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How municipal, commercial and residential actors fight for the

distribution of social, cultural, economic and housing functions in

Amsterdam

A case study on mixed urban redevelopment in Oostpoort and de Hallen

Master thesis Urban Geography

Jim Engelshoven

September 2016

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Colophon

Master thesis Urban Geography

Title

Fighting for the right to the city:

How municipal, commercial and residential actors fight for the distribution of social, cultural, economic and housing functions in

A case study on mixed urban redevelopment in Oostpoort and de Hallen

Supervisor Prof. dr. J.B.F. Nijman Second Reader Dr. ir. C.J.M. Karsten Student Jim Engelshoven UVA ID: 10109536 j.engelshoven@gmail.com Date September 2016 University of Amsterdam

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Abstract

A closer look at two big urban redevelopment projects in Amsterdam and their goals. The thesis is a comparative study between two neighbourhood upgrading projects in gentrifying and popular central neighbourhoods in the City Districts Amsterdam East and Amsterdam West: Oostpoort and de Hallen. Both projects are built (partially) within old industrial areas and are a mix of housing development and more social and economic development (social functions, shops, restaurants, bars and touristic hotspots). The goal of the research is to gain insight to who benefits from mixed urban redevelopment. Looking to add to the discussion on the right to the city, the thesis looks at the real power behind urban change and the results of the constant struggle between municipal, commercial and residential actors in the allocation of functions in mixed urban redevelopment. The thesis will use mostly qualitative research to determine what the social and economic goals in relation of both municipal, residential and commercial stakeholders have been and to what extent residents are either included or excluded in the development of both projects. The resulting variations of gentrification, the influence of the municipality in Dutch planning and the role of money are all central in describing the processes of development in both cases.

Key words: (state led, tourism, commercial and cultural) gentrification, social mix strategies, the right to the city, entrepreneurialism and the entrepreneurial city, mixed urban redevelopment, Amsterdam, Oostpoort, de Hallen.

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Inhoud

1. Introduction ... 8 1.1 Scientific relevance ... 9 1.2 Social relevance ... 9 2. Theoretical Framework ... 11 3. Research design ... 14 3.1 Research question ... 14 3.2 Sub-questions ... 14 3.3 Conceptual model ... 14 3.4 Research strategy ... 15 3.5 Interviews ... 16 3.6 Photo’s ... 17

3.6 Ethics & limitations ... 17

4. Case descriptions ... 18

4.1 Oostpoort ... 18

4.1.1 From industrial site to “heart” of East Amsterdam ... 18

4.1.2 Developing the Polderweggebied into Oostpoort ... 19

4.1.3 The effects of the economic crisis on building Oostpoort (2010-2014) ... 22

4.1.4 The final project... 23

4.2 De Hallen ... 27

4.2.1 From Tram-depot to “monumental city heart” ... 27

4.2.2 Fifteen years of vacancy, drama and planning for the City District, residents and developers ... 29

4.2.3 Finding stability, investment ánd support: the creation of Stichting TROM ... 30

4.2.4 The final project... 32

4.3 Public opinion of Oostpoort and ‘de Hallen’ ... 35

5. Results ... 37

5.1 The role of commercial and municipal stakeholders in Oostpoort ... 37

5.1.1 Oostpoort: the role of the municipality vs the commercial developer ... 37

5.1.2 Controlling mechanisms of the municipality: from planner to mediator ... 39

5.1.3 Creating housing construction ... 42

5.2 The beneficiaries of Oostpoort ... 43

5.2.1 What is the function of Oostpoort within City District East (and Amsterdam) ... 43

5.2.2 Who benefits the most from Oostpoort?... 45

5.3 The role of municipal and commercial stakeholders in de Hallen ... 46

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5.4 How do residents evaluate their neighborhood? ... 47

6. Conclusion and final remarks ... 49

6.1 Conclusion ... 49

7. Literature ... 52

8. Appendices ... 55

8.1 Transcipt of interviews ... 55

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1. Introduction

In the infinite process of urban redevelopment two big urban planning projects stand out in the city center of Amsterdam in recent years. Similar because of their size, time of development and location within the city, both de Hallen in Amsterdam West and ‘Oostpoort’ in Amsterdam East are most importantly comparable because of their mix of housing, economic, social and cultural development. Using the former industrial built environment – both projects are (partially) built within a former industrial halls – while also developing new middle class owner occupied housing, both de Hallen and Oostpoort seem to be what Amsterdam gentrification-planning has all been about over the last couple of decades (Doucet, 2014). While the city has quickly transformed from being a social-just place, with short waiting lists for all the public housing, to a more market-driven housing market, urban redevelopment is also still dominated for a large part by a strong role for the municipality – as they own the land – and large influence by housing associations. Thus, although becoming more neoliberally market-driven, urban redevelopment in Amsterdam, and the rest of the Netherlands, has its unique factors, compared to counterparts in other Western cities outside of the country.

Although it can be wildly debated to what extent these governments have “real power”, or are merely guided by the flows of big money and doing their part for the new entrepreneurial city (Harvey, 1989), their inclusion in planning definitely creates more attention for social goals within the planning of redevelopment projects. This is also the case for both projects central to this thesis. Using mixed urban redevelopment one of the main goals in both cases has been to “stimulate economic and social progression in surrounding neighborhoods” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2013). Relying on what the municipality calls a “spin off-effect” the ambition was for‘Oostpoort to become a “vital and powerful heart” of the city district East, while de Hallen should become a “social and economic impulse” for the area that used to be city district ‘Old-West’, and is now part of the larger district West (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006 and 2013).

Instead of reinventing the wheel and simply researching gentrification in Amsterdam, this thesis will try to take a different approach by focusing on this last central notion of both urban redevelopment projects. Focusing on the benefits for residents from surrounding neighborhoods will give insight on the social and economic inclusion or exclusion of this group in urban redevelopment in the city of Amsterdam, while at the same time give a more general idea of the advantages and disadvantages of mixed urban redevelopment. On the one hand, the research looks at the process of redeveloping in Amsterdam, looking at the different stakeholders, their interests and for who they are planning, and on the other, it looks at who in practice really do benefit from their efforts in mixed urban redevelopment projects. Furthermore, the results of this research will also be useful in the above mentioned, more structural debate on the power of the state versus the power of money, as we gain insight in to what extent social goals are as important as economic ones. The conclusion therefore will become part of the topical discussion in Amsterdam, as to whom the right to the city currently belongs. Ultimately, the thesis therefore will try to answer the following research question:

To what extent do mixed urban redevelopment projects socially and economically benefit residents from the City Districts Amsterdam East and West?

Mixed urban redevelopment projects, as explained above, here are defined as projects that integrate housing development with social, cultural, economic and commercial development within the same area.

