African perceptions towards China : working towards an analytical framework

African Perceptions Towards China:

Working towards an analytical framework

Bachelor Thesis Joost Lina

Student No. 10002215

June 27

2014

Katja Biedenkopf & Julien Jeandesboz

Second Reader Rosa Sanchez Salgado

8676 Words

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Abstract

Though Western media claim that African countries are negative towards China, public opinion polls show the opposite. African countries are the most positive of all countries towards China. Research in the field of African perceptions towards China is underdeveloped and based on insufficient data. One of the reasons this field is underdeveloped, is because there is no substantial analytical framework to use. In this paper, I analyse different variables that can explain the difference in attitudes amongst African countries. I will look at Kenya, a positive country, and South Africa, the most negative of the African nations. In doing so, I try to make the first movement towards an analytical framework that explains the variation in attitudes towards Africa amongst African countries. I find that economic factors and commitment by China can be explanatory factors, but I conclude that culture and the historical relationship have mixed results.

Introduction

Over the past couple of decades, China has increasingly invested billions in the African continent. In 2007 Chinese companies invested over one billion dollars in African countries (Feng & Mu, 2010; 7250). Hanusch (2012, 492) states that in 2000 the bilateral trade between China and African countries encompassed about ten billion dollars. Ten years later, this number increased to an astonishing 126.9 billion dollars. During the same period, investment saw a tenfold increase. China puts more Foreign Direct

Investment (FDI) in Africa than in Europe, North America and Oceania (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; 27). This increase in trade and investment has deepened the relationship between China and the African nations it invests in. “This has been

driven largely by China’s remarkable economic growth, which has increased demand for energy and commodities, thus encouraging trade and investment with different African countries” (Mawdsley, 2008; 509).

This increase in Chinese investment in the African continent has not gone unnoticed. In the Western hemisphere media have been reporting extensively on the increase in Chinese investments and their implications. The media report that the Chinese offer outrageously low wages and the working conditions are horribly bad (amongst others, chinaafricarealstory.com, 2013). The Western (both EU and US) press tends to be very negative about the increasing influence. The media write that China is a neo-colonist power and that the Chinese investments are only to extract the natural resources from the African countries (Park, 2013; 132). In addition, the poor African countries cannot protect themselves against the Chinese (Sautman & Yan, 2009; 728). The portrayal of an evil, imperialist China along with a positive image of the West paints a picture that is “unconvincing and

unconstructive – as we have seen, both the West and China have more complex relations with different parts of Africa, and with each other” (Mawdsley, 2008; 523).

Just as Mawdsley suggests, the Sino-African relationship is not necessarily like the media say. Several surveys have been held amongst citizens of different African countries throughout the last decade

Table 1: Favorability of China per continent (Pewglobal, 2013)

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(see annex 1) and they all point in one direction: Africa likes China. Actually, Africa is the continent that is the most positive towards China, in particular sub-Saharan Africa. Almost every single country is (extremely) positive towards Chinese influence (see table 2). The data these surveys provide, contradict the negative media reports (ft.com, 2012; nytimes.com, 2014). As table 1 shows, African nations are very positive towards China, especially in comparison to nations on other continents. However, despite the general positive attitude towards China amongst the African countries, there is a good amount of variation between the most positive and the most negative African countries. Existing literature on the Sino-African relationship and, in particular, the perceptions of African countries towards China is limited in scope and depth. Most literature concludes that the perceptions of African nations are not as negative and uniform as the Western media suggest. The large part does not explain why African perceptions are so positive and what explains the variation between the African countries in attitude. The literature (amongst others Sautman & Yan, 2009) that dives into these matters, provides dissatisfactory explanations and conclusions. There are several issues with researching the African perceptions on China. First of all, there is a lack of data. Both China and Africa are not as transparent as European countries tend to be. Additionally, research on a lot of matters, such as public opinion polls, have not been executed in African nations. Second of all, the scope of previous research generally encompasses one or two countries. This provides answers for specific case studies, but not for a cross-country analysis. A complete cross-country research is difficult, partly due to the problem of availability of data. Third and last of all, the existing literature provides a limited analytical framework. In order to analyse which factors influence the African perceptions, one needs to have an analytical framework that encompasses all the relevant variables (Keuleers, 2014). I will try to provide the first steps in attaining such a framework by building upon existing literature and testing different variables on two African countries. With these first steps, I try to work towards the answer of the question “What explains the variation amongst African countries in their attitude towards China?”, though I will not give a definite answer in this paper.

First, I will sketch the analytical framework and present the different factors that can influence African perceptions: historical relationship, culture, commitment and economic. The factors are each divided in different variables. After discussing the variables I use for my framework, I will justify my choice of countries and the research design. The latter is a most different case design in order to eliminate factors that have no (potential) explanatory value. I have chosen Kenya and South Africa as most different cases, based on their attitudes towards China. See annex 1 on the content of the used surveys on which I based my verdict about the attitudes. In the Analysis section, I will discuss the results of each country per factor and variable. I find that the results on historical relationship are not in line with the expectations. The cultural variables provide mixed results. Commitment and

economic, however, provide results that correspond with the theoretical explanations, suggesting

they have explanatory value within the framework. After the analysis, I will present concluding remarks and discuss the difficulties with this paper.

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Analytical framework

In this chapter I will present the different variables that I will use to explain why there is a difference between Kenya’s and South Africa’s perception towards China. I discuss several factors that are each operationalized into different variables: historical relationship (length, nature), culture (national culture, democracy, corruption, income inequality), commitment (finance, context) and economic (GDP per capita over time). First, I will introduce the topic and my methodology.

