Cold War Blinders
How the CIA’s ‘Cold War Tunnel Vision’ clouded American
Judgment on Guatemala in 1954
Sjoerd de Vries Lentsch
History Master Thesis - American Studies Supervisor: prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens Second reader: dr. H.B. Beukenhorst Final version: October 2014
Table of contents
Introduction 5
Chapter 1: The Case of Guatemala 16
Chapter 2: The Actors: The United States of America 27
Chapter 3: The Central Intelligence Agency’s ‘Modus Operandi’ and
Operation PBSUCCESS 40
Conclusion 56
Introduction
Operation PBSUCCESS. The name demonstrates the great confidence and even arrogance the Central Intelligence Agency displayed in the planning and execution of its 1954 covert
operation to overthrow the government of Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. The operation was considered a resounding success, as a troublesome president suspected of communism (and therefore seen as inherently under the control of the Soviet Union) was removed from power and a cooperative dictator replaced him. All this was achieved without any direct evidence that the CIA or the United States were involved, though American involvement was widely suspected. Despite this suspicion, the agency was so pleased with operation PBSUCCESS that it would be used as a blueprint for future operations, the most notorious one being the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba which ended in a complete failure for the United States, both militarily and politically.
As successful as operation PBSUCCESS was considered from an operational point of view, it would become one of the most controversial CIA operations to date and did
considerable damage to the reputation of the CIA and the United States, in particular in Latin America.1 Operation PBSUCCESS, or at least the situation it created, is also seen as one of the main causes of the Guatemalan civil war (that lasted 36 years and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Guatemalans). The controversy surrounding this operation does not only derive from the CIA’s ousting of a democratically elected president because the United States, the ‘protector of Democracy,’ disagreed with this president’s policies. One of the main points of criticism is that Jacobo Árbenz did not intend, as the United States believed, to turn
Guatemala into a communist state. Also, historians question the American conviction that Árbenz (and his policies and reforms) were communist to begin with, and if he should have been considered a ‘communist’ in the Eastern European/Soviet tradition. Moreover, as the CIA archives were gradually declassified it turned out that the American claim that Árbenz was controlled and financed by Moscow was not based on any hard evidence. This claim had already met with skepticism in the international community in the years leading up to and following the coup, despite vigorous American efforts to convince the world otherwise.2
In the existing literature on operation PBSUCCESS the role the CIA has played in the operation is predominantly described as merely an executive one: The United States
1 Max Holland, ‘Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of SUCCESS’, International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence 17 (2004) 300-332, 323.
government came to the decision that an intervention was necessary and the CIA was the instrument used to make this happen. This is however a gross undervaluation of the role the Agency played. The CIA operated as an independent body with its own worldview, analytical tradition and with its own set of goals, and its analysis of the situation in Guatemala was wrong precisely because of this. This view of the CIA and its role is something that has only gradually become apparent due to the declassification of CIA archives, and is beginning to be recognized in more recent studies on the subject. The independent role the CIA played will be the focal point of this thesis.
The intervention
What eventually drove the United States to feel compelled to intervene in Guatemala was a revolutionary land reform program that was planned and enacted by Árbenz. This land reform was the culmination of a radical transformation Guatemala was going through that had started in 1944 with a revolution. In the early 1940s, 2% of all landowners owned 72% of all
Guatemalan land. The American United Fruit Company was by far the most powerful economic player in the country; it was the largest landowner in Guatemala and owned the railroads (through its subsidiary the International Railways of Central America), the country’s power supply, and the only major harbor.3 In 1944, the rising tensions after decades of
dictatorial rule, combined with economic hardship and calls for democratization, culminated in a revolution led by university teachers. The main inspiration for these teachers was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous 1941 State of the Union address, or his ‘Four Freedoms speech,’ in which he stated four fundamental freedoms people everywhere should enjoy. This revolution forced dictator Jorge Ubico to step down, and in the following year democratic elections were held for the first time in Guatemalan history.
The goals of the revolution were not only aimed at the deposing of a dictator followed by the democratization of Guatemala, but also at reforming the social structures, which was widely considered (even by American economists) to be impossible without rigorous agrarian and economic reform, as land and social status were intimately entwined. It was self-evident that any attempt at large-scale land reform would be met with fierce resistance from the ruling classes and foreign companies with large interests in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company in particular.45 These land reforms were advocated and enacted by Jacobo Árbenz, elected in
3 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit. The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1982) 38, 65-67.
1951 and would eventually lead American president Eisenhower to intervene and approve the planning and execution of operation PBSUCCESS. (The decision to intervene in Guatemala was essentially already made during the presidency of Harry S. Truman, who approved a similar operation prior to PBSUCCESS, named PBFORTUNE. This operation was cancelled however, as it was compromised at an early stage.6) The suspected communist nature of the Árbenz government (and the – according to the United States – therefore inherent ties to Moscow) and the danger the land reforms posed to American economic interests in Guatemala are considered to have led to this controversial decision. The United States government was determined to prevent the creation of a ‘communist beachhead’ in its own backyard.
Many books and articles have been written on the 1954 coup, and a few studies are considered to be ‘standard works’ on the subject. Among these standard works are Bitter
Fruit by Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, The CIA in Guatemala by Richard
Immerman, Shattered Hope by Piero Gleijeses, and Secret History by Nicholas Cullather. In these works the main interpretations of the coup are represented. An important note on Secret
History by Nicholas Cullather is that it has been written in 1993 as part of an internal CIA
project after a series of declassification of CIA archives concerning the coup, and was initially not intended for publication. In all the aforementioned works the coup itself is essentially considered to have been a mistake caused by gross misinterpretation of the situation in Guatemala by the United States government and the CIA. However, the views differ on how the American government came to the decision to intervene and which players or ‘factions’ influenced the decision and to what extent this influence was decisive or superfluous. Only Cullather acknowledges the aforementioned undervaluation of the role the CIA played, but he does not expand on this as his work had a different focal point.
