An emerging Africa : moving beyond the binary

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An Emerging Africa: Moving beyond the binary

MSc Thesis Political Science: International Relations

Research Project: The African Renaissance and the Politics of Development

Word Count: 18,098

June 2019

Amaury Falt-Brown Student Number: 12236535

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to challenge the argument put forward by countless academics and politicians, that Africa’s developmental trajectory should be guided by either Western or Chinese development models.

The thesis will not only carry out an assessment of existing Western and Chinese developmental policies in Africa, but it will also go one step further and propose the discussion of an alternative developmental policy – the African Consensus. I argue that the problems facing the African continent are unique and therefore that they necessitate solutions which take that into consideration. To achieve this objective, I propose that African development should be spearheaded by the African Union, with the support of regional blocs and national governments, by adopting a truly Pan-African ideology; increasing African agency; developing strategic partnerships; working with civil society organizations; and insisting upon good governance. The objective of this thesis is not to presume what structural conditions are needed for African development, but to suggest that the goal of many of Africa’s independence leaders – of forming a strong and unified continent - is most likely the best way forward.

Key terms: African Consensus, African agency, Beijing Consensus, civil society, developmental policy,

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List of Abbreviations

AfC African Consensus

AfDB African Development Bank

AU African Union

AUDA African Union Development Agency BjC Beijing Consensus

CFTA Continental Free Trade Agreement

CT Critical Theory

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

IMF International Monetary Fund IO International Organization IR International Relations OAU Organization for African Unity PAP Pan-African Parliament

SADC Southern African Development Community SAPs Structural Adjustment Programs

UN United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

WB World Bank

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1. Introduction

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The following segment of this research paper will serve to introduce the research area that will be covered by this paper; its significance to academia; the research question that will guide the paper throughout its course; and the manner in which the paper will be presented.

The early stages of the African renaissance brought with it many hopes and dreams concerning the direction of the African continent, as well as raising many questions about governance. Still today many questions linger among academics, politicians and civil society organizations regarding what the best developmental policies might be, and the discussion remains as pertinent in our modern times as it did in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The catastrophic nature of colonialism on the peoples of Africa paved the way for economic, social and political turmoil that has, in many instances, lasted until the modern day. All the while it has become clear in the post-colonial era that outside powers have not lost their interest in Africa for it remains a great source of wealth in terms of culture, capital and natural resources. Yet, for many decades in the post-colonial era it was primarily the Western world which took an interest in Africa’s development, largely driven by its economic desires. Foreign aid from Western countries poured into the continent, as did Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and continues to do so to this day (Carlsson, Somolekae & Van de Walle, 1997). However, at the turn of the century we began to see a shift in the rather one-sided developmental assistance which Africa had been receiving from the West.

As other nations began to grow their own developmental models, they too began to take an interest in the vast economic potential which Africa has to offer, particularly China (Shinn and Eisenmann, 2012). The rapid rise of Chinese influence and capital expenditures within Africa over the past two decades have led the Western world and China into a geopolitical and ideological conflict over the continent (Rotberg, 2008; Dzinesa & Masters, 2009; Conteh-Morgan, 2018). One of the major results of this conflict has been an intensifying debate in academia and political spheres over what policies are best suited for efficient and long-lasting development in Africa (Ang, 2018). The issue that arises from this debate is that it seems to propose that Africa’s developmental options are a binary between the Western and Chinese approaches, often ignoring the alternatives which others have suggested. In International Relations (IR) this binary is referred to as the Washington Consensus (WsC) and the Beijing Consensus (BjC) and together they will be explored in a more in-depth manner along the course of this paper. The term binary is employed because the manner in which many scholars debate these two consensuses implies that policy makers must choose between one or the other, whereas there are in fact many scholars who propose alternatives to the binary.

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2 The binary debate has produced several questions which guide this thesis, such as, what role should the African Union (AU) play in development? How can an alternative developmental policy be efficaciously established? And, why do we not speak of an African Consensus (AfC)?

A great deal of academics and politicians have proposed viable alternatives the BjC and WsC – such as political economist George Ayittey’s concept of “African solutions to African problems” – but despite their efforts much of the debate still focuses on the BjC and WsC. I do not argue that an alternative development policy should rid itself of Chinese and Western influence, rather, that it should build upon their achievements and failures, while shaping new partnerships with them. I argue that African states should collectively adopt an African Consensus - a term coined by former Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete and explored further on in this paper – which would be applied through the institutions of the African Union, principally, by the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). The PAP was formed in 2004 and has a mandate to become the legislative body of the AU, but it is plagued by inefficiency and remains till this day an advisory body with no legislative power (Emmanuel, 2010). However, if its mandate is

implemented it could be the driver of an AfC and offer a solution to what many perceive is a weak African Union.

The African Consensus is based on the understanding that the solutions to Africa’s problems are primarily going to be homegrown and that there is a need for a unified response by states to deal with these problems (Biko, 2019; Soyinka et al., 2015). I propose that the African Consensus be guided by five policy points, namely, African agency; Pan-Africanism; good governance; civil society driven change; and strategic partnerships, all of which will be elaborated upon in my theoretical framework. The analysis section of this paper will then link these five policy points to three of the key intervention areas

identified by the AU as critical for development: 1) peace and security 2) development, integration, and cooperation 3) institution and capacity building, (Kühnhardt, 2014). By linking the policy points of the AfC to the issue areas identified by the AU I will demonstrate how the AfC would likely be a more efficient and beneficial method of developmental policy for Africa.

The reason I put forward concerning why an alternative to the BjC and WsC should be explored is that “the African region has its unique development problems which deserve separate attention” (Ekeh, 1986). Applying developmental policies in such a way that they try to reciprocate development in other regions of the world does not take into consideration the African context and therefore they are less likely to be effective (Ekeh, 1986) because they are not African solutions to African problems. The WsC was formulated as a set of policies which would apply to Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia, whereas

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3 the BjC is largely based on applying China’s development model in Africa. In both instances we see that neither of these models has been shaped to specifically respond to the African context. Quite to the contrary, I argue that these developmental models are practiced according to the political agendas of China and the West, so as to benefit them politically and economically. The AfC seeks to rectify this issue by proposing policies that have been developed by the African Union, for the African context. This, however, does not suggest that all of the policy points of the BjC and WsC are ineffective. In my analysis I explore the positive and negative consequences which have resulted from Chinese and the Western developmental policies.

