the impression that the US faced a serious security threat. By linking the issue to national security, government officials could also be excused from

answering critical questions from journalists. They succeeded in this, since the media picked up on this false information, partially due to the fact that a select group of journalists were embedded with the Iraqi army under strict conditions.

Even though some scholars (Bill, 1996; Halliday, 1993; Lockman, 2010) critique the linguistic research approach in general, and Eyal (2002) primarily emphasizes the negative effects of language and power in terms of creating strong pro-government narratives, there does seem to be value in performing discourse analyses in Middle Eastern studies. Even though these scholars are right in problematizing the current security and terrorism narratives, in which discourse is used as an instrument to shape social reality so that it can be used as a justification for political policies, the power that is created and maintained through these narratives can also be used by scholars to bring up the discussion of how problematic this development is. By analyzing how different concepts concerning the Middle East are displayed and thus framed in Western media, perceptions, strategies and visions might be defined and uncovered. Inspired by Foucault, the results of these studies can be used to build counter

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Eastern narratives used by official accounts (Tamboukou, 1999). Kumar (2006) pleads for a similar strategy and states that intellectuals bear an enormous

responsibility to make sure that the media maintain a resemblance of independence and not appear to be obviously subservient to elite interests. Dissenting voices in the public sphere should have access to institutional resources so that they can play a role in producing scholarship critical of the new imperialism. Sallam (2013) also

recommends a strategy in line with this by pleading for a change in research and university teaching. He states that the Arab Revolutions should be viewed and approached as living contested phenomena rather than a set of well-defined discrete outcomes. Based on a case study of Egypt’s 2011 Revolution, he argues that

highlighting and examining the tensions between the revolutions their competing accounts, which mirrors ongoing battles between various political actors, offers an invaluable lens for understanding the nature and contours of the present political conflicts in Middle Eastern countries. This is especially relevant for this study, since it tries to find out how the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi are on the on hand portrayed as democratically elected and thus legit, indicating that the 2011/2012 ‘democratic’ elections symbolized the end of the revolution and finalized Egypt’s transition towards democracy. On the other hand, and in line with Sallam’s (2013) strategy, it would be better to emphasize the open-end character of the revolution. This can be done through noticing that even though the 2011/2012 elections were procedurally correct, they did not necessarily represent the will of the people, meaning that the Egyptians who protested against Morsi in 2013 may have perceived the intervention by the Egyptian Armed Forces as a continuation of their revolution instead of a coup against a democratically elected president (Matthies-Boon & de Smet, 2013).

2.3 Dominant discourses in reporting on the Middle East

Now that more insight is gained in both the functioning of the US media system and the role that language and power play in media narratives concerning the Middle East, it is interesting to look into what these narratives that represent the superiority of the West and the inferiority of the East consist of. What can research tell us about the particular sets of practices and ideas that define Western culture (Hanitzsch, 2007), and how are narratives based on this superiority of the West used in reporting on the Middle East? As earlier mentioned, journalists’ reporting on the Middle East has

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become disciplined and somehow in line with the historical narratives of Western reasoning that focuses on the inferiority of the Middle East (Tamboukou, 1999). This neo-orientalist narrative, and what it consists out of, will also be further elaborated on. But first insight will be given into the use of Western liberal capitalist

democratization narratives, and how they highlight and promote the superiority of liberal democracy.

2.3.1 The Western liberal capitalist democratization narrative applied to a Middle Eastern context

Westocentrism can be defined as a way of thinking that consistently puts the West, or a certain constructed notion of Western experience, as a universal ideal to be mirrored by the rest of the world (Mikula, 2008). Historical theology, in which the

development of Christianity is studied from its founding until the present, plays an important part here in terms of emphasizing the superiority of Western development and stating that it is a single secular modernity that should be followed by the rest of the world (Rist, 2002). This opposed to scholars like Eisenstadt (2000), who argue against a single Western modernity and state that multiple modernities are possible. By emphasizing on the political and philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment, Greco-Roman heritage and Christian faith, Westocentrism constructs the idea of Western society’s uniqueness en universality. Furthermore, the discourse imagines the West as the world of material wealth, military might, scientific triumph, and tolerance towards individuals in terms of liberal democratic rights. Notably, it was this same discourse that was used to maintain the hegemonic position of the West worldwide and justify imperial projects during the colonial era (Mikula, 2008). Much of this can be detected in cultural resonant frames that appear time and time again in the United States and are consistent with the enduring values of ethnocentrism, ‘democracy-is-good’, responsible capitalism, small-town glorification, individualism and national

leadership, especially when they can be linked to a political sponsor (Gans, 1979).