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1.1 Scientific relevance

Looking at the role of different stakeholders in urban redevelopment and the struggles of interfering interests of the municipality, commercial developers and residents within the Dutch planning context will add to the existing literature on the right to the city and the importance of social and cultural functions within urban redevelopment (Peck, 2002; Harvey, 2008; Doucet, 2014; Teernstra & Pinkster, 2015). Studying two cases in comparable places in the city, with an equal project size and development era, but with a completely different development process and final outcome helps to give insight on what drives urban change. The difference in role played by the municipality, commercial developers and residents between both cases also adds to the existing literature in the discussions on the importance of money flows and the free market versus municipal, social designs and the inclusion or exclusion of residents in planning (Harvey, 1989; Teernstra & Pinkster, 2015).

Furthermore, most of the literature on the role of the municipality and commercial development looks either at the small neighborhood level, as they relate to how they impact local life (Boersma et al. 2013; Ernst & Doucet, 2012; Pinkster, 2015) or study more macro level economic and social processes (Harvey, 1989; 2003; Peck & Tickell; 2002). This study tries to expose the driving forces of urban change on a higher level and subsequently describe how different distributions in power among stakeholders impacts residents on a lower level.

This seems to be especially relevant for urban redevelopment in a city like Amsterdam, which has historically been dominated by democratic planning, urban social movements and municipal interventions based on the needs of its residents (Pruijt; 2004). The multiple case study therefore adds to the literature a more extensive approach to urban redevelopment, within the Dutch and Amsterdam context, focusing on the relation between stakeholders, their goals and their influence, as well as that of the final result, on residents within the area. In addition, the two cases give a complete opposite view of urban development in terms of residential influence. Oostpoort gives us a unique opportunity to observe inner-city redevelopment of an area with almost no residents to a residential neighborhood, while de Hallen is at the opposite of the spectrum as final development and management was taken over by local initiators after displeasure and protests of local residents because of the created plans of the municipality and commercial developers.

1.2 Social relevance

With gentrification being such a present force in contemporary Amsterdam, and rising fears among long-term residents of the city turning into a “yuppie-paradise” for the hip and high educated hipsters and cargo bike mothers (Het Parool, 2015), it seems of importance to look at who is developing the city, who they are planning for and ultimately, who benefits the most of their efforts. Although urban redevelopment often is focused on upgrading, the power struggle between municipal, commercial and residential stakeholders in Oostpoort and de Hallen shows that there’s more to it than just quick state-led gentrification and commercial upgrading. Documenting which types of planning, and efforts of upgrading, have a positive or negative effect on residents within the project area is relevant for these residents themselves as well as policymakers.

In terms of social relevance, this thesis will therefore help understand the impact of mixed urban redevelopment projects on the neighborhood it’s performed in. Looking at the notion of van Gent (2013) that right to Amsterdam is shifting to the elite, the research can help understand why this is the case, and to what extent residents and the municipality can approach redevelopment differently to make it more inclusionary.

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10 This thesis contains six chapters. Following this intro introducing first chapter, chapter two goes through the relevant theoretical framework behind the research, looking at the dominant theories on the right to the city, the role of the municipality in modern neoliberal urban change, resident participation and different forms of resulting gentrification. Chapter three will elaborate on the research design, showing the research question and methodology. In the fourth chapter the process of redevelopment in both Oostpoort and de Hallen is extensively clarified. Chapter five will present the findings based on the qualitative research and try to answer the sub questions that are central to the thesis. And finally, in chapter six these findings will be brought together and discussed in combination with the theoretical framework to ultimately answer the main research question. Chapter six will also contain a short reflection on the entire process of the research.

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2. Theoretical Framework

To make a better understanding of the relevant academic debate(s) surrounding urban redevelopment it makes sense to start from a more holistic, overarching viewpoint and slowly move down to more place specific issues. Urban redevelopment and the process of city making, according to Harvey (1989) is “both product and condition” of capitalist development. And as capitalism has changed over time, the role of the state has slowly evolved from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Ultimately, from this viewpoint the role of the state is to promote local areas and create an attractive place for investment. In this sense, urban governance is way more than urban government and “the real power to reorganize urban life so often lies elsewhere”. In a neoliberal world, the government’s role in urban development therefore no longer is that of the manager of large planning projects, but that of the entrepreneur, or even the booster, trying to win the intra-urban competition for investment. Following Harvey (2008) private property and profit rate “trump all other notions of rights”, the right to the city therefore is more than just our individual right to make use of all different types of urban functions, it’s a common act of transformation based on “the collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization”. In Harvey’s line of thinking, the driving force behind this urban change is based on creating economic surplus and comes from owning property and maximizing the value of it. In urban governance it’s therefore no surprise that Harvey sees the role of the municipality in contemporary local development and employment growth as entrepreneurial (Harvey, 1989). Implementing social goals in urban redevelopment projects therefore is in a sense more about justification and creating enough public support, than it is a catalyst for real change (Harvey, 1989; Peck, 2002; Teernstra & Pinkster, 2015).

This is in stark contrast with the entrepreneurial city of Doucet (2013). While looking at megaprojects in Western cities, Doucet states that plans often need the municipality to steer investment, to cause development in less attractive areas. According to Doucet, private projects are focused too much on creating short term profits, which ultimately hurts the projects long term chances of becoming successful. In a different article (2014), he further shows how in the Dutch context historically there have been large roles in urban planning for the municipality and for housing associations. Because the government owns much of the land, and the large sum of public housing has given strength to the power of these housing associations, Dutch planning has had its unique factors. Public-private partnerships still have a strong emphasis on social goals, as well as economic ones and it’s often the state that carries much of the risk in these projects, while private parties are mostly responsible for the (housing) development. According to Doucet (2013), if the land is owned by the city it’s easy and quite logical for development to turn into a municipal project. Although construction is left to the private sector, the government can steer investment in order to create development in less attractive areas, to stimulate social upgrading. According to Folmer & Risselada (2013), the municipality uses land-use plans to control economic development, although they mention that the shift in dominant economic sectors and firm sizes is rearranging the landscapes of post-modern cities, as entrepreneurial and creative islands of business activity can also come up in residential areas. Folmer & Risselada distinguish four different types of economic zones, with “The Market”, the prototypical low-rise shopping center which is a result of old-fashioned land-use plans, as the type of economic zone that is currently dying out.