The significance of this topic draws from the fact that Africa’s developmental trajectory is a burning question in many circles as highlighted in numerous reports from the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union and International Organizations (IO’s). It is particularly of concern to the youth of Africa, who represent over 60% of the continent’s population and are increasingly becoming politically engaged, despite their disillusionment with politics (Mengistu, 2017).

To approach this topic, I will use the theoretical lens of Critical Theory (CT), a theory of IR which looks at the core structure of a problem and seeks to question it, before exploring what alternatives solutions to that problem may be. As this thesis seeks to question the status quo for African development, and suggest an alternative, it remains paramount to implement CT in pursuit of the research question:

“What has been the efficacy of current developmental policies in Africa? Based on these results, should there be a concerted policy shift towards an alternative developmental policy?

To structure the discussion the analysis section of this paper will explore the history of the BjC and WsC before demonstrating how the AfC can be applied to three of the key intervention areas identified by the AU as critical for development. My research will focus on the collection and analysis of qualitative data in the form of secondary sources from academia, government publications, civil society

organizations, news articles and IO reports.

The thesis will be divided into several chapters. The chapter immediately following the introduction will be an outline of the theoretical framework of the thesis and the key terms that will guide the reader. Chapter three will feature a literature review which will detail the literature concerning the BjC and WsC, as well the literature concerning the policy points of the AfC. The next chapter will illustrate the papers research design while chapter five will include a comparative case study of Angola and Botswana.

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4 Chapter six shall feature an analysis of the information provided and will be followed by a conclusion which shall summarize the findings in chapter seven.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this section I explore Critical Theory as a tool for carrying out my research before going on to define the key terms that will guide this paper – the five policy points of the African Consensus.

2.1 Critical Theory

Robert Cox (1981) presents Critical Theory as “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an

alternative order” - order being the term he uses to describe political systems (Cox, 1981). In his text Cox juxtaposes Critical Theory to Problem Solving Theory, explaining that Problem Solving Theory looks at a problem and seeks to fix it, without addressing its core structure. Critical Theory, on the other hand, seeks to understand how a particular problem came to be in a bid to not only question its existence, but to change its structure altogether. Cox (1981) explains that CT is a rejection of the “permanency of the existing order” and that it ultimately is a useful tool to create a “social and political order” that is different to the status quo, whereas Problem Solving Theory actually strengthens the status quo. The problem I explore in this thesis is that attempts to produce developmental models for Africa that do not consider the specificities of the continent cannot be efficient (Ekeh, 1986). Considering my argument that the Washington and Beijing models of development - as the current status quo for African

development - reflect the political and economic agendas of the Western world and China, respectively, then how can they be efficient models? Critical Theory then becomes relevant to my argument because it seeks to question how the current order came to be, before seeking an alternative.

By applying Critical Theory to my argument, I am questioning the validity of the WsC and BjC and not seeking to alter them. Instead of these models I propose an alternative that will change the structure altogether. The Problem-Solving Theory would question why the current models are not producing efficient development and then attempt to alter them. This has already been done by academics who looked upon the failures of the WsC in the 1980’s and formulated the New Post Washington Consensus, which I explore later on in the paper. However, as my argument proposes to a establish a new order, it becomes paramount to use Critical Theory, which Cox refers to as going beyond conventional IR.

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2.2 Non-Interventionism and Conditionality:

The terms non-interventionism and conditionality serve to denote the ideological differences which the Beijing and Washington consensuses represent. On the one hand is the Chinese model of

“non-interventionism” - which is a pillar of China’s foreign policy, and by extension its developmental policies - and on the other lies the Western concept of “conditionality” – that state to state relations must be grounded in the conditions laid out by the assister to the assisted. It is a result of many decades of internal politics which has formed these two global outlooks. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has for several decades been consistent in its policy of avoiding meddling in the internal politics of other states, while the United States has attempted to build its post-war reputation as that of the enforcer of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the purveyor of peace. The debate over which of the two systems is best suited to the development of African states has been ongoing for nearly two decades, which has left room for much academic discussion. Simply the title of Yasheng Huang’s (2010) article “Debating China's Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or The Washington Consensus” sums up the binary debate that many academics are having with regards to African development.

Joshua Cooper Ramo, who famously coined the term “Beijing Consensus” in 2004, is naturally one of the strongest advocates for this system. He argues that the Western model is not the correct model for developing states and that China, as a “developing” state itself, has policies more suited to their needs. The idea is not to push for political liberalization but instead to insist upon sustained economic growth which will lead people out of poverty and eventually allow them more personal freedoms. Yuen Yuen Ang (2017) summarized the BjC side of the debate by saying that what Africa needs is less political meddling and more capital investment. The policies of the WsC are a strong repudiation of this ideology. The foundation of the Washington Consensus is based upon John Williamson’s 1989 10-point policy prescription advocating a neo-liberal restructuring of economies in the developing world. One of the trademarks of this system is the way that it imposes conditions as a precursor for developmental assistance - a point made by Olav Stocke (2004) in his book Aid and Political Conditionality. This form of development assistance is lauded as a means of ensuring the UDHR is respected and that states live up to their international obligations. Its detractors, however, point to a neo-colonial method of governance which imposes political will on less powerful states (Ang, 2017). From the beginning the key advocates for the WsC were the Bretton-Woods financial institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – which support a neo-liberal, mainly Western economic agenda. Today these institutions have rebranded the WsC as the “New Post-Washington Consensus” (Lopes, 2012).

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2.3 Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism is an ideology and a movement which began to develop as far back as the 18th_{century as}

a means for the African diaspora of the time to deal with what they saw as common issues in a united manner (Adi, 2018) The term began to gain in popularity at the 1900 Pan-African Congress in London, (Esedebe, 1982) yet its exact definition is still contested. What is agreed upon by most Pan-African scholars is that Pan-Africanism represents “Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of African origin, solidarity among men of African descent, belief in a distinct Africa personality, rehabilitation of Africa’s past, pride in African culture, Africa for Africans in church and state, the hope for a united and glorious future Africa” (Esedebe, 1982). These components draw heavily on the importance of identity, which is a key feature of Pan-Africanism.

Biko (2019) advocates for the “rediscovery of … African identity” and details how this could “restore a sense of abundance and prosperity” on the continent by reshaping the narratives and the institutions guiding Africa. Momoh’s (2003) work carries a similar message of rediscovering what Pan-Africanism means in the 21st_{century and how it can help Africa prosper in its development. Building on their}

arguments I propose that Pan-Africanism become not only a theory which guides the AU, but that it guides the practices of the AU through its institutions and the relationships between states. The ravages of colonialism and slavery threw into disarray the identity of African peoples. Pan-Africanism argues that there is a common identity shared by Africans which must be nurtured to empower and unify Africa. The Center for Pan-African Thought, like Esedebe, believes that there is inevitably a socio-economic aspect to Pan-Africanism. This argument maintains that if Africans are able to grow their shared identity and work together, then Africa will once again prosper socially and economically, hence the relevance of Pan-Africanism to the developmental policies of the AfC.

