When the flame of fire is quenched…
On Iran’s vulnerability of civil conflict in light of the Arab uprisings
Submitted by: Kiria Sueweh Ann Logtenberg || 59345254
First supervisor: Dr. Anne de Jong || Second supervisor: Dr. Vivienne Matthies- Boon Master thesis Political Science || International Relations
Research project: ‘Power & resistance in the Middle East’
Title: When the Flame of Fire is quenched: On Iran’s vulnerability for civil conflict in light of the Arab uprisings
Graduate School of Social Sciences || University of Amsterdam Date of submission: 06-27-2014
ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS
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First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Anne de Jong for her guidance and provision of constructive feedback throughout the process of writing my Master thesis. I experienced her as a supervisor with a sincere passion for her profession.
I am also very thankful to my former professors, drs. Paul Aarts, drs. Umut Kibrit, dr. Mehdi Amineh and dr. Vivienne Matthies- Boon, who furnished me with knowledge on the MENA region during my studies. My interest for the region emerged from the complex, intertwined and interdependent relation between religion, politics, economy and culture, which is characteristic for the Middle East and North Africa. A special thanks also to the Zeytun program, which gave me during my Bachelor the opportunity to visit and experience Iraqi Kurdistan from a scientific perspective.
My special interest for Iran arose from its exceptional position on both a regional and global level. The paradox of beauty and savagery, as I perceive Iran, triggered me to study this country during my Master at the Graduate School of Social Sciences. This research on Iran its vulnerability for civil conflict is the final product of my journey on the University of Amsterdam, for which I am very thankful.
ABSTRACT
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This study examines Iran its vulnerability for civil conflict by identifying the main preconditions and motivations for civil conflict in light of the ‘Arab uprisings’. Since the start of the ‘Arab Awakening’ the paradigm of authoritarian stability within civil conflict theory has ended. This study reconsiders civil conflict theory derived from Conflict Studies in light of the civil based ‘Arab uprisings’ by developing a theoretical framework based on Protracted Social Conflict theory and empirical literature of the motivations and preconditions behind the ‘Arab uprisings’. This study argues that the main motivations for the Iranian civil society to start a civil conflict can be found, since the Iranian regime suppresses all humanitarian-, political- and economic- needs. However, focusing on the main preconditions for civil conflict and the process to civil conflict in which those preconditions are required, civil activism in Iran appears to be a fundamental force, but the civil society is characterized by fear and reluctance for civil conflict. This lack of urge for revolution or confronting the regime with its failure in proving ‘human needs’ can be explained by its young history of civil conflict within a system of obedience. This attitude of fear and reluctance will make Iran less vulnerable for civil conflict. The developed framework used to study Iran its vulnerability for civil conflict, can also be used to study the vulnerability for civil conflict in similar cases within the MENA region.
TABLE OF CONTENT
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………...3 ABSTRACT………...4 TABLE OF CONTENT………...5-6 ABBREVIATIONS………...7 LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES………...7 INTRODUCTION………...8-11 i) || MOTIVATIONS & RELEVANCE………...8-9 ii) || RESEARCH QUESTIONS & OBJECTIVES………9-11 METHODOLOGY………...12-15iii) || STRATEGY, DESIGN & METHODS………12-15 iv) || CHAPTER OUTLINE……….15
PART I || THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK……….….16-36
1. || STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS………...…16-23 1.1. || INTRODUCTION………16 1.2. || THE CONCEPT OF STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS………..……17-19 1.3. || STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST ………19 1.4. || THE POWER OF AUTHORITARIANISM ……….19-21 1.5. || FROM STABILITY TO FRAGILITY | THE ARAB UPRISINGS...………21-22 1.6. || CIVIL ACTIVISM AND THE END OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PARADIGM………...22-23
2. || CONFLICTUAL STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS IN
AUTHORITARIAN CONTEXTS……….24-30 2.1. || THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL CONFLICT………24-26 2.2. || CONFLICT THEORY ABOUT MOTIVATIONS OF CONFLICT………26-30 2.2.1. | MOTIVATIONS FOR CIVIL CONFLICT | GREED VERSUS GRIEVANCE……….… 26-27
3. || PRECONDITIONS & MOTIVATIONS FOR CIVIL CONFLICT………30-36 3.1. || THE DRIVERS BEHIND THE ARAB UPRISINGS……….30-34 3.2. || A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING CIVIL CONFLICT IN IRAN……….34-36
PART II || ANALYSIS | IRAN……….37-59
4. || PRECONDITONS FOR CIVIL CONFLICT IN IRAN……….37-43 4.1. || INTRODUCTION………37 4.2. || A HISTORY OF REVOLTS AND REVOLUTION………38-40
4.2.1. | THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION……….……….38-39 4.2.2. | THE GREEN MOVEMENT………..………...……….39-40 4.3. || THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CURRENT IRAN……….40-43
4.3.1. | LIBERALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM? | THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CIVIL
ACTIVISM ………41-43 4.3.2. | HETEROGENEITY OF THE IRANIAN STATE AND SOCIETY………..………..43
5. || MOTIVATIONS FOR CIVIL CONFLICT IN IRAN…………...………43-59 5.1. || HUMANITARIAN NEEDS || HUMAN RIGHTS……….44-45 5.2. || POLITICAL NEEDS ……….45-49 5.2.1. | CORRUPTION OF THE IRANIAN REGIME………..45-47 5.2.2. | RESPONSIVENESS & ACCESS TO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS………..47-49 5.3. || ECONOMIC NEEDS……….49-59 5.3.1. | ECONOMIC GROWTH………...…….49-51 5.3.2. | MARKET ACCESS TO MINORITIES & UNEMPLOYMENT……….51-54 5.3.3. | ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT………..54-59
5.3.3.1. ||| ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & RESOURCE WEALTH...55-56 5.3.3.2. ||| PRIVATIZATION………...……….56-57 5.3.3.3. ||| DIVERSIFICATION & COMPETITIVENESS……….58-59
CONCLUSIONS………...…...………..60-63
BIBLIOGRAPHY……….64-73
ABBREVIATIONS
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FYDP || Five Year Development Plan GDP || Gross Domestic Product HRW || Human Rights Watch
ILO || International Labour Organisation IOC || International Oil Company
MENA || Middle East and Northern Africa NED || National Endowment for Democracy NGO || Non- governmental organization NIOC || National Iranian Oil Company
OHCHR || Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights OPEC || Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PSC || Protracted Social Conflict
SOE || State Owned Enterprise
LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES
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Figure 1 || Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict 28
Figure 2 || The process of civil conflict in light of the Arab uprisings 36
Figure 3 || Corruption Perception Index Iran 47
Figure 4 || Economic growth Iran 51
Figure 5 || Iran’s Economic Freedom Score 52
Key words || Iran | Arab uprisings | civil conflict | civil society | authoritarianism | Protracted Social Conflict | motivations for civil conflict | preconditions for civil conflict
INTRODUCTION
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“The link between the Green Movement and the Arab Spring has reopened the gate of history, for a renewed consciousness” (Dabashi, 2012:2)
This year, it is exactly 35 years ago that the Islamic Revolution changed Iran from a monocracy to a theocratic republic. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian people went to the streets of Tehran to celebrate 35 years existence of the Islamic Republic (Al Jazeera, 2014). For Iran, the revolution in 1979 was one of the most important moments in their modern history. The change of their political system from a monocracy to an Islamic Republic made Iran politically an exceptional state on both a regional and international level. There are rarely any countries on a global level where the Islam is so deeply integrated in personal, social and political life. This exceptional position is not limited to their political system, but also on an economic and sectarian level it can be argued that Iran is uncommon. The domination of Shiites in the population and politics makes that Iran is different to most other Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, where Sunnis are the majority (Sørli et al. 2005:147). Economically speaking, Iran experiences a lot of international pressure. Many sanctions are imposed on Iran since the revolution. This means that Iran is in an isolated position on many terrains.