Bitter Fruit
In the 1982 book Bitter Fruit. The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala journalists Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer argue that the most important factor in the decision to intervene was the threat president Arbenz and his communist policies posed to American economic interest in Guatemala. The ‘containment of Communism’ played an important role in the validation of the coup as well, but it was only the result of the economic
5 Nick Cullather, Secret History. The CIA’s classified account of its operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 25-26.
angle; without a threat to the economic interests Communism would not have been detected. The United Fruit Company was one of the first (and largest) landowners and employers in Guatemala to be affected by the reforms. The company already had many conflicts with the Guatemalan government caused by the modest reforms of Juan José Arévalo (the first
Guatemalan president after the 1944 Revolution). These conflicts would later escalate during the extensive land reforms of the Árbenz administration.7 From early on United Fruit would start lobbying against the Guatemalan government. This lobbying (by influential and
respected figures) was not only aimed at the United States government, but also at the American public. The United Fruit Company proved to be very successful at convincing the American public and government that Guatemala posed a communist threat.8 According to Schlesinger and Kinzer this is essentially where ‘the road to intervention’ originates. The relationship between the American and Guatemalan governments escalated, as the economic dispute between United Fruit and Guatemala intensified. By the time relations were at a low, the idea of a communist state so close to the United States was simply unacceptable for the American government during the Cold War, especially during the early 1950s. This scenario would eventually and inevitably lead to a United States sponsored coup (or ‘regime change’).
Schlesinger and Kinzer state that without the lobbying by the United Fruit Company (or without United Fruit in general), there would have been no serious conflict between the United States and Guatemalan governments, let alone a CIA sponsored coup. Therefore Schlesinger and Kinzer state that the protection of economic interests stood at the basis of the coup, as without any economic interests – or essentially the United Fruit Company to protect – the United States government would have had little interest in the political developments in Guatemala.9
The CIA in Guatemala
In The CIA in Guatemala. The Foreign Policy of Intervention, also from 1982, historian Richard Immerman has a similar view concerning the United States economic interests, but attributes more importance to the American goal of ‘containment of Communism.’
Immerman identifies virtually the same development as Schlesinger and Kinzer, but comes to a different conclusion concerning the decisive element in regard to the motivation and
validation of the coup. He acknowledges that the United Fruit Company and its subsidiaries
7 Schlesinger and Kinzer, 70-77. 8 Ibid, 94-97.
had influence on the United States government’s perception of the Árbenz administration through lobbyists, among who were several key figures in the CIA and American
government. However, he states that the American fear of Communism (nonetheless influenced by the United Fruit Company) was the main driving force behind the coup, not American economic interests.10 Immerman places the coup in a Cold War context. He considers the economic factor to be of minimal importance as a decisive element in the motivation of the United States government. He does however recognize that the hostile attitude of the American government was developing parallel to the labor disputes between the Guatemalan government and the United Fruit Company, and that this attitude got progressively worse as the disputes became more intense. Immerman sees the political and economic position of the United States in Guatemala (and in fact the whole region) as inseparable. This is in part demonstrated by the obvious connection between government officials and the United Fruit Company and its subsidiaries. These connections were however not only of an economic nature according to Immerman, but should be seen in the ideological context of the Cold War.11 The United States government interpreted the increasingly radical
reforms of the Árbenz regime as clear signs of Communism in Guatemala and therefore as a threat and challenge to American power, both political and economic, in the region.
Immerman, like Schlesinger and Kinzer, sees the American interpretation of the Guatemalan situation as a gross misperception.
Shattered Hope
Historian Piero Gleijeses wrote his book Shattered Hope. The Guatemalan Revolution and the
United States, 1944-1954 in 1991, nine years after both Schlesinger’s and Immerman’s books,
and he starts out with identifying the existing different views on the motives for the 1954 coup d’état – protecting economic interests versus fighting communism. Gleijeses further indicates that he intends to incorporate the Guatemalan side of the story (by interviewing many key figures from both Guatemala and the United States), as this side has been neglected in studies on the subject. He states that when looking at the archives (those available in 1991, before the period of extensive declassification mentioned earlier), the United Fruit Company had an enormous influence on, or even shaped, the American perception of the Arévalo administration. However, when Árbenz is elected president, Gleijeses notes that United Fruit
10 Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala. The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) 73, 88.