2.4 Agency

Agency can be defined as the capacity to operate independently and exert power. The concept of agency is well established within the International Relations theory of Agency and Structure, but it has only recently started to appear in the literature concerning African development (Chipaike, 2018). In academia the little which has been published on the joint topics of agency and Africa tends to paint the two with one brush – African states and their agency vis-à-vis the international system (Fisher, 2018; Chipaike, 2018). Although I argue that state influence is a key component of African agency, many academics of International Relations have attempted to argue that states cannot be agents (Wight,

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7 2004). Alexander Wendt (1999) on the other hand, argues that states can indeed be agents because the way in which we speak about them as actors makes them agents.

For the sake of this paper states shall be considered to be agents. However, states are not the only actors capable of exerting agency. Although this thesis places a heavy emphasis on the top down approach, I also consider that creating change from the bottom up is of great importance. The role that individuals and civil society can play to increase African agency, both on the international stage and within the African continent, should not be negated. In this sense, the African Consensus is neither a wholly top down, nor a bottom up development policy. The African Consensus is based on wholistic approach that incorporates governments, civil society, individuals, organizations and movements. This approach makes it clear that meaningful and lasting change will be the product of all aspects of society working together.

The recent grassroots demonstrations which brought down authoritarian rule in Sudan and Algeria demonstrate the meaningful influence which civil society movements have when agency is applied at a non-state level. The Sudanese Professionals Association is an umbrella group representing 17 Sudanese unions. Through its campaigning and its tenacity this union managed to topple the autocratic Omar al-Bashir, demonstrating the power of civil society to ensure good governance when they use their agency. On the international level African agency is, perhaps, best represented by the voting power which the 54 member African bloc wields at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Although African states at the individual level do not usually wield an enormous amount of power in international politics, when they unite and exert their agency, they are capable of meaningful change.

The Conference of Parties (COP) forums seeking to tackle climate change have demonstrated this capacity to create meaningful change, as small island nations and African states banded together to influence meaningfully the final decision-making process. Another point which highlights the strength of African agency at the international level goes back to the United Nations. Accusations have been leveled against the Chinese government of “buying” votes from developing countries at the UN – especially African countries - in exchange for development assistance (Tull, 2006). In this way African states have become a tool for China to exert its own agency, while African agency diminishes. However, the fact that China is actively seeking African votes demonstrates that African states wield significant influence in IO’s, and that if they voted along Pan-African lines that they could greatly advance their own agendas.

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2.5 Strategic partnerships

One of the main policy points of the African Consensus, strategic partnerships represent a relatively straight forward concept in international relations. The African Union describes these partnerships as “the need to cooperate strategically with other regional groupings, international organizations and states to market Africa’s position, acquire support to enable the attainment of her objectives, increase Africa’s international standing and obtain the global leverage that would enable the continent to maximize its impact on the world scene”. Forming these partnerships has become one of the

cornerstones of the African Union’s development strategy, as it seeks to develop new relationships and improve on older ones.

Notable amongst these partnerships is the Forum on China-Africa Relations (FOCAC) and the joint AU-EU Partnership. However, the African Union has made it a priority to develop other working relations so as to broaden their trade horizons and assure economic stability. The Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum recently held its second conference, backed by the Turkish government and the African Union, and this relationship is developing as a contender to FOCAC and the EU. The Turkish government said of the relationship that it “focuses on political equality and mutual economic development rather than creating new relations of dependence, tutelage and exploitation” (Foreign Economic Relations Board, 2018). It is relationships like this which promote African agency and push other foreign states to follow suit in Turkey’s calls for “mutual economic development”, for fear of being sidelined by their African partners.

2.6 Good governance

The concept of good governance has the potential to be rather abstract, owing to its subjective nature. However, the African Union has expressed its desire for good governance to be one of the driving principles which guide it and as such they have developed the African Governance Architecture (AGA). AGA is a “platform for dialogue between the various stakeholders who are mandated to promote good governance and strengthen democracy in Africa” (African Governance Architecture). AGA is guided by the principles of the the African Union’s Constitutive Act, which call for the respect of human rights, transparent elections and a separation of powers amongst other pre-requisites to achieve “good governance.” This paper will be therefore rate good governance according to the principles laid out by the African Union, as well as considering that for good governance to be possible, there must be a general will amongst governments to promote peace, prosperity and equality.

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9 A notable example of a good governance model is Botswana, which figures in the case study chapter of this paper. In the era of decolonization in Botswana was among the poorest states in the world, but thanks in large part to its insistence on being ruled by the principles of good governance the small Southern African country is rated the least corrupt in Africa, and 32nd_{least corrupt in the world by}

Transparency International. Botswana is also an upper-middle income country, according to the World Bank, and its citizens are said to enjoy a relatively prosperous lifestyle, especially when compared to neighbouring Angola and Zimbabwe.

3. Literature Review

To understand the development paradigm in Africa - and why a shift towards an African Consensus is argued for in this thesis - requires one to look at all of the competing arguments. In order to achieve this goal, it is important to begin by placing an emphasis on the Beijing and Washington consensuses, which have been so heavily debated in academic circles.

Prior to the evolution of the Beijing Consensus a large portion of developmental literature concerning Africa was written in relation to foreign aid and Foreign Direct Investment. This literature was usually focused on the role that the Western world should play in delivering this capital. However, with the onset of the Beijing Consensus in the early 2000’s came a growing scholarly literature discussing the benefits and downfalls of this practice, and inevitably the debate became geared towards comparing the Chinese model to that of the West. Over the years the conditionality vs non-interventionism debate has remained an integral part of academic discussion and as a result I argue that there has been less

academic focus on the discussion of alternative developmental policies. Therefore, the second section of this literature review will serve to highlight what these proposed alternatives are and where they figure within the literature.

Fisher (2019) argues that “International Relations theory has tended to overlook the role of Africa and Africans in the international system. Traditionally, the discipline’s most influential theorists have focused instead on relationships between and perspectives of major powers.” Hence the guiding concept of the literature review lies in the need to first demonstrate what I see as the problem in the development paradigm – the insistence of countless scholars to apply either the WsC or the BjC – followed by a look at a viable alternative development model– the African Consensus.