It seems to be the promotion of Western style liberal democracy that plays a large role in frames that emphasize on the superiority of the West. Fukuyama (1989) can be considered an important contributor to promoting liberal democracy, arguing that the end of the Cold War proved that Western liberal democracy triumphed due to the total

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exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives. According to him, the world was witnessing the end of mankind’s ideological evolution, and a universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government that is able to resolve all fundamental contradictions in human life. Even though Fukuyama made changes to this philosophy later, the promotion of liberal democracy is still very much present today. Teti (2012) for example finds that before as well as after the Arab Uprisings, the European Union’s democracy assistance policy still contains a

substantively liberal model for both development and democracy. This means that the policy pleads for a narrow conception of democracy in which the main focus is on elections and political rights such as freedom of speech. Furthermore, by holding on to a rather narrow definition of democracy instead of implementing a more holistic approach, minimalist goals such as elections and political rights are preferred over social and economic factors. This also relegates the pursuit of social justice and economic rights to the realms of aid developing, failing to recognize these rights as essential to democracy and the transition towards it (Teti, 2012). Moghadam (2013) agrees and states that in a liberal democracy, it is not ensured that citizens will have the material means to be able to enjoy the civil and political rights that are afforded to them constitutionally. This is where social rights and economic citizenship come in, and why they are so important to pursue. A real democracy in the Middle East, and especially in the uprising countries, according to Moghadam (2013), should thus be seen as a multifaceted and ongoing process at different levels of social existence: in polity, civil society, economy, the workplace and the community. By repeating to promote a liberal democracy strategy on the Middle Eastern region, Hanau Santini and Hassan (2012) state that both the US and the EU risk another even bigger policy failure.

Since Western political actors their responses to the Arab Uprisings do not seem to differ much from the strategies they pursued before 2011 and thus still focus on the spread of a liberal type of democracy while ignoring factors like social justice and economic rights (Hanau Santini & Hassan, 2012; Moghadam, 2013; Teti, 2012; Teti, Thompson & Noble, 2013), and cultural resonant frames inspired by Westocentrism are still present in US media, a Western liberal capitalist democratization narrative is likely to be present in news articles about the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian

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Revolution. The push for fast parliamentary elections by Western diplomats in 2011, and the emphasis on Morsi as a democratically elected and thus legit leader close to the intervention by the Egyptian Armed Forces, are good possible examples of how a form of liberal democracy was projected on Egypt. This is why it is important to research the presence of Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives in US news articles, and how these frames are used to portray the Muslim Brotherhood during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

2.3.2. Neo-orientalist frames in Western media

Tuastad (2003) states that current conflicts in the Middle East are in general presented as a struggle between civilization and primitivism. In this context Western society represents the educated few, while Middle Eastern citizens represent the uneducated but newly empowered millions whose borders are not those of national states, but of culture and tribes. Neo-orientalism emphasizes and promotes a duality between the West and East, or the self and other, in order to justify and naturalize structured patterns of domination and exploitation (Tuastad, 2003). This way of presenting the Middle East is inspired by Classical Orientalism, developed in the 19th century and during the colonial times, in which the East or Orient is classified as static and underdeveloped, and its people depicted as lazy, prone to violence or highly sexualized (Said, 1979). Current reporting on Arabs by Western media also still seems to be inspired by this, something that Regier and Khalidi (2009) refer to as ‘Arab street’. This concept basically refers to the negative stereotyping that Arabs face by being portrayed as irrational, hot headed and making it look as if the only way they know how to express their political dissatisfaction is by protesting on the streets, opposed to reasoned Westerners, who express their political dissatisfaction through voting and practice politics in organized governmental buildings. Another part of neo-orientalist reasoning is the construction of Western heroism in which Muslim women need saving from Muslim men. This projection of Western ideas of freedom and liberty on Muslim women was one of the frames used to justify the US’s war in Afghanistan (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Al-Ali & Pratt, 2006). But besides the Middle East and Islam being presented as violent and resistant to democratic change (Tuastad, 2003) to justify (neo) imperialism, Mavelli (2013) states that politicians in Western