quickly becomes a less important influence on the American government as they are by then already convinced Árbenz is too great a threat to stability in the region; in the assessment of Arbenz the United Fruit Company has clearly moved to the background, as United Fruit’s interests were only a secondary concern to the American government.12 Gleijeses argues that this concern should be seen within the United States government’s views on Central America being part of its sphere of influence. The plight of the United Fruit Company did however serve as evidence to the American government that Communism was taking hold in
Guatemala, as they viewed the reforms Árbenz was enacting as unmistakably communist and profoundly shocked United States officials.13 Gleijeses further argues that Árbenz was in fact a communist, or at least something very similar to a communist, and above all an idealist. Gleijeses interviewed many people connected to the coup, most notably Árbenz’s (by then ex-) wife and one of his closest friends of the period, communist leader Manuel Fortuny. In these interviews, Árbenz’s political conviction is depicted as moving closer and closer to Communism, especially during the months leading up to the coup.14
In the late forties and early fifties it did not take much for the United States to perceive a man like Árbenz as a communist, especially when, according to Gleijeses, he actually was one or at least something very close to it. He was also openly working very closely with known communists. The spirit of McCarthyism was widespread throughout American society, the Korean War had just ended and China was suddenly (at least in the eyes of the United States and the CIA) ‘lost’ to Communism. Gleijeses argues that the United Fruit Company was absolutely not necessary to point out (suspected) communist influence in Guatemala.15 In conclusion, Gleijeses states that Árbenz was an idealistic nationalist, a communist (or at least very sympathetic to Communism), and naïve in his assessment of American determination and willingness to intervene. In turn, the United States government misinterpreted the intentions of the Árbenz administration because of their initial ignorance on the Guatemalan situation. The way in which the United States typically approached governments in Central America is described by Gleijeses as an attitude of ‘imperial hubris’, which also added to the strenuous relationship between the successive American and
Guatemalan governments.16
12 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope. The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 361-363.
13 Ibid, 364-366. 14 Ibid, 141-148. 15 Ibid, 362. 16 Ibid, 361-363.
Secret History
Historian Nick Cullather’s book Secret History. The CIA’s classified account of its operations
in Guatemala, 1952-1954, especially the second edition from 2006, is perhaps the most
interesting study on the subject to date. His book was written as an internal study for the CIA itself during a period of more openness followed by the fall of the Soviet Union. Cullather explains this sudden openness by saying: “As the new Russian government was opening all the archives, the CIA could not stay behind.”17 Cullather and several other historians were hired by the CIA in order to write internal histories (i.e., meant for internal use only) of major Agency operations, as this sort of internal histories and evaluations did not exist. Cullather would write about operation PBSUCCESS. Cullather describes the goal of his work as follows:
The book’s core audience would be CIA officers and trainees who would want to know how an operation worked from start to finish: How the agency assessed a threat and devised a plan to combat it, what kind of government and society it aimed to create, how the operation played out, and how (or whether) the outcome was measured against the original plans and goals.18
After the initial initiative for openness began to lose momentum, Cullather quit his position with the CIA after completing his study on PBSUCCESS in 1993. Eventually his book was published in 1999 after a new popular call for more openness on past CIA operations. The second edition (printed in 2006) includes more files from a new volume of the FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) series, including newly declassified materials that were still classified at the time of the initial public publication of Cullather’s book. With access to all of these (declassified) documents, Cullather was able to paint a far more detailed picture of the coup d’état, as these documents show the inner workings of the United States government and the CIA. From these files the actual view of the CIA itself on the Guatemalan situation can be distilled.19
Cullather identifies the CIA as an independent body among all the parties involved, rather than an instrument used to execute United States policy without forming an
independent opinion on Guatemalan affairs, as the other authors seem to do. He illustrates this by stating that the CIA “often had little understanding of or interest in the motives of those in
17 Cullather, xi-xii. 18 Ibid, xv. 19 Ibid, 7-8.
the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the White House who made the final decision.”20 Cullather states that the Agency operated solely based on its own ‘Cold War motivated worldview,’ rather than looking at the situation in Guatemala, the region and its history. By completely neglecting the uniqueness of the Guatemalan situation in the 1940s and early 1950s, and failing to view the progress and outcome of operation PBSUCCESS as a unique and individual event, the CIA not only misinterpreted the Guatemalan government and its intentions, but also wrongfully considered the operation to be the perfect blueprint for ‘regime change’ in the future.21 Essentially Cullather’s book is an analysis of a controversial CIA operation, written as a warning against misinterpreting similar events and with it a critique on the Agency’s method of interpreting world events (all intended for internal use by the CIA).
What’s interesting when looking at all these works on operation PBSUCCESS, is that all the authors seem to downplay or ignore the role the CIA played as an independent body, as Cullather points out in ‘Secret History.’ They all pay a lot of attention to the role the CIA played in the coup itself and in the necessary technical and logistical matters, but they always consider the Agency as primarily an instrument and executor of government policy and
decisions, rather than an organization with an agenda of its own and considerable influence on the government perception, and showing great initiative on its own accord. The United Fruit Company appears to have been given too much credit in shaping the evolution of the
American-Guatemalan relationship in the years leading up to the coup. Cullather is the only one who points out this ‘shortcoming’ of earlier works, but he does not really make an in depth analysis of the CIA and its traditions and motives that have been of great importance to the Agency’s view on Central America. Instead, he focuses more on operation PBSUCCESS itself and the operational details, as this was the intention of his study.
In this thesis I intend to focus on the independent role of the CIA Nick Cullather has identified in his book ‘Secret History.’ As Cullather concluded, the CIA failed to see the events in Guatemala in the appropriate context; rather than looking at Guatemala from a Central American context the CIA did not differentiate between Communism (suspected or real) in Latin America, Eastern Europe or Asia and placed it in a Cold War context. Because of this the CIA did not pay sufficient attention to the ‘situation on the ground’ in its analysis of the Guatemalan situation. I will look at the events in Guatemala using the models that are identified and used in Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis by political scientists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. In Essence of Decision, Allison and Zelikow