Over the last couple of decades these public-private plans in Dutch cities have been dominated by a social-mix strategy (Doucet, 2014; van Gent, 2013; Veldboer & van der Graag, 2009). Shifting away from a housing market dominated by public housing, the goal of Dutch urban planning recently often has been to attract more middle class residents to deprived areas. Social-mixing in this sense therefore is closely related to gentrification, and makes this latter term – according to Doucet “the most

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12 politically loaded concept” in human geography – have a much less negative tone to it than in other parts of the world. Furthermore, this social-mixing, or state-led gentrification, has developed over time, as no longer it’s only about classical housing gentrification. New forms, like commercial gentrification (changes in street-level spectacles), tourism gentrification and studentification have become either goals or results of the social-mix strategy in Dutch cities (Doucet, 2014; Ernst & Doucet, 2012; Veldboer & van der Graaf, 2009). Which raises the fair questions Veldboer & de Graaf (2009) ask themselves: which middleclass groups are willing to share their neighborhood with the deprived; which middleclass groups are really willing to live in a mixed area?

With commercial gentrification it’s not just the housing landscape that changes anymore, but also street-level spectacles like bars, restaurants and social diversity, while in tourism gentrification the promotion of tourist spaces leads to the displacement, as residents are squished out of their own neighborhoods. The same can happen with studentification. Ultimately, we can subtract from these additional forms of gentrification that the term no longer only focusses on a certain age group, as yuppies, yupps and the super-rich can create displacement of local residents (Doucet, 2014; Paton, 2012; Freeman, 2006). Furthermore, commercial gentrification can lead to certain consumption spaces for the middle class (Ernst & Doucet, 2012). This can lead to what Zukin (2008) calls “fabricated authenticity”.

The other logical result of these policies, of course is exclusion and ultimately displacement, although van Gent (2013) & Teernstra (2015) are quick to point out that multiple institutional constructions protect deprived residents, as there is still a large social rent stock, housing corporations are obliged to keep developing public housing and residents are protected by rent subsidies and rent stabilization laws. Ultimately, though, in the case of Amsterdam – where gentrification is currently in its third wave – it’s clear “exclusionary displacement” will take place (van Gent, 2013).

Of course, in Holland, and especially in Amsterdam, the amount of public housing remains high. According to Chaskin & Joseph (2013) the issue of public housing is at the core of deconcentrating poverty in urban policy, as often the demolition of public housing and attraction of higher-incomes is creating gentrification. Social-mixing draws on the social disorganization theory as the presence of residents with a higher income should facilitate social control and reduce crime levels. With that, in terms of right to the city is lost, as Lefebvre (1996) determined that right as access, use and enjoyment rather than ownership. The right to the city therefore is also bound to “the freedom to use and enjoy neighborhood space” (Chaskin & Joseph, 2013). Besides, Teernstra (2015) points out that multiple state actors are concerned with different goals, for instance not only the municipality plays a large role in state-led gentrification. As laws on the housing stock can come from different levels of policymaking. To circle back to Harvey (2003) and a more neoliberal view of these processes this ultimately comes back to “the right to the city”. According to van Gent, the right to Amsterdam, currently is with the elite, as a city that has politically been dominated by social democrats, now is changing radically, while surprisingly there seems to be almost no opposition.

The role of the municipality, the influence of capital investment and commercial developers and the Dutch tendency to dominate urban redevelopment with a social-mixing strategy are all part of the academic discussions relevant in this thesis. Ultimately, looking at the social and commercial goals of mixed urban redevelopment projects in Amsterdam will give insight in the role of the state, while looking at the social and economic benefits for residents within and around the project areas will give us a better understanding of both the effects of these types of redevelopment on a larger scale and to whom in fact the right to the city just might become. The thesis therefore will be relevant for academic

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13 debates on multiple levels: the level of Amsterdam, the level of Dutch planning and the more holistic structural level, about the real power behind urban change.

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3. Research design

This chapter will explain the overall design of this research. The research is a comparative case study, which looks at two urban redevelopment projects in Amsterdam, with a different character and process of development, yet comparable because of the timeframe and the inclusion and mix of social, economic, cultural and housing development. The goal of the thesis is to use these redevelopment projects to find out more on the role and interests of different municipal, commercial and residential stakeholders in urban redevelopment, and deduct from this process who in Amsterdam benefits the most from their efforts; and therefore to whom the right to the city has become. As with all case studies, the goal will be “to collect, present, and analyze data fairly” and “to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003).

The research will be a comparative case study on two different mixed urban redevelopment projects in comparable districts of the city. The expectancy is that there will be more involvement from people from surrounding neighborhoods in de Hallen than in ‘Oostpoort’, because the former is built predominantly on an already existing structure, while the latter has been developed on a largely new building site. It could therefore be, that there is more rootedness and bonding in West for de Hallen than there is in Oost. This main difference, along with smaller structural differences in planning are what makes it relevant to compare both of the cases, instead of studying just the one. Another difference between both cases is the public opinion, as both projects have attracted media attention for different reasons. Where de Hallen has been named as a touristic hotspot (Parool, 2015), the shopping mall of ‘Oostpoort’ has often been in the news for some of its struggles (Parool, 2016).

3.1 Research question

The main research question this thesis is based upon to direct the research is:

To what extent do mixed urban redevelopment projects socially and economically benefit residents from the City Districts Amsterdam East and West?

3.2 Sub-questions

To answer the main research question the thesis is divided in two parts. The first two sub-questions look at the role and interests of different stakeholders in the development of mixed urban redevelopment. Central to this part are the instruments certain stakeholders have to impact planning of these projects. The final two sub-questions focus on who, now that these projects are finished, benefits the most from these projects and how residents evaluate the influence of the finished project on their neighborhoods. Ultimately, the following sub-questions are answered for both Oostpoort and de Hallen:

1. What is the role of municipal, commercial and residential stakeholders in mixed urban redevelopment?

2. What instruments do stakeholders have to obtain their goals? 3. Who benefits the most from Oostpoort and de Hallen?

4. How do residents experience their neighborhood since the (partial) completion of the development?

3.3 Conceptual model

The conceptual model that goes with the research question and theory is shown in figure 1. The model shows the different sides of mixed urban redevelopment and their possible influence on the neighborhood and City District based on the theoretical framework. It’s anticipated that the extent in with residents are included or excluded within the planning – by direct public participation or through

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15 municipal and commercial actors – influences the result the planning has on the types of gentrification that takes place within the area. Based on this model, mixed urban redevelopment can lead to multiple types of gentrification, and therefore focus easily on new residents, but can also create social and economic opportunities for people from within the neighborhood and possibly function to the benefit of the larger City District (Doucet, 2014). Unsurprisingly, housing development is closely related to the more classical form of gentrification as more middle class housing is created, while the total number of public rent in the neighborhood goes down (this is especially the case with de Hallen), which of course fits with Dutch policy over the last decade or so that focusses on social-mixing (Veldboer & van der Graaf, 2009).

Figure 1: Conceptual model

Commercial, and social and cultural development, though, could bring an array of different results; popularity of these types of development could bring social and economic opportunities to the neighborhood, but a successful project therefore can also bring a large amount of new visitors to and users of the area. This of course, could lead to different types of commercial and tourism gentrification. Overall inclusion or exclusion of residents from surrounding neighborhoods in relation to all different changes brought by these mixed urban redevelopment projects will be of central value to the research.