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societies and specifically Europe, often approach the Middle East from a secular point of view to gain public support for national policies. This strategy, in which a

discourse of securitization is being used, often presents Islam as dangerous, and emphasizes that religion belongs in the private sphere instead of the political sphere. By constructing the threat of Islam as a political threat to Western society and its values, politicians thus justify policies as for example the prohibition of the burqa in France, which was considered to be a symbol of suppression (Mavelli, 2013).

With conflicts in the Middle Easts being presented as a struggle between civilization and primitivism, the region as resistant to democratic change (Huntington, 1996; Tuastad, 2003) and Arabs portrayed as hotheaded and irrational (Regier & Khalidi, 2009), a neo-orientalist framework is still present in Western news reporting. This, in combination with the still ongoing war on terror in which Islam is presented as a threat in terms of it being violent, dangerous and incompatible with democracy

(Kumar, 2006; Tuastad, 2003), would lead to the assumption the Muslim Brotherhood will be depicted in a similar way in news articles about the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. This, in combination with the presence of the earlier mentioned Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives, makes it interesting to look into how both these frames are used and possibly combined into a paradox that represents the Muslim Brotherhood as on the on hand Islamic, violent, dangerous and

undemocratic, while on the other hand democratically elected and legitimate.

3. Egypt; its political relation to the US and the

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

It is important to pay attention to the relationship between the US and Egypt under authoritarian rule, since this is crucial in explaining the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. On the one hand, Egypt under authoritarian rule is known to be an important strategic partner for the US (Brownlee, 2004). On the other hand, democracy and cultural resonant discourse that promotes Western superiority and liberal democracy seem to be highly present in US news reporting (Gans, 1979; Mikula, 2008; Rist, 2002). This, in combination with

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the representation of (political) Islam as violent and resistant to democratic change (Mavelli, 2013; Tuastad, 2003), makes it interesting to see how US media portrays the Muslim Brotherhood during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Besides these conflicting values, it is also important to look at how the Muslim Brotherhood is perceived by academics in terms of them being democratic in general, but also

specifically during the time Morsi was in power.

3.1. The US-Egyptian historical relationship

3.1.1. Authoritarianism in Egypt and the US as a political and financial partner Bellin (2004) states that the Middle Eastern regions true inability to make the

transition to more democratic societies lays within the will and capacity of states their coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initiative. According to Kassem (2004), the accumulated powers that Egyptian Presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak gained during their presidencies indeed rendered the Egyptian political system as one of the most resilient personal authoritarian systems in the world. Two of the factors that Bellin (2004) names as prerequisites to maintain authoritarian rule are international support and rentier income, and the dependency relationship between Egypt and the US proves to be a good example of these (Waterbury, 2014). Mutual training

operation Proud Phantom in 1980 marked the long lasting partnership between the US and Egyptian government, that started of with the goal of gaining influence in the region to counter Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and absorb the aftershocks of the Iranian revolution (Stork, 1980). After Sadat’s death and the launch of Mubarak, the US feared that Egypt’s commitment might decrease due to domestic opposition. This made them even more willing to invest large amounts of money in aid and military training, resulting in the Egyptian and US army growing even closer together. So while authoritarianism in Egypt thrived, Mubarak’s political security remained integral to US planning (Brownlee, 2012; Waterbury, 2014). Rentier income, which according to Bellin (2004) strengthens authoritarian regimes their coercive apparatus, also played an important role in Egypt. When Mubarak was facing domestic

challenges due to Egypt’s severe debt burden, the US was there to financially help the regime out (Brownlee, 2012). These major financial problems were partially the effect of the Arab region temporarily abandoning Egypt due to their signing of the Camp

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David treaty, which also forced them to export oil to Israel far below market price (Quandt, 1986). Since rentier income is extremely important in authoritarian regimes because it reassures stability due to the fact that it pays the military and security forces while keeping the overall country in pour economic health (Bellin, 2012), Mubarak knew that he had to prove Egypt’s loyalty to the US to receive a financial injection (Brownlee, 2004).