20 Ibid, 8. 21 Ibid, 109-110.
describe three models that can be used to look at a (historical) event. They start with stating that generally speaking the questions that are asked when looking at a historical event are essentially ‘what happened and why did it happen’ questions. Allison and Zelikow state that three conceptual models can be used when looking at an (historical) event. “Most analysts explain (and predict) behavior of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, here entitled Rational Actor Model (RAM or Model I).”22 In short, using this model means that the decisions of a government are seen as “the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments… Theorists of international relations focus on problems between nations in accounting for the choices of unitary rational actors. Strategic analysts concentrate on the logic of action without reference to any particular actor.”23 So Model I is fairly straightforward, as the main question that is asked in this model is the ‘why question.’ Why did – using the events in Guatemala as an example – the American government decide an intervention was necessary in Guatemala? Why did Árbenz enact such drastic reforms defying the United Fruit Company and with it American economic interests? The researcher “focuses attention on certain concepts: goals and objectives of the nation or government.”24
Allison and Zelikow point out that while this model answers relevant questions, its scope is limited. They argue that this model needs to be supplemented in order to paint a more complete picture of the events. One of the other two models they introduce is the so-called Organizational Behavior Model (or Model II). “According to this Organizational Behavior Model, what Model I analysts characterize as ‘acts’ and ‘choices’ are thought of instead as outputs of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior.”25 “The analyst invokes certain patterns of inference: if organizations produced an output of a certain kind at a certain time that behavior resulted from existing organizational structures,
procedures, and repertoires.”26 In other words, the focus in Model II lies with the different (governmental) organizations that are active and in which context, and from what beliefs, convictions, procedures etc. these organizations act. In the case of Guatemala it is the CIA that is neglected as an independent organization with its own procedures and worldview, as Cullather has pointed out.
The third model Allison and Zelikow identify is the ‘Governmental Politics Model’ (or Model III). “According to this model, events in foreign affairs are characterized neither as
22 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Longman, 1999 2nd edition) 4.
23 Ibid. 24 Ibid, 4-5. 25 Ibid, 5. 26 Ibid, 6.
unitary choice nor as organizational outputs. Rather, what happens is understood as a resultant of bargaining games among players in the national government.”27 So in the case of
Guatemala, the focus would be the ‘intra-governmental’ bargaining in the United States government, mainly between the American president, the State Department and the CIA.
In this thesis I intend to demonstrate that the CIA’s ‘Cold War inspired worldview’ and its Cold War ethos dominated the agency’s assessment of the situation in Guatemala to such an extent that there was only one outcome possible: a coup d’état. The CIA had put on a set of ‘Cold War blinders’ that limited the agency’s view throughout the entire Cold War. This concept of ‘Cold War blinders’ should be seen in conjunction with the concept of ‘groupthink,’ described by psychologist Irving L. Janis. In his book Groupthink, Janis
describes the effects the composition of groups have on their decision making process. When, as is the case with the CIA, the group in which decisions are being made consists of a small amount of likeminded people, it is likely that this ‘cohesiveness’ of the group will have a strong limiting influence on the outcome of the decisions. Jarvis calls this phenomenon ‘groupthink,’ which he describes by analyzing United States foreign policy. He states that groupthink leads to “overestimations of the group” (its power and morality), “closed-mindedness” and “pressures toward uniformity.”28 These principles of groupthink would be
of an even greater influence on the CIA, due to its closed nature and strong ‘esprit de corps.’ In order to demonstrate the existence of these ‘Cold War blinders,’ the abovementioned Model II (or the Organizational Behavior Model) will be the main model implemented when looking at the role the CIA played as an individual player within the American organizations and government agencies that played a role in the Guatemalan coup d’état. Model III (or the Governmental Politics Model) will automatically be used when the CIA’s influence on and interaction with the State Department and the American president and the ‘bargaining’ between these government bodies are studied, but the main focus will be on the CIA’s independent internal workings.
In order to prove the abovementioned thesis, I will first analyze the events in Guatemala leading up to the intervention in 1954. After this I will identify the different American and Guatemalan actors that were active and played important roles in the coup d’état. With these three chapters the Guatemalan coup d’état will be contextualized and illustrated, for which the abovementioned studies on the 1954 Guatemalan coup will be used.
27 Ibid.
28 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink. Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Second Edition (Boston: Wadsworth, 1982) 2-3, 175-175.
In the final chapter the focus will shift to the inner workings of the CIA itself and how the agency responded to the events in Guatemala. The position the CIA was in at the time, the Agency’s worldview, the prevailing ‘Cold War discourse’ and the ‘corporate culture’ within the Agency will be analyzed, as well as its relationship with the State Department, the United States president and other actors like the United Fruit Company. From this analysis it will become clear that the CIA’s ‘Cold War worldview’ created a tunnel vision that essentially pre-determined the outcome of their assessment of the situation in Guatemala. In this final chapter Model III will be used as well as Model II in order to demonstrate the interaction between the different governmental organizations. The primary sources used for this will be the declassified CIA archives29 and the previously mentioned FRUS series, both the original series as well as the additional Guatemalan series that were released after declassification and National Security Council reports.
29 All references to declassified CIA documents in footnotes will refer to the title of the document and a page number. The CIA website offers a database that is difficult to navigate to say the least. In the bibliography section all titles are listed chronologically and with direct links to the PDF files. All references made to page numbers are the page numbers of the PDF files themselves, not of the CIA documents, due to the fact that in some documents page numbering is inconsistent.
Chapter 1 – The case of Guatemala
In this first chapter I will take a look at the situation in Guatemala leading up to the 1944 Revolution, the (political) changes that resulted from it and the way the United Fruit Company and the United States Government responded to this new political situation.