3.4 Research strategy

The research will use a mixed-methods approach, with a heavy focus on qualitative research, which is complemented by a policy analysis, statistical data from government surveys and a short analysis of public opinion on the projects within national and local media outlets. Fieldwork for this thesis predominantly focusses on Oostpoort, as the amount of data and literature on de Hallen is much more extensive. The choice was made to focus the fieldwork on Oostpoort to be able to compare it with the existent information on de Hallen. Therefore, all eight in-depth interviews are with stakeholders from Oostpoort. For the case description and extensive outline of de Hallen the research uses the book

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16 ‘Nieuw leven in de Hallen’ by Eisse Kalk (2015) on the twenty year long process of development of the former tram remise in addition to policy documents. The case description of Oostpoort is partially also reliant on the results of the interviews, because of a lack of concentrated information and also makes use of policy documents.

The use of a mixed-methods approach has three main positive effects (Hammersley, 1996). First, triangulation – the additional function of multiple types of information – helps create a better reliability of the research. Second is facilitation, which is when the results of different research methods support one another. And third, all methods are complementary, as the researcher can adjust the different types of research to one another and offset the weaknesses of one method to another. On a social level the interviews will try to gain insight in to what extent residents from surrounding neighborhoods make use of the project areas and included, while on an economic level the interviews will focus on whether or not the projects really provide work and economic impulse for local residents and entrepreneurs, or that these privileges belong to others. Who is using the newly developed commercial and public space? And to what extent is there a trend of local entrepreneurship? And has this been encouraged by the municipality? All questions that should become more clear because of the thesis. The unit of analysis within the research will be the projects themselves, as ultimately we want to be able to tell something about mixed urban redevelopment projects and their (dis)advantages for (residents of) larger urban areas. The units of observation will largely be individual residents (survey) and stakeholders (interviews).

3.5 Interviews

The main part of the fieldwork consists of eight relatively long interviews with key actors in the development and management of Oostpoort. The interviews were used to acquire data for the case description of Oostpoort (chapter 4) as well as in answering the main question and sub-questions of this thesis (chapter 5). The interviews were performed in a semi-structured approach, following certain topics related to the expertise of the interviewees, to gain knowledge about the project (area) and collect expert opinions on the planning, realization and use of the area. A snowballing effect was used in order to find the most relevant experts and stakeholders for the project area. The interviewees were approached by e-mail, through which appointments were made to meat up and record the interview. The transcript of all interviews is in the appendix of this thesis, except for the interview with local entrepreneur Magali Heuberger from concept store Het Faire Oosten, because it was by telephone. Table 1 shows the interviewees, there role and the duration of the interviews.

Name Role Duration

1 Sjoerd Soeters Architect and supervisor of Oostpoort 49:29 2 Bert Thjie Architect of seniorcomplex in plot 13 1:20:31 3 Stephany van Veen Residents participation manager Oostpoort and

Dapperbuurt

56:38 4 Fred Langeslag Project leader of the Ontwikkelingscombinatie

Polderweggebied (OCP)

57:01

5 Joreen Röben Project manager Oostpoort East 1:04:02

6 Eline Kanters Accountmanager neighborhood economy Oostpoort and Dapperbuurt

45:19

7 Thijs Reuten Alderman City District East 33:13

8 Magali Heuberger Local entrepreneur of concept store Het Faire Oosten - Table 1: List of interviewees for the fieldwork on Oostpoort

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17 The goal was to create a group of respondents that reflected the importance of certain stakeholders in the development of Oostpoort. The mix of people from multiple levels within the municipality, two architects, the project leader for the most important commercial party OCP and one of the few local entrepreneurs of the shopping center, a very wide range of viewpoints on Oostpoort have been recorded.

The semi-structured topics corresponded with the sub-questions of this thesis. Of course, with certain experts on certain levels the focus shifted per interview on certain stakeholders, interests, goals and developments.

3.6 Photo’s

Added to this thesis is a small booklet with photos, by photographer Zindzi Zwietering, in which an overall impression of the atmosphere of both Oostpoort and de Hallen can be seen. The photos show some of the most important characteristics of both projects, as well as the ongoing development of the housing construction. The detachable booklet can be used to give a quick impression of the projects, or drawn out alongside this thesis, while reading the case descriptions and results (chapters 4 & 5). In a sense, the photos help give a little ethnographic contribution of the area’s, to help the reader of the thesis to them place themselves inside of Oostpoort and de Hallen (Schwartz, 1989).

3.6 Ethics & limitations

Logically from an ethical aspect, the qualitative part of the research had to be performed as open to the respondents as possible, by creating a natural environment for the interviews and being very clear on what the data they were providing is used for. Especially with such a heavy focus on qualitative research, ethics play a big part in the overall collection of data. Of course, all respondents were asked for approval as to whether the interview could be recorded. In addition, an agreement was made that the data derived from the conversations would only be used for this particular thesis. If further publishing ever became an option, a new agreement has to be made based on the published data. In terms of limitations and constraints, the most obvious one of this research is the choice that has been made to focus the fieldwork on Oostpoort. Although the development of de Hallen has been documented very extensively, there was a lack of asking questions on missing pieces of information. Also, this part of the research is therefore dependent for a large part on only one source. Given the limited timeframe in combination with the lack of data on Oostpoort this came out as the best solution for the thesis. Another limitation is the fact that besides the surveys of the municipality there has been no contact with residents in the area, except for observations and in making use of both areas. The fear herein was that interviews with a small group of respondents would quickly create a biased image of the project. Therefore, the decision was made to derive this information from the mentioned surveys, as well as the viewpoint of experts; as some of which are responsible for, or in daily contact with these residents. The final limitation lies in the fact that both projects are very recent, and housing development has only partially been finalized.

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4. Case descriptions

In this chapter the development process of both Oostpoort and de Hallen will be extensively described. To make a better understanding from a literal viewpoint, it’s advised to first take a look at the photos in the detachable booklet and use it to get a better feel of the following information.

4.1 Oostpoort

Oostpoort is a recently developed new neighborhood in Amsterdam East in the area that was formerly known as Polderweggebied (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2013). Since the 1990s the Amsterdam city government has started to develop the project area in order to create what they call “the new hart of City District East”. While its central location makes for an attractive urban redevelopment area, soil contamination left Oostpoort relatively underdeveloped up until 2004 when a long and laborious five years of soil sanitation made the neighborhood safe again for commercial, social and housing development (SKB, 2009). Oostpoort is the area in City District East, between the Lineausstraat and Middenweg on the east, the railway tracks north and west, and the Ringvaart south (figure 2). The new neighborhood is situated between the Transvaalbuurt, Dapperbuurt, Indische buurt and Watergraafsmeer.