After the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the debate about of the amount and continuation of US military and economic aid started. Recent congressional research shows that between 1948 and 2011, the US has given Egypt a total of 71.6 billion dollars; 1.3 billion dollars on military aid, and 250 million dollars on economic aid per year (Sharp, 2015). US national security interests in terms of geography, demography and diplomatic posture, the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace and the instable political situation since 2011, are mentioned as the prime reasons to continue this high amount of financial aid. According to US officials, decreasing this amount will only lead to more instability in the political system (Sharp, 2015). The US’ historical political relation with Egypt in terms of financially and politically supporting former authoritarian regimes, and the high amounts of military and to a lower extent economic aid that are still given today, indicate that US government might not have been excited to witness Mubarak being removed from power in the first place. On the other hand, Morsi’s economic practices later seemed to be in line with Mubarak’s and primarily focused on neo-liberal reform (Matties-Boon & de Smet, 2013), indicating that the US could also profit from the Egyptian economy and influence Egyptian politics under Muslim Brotherhood rule. This makes it even more interesting to research the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood in US news media during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and might indicate that even though US news reporting might have been skeptical at first about Muslim Brotherhood rule, this opinion became more positive as the US government discovered that their influence in Egypt could be maintained.

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3.2. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, political Islam and its relation to democracy

Even though the Brits arrested their founder Hasan al-Banna in the early 1940s for becoming an influential factor in Egypt’s political life, and the fact that there was a short period of conciliation right after the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supported the 1952 Free Officers Movement coup that eventually brought Nasser to power, the political organization spend most of its time in Egypt under authoritarian rule banned, not granted a legal status and/or operating under the radar (Aly & Wenner, 1982). The following section will pay attention to how scholars perceive the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of them being democratic in general, and their democratic legitimacy during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in particular.

3.2.1. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its democratic ability and legitimacy Academics their views, described in articles published before and after 2011, seem to contradict each other in terms of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to be part of the democratic order. There are scholars who state that the Muslim Brotherhood cannot function democratically (Khalil, 2006; Servol, 2003), a statement that is often supported by neo-orientalist inspired arguments that involve statements that refer to the violent character of Islam, its general incompatibleness to democracy (Mavelli, 2013), and the Arabs and Muslims their cultural and religious identities which function as a main source of conflict and exclude minorities (Huntington, 1993). Where Khalil (2006) states that it is impossible to believe that Islamist parties in general, and thus the Muslim Brotherhood in particular would accept the values of a democratic society, since they are in total contradiction to their own proclaimed values in terms of non-transparency and undemocratic internal structure, Servold (2003) specifically focuses on the Brotherhood’s violent behavior in terms of jihad, and radical vision in terms of funding international terrorist organizations as

indications for their undemocratic behavior. Scholars who do believe in the Muslim Brotherhood’s capability of democratic rule seem to generally disagree with

opponents their definition of Islamic governing and the Brotherhood’s proclaimed values (Abed-Kotob,1995; Aly & Wenner, 1982; Campagna, 1996). In their opinion, Islamic governing and jihad should be interpreted as the struggle to employ justice,

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mercy and communication, which indicates that an Islamic state should be build from the individual upwards (Abed-Kotob, 1995) instead for interpreting it as the use of violence to achieve goals. They also emphasize on the Brotherhood’s existence within the Egyptian community and their long – even though mostly underground – political experience as indicators of their capability to democratically govern, in terms of them exercising substantial political influence over a sizable portion of the educated and professional Egyptian population for quite some time (Abed-Kotob, 1995; Aly & Wenner, 1982). According to these scholars (Abed-Kotob, 1995; Aly & Wenner, 1982; Campagna, 1996), the Brotherhood’s main strategies over the last decades have always been non-violent and in accommodation with the existing political system. This means that attempts from the Egyptian government to curb the organization’s access to both the People’s Assembly and the syndicates, have nevertheless made the Brotherhood continue its call for constitutional access to the political system, and that they did not abandon the system that was apparently trying to abandon them. Aly and Wenner (1982) furthermore highlight that authoritarianism is not likely to develop under Muslim Brotherhood rule, due to their long experience of the organization without a charismatic leader.