Guatemala in the first half of the 20th century: Banana Republic
Guatemala in the 19th and early 20th century was a quintessential banana republic: the
country’s economy was based on the export of just two products, bananas and coffee, and was in the hands of foreign companies and a small local elite. A dictator friendly to these
companies and the local elite ruled the country. The Guatemalan economy was therefore best described as semi-feudal. The social-political system was also aimed at providing both the local elite and the foreign companies with cheap labor and low taxes. This was combined with structurally granting extremely favorable conditions on land acquisitions, especially by the country’s last two dictators before World War II. This system provided the small Guatemalan elite and especially the foreign companies with a monopoly at an incredibly low cost. The largest company – which had by far the most land, workers and investments in Guatemala – was the Boston based United Fruit Company. United Fruit was the largest landowner and employer of Guatemala and had many interests and investments throughout Central America. It played a major role in the region’s economy and politics, as the company was not known to shy away from interfering in the affairs of Central American governments in order to advance or protect its interests. Because of this vast (economic) empire it was called ‘el pulpo,’ or ‘the octopus,’ throughout Latin America, as it had its ‘tentacles’ in many Latin American
countries.30
Guatemalan society in the 19th and early 20th century was essentially made up of two groups. The vast majority consisted of the descendants of the Mayans (or ‘Indians’31 as they were called), who – like their ancestors before them – had virtually no rights. The elite of Guatemala was very small, consisting of the descendants of the Spanish colonizers (and by the 20th century also Americans and their descendants). The term used to indicate these
‘European’ Guatemalans was ‘Ladino.’ At the start of World War II the elite still consisted of mainly foreign-born landowners and social mobility was virtually non-existent. However, the
30 Immerman, 20-22, 27-29.
31 In this thesis the Guatemalan descendants of the Mayans will be referred to as ‘native Guatemalans’ rather than ‘Indians.’
first half of the 20th century saw the ‘birth’ of a middle class. The rise of this ‘new’ social group also began to influence Guatemalan politics. By the 1940s, this new middle class constituted only about 30% of the total population (the native Guatemalan population being estimated around 70%, with the elite estimated at only 1% or 2%).32
Economic hardship and social unrest: the 1944 Revolution
As mentioned earlier, Guatemalan society, politics and economy were all closely connected to each other. The economy was by far the most important factor or pillar, as the political and social structures were built around the economy and were designed to maintain the ‘system’ and is therefore to be considered the crux of any attempt at reform. One of the most important aspects, if not the most important, of the Guatemalan economy of the early 20th century that caused this semi-feudal system was the enormous disparity in landownership. The largest percentage of the land was incorporated into large plots, called ‘latifundios’ (small plots were called ‘minifundios’). These latifundios were for the most part owned by foreign companies. The disparity is best demonstrated in numbers given by Richard Immerman:
Prior to Árbenz’s land reform in 1952, only 2,2 percent of Guatemala’s
population held over 70 percent of the land, and less than one-sixth of 1 percent held almost 14 percent. Twenty-two percent of the population, most of whom were Ladinos, owned another 20 percent of the land, leaving less than 10 percent for the remaining population. About 90 percent of this remainder was Maya.33 In short, of all the arable land in Guatemala the vast majority of it was organized in ‘latifundios’, which included the best locations in both accessibility and fertility. Among these large landowners the Guatemalan elite was represented, but the largest operator by far was the United Fruit Company, that held around 550,000 acres of land.34 United Fruit did not only own land in Guatemala; the American company also controlled the country’s
infrastructure. The railroads, Guatemala’s only major port Puerto Barrios, the electrical and phone companies were all owned by the United Fruit Company itself or by a subsidiary. This meant that United Fruit effectively controlled Guatemala’s economy. This foreign control meant that all the profits that were made naturally flowed out of Guatemala to the United States, as the Guatemalan landowners also tended to invest their profits in America or Europe.
32 Ibid, 25-31. 33 Ibid, 28.
The focus on only two products that were destined for the export market (coffee and bananas, coffee being the most important one for Guatemala itself as it was in the hands of Guatemalan nationals and not foreign companies) made the Guatemalan economy incredibly vulnerable, as it was completely dependent on the international price of coffee and bananas. During the economic crisis of the 1930s the Guatemalan economy was among the hardest hit in the whole of Latin America. The coffee market again came under intense pressure as World War II broke out, effectively closing the European market. The United States remained as the only large market for coffee and “could not absorb the entire surplus, since the other Latin
American coffee-producing nations, experiencing the same difficulty, also turned to the United States.”35 Guatemala was consistently, as Immerman puts it, “on the brink of total collapse”36 since the Crash of 1929.37 This lengthy and continuous economic hardship would be an important factor in the 1944 Revolution.
The economic hardship of the 1930s and 1940s combined with the political changes that came with the Second World War created pressure on the privileged position of the foreign companies and the Guatemalan elite. The growing and upcoming Guatemalan middle class began to stir and demanded change, which came with the 1944 Revolution that
overthrew dictator Jorge Ubico. The revolutionary period in Guatemala that followed was aimed at nothing less than radically reforming the political, social and economic ‘structures’ of the country.
The revolutionary movement
The 1944 Revolution was marked by a unified resistance to the 13-year rule of general Jorge Ubico. The term ‘unified’ must be placed in its proper context though, as it is to be considered unified in Guatemalan society of the period. The fact that the growing Guatemalan middle class rose up as a virtually unified movement was a novelty in itself. Even more remarkable was that not only the non-elite Guatemalans voiced their discontent. The elite, or at least a considerable part of it, eventually also turned its back on Ubico, the man they had put into office themselves in 1931. The main absentees in the ‘revolutionary movement’ were the native Guatemalans, making up the vast majority of the countries’ population. This group did not participate in the demonstrations started by Guatemala’s middle class, although the
35 Immerman, 31. 36 Ibid, 32. 37 Ibid, 30-31.
demands made by the demonstrators were – be it indirectly – also on their behalf.38 However, the fact that representatives of all the politically influential groups started to resist Ubico’s rule was what put a pressure on the dictator that had never before been this strong.