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3.1 Insisting upon tried methods – The Washington Consensus

Within the literature which seeks to promote either the WsC or the BjC the debate abounds over what the best policies to spur on African development are. From the onset of this debate there was a strong belief in academia that the neo-liberal restructuring of developing economies would be a positive force for change, not only in Africa, but throughout the developing world (Gore, 2000). Over time, however, many of these policies began to produce negative effects on already struggling economies. The production rates of countries dropped, and, in many countries, the total per capita income declined continuously from 1980 - 1994 as result of Structural Adjustment Programmes, (SAPs) which are a trademark of the Washington Consensus (Stein & Nissanke, 1999). Therefore, in a very short amount of time following the start of the WsC most observers noted the failure of its policies, whether they were its proponents or critics (Rodrik, 2006).

In modern literature there seems to be a near consensus that the neo-liberal imposition of

conditionality on Africa and other developing regions has been less than successful, if not disastrous (D’Arista, 2008; Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005). Yet many economists were not ready to simply abandon their ideology, instead they chose to restructure the WsC as the “New Post Washington Consensus” (Stiglitz, 1998). The New Post Washington Consensus is an altered form of its predecessor which seeks to not only tackle economic development, but social and environmental development as well, and it is the policy which now guides the IMF and WB policies in the developing world (Lopes, 2012). The rationale behind the restructuring of the WsC was that it had been too focused on short term, economic change and had therefore neglected the importance of developing other sectors of society. In comparison to its predecessor, the New Post Washington Consensus appears more popular in academic circles, (Stiglitz, 1998; Lopes, 2012) but it remains strongly debated whether or not it is a better policy as compared to the Beijing Consensus.

3.2 An unsteady path to development – The Beijing Consensus

Many are the academics who are proponents of China’s developmental policies in Africa. These academics argue that the Chinese model is based on a more equal relationship than the model which Western countries maintain (Van Dijk, 2009; Ang, 2017; Donou-Adonsou & Lim, 2018). One of the main policies of the BjC, which is lauded by its proponents, rests upon the non-conditionality approach which China employs (Donou-Adonsou & Lim, 2018 ; Ang, 2017) because, they argue, it allows for African states to develop according to what their needs are, and not according to what foreign powers think

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11 their needs are. In addition, the presence of Chinese capital in Africa is said to have increased the rate at which African economies are growing due to the exponential year on year increases in bilateral trade (Lafargue, 2009). Nonetheless, the literature which critiques Chinese policies in Africa can also be found in abundance,

One of the strongest critiques levelled against China is its policy of non-interventionism, which,

ironically, is also one of the policies most championed by pro-China advocates. Non-interventionism has guided Chinese foreign policy for decades. Its opponents claim it promotes human rights abuses by allowing the funding and political support of dictatorial regimes (Osondu-Oti, 2016) such as those of former Chinese ally, and Sudanese President, Omar El-Bashir. Yet another common criticism of Chinese developmental practices in Africa lies in the question of debt. The Chinese government is quick to hand out loans to African states that are not always in an economic condition to repay those loans. The accusation is that the Chinese government knows this and will eventually levy the debt in exchange for economic concessions – a debt trap (Chellaney, 2017). As a result of debt reclamation, the Chinese government now owns huge amounts of infrastructure projects across the continent, from power companies to ports and mines.

The literature I discuss concerning the BjC and WsC demonstrates that there is a significant school in academia which chooses to focus its area of study on tested methods of development, . This thesis does not suggest that academic research should not be carried out on the topic of the Washington and Beijing Consensuses, simply that if there is a consensus that neither option is optimal, why insist upon

comparing them rather than exploring other viable alternatives?

3.3 Exploring the alternatives – An African Consensus

Within the scholarly literature there is hardly any mention of an African Consensus - although it has begun to appear – which I argue is partially due to the intense focus placed on the WsC and BjC. The concept of the AfC first appeared at the World Social Forum in Senegal in 2011, and was later described by then Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete at the African Consensus Inception Forum as:

“a fresh economic paradigm for sustainable development built on practical experiences across the African continent together with shared experiences from other regions facing similar challenges. It merges the pioneering efforts of civil society in such areas as renewable energy, community finance and empowerment, organic agriculture and water resource management, environmental and endangered species protection coupled with the pragmatic experiences of business and finance required to scale

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12 these efforts into viable economic models. Seeking a pragmatic path for development, it emphasizes the importance of heritage, cultural and identity protection with the need for economic advancement.” In his vision for an African Consensus President Kikwete evokes the need for a revival of Pan-Africanism and he champions the role of civil society organizations and strategic partnerships. However, the vision put forward for an AfC in my thesis not only adopts this definition, but it also goes further to incorporate policies concerning African agency and the need for good governance.

Although the literature referencing an African Consensus is almost non-existent, the policy points of an AfC have individually been discussed in much more detail. Possibly the most central of these ideals is Pan-Africanism, as it encompasses what President Kikwete meant when he spoke of uniting practical experience of the African continent with the importance of heritage, culture and identity – similarly to Biko (2019) in his book Africa Reimagined. In Africa Reimagined Biko (2019) argues that Africans must redevelop a pride of being African and transcend national borders to unite as one in a rebirth of Pan-Africanism. He goes on to explain that this would allow African institutions to be structured around African values and that this would inevitably bring wealth to the continent. Pan-Africanism: The Ideal

and Movement (Esedebe, 1982) was written much earlier than Biko’s 2019 book, but it advocates for a

similar need to consolidate African identity and bring the continent together, politically and socially, to deal with issues in a united manner.

Another one of the key policies guiding an African Consensus lies in the need for increased African agency - the idea that African state and non-state actors should be politically independent from the outside world, while exerting collective strength to achieve common goals (Brown & Harman, 2013). The African Union has put forward several viable measures which aim to increase African agency in

international politics, but they have had rather poor results due in large part to a lack of agency (Leke, 2017). In 2016, 80 percent of the African Union’s budget still came from donor countries outside of Africa, which severely diminishes the potential for increased agency (Leke, 2017). However, the blueprints to consolidating African agency have already largely been drawn by the African Union as it seeks to effectively unite the continent.

One of the main factors driving African agency at the moment is the AU’s Agenda 2063 (Achieng, 2014) which the African Union describes as “Africa’s blueprint and master plan for transforming into the global powerhouse of the future. It is the continent’s strategic framework that aims to deliver on its goal for inclusive and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the pan-African drive for

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13 unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.”

