Will Wright
Cognitive Institutions and Non-Referring Content
Table of Contents: Introduction
Establishing Extensive Potential: Where and When to Look Wrangling Cognition In
Setting the Stage
I Ain’t Afraid of No Ghost Conclusion
Introduction
The concept of the mind is stretched back and forth, and for good reason. When one begins to trace the extension of cognition which has taken place predominantly within the last three decades, one immediately notices that extension is primarily applied to directly referring, ostensive beliefs. Perhaps this is a matter of ease or convention. By examining first the more overt cases of extra-cranial cognitive extension, our intuitions to the contrary are simpler to overcome. Overcoming strong traditions is always a difficult task and it makes economic sense to go after the weak link rather than take on the chain as a whole. The dangers of this piecemeal approach, however, is that some of the resulting conclusions and formulations are geared specifically to the attack. Setting up the discussion of any alternates thusly appears to suggest rewriting the project entirely and is in some ways made doubly hard.
All of this to say that the first formulations in regards to extending cognition were made with simple premises and intuitively strong conclusions. They do not adequately flesh out the potential which the extended mind thesis ultimately has to offer us. What I want to do in this paper is take a particularly strange occurrent belief kind which on its face seems especially difficult to fit into an extended mind theoryand show how in fact these cases necessitate a much stronger form of the extended mind thesis. In order to do this, I will trace out the arguments thus far in the extended mind debate. Then I will show how arguments which appeal to particularly hard to define concepts remain a bit of an impasse for proponents of externalism with regards to cognition. Mental states have a particular about-ness, a content which serves to individuate and distinguish from other sorts. A belief about a table is unique from one about a chair, for example. Still, these are directly demonstrative to the things which they purport to represent; they are ostensive in that they refer to objects in a straightforwardly referential way. There exists another set of content-full states which are not so directly ostensive which, thereby, appeal to internalist narratives. What are we to make of cognitive states operant on content of ghosts, Santa Claus, the Tooth fairy and other such content which does not have a referent but which functions as if it did? In the current literature, this has been largely overlooked. In effect, beliefs with content parading as referent yet non-ostensive must be propped up by a socially extended mind and without the co-constitutive role of social institutions, cognizing as such would be impossible.
It seems intuitively strong that perhaps cognition, the mind and all its capabilities, are strictly limited to the brain. Cognition, of course, not identical with the mental outright although they are easy to misconstrue. The thinking, perceiving, reflecting, believing, reasoning, etc. that the minded being does are acts of cognition.1 Mental life involves other phenomenological areas
that I will not touch upon here. Instead, I will focus on the intuition that cognition operates only based on elements internal to the skin and skull. Increasingly, this intuition is under siege. Here I will add to this assault under the guise of a particularly thorny content with a myriad of
difficulties. Namely, I will make the case that we ought to appeal to structures outside of the brain not merely as scaffolding cognition but as actually co-constituting it. By that, I mean that without these external structures, cognizing entities would not be able to perform the same sorts of cognitive actions. The mind, then, only emerges or is brought about through a particularly systematic and embodied relation with context-sensitive structures in the environment.
In that way, I plan on demonstrating how mental states with content intensionally about something in the world which is itself non-naturalizable must rely on social institutions for its constitution. Cognizing without referent, while seemingly a good case for internalistic leanings, is in reality the strongest case for a broadening of the mind. I hope to show that the best
explanation for this strange linguistic phenomenon is an appeal to Putnam and Burge on meaning, Davidson on historical iteration of that meaning, and Gallagher on the way social institutions structure not only what we belief, think, perceive, etc. but more importantly constitute the process by which we acquire knowledge and produce mental states which are content-full. For Burge, linguistic convention dominates the social realm. For Gallagher, social institutions are rules of law, university organization, and the like. In a similar vein, I will appeal to the social institution of culture replete with tradition as a constituting element in a socially extended cognitive mind.
To do this I start with the key moves in extending the mind and getting it out of the brain, followed by the critiques which, in some crucial ways, set up for the particular analysis I will providing. Next, I outline one of the most powerful responses to that formulation in an attempt to address the alternative positions. Once the argument has been sufficiently polarized, then, I begin an outline of the important of formulations of content meaning in social convention. This setting
of the stage entails a brief look at the work of Putnam, Burge and Davidson in order to establish the role which relations to the world play in characterizing cognition. Finally, and with those first steps clearly in mind, I present the case for socially extended mind through the case of non-referring content. We begin first with Otto.
Establishing Extensive Potential: Where and When to Look
Modern philosophy of mind is rife with a struggle for boundaries. One side seems to be naturalizing and reducing so quickly that the mind disappears altogether, while the other seems to be expanding so rapidly that the mind as a term has lost all semblance of meaning. This is the struggle for constitution, begun in its modern form in the eighties as our field took a more scientific look at cognition. An element which is constitutive is “one that, were it to be removed, the process would not be what it was.” 2When we have such a strange phenomenon as
mindedness appearing at such a specific and unique crossroads, it is almost required that we question what sort of things could be happening to produce the capabilities that we enjoy. How is it that we have come to perceive, know we are perceiving and represent this perception to
ourselves when, at least at first glance, it seems that no other such entity does so? This question centers on a desire to uncover the hidden mechanisms which must be present in order to bring about a cognitive agent, a person who enjoys a mental life replete with purpose and intension. The current state of the art revolves around finding a way to bracket in these specific components so that some cohesive semblance of a theory can be brought about and offer some coherent explanation. Unfortunately, these boundaries are yet to materialize and camps are forming rapidly.