Figure 2: Location of project area Oostpoort in Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014)

4.1.1 From industrial site to “heart” of East Amsterdam

Originally developed as an industrial site in 1885, Polderweggebied and its most important factory, the Oostergasfabriek (literally translated: Eastern gas factory) were built to produce city gas from black coal on, what was then, just outside of the border of Amsterdam (SKB, 2009). Until 1963 the main

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19 usage of the area was therefore the production of gas (until 1922) and later the distribution of the same product originating from other parts of the Netherlands. When Amsterdam’s industries and households shifted from gas made from black coal to natural gas and electricity the relevance of the Oostergasfabriek regressed and industrial activity in the Polderweggebied decreased (Beleef Oostpoort, s.d.). As a result, multiple original buildings of the gas factory were either shut down or used for different purposes ever since 1917; the exact year Amsterdam city government started using electricity for street lighting, instead of gas.

Within the area, mostly in former factory buildings, the Polderweggebied sheltered among other things a police station, Social Services office, high school, animal shelter, gym and swimming pool as of the early 2000s (SKB, 2009). While the area still had the look of an industrial or business site there was an overall lack of real companies and dwellings established in the Polderweggebied during this time and the main use of the largely contaminated soil was commercial. Most of the area’s shops were in the Lineausstraat and Middenweg at the eastern border of the area, while the central part of the Polderweggebied was characterized by empty and unsafe spaces between the former gas factory buildings. The contaminated soil in this area formed a risk for both the Polderweggebied itself, as well as the surrounding neighborhoods, as the dangerous possibility of the pollution spreading through groundwater loomed over the area during much of the latter part of the twentieth and start of the twenty-first century.

Finally, in 1997 City District East started unfolding large redevelopment projects for the Polderweggebied. The local authorities wanted to intensify the use of ground in the area, and the Polderweggebied - as of that moment in time, a combination of (empty) space and already existing social and commercial places along the Linnaeusstraat and Middenweg - was in their eyes the perfect spot to create a “new, lively city neighborhood” (SKB, 2009). Although it was already clear that the soil sanitation would come with incredibly high costs, the fusion of city districts East and Watergraafsmeer in 1998 made the Polderweggebied based on its location suddenly the center of a new and larger part of the city. Consequently, the new district decided, no matter what its costs, that the creation of a new united body of buildings, starts by creating a healthy heart. The formerly contaminated industrial Polderweggebied therefore became known in multiple plans as what was to become the “Heart of East” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2013).

4.1.2 Developing the Polderweggebied into Oostpoort

While the direct reason for redevelopment of the Polderweggebied was the contamination of the ground, and the danger of pollution spreading through the groundwater to adjacent neighborhood Watergraafsmeer, the City District used the opportunity to create their own center for both housing and social and commercial functions (Soeters, 2016 & Langeslag, 2016) . The main shopping area up until that moment in time was located at the Middenweg and Lineausstraat, on the east side of the Polderweggebied. But, while other city districts had their own real shopping centers – Osdorpplein in West, Buikslotermeerplein in North and Gelderlandplein in South – East was lacking a real shopping area (Langeslag, 2016). Thus, the municipality started conversations with housing corporations Ymere and Stadgenoot, who owned pieces of the land, and developer BPD about developing a new city heart with dwellings and a shopping center with a multitude of social functions in the Polderweggebied. Up until 2003, these parties tried to plan the redevelopment of the area, with a heavy focus on social functions spirited by the municipality. To create a better urban design and work out the plans of Ymere, Stadgenoot and BPD - who would create their development cooperation Ontwikkelingscombinatie

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20 Oostpoort (OCP) in 2004 – in collaboration with the city district two key stakeholders were recruited to the project: project leader Fred Langeslag and architect and urbanist/ supervisor Sjoerd Soeters. The direct reason for their appointments was the economic crisis of the housing market in 2003, which led to a more realistic and commercial approach.

Fred Langeslag: “At that moment in time (2003) there was a crisis on the housing market, and all plans

that were containing 60 percent of social unprofitable functions and 40 percent commercial profitable functions in the Polderweggebied weren’t possible anymore. Therefore, two things happened: they called me, and they decided to make their plans’ urban design better organized, with a shopping center and a logical route. That’s also why they asked Sjoerd Soeters. In a few weeks’ time we have tried to create a sharper urban design, which was a lot more in line with the market. We changed it around, so 60 percent commercial and profitable functions and 40 percent social unprofitable functions. Those unprofitable functions aren’t necessarily all horrible, but if you already have a new City District office, a dance theatre, music theatre and the renovation of the swimming pool, there already are a lot of social functions. You have to pay for the sanitation in one way or the other, by setting the program on top of it. That wasn’t possible, so the national government and the municipality payed a share of it, and from the housing program and shopping program we created new land prices, to organize a conclusive land exploitation.”

Langeslag’s words show how the economic situation put a limit to the social goals of the municipality and enlarged the role of the commercial party (OCP), as the municipality was dependent on higher ground prices to be able to realize the ground sanitation of the area. This meant a heavy focus on the housing and shopping programs, which quickly became intertwined in the project. Architect Sjoerd Soeters designed a plan that had two main goals at the time: on the one hand create a mixed and lively area with both shops and dwellings, and on the other stimulate the declining shopping area around the Lineausstraat and Middenweg.

Sjoerd Soeters: “We had learned from other projects that in central areas you have to build in circles

or eight-figured forms, because no one wants to have to walk in one direction and afterwards have to walk back through the same route. So, what did we do in Oostpoort? If the Lineausstraat is the most important shopping street, then on the point of dying out, you can hang the shopping center on it. … You don’t want to make this circle so deep that you empty out the Lineausstraat, but deep enough to create volume, and so it can become an addition to it. That idea was shared by friend and foe; everybody agreed to it back then.” (Soeters, 2016).

To create an attractive and lively center, the design of Soeters contained shops in and around the above mentioned circle, see figure 3, and had housing on top of it to create a lively setting at nighttime as well as during the day (Soeters, 2016). At the same time, the challenge for the urban redevelopment plan was to create a heart of East, which connects to all socioeconomically different surrounding neighborhoods. With the relatively high-class Watergraafsmeer on one side, and the by public rent dominated Transvaalbuurt on the other, the challenge for both the OCP and City District quickly becomes the creation of a mixed social and economic center that fits to the interests of a very mixed audience. Architecturally, the plan was to connect Oostpoort to the Watergraafsmeer, while the housing construction linked to the Transvaalbuurt, because of the intertwined design of public rent and private homeownership within the same buildings.

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21 Figure 3: A quick sketch by Sjoerd Soetersof the shopping center in Oostpoort, with left the Linnausstraat and central the

“shopping circle” (Soeters, 2016).