i) MOTIVATIONS & RELEVANCE
However, at the same time Iran remains part and parcel of the Middle- Eastern region and cannot ignore the current developments. The so- called ‘Arab Awakening’, ‘Arab uprisings’ or ‘Arab Spring’ is changing the political landscape and the relation between the Arab regimes and their civil societies in particular. Although the developments in the region are, until now, limited to Arab countries, Iran is both on an empirical- and theoretical level involved in the uprisings. This almost paradoxical phenomenon of isolation and involvement of Iran in the Arab region makes it interesting to focus on the current relation between the Iranian regime and its civil society in light of the changing political landscape in the region 35 years after its own revolution.
On the empirical level, the wave of uprisings did not reach Iran (yet), but the Islamic Republic is indirectly involved in the ‘Arab Spring’. Iran is for example one of the main supporters of Assad’s regime in the Syrian civil war on a military and financial level (Friedman, 2011). Also on a theoretical level Iran is a main subject for scholars. In the debate around the Arab uprisings, many scholars have been writing about the relation between the Arab uprisings, the Iranian uprisings in 2009 and the Islamic revolution in 1979 (Kurzman, 2012a; Rafati, 2013; Ahmadi, 2013; Jones, 2013; Khiabany, 2012). Main themes are first, the comparison (similarities and differences) between the Arab uprisings and the Iranian revolution of 1979 and revolts in 2009. Second, the Islamic revolution and uprisings in 2009 as the founder or even the main cause of the Arab uprisings are extensively analysed in the literature. And third, the question if Iran emerged as the winner of the Arab uprisings is a topic in the current debate (Kaye et al., 2011).
This literature provides interesting insights in the relation between the Iranian revolutions prior to the ‘Arab Awakening’ and the current Arab uprisings. It provides particular explanations on indirect underlying roots of the uprisings and on how we can understand uprisings in the region in light of the Iranian uprisings. Within the broader theme of understanding the Arab uprisings, the roots and motives of the Arab uprisings have been studied extensively after three years of revolution by, among others, Ogbonnaya (2013), Salih (2013), Jones (2013), Lynch (2013), Kinninmont (2012) Goldstone (2011) and Joffé (2011). This resulted in new theoretical and empirical insights in how and why conflicts between authoritarian states and the civil society in the Middle- East emerged. Examining the conditions and motivations prior to the uprisings is even more important since Middle Eastern studies missed the Arab Spring (Gause III, 2011; Goodwin, 2011). Gause III (2011: 83-88) examines three factors that caused the surprise of the Arab Spring. First, scholars were wrong by assuming that the military apparatus will never turn itself against the regime. Second, they underestimated the protests that emerged as a result of liberal reforms in the economy. And third, scholars undervalued the common cross-border Arab identity, which caused the domino effect. He argues that the focus of scholars was almost exclusively on the invincible power of authoritarian regimes and not on the preconditions, which can change that. In other words, the myth of authoritarian stability is not longer believed since the awakening.
This shift of paradigm under scholars towards the relation between autocratic regimes and civil societies in the Middle East makes it interesting to study this relationship in other authoritarian states in the region where the uprisings have not been spilled over. Although it may seem obvious to study the current relation between the Iranian regime and its civil society and the motivations for conflict in light of the findings of the Arab uprisings, scholars paid so far not much attention to this subject. This is particularly remarkable since Iran has at first a main position in the debate due to its revolution in 1979 and uprisings in 2009, and second a history of civil conflict against the regime. At least scholars should not miss another prospective uprising. Those motivations and the relevance of studying Iran its vulnerability for civil conflict have led to the following central question for this thesis:
To what extend is the relation between the Iranian state and civil society prone for civil conflict in light of the Arab uprisings?
The focus within this vulnerability for civil conflict will be on the preconditions and motivations for civil society to start a civil conflict and will be approached in light of the current ‘Arab uprisings’. To provide deeper insights and a valid answer on the main questions, I take the following steps in this research. First, the main concepts within the question will be filtered and examined from a higher level of abstraction. This means that at first state- society relations in general and particular in the contemporary Middle East will be addressed including the shift from a stable to fragile relationship since the ‘Arab uprisings’. Therefore, the sub question of chapter one will be:
1 // How can state- society relations in the contemporary Middle East be explained?
The next chapter is focused on civil conflict, which is explained by theories from conflict studies in order to approach the civil based ‘Arab uprisings’. The sub question that is addressed in chapter two is therefore:
2 // How can conflictual state- society relations in authoritarian contexts be explained in light of the Arab uprisings?
In chapter three, the civil based conflicts in the Arab region are approached with a focus on the main preconditions and motivations for the civil society to stand up against the regime.
This will provide, together with the civil conflict theories, the theoretical framework for the analysis. The question that will be addressed here is:
3 // How should preconditions and motivations for civil conflict be approached in light of the Arab uprisings?
After building a theoretical framework on preconditions and motivations for civil conflict in light of the ‘Arab uprisings’ the analysis starts in chapter four with analysing the presence of preconditions for civil society to start a civil conflict in current Iran and ends with the
motivations in chapter five. Those five sub questions will lead to the conclusions in which the main question will be addressed. The sub question of chapter four and five that will be
examined are:
4 // To what extend can the preconditions for the Iranian civil society to start a civil conflict be designated?