Consequently, Ubico caved in remarkably quickly and stepped down after only a few weeks of protests.
The Second World War did not only bring economic hardship to Guatemala. It also brought international ideals on basic human rights and freedoms. The main inspiration for the 1944 Revolution is believed to have been the famous ‘Four Freedoms Speech’ by president Roosevelt – his 1941 State of the Union speech – in which he spoke of four basic human rights or freedoms. Roosevelt advocated that everywhere in the world people were entitled to freedom of speech, freedom of worship (or religion), freedom from want and freedom from fear.39 Roosevelt enjoyed enormous popularity in Guatemala in the 1940s and his speeches on human rights and his labor reforms – such as the New Deal and the Wagner Act – awakened the Guatemalan middle class politically. Also the signing of the ‘Atlantic Charter’ (drafted by Roosevelt and Churchill) by all Allies in early 1942, where the principles of the ‘Four
Freedoms’ speech were made into the official Allied goals of the war, inspired the Guatemalan middle class. 40
The presidency of Juan Jose Arévalo
An important aspect of the revolutionary movement is that it was initially without any central leadership. The 1944 Revolution is considered to be a true spontaneous popular uprising. There were no real ideological origin or motives, nor was there an organized movement that led the protests. The Guatemalan teachers are generally considered to have been the driving force of the revolution and it would be a teacher, Juan Jose Arévalo, who would be elected president in the first truly free and democratic elections ever to have taken place in
Guatemala.41 Arévalo presented himself as a liberal and a socialist, although he did not adhere to any ‘radical ideology’ and was anti-communist: “Communism is contrary to human nature, for it is contrary to the psychology of man… Here we see the superiority of the doctrine of democracy, which does not seek to destroy anything that man has accomplished.”42 His political ideas and beliefs are usually referred to as ‘Spiritual Socialism’ and were strongly
38 Immerman, 38.
39 Schlesinger and Kinzer, 26. 40 Ibid, 22-23.
41 Gleijeses, 30-36.
identified with the policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, most notably Roosevelt’s New Deal and Four Freedoms speech. As Arévalo himself put it: “he taught us that there is no need to cancel the concept of freedom in the democratic system in order to breathe into it a socialist spirit.”43
The reforms enacted by the Arévalo administration were aimed at changing the appalling labor conditions in Guatemala. Arévalo would use laws and acts of his political ‘idol’ Franklin D. Roosevelt as an example. The Social Security Law – approved by the Guatemalan Congress in 1946 – was based on Roosevelt’s New Deal and was designed to revolutionize the relationship between Guatemala’s workers, employers and government. Its main goal, like the New Deal, was to realize better conditions and security for the Guatemalan workers.44 In the wake of the Social Security Law came the Labor Code, approved in 1947. The Labor Code was inspired by another American reform, namely the Wagner Act, also enacted by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Labor Code was the next step in revolutionizing the Guatemalan worker-employer relationship. One of the most important effects of the Code was that the formation of unions would be allowed and that the Guatemalan government would no longer automatically support the employers in labor disputes, as it has done until then.45
The reforms of Arévalo caused a serious conflict with the United Fruit Company and eventually also the United States State Department. United Fruit claimed and successfully convinced the State Department that the reforms were aimed especially against the American company and were therefore racist.46 A salient detail concerning the State Department’s labeling the Labor Code as discriminatory is a report of the legal advisor of the State
Department. This advisor had spoken out in favor of the reforms in his report, stating he saw no discriminatory aspects in any of the Guatemalan reforms and even going as far as stating the reforms were quite similar to American – and other nations’ – laws. Arévalo’s reforms, and later Árbenz’s more radical reforms, were even considered by the World Bank as being vital if Guatemala was to evolve into a modern democratic state.47 This analysis from within the State Department itself was not heeded though and the Department continued its efforts to convince the Arévalo administration to undo its reforms and cease its ‘persecution of
American businesses.’48
The dispute between the Arévalo administration and the United Fruit Company and the State Department was serious but did not escalate during the presidency of Arévalo. The
43 Ibid, 34-35. 44 Ibid, 38. 45 Ibid, 39. 46 Gleijeses, 94-96. 47 Ibid, 87-88. 48 Ibid, 96-98.
United States government hoped that the new Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz, who would take office in early 1951, would be less stubborn and would be open to American demands. It soon turned out that Árbenz was grossly misjudged.49
The presidency of Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán
Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán assumed the Guatemalan presidency in March 1951. He quickly announced he would continue on the path of reform in the spirit of the 1944 Revolution, picking up where Arévalo had left off: agrarian reform. In his inaugural speech he presented his intention to move Guatemala away from its feudal system and turn the country into a ‘modern capitalist state.’ He made it clear that foreign businesses were welcome, as long as they obeyed Guatemalan laws and operated not only in their own interest but in that of Guatemala as well. The World Bank published an extensive report on the Guatemalan
economic situation and it came to the same conclusions as Árbenz. The World Bank affirmed the targets and objectives of the new Árbenz administration concerning economic reform as being essential if Guatemala wished to modernize and develop its economy. As Schlesinger and Kinzer point out, the World Bank seemed to anticipate very accurately how foreign companies in Guatemala would respond to this attempt at agrarian reform: “the Bank warned foreign companies against ‘any direct or indirect political activity against the government’ and counseled them to ‘accept … the need to adapt their legal status and their operations to changed conditions.’ ”50
The Guatemalan elections and the planned policies of the Árbenz administration caused an even greater division and polarization in the country’s politics. The ‘old order’ and the country’s elite were determined and united in their opposition to the revolutionary
government of Árbenz, and they had the United Fruit Company on their side. The
revolutionary parties, the country’s army and the labor movements all supported the newly elected president. This caused a practical problem for Árbenz, as obtaining sufficient political support for his reforms was difficult in this polarized political climate. Árbenz did however continue his attempt at agrarian reform.