In this paper, I will look at cross-country factors at the national aggregate level. Sautman & Yan (2009) published one of the first articles that, as they put it, was not based upon “a putative “African view” of Africa–China links, constructed from anecdotal evidence” (ibid.; 728). They looked extensively at factors at the individual level, such as age and education, but also at the national aggregate level, such as the influence of political rhetoric and media at the national level (ibid.; 758-759). Their most important conclusion was that both levels didn’t provide statistically significant results, but the results showed that factors on the national level across countries provide stronger explanatory values than on the individual level. The attitude towards China is

determined by nationality and not by different individual qualities (Sautman & Yan, 2009; Rebol, 2010; 3533). I will therefore look at different factors per country and compare them.

Though Sautman & Yan (2009) didn’t find statistically significant results on the variable at the national level - the influence of politicians on the public attitude towards China -, their research is by no means useless. The surveys they use might not be as representative as one hopes, but the research does lift a corner of the veil that is the cross-country research on African perceptions of other nations. Furthermore, they held surveys in countries of which

no data was available before, such as Zambia (ibid.; 729). I stand for the same problems they encountered when it comes to data: the scarce data available might not be as representative as one hopes. In order to ensure my analysis is based on as accurate data as possible, I tried to find multiple sources to verify my assumptions.

Furthermore, the increased trade and ways of doing business tend to influence the attitudes towards China: “Chinese trade can have benefits for a large share of the population, including small scale vendors and consumers that benefit from more competitive prices” (Rebol, 2010; 3533) and “China has introduced a new set of rules to the game: aid from the West versus business from Asia” (Naidu & Mbazima, 2008; 758). I will incorporate the former in the economic section and the latter will be operationalized in the commitment section. In the next sections, I will present the different factors as listed above successively, after which I will analyse each of them in the analysis. In the analysis, I will discuss the methodology further and present the reasons for my choice in Kenya and South Africa.

Table 2: Perceptions of countries on China (Pewglobal, 2007; 39)

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Historical Relationship

The history between two countries can explain why the citizens of the respective countries tend to be positive or negative towards one another. Applied to this case, I will look at the history between Kenya and South Africa and China. Building upon two case studies (Esteban, 2010; Park; 2013), I argue that the longer the relationship of China with Kenya and South Africa, the more positive the attitude towards China is. Length is the first variable. The second is the nature of the historical relationship: if the history is full of negative encounters, it influences the relationship negatively. The first historical variable is length. A positive attitude towards China can be explained by a

relatively long bilateral history (Park, 2013). If a country is familiar with Chinese customs, they don’t see them as intruders. The longer the relationship, the longer the locals have to get used to the ways of the immigrants. This goes beyond political ties, but it requires people from both nationalities to interact on a regular basis. (Esteban, 2010; 249). I expect that the longer the relationship with China, the more positive the country is towards China.

The second variable is the nature of the relationship. During the period of interaction, however long this may be, the nature of these interactions determine whether people experience the other as friendly or at least not hostile. The more positive experiences between the peoples of the different countries, the more positive the attitude (Esteban, 2010; 249). However, length and nature are interlinked. The longer people have had positive encounters, the more nuanced they respond to sudden negative pressures (Park, 2013; 139-140). I expect that that the more positive the nature of the relationships, the more positive the attitude towards China. This effect can be increased by a longer period of positive or negative encounters and the longer the relationship (for example positive), the more locals will put recent developments (such as negative press) in to perspective. I will look at several reports on South Africa and Kenya for both length and nature and draw my conclusions on this qualitative approach.

Culture

Another important explanatory factor in the variation in African perceptions of China can be culture. I will present four different variables in this subsection: national culture, democracy, corruption and

income inequality.

National cultural differences can trouble a relationship between two countries or provide common ground. It is important that cultures are compatible and/or can coexist next to each other in order to establish successful ties. People with large cultural differences tend to be more sceptical towards one another (Feng & Mu, 2010; 7254). The more two cultures differ from one another, the more difficult it proves to have a fruitful bilateral relationship. If the cultures between the African nations and China clash, it can influence the perception of the respective nation in a negative way. The difference between the cultures can contribute to the analytical framework. Culture itself is defined as such: “culture is the collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or category of people from others” (http://geert-hofstede.com/, 2014). Geert Hofstede conceptualises national culture as “implicit; core; systematically causal; territorially unique; and shared”

(McSweeney, 2002; 91). Of these five components, core, territory and sharing are the most relevant. His conceptualisation of national culture is derived from his definition of culture in which people from different nations are the “members of one group”. ‘Core’ means that national culture is a common component to a “wider culture which contains both global and sub-national constituents” (ibid.; 92). Furthermore, Hofstede argues that every nation ‘shares’ its own unique culture that is fundamentally different from other nations and is therefore ‘territorially unique’. Hofstede’s work

5 has had a lot of acclaim, as well as a lot of criticism, because of his strong assumptions (McSweeney, 2002). It does provide a good framework in comparing the national culture of different countries. Based on his work on national culture, Geert Hofstede developed a cultural index to analyse national cultural differences. I will use this to compare China with Kenya and South Africa. The index

compares countries on six variables, namely power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty

avoidance, pragmatism and indulgence. Table 3 shows that China has a high amount of power

distance, pragmatism and masculinity in contrast with low indulgence, individualism and uncertainty avoidance. According to the Geert Hofstede Index, a high score on power distance means the society in question in very hierarchical. Individualism tells whether people tend to think in terms of ‘I’ or ‘we’. The low score of China means the Chinese tend to think in ‘we’. High masculinity means the society is driven by competition and success, where a lo (feminine) score means the society focusses on quality of life and caring for others. Uncertainty avoidance looks to either control the future or let it go. The low Chinese score on this shows that they are comfortable without a completely planned future. Pragmatism shows how easy people can adapt their customs to changing environments. A high score, such as the Chinese, tells us they are very adaptable. Lastly, the low score on indulgence means that the Chinese do not restrain from their desires and like to do what their feelings tell them (http://geert-hofstede.com/, 2014). These six factors provide an overall overview of a national culture. I will compare China with Kenya and South Africa on these factors. The more China and either of the African countries have the same values on the Geert Hofstede Index, the more compatible the countries are culturally and the more positive I expect the country to be towards China.