5 // To what extend are the motivations for the civil society to start a civil conflict present in current Iran?
The overall aim of this research is to get a better understanding to what extend Iran is prone for civil conflict. I elaborate the level of stability between the Iranian regime and the civil society by examining civil conflict theory and empirical literature on conflicting state- society relations in the light of the Arab uprisings. This research demonstrates if the main preconditions and motivations for the Iranian civil society to start a conflict against the Iranian regime can be observed. I do this by providing a theoretical framework, build on civil conflict theories derived from ‘Conflict Studies’ and empirical literature on the drivers behind the Arab Spring. This means that the theoretical framework engages grounded civil conflict theories with empirical knowledge on the Arab uprisings in order to give an innovatory analysis on state- civil society relations in Iran.
The use of grounded theories in combination with recent empirical insights of the uprisings might be a useful- and innovative way to get better insights on state- civil society relations in authoritarian regimes in other cases in the region. This will, beside the overall aim, also contribute to the public and theoretical debate on the ‘Arab uprisings’ and might
METHODOLOGY
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iii) STRATEGY, DESIGN & METHODS
To meet the objectives, examined in the introduction, I chose a qualitative research strategy, which is designed as a case study. Iran is the focus of interest in this research and therefore one of the main concepts. Iran will be approached as a nation state, officially called ‘the Islamic Republic of Iran’ since 1979 (CIA Website, 2014). The political and historical context of Iran will be discussed in the introduction of the analysis. The second main concept in this research is the ‘Arab uprisings’, which is defined as “a series of cascading events that sweep through the Arab world of which the Tunisian uprising (at the end of 2010) was the first” (Gelvin, 2011:27). From that moment demonstrations were spread in a relentless wave through the Arab region (Kurzman, 2012b:378). More specifically, an uprising “is somewhat analogous to three other types of organisation: protest movements, armies, and organised crime. In popular and political analysis, the most common analogue to rebellion is protest” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000:3). Also for this research, uprisings will refer to protest movements. I will focus on general patterns of the uprisings as a whole, without denying the differences between the cases.
The Arab uprisings are also often defined as the ‘Arab Spring’, which is debated by scholars. Some scholars argue that the concept ‘Arab Spring’ is not appropriate since it generates wrong expectations. On the other hand, the conception of the ‘Arab Spring’ “marks the time of year and it metaphorically marks the season of hope, trust and rebirth” (Dabashi, 2012:xviii). With this explanation of the ‘Spring’, the concepts of ‘Arab uprisings’, ‘Arab Spring’ and ‘Arab Awakening’ will be used interchangeable in this research.
My focus within Iran will be on state- (civil) society relations, particular on preconditions and motivations for civil conflict. Since state- society relations are a very broad concept and part of my theoretical framework, this concept will be examined in the next chapter. I tend to focus on a single case in order to get an in depth understanding of the research subject (Vromen, 2010:255). This means that there is no objective for generalisation of my case analysis. The design of a case study means that I do not necessarily aim to generalise my findings and statements on other cases, regardless of time and place. Although
the case of Iran is unique, it can be helpful in future analysis of other cases in the region. Moreover, the theoretical framework may be useful in the development of civil conflict theory focused on the Middle East since the Arab uprisings. Prior, I selected Iran due to its paradoxical position in the region and its history of civil conflict.
An appropriate method for my analysis is a critical literature study complemented with a document analysis to provide in- depth information. A literature study has a theoretical character and is a useful method to provide a systematic analysis. The literature study consists of both literatures on theoretical and empirical research. My data consists of a combination of primary and secondary documents and texts. Primary documents are “original documents produced by political actors ranging from executive parliamentary or judicial arms of governments, policy-making agencies or non-governmental organisations” (Vromen, 2010:261). These are for example news articles and organisational research reports. The main part of the data consists of secondary sources, which are documents (mainly scholarly journal articles) based on primary sources or other secondary sources. All data is reviewed and analysed critically in order to provide thought-out and balanced arguments. This means I focus on the process and approaches or discourses used in the literature and documents but will not follow one particular method, such as process tracing or discourse analysis. The choice for one certain method may exclude important information for this research, which can be generated due other methods.
Important to mention is that the process of data collection and data analysis are an iterative process in a case study (Hartley, 2004:329). Within my process of data collection and data analysis, I follow the points below, which are the features of a qualitative case- study design, according to Vromen (2010:257)
1. I have done an inductive analysis, which means that I will elaborate categories out of theory, rather than testing hypotheses through deduction
2. I have used a comprehensive perspective, in a sense that I aim to understand all of the phenomenon in its context, rather than have concrete variables
3. Moreover, the process of my research is not restrained with an inflexible design, but adaptable to changing circumstances
4. I have assumed that full objectivity is impossible, which means that I have not tried to be empathetic neutral
Above characteristics of a qualitative research design were determining in the whole process of this research on motivations and preconditions for civil conflict with the overall aim of arguing to what extend Iran is prone for civil conflict. This research is not about who within the civil society were the foundation for change or how the process of social movements and mass protests can be explained, but about what are the motivations for the civil society to stand up. Important here is the distinction between motivations and conditions. Motivations for civil society to start a civil conflict rise out of dissatisfaction with certain circumstances, such as repression or poverty. In other words, these circumstances are drivers for civil conflict. Next to motivations or drivers, there should be the possibility of feasibility to start a conflict. So to speak, there are always some necessary preconditions for civil conflict.
Some difficulties in my thesis are related to the credibility (equivalent of internal validity in quantitative research) of this study. I will try to expose the underlying features of the uprisings in the Arab region since the end of 2010. First, this is difficult because ‘the Arab Spring’ consists of different cases, which are not always comparable. For example, Dabashi (2012:23) argues that in Algeria demonstrations broke out over food prices and unemployment, while in Oman, society aims for jobs and political reform, and in Kuwait protestors ask for political participation and political reform. However, I try to argue that there are similar features, which gave rise to the uprisings and revolutions. I do this by analysing the existing literature on this subject extensively. Second, this might seem that I incorporate a causal relationship between certain characteristics and the uprisings. However, I do not per se suggest that x is responsible for variation in y, but only give an analysis of common preconditions and motivations that were present prior to the ‘Arab uprisings’.
Moreover, I also do not try to examine a causal relationship between current the state- society relations in Iran and the developments in the Arab region, because explaining this relationship is beyond the scope of this thesis. In this research I aim to provide a solid, reliable and valid analysis on the preconditions and motivations for civil conflict in Iran in light of the Arab uprisings. Another limitation has to do with the data gathering process. Although the majority of the literature on the ‘Arab Uprisings’ is written in English, there is also some scholarly work written in Arabic (or Farsi, since the analysis will be on Iran) (Aarts et. al, 2012:3). Since I do not read one of the languages, there may some interesting insights not taken into account. However, many theory and data is provided by scholars or analysts who do speak Arabic or Farsi, who hopefully covered the Arabic and Persian insights within the literature.