In practical terms African agency is the AU’s creation of an African Union Development Agency (AUDA). AUDA is a development agency tasked with gradually replacing foreign aid agencies in favor of Africans providing aid to one another. African agency is also manifesting itself in the Continental Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) which aims to open up the continent for trade. The CFTA is similar in design to the Schengen zone in the European Union (EU) as it allows for the free movement of goods, services and people in a bid to spur on inter-African trade and boost development. Finally, agency also means Africans being a part of the conversation when it comes to matter that concern them. Broad and Cavanaugh’s article “The Death of the Washington Consensus” (1999) contends that the best way to develop Africa is to speak to Africans and not blindly develop policies in Washington. Ekeh (1986) follows a similar argument when he says that African developmental policies should be developed according to the needs which African states propose, and not according to what foreign states propose.

3.4 Macro level application of an African Consensus

In a macro level approach, the African Consensus consists in the African Union, regional blocs and individual states ensuring that principles of good governance are respected; that African institutions - whether national, regional or continental - are strong and resilient; and that states work in a unified manner to handle collective problems.

One of the main issue areas identified in the Constitutive Act of the African Union is the need for good governance (Okumu, 2009). The AU has argued that corruption and undemocratic values continue to plague certain regions of Africa and detract from their potential in trade and development (Agbiboa, 2012; Künhardt, 2014). Nigeria is often cited as an example of a state which possesses extreme wealth yet displays lackluster development due to engrained practices of corruption in much of the country (Agbiboa, 2012). On the other hand, is Botswana, which is Africa’s least corrupt state according to Transparency International, but also the 34th_{least corrupt state in the world. The reasons for this}

progress are largely attributed to the good governance policies which have guided the country for decades and continue to do so (Lewin, 2010). Democracy is strong, while freedom of speech is protected, at the same time there has been a dedicated push to ensure that institutions are kept independent and resilient (Lewin, 2010). This combination of factors demonstrates how supporting policies of good governance has the potential to produce large scale benefits.

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14 The role which institutions play in influencing development, or hindering it, is also vital for producing lasting change on the continent (Signé, 2017). On paper the institutions of the AU are quite resilient and powerful, yet in reality many of them have failed to live up to their mandate, such as the Pan-African Parliament. I consider the PAP to be a vital component for ensuring that any future African Consensus be implemented accordingly. If it lives up to its mandate the PAP could drive the policies of the AfC to be implemented and monitored and play an even more significant role than the European Parliament (EP) plays within the EU. If the PAP becomes fully functional and capable of exerting the powers which are afforded to it by the African Union, this institution would be able to implement laws, sanction members and take decisive action when necessary, something the AU has proven not very efficient at so far. Another example of institutional change which has the potential to produce large scale development in Africa is the Continental Free Trade Agreement. If the Schengen zone is Europe’s answer to

Pan-Europeanism, then the CFTA is Africa’s answer to Pan-Africanism. Through the CFTA African states will be able to greatly increase trade among one another and therefore will increase their agency and reduce foreign dependence (Edozie & Gottschalk, 2014).

Overall the concept of a macro level application of the AfC means that large scale emphasis must be placed on institution building and the promotion of good governance. Strong institutions and

accountable governments offer are a corner stone of the African Consensus and all evidence points to these factors contributing greatly to development.

3.5 Micro level application of an African Consensus

African agency is not solely limited to the role which governments play in advancing the interest of the state, despite most of the literature pertaining to African agency focusing on the role of the state (Fisher, 2018). Indeed, the role of the state cannot be negated because ultimately it is the state which carries the responsibility of developing a country. However, when the state is unwilling or incapable of exercising its obligations civil society groups and dedicated individuals play a key role in development (World Bank, 2005). As Chipaike (2018) notes in his argument, “African agency should not be solely seen as emanating from and being exerted by governmental elites but should also be examined as coming from independent civil society movements as well as exceptional and ordinary African individuals.” If that agency is then paired with the other policies of the AfC it creates the backbone for a micro level application of an African Consensus. That, nonetheless, should not deter the AU, governments and the

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15 private sector form investing in and backing individuals and civil society organizations in strategic

partnerships.

At the civil society level there are an abundance of actors which work to promote Pan-African agency and develop Africa with homegrown solutions. Civil society organizations have often been championed as drivers of development in almost every sector of society (Pearce, 2011; Charveriat, 2015). The Green Belt Movement is an award-winning organization founded by Professor and Nobel laureate Wangari Maathai of Kenya in 1977. The Green Belt Movement seeks to promote a sustainable environment, women’s right and a healthy democracy through tree planting and other such activities (Green Belt Movement). To date it has planted over 51 million trees and Professor Maathai was the first African woman bestowed with the Nobel Peace Prize. Her movement demonstrates the capacity of micro level civil society organizations to influence social change in a meaningful way (Michaelson, 1994; Young, 2002). I will discuss the vital role of civil society in promoting peace and security further in the analysis chapter.

Promoting the vision for an African Consensus at the individual level is perhaps best accentuated by the work of Fred Swaniker, a Ghanaian entrepreneur who is developing the African Leadership University. The ALU aims to become one of Africa’s most respected institutions by ensuring a world-class education for Africa’s brightest minds, rich or poor. Swaniker aims to build 25 campuses across the African

continent and train three million leaders by 2060, all of whom will follow a curriculum geared towards promoting African development (ALU, 2019). In addition, each student is required to spend the first three years of their professional career somewhere in Africa so as to avoid a brain drain and ensure that bright local minds help build the future of their continent. Fred Swaniker’s work has earned him a spot on 2019’s Time 100 list; he has presented at TED conferences; and he was chosen to be a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum (Greenspan, 2019). It is through individuals like Fred Swaniker, who are politically and socially orientated, that the African Consensus can be applied at a micro-level, with assistance from the AU, governments and the private sector.

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4. Methodology

This objective of this thesis is multi-pronged. The first objective is an assessment of the Washington and Beijing Consensuses and their efficacy, followed by a need to understand how academic and political focus on these policies has drawn attention away from the study and application of an African

Consensus. The final objective of this thesis is to explore the concept of an African Consensus and how it can be adopted as an alternative model for development in Africa.

To be able to accurately explore these topics it was necessary to assess a broad range of sources and employ a comparative outlook. Furthermore, the use of Critical Theory was important to this study for CT seeks to understand how a particular problem came to be in a bid to not only question its existence, but to change its structure altogether. Critical Theory seeks to demonstrate that there are no pre-determined truths in international relations and therefore that the manner in which international relations take place can be altered. This thesis also seeks to demonstrate that in terms of African development there are no predetermined truths and therefore that the manner in which development takes place on the continent can also be altered.