Geert Hofstede Index

Power

Distance Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty Avoidance Pragmatism Indulgence

China 80 20 66 30 87 24

Table 3: China’s Score on the Geert Hofstede Index (http://geert-hofstede.com/china.html, 2014)

Another important facet of culture I will incorporate is political culture. Political culture can be defined in many ways. I will use a broad definition: “state public opinion as summarized in party identification and ideological identification” (Erikson, McIver & Wright, 1987; 798). In other words, I will look at the public opinion as summarized in ideological identification (ibid.). Hanusch (2012) linked African perceptions towards China and how people value democracy. China is no democracy. People who value democracy as something good, will be negative about the increasing influence of China. Therefore, the more respondents are pro-democracy, the higher the negative attitude

towards China. The Afrobarometer (2008) values the African perceptions on democracy. I will use the same method and definition of democracy in this paper: “democracy requires at a minimum that free elections be held regularly” (Hanusch, 2012; 498). It is a narrow, but striking definition, especially since a lot of African countries don’t have regularly held elections (e.g. Zimbabwe or Chad). I will therefore test Kenya and South Africa on two questions from the Afrobarometer (2008; 7-8). The first question is about whether they prefer democracy or not and the second asks if the respondents think elections should be held on a regular basis. The more a country’s residents are pro-democracy and pro-regular elections, the more negative I expect them to be towards China.

A third and fourth cultural explanation are economic in a sense: inequality and corruption. The non-interference policy of China allows it to invest in countries regardless of their political structure and culture. Kolstad & Wiig (2012; 33) elaborate: “It is striking that Chinese foreign investment appears to be attracted by the type of institutional dysfunctions which are at the core of the so-called resource

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curse, whereby poor institutions lead to a detrimental impact of natural resources on economic development. This may be particularly harmful, since Chinese investment would then play straight into key dysfunctions of resource rich developing countries, possibly exacerbating resource-related problems. This further strengthens the tentative conclusion of Frynas and Paolo that “the new investments in the African oil and gas sector may not necessarily be good news for ordinary Africans”.” This last sentence suggests that income generated from the Chinese presence in the economy leads to an unequal income distribution. This can be instigated by either income inequality, the unequal distribution of wealth within a country, or it may well be that the disparities are caused by corruption, transferring the money via illegal canals. In a country with high inequality, the income distribution is largely in favour of the wealthy elite, who accumulate most of the national income. Corruption would increase the unequal income distribution by allowing people to enrich themselves by illegal practises. In both Kenya and South Africa, the Chinese are being accused of engaging in bribery (Petroba, 2012; Park, 2013). The higher inequality and corruption rate within a country, the less positive the attitudes towards China will be, because profits of the trade with and investment of China go into the pockets of the elites.

I will use the ‘Perceived Corruption Index’ as an variable for corruption. “The Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 serves as a reminder that the abuse of power, secret dealings and bribery continue to ravage societies around the world” (cpi.transparency.org, 2014). This index provides a scale from 0 (corrupt) to 100 (clean), on which a ranking of all the different countries is based. The results are mainly based on the verdict of a panel of experts on corruption. If the country is corrupt, I expect people to be more negative towards China. The ‘cleaner’ it is, the more positivity I expect towards China.

I will use the Gini Index to value scores on income inequality. “[The] Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution” (worldbank.org; quandl.org). A score of 0 means a perfect income distribution, whereas 100 means perfectly unequal. I expect that the more a country’s income distribution is unequal, the less people benefit from the trade with China and the more negative the country is towards China.

Commitment

There are two sides to each story. Thus far I have presented factors that are mainly derived from the African countries and their constituents, but now I will present one important variable from China’s side: their commitment in the respective African countries. I will look at the commitment of China in Kenya and South Africa in two different ways. First of all, I will use the variable finance to assess the (relative) amount of official commitment by China. Secondly, I will use a qualitative approach by looking into academic reports and deduct whether these investments are actually a commitment or just investments for the benefit of China. I call this variable context. These two variables are

complementary. Without context, finance only offers cold numbers and the context is useless without finance data to put into perspective.

China is not transparent about their financial aid and investments to other countries. Though numbers exist on the investments of China in (for example) Africa, the question remains to what extent these numbers are accurate and complete. There are sources that work around these obstacles and try to deduct the amount of investments by China, such as china.aiddata.org/. It looks at all the different investment projects of China by country and by sector, but there is no clear overview of the aggregate amount of investment by country or by sector. The scope of this paper unfortunately doesn’t allow to do extensive research in their database and create a clear picture to

7 which extent China invests in countries and what the nature of these investments is. I will therefore use data on the official finance to African countries to assess how much money invests in Kenya and South Africa. I will use data provided by Strange e.a. (2013; 36-39, see annex 3) on the share of finance received from China and how much the finance is as a part of GNI. This shows how much China relatively invests in a country compared to the size of its economy.

However, how high the amount of finance may be, the flow of money needs to be put into

perspective. I will bring the finance of China into context by analysing reports of the commitment and investment of China and link this to the perceptions of Kenyans and South Africans towards China. It is unwise for China to ‘just’ invest in the African countries. If the Chinese only invest in the economy of the respective countries and drive locals out of business, whilst extracting natural resources and money, the inhabitants of the recipient countries would be hostile towards investor, in this case China. If the Chinese commit themselves to long term projects, in which they invest in more than factories and mines, the Africans will be more positive towards the Chinese (Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006; 253-254). This means getting in touch with locals, investing in projects such as infrastructure and hospitals and providing better labour circumstances. Committing to Africa for the long term would bring China positive attitudes in return (Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006; Feng & Mu, 2010). I expect the more China ‘goes the extra mile’ by investing in projects such as education and hospitals, the more positive the attitude towards them.