Referring to the Arab uprisings will have two functions in my research. On one hand the events during the uprisings will provide empirical evidence and support for the theory on civil conflict. On the other hand, the revolts and revolutions in the Middle East developed new empirical literature on this subject. Therefore both the empirics and theory on the current conflicts in the Arab region will contribute to, and be the foundation of my theoretical framework. This framework is suitable to apply on the case of Iran, because it takes into account general theories on civil conflict and empirical literature the current conflicts between states and their civil societies in the region. By using this framework, I will be able to provide a sustainable and balanced argument on the current state- society relations in Iran.
iv) CHAPTER OUTLINE
To accomplish this, my thesis is designed as follows; in the first chapter the state- society relations in the contemporary Middle- East are examined with a focus on the shift from stability to fragility as a result of the ‘Arab uprisings’. The first section the main concepts are introduced, which is followed by examining theory on regime stability and change in authoritarian contexts in light of the Arab uprisings. The first chapter ends with discussing a paradigm, which is useful to approach motives for civil conflict. In the second en third chapter, the theoretical framework is build on civil conflict theories in authoritarian contexts from conflict studies and literature on the ‘Arab uprisings’. In chapter two the concept of civil conflict is defined and an overview of the debate on civil conflict is elaborated in light of the Arab uprisings. This will be complemented in chapter three with empirical literature on the motives of the Arab uprisings out of which an appropriate framework to approach the state- civil society relations in Iran for this research will arise. Part two is the analysis, which is divided in two chapters. In chapter four the case will be introduced with a focus on civil conflicts in the modern history of Iran and the current state- society relations. This will be followed by an analysis on the preconditions in current Iran. Chapter five is devoted to the presence of the motivations for civil conflict in Iran. In the last section of the analysis, the motivations will be wrapped up, which will be followed by the conclusions and a short discussion.
PART I – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
CONFLICTUAL STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST IN THE LIGHTOF THE ARAB UPRISINGS
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1. || STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS
1.1. || INTRODUCTIONThe aim of the first part of this thesis is to built a theoretical framework on preconditions and motivations for civil society in the current MENA region to start a civil conflict against the regime. This theoretical framework should provide a suitable foundation and model to apply on Iran in the second part of this research. I will start the first chapter by defining the concepts state and civil society, and the relation between them. Next, the normative idea of an authoritarian regime will be explained, which will be followed by the strategies and mechanisms that this type of government uses in order to maintain a stable relationship with its society. This normative conceptualisation will be criticised by introducing the Arab uprisings. The uprisings will illustrate the transition from stability to fragility of the relationship between state and society, which is accompanied by the emergence of civil society and social movements. This process will be elaborated. The first chapter will be ended with a short discussion on a paradigm that will be assumed as useful to view civil society in this research.
The next chapter focuses on civil conflict and its motivations, which will be approached by civil war theory, particular in authoritarian contexts. This will be discussed in light of the Arab uprisings. In the next chapter, these civil conflict theories will be enriched with literature on the drivers behind the Arab uprisings. This combination will provide a solid theoretical framework with both a strong theoretical and empirical foundation.
1.2. || THE CONCEPT OF STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS
State- society relations are about the interaction and interdependency between the state and its society (Hague & Harrop, 2007:4). The state and society are connected within boundaries (Agnew, 1994:53). It is impossible to think of a civil society in absence of a state, because the two are bound up in a dialectical relationship that shapes political life (Norton, 2001:xv). The state is a unique institution that is positioned above all organisations within society (Hague & Harrop, 2007:13). Since the rise of the modern state it is prevalent to make a distinction between the concepts ‘state’, ‘government’ and ‘regime’. A regime is “a system of government and administration”, while the government consists of institutions, which make the collective decisions for society (Hague & Harrop, 2007:6). More narrowly, a government refers to the top political level of these institutions. However, in authoritarian regimes, this distinction does not count, since all those concepts are ruled by the same group of elites. Therefore, the concepts are used interchangeable in this research. In comparative politics, governments are classified in three categories - liberal democracies, illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, which is useful to compare different cases of state- society relations. In a liberal democracy, rulers are chosen by society through fair, free and frequent elections and the government of this democracy is limited by the constitution. This type of government is liberal in a sense that individual rights, including freedom of press, religion, speech, assembly and property are defended in the court (Ibid:6).
In an illiberal democracy, freedom is limited to elections. The elections in this type of government are controlled and rarely achieve administrative change. The authoritarian regime is neither democratic nor liberal, which means a lack of control of society over its rulers and elections are restricted, not fair or do not take place at all. Moreover, political parties are banned or not independent in a sense that they cannot challenge the existing order. Many authoritarian regimes can be found in the Middle- Eastern region (Ibid:7). This research focuses on the conflictual relation between the state and civil society in Iran in the light of the current civil conflicts in the Arab region. A common feature of the state- society relations within the different cases or countries of the Arab uprisings and Iran is that the system is autocratic. Therefore, my theoretical framework will be limited to the authoritarian regime type.
The definition of civil society in the literature differs but all definitions include the idea of “organised collective participation in the public space between individuals and the
state” (Ibrahim, 1995:28). When a group within the civil society becomes institutionalised, it formally adopts the embodiment of a Non Governmental Organisation (NGO). A civil society is build upon a shared sense of identity within the boundaries of a political unit and provides an outlet for free expression of political ideas (Norton, 1993:210,213). Larry Diamond (1994:4 in Cavatorta, 2013:8) defines, for example, civil society as “the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules”. The normative idea of a civil society has behavioural codes and values of accepting other opinions and they manage the public space peacefully (Ibrahim 1995:28; Norton, 1993:214).
A broad definition, used by Norton (2001:xi), defines civil society as “the emergence of autonomous institutions, which facilitate political, economic and social activity”. This definition includes informal organisations in the concept of civil society and therefore differs from a more narrow definition of civil society in which civil society is limited to formal institutions. The aim of this research is to get a better understanding of the relation between the regime and the civil society in Iran in light of the Arab uprisings. Civil activism or collective participation during the ‘Arab uprisings’ was largely unorganised. Therefore, a definition of civil society used for the activism during the uprisings is useful. Moreover, this broader definition is also useful to make sense of the history of civil activism in Iran during the Green Movement in 2009-2010 (Rivetti, 2013:202).