As such the hypothesis for my research is the following:

For decades developmental policies in Africa have largely been shaped according to the agendas of foreign powers and therefore these policies have often fallen short of producing effective results. In a

period of increasing African unity it is time for continental policy shift towards an African Consensus, characterized by Pan-Africanism; African agency; good governance; strategic partnerships; and civil

society driven change.

4.1 Research Design

The research method for the thesis employed a qualitative, multiple case study approach. The use of a qualitative research design was employed because qualitative research facilitates the use of multiple sources of data when exploring a certain topic, ensuring that the researcher does not get stuck looking at the issue with one lens (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Hence this study drew its information from a range of sources. The data which was analyzed are secondary sources – mostly journal articles sourced from academic databases, and academic books – as well as news articles and reports from governments and International Organizations.

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17 Qualitative research, as opposed to quantitative research, was a more appropriate research method for this study because qualitative research is geared towards understanding the social aspect of human interactions, specifically, how and why certain phenomena operate in the way in which they do (Polkinghorne, 2005). As the nature of this thesis was to understand what is being said about the WsC and BjC, and how that is affecting the evolution of an AfC, a quantitative approach would not be as appropriate. Quantitative research is more limited in the sense that the method of drawing information is already predetermined – e.g.: a questionnaire or survey – whereas qualitative research “is endlessly creative and interpretive” (Mcleod, 2017).

Critical Theory, which I employed in the theoretical framework of this thesis, was well suited to

quantitative data collection because it seeks to question knowledge. The nature of qualitative research is highly subjective leaving the researcher exposed to many different opinions and sources (Mcleod, 2017). This means that the researcher must be ready to question the ideas which are presented to formulate an accurate analysis, thus Critical Theories questioning nature allowed for a more nuanced understanding of data. The subjective nature of qualitative research, however, does not undermine the researcher’s ability to produce information in a scientific manner (Wildemuth & Zhang, 2016).

As the issue at hand was one which required in-depth research to formulate an understanding of the how and why of the subject, this thesis used a multiple case study. Yin (2003) argues that case studies are appropriate research methods when the behaviour of the subject of inquisition cannot be

manipulated, as was the case with this paper. Case studies are useful in so far as they allow the

researcher to test their hypothesis according to real examples (Pinfield, 1986). A research paper would not be as pertinent if the theories developed within the paper are not tested according to real examples. The use of multiple case studies, then, allows the researcher to not only test their hypothesis against one example, but multiple examples, in this case Botswana and Angola. These two countries were used as the case study because they represent two very different examples of development practice, whereas Botswana is seen as much less reliant on the Beijing and Washington Consensus model of development than most African countries, and Angola is considered heavily dependent on the BjC, and to a lesser extent, the WsC.

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4.2 Data Collection

To be able to produce a thesis that was thorough it was necessary to explore a wide range of data allowing for the subject at hand to be explored with multiple lenses. This approach ensures that every viewpoint is considered and minimizes the risk of viewing the topic at hand through one lens. The main sources that were used to collect data were those produced by academics that feature on scholarly databases, such as Jstor or Google Scholar. These databases ensure that all of the scholarly work they feature has been peer reviewed and are considered legitimate. Scholarly work is a valuable resource when conducting research, not only because it has been peer reviewed, but also because it is the work of qualified researchers, as opposed to being the product of an opinionated blog or news article. For much the same reasons many of the sources used to conduct my research were books written by scholars. However, it would be a great limitation for any researcher to base all of their work on solely the work of other researchers because opinion does matter to this study.

Most of the academic research used in this paper came from sources who discuss the WsC and BjC but are not directly affected by its policies, nor their outcomes. Although this has the advantage of

producing less biased work, I argue that it is just as important to study news articles and relevant blogs to understand how people who are affected by these policies determine their efficacy. Whereas the academic prefers to quote other academics, news articles quote government officials and other people directly affected by policy and, therefore, give an insight into the situation which goes further than scholarly understanding. The insight might be subjective, but subjectivity is important to gauge

perspective. For this reason, a significant portion of the data collected came from news articles and NGO reports.

The data collected ranges from publications in the 1970s until the present day. Although it could be argued that data from the 1970s and 1980s is outdated, I contend that using older sources is another important method for gauging perspective. For example, early sources addressing the topic of Africanism were highly positive about its potential, but over the decades it appears as though Pan-African literature gained many detractors, and in the age of the Pan-African Union there seems to be a revival of its proponents (Hablous, 2016). Inferences can then be made about why these phenomena occurred and how they affect outlook on the WsC and BjC.

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4.3 Case Selection

Although this thesis aimed to consider Africa’s general history with both the Washington and Beijing consensuses, and how this has affected the development of an African Consensus, I chose to

incorporate a multiple-case study to demonstrate the effects of these policies on a case by case basis. The use of a case study allows the researcher to apply their hypothesis to test its validity. For this reason, the two case studies undertaken in this thesis – Botswana and Angola – are quite different from one another. Botswana’s government has historically criticized the West for not treating it as an “equal” and has chosen to lean on China for economic support instead (Youngman, 2013). However, in recent years, the relationship with China has also deteriorated as Botswana’s government seeks to assert its sovereignty (Masokola, 2015; Zi, 2017). Angola, on the other hand, has chosen to maintain very strong ties with China, and to a lesser extent, the United States. The country is doing extremely well in terms of economic indicators, yet, as this thesis documents, in many instances these relationships are less than desirable for Angola and its people. These two case studies therefore served as examples of how WsC, BjC and AfC policies affect states at the national level, while also demonstrating another point of this thesis, which is that no matter which policies African governments choose to follow, there will always be a need for partnerships with foreign countries due to the globalized nature of our world.

4.4 Limitations

Although the subjectivity of qualitative research can be a strength in so far as it allows a researcher to access more opinions and sources, it can also be a limitation. If the nature of the data collected is too subjective it becomes difficult to formulate a nuanced understanding of the problem. This limitation, however, can be overcome if the researcher carries out their work in a scientific manner (Wildemuth & Zhang, 2016).

Another limitation which arose with this thesis was the breadth of the study. It dawned on me that the study might be too broad a topic to explore in a thesis of this length, and that I should consider simply using case studies, rather than looking at all of Africa. However, although this does make the work more difficult, I argue that without taking a general look at Africa and how the WsC and BjC affect its

individual states, I could not suggest an African Consensus. Africa is not just Botswana or Angola, but it represents 55 member states of the African Union and to develop an African Consensus requires a generalized but nuanced look at the continent as a whole. In wanting to deal with this issue I decided to include the two case studies of Botswana and Angola, to offer perspective and test my hypothesis.