Economic

In this section I will present one economic variable that I will use and can explain the difference in attitudes of African countries towards China: GDP per capita over time. I will also discuss other factors briefly that I will not use, but of which it is relevant to know why I don’t use them. These are FDI and imports of China by the African country. The first variable is GDP per capita over time. The “Easterlin Paradox” (Easterlin, 1974) “suggests that there is no link between the level of economic development of a society and the overall happiness of its members” (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008; 1). However, Stevenson & Wolfers re-examine the “Easterlin Paradox”. They come to an interesting, opposite conclusion. Based on extensive data, they compared different countries over several decades and looked at what the effects of GDP per capita changes over time were on the overall happiness of people. They found that a higher GDP is undeniably correlated to average level of subjective well-being: “Together these findings indicate a clear role for absolute income and a more limited role for relative income comparisons in determining happiness” (ibid.; 1).

In relation to the reversed Easterlin argument, the general public tends to have a positive attitude towards the source of economic progress (Gabel & Whitten, 1997). The higher the GDP, the happier people tend to be (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008) and the people express that happiness towards the source that instigated the growth of GDP (Gabel & Whitten, 1997). I will therefore expect, when looking at the development of GDP per capita over time, that a growth in GDP will bring a positive attitude amongst the Africans towards China. It is crucial that the growth of GDP can be linked to China. This means that I need to compare GDP levels before China’s engagement and after. Based on the information provided in the section on the history and commitment between China and Kenya and South Africa, I will assess when China started to engage financially. I will look at the moment China started to invest in the respective countries and will look at the development from that moment on and how the level of GDP now relates to GDP before China’s engagement. I will use data provided by the World Bank on GDP per capita (data.worldbank.org/).

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The second variable – the first that I will not test – is FDI. Foreign Direct Investment are investment numbers that are not put into context. In addition, Hanusch (2012) finds that there is no statistically significant effect on African perceptions by FDI.

The second variable I will not use is the effect of imports from China on the African perceptions. There has been extensive research on imports. Hanusch (2012; 509) finds mixed results. He argues that Chinese imports that compete with local producers have a negative impact, because people think they will be put out of business. However, “the negative effect of trade on Africans’ perspectives is counter-balanced by the effect Chinese engagement has on poverty alleviation” (ibid.).

Jenkins & Edwards (2006) have done the most extensive research on imports and provide evidence that they play an important role in the attitude towards China. They find that countries in which exports to China has been the major result of the Chinese influence are more positive towards the Chinese. However, in countries where imports from China have the major impact, the attitudes tend to be more negative (Jenkins & Edwards, 2006; 224).

Lastly, He (2013) found that China provides the countries with better equipment for their industries through imports, so they can develop and work more efficient. At the same time, He argues that the Chinese imports work and the Western imports don’t, because the West’s technology is too

advanced to adapt easily and convert into a well-functioning and efficient work process (ibid.; 37-38). The problem with imports as a variable for this analytical framework is its complexity. Imports have very mixed results within societies (Esteban, 2010). It requires thorough research to know which sectors and social groups benefit, lose or left unaffected by imports. Also, the imports themselves differ in nature, again instigating different effects on the different groups. There is undeniably a link between imports and attitudes towards China, but the scope of this paper wouldn’t allow me to do right to the complexity of this variable. Therefore, I decided to leave it out, though I recommend future researchers to include it, since it potentially has great explanatory value.

Kenya and South Africa

In this section, I will test Kenya and South Africa on the different variables. I will compare both countries on each variable and draw conclusions based on the expectations and the findings. I will first justify the choice for Kenya and South Africa. After that, I will present the different factors, namely history, culture, commitment and economic and the variables they entail.

The goal of this paper is to present a framework that explains the difference in attitudes of African countries towards China. In order to develop a sound framework that reveals which variables influence the attitude, one requires to eliminate those that don’t explain the variation in attitudes towards China and present the ones that do. A most different case design includes two or more cases that differ completely on either the dependent or independent variable. A most different case design unfolds which variables do not affect the attitude towards China and which do in comparing both cases on the variables. The case design can prove a correlation, eliminate the variables without any explanatory value and build towards a sound framework (Seawright & Gerring, 2008; 298).

9 I selected Kenya and South Africa based on their different attitudes towards China, the dependent variable. South Africa is the most negative (or least positive) country in its attitude towards China, whereas Kenya is one of the most positive countries (see Table 2 and annex 2). This difference on the dependent variable suggests that the scores on the independent variables are different as well. If the scores do not differ, or barely, the independent variable in question most likely has no explanatory value.

One of the main problems with this research, is the lack of available data. There is a scarcity in data on most African countries and some countries don’t have any data at all on some variables. Table 2 suggests South Africa and either Mali or Ivory Coast as the cases for this most different cade design. There is enough data for South Africa. This is not the case for Mali and Ivory Coast. Kenya is the most positive country on the list with enough available data. Sautman & Yan (2009) address the problem of the lack of data on African countries and call for more collection of raw data. Unfortunately, the scope and format of this paper doesn’t allow for such extensive research.

The next section discusses the difference in attitudes of South Africa and Kenya towards China (see annex 1 for information about the surveys), after which I will compare South Africa and Kenya on the different variables. First, I will discuss the historical relationship between China and the two

countries. The historical relationship is divided into the variables length and nature. In the second subsection, I will present the cultural factors. The four used variables are national culture,

democracy, Corruption Perception Index and inequality. Thirdly, the results on commitment will be

discussed, which is divided in finance and context. Lastly, the economic variable GDP per Capita over

time will be presented.

Attitudes

Kenya has a very positive attitude towards China in contrast with South Africa. Both Pewglobal surveys (2007; 2013, see table 5 and annex 2) show that Kenya is amongst the most positive countries on the most positive continent on the globe, which is Africa (see table 1). South Africa is the most negative country on the African continent and has a less positive attitude towards China than many countries on other continents (see table 2 and annex 2F). Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the differences in perception of South Africa and Kenya on multiple questions in several surveys. The general picture painted is a very positive Kenya and a negative South Africa. Some numbers raise questions: Kenya is not very positive about the growing military power of China (table 4 & 6) and is not positive about the Chinese culture spreading (annex 2B). The Kenyans are, however, positive towards all the economic facets of the Chinese growth. The South Africans are more negative in general. They are surprisingly positive about the way China trades and whether China considers its interests. The general picture, however, is quite negative. I expect this clear difference between South Africa (negative) and Kenya (positive) to be reflected in the analysis of the variables below.