Árbenz needed to break the monopolies of foreign businesses that controlled the Guatemalan economy in order to transform it. Nationalization would be a dangerous move and would certainly be criticized worldwide, certainly by the United States and would most likely be opposed in the Guatemalan Congress. However, in order to break the hold on
49 Ibid, 132-134. 50 Ibid, 52-53.
Guatemala’s arable farmland by large landowners, the land had to be redistributed.51 Árbenz’s agrarian reform came with the passing of the agrarian reform law in 1952, better known as ‘Decree 900.’ The decree targeted large plots of uncultivated land, of which the United Fruit Company owned many. The decree had several limitations that ensured only uncultivated land would be targeted: farms of 223 acres or less would not be subjected to the law, nor would farms of between 223 and 670 acres that cultivated at least two thirds of its land. The owners of the land that would be expropriated according to these targets would be
compensated for their land. This compensation would be based on the lands declared taxable worth set in May 1952.52 The landowners affected by the decree, especially United Fruit, considered the compensation to be nowhere near the real value of the land, as large landowners had systematically undervalued their land in order to reduce taxes.53
The United Fruit Company responded to the decree in the exact same way as it did when the Labor Code was enacted by Arévalo: it claimed the company was the subject of
discriminatory policies and the decree was specifically designed to target the American company. The fact that Guatemalan landowners and even large plots of state-owned lands were targeted and expropriated did not change this view of United Fruit.54
Árbenz’s attempt to enact Decree 900 automatically ‘pushed’ the Guatemalan president towards the Guatemalan communists, who supported the idea of land reform. During his presidency, Guatemalan communists were given several mid-level positions in his administrations, but no major posts were obtained by the communists. However, these posts were very visible to the outside world, and the United States was quick to notice this.55 It would be Decree 900 and Árbenz’s political collaboration with the Guatemalan communists that coincided with rising Cold War tensions that convinced the United States government that an intervention was necessary.
American interpretations of the situation in Guatemala
The democratic aims of the 1944 Revolution may not seem to be very radical compared to democratic states in the region at the time (or even the United States itself), but it is important to bear in mind that a transition to a democratic and capitalist system would mean a break with a longstanding system and tradition with its strongly anchored privileged position for a
51 Schlesinger and Kinzer, 53. 52 Ibid, 54.
53 Ibid, 54-55. 54 Gleijeses, 150-151.
small elite and foreign companies. It is therefore remarkable that this revolution did not, at first, arouse any concern in either the United States government or the United Fruit Company. The State Department welcomed the deposing of dictators in democratic revolutions and had no reason for concern, as the Arévalo administration cooperated with all regional American (strategic) programs.56 This initial calm reaction by both the United States government and the United Fruit Company can most likely be explained by the nature of the revolutionary movement. The fact that the uprising was an affair of the Guatemalan middle class, the elite and eventually the army was no immediate cause for alarm for United Fruit or the United States. As mentioned earlier, the main absentees during the revolution were the native Guatemalans. This was the group that was essential to the interests of the United Fruit
Company, as a massive uprising of the native Guatemalans would mean the plantations would shut down. The fact that it was the middle class that was at the forefront of the of the
Guatemalan Revolution reassured United Fruit and the United States government that the economic interests were not at stake. The United Fruit Company however was quick to express its worries concerning the new Guatemalan government after the first of the abovementioned reforms were enacted. The American company was quick to describe the Guatemalan reforms as being communist (despite the fact that these initial reforms were all based on American laws) rather than nationalist or democratic, and deliberately
discriminatory of American businesses.57
The United States State Department initially did not share United Fruit’s view that the Guatemalan government was communist, but it did agree that the policies were
discriminatory. This initial dispute between the American government and the Arévalo administration must therefore be seen as essentially an economic one. The appraisal of the Arévalo administration changed dramatically though as Cold War tensions started to rise in the wake of World War II. The new worldwide ‘communist threat’ abruptly placed the sudden Guatemalan ‘brash’ attitude in a completely different light. The Berlin Crisis, the Soviet nuclear bomb, the ‘fall of China to Communism’; all of these developments swiftly changed the American stance on anything slightly resembling leftist or communist tendencies. With these rising Cold War tensions the CIA’s analysis of the situation in Guatemala became increasingly hostile.