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20 Possibly the most challenging limitation to the subject matter of this thesis lies in Africa’s diversity. Although diversity is a strength in many instances it also renders continental unity more difficult. The large number of ethnic groups, religions, kinships etc. mean that forming a consensus becomes a challenge. For instance, Kenya suffers from deeply rooted tribal rivalries, which are a legacy of colonialism. These rivalries make political consensus very difficult in the country and mean that most Kenyan’s choose to vote along tribal lines. If it is difficult to form a Pan-Africanism spirit within one state it will be a serious challenge inculcate this spirit across Africa. Although trends are slowly changing the issues of division across the continent are a serious limitation to the formation of a unified

developmental policy for the African continent. However, the Continental Free Trade Agreement has been ratified by all but three African states, which demonstrates that the possibility for unity is there but that it must be nurtured. The European Union project has taken several decades to become the

powerful body that it is, and it has arguably faced far fewer challenges than the AU.

The final limitation which came up when writing this thesis lay in the availability of data. African governments have not all been very effective in producing online sources which explain their finances, their politics and other important areas of study. In addition, the general lack of sources available on the concept of an African Consensus made it more difficult in drawing up information. This, nonetheless, was expected as a significant point of this thesis is to demonstrate that the heavy focus placed on the WsC and BjC has taken away considerably from the discussion of an AfC.

5. Case Studies

Case studies are a useful in so far as they can demonstrate an argument within its context and test whether a suggested model can work in practice, rather than only in theory. As a means of testing this thesis’ theory I will apply two opposing case studies. The first case study is of Angola, an example of an African state which is heavily dependent on China, and to some degree the West. I will argue the case that by choosing the BjC as its preferred developmental model Angola is limiting its development, despite the fact that it has a fast-growing economy. The second case study is of Botswana, an example of an African state which has developed successful policies that balance its relationships with foreign powers, asserts its agency, imposes its sovereignty and embraces Pan-Africanism. Botswana is often considered a shining example of effective development policies, not only in Africa, but throughout the world.

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5.1 Angola – On the path of conditionality and debt

Angola is a country with an exceptionally turbulent history. It remained a Portuguese colony until 1975 when the country broke down into a protracted and extremely violent civil war, from 1975 until 2002, in which more than 500,000 people died (Hurst, 2009). Occurring during the height of the Cold War, the Angolan civil war was a proxy war waged primarily between the three Angolan independence parties, the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA. Today these three parties still dominate the political scene in Angola, despite the MPLA having been in control of the presidency since Angola’s independence. It was only recently, in 2017, that former President Jose Eduardo dos Santos renounced the presidency, after 38 years in power. In the past 17 years, since the end of the war, Angola has managed remarkable economic growth and now stands as the third strongest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria and South Africa (Chazan, 2018). However, the country is still considered to be ruled by members of the Dos Santos’ entourage, and his MPLA party. As a result, very little wealth has trickled down to the ordinary citizen (Hylton, 2014).

Angola is ranked 45th_{on the Mo Ibrahim Index for African Governance and 165}th_{on Transparency}

International’s Corruption Perception Index, making it one of the most unequal countries on earth. Despite this inequality the country has consistently been the second largest oil producer on the continent, and its third largest source for diamonds (World Bank). With its wealth in natural resources and a significant coastline Angola should be one of the continents most developed states, yet the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reports that Angola is one of the worlds most underdeveloped and unequal states. Many academics and economists blame the countries poor record on two factors – poor governance and a lack sovereignty with regards to China (Chazan, 2018)). A weak civil society is also considered to hinder Angola’s growth (Amundsen & Abreu, 2006). Yet there are some positive indicators for the country – the new president is said to be cracking down on corruption and it appears as though the government is embracing a Pan-African agenda.

During former President Dos Santos’ rule billions of dollars were lost from state coffers while his entourage enriched themselves. His daughter remains Africa’s richest woman, with Forbes Magazine estimating her wealth at $2.3 billion in 2019, despite more than 36% of the population living below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2018). The corruption and inequalities experienced in Angola are largely blamed on the poor governance it has succumbed to for decades, as politicians and rebel groups have placed wealth and power above the nation’s best interest. Dos Santos’ successor, Joao Lourenco,

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22 has been trying to distance himself from his rule and commit to an anti-corruption drive, but many say it is half-hearted as corruption indicators remain largely the same.

In May 2019 the head of Angola’s state oil company was sacked due to the current oil shortage the country is going through. Although it is Africa’s second biggest exporter of crude oil, Angola lacks the capacity to refine its own oil and citizens regularly experience power cuts and fuel shortages at gas stations (France 24, 2019) – much like in Africa’s largest exporter of crude oil, Nigeria. The policies of the African Consensus accentuate the need for good governance and proper resource management,

because the “resource curse” (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001) facing Africa is not inherent, rather, it tends to be the result of poor governance and extractive multi-national companies.

Although the United States was Angola’s largest trading partner for many years the Chinese government has now surpassed the United States by a significant margin. In 2017 over 67% of Angola’s petroleum was exported to China, effectively making Angola China’s second biggest trading partner in Africa. The issue is not that China wants to buy Angolan oil, but that Angola does not receive money for this oil. Under the so called “Angolan Model” the government exchanges its oil for infrastructure projects carried out by Chinese state companies (Chazan, 2018). Although this process has been credited with rebuilding the country after its civil war, Chinese companies are accused of poor working standards; hiring a disproportionate number of Chinese workers; and using imported materials. These accusations are often leveled against Chinese firms working in Africa, yet some states, such as Botswana, are taking a firm stance against poorly built Chinese infrastructure projects.