Cavatorta (2013:2) explains the complex relation between authoritarian regimes and civil society by using the concept ‘activated citizenship’. This concept emphasises the importance of informal and non-structured civil society organisations. “In addition to traditional organisations, other modes of engagement exist, from individual writings to mass participation, from seemingly non-political events to political engagement” (Ibid:9). Moreover, the lines have also become blurred between different issue areas and political and social fields. This does not imply that traditional vertical and organised social movements have disappeared.
The Arab Spring gives evidence for this statement, since the uprisings in among others Tunisia, Egypt an Syria were led by informal and horizontal organisations, groups and associations (Challand, 2011:275). In the run-up to the uprisings new movements mobilised mostly without formal institutional structures. They were largely leaderless, non- traditional in their structures and focussed on regime change and political reform (Durac, 2013:175-176).
Civil society can be considered as a competitive area where organisations and activated citizens can have contrasting objectives (Cavatorta, 2013:10). On one hand, civil
society has the aim for reducing power of the authoritarian regime in order to get more power of expression and contestation. On the other hand, they want to have a voice as interrogators of the regime. One of the assumptions is that civil society exists in a healthy public sphere. This ‘healthy sphere’ means that civil society needs some freedom to exist. This makes it difficult for civil societies in autocracies to emerge.
1.3. || STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST
There is a significant difference in the level of participatory governance between the MENA region and other regions in the world (Gelvin, 2012:4). This is due to the authoritarian type of government in the Arab region. An authoritarian system has a deeply centralised and concentrated power structure. Several features characterise autocratic regimes. Vestal (1999:17) distinguishes four characteristics of such a political system: control and support of the military force in order to provide security to the system and control the society; a dominant bureaucracy staffed by the regime; control of any form of civil opposition and resistance and creation of obedience through different strategies.
It is also build on a few principles: no rule of law, but rule of men; manipulated elections or no elections at all; political decisions are made by unelected officials; a bureaucracy operates highly independent of rules and informal and political power is not restrained by rules. The authoritarian regime has control over all facets of society. The regime controls among other things the mass media and the authoritarian rule is repressive to civil freedom and any form of opposition. This system of power, in which power is distributed under a small amount of people, has its effects on the society and the relation between them. As mentioned in the last section, the development of a strong civil society is difficult under the principles and rules of an authoritarian regime.
1.4. || THE POWER OF AUTHORITARIANISM
Regime stability used to be a common characteristic of the MENA region (Selvik & Stenslie, 2011:11; Gause III, 2011:82). In light of the current uprisings in the region, it seems not longer obvious that the relation between the (Iranian) state and its civil society is characterised by stability and peace. That makes it interesting and relevant to examine the strategies of the authoritarian regimes in order to keep control over its society. In other words,
how can regime stability under the authoritarian rule be explained? Important to mention is that this paragraph is limited to explaining top down strategies to maintain stability.
The characteristics of the authoritarian rule as examined in the last paragraph, all show the controlling and repressive attitude of the regime. Authoritarian regimes suppress and control society via a strong security apparatus and a bureaucracy staffed by the elite, which guarantees cohesion within the regime (Bellin, 2004:144-146; Amineh, 2010a). The stability of the autocratic regimes is according to most scholars created by the ‘military-security complex’ and control of the state over the economy (Gause III, 2011:83). The military security services are amalgamated with the regime and the control over the economy implies that, particular in ‘petrostates’, the state has the ability to oppress the civil society from above. “On one hand, the money that flows directly to the state gives the state the ability to buy off loyalty from society” (Logtenberg, 2014:7). This means the motivation to support political and economic development from below is obstructed. “On the other hand, the state is repressive and suppresses all forms of oppositional forces. So, even if there is bottom up motivation to support economic development, the state gives society no ability to develop from below” (Ibid:7). Al Rasheed (2011) highlights also the importance of sectarianism, in which the regime stimulates polarisation between religious groups to maintain stability: “At the political level, the rift means that Sunnis and Shia are unable to create joint platforms for political mobilisation” (Ibid:513). Repression of opposition and political participation and representation is a compulsive strategy to maintain power and stability.
Next to a repressive strategy, authoritarian regimes use mechanisms through which society has less desire to disrupt the balance between them and the state. Selvik and Stensli (2011:50-60) bring forward two mechanisms that authoritarian regimes use to sustain their stability by preventing opposition or civil activism. The first mechanism, which the ruling elite uses to prevent growth of a class-based opposition, is corporatism. Corporatism implies a system in which regime power and social organisations are integrated. This means that the regime is able to regulate the organizations from above. However, this relationship is not equal since “social actors are forced into a state-defined framework but are not themselves permitted to participate in political decision making” (Ibid:56). The second mechanism is clientalism, which can be explained as the exercise of power whereby persons in influential positions offer their services to less influential persons in exchange for political support. In this relationship the patron guarantees protection and serve as an intermediate between the client and the state.
The core of all strategies is that the regimes try to keep the civil society weak (Lust, 2011:427; Selvik & Stenslie, 2011:261). This implies that in most cases, opposition movements are not strong, unified and capable enough to put the regime down. It should be noted that there are more stability mechanisms and methods analysed in the literature – of which the main strategies are examined here -, but elaborating them all is beyond the scope of this thesis and goes beyond the central aim of this essay.
1.5. || FROM STABILITY TO FRAGILITY | THE ARAB UPRISINGS
As examined in the last paragraph an authoritarian regime is normatively characterised by sustainability and stability and keeps society under its control. Some scholars argue that, due to the repressive character, an authoritarian regime is together with a democratic regime -less prone for conflict (Hegre et. al, 2001:33 ; Fearon & Laitin, 2003:85). And even if other scholars did not support this argument, the ‘Arab Spring’ came as a surprise for everyone. The Arab uprisings showed that it seems that the idea of the link between stability and authoritarianism is not plausible anymore, since the relation between the state and society in many parts of the region has become conflictual and unstable.
However, the idea of a conflictual relation between the state and its civil society is not something new. In 1993 Norton (1993:205) already signalled that dissatisfaction from societies in the Middle East towards their regimes was increasing and that governments were under increasing pressure because they failed to meet the needs of their people. “In short, the region’s governments, especially the Arab ones, face a persistent crisis of legitimacy” (Ibid:205). However, he adds that it is naïve to expect civil society to bring down the state. He argues that the relation between state and society is cooperative rather than conflictual. The Arab uprisings showed that it is naïve to expect that civil society is not able to bring the autocratic regime done. The identity of the region turned from stable to fragile relations between the state and society.