The most influential argument made within the Extended Mind theory is given to us by Clark and Chalmers in their paper entitled The Extended Mind.3 Therein they set about pumping
intuitions in Philosophy of Mind about the way in which cognitively rich lives emerge. Furthermore, it is simply a nice construal of a particular situation and the best possible way to perceive the resulting scenario. In effect, their work will serve as a roadmap to extending the mind for overtly referent belief states. So powerful was their argument that anyone within the topic today must contend with their work. I continue this tradition by laying out the essence of their work.
Essentially, their project relies on the parity principle. A rough-and-ready approach to how and when cognitive systems are extendable. The parity principle claims that any process, typically deemed cognitive were it to be performed entirely internally, qualifies for cognitive
2 Tollefsen, Deborah, Rick Dale, and Lucas Olsen. "The Devil’s in the Details: Mental Institutions and Proper Engagement." 2013.
status. A system is cognitive if it would reach that level if all the components were internalized. 4
First, we are asked to consider a pretty standard reading of how beliefs are formed and how the mind operates. Imagine a woman named Inga who hears about some exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art. She decides she wants to go so she thinks about where the MOMA is located. Inga recalls the location of the museum and uses that information to form a belief about what sort of actions will be most effective at achieving her goal. The belief, they say, was perhaps dormant somewhere within Inga and was activated during the recall process. One possible description of this event is to say that Inga consulted her memory, however this seems to be an obvious set up for the move to come. It is better, I think, said that the information of the museum’s location was a part of the triggering of events started from the hearing, and moving systematically all the way to the action of going to the museum. Either way, Inga trusts her memory and proceeds to take the appropriate steps towards her goal.
Immediately following this formulation, Clark and Chalmers challenge the reader to imagine a different, yet sufficiently similar scenario involving a man named Otto. Accordingly, Otto also hears about some exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art. He then decides he wants to go, however there is a problem. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and therefore has difficulty remembering such information. Fortunately, Otto has devised a system whereby he religiously writes information in a notebook that he has with him at all times. Perhaps another way to construe this, although a clear setup for my move to come, would be to say that Otto was encultured via social institutions to utilize operations which allowed for the informationally-rich cognitive system thereby produced. For now, we are simply asked to assume ex hypothesi that Otto has the notebook at all times and reliably trusts that information. So when Otto hears of the new exhibit, decides he wants to go and recalls the information, he must check his handy
notebook to achieve the appropriate information to guide his actions.
By juxtaposing these two cases against one another thusly, we are meant to unearth some pretty basic assumptions made with regard to what counts in constituting cognition. What Clark and Chalmers have done is to situate our discussion in such a way that the intuition that
cognition occurs exclusively within the head is overcome. The notebook functions in the same respects for Otto as Inga’s memory for her. Both sets of information, it is purported, are central
to governing actions and contain both reliable and essential information. In other words, the action taken within the cases at hand are the direct result of a belief which could have only occurred, and were taken directly as a response to, a concerted effort between traditionally inner and outer elements. The two authors claim that they do not want to debate if this construal of cognition aligns with its standard usage. Instead, they ask the reader why it should not be that the notebook be considered a valuable, essential, co-constitutive element in the belief-producing process leading to the successful actions taken by the individual. Our job becomes to point out the important functional difference which would allow a memory-checking mind producing a belief to fall into the category of cognizant which would exclude note-book checking mind producing belief from that same category. The conversation changes as a result of this argument. The belief for Otto clearly could not have possibly been formed without his trusty notebook. Likewise, Inga’s belief was reliant on her memory not being struck by Alzheimer’s disease. The two sets of memory recall have a joint functionality which, it is argued, gives rise to a particular cognition. Overt differences between methods of retrieval and formulation, in this case one involving only biological versus the involvement of motor functions and then some, with which information was received appear somewhat shallow and arbitrary; differences which make no difference.
The present formulation pumps our intuition on just what ought to play a constitutive role in creating an intentionally cognitive system. The conditions which must be met to form a cognitive entity are challenged from a perspective which had never been taken before. What a strange claim to make, that a notebook could be a vital part of a minded system. In order to substantiate their claims, a set of conditions were postulated that would decide whether or not a set of interacting elements could legitimately be included in defining conditions. A basis was laid which had nothing to do with, allegedly, arbitrary distinctions of skin, skull or what have you. Basically, Clark and Chalmers created a set of conditions which they believed would form the foundation governing just where and when cognition is instantiated. The mind could be extended in this way if the element helping to form a belief reliably and consistently was purposefully and systematically available and invoked. Cognition incorporates the exterior if information taken is implicitly accepted by the system as a whole. Finally, the conditions were met if information was not too difficult to glean from whatever subcomponents were operant within the system.5 Later I
will contend that these definitions are somewhat dangerous for the extended mind theory but, as I said before, they seem to have been chosen due in part to the fact that they so clearly resemble the traditional ways of characterizing cognitive processes. Indeed memory recall typically happens in these ways, but, importantly, they need not necessarily do so.