In addition, the boost that Oostpoort should have on the declining shopping area around the Linaeusstraat and Middenweg was planned by attracting large commercial shopping chains within the shopping center (Langeslag, 2016; Soeters, 2016; Reuten, 2016). In this way, the developer (OCP) had some financial stability – as big shopping chains have the ability to sign a long term future rent contract – and the thought was that this could create space for local entrepreneurs within the Linaeusstraat and Middenweg, where shop spaces where smaller. So, ultimately “boutiquing” by local entrepreneurs in the Linnaeusstraat and Middenweg, and large shopping chains in the shopping center of Oostpoort. Relatively unique in the planning was the absence of residents in the area, as most of Oostpoort was planned on empty soil. The only exception was Tuinwijck, which itself isn’t included in the redevelopment, although its residents had to live in a construction site for over ten years, because of the intensive soil sanitation and the subsequent construction of Oostpoort, and meanwhile have become a part of neighborhood Oostpoort (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014 & Langeslag, 2016). Including Tuinwijck, the new project, under the name of Oostpoort, split up the Polderweggebied in four different areas, see figure 4. The shopping center with housing on top was planned to be in the western part, the new City District Office and other social functions, like a primary and secondary school, in the middle and more housing construction in the east. Sanitation of the area started in 2005, and while Soeters, Langeslag, the OCP and the municipality were refining their plans, was finished in 2009 (OCP, 2015). In addition, some of the social functions in the middle of Oostpoort, like the City District Office, were directly realized at the end of the sanitation in 2009. With of the effects of the economic crisis not yet reaching Oostpoort and a relative lack of residential engagement – with only one official complaint on the parking garage, and no official complaints on the commercial development

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22 (Langeslag, 2016) – the sky was the limit, and in 2010 the construction of Oostpoort West was planned to begin.

Figure 4: Subareas of Oostpoort: red = Tuinwijck, blue = Oostpoort West, yellow = Oostpoort Middle, green = Oostpoort East (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014).

4.1.3 The effects of the economic crisis on building Oostpoort (2010-2014)

After working out the development plan, and finishing the soil sanitation, the construction of Oostpoort started in 2010 right in the middle of the economic banking crisis (OCP, 2015). All of a sudden, the OCP had to decide on the total development of the area, and ask itself “how much risk can

we take?” (Langeslag, 2016). Developer BPD was already affiliated with a bank, and housing

corporations Ymere and Stadgenoot had to make up how much commercial estate they could develop. Fred Langeslag: “All of a sudden we had to decide on the investment of a parking garage with 874

spots, 18.000 m2 of shops and 350 apartments, in the midst of an economic crisis! We had already

rented out 40 percent of shops to big store chains, but we had sold zero percent of the dwellings. You can’t say: you can buy an apartment now, but you’ll get the key three and a half years later. So we had to build that on our own risk. … So, we sold the shopping center to SPF and Achmea and with some further help from the national government we were able to start building. There was no way back, the sanitation had already finished in 2009, so it was fingers crossed and time to start.”

Again, an economic crisis was of big effect on the project, as all stakeholders took a big financial risk in developing Oostpoort, and realization of the eastern part of the area was delayed until after the creation of the shopping center in Oostpoort West. The big financial risks led to doubt with the commercial developers and created some tension between OCP and the municipality. One of the

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23 municipality’s project managers –responsible for Oostpoort East – tells about this stalemate between both parties:

Joreen Röben: “The last thing we wanted was for the area to remain fallow for another ten years. So

around 2011 we took a time-out. And I think that really helped, because the alternative was fighting it out in court and terminate the contract. Then no one would’ve been happy. … So we put together a new program, more crisis-proof, and we set up a new contract in which OCP remained the developer, but per plot both parties could also decide to part ways. So, if OCP decided with plot 2 that they didn’t want to develop, they would still have the first option at plot 3. … Actually, we expected the OCP to pull out after plot 1, but they didn’t; it helped that the crisis stopped and in the end it’s also fine if one developer finishes the complete project”.

The OCP’s big risk to develop the dwellings and the remaining 60 percent of retail out of their own pockets and without the guarantee of sale and rent would eventually pay off. The result is a finished Oostpoort West in 2014, as the shopping center opens its doors to the public on March 26th 2014 (OCP,

2015). With Amsterdam’s housing market quickly improving the OCP was able to sell all dwellings at the end of 2014, and afterwards had to decide whether to continue with the development of housing construction in Oostpoort East (Langeslag, 2016). Ultimately, the OCP and the City District decide to start building in a more phased style, developing plot for plot. The strategy of starting with the development of the shopping center seemed to pay off, as potential new residents for Oostpoort East now could see at least some of the environment their houses were going to be built in. Although, OCP wassn’t willing to take the same amount of risk as in the first part of the project, it remained active as the main developer of the area. With the housing market rising to whole new levels in Amsterdam, the realization of housing in Oostpoort East went rather quickly:

Joreen Röben: “The first residents of Oostpoort East came in June of 2015, and now two more plots are

being delivered, so that’s going in a real quick pace. Of course, because of the economy, but also because we now know what the plan is, and all parties know what they have to do. So we have almost become a well-oiled machine, as the cooperation between the OCP and municipality is going really well. No longer are we having really hard discussions with one another.” (Röben, 2016).

4.1.4 The final project

Oostpoort West was completed in the spring of 2014, and consists of an underground parking garage with 874 parking spots, and on top of that 18.500 m² of lettable floor space for shopping and 350 dwellings, see table 2. Relatively unique for newly constructing housing is the fact that different sizes of apartments, and public rent as well as owner occupied housing is situated within the same buildings: Fred Langeslag: “We have organized it in a way that public rent is really included in the whole project.

If you walk the shopping circle (of Soeters), the building in the middle doesn’t look like public housing. But, that little gem in the middle, can only be a gem because of the apartments on top of it. And in the end it actually is public housing. (Langeslag, 2016).

So by the integral development of public and owner occupied housing, and by creating apartments differing from 50 m² to 200 m², the OCP and municipality have tried to attract people from both the Watergraafsmeer – on the high part of the segment – and the Transvaalbuurt – with the lower segment – to the neighborhood, and make sure that this mix of new residents automatically blends in with one and another. In total 350 apartments were created on top of the shopping center, with almost 33 percent of them public rent.

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24 The total costs for the realization of the project were 167.8 mln for the OCP, although that doesn’t include the sanitation costs of the complete area, which cost the municipality an additional 87 million euros, while their total costs for the sanitation, ground exploitation, purchase of various buildings and ground level furnishing in the whole of Oostpoort were 147 million euros (OCP, 2015).