The last paragraph examined the strategies authoritarian regimes use to keep its civil society weak in order to maintain a stable balance from above. In this section, I will examine how civil society emerged under the authoritarian regimes prior to the Arab Spring. This means that I will not elaborate the motivations for the civil society to stand up against the regime in this part, but the aim for this paragraph is to explain how the regime lost grip on its society.
Before the uprisings started in 2010, scholars argued that opposition groups in the Arab region were divided and weak (Lust, 2011:425). However, Daniel Brumberg (in Joffé, 2011:512) observed already in 2002 that the autocratic regimes in the Arab world tolerated some autonomous political and institutional space. Brumberg was not the only scholar who observed the upcoming civil society in that period. Also Kubba - senior director for Middle East and North Africa at the NED – noticed in 2000 that the ‘awakening of civil society’ in the Arab world has started and would be the decisive factor in challenging the authoritarian rule (Cavartorta, 2013:1).
However, this ‘tolerance’ showed the ways in which authoritarian regimes for a lack of alternative sources, through which total authoritarianism could be maintained. It was a mechanism for the regimes to manage legitimacy. Such regimes are defined as ‘liberalised autocracies’ (Brumberg in Joffe, 2011:512). In liberalised autocracies political parties are tolerated unless they challenge the regime. Some individual liberties are also allowed, but they remain highly restricted. One can thus argue that Arab governments used this phenomenon of political liberalisation as a strategy to avoid bottom up resistance.
Nevertheless, this partial political liberalism to create autonomous organizations created at the same time the possibility for civil society to start a social protest. “Nonetheless, these occupants, whether organisations or even individuals, effectively became the precursors of the kind of civil society that would normally mediate between the state and the private sphere within democratic polities and thus acquired the potential to transmute into social movements prepared to contest regime discourses, should pro-regime alliances ever falter” (Joffé, 2011:514). With social movements he means “collective challenges to authority, which embody common purposes”. It means that the authoritarian regimes in the Arab region lost their grip on society by tolerating some political liberties in order to maintain legitimacy (Khatib, 2013:19). Cavatorta (2013:10-11) adds that technological developments, particular in the virtual world, also had a positive effect on the health of the public sphere. It gave the civil society ‘virtual’ space to organise. In sum, a strategy of ‘liberalised authoritarianism together with a process of technological improvements, created the potential to become a strong civil society of which the regime lost its grip.
The ‘Arab uprisings’ have shown the start of a wave of civil activism, revolts and revolution in the Arab region. But how should this wave of civil conflict be approached? Democracy used to be the central element in the debate around the conflictual relationship between civil society and authoritarian regimes. This idea has emerged from the theoretical assumption that civic activism is inherently linked to the aim for democratisation and the empirical evidence that history has shown (Rau, 1991 & Putnam, 2000 in Cavatorta, 2013:1; Norton,1993:212). “The emergence of a civil society is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the development of democracy” (Norton, 1993:212).
It is undoubted that civil society has the aim to change the context that is shaped by the regime. However, the argument that the overall aim is per definition democracy has been contested since the mid-1990s. Jamal (2007 in Cavatorta, 2013:1) for example argued that civil society is not directly linked to democracy and can even undermine it. Moreover, also in most empirical cases, a successful transition of the system into a democracy has failed. “By far the majority of the third wave countries have not achieved a relatively well functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing in whatever democratic progress they have made” (Carothers, 2007:7 in Cavatorta, 2013:4).
The perception of scholars slowly changed when reality gave evidence for non- democratic process in many cases in the Arab region (Cavatorta, 2013:4). Particularly the start of the ‘Arab Spring’, on which this research is focused, can be designated as the end of the democratisation paradigm. The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia can be considered as the spark that fuelled the uprisings. The reason behind his suicide was not an aim for democracy, but rather the decline in food prices. “The wave of protests is not the result of two decades of neoliberal democracy or civil society promotion. Not a single dime of aid earmarked for democratisation has contributed to the flow of people pouring into Middle Eastern streets” (Challand, 2011:273-274).
The democratisation paradigm turned out to be a more a Western conception of civil society instead of the main objective for the civil societies in the MENA region. A new theoretical approach perceives civil society as a neutral variable, rather than democracy promoters (Cavatorta, 2013:5). The civil society in the MENA region has not per se the same role as Western civil societies. Therefore, this research will explain the complex relation between civil society and the regime in Iran outside the framework of democratisation. However, this does not imply that motivations or objectives of civil society that fit within the idea of democracy are falsified, but only that they will not be approached as part of a
2. || CONFLICTUAL STATE- SOCIETY RELATIONS IN
AUTHORITARIAN CONTEXTS
2.1. || THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL CONFLICT
The last paragraph showed that the idea of an inherent relationship between autocratic system and stability between the regime and its society is not plausible anymore. One can argue that the strategy of tolerance gave space for the development of social movements. However, social movements emerge out of certain common dissatisfactions against the regime. This brings us to the central point of this research: what are the main preconditions and motivations for civil society to start a civil conflict in light of the Arab uprisings. Therefore, the framework is built on grounded theories and empirical literature on the Arab uprisings. Rather than taking International Relations theories on interstate conflict, this research prioritises theories from conflict studies to approach the civil based ‘Arab uprisings’. Therefore the focus will be on theory from conflict studies on civil conflict, in order to get a better understanding of the Arab uprisings and current Iran.
Conflict is about incompatible goals between two of more parties (Azar, 1990). Many scholars, under who Collier & Hoeffler (2000:3), Gleditsch (2002:168) and Hironaka (2005), argue that civil conflict or civil war – which can occur as a result of civil conflict - is between organised groups of which the state is always one actor in the conflict. This is a useful approach, since the focus in this research is on conflicting state- civil society relations. There is not an unambiguous idea on the exact turning point from a civil conflict or revolts into a civil war. In this research, the motivations for civil conflict in Iran will be analysed, rather than the motivations for civil war, since civil conflict is arguably the first phase within the process of conflict.
There is no clear definition of civil conflict, but all conceptualisations include the idea of “a violent conflict within a country fought by organised groups that aim to take power or to achieve change […]” (Fearon, 2007:4) and takes place on an intra state level. Focusing on the ‘Arab uprisings’, as the series of cascading events that sweep through the Arab world, the definition of Fearon is appropriate. The ‘Arab uprisings’ were violent conflicts fought by organised groups that aim to take power or to change the system. Since this research on civil conflict will be done in the light of the Arab Spring, this definition will be used.