For now, it is important to address some of the more surface level critiques of the extended mind hypothesis so that when we bring in the heavy hitters we can more clearly get at the root of our debate. One such position is based on the reliability of memory based on internal resources and those perhaps found elsewhere. There is an immediacy, and self-determinant, aspect to Inga’s case which could be differentiated with Otto’s. The way in which memory is accessed does differ and with it perhaps the categorical nature of the system as a whole. Clark and Chalmers, however, tell us that while Inga’s memory information producing system seems safer to some degree, it is still susceptible to influence, reflective change, brain damage, or a nefarious neurosurgeon. One could further posit that the relation to the system is vital. That, for our memory, we experience a direct connection with better access with which we can always avail ourselves.6 Again, this is not problematic ex hypothesi. The notebook may as well be
information directly tattooed onto Otto’s skin. The point is still effectively maintained. It is important to get these surface level challenges out of the way early as the critique to be leveled in the next section is strikingly more contentious. One could tell a story about Inga having a desire, believing the information to be in the recesses of her memory, she thereby retrievs the
information and then acts upon that information to take action. This seems needlessly complex, however. The same is maintained for Otto wherein an equivalent tale can be told with equal complexity.7 The question becomes why ought this be necessary?
Clark and Chalmers have given the extension project a set of guidelines. Operating within this theory, we may use their guidance as a method with which to analyze the constitutive
elements giving rise to cognitive forms. Mind operations as thusly demonstrated can contain classically perceived extensive items. Beliefs, so it is claimed, can arise out of world involving systems which themselves constitute cognition. The classically considered internal and external play similar constitutive roles in completing cognitive tasks. The criteria set up give us a way to analyze these systems and approach the topic of cognitive extension. For many, however, this is
6 Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." 2010. Pg.36
not a palatable claim. The reason for this involves deeper claims about the ontic nature of the mind and what happens to our meaning, our intuition, and our mind if such radical extension is embraced. We turn now to the most influential of these arguments, given to us by Adams and Aizawa.
Wrangling Cognition In
The most prominent response to the formulation laid out by Clark and Chalmers is perhaps given by Adams and Aizawa in a paper entitled “The Bounds of Cognition”. Therein, they challenge the case of extending Otto’s mind directly, effectively challenging the issue of whether or not a belief can be extended between component parts which are not wholly within the head. They challenge this with the idea that what constitutes cognition is a “mark of the cognitive” i.e. there is something special about mental life which, as a contingent empirical fact, exclusively occurs within the limits of the brain.8 In identifying the mark of the cognitive,
however, they are much less clear. Here we will unpack the argument they lay out in a partial attempt to lead to the special cases of non-referring content forthcoming.
Adams and Aizawa tell us that what separates the cognitive from the non-cognitive is a reliance of content which is non-derived. That is, this content is about the world and has
intensionality, however, unlike other manners by which something can obtain intensionality, the intensionality of non-derived content is original intensionality. This is to be taken in a strict principled sense. Nothing engendered the about-ness of cognitive content. Its meaning is of its own accord. This can be opposed by a classic example of the intensionality involved in street signs, for example. Whatever a particular street sign is about is designated to it, given over perhaps even arbitrarily so. Cognition, in this way, is only able to be distinguished and individuated from the point of view that they contain or are engendered with a content that is intrinsic unto itself. Therefore it need not rely on parts outside of itself for help in its domain. As this is a particularly thorny counter to the project of the extended mind, it will take more time to fully unpack their reasons for thinking so.
A move towards representation-involving cognition was dominant in the 1980s. With the help of philosophers such as Fodor, a semantic functional theory of cognition took the forefront.9
Such theory types were based on the intrinsic, original intensionality wherein what characterized mental life was its sole operation on non-derived content and representation vehicles. Defining just what that meant, however, was a much more challenging feat. Regular law-like relations were postulated on the triggering of internal representations of the world replete with content
8 Adams, Frederick, and Kenneth Aizawa. "The Bounds of Cognition." 2001. 9 Fodor, Jerry A. “The Language of Thought.” 1975.
but, in terms of individuation and constitution, entirely self-reliant. This is the famous example of so called ‘mentalese’ where translations between inputs into the sensory mechanisms triggered a cognitive capability operating on a set of original representations. The trouble is that this appears curiously to be a sort of Cartesian move in the guise of naturalism. There exists some skeptical epistemic divide. Intrinsic causes were instantiated by outward causes, yet these triggerings, while proposedly law-like and rigid, were the things which could be faulty and we may be none the wiser. The vehicles carrying content were not placed on solid epistemic ground.10
Adams and Aizawa follow in the footsteps of these thinkers. In pursuit of what elements cognition could supervene on, they too came up with such non-derived, original content.
Representations are then the cognitive vehicles which cognition trades on. Otto’s notebook would not be a candidate to be a part of such a cognitive producing machine as it is only capable of having meaning when it is causally interacting with a representationally rich cognitive system. The notebook does have a type of content, but its meaning, the about-ness contained in the words, are explicitly reliant upon some independent system for bestowal. It informs cognition, but does not give rise to it. A necessary condition in order to truly be deemed cognitive, then, is the supposedly non-derived content of the likes of Inga. Otto’s belief is only in that the notebook contains the information, and is not somehow distributed across Otto’s faulty brain and his trusty notebook.
The trouble here which is alluded to in Adams and Aizawa is that there is a lot of contention about just what this non-derived content is. What are its characteristic elements, wherefore are the conditions to apply it? They further allow that it is “possible that cognitive processes…include a closed set of non-representational elements” as long as some of the elements are representationally rich, non-derived content-having components of some sort.11
Still, they are more than hesitant to outright include Otto’s notebook or any extra-cranial process from achieving such heights.