Pewglobal

2007 Survey View of China Growing Military Power China Growing Economy China China’s Influence

Favorable Unfavorable Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad

Kenya 81 15 69 20 91 4 91 6

South Africa 44 47 25 39 52 32 49 32

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Pewglobal

2013 Survey View Of China China: Partner or Enemy Chinese Ways of Doing Business

Does China Consider Your Country’s Interest?

Favourability Partner Enemy Like Dislike Yes No

Kenya 78 77 8 68 27 77 18

South Africa 48 52 11 43 42 67 23

Table 5: Attitudes towards China (Pewglobal, 2013)

BBC 2011

Survey Growing Military Power China Growing Economy China Fairness China in Trading

Positive Negative Positive Negative Fair Neutral Unfair

Kenya 41 35 77 16 81 9 9

South Africa 32 35 52 29 61 15 18

Table 6: Attitudes towards China (worldpublicopinion.org, 2011)

Analysis

History

I will discuss the historical relationship between China and Kenya and South Africa in this section. First, the discussion will turn to the length of the relationships. The longer the relationship, the more positive I expect the attitude to be. Second, I will analyse the nature of the relationships. Based on the theory and its attitude, I expect Kenya to have a long historical relationship with China with a very positive nature, whereas I expect the opposite of South Africa.

The legend tells that Chinese ships landed on the Kenyan coasts back in the 15th _{century. A few of the} sailors shipwrecked and built settlements, though no real Chinese community sprung from the stranded (King, 2010; 489). It was not until the twentieth century, however, that actual relations between the states China and Kenya came to be. China and Kenya established diplomatic relations in 1963 after Kenya’s declaration of independence. From that moment on, the first real migration streams started to well, be it humble at first: the first 15 years were marked by political struggles between the two countries. Both governments accused each other of undermining one another’s authority, leading to diplomatic struggles. Though the relationship never turned sour, it didn’t significantly improve during this period. This changed from 1978 on: the relationship became better as the presidents of both Kenya and China sought to increase bilateral trade. China invested in several projects in Kenya and over the years the trade and relations grew gradually (Petroba, 2012; 6).

11 Sino-South African relations date back to the 1800s: “South Africa is the only country on the African continent with a significant “indigenous” or ethnic Chinese community with roots going back to the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the late 1870s and 1880s” (Park, 2013; 136). Ever since, the Chinese have scattered across the different provinces, residing most often in urban areas. New life was blown into the Sino-South African relationship after World War II: ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the mainland Chinese government has supported the South African cause for liberty and national independence. South Africa and China kept close ties for decades, but it wasn’t until 1996 that the South African government decided to derecognize Taiwan and recognize China. The diplomatic and economic ties increased after the recognition and led to a good bilateral relationship (Shelton, 2012; 9-10). In sum, the Chinese have been in South Africa for a couple of ages, whereas the first real migration flows to Kenya really started in the late twentieth century.

The nature of both relations with China differ as well. Traditionally, the Chinese in South Africa have blended in quite well. They started their own small businesses in sectors that the South Africans didn’t want to engage in. Therefore, the Chinese never actually competed with the local businesses, but became an addition to the society: “So, as opposed to stealing the livelihoods of others …, the Chinese in South Africa tend to create economic opportunities, albeit on a relatively small scale” (Park, 2013; 142). After South Africa recognized China in 1996, about 350.000 to 500.000 mainland Chinese migrated to South Africa (Park, 2013; 136). Migrants from other nations found their way to South Africa as well. This has led to an increase in xenophobia amongst South Africans, resulting in violence (Landau & Kabwe Segatti, 2009; 9). Though most xenophobic hatred is aimed at migrants from other African countries, the Chinese are threatened at times (Park & Rugunanan, 2009; Park, 2011).

Not only the recent inflow of Chinese migrants has put pressure on the relationship, but the increase of imports as well. Though the economy grows due to the increase in trade with China, the imports are generally manufactured goods. The Chinese manufactured goods are of better quality and cheaper than their South African equivalents. This leads to tensions with the manufacturing sector in South Africa. At the same time, the Chinese provide jobs in mines and factories, but the local

employees claim the labour conditions are very bad and the wages are low (Park, 2013; 141). “These ongoing tensions around labor, crime, and China’s human rights record have undoubtedly had an impact on perceptions of ethnic Chinese in the country” (ibid.; 142). However, the increase in cheap and high quality products benefits a great part of the society. Consumers and retailers are better off, because of the quality and price of the goods. In addition, the Chinese immigrants are accused of crimes, such as human trafficking, illegal immigration, bribery, corruption and smuggling of protected goods, like ivory. A lot of South Africans complain about the complete disregard of human rights and liberties the Chinese have. Because there are hundreds of thousands Chinese in South Africa, this increasingly leads to clashes with locals.

The Kenyans experience almost the same benefits and tensions that the South Africans do. The Chinese imports have ambiguous effects, the employers provide poor labour circumstances and the Chinese are increasingly accused of the same allegations as in South Africa, though they are not as passionate about human rights as their South African counterparts. There are some differences: first of all, there are not as many Chinese immigrants for jobs as in South Africa (about 10.000) (King, 2010; 489). This means there are less Chinese to have either positive or negative encounters with. Also, this results in less clashes with locals than in South Africa. In addition, Kenya is not as

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For both Kenya and South Africa the increasing influence of China provide opportunities and difficulties. South Africa is more familiar with the Chinese immigrants due to the long and

traditionally positive history it has with them. Kenya’s relationship is shorter and marked by fewer Chinese migrants. Based on the length of the relationships South Africa should be the most positive of the two countries.