In terms of this still ongoing debate on the extent to which Islam in general, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular is able to function democratically, Schwedler (1998) seems to asks a relevant question: Why, even though scholars are highly aware of the blatant election manipulation by Middle-Eastern authoritarian and

undemocratic regimes, are Islamic parties like the Muslim Brotherhood so often at the center of debates like these? She states that the real question is not whether Islamists pose a threat, but what political agendas are served by continuing to paint Islamists as a monolithic, antidemocratic mob. This brings us back to the earlier discussed

increasing politicization of Middle Eastern studies, and the extent to which research is used as an instrument to favorably bend public opinion towards supporting

government policies (Eyal, 2002). The US’ historical economic dependency relationship with Egypt, and the fact that this relationship could eventually be maintained or restored due to the liberal economic policies that Morsi’s government implemented and maintained, possibly indicate that while neo-orientalist inspired narratives are likely to be initially used to address the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic

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and undemocratic character, a liberal democracy narrative that emphasizes on the democratic legitimacy of Morsi is likely to be presented later when his government proved to be loyal to the US in terms of maintaining a Egypt’s former liberal economic approach.

The existence of this paradox is to a certain extent already visible when we look at news articles written by both academics and journalists right before and after the July 2013 intervention by the Egyptian Armed forces that eventually removed Morsi from power. Bennis (2013), published on the website of Doha based and Qatari state-funded Al Jazeera for example uses a Western liberal capitalist democratization narrative inspired argument to emphasize on the democratic legitimacy of Morsi’s presidency. In one news article this becomes clear when the differences between the overthrow of Mubarak and Morsi are highlighted: “But there are serious differences,

and major dangers. This time, the sitting president was not a US-backed military dictator kept in power by US funding and political support. This time, the deposed president was Egypt’s first democratically and popularly elected president in several generations. This time, when the military deployed armored personnel carriers in the streets of certain neighborhoods of Cairo, it was only, apparently, in areas known as strongholds of former President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood-based party he represents”(Bennis, 2013, p.1.). While this view implicitly denies US influence in

current Egyptian affairs and highlights Morsi’s democratic legitimacy, authors published on independent online magazine Jadaliyya suggest quite the opposite and state that, seemingly inspired by neo-orientalist knowledge, a conspiracy exists between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Western media and politics (Goldberg, 2013; Shaalan, 2013). This becomes clear by statements like: “The United States,

Britain and many other counterparts have heavily invested in the empowerment of a tamed Islamist rule—spearheaded, of course, by the Muslim Brotherhood—to take over the Middle East from post-colonial populist regimes living long past their expiry dates. American and British ambassadors to the region have been carefully weaving this vision and reporting back home that this is simply the best formula for the protection of their interests in the region” (Shaalan, 2013, p.1.). According to these

authors, the demonstrations that eventually led to the 2011 downfall of Morsi and the 2013 military intervention were in US media depicted merely as a significant sign of

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social discontent that would not bare serious consequences to the Washington-sponsored coalition between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military. Scholars like Hamilton (2013), Matthies-Boon and de Smet (2013) and Hamoud (2013), who publish in Egyptian online magazines Mada Masr and Aswat Masriya and newspaper

Daily Egypt News, seem to all question Morsi’s democratic legitimacy, and state that

Egyptians their anger towards Western media is not surprising, since they remained largely silent on Morsi’s past abusive powers and now depict him as a legitimate president who has been illegitimacy overthrown by a military coup. They rather perceive the intervention as the achievement of a second revolution that represents the will of the people (Matthies-Boon & de Smet, 2013, p.1.). This debate does not only shows that scholars disagree about the democratic legitimacy of Morsi, but also that both Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives and neo-orientalist

reasoning are used to underline this, meaning that it is likely to expect a similar pattern in US news reporting.