Finally they state that a second condition of processual nature must be adhered too. That is, one ought to appeal to causal processes already known to give rise to cognition as the starting point in determining if any process is in fact cognitive, as opposed presumably from merely
10 Clark, A. "Language, Embodiment, and the Cognitive Niche." 2006. Pg. 1 11 Adams, Frederick, and Kenneth Aizawa. "The Bounds of Cognition." 2001. Pg. 50
looking as if it is so. This feels a bit like the parity principle. Discriminating and individuating on this basis, however, is a dangerous game. What is postulated, essentially, is that something cannot be cognitive on the condition that it is not similar enough to the one thing which we can almost certainly know instantiates cognition: the brain. When we look at the case given by Clark and Chalmers, we can reject the hypothesis based on the fact that it is not the same as how the brain works. In other words, it is just too different than what we are accustomed too and therefore does not qualify.
This is dangerous because it is circular and question begging.12 When the mission is to
find under what conditions cognition is manifested, one cannot have as their starting point a decisive composition of cognition presumed. Brains, of course, are clearly a vital part of
whatever is going on here but the pre-established presumption that in fact the brain plays the sole role leads an investigation through a loop back to the start. Adams and Aizawa have done
themselves a disservice here. They start by proclaiming a look for a defining mark of what makes something cognitive and are determined by their intuitive opinion that the project points at how clearly nothing operates similarly enough to the brain to warrant inclusion into the cognitive kind. They are not forthcoming with a characterization of what precisely non-derived, originally intensional content could be. So, it remains obscure. They are much clearer with their rejection of Clark and Chalmers project, albeit evidently on the grounds of their intuitive belief in a fundamental separation between the things they perceive as cognitive and those they do not.
Importantly, they offer a particular interesting argumentative structure. Adams and Aizawa claim that the mistake which Extended mind theorists make is a coupling versus
constitution fallacy. When we are trying to set up a bounded system which is producing the right cognitive kind, we are supposed to remain mindful of mistaking a system which is already cognitively viable and then coupled with an extra-cranial resource with a cognitively rich system itself involving said extra-cranial resource. Otto may not share as partial component of
involvement in a belief forming system with the notebook but is rather a cognitive system himself which is only as an afterthought causally coupled with his trusty notebook. As they say, “coupling relations are distinct from constitutive relations” and we ought to be careful of making this fallacious move.13 This is a wise warning without which we are at risk of cognitive bloat, or
12 Gallagher, Shaun. "The Overextended Mind." 2012. Pg.10
making everything in the world cognitive. Supposedly, they worry that the word will be so deluded as to refer to any interrelating, coupled parts whatsoever. The trouble however is that the difference between constitution and coupling for Adams and Aizawa rests on the intuition that the brain alone has intrinsic content and that everything else is merely triggering it.
Clark and Chalmers’s project is not defeated by this. They are forthcoming that they do not wish to defend the model of cognition as being brain bound. Instead they merely ask why it could not be that informational systems giving rise to cognitive kinds, coupled in the right sort of way, be considered systems which also encompassed extra-cranial things. Otto only has his belief thanks to information in his notebook which he directly and reliably attained. It was functionally equivalent in the story. So why should it not be included? Adams and Aizawa essentially, then, mistake the project of Extended mind. They do this partially because of the way in which Clark and Chalmers began their exegesis. Their project, recall, rested on the fact that cognitively extended systems functioned in such a way that, if they were done in the head, would generallybe considered cognitive. This is the parity principle that these two systems are equally efficient and made of equally necessary components for the belief which informed the action. What is clear though is an implicit reliance on the intuitive belief that cognition takes place entirely in the head. This leaves open a big hole wherein one can chip away at their theory, precisely as Adams and Aizawa have done. There is no eseential reason, however, that the parity principle must be upheld. Indeed, it could be that many cognitive systems exist that are
functionally quite distinct from the operation of the ones with which we are familiar.
Contingently, this is not incredibly evident but one need not concede that the gold standard by which we judge cognitive viability is based on the traditional theories held which one is actively working against. I suppose, as I stated earlier, that was done in an attempt to break a long held tradition and ease the transition therefrom.
The discussion now is headed in the right direction. A crucial distinction has emerged which is at the heart of our present issue. Our intuitions concerning the nature of the precise circumstances bringing about mental activity must now be properly vetted. If not then the debate may dissolve entirely. To what ought we to appeal in our desire to uncover the class of the cognitive, the mark which necessarily groups the haves from the have nots? The discussion thus far has framed this debate on explanatory purchase. Is it functional similarity creating cognition
as such or is it perhaps the much more elusive non-derived mark? In the next two sections I plan on outlining a path towards a potential answer for the case of belief states with non-referring content. A foundation of a few famous thought experiments about how content may be passively externalized as a matter of convention, the Putnam, Burge, and Davidson arguments for
distributed and normative aspects relevant to meaning, will be our first steps towards
externalizing and deriving non-referring content. An externalization of content is arguably the first steps toward an externalism of the mind. Then I will look at a more active approach to their theory whereby cognitive functioning is itself constituted by social institutions. I will use these theories to instigate a discussion about a subset of content which cannot be non-derived but must be directly constituted by social institutions, culture, and practices. This is content which has no overt referent but can only be achieved through involving the mental states of others. With any luck, this will demonstrate that an appeal to internal, original content-full cognitive states is not a valid position due to the lack of referent to which the terms purport to apply. I turn now to Putnam, Burge and Davidson.