The nature of the relationships is mixed, because it changes over time. South Africa has had a good relationship with China, because of the good political ties and the participation of the Chinese in the economy. Recent developments over the last decade – imports and bad labour conditions – provide tension between the Chinese and South Africans. However, due to the lengthy positive relationship with China, one would expect those tensions to have small effect. Kenya has had a politically good relationship with China since the 1980s after a couple of decades without interaction. From the eighties on, the migration flows started coming. Kenya has had a relatively short period to get used to the growing wave of Chinese immigrants and encounters problems with labour conditions, imports and corruption. The recent tensions have put a lot of pressure on the relationship. Based on these results, I would expect the Kenyans to handle the recent negative encounters worse than South Africa.

South Africans have had a long period before the most recent wave in which they cooperated with the Chinese with pleasure. The Kenyans don’t have the same positive history and I would expect them to be more prone towards these recent negative encounters. However, these findings do not correspond with the expectations. Based on the results, I would expect South Africa to be more positive than Kenya and I would expect Kenya to be a lot more negative about China. Therefore, these findings do not confirm the assumptions.

Culture

In this section, I will discuss four variables that can have explanatory value in the difference between the perceptions of African nations towards China. First, I will discuss national culture by using the Geert Hofstede index, after which democracy follows as the second variable. The third discussed variable is corruption. Lastly, I will address income inequality. I expect Kenya to have the most similar culture to China, to be the least positive about democracy and have the least corruption and income inequality in comparison to South Africa.

The first cultural variable I present that can have explanatory value is national culture. Table 7 shows the scores on the different variables of the Geert Hofstede index. There is no data available on two of the variables for Kenya. Kenya scores (relatively) equal to the different values of China. This suggests that, without drawing preliminary conclusions, the (small) differences in national culture should not provide any problems in bilateral relations. The lack of data does, however, provide a problem. South Africa scores very different on multiple variables than China, suggesting a difference between the different national cultures. The relative similarity between Kenya and the difference between South African national culture and the Chinese is according to the assumption and the attitudes towards China and suggests that national culture can provide explanation in the different attitudes towards China.

13

Geert Hofstede Index

Power

Distance Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty Avoidance Pragmatism Indulgence

China 80 20 66 30 87 24

Kenya 70 25 60 50 No data No data

South

Africa 49 65 63 49 34 63

Table 7: Comparing China, Kenya and South Africa on the Geert Hofstede Index (http://geert-hofstede.com/china.html, 2014)

The second variable I discuss is democracy. The Afrobarometer (2008; 7-8) inquired people about their opinion on democracy and elections, the latter being the essence of the definition of democracy used in this paper. The first question asks respondents whether they think democracy is the best form of statehood. 78 per cent of the Kenyans agree, whereas 67 per cent of the South Africans do. The second question asks whether elections should be fair and held on a regular basis. 81 per cent of the Kenyans agree and 69 per cent of the South Africans. These results are not in line with the assumptions: Kenya is more positive towards democracy than South Africa. This suggests that this variable has no explanatory value.

The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is the operationalization of the third cultural variable,

corruption. The CPI shows that Kenya is number 136 out of 177 on the list of countries in the world, number 1 being the least corrupt. This means Kenya is one of the most corrupt countries around. It scores 27 points on the index, 0 being completely corrupt and 100 completely clean. South Africa does better: they are 72nd _{on the list with a score of 42. These results do not correspond with the} expectations. I would have expected Kenya to be the least corrupt and South Africa to be the most. The last cultural variable I test on Kenya and South Africa is income inequality using the Gini index. Kenya scored 47,68 last time it was measured in 2005. This means the income distribution is unequal relative to other countries. South African income inequality was last measured in 2009, showing a score of 63.14, a score that is far worse than that of Kenya. This is in line with the expectation that Kenya has a more equal income distribution than South Africa.

Summarizing, the results of national culture and income inequality were in line with the assumptions and might have explanatory value. Democracy and corruption do not correspond with the

assumptions and, therefore, these results suggest that these factors as defined in this research do not have explanatory value.

Commitment

In this section I will present the two variables of the factor commitment. First, I will present finance as a variable and show the official numbers that China is providing to Kenya and South Africa. Second, I will discuss how this money is used with the variable context. I expect that China invests relatively more in Kenya than in South Africa, which not necessarily means that Kenya receives more finance in absolute numbers, but rather relative to the size of both economies. In addition, I expect China to invest more in Kenya beyond the cold numbers and that they invest in other projects that do not directly benefit them economically. I expect the opposite in South Africa.

The data for the first variable, investment, is provided by Strange e.a. (2013; 36-39, see table 8 and annex 3). The numbers show that South Africa receives a larger share of China’s finance, compared to Kenya. However, Kenya receives a larger share in the projects undertaken by the Chinese in Africa,

14

also compared to other African nations (see annex 3B). Only Ghana, Liberia and Zimbabwe have received more projects than Kenya. Lastly, the China’s official finance as a percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI) shows that the finance to Kenya is relatively larger than to South Africa, where it is only comparable to 0.07 per cent of the GNI. This means that the impact of the finance by China can have a larger effect on the Kenyan economy, because the finance is relatively larger to their economy. This is according to the assumption that Kenya receives (relatively) more projects and finance compared to South Africa.