It has been intensively debated in both policy and scholarly literature that 20th century conflicts differ from the type of wars in the 21st century (Kaldor, 2013:1). From the mid 90’s the focus in the literature shifted to a new paradigm, which is explained as ‘internal conflict’, ‘new war’, ‘small war’ or ‘civil war’ (Ramsbotham, 2005:109). Patterns of conflict were changing the mainstream analysis of interstate war, which became less relevant after 1945. Mary Kaldor (2005) makes a distinction between ‘Old-’ and ‘New War’, in which civil conflict is defined as ‘New War’. Old war is fought between states and, at least in theory, restricted by certain rules that are codified in the Geneva and Hague Conventions to give them legitimacy. ‘New Wars’ consist of networks of state and non- state actors which are fighting without formalities and official rules. “They are wars where the distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, legitimate violence and criminality are all breaking down” (Kaldor, 2005:3).
The foundation of ‘New War’ is the reconstruction of political legitimacy, which is based on an international framework of law. Holsti admits the perception of a distinction between ‘Old-’ and ‘New Wars’. He argues that wars of the late 20th century “are not about
foreign policy, security honour or status; they are about statehood, governance and the role and status of nations and communities within states” (Holsti in Ramsbotham, 2005:109). Moreover, New wars are characteristic for authoritarian regimes that are weakening as a result of their globalisation process (Kaldor, 2013: 2).
Kaldor (2013:13) defines ‘New War’ as “an act of violence involving two or more organised groups framed in political terms”. This definition is quite similar to the adopted definition of civil conflict; a violent conflict within a country fought by organised groups that aim to take power or to change. She describes new wars in terms of “involvement of non- state actors, the role of identity politics, the blurring of the distinction between war (political violence) and crime (violence for private interests) as well as the fact that, in new wars, battles are rare and violence is mainly directed against civilians” (Kaldor, 2007).
Kaldor argues that ‘New Wars’ should be considered as a theory that demonstrates the logic and attempts a research strategy of contemporary war rather than an empirical category. I would argue that the Arab Spring provided empirical support for her theory. Taking the Arab uprisings as an example of uprisings and civil war in the Middle East, combined with what is currently seen in the region. The Arab Spring gives evidence for this statement, since the uprisings in among others Tunisia, Egypt an Syria were led by informal and horizontal organisations, groups and associations (Challand, 2011:271). This integrative framework of
approaching civil conflict will take a central position within the theoretical framework of this thesis.
2.2. || CONFLICT THEORY ABOUT MOTIVATIONS OF CONFLICT
2.2.1. || Motivations for civil conflict | Greed versus grievance
Many scholars have written about the underlying features or motivations of civil conflict and civil war. Two main analyses have been dominant in so-called civil war theory: greed- and grievance theory (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000:26). A conflict motivated by ‘greed’ means that a cost- benefit analysis, with a desire for better economic circumstances, is the consideration to start a civil conflict. ‘Grievance’ is the approach in which is argued that identity issues are the motivator for conflict (religion, class or ethnicity), rather than economics. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) developed the ‘CH model’, which gained much attention in the empirical study of civil conflict. The model is greed oriented and shows that civil conflict is motivated by economic circumstances. They argue that the aim for economic development and economic growth are the two main motivations for civil conflict. “The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance, but the silent force of greed” (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999:8 in Sørli et al., 2005:145).
Sørli et al. (2005: 152-156) (con)tested the C&H model on the Middle East to see if it is an exceptional region or if conflict in the region can be explained by general civil conflict theories. They found that the Middle East can to a large extend be explained by general conflict theories and is therefore not exceptional. However, some variables that are compatible with the grievance theory are also relevant in explaining civil conflict in the Middle East. In line with the C&H model they found that economic growth and economic development are two motivators for rebellion. It should be noted that a variety of conflict can be observed in the period of their research (between 1960 and 2003), but general patterns can be found. In many MENA countries, there is a lack of social and economic development in the foundation of the economy. However, next to the economic drivers, they also analysed that regime type and ethnic dominance are relevant variables for conflict. The other characteristic variables for the Middle East – oil dependency and religion (Islam) – were not significant in their research (Sørli et al, 2005:140,147).
Next to Sørli et al., there have been many scholars who analysed the motivators for civil conflict in the Middle East. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued for example that economic (growth and development) and political factors (weak government) did have an effect while ethnicity did not. “The conditions that favour insurgency - in particular, state weakness marked by poverty, a large population, and instability - are better predictors of which countries are at risk for civil war than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination against minority religions or languages” (Ibid:88). The debate between proponents of the greed- and proponents of the grievance can be further deepened, but the focus within the civil conflict theory is on the Arab uprisings, which will be extensively analysed. Therefore, the distinction between the two approaches will be taken as starting point of the theoretical framework rather than the main focus of the theoretical framework.
2.2.2. || Protracted Social Conflict
The greed and grievance theories were prominent in the debates on civil conflict, but do not include the whole debate. With a focus on the Arab Spring in this research, another approach on civil conflict might be interesting for this research.
Azar developed a type of conflict that does not fit in the classical classifications of conflict: protracted social conflict. Similar to Kaldor’s idea of ‘New War’ it implies conflicts, which are characterised by blurred lines between actors, have many different causal features and do not have a clear starting point. The point he tries to make is that we should approach social conflicts interdisciplinary (Ramsbothan, 2005:114). He developed a model, which distinguishes a set of conditions that transform a situation from non-conflictual to conflictual. In other words, Azar’s model explains what the underlying characteristics of conflict are. The main point in his theory on ‘protracted social conflict’ (PSC) is that it represents “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” (Azar, 1970 in Ramsbotham, 2005:113). His theory was based on communal identity.
Edward Azar appoints four preconditions for protracted social conflicts (Azar, 1970 in Ramsbotham, 2005:114-118). The first variable is ‘communal content’ by which he means that identity groups (racial, religious, ethnic and cultural) are the main unit of analysis within social conflicts. It measures the degree of heterogeneity. The state usually represents one
the level of ‘human needs’, which should be not be related with interests. Azar defines needs as ‘development’ and ‘political access’. These needs should be interpreted as the level of access for communal groups to the market and political institutions and the development of the economy instead of material needs. The third precondition for PSC is ‘governance and the state’s role’. Most PSC arise if governments are patriarchal, fragile and authoritarian, which is directly linked to failure of providing human needs. The power is mostly dominated by one identity group and resists participation of other identity groups and fails to ensure those other groups to meet their basic needs.
The last variable is ‘international linkages’ by which Azar means “political- economic relations of economic dependency within the international economic system, and the network of political-military linkages constituting regional and global patterns of clientage and cross-border interest” (Ibid:116). This means that economic dependency on the broader economic system declines the autonomy of the regime, which can worsen providing of human needs. Moreover, clientalism with other states can also weaken the state autonomy, since the clients can represent the needs of their own communal. The figure (1) below shows Azar his idea of ‘Protracted Social Conflict’, included the disciplines, which Azar deems relevant for research.