4. Detecting neo-orientalist and Western liberal

democracy frames through quantitative and

qualitative analyses

To gain more insight into the extent to which US news articles written during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution make use of neo-orientalist frames and Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives to portray the Muslim

Brotherhood as on the one hand violent and undemocratic Islamists, and on the other hand democratically elected and thus legitimate, quantitative and qualitative analyses are combined. This chapter will provide an insight in both these analyses. For the quantitative part of the analysis the determination of the timeframes, the creation of the sample and the codebook are explained. For the qualitative part of the analysis the downscaling of the quantitative sample, the structure of the discourse analysis and the relation between power and language are elaborated on.

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4.1. Quantitative study: data collection and codebook

Since quantitative content analysis is useful in the way that it is highly reliable, but tends to be low in terms of validity (‘t Hart, Boeije & Hox, 2009), it is in this research used as a tool that provides general insight into the selected news articles, before a qualitative analysis further digs into the meaning behind these quantitative findings. It thus gives a reliable and consistent overview of the amount of times that specific keywords or explicit references are made to variables that are relevant to this study (‘t Hart et al., 2009). This is for example source use, explicit references to the

importance of liberal democracy or links that made between Islam and violence.

4.1.1. Data collection: determining the timeframes

This study will make use of two different types of content analyses; applied to the news articles of two US based newspapers during three different timeframes. The newspapers are the New York Times and USA Today. These newspapers were chosen because they are both available throughout the entire country, and because of their differences in terms of the audience that they supposedly attract. The New York Times is considered a quality newspaper, which means that it contains relatively more political information and less entertainment than popular newspapers, like USA Today (Bakker & Scholten, 2009). The news articles from both newspapers are selected through online newspaper database LexisNexis1. Three different timeframes are used for data collection. These timeframes are: (1) 28 November 2011 until 31 January 2012, because this is when the parliamentary elections after the fall of Mubarak where held that were won by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. The second timeframe (2), 22 November 2012 until 22 December 2012, is chosen because it marks the start of the protests against Morsi’s constitutional declaration and the controversial national referendum that eventually legalized it. The third timeframe (3), 16 May 2013 until 3 July 2013, is chosen because it marks the last days of Morsi’s regime under heavy protests that eventually led to an intervention by the Egyptian Armed forces that removed Morsi from office.

1 The used search string is ‘Egypt AND (protest! OR revolution OR election!)’. By using this search string, all

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4.1.2. Data collection: quantitative sample

A total of 256 news articles could be selected during timeframe one, 128 during timeframe two and 133 during timeframe three. Since this amount of data is quite large, and a random sample can also function as a representation of the news articles, samples are created. The samples will consist out of constructed weeks. By randomly including all the days on which the newspapers are published (Monday to Saturday) at least once in the sample, both systematic and random sampling can be assured.

Unfortunately every sampling method has its disadvantages. Using the constructed week method caries the risk of the sample not being completely representative, since certain days of news reporting are being kept out of it completely. This is why it is important to increase the amount of constructed weeks when data is collected over a long period of time. But since the timeframes used for this research are relatively short, one constructed week per timeframe seems appropriate.

Table 1

Number of news articles selected per timeframe

Newspaper Timeframe Quantitative study Qualitative study2

New York Times 1 15 3

USA Today 1 11 3

New York Times 2 12 3

USA Today 2 14 3

New York Times 3 12 3

USA Today 3 9 3

In Table 1, the selected amounts of articles per newspaper per timeframe can be found. It is important to note that in these samples, all articles from USA Today are included due to the fact that the amount of news articles on Egypt published in this newspaper was significantly lower than the New York Times. The articles from the

New York Times are subjected to the just mentioned sampling method. Out of the a

total of 256 news articles in timeframe one, fifteen articles from the New York Times and eleven from USA Today could be selected3. This leads to a first sample of 26 news articles. For timeframe two, out of a total of 128 news articles, twelve articles

2 The selection process for the qualtitative part of the analysis will be elaborated on later, in subsection 4.2.1. 3 This selection includes the following days in December: Friday 2, Saturday 10, Monday 12, Tuesday 20 and

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from the New York Times and fourteen from USA Today were selected4. This leads to a second sample of 26 news articles. And last, for timeframe three, out of a total of 133 news articles, twelve from the New York Times and nine from USA Today could be selected5. This leads to a third sample of twenty-one news articles. The entire

sample thus consists out of 73 news articles. It is important to note that these samples only include articles relevant to this study. Due to the fact that an electronic device in the first place selected the news articles, articles that were not written or related to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and/or its aftermath were manually removed from the sample.