Setting the Stage
We have seen thus far the divide which has occurred in the pursuit of cognitive understanding. I place this divide at the feet of Clark and Chalmer’s parity principle which implicitly assumes that cognition as such is brought out from an internal state and thereby extended. This leaves it open to theories whose standards differ on degree to which similarity holds. Instead, cognition might be construed as something which need not be drawn out from an internal realm but rather constituted from the outset thanks to principles of social practice and extension. For this reason, I will first briefly look at older literature whose authors envisioned a type of externalism the content of which relied on elements in the world from the outset.
Hilary Putnam is largely cited as the first externalist to really get people thinking about thinking outside of the head. His work on meaning began the discussion leading to extended cognition today. For that reason, I will briefly outline what I take to be the essence of his project here. Furthermore, his work helps to give argumentative force to my forthcoming conclusion.
In his thought experiment, Putnam asks us to imagine a twin-earth where everything is exactly identical with the noted exception of water whose manifestation is the same but whose chemical structure is now XYZ and not H2O. A person cognizing water in some way has that water as the intension of their effort. A twin-person has the twin-water in the same manner. If we were to take a person from earth and transport them unknowingly to twin-earth however they would be perceiving, thinking about, forming beliefs about the XYZ twin-water in front of them but mistaking it for the H2O water they know. Ex hypothesi, if we are to hold the internal properties the same, it seems intuitively strange to claim that there is not some way of
individuating the content of thought or belief about twin-water which was intended for water. It seems in this case we must appeal to the world in order to properly characterize the emergent cognitive phenomenon. The conditions for differentiating thoughts intensionally about water and twin-water necessitate a move outside the head. Two people can mean different things with the same propositional attitudes. The manifestations are identical, therefore any translations into mentalese are presumably the same. Here Putnam takes to task the divide which had been present between intension and extension. He further postulates the power a linguistic community has to engender intensionality, proper use being distributed across a linguistic community. 14
Tyler Burge took up this last move and pushed it even farther. Putnam’s thought
experiment relied upon keeping the internal intensional properties the same. For Burge, however, a person with water beliefs and twin-person with twin-water beliefs “are in no sense exact duplicates in their thoughts.”15 Thereby he takes a more principled approach to the extension of
meaning. Following Putnam again, Burge sets up a “twin-earth” style argument wherein a person goes to the doctor and complains about having arthritis in his thigh. The doctor informs the patient that he cannot have arthritis as it is an ailment of the joints alone. The patient’s belief intensionally about arthritis is therefore wrong. Burge asks us to consider a counterfactual world were arthritis as a term means an ailment of the joints as well as the thigh. In this case, the doctor would not correct the patient as his belief was a correct belief. This is designed to demonstrate that to some extent the content of our cognition is socially determined. In both cases he acquired the word from communication and learned to apply it appropriately. The beliefs formed involved precisely that which social practices determined to be the correct extensions. In some principled constitutional way, then, the content of the beliefs formed were socially distributed. In fact, the only thing separating the two cases is the social environment’s unified application of the word arthritis. Burge demonstrates that the patients’ mental content can differ even if the physical and mental life of the patients is maintained all the way up to that doctor visit. Burge thereby denies the case for any sort of intrinsic meaning.16
Finally, Davidson offers a third thought experiment designed to demonstrate that meaning partially relies on historical experiential relation. He imagines a scenario where he is struck by lightning in a swamp, completely decomposed and, by pure coincidence, a physical replica of himself is created from the swamp. That swamp-man performs behaviorally the same but “it can’t recognize anything, since it never cognized in the first place.”17 A belief about
seeing an object again would be incorrect. It can’t mean the same things as the first version as it lacks the historical, causal, experiential ability to do so. In fact, it cannot even really have such a thought.18 In some necessary way, then, our historical process leading up to forming a belief
about water, arthritis, or loved ones involves an amount of conditioning in a causal, social and world-involving way. The constitution of the meaning of the content of cognitive processes is
15 Burge, Tyler. Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays. 2007. Pg.87 16 Burge, Tyler. "Individualism and the Mental." 1979
17 Davidson, Donald. "Knowing One's Own Mind." 1987, pg. 531 18 Davidson, Donald. "Knowing One's Own Mind." 1987. Pg. 531
thereby extended. A struggle, however, is whether or not cognition itself should involve the characterizing and individuating constitution of the meaning it operates on. After all the content is merely the conceptual aspect of what the person is cognizing. There are many still today who resist this move.
In short, Putnam extended content, Burge contextualized it and Davidson made it
historical. One is hard pressed to align with the private theater, interpretation-ist models on these accounts. Yet this is still not a convincing argument to some as it seems to only passively give the world a constitutive role to play with respect to content-full meaning. Once meaning is obtained, perhaps, then non-derived cognitive structures do the heavy lifting. Is it
constitutionally or causally relevant? A strong law-like translation machine could make a mentalese language of thought, mark of cognition vehicle theory still viable. Next, I will turn to my own problem to try to show how the situation so far, coupled with an active cognizant form, necessitates an explanation of actual mental work being actively distributed in real time. While one can rest easy that the “mental events and states [which] occur in him, depends on the character of his physical and social environment”, this is not sufficient in extending cognition.19
Thus far only the content has been extended. In order to fully refute the mentalese, mark of the cognitive turn then I will appeal to content which offer no direct water, arthritis, loved ones extension. These content are non-referring and therefore present a unique case. The extension in these cases are not overt and therefore require a different sort of cognizant story in order to extend. I hope to show that these terms offer a slight but important deviation from the Otto case earlier and that this separation necessarily cannot be overcome by internalist intuitions.