Finance Percentage of Chinese

Projects to Africa Received 2000-2011 Share of China’s Official Finance to Africa 2000-2011 China’s Official Finance as Percentage of GNI 2000-2011 Kenya 4.15 1.77 0.41 South Africa 1.72 3.18 0.07

Table 8: Chinese finance to Kenya and South Africa (Strange e.a.; 2013; 36-39)

The second variable will explain the context in which the Chinese investments were made in order to assess whether China actually commits to the countries or transfers money in order to gain fast money without regard for the country it invests in. It builds partly upon information provided in the section on historical relationships. It is difficult to see these two separately from one another. China is committing to Kenya. China not only invests in factories and mines, but they invest in

infrastructure, medical aid and education (King, 2010). Furthermore, China invests in human resource development projects in Kenya, which improves the well-being of the people. In addition, they grant big loans to Kenya with barely any to no rent. The Chinese commit to the Kenyan cause for long term projects. They engage in a bilateral relationship that is and should be beneficial for both countries (Petroba, 2012; 6). “[it gives] the impression … that China is on a learning curve as far as its delivery of assistance at the country level is concerned. Politically and strategically, China is in Kenya for the long term” (King, 2010; 496). South Africa does not receive the amount of projects Kenya receives and certainly not the specific nature of the different projects (Park, 2013). It mostly receives infrastructural projects, but not human development projects as Kenyans receive. China appears to be in South Africa to trade and make money and not much more than that. These findings are in line with the expectations. China commits more to Kenya than to China. This suggests that the factor commitment can have explanatory value.

Economic

Lastly, I present GDP per capita over time as the economic variable. of Kenya over time. I will first determine when China started to invest. Then I will compare the GDP per capita levels before and after Chinese mingling. I expect that Kenya has had the largest increase in GDP per capita growth since the investments of China compared to South Africa. According to Petroba (2012), the Chinese started in the late 70’s with investing in Kenya. However, she does mention that from 2003 on the economic relationship increased rapidly and the money flow has grown since. Before 2003, GDP per capita in Kenya varied between 300 and 450 US dollars. According to the most recent calculation in 2012, Kenya’s GDP per capita is 943 (data.worldbank.org/). The numbers have doubled in a decade. This astonishing increase started to around 2003, the year China started investing more a lot. China’s relationship with South Africa really started after the recognition of China by South Africa in 1996 (Shelton, 2012; 9). In the decade before 1996, GDP per capita varied from 3000 US dollars to 3500. After 1996, the GDP per capita declined before rapidly increasing to 4000 in 2004. In 2012, South Africa had a GDP per capita over the 7000 US dollars. South African GDP per capita has increased drastically over the last decade, but almost a decade after China and South Africa set up good ties. This is in line with the assumption that Kenya’s growth is higher than the growth of South Africa after

15 China started to invest in the economy. This doesn’t explain, however, why South Africa’s GDP actually decreased after China started to invest. Therefore, the results of South Africa are mixed, because they raise questions.

History Culture Commitment Economic

Length Nature National

Culture Democracy Corruption Income Inequality Investment Context GDP

Kenya No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

South

Africa No Mixed Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Mixed

Table 9: Did the results on the variables confirm the assumptions?

Conclusion & Discussion

I have presented several factors that might explain the difference in attitude towards China by Kenya and South Africa. I distinguished between historical relationship, culture, commitment and economic factors, which each entail different variables. The results are summarized in table 9, showing which results where according to the expectations per variable. Within the historical relationship I found no confirmation of my expectations. I expected the Kenyans to be less positive because of the recent negative interactions and the vulnerability to negativity due to their short relationship with China. South Africa, based on their history, should be more positive. This suggests that other factors might explain the variation in attitude towards China.

Within culture, the findings on national culture and income inequality were along the assumptions made in the analytical framework. This proves that cultural differences on the national level might provide friction and similarities common ground. In addition, it suggests that the unequal distribution of income leads to friction. The increasing wealth due to trade with and investments by China is more profitable for the Kenyan society, who reflect their happiness about that in their attitude towards China. Corruption and democracy proved to be unsuccessful variables. This might be explained by the use of my definition and source and I therefore recommend that others analyse these variables further, even though I did not find any satisfactory results.

My expectations about commitment were affirmed, as well as for the most part on the economic factor. Both factors confirmed the expectations strongly. This suggests that both factors have explanatory value. Commitment is partly economic, due to finance. It suggests that the relation between money and how it is put to use, explains the difference in attitude most strongly. By ‘how it is put to use’, I not only mean context, but income inequality as well, because without people receiving the profits, there is no gain. Additionally, the people need to be willing to receive resources from the Chinese, something national culture might play a role in. However, I would expect history to play a role in that as well, which proved fruitless in this paper. One explanation might be that Kenya is less developed and is more willing to accept all the investments from China than South Africa. In sum, these results provide a good basis for further research.

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In testing all these different variables and finding mixed results, I don’t have a definite answer on the question “What explains the variation amongst African countries in their attitude towards China?”. In addition, the scope of this paper didn’t allow the amount of variables and depth it would require to research this topic. By no means I try to claim that I have presented the analytical framework that explains why there is a difference between African nations in their attitude towards China, but the first steps towards one have been made. In doing so, I contributed to the academic literature on African perceptions.

Discussion

I have already mentioned some difficulties in writing this paper. First of all, the scope is not sufficient to present a complete framework on such the topic of African perceptions (towards China). It is a phenomenon that requires the analysis of different, inter-linked variables that all together provide an analytical framework. In the previous paragraphs, I have tried to link several of these factors to present a bigger picture. The variables I incorporated in this paper can have explanatory value. Even variables on which I didn’t find any effect, such as democracy, might have explanatory value if defined differently and researched more extensively. Furthermore, the scope didn’t allow me to incorporate imports, potentially one of the most important variables. Its complexity and mixed effects on society require extensive analysis.

In addition, the variables and factors might be interrelated. The scope of this paper didn’t allow to test for the effects different factors and variables might have on each other. For example,

commitment and history have an overlap in relevant information. And the nature of the historical relationship might be determined by the compatibility of national cultures.

Secondly, there is not enough data on African countries. Many authors (for example Keuleers, 2014 and Sautman & Yan, 2009) have argued that research on this topic is hard, because there is not enough raw data to base an argument on and the available data might not be representative. For example, the public opinion polls I based my selection of countries on in their attitude towards China might not be as representative as a poll held in Germany or Australia because of the operational difficulties it brings with it. If more data is available, it would become easier to present an analytical framework that is plausible and with more available data on more countries, the amount of cases could easily be extended. In doing so, one could draw generalizable conclusions on African perceptions towards China.