Angola’s government has been accused of turning a blind eye to Chinese malpractice in exchange for benefits. In addition to this issue, the government owes over $21.5 billion to the Chinese government, but due to their policy of trading oil for infrastructure, the government hardly owns any foreign exchange reserves and consequentially is unable to pay back its loans. This is what many economists have labeled “debt-trap diplomacy” (Pandey, 2018). Debt-trap diplomacy is described as one state providing huge amounts of loans to another state regardless of that states capacity to repay the loans. Eventually the state receiving the loans will default on these loans and will be indebted to their creditor. Today China has significant stakes in the Angolan state, which owes the Chinese government enormous sums of money, leaving the Angolan state vulnerable (Pandey, 2018). This situation has diminished Angola’s sovereignty and agency, not only with regards to China, but other foreign powers as well. The majority of the oil fields in the country are operated by Western companies which continue to enrich themselves while investing a minimum amount of wealth back into the country (Hylton, 2014). This

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23 example demonstrates that under the BjC and WsC models there is a strong likelihood that African governments will lose their agency, invite practices of bad governance and forsake equal partnerships. One of the important pillars which the African Consensus rests upon is the strength of civil society to bring about meaningful change and apply pressure on a government when it is not living up to its obligations. However, Angola has a weak civil society, in large part because of the civil war which fragmented the country, but also because there is such strong partisanship in the country (Amundsen & Abreu, 2006; Kibble & Vines, 2001). Although not the sole cause of partisanship in Angola, China’s policies can be partially blamed for fueling a culture of division in Angolan politics because they continue to fund, arm and support the MPLA at the expense of human rights and political equality.

The case study of Angola highlights the issues which Angola and many other African states face as a result of pursuing developmental policies which do not reflect their own needs. Clearly the policies of the Beijing Consensus being employed in Angola are of significant benefit to China. Angola and

Angolans, meanwhile, do not reap the majority of the benefits from their vast natural wealth. Dambisa Moyo, in her book Dead Aid, outlines that reliance on China or the West for development can in turn promote poor governance and a loss of sovereignty. This is not only the problem in Angola but in much of Africa, and this case study demonstrates why there is a need to shift towards an alternative

developmental model that reflects the needs of the continent, for example, the African Consensus.

5.2 Botswana – Trailblazing an alternative model for development

In contrast to Angola, and despite its small population of roughly 2.3 million people, Botswana has managed to garner significant appraisal for its policies of good governance and steady economic development. When Botswana was granted its independence in 1966 it featured among the 25 poorest countries in the world, and yet, in the space of three decades it has risen to become an upper-middle income country, far surpassing most of its African counterparts (World Bank, 2001). Today Botswana is considered to be the most democratic and least corrupt country on the continent (Transparency International) with an impressive human rights record and robust economy. These titles have not been bestowed upon the state by chance but are the product of decades of thorough policy development that reflects the needs of the country.

Since its independence the government of Botswana has continuously accentuated its sovereign will in matters of the economy and of politics. The government is also known for employing its agency on the international stage when it feels the need to, and it harbors Pan-African ambition. The combination of

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24 these factors has allowed Botswana to form strategic partnerships with foreign powers, while retaining control over its developmental policies. Botswana’s upward trajectory and developmental policies embody the success stories which I suggest can be replicated by an African Consensus across the continent, and Botswana’s model therefore stands as an alternative to the China and West binary. However, the country still faces the need to improve upon certain factors affecting its continued development, such as broadening its Pan-African agenda and diversifying its economy (Leith, 2005). According to the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Botswana had the fifth best governance record in Africa in 2018, down three spots from being second best in 2017 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018). Since the index’s conception, in 2008, Botswana has consistently ranked in the top five as its politicians continue to demonstrate policies of good governance. Transparency International has ranked Botswana as the least corrupt country on the continent, its indicators closer to those of Australia and France than to most of its fellow African states (Transparency International, 2018). There have also always been consistently democratic and relatively peaceful transfers of power in the country, despite its rich mineral wealth that so often leads developing countries to violence.

Although Botswana’s primary revenue sources are its natural resources, namely diamonds, the country has not experienced what academics have coined the resource curse. According to an official World Bank (2001) report entitled “Beating the Resource Curse: The Case of Botswana” the government has continuously implemented long term investment strategies aimed at bolstering markets and stabilizing the economy since the 1970’s (Leith, 2005). Developing countries rich with natural resources often succumb to extreme levels of violence and corruption as a result of poor policies and hawkish

multinational companies. The ravages of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia were largely due to the corruption and poor governance which stemmed from their diamond industries. However, upon discovery of its own source of diamonds, in the late 1960’s, the government of Botswana devised a strategy whereby the mining conglomerate De Beers would share a 50/50 stake with them in all local mines (World Bank). This practice has widely been credited for boosting the local economy and today diamonds account for over 30% of the countries Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Yet one of the biggest inhibitors to development across the developing world has been the dependency of states on natural resources, and a part of good governance is ensuring the economy is robust and diversified. Angola’s economy is almost entirely dependent on its oil reserves - 50% of its GDP comes from oil production - and is thus at the mercy of international markets in case of a crash in oil prices (OPEC, 2019). Botswana has been attempting to diversify its economy, but this still remains one of the

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25 key challenges in the way of its continued development (World Bank; Leith, 2005). The government of Botswana has refused to apply the Angola Model for its trade relations with China, or any other partner, and instead prefers to sell its resources for foreign exchange that strengthens its economy.

Botswana has also received appraisal by many for the agency with which it has handled its relationship with China. After Chinese government contractors were accused of carrying out poor work on three mega-projects in the country, then president Ian Khama refused to award any new contracts to Chinese companies, instead seeking South Korean assistance to complete projects (Masokola, 2015; Zi, 2017). In another incident, the Chinese government tried to force Botswana’s hand and annul the visit of the Dalai Lama for a conference in Gaborone. The government did not appreciate this undermining of their sovereignty and refused to acquiesce, claiming that they were not a “colonial subject” (Tibetan Review, 2017). These examples, among many others, demonstrate that African states are capable of exerting their agency and retain control over their sovereignty, all the while maintaining strong partnerships with foreign powers.

The final major factor which can be credited for Botswana’s impressive development story lies in its Pan-African ambitions. Not only is the country a key member of the Southern Pan-African Development

Community, it is also host to the regional bloc’s headquarters. The government has signed on to the Continental Free Trade Agreement and is a supporter of increasing trade among African states. In addition, Botswana’s government has not shied away from its duties regarding the promotion of good governance among its neighbours. Botswana is host to a large population of Zimbabweans who fled their home country in search of better economic opportunities after the latter’s economy crashed and continues to act as a mediator between political rivals in neighbouring countries.

Botswana is therefore a shining example of an African Consensus at work. By employing policies which are the hallmark of the African Consensus, such as policies of good governance, sovereign will, strategic partnerships and political agency, Botswana has built a reputation for being safe, inclusive and

prosperous, and continues to champion its role as a positive influence for developing states. I argue that the Botswana model is successful because it is based on policies which are developed by the people of Botswana and not by Beijing or the West. Furthermore, I argue that this method of development is the right one for all of Africa and should be championed by national governments, as well as the African Union and regional blocs.

An emerging Africa : moving beyond the binary