I Ain’t Afraid of No Ghost
With the help of Otto and our other thought experiments, we have heavily drawn in to question the traditional conception that cognition lies within the seemingly arbitrary lines of neural or physical distinction. Furthermore, we have placed at the center of our investigation the
relation we have with elements in the world. What has been shown is that some instances of cognitive capacity call for a constituting role to be given to elements within our environment. How, when and to what extent this holds is nevertheless still open to speculation. For Otto, it was a belief system containing a notebook. For our thirsty earth inhabitant, it was a thought whose content may not have been what it seemed. For our ailing patient, it was a belief epistemically applied with the aid of a linguistic community. And for our lamentable man by the swamp, it was saying without the historical backup to be meaning. All of these combine to chip away at the idea that content-full belief functioning rests solely on a foundation of classically inner mechanisms. Still there persists today the case being made for non-derived content. As the argument goes, all that these previous examples show is the causes of representational states upon which then do the real cognizant work. There is causal influence upon what triggers which thing when, but no concession is made as to why the ‘external’ ought to be considered constituent.20
The conversation must now not focus on what cognition operates on but the nature of cognitive operation as such.21 It is a subtle but an important distinction. More crucially, we must
unearth the intuitions which lead us down the rabbit hole. The trouble is that it is not clear where internalist definitions of this process make that switch. If, indeed, the mark of the cognitive is its operation on intrinsic or original content then that position is less tenable with the current
analysis. Entirely non-derived content-full mental states are practically nonsensical. How could meaning gain its character in such a theory? One becomes forced into a position wherein it makes sense to claim that “we cannot make the firing of a particular set of neurons mean what it does simply by an agreement that it does.”22 This is a rather strange position to take as it seems
empirically clear that through reinforcing and pointing a child at water and saying “this is water” enough of a route neuronal firings is formed in such a way that the child would one day answer to the question “is this water” in the affirmative in the case when they are in the vicinity of water. In large part, this is because they are in the state of perceiving water and the appropriate
mechanisms are indeed firing. If one retreats into the claim that we are representation operates whose operation is entirely independent in some essential way, though, this is the fallout.
20 Notice, I now feel relatively confident to place “external” in scare-quotes. 21 Wilson, Robert. "Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist."2010. pg. 171 22 Adams, Fred, and Ken Aizawa. "Defending the Bounds of Cognition." 2010. Pg.72
We must begin again and this time remove the parity principle, remove Putnam’s supposed holding constant of the internal, as these are appeals to traditional intuitions and definitions.23 Understandably done, whose point is well taken, but they must now be thrown off.
If, instead, we begin with the idea that cognition is capable of emerging from systems so long as the functional relation of elemental components operate in such a way as to produce the right sort of mark, then the playing field for the discussion takes on a new form. The struggle then is only to decide what the functional kind may be. The previous insistences on equivalency between inner and outer begs the question about what cognition is and potentially disqualifies certain aspects before the analysis has begun. We shift our focus from striving toward a parity between classically cognitive forms to functional similarity between new systems which could be considered cognitively viable all on their own.24 In this way, similarly functional relations are
not the prime argumentative force. Parity then “is a sufficient rather than a necessary
condition.”25 Instead, what ought to be the decisive force is whether or not an interacting system
is linked in the right sort of way. We must be careful, of course, in defining the precise operative nature of what makes a system cognitive.
It has recently been conjectured that the extension of cognition is not reserved for external resources like notebooks and Tetris blocks alone. The idea of a socially extended mind has begun to take hold in various circles. Following Burge, it takes on a more fundamental conclusion about the role which communities replete with social institutions play in constituting cognition originally. It is argued that certain cognitive tasks could not be accomplished without the co-constitutive interaction of components distributed within one’s social milieu. 26
Institutions are social practices with which we become familiarized throughout life. Largely this is a process which subconsciously influences the way we think. Imagine a sheep herder putting away his flock. It would be hard to say that the particular manner with which the problem of encapsulating the sheep was not in some way altered as a result of local customs. The problem solving cognitive function operated in part with the help of social extension and, importantly, would have been different were the cultural norms different or perhaps even non-existent.27
23 Menary, Richard. "Cognitive Integration and the Extended Mind." 2010. Pg.234
24 Merritt, Michele, Somogy Varga, and Mog Stapleton. "Editorial Introduction: Socializing the Extended Mind." 2013. Pg. 2
25 Gallagher, Shaun. “The Socially Extended Mind." 2013. Pg.5 26 Gallagher, Shaun. “The Socially Extended Mind." 2013. Pg.6 27 Gallagher, Shaun. “The Socially Extended Mind." 2013. Pg.10
Following Menary, one can state that “cognitive systems are integrated wholes with heterogeneous, but interacting parts… [which] can be neural, bodily and environmental.”28
Socially Extended Cognition is a hypothesis about the right sort of functionality that must be initially present to produce cognition. In this way, it is not a strictly ontic project such as that Adams and Aizawa, nor is it an attempt to appeal to classical ontic intuitions as in Clark and Chalmers. Instead it asks us to consider that, in some fundamental respects, our cognitive functionality is only what it is as a direct result of being socially extended from the outset. Our mental life could not ex hypothesi be what it is if it were not significantly, principally,
fundamentally constituted at least in part by social practices and institutions which engendered it with the tools to complete new actions and form complex representations which would otherwise be impossible. In all respects, “it is a view of what cognition is for at least as long as it has been a trait of human beings.”29 Enculturation allows for cognitive forms to take shape. In order to
demonstrate this, consider a thought experiment.