Figure 1: Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict (Ramsbotham, 2005:118)
Moreover, Azar distinguishes three process dynamics, which can explain when the four variables result into conflict: ‘communal actions and strategies’, ‘state actions and strategies’ and ‘built-in mechanisms of conflict’ (Ibid:116-117). With ‘communal actions and strategies’ Azar means potential sparks that encourage conflict. These sparks (individual victimisation) need to obtain collective recognition before it can turn into a civil conflict. After the process is encouraged, it has a spill over to other issue areas, such as poverty or political liberties. This process is mostly accompanied with repression. The second dynamic is also mostly
characterised by repression, rather than political compliance since economies and politics are weak and ‘the winner takes it all’ is the norm in conflicting situations. The strategy of a state dealing with communal differences is often focused on fragmentation of the opposition. ‘Build in mechanisms of conflict’ explain the spiral of escalation into conflict. It explains the effects of conflict on the long term. Since this research is focused on conditions and motives prior to civil conflict it will not be further elaborated.
I will approach the Arab uprisings as a protracted social conflict, because dynamics within the model Azar examined are highly compatible with the current conflict in the Arab region. First, the general idea of PSC is similar to the Arab Spring, since the Arab Spring is a “prolonged and violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” (Ibid:113). Second, the dynamics, which Azar examines, were also seen prior to the Arab Awakening. First, the Arab uprisings also started as a communal action. The spark was – literally and figuratively - ignited by the individual case of Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 18 2010 in Tunisia (Salih, 2011:184). Second, according to Azar, the strategy and actions of the state can be explained by repression. All Arab states, which were confronted with uprisings, used a highly repressive strategy towards their civil society. The last dynamic of built in mechanisms of conflict, which explain the spiral of escalation can also be observed during the ‘Arab Spring’. The Awakening is for this reason explained as a relentless wave of protests in the region. However, it should be noted that this dynamic would not be part of my theoretical framework as these are long- term dynamics while this research is about conditions and motives prior to conflict.
Focusing on what Azar calls the ‘preconditions’ in the process PSC emerging should be revised into a clear distinction between preconditions and motivations, since I argue that the factors he mentions are not all preconditions but also motivations. First, failure of the regime to provide human needs is the main motivation within the model, since that is about the needs of society that are not fulfilled by the regime. Communal content includes both a motivation and an essential precondition. The presence of different communal groups (a heterogeneous community) is an essential precondition, since the mistreatment of communal groups (minorities) but the unequal treatment and unresponsiveness of the regime towards those different communal groups is a motivation.
Also the state’s role and governance includes an essential precondition and motivation. The repressive role of the authoritarian governments is can be considered as the determining
within an autocratic system the state determines all facets in society, the state’s role can be perceived as an overarching motivation, who determines how to deal with communal content and to what extend communal groups have access to human needs. First, an autocratic regime is usually only responsive to one (its own) communal group and unresponsive to the needs of other groups. Second, bad governance results in communal groups being unable to access basic human needs, such as political- and market access, and economic development.
However, as discussed earlier, a strategy of total repression would provide no space for civil society to develop. This implies that ‘liberal authoritarianism’ is an essential precondition within the role of the regime, since it gives the civil society the ability to organise and stand up against the regime and the unpropitious economic and political circumstances constituted motivations to start a conflict against the regime. Finally, international linkages are not a direct motivator for protracted social conflict, but an indirect factor. The intensity of international linkages affects the state’s role and governance, which can on its turn influence human needs and communal content. However, since the focus of this research is on preconditions and direct motivations for civil society to start a civil conflict, international linkages will not be part of my analysis.
Analysing different theories on civil conflict, the theory of PSC seems to provide a good framework to approach Iran its vulnerability for civil conflict in light of the Arab uprisings. The dynamics of PSC are also found in the process prior and during the ‘Awakening’ and the features of PSC can be explained as main preconditions and motivations for civil conflict. In the next section, the ‘revised’ model of PSC will be extended with empirical literature on the motivations of the ‘Arab Spring’.
3. || PRECONDITIONS & MOTIVATIONS FOR CIVIL
CONFLICT
“Stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty” (Hamid, 2011:23)
3.1. || THE DRIVERS BEHIND THE ARAB UPRISINGS
After more than three years of conflict, many scholars have tried to understand the conflicts in the Arab region. This resulted in reviews and contributions of existing theories on internal and
regional conflict. The aim of this research is to get a better understanding of the clashing state- society relations in Iran by analysing this in the light of the current conflicts in the Arab region. Therefore, this chapter will explore literature on the main motivations underlying the uprisings as a whole, and to what extent this is compatible with the ‘preconditions’ of PSC. Perceiving the drivers behind the ‘Arab Spring’ as a whole does not mean that the internal differences are denied, but those are not of main relevance and beyond the scope of this research. In other words, I do agree with the argument that there is not a unified idea among the Arab people about what has happened (Lynch, 2011; Jones, 2013:76), but it should at the same time not be denied that some general drivers behind the uprisings in the Arab region can be distinguished.
Reviewing the literature on the drivers1 behind the uprisings shows that there are more than one perception on what fuelled the revolts and revolutions. To start by giving a sort of an overview of possible motivations within the literature, Ogbonnaya (2013:6) gives a comparative analysis on the key factors and variables that caused the Arab uprisings and distinguishes ten different causes: “inflation and shortages, unemployment/ underdevelopment, political/ religious oppression, absence of political dissent/ lack of political participation, foreign interference, kleptocracy, police and state brutality, autocracy, social imbalance and restrictions on communications and censorship”. He concludes that the main motivation for civil society is that the government failed to create political inclusion, good governance, jobs and policies of inclusive growth (Ogbonnaya, 2013:5). This argument that economic and political failure were can be designated as main causes is supported by the African Development Bank, who argued that the development of plural and open political systems failed and the regimes were unable or unwilling to create jobs and economic growth policies.
A side note on religion should be made. Since the start of the Arab uprisings, the political Islamist movements distributed and strengthened their power within society (Jones, 2013:76; Gelvin, 2011:28). The emergence of these Islamic movements as a major force can be a relevant element for the analysis. If these forces are founded on religious conviction is debatable and not relevant for this research, but the question if the Islam is one of the main motives that fuelled the uprisings is important. It may be plausible to argue that religious considerations may have been the motive for the civil society to stand up. However, in the
1 In order to elaborate the main preconditions and motivations underlying the Arab uprisings, the