4.1.3. Codebook quantitative study

The first part of the codebook focuses on general information about the news articles such as the name of the newspaper, publish date, title, genre, length and position of the news article in the newspaper. Attention in this section is also on source use and their origins with the purpose of determining the ratio between Western versus non-Western sources, and non-Western governmental versus other sources. After this more general part, the focus shifts to questions that try to determine the extent to which a neo-orientalist framework is present. Questions in this section concern the optional mentioning of the historical background of the conflict in terms of the relationship between the US and Egypt under authoritarian rule and the presence of dualistic arguments in terms of highlighting the superiority of the West and/or the inferiority of the Middle East. They also pay attention to how protestors in general are referred to, and whether explicit parallels are drawn between Islam and values such as violence, danger and being undemocratic. The third section of the codebook, that determines the presence of Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives, focuses more on explicit mentioning of the word democracy. A distinction is also made between liberal democracy approaches that purely and solely focus on procedural democratic rights such as free elections and freedom of speech, and broader mentions of democracy that also emphasize on the importance of social and economic rights and or cultural and minority rights, but only when either type of democracy is explicitly referred to.

4 This selection includes the following days in November: Thursday 22 and Friday 30. And in December: Saturday

8. Monday 10 and Tuesday 18.

5 This selection includes the following days in May: Thursday 16 and Friday 24. And in June: Saturday 1, Monday

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Overall, part two and three of this analysis are more interpretive than the first part of the codebook. To maintain the high reliability character of the analysis, the statements that measure the presence of neo-orientalist of Western liberal democratization

narratives can only be answered with yes when explicit proof is present in the text. This is problematic in the sense that this proof can also be implicitly made, but that will be further elaborated on in the quantitative analysis.

4.2 Qualitative study: data collection, discourse analysis and structure

Where the quantitative analysis provides general information about the news articles and guarantees relatively high reliability, the qualitative analysis increased the validity of this research by investigating and describing the meaning behind the texts and detect certain patterns (‘t Hart et al., 2009). Qualitative analyses on the other hand, generally score lower on reliability, since the role of the researcher itself is more questionable because the way in which certain patterns of regularities are detected, and the interpretation of the text and context are influenced and subjected to the researcher’s own understanding of culture (May, 2011). This will be further elaborated on during the shortcomings of this research. Overall, combining a

quantitative and qualitative content analysis in this research seems to be the best way to achieve the highest possible reliability and validity.

4.2.1. Data collection: qualitative sample

For the discourse analysis, a smaller amount of news articles is selected based on the outcomes of the quantitative analysis. As can be seen in Table 1, three articles are selected per newspaper per timeframe, leading to an amount of six news articles per timeframe, and eighteen news articles in total. All three timeframes consist out of two news articles in which neo-orientalist and/or Western liberal narratives are barely present, two news articles in which these narratives are somehow present, and two news articles in which they are highly present. By selecting these three different types of articles, a clear view can be provided on what articles look like that highly and partially promote, or lack neo-orientalist and Western liberal capitalist

democratization values, and on how this influences the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood. Appendix II gives an overview of the articles that are selected for the discourse analysis.