I have a good friend named Christian. It is important, I think, to note that Christian is South American and I am North American. One night, we were both for whatever reason entertaining the occurrent belief that there was a ghostly presence in our apartment. Let’s safely presume now that ghosts do not exist and that the content of any cognitive mental state regarding ghosts, Santa Claus or phlogistons is therefore not overtly referent. Nevertheless, we both had the occurrent belief that indeed what we were presently perceiving was in fact a ghost. What is curious, however, is that not only were our reasons for thinking that the ghost was there
different, but the epistemically informed actions thereby taken were different. Apparently, ghosts in some South American cultures are not things of which to be frightened but are instead
reminders of loved ones looking over us. They are to be respected to some extent. I did not know this and was not as friendly as I could have been.
I posit that the best way to explain our beliefs is by appeal to their constitution in social and cultural institutions. It seems as if it would be impossible to have such a belief without a direct instantiation for the content of that belief in the fabric of the social structure. Information about what the non-referringcontent is and how one ought to perceive the imperceptible make for an excellent challenge to someone who would give an internalist story about the cognitive
28 Menary, Richard. "Cognitive Integration, Enculturated Cognition and the Socially Extended Mind." 2013. Pg.28 29 Wilson, Robert. "Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist." 2010. Pg.181
feat of ghostly belief. It seems implausible that non-derived, intrinsic, original intensionality is responsible for individuating and delineating cognition in this present scenario. If one were to hold to that untenable position then they might be saying that we are from the start innately replete with an awareness not only of ghosts but of what our beliefs ought to be like in regards to ghosts. The beliefs being non-referent and yet strangely culturally appropriate. This is simply too innate a theory to be comprehensible. One could perhaps claim that we have been conditioned to respond to stimulations with unclear origins in a specific manner and that this is still wholly within us. That is one line of argumentation and a potentially successful one but it still forces the internalist to give up the idea of non-derived content for the belief as solely the result of
reinforcement whereby a community attributed content to a set of non-referent sensations and conditioned the responses. A much better explanatory theory can be given by including social institutions in constituting those cognitive capabilities.
To emphasis the point further, one can imagine the cases for Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy. A child’s belief that money left under their pillow by the tooth fairy is a direct result of the belief being constituted by the institutional practice of enculturating youth into group cognition. When a tooth falls out, a child places the tooth under their pillow and form the belief that the money which appears in its place the next day is a result of the actions of a concept which is not ostensibly referent. The mistaken attribution of content can be characterized and individuated as a direct result of its constitution within the social institution. An internalist inclination would be that the Tooth Fairy and Santa Claus “lack extension”.30 Then they are cases for intrinsic original
content and further that “Santa's [or the tooth fairy, etc.] non-existence and the corresponding absence of [intensional] content make little difference to the success of“ attributing content to the belief.31 What is the conclusion to be gleaned from this? We are perhaps to presume that mental
states regarding these non-referent concepts are innate, perhaps, originally born. When an American child believes they are perceiving the sounds of Santa they leave out cookies as opposed to a Dutch child who may also leave out carrots for the reindeer. These actions represent cognitive norms based on the cognitive practice of attributing a content in a specific way and acting on the resulting beliefs formed. 32
30 Chalmers, David. "On Sense and Intension.” 2002 31 Chalmers, David. "The Components of Content." 1995
It is important to note here that the best explanation for the resulting actions of these beliefs through an appeal to the coupled relationship within a social institution which gives form and allows for the individuation of cognitive structures. Without these systems being extended to include other cognitive systems of their own right, we must then perhaps resort to a Cartesian theater which promises too much to be inborn. The particular operation of that belief would not be what it is without the constitutive relation on a metaphysical, ontic level with the social, cultural practices which instill it with intension. The best explanation for this content, perhaps even the only explanation of this content, is as a derived intensionality. If one defends the position that for “original intensionality … the meaning that its constituent mental
representations have [do] not in turn derive from the intensionality of anything else” then they are left to formulate a position whereby intensionality can emerge for concepts which are not overtly referent.33 There is no Tooth Fairy, Ghost or Santa Figure on the roof to point towards.
We start with the claim that if “some cognitive process functions properly only when that fact [about the world] holds, then the part of the world constituting that fact becomes a literal part of the cognitive process.”34 On this reading, it is clear that any cognitive process involving
content which is not, in the traditional sense, existent must rely on social institutions for its creation. There is often in the literature a talking at cross levels between what is the virtue by which content gets its character and between how we should separate the cognitive from the non-cognitive systems. My project is in some essential way aimed at eliminating this separation. I have done my best herein to demonstrate that the latter is at best an intuitive guess, a biasing towards the self. It is the former which really gives us promise to answer the later. Any address aimed outright at cognitive character runs the risk of question begging.35 Thus, we have begun to
shift away from a focus from representational essences to representation in practice, a practice which is socially informed.36 A retreat into an ontic search for a specific mind-essence is
dangerous. Holding too tightly to the brain or the skin leads to one’s head in the sand.