Lastly, the focus of the research was on the national level. Some literature suggests, such as Jenkins & Edwards (2006), that it would be wise to look at differences in attitude within countries, because of the mixed effects of some variables, such as imports.

17 Literature

- Dupasquier, C. & Osakwe, P. (2006) Foreign direct investment in Africa: Performance, challenges, and responsibilities. Journal of Asian Economics 17: 241–260

- Easterlin, Richard A. (1974). Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence. In: Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder (eds) Nations and Households in Economic

Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz. New York: Academic Press: 89-125

- Esteban, M. (2010) A Silent Invasion? African Views on the Growing Chinese Presence in Africa: The Case of Equatorial Guinea. African and Asian Studies 9: 232-251

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- Gabel, M. & Whitten, G. (1997) Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration. Political Behavior 19 (1): 81-96

- Hanusch, M. (2012) African Perspectives on China–Africa: Modelling Popular Perceptions and their Economic and Political Determinants. Oxford Development Studies 40 (4): 492-516 - He, Y. (2013) Does China's trade expansion help African development? —an empirical

estimation. China Economic Review 26: 28–38

- Jenkins, R. & Edwards, C. (2006) The economic impacts of China and India on sub-Saharan Africa: Trends and prospects. Journal of Asian Economics 17: 207–225

- Keuleers, F. (2014) African Popular Perceptions of the EU and China: A Comparative Analysis. Forthcoming: Paper presented at the European Union in International Affairs IV Conference, Brussels, 22nd_-24th _{May 2014}

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International Journal of Educational Development 30: 488–496

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Business 47: 26-34

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China, Africa and the West in British broadsheet newspapers. Political Geography 27 (5): 509-529

- McSweeney, B. (2002) Hofstede's model of national cultural differences and their consequences: A triumph of faith - a failure of analysis Human Relations 55 (1): 89-118 - Naidu, S. & Mbazima, D. (2008) China–African relations: A new impulse in a changing

continental landscape. Futures 40: 748–761

- Park, Y.J. (2011) “ Black, Yellow, (Honorary) White or Just Plain South African? Chinese South Africans and Affirmative Action. ” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 77: 117 – 31

- Park, Y.J. (2013) Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the “Other” and the Role of Memory. African Studies Review 56 (1): 131-153

- Park , Y.J. & Rugunanan, P. (2009) “Visible and Vulnerable: Asian Migrant Communities in South Africa.” In: Atlantic Philanthropies Report: “South African Civil Society and

Xenophobia.”

http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/learning/report-south-african-civil-society-and-xenophobia .

- Patroba, H. (2012) China in Kenya: Addressing Counterfeit Goods and Construction Sector Imbalances South African Institute of International Affairs: China in Africa Project Occasional Paper no. 110

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- Rebol, M. (2010) Public perceptions and reactions: Gauging African views of China in Africa.

African Journal of Agricultural Research 5(25): 3524-3535

- Sautman, B. & Yan, H. (2009). African Perspectives on China–Africa Links. The China Quarterly 199: 728-759

- Seawright, J. & Gerring, J. (2008) Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research : A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options Political Research Quarterly 61 (2): 294

- Shelton, G. (2012) Hong Kong — South Africa’s Gateway to China South African Institute of

International Affairs: China in Africa Project Occasional Paper no.108

- Stevenson, J. & Wolfers, B. (2008) Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2394: 1-30

- Strange, A. e.a. (2013) China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection Center for Global Development: Working Paper 323

Websites/non-academic - http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2013/02/nigerian-workers-protest-conditions-at.html - http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/7ad36b46-16b5-11e2-b1df-00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs %2F0%2F7ad36b46-16b5-11e2-b1df-00144feabdc0.html%3Fsiteedition%3Dintl&siteedition=intl&_i_referer=#axzz32HkT0IEp - http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/opinion/majapearce-nigerias-china-connection.html - http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html - http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/ - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=2 - http://www.quandl.com/demography/gini-index-by-country - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W-KE?display=default - china.aiddata.org/ - http://afrobarometer.org/files/documents/working_papers/AfropaperNo108.pdf - Polls/Surveys - http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/256.pdf - http://www.gallup.com/poll/25408/early-impressions-africans-uschinese-leadership.aspx - http://www.gallup.com/poll/104404/chadians-view-us-china-more-favorably-than-france.aspx - http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-3-attitudes-toward-china/ - http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCChina_Mar11_rpt.pdf

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Annexes

Annex 1 - Surveys

The Pewglobal survey (2007) poses different premises, as follows: - View of China (favourable/unfavourable)

- Growing military power (good thing/bad thing) - Growing economy (good thing/ bad thing) - China’s influence (good thing/bad thing)

The Pewglobal survey (2013) poses some of the same, but also some other, premises: - View of China (favourable/unfavourable)

- China is seen more as a (partner/enemy/neither)

- China’s scientific and technological advances are (admired/not admired/don’t know) - Chinese ways of doing business (like/dislike/don’t know)

- Chinese music, movies and television (like/dislike/don’t know)

- Chinese customs and ideas are spreading here (like/dislike/don’t know)

- How much does China consider your country’s interest (not too much, at all/great deal, fair amount)

The BBC-survey (worldpublicopinion.org, 2011) is a random survey across a lot of nations around the world. The surveys performed in the African nations I look at are nation-wide random based. I will look at results on different questions posed by the researchers, on which respondents can answer ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ and ‘fair’, ‘neutral’ or ‘unfair’ (ibid.; 12-13). Respondents needed to give their stance on the following premises:

- China becoming more powerful economically (positive/negative) - China becoming more powerful military (positive/negative)

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Annex 2 – Pewglobal Survey 2013 A)

21 B)

C) D)

22 E)

23 F)

24

Annex 3 – Strange e.a. (2013; 36-39) A)

25 C)