Function Capacity Costs

Layer Sublevel Parking 874 spots 22.0 mln

Ground level Shopping center (total) 18.500 m² 63.1 mln

Shop space 16.550 m²

Horeca 1.470 m²

Office space 479 m²

Leisure unknown

Top-level Dwellings 350 apartments 82,7 mln

Owner occupied 235

Public rent 115

Total 167.8 mln

Table 2: Function, capacity and costs per level of Oostpoort West (Own creation, based on Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014 & OCP 2015)

Figure 5: Social and commercial functions of Oostpoort West and Middle in 2016: yellow = cultural/social, red = local entrepreneurs, green = leisure, blue = horeca (beleef Oostpoort, 2016)

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25 Figure 5 shows the current distribution of commercial and social functions in Oostpoort West and Middle, anno 2016 (beleef Oostpoort, 2016). The central shopping area, along the Land van Cocagneplein and the Waldenlaan – which is the circle designed by architect Soeters – contains mostly of large shopping chains, with the only exception being Het Faire Oosten and The Cool Collective – two concept stores on the Oranje Vrijstaatsplein – and local bakery Balvert on the Land van Cocagneplein. For leisure there’s also swimming pool Sportfondsenbad Oost. Between the Ringvaart and Oranje-Vrijstraatkade there is a concentration of horeca – the Dutch word for the assembly of all hotel,

restaurant and café related industries - while the main functions in Oostpoort Middle are social and

cultural, with the City District Office, music theatre Q-factory, primary school De Kraal and art center CBK.

Developer Plot

OCP Plot 1 95 dwellings

72 public rent 23 owner-occupied or private sector

Plot 2A 33 owner-occupied or private sector

Plot 2B 61 owner occupied or private sector

Plot 3 77 owner-occupied or private sector

Total 266 dwellings

Habion Plot 13 60 apartments for elderly care

74 private sector apartments for 55+

Total 134 dwellings

Total 400

Table 3: Different types of dwelling of Oostpoort East (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015)

Figure 6: Phased housing construction in Oostpoort East (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015)

As mentioned above, the development of Oostpoort East was affected immensely by the economic crisis, which had forced the OCP to take a lot of risk in Oostpoort West with the development of all housing, having to construct before selling any of the dwellings. Although, the OCP in the end did

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26 continue with the development of Oostpoort East, the program has become minimal, with the total number of planned dwellings mitigated from 380 to 266. Although, the total number of apartments is 400, because of the development of plot 13: a housing complex for elderly witch an additional 134 senior apartments. Table 3 shows the distribution of different types of housing in Oostpoort East. Development started in 2014, and the first plot was realized in September of 2015. Currently, only plot 3 is still in development. Figure 6 shows the location of all plots of Oostpoort East.

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27

4.2 De Hallen

Similar to Oostpoort in Amsterdam East, the Bellamybuurt in City District West has dealt with mixed urban redevelopment in a former industrial area over the last twenty years. The area was originally one of Amsterdam’s first industrial areas – with the oldest sawmills dating to 1661 – while it later became known as the central workplace for the maintenance and storage of the city’s most important public transport system of the start of the 20th century; the tram (Kalk, 2015). Also common to

Oostpoort, redevelopment of the former industrial area started in the 1990s and took over twenty years to develop, as the projects main stakeholders – the municipality, investors, residents and architects – struggled to finance the project and agree on how to reuse this central area of the city. In contrast to Oostpoort, the development of social, commercial and cultural functions has largely been within the former tram remise, which is now called de Hallen, because it consists of a number of former tram halls. Development of de Hallen includes a transformation of the former depot, as well as newly constructed housing alongside of it. The project area, figure 7, is located in the middle of the Bellamybuurt, between the Bilderdijkkade on the east, Kinkerstraat on the south, Ten Katenstraat on the west and Bellamyplein in the north.

Figure 7: Location of project area de Hallen in Amsterdam (Google Earth, own creation)

4.2.1 From Tram-depot to “monumental city heart”

The popularity of the tram in Amsterdam at the start of the 20th century, and the systems transition to

electricity as main source of power – until then trams in Amsterdam were literally running on horse power – created the need for multiple tram-depots (Kalk, 2015). Between 1901 and 1914 Dienst Publieke Werken (Department Social Services) was responsible for building and expanding five big halls and a passage; which became known as Tramremise West at the Tollensstraat. Similar to the Oostergasfabriek in Oostpoort all buildings were architecturally built in style of the Amsterdamse School. Because the rising popularity of the tram as a public transport system was such an important

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28 catalyst of the success and expansion of Tramremise West, it comes as no surprise that the start of World War 2 and subsequent stop of all tram traffic by the Germans in 1944 created an overhaul of the overall use of the area. This meant, that as of 1964 some of the depots halls were also used as workshops for painters, carpenters and upholsterers. To add to this, the storage of trams already was moved to Remise Havenstraat (1914) near the Haarlemmermeerstation and Remise Lekstraat near the Amsteldijk (1927) before the start of the war. Therefore, the role of the remise at the Tollensstraat in Amsterdam’s tram-system was reduced to maintenance work (SPQA,2012).

When the Dutch public transport company GVB decided to move maintenance of trams to a more peripheral location in Diemen in 1996, it came as no surprise to the neighborhood (SPQA, 2012). Residents had seen the decrease in usage of the tram depot for years, and multiple community based organizations had already started developing possible plans for the area. While there was a definite longing among longtime residents and former workers of the factory to maintain all of Tramremise West and use the former factory halls for community based purposes – almost all proposed plans consisted of some form of culture (library, theater, cinema), sports (gym) and shops within the existing brick-framed environment – the municipality and investors were also interested in creating some bang for their buck (Kalk, 2015). The result was a twenty yearlong battle amongst multiple stakeholders on what to do with the former factory hall; an era with so many different plans, investors, interests, issues and momentum-swings that it can only be described as what TROM-chairman Eisse Kalk calls “an exciting reality soap”.

With the nearby Westergasfabriek acting as an important role model during this time, residents and architects tried to “convince the municipality that (redevelopment of) de Hallen was a terrific opportunity to make this place a monumental city heart” (architect H. Pamentier in Kalk, 2015). While ongoing protests of residents revised some of the municipality’s original plans of (partial) demolition, the ultimate conclusion remained that “for a financially feasible plan, the focus should be on realizing housing construction, horeca and shops” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1996 in Kalk, 2015).

Thus, the first years of planning de Hallen were characterized by three main conflicts of interest (Kalk, 2015). On the one hand, between “hallenslopers” – those who wanted to demolish and rebuilt – and “hallengebruikers” – those who wanted to reuse the factory halls. And on the other, amongst realists – the municipality and investors – and opportunists – residents and former workers. Lastly, a third problem was the definition of the project area, with some wanting to develop strictly within the GVB-turf and others striving to connect and develop de Hallen with(in) its embedded environment. The first of these three problems came to a solution when collaboration between residents and architects resulted in the acquirement of the status of monument for de Hallen in 2001 (Rijksdienst voor het Cultureel Erfgoed, 2016). This meant that building apartments within the factory halls became “very difficult”, the appointment of de Hallen as a national monument also impacted the third aforementioned problem; if the plan would involve housing construction it should be outside of the factory halls and the project therefore should try to connect these halls with its environment. Unsurprisingly, in the projects first official urban development plan (i.e. Stedenbouwkundig Plan, SP), set up between 2000 and 2002 it was therefore insisted that the project area was enlarged (BRO Amsterdam, 2002).