33 Wilson, Robert. "Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist." 2010. Pg.168 34 Rupert, Robert D. "Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind." 2010. Pg. 429 35 Wilson, Robert. "Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist." 2010. Pg.182 36 Wilson, Robert. "Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist." 2010. Pg.183
Conclusion
The Extended Mind Hypothesis is currently limited to the non-social realm. It is focused on a type of externalism which is more palatable to classical conceptions of cognition. While it is understandable why this is the case it is no longer sufficient to stay at this boundary of cognition. We must begin to analysis the way which social practice, traditions and the institutions within which they take place have a fundamental, constitutive role in our cognitive operation. Otto is at a loss to incorporate the information within his trusty notebook without the help of social
institutions which allow for the practice of obtaining meaning from the directions scribbled therein. The methods instructed and the resources made viable are in some essential way a direct result of his enculturation into social practices, without which his unique cognitive system could not operate.37 I am unable to cognize content which has no overt reference in the world without
the appropriate relation to traditions and cultural practice to which I have been accustomed. Mental content, in this way, is derived in part from our experiences with conventional narratives with a set of practices attached to them.
Not only must we assimilate extra-cranial resources into the cognitive-system, but we must also assimilate those practices and institutions which determine how the relations between component parts operate. Without these, the functional integrity of the system is dramatically altered. It can be claimed, however, that this historical, social account of cognition does not fully undermine the orthodox view that “elements in the external code cause the activation of various mental representation [which alone] participate in internal cognitive processing.”38 While, it does
not fully eliminate this, the present theory does force the project of setting up bounds of the condition of non-derived content further into contention. There is a way in which one can resurrect the boundaries of skin and skull but the arbitrariness with which it is done becomes fully revealed. Non-derived content cannot be the mark of the cognitive when content-full cognitive states exist which must be fully derived and constituted by social institutions. The challenge presented by non-referent, non-existent mental content creates a dilemma for this method of defense.
37 Menary, Richard. "Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character." 2012. Pg.148 38 Rupert, Robert D. "Cognitive systems and the Supersized Mind." 2010. Pg.430
Our cognitive abilities are changed as a result of their extension in the social institution. Social institutions even give rise to their own unique cognitive operations, upon which there could be no operation without. Cognitive niches are formed whereby norms and standards of operational procedures are delineated and reinforced. These play just as much a constitutional role in the cognitive capacities we enjoy as the resource incorporation for which they allow. Holding too closely to the parity principle could lead to a conclusion that these social structures are not relevant in one’s use or function. Indeed, they are even more fundamental. In the case of non-referent cognizing the case is even clearer. Without the distribution of cognition there could be no cognizing non-referent content. Embracing a theory of cognition setup around non-derived content does not allow for this particular kind of cognition.
Bibliography
Adams, Frederick, and Kenneth Aizawa. "The Bounds of Cognition." Philosophical Psychology 14.1 (2001): 43-64.
Adams, Fred, and Ken Aizawa. "Defending the Bounds of Cognition." The Extended Mind. Ed. Richard Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 68-80. Print.
Burge, Tyler. Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon, 2007. Print. Burge, Tyler. "Individualism and the Mental." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, no. 1 (1979):
73-121.
Chalmers, David. "The Components of Content." University of Arizona, 1995. Web. Chalmers, David. "On Sense and Intension." University of Arizona, 2002. Web.
Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." The Extended Mind. Ed. Richard Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 27-42. Print.
Clark, A. "Language, Embodiment, and the Cognitive Niche." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10.8 (2006): 370-74.
Clark, Andy. "Memento’s Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended." The Extended Mind. Ed. Richard Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 43-67. Print.
Clark, Andy. "Coupling, Constitution, and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa."
The Extended Mind. Ed. Richard Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 81-100. Print.
Davidson, Donald. "Knowing One's Own Mind." Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 60.3 (1987): 441-58.
Fodor, Jerry A. “The Language of Thought.” Cambridge, MA: Harvard U Press, 1975. Gallagher, Shaun. "The Overextended Mind." Southern Journal of Phil. 50.2 (2012): 304- 18. Gallagher, Shaun."The Socially Extended Mind." Cognitive Systems Research 25-26 (2013):4-12 Gelder, Tim Van. "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?" Journal of Philosophy 92.7
(1995): 345-81.
Hurley, Susan. "The Varieties of Externalism." The Extended Mind. Ed. Richard Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 101-54.
Hutchins, Edwin. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006
Menary, Richard. "Cognitive Integration and the Extended Mind." The Extended Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 227-244. Print.
Menary, Richard. "Cognitive Integration, Enculturated Cognition and the Socially Extended Mind." Cognitive Systems Research 25-26 (2013): 26-34.
Menary, Richard. "Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character." Philosophical Explorations 15.2 (2012): 147-64.
Merritt, Michele, Somogy Varga, and Mog Stapleton. "Editorial Introduction: Socializing the Extended Mind." Cognitive Systems Research 25-26 (2013): 1-3.
McCulloch, Gregory. The Mind and Its World. London: Routledge, 2003.
Putnam, Hilary. "The Meaning of ‘Meaning’." Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975): 131-193.
Rupert, Robert D. "Cognitive systems and the Supersized Mind." Philosophical Studies 152.3 (2010): 427-36.
Sen, Madhucchanda. Externalism and the Mental. New Delhi: Oxford U Press, 2015.
Slaby, Jan, and Shaun Gallagher. "Critical Neuroscience and Socially Extended Minds." Theory,
Culture & Society 27.1 (2014): 1-22.
Theiner, Georg, Colin Allen, and Robert L. Goldstone. "Recognizing Group Cognition."
Cognitive Systems Research 11.4 (2010): 378-95.
Tollefsen, Deborah, Rick Dale, and Lucas Olsen. "The Devil’s in the Details: Mental Institutions and Proper Engagement." Cognitive Systems Research 25-26 (2013): 35-39.
Wilson, Robert. "Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist." The Extended Mind. Ed. Richard Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010.167-188. Print.