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4.2.2. Discourse analysis and the relation between language, power and discourse A discourse analysis based on Pan and Kosicki (1993) is used to gain more insight into how neo-orientalist frames and Western liberal capitalist democratization narratives are used in news articles about the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian

Revolution to portray the Muslim Brotherhood as on the one hand violent, dangerous and undemocratic Islamists, and on the other hand democratically elected and

legitimate. As mentioned earlier, it is important to keep in mind that these news articles cannot be separated from the social and political context in which they are written (May, 2011). When tracing particular linguistic regularities in these articles that might at first not be instantly obvious, it is important to note that the reality that these texts represent is socially constructed (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006), and thus influences the way we perceive it. This means that these news articles do not blindly represent reality and that authenticity, credibility, representativeness, intended and received meaning do thus need to be taken into account (May, 2011). Besides

focusing on what the articles contain, it is also important to focus on what they leave out (May, 2011). This is where the connection between discourse analysis and framing analysis becomes more clear, since frames are known to only select certain aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient while leaving others out with the purpose of promoting a particular problem definition, causal impression, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993). A frame is thus a structured narrative in which a specific way of thinking is promoted with the purpose of influencing the audience its opinion in a certain way or at least steering it into a certain direction. Foucault’s (1980) earlier mentioned approach to discourse analysis, that prioritizes the relation between discourse and power, is especially relevant here since it forces us to critically address the use of discourse as an instrument or

justification of political acts into account. Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) discourse analysis is selected for this research because the main purpose of their analysis is to pay

attention to the detection of frames throughout news texts, which they perceive as a central organized idea that connects different semantic elements into a coherent whole. Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) method provides the devices and structure necessary to detect systems of organized signifying elements that advocate and encourage neo-orientalist and/or Western liberal ways of thinking about the role of the Muslim

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Brotherhood during the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and their perceived democratic ability.

4.2.3. Structure of the analysis

In terms of the structure of the analysis, and how this is applied to the individual news articles, Pan and Kosicki (1993) divide framing devices into four structural

dimensions of news discourse being syntactical, script, thematic and rhetorical. Table 2 provides a short overview of these structural dimensions in terms of explaining them and summarizing what they refer to.

Table 2

Structural dimensions of discourse analysis by Pan and Kosicki (1993)

Structural dimension Explanation Refers to Syntactical Sequential organization of

structural elements.

Headline; lead; quoting experts and/or official sources; marginalizing certain points.

Script Storytelling aspect of the news

article. Who; when; where; why and how aspect of the event reported on. Thematic Multilayer hierarchy that is

responsible for the connection of the main theme to subthemes and major nodes in order to serve as supporting elements.

Summary represented by headline, lead, conclusion; Body in which evidence is provided in terms of quotes and background information to illustrate the point by words such as because, since, for. Rhetorical Stylistic choices made by

journalists in relation to their intended effects

Metaphors; exemplars; catchphrases;

depictions.

Syntactical structures refer to the stable patterns of the arrangement of words into phrases and sentences. It pays attention to the sequential organization of structural elements such as the headline and lead of the news article. The working definition of objectivity is also important here, which is reached by claiming empirical validity through quoting experts, linking certain points of view to authority by quoting official

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sources or marginalizing certain views by relating a point of view to a social deviant (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Script structures refer to the impression that news articles are a relatively independent unit, since they appear to contain complete information of an event in terms of a beginning, climax and end. It thus focuses on the storytelling aspects of news articles by structuring the ‘who, when, where, why and how aspect’ of each news report (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Thematic structures refer to the multilayer hierarchy within a news article in which the theme is the central core connecting various subthemes as the major nodes that are connected to supporting elements. This means that in this structure, the focus is not on news articles that are action of event oriented, but on issue-stories, that focus on one topic or issue at the time and report several actions, statements or events related to the issue (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Last, rhetorical structures refer to the stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their intended effects and/or to improve the effectiveness of his or her point. This structure also refers to journalists’ tendency to use various devices to maximize the survival of his or her interpretations and observations or to increase the effectiveness of news. Metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images belong to this category (Pan & Kosicki, 1993)6. Besides these four structural dimensions, attention in this analysis will also be paid to the role of lexical choices throughout the article, since these often endorse intended meaning and are an important part of frame detection (Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). References to this will be made when relevant and throughout the different structural dimensions.

5. Quantitative analysis of the portrayal of the

Muslim Brotherhood during the aftermath of the

2011 Egyptian Revolution

With the purpose of first gaining some main insight into the news articles that were written by the two US based newspapers about the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in this, a quantitative analysis was performed. The results of this quantitative analysis will be elaborated on in this

6 Visual images will not be included and analyzed in this discourse analysis, since unfortunately LexisNexis does

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