With two-thirds of the tram-depot’s redevelopment issues partially resolved, one could see the fact that it took almost fifteen years from the resulting first official urban development plan until the final

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29 realization of the project, as both a surprise and extreme waste of time, effort and especially a wonderful central location of Amsterdam. However, one could also point out, that this is a perfect example of what, ultimately, are the two deciding factors and most important issues in creating any important decision in urban (re)development: money and public support.

4.2.2 Fifteen years of vacancy, drama and planning for the City District, residents and

developers

After setting up the SP (Stedenbouwkundig Plan) – basically a collection of all serious propositions for the area – from 2000-2002, City District West invited multiple property developers to create a plan of action based on the SP. Eventually, the choice fell on SFB Vastgoed (later BPF Bouwinvest), an experienced player in the world of Amsterdam urban (re)development that had just rebuilt the city’s Olympic Stadium (Kalk, 2015). The City District liked the developers experience with redeveloping monuments, its reputation for impressive long term vision and the proposed plans for a new district office within de Hallen, as well as 400 new dwellings outside of it (van Randeraat, former project leader of SFB in Kalk, 2015).

Unfortunately, the cooperation between BPF and City District West already came to an end in 2004, when BPF decided to back out of the project. The developer repudiates the role of the municipality and sees “insufficient opportunity in the large investment” (BRON). In ‘Nieuw leven in de Hallen’ (Kalk, 205) former City Council Member Hans Weevers, who was responsible for de Hallen from 1997 until 2008, interestingly explains the municipality’s role at this time in the project:

Hans Weevers: “What I have learned from that era is that when the municipality starts guiding these

big projects, it often goes wrong. Why? At the time a lot of people with expertise had already left the municipality. In fact, we primarily had the role of supervisor and director. There weren’t too many experienced developers at the municipality (left). At the City District we had to attract developers from outside. ... Later we tried to resolve it internally, but maybe we shouldn’t have. Nevertheless, it became clear quite quickly that financially it was a complicated project, in which we had to earn money within the project itself to be able to finance it.”

With that last sentence Weevers means that new housing construction was supposed to make the renovation of ‘de Hallen’ possible. At the same time, BPF wanted to double the amount of horeca and create more profitable opportunities within the former factory halls as opposed to only the community based proposition of the municipality. In this sense, the role of the government - in both their own, as well as the developer’s words – was, though of positive influence on the inclusion of cultural, community based parts of the project, yet clearly not enough to produce a realistic mixed urban redevelopment plan, let alone develop it as a project. The first years of planning de Hallen therefore show how – no matter how relatively big the role of the government in Dutch and Amsterdam planning might be compared to that in cities in other countries – they are still reliant on investors, developers and consequently need to create an attractive investment opportunity that can coexist with their community based plans.

Subsequently, the municipality must have come to the same conclusion, as they rapidly engaged with a new partner; which coincidentally was a more commercial, yet culturally focused one (Kalk, 2015). Harry de Winter, a Dutch producer and media-entrepreneur, - and his company LETZ – seemed like the perfect choice for City District West (Urban Inspiration, 2015). De Winter was known as a man with “money, relations and creative plans”; the ideal candidate to transform the former factory halls in,

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30 what de Winter himself called: “a cultural capital within the capital itself” (Kalk, 2015). Because of de Winter’s theater-background, the plan quickly became known as Broadway in de Hallen. The project consisted of two theaters, a cinema, a concert hall and a nightclub, as well as 344 new dwellings, a parking garage, shops, offices and a new City District office. Although commercial, the municipality saw de Winter’s approach to de Hallen as “an opening to realize the project” (Weevers in Kalk, 2015). As the municipality and LETZ were happily ready to start their cooperation, this time it wasn’t the money factor that threw a spanner in the works. Among residents a decisive fear for the anticipated gulf of loud intoxicated wandering nocturnal visitors rose (Urban Inspiration, 2015). Adding to this fear was a growing frustration for the lack of resident participation, as suddenly the municipality shifted from consulting all their plans with the neighborhood, to a more traditional top-down style of planning. Ultimately, the distaste and protests outgrew the positives of the plan. The message became loud and clear: residents didn’t want de Hallen to become the “third entertainment and nightlife center” of the city. De Winter quietly disappeared from the scene in 2006, investors and the municipality steered plans for a new cultural entertainment center to Amsterdam Zuidoost and de Hallen remain unused, empty and without a realistic plan.

If the municipality’s failed cooperation with BPF between 2002-2004 showed the importance of money and creating an attractive investment in urban redevelopment, its failed collaboration with LETZ from 2004-2006 displays the significance of public support. Or as former Council Member Roel Walraven (Urban Inspiration, 2015) sums up the irony:

“First, the municipality had public support, but no money. Now she has the money (from de Winter), but no public support”.

Nevertheless, it should be added that, even though the lack of public support was the main catalyst behind the failure of de Winter’s plans, in hindsight there also were doubts about the financial side of the project. De Winter clarified in an interview in local newspaper Parool in 2008: “We were seen as

the big bag of money, but it always was the intension to find co-investors.” De Winter wasn’t able to

deliver on his promises, as his company provided only one-third of the expected “money, relations and creative plans.” To add insult to injury, the resulting new official (“creative”) urban development plan (Stedenbouwkund Plan +) was overbudgeted – costs were estimated at ca. 50 million euros – and consisted the questionable and criticized inclusion of a new City District office and parking garage (Kalk, 2015). The man who was supposed to deliver Broadway in de Hallen, left it as an empty theater, with no actors, a fired director – City Council Member Hans Weevers is forced to step down after the disaster - and only a big pile of unsold tickets.

The municipality, with new City Council Member Bouwe Olij – known for his decisiveness – meanwhile kept on trying to execute the project after the departure of de Winter until 2011 (Kalk, 2015). Although Olij’s proposition to cancel the plans for the expensive new City District Office is lauded, problems keep reoccurring between possible investors/ developers and either the municipality or residents. Ultimately, the creation of Stichting TROM (Tramremise Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij, translated as Tram Remise Development Company) – a non-profit organization consisting local residents, led by architect Andre van Stigt – offered a solution.

4.2.3 Finding stability, investment ánd support: the creation of Stichting TROM

Between 2010 and 2011 a fierce battle between the newly created TROM and commercial developer Lingotto took place, as the municipality hesitated which plan was more realistic (based on finance and

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