56 Cullather, 14-15. 57 Gleijeses, 94-96.
CIA Tunnel Vision in Guatemala
The American political climate of the postwar years and the characteristics of the CIA (which will be treated extensively in chapter two) added to the agency’s Cold War tunnel vision. This tunnel vision can be easily identified when the CIA’s approach to Guatemala is studied. The CIA’s analysis of the situation in Guatemala during the late 1940s and early 1950s is the exact opposite of those made by the authors that have been mentioned in the introduction. Also contemporary assessments of Árbenz’s policies and motivations made by organizations like the World Bank were nothing like the CIA’s view on the Guatemalan president. The CIA made its assessments solely from a Cold War perspective, completely ignoring the Latin American context and dismissing all differing interpretations as wrong, communist-inspired or as based on communist deception. To the CIA the matter was simple: communists had taken hold of the Guatemalan government, and by definition all communists were under the control of Moscow. As John Peurifoy, ambassador to Guatemala during the coup, put it: “Communism is directed by the Kremlin all over the world, and anyone who thinks
differently doesn’t know what he is talking about.”58 This statement sums up quite accurately
how the CIA (and parts of the American government) viewed communist and leftist
movements throughout the world, and how any differing opinions of these movements were dismissed.
Even though the CIA viewed Árbenz as a threat from the very beginning of his presidency in 1951, the assessment of his predecessor Juan José Arévalo was not as extreme. In a 1949 CIA ‘outline briefing’ on the American – Soviet ‘conflict’ throughout the world, Guatemala is mentioned in a passage on the Latin American revolutions of the period. In this report it is concluded that “there is no evidence of any Communist backing – the changes in government were rather caused by more conservative elements … and are a result of
economic conditions rather than political.”59 Here the assessment is placed in the appropriate Latin American context while at the same time including the Cold War context, resulting in a much more accurate appraisal of the Guatemalan political situation. After Árbenz’s election the Latin American context disappears completely form the CIA assessments. Árbenz’s cooperation with the communists on programs like Decree 900, the communists’ rising popularity and their apparent influence on the new president and Guatemalan politics in general are by then all ‘Cold War events’ in the eyes of the agency. After this ‘detection of
58 Cullather, 26.
Communism’ and the reputed communist (meaning Soviet) control over Guatemala, Cold War thinking lies at the heart of the CIA assessments of the situation in the country.
Schlesinger and Kinzer present a thorough analysis of the position of the Guatemalan communist party in ‘Bitter Fruit.’ It is recognized in all studies on the Guatemalan coup that the Guatemalan communists exerted most influence in agrarian matters, most notably in the Decree 900. However, the staff of the governmental ‘agrarian department,’ the department responsible for this reform, numbered only 26 communist party members out of a total of 350. Of the 56 seats in the Guatemalan Congress, only 4 were held by communist party members, while 47 seats were held by members of more moderate and liberal parties, leaving the remaining 5 seats in hands of the conservatives. On lower level posts the communists were also poorly represented: “no more than seven or eight Communists ever held significant sub-cabinet posts, and neither Arévalo nor Árbenz ever appointed a single Communist to his cabinet.”60 The party itself had a meager 4000 members. However, in spite of their small numbers, the Guatemalan communists definitely exerted influence on Guatemalan politics. They worked closely together with the president and many well-known and high-ranking communist leaders were among the personal friends of the president. Most importantly, the communist party had considerable control over the powerful urban labor movement, which gave them substantial power in the cities. But as historian Cole Blasier commented on this influence: “Influence is one thing; control is another.”61 Árbenz needed this communist influence in order to carry out his reforms, as has been mentioned earlier. The fact that the communists shared some of his goals and that the president welcomed their support was evidence for the CIA of their enormous influence, rather than the logical result of the Guatemalan political reality.62
The CIA assessment of the influence of the Guatemalan communist party is well documented in a December 1953 report called ‘Stage One Report Annex A – Nature of the Enemy.’ In this report the communist party is portrayed as being firmly in control of all labor organizations and unions that are active in Guatemala. The party’s leaders are said to be under direct control of Moscow, though the only evidence given for this are visits of these leaders to the Soviet Union. The modest size of the communist party is acknowledged in the report, but despite its meager numbers the party’s influence is considered to be extensive. A list is given identifying the goals set out by the party, in which terms like ‘infiltrate’ and ‘control’ appear
60 Schlesinger and Kinzer, 59. 61 Ibid.
regularly. Some of the listed objectives include “to make Guatemala a Communist beachhead in semi-colonial Latin America; to neutralize or destroy U.S. interests and influence in
Guatemala; to infiltrate and continually increase control and influence over the national life of Guatemala;” and last but not least “serve the current Soviet Line.”63 These rather extreme goals seem to be considered as being logical aims for any communist organization, as there is no reference to any substantial evidence to support these supposed goals.
Evidence or no evidence, this is the rhetoric the CIA used to describe the communists and their goals in Guatemala. The emphasis lay on the immediate threat the communists posed to United States national security and how this threat would only grow should Árbenz be allowed to continue his policies. When even the more moderate elements of the United States government began to be concerned about Árbenz and his land reforms, the CIA had increasingly less difficulty in convincing the American government that Árbenz simply had to be removed. The mere thought of possible communist elements in Guatemala, which also according to the United Fruit Company were active in the country, was considered to be a major threat to the security of the region and with it, the United States. Accordingly, the Arévalo administration and especially the Árbenz administration were no longer viewed as democratic and nationalist, but as in danger of being taken over by communist elements or having already been ‘hijacked’ by communists. This theory was considered increasingly ‘realistic’ in an increasingly ‘McCarthyite’ America.64
This image of a communist takeover in Guatemala was strongly influenced and for a large part created by the CIA. The agency’s assessment concerning Arévalo differed greatly from that of the State Department. With the election of Eisenhower this disagreement was overcome, as the United States would conduct a more active policy concerning ‘communist expansion,’ which would become known as ‘Rollback.’ The CIA’s role in this policy, its differences with the State Department and its role in the sudden change in the perception of Guatemala will be treated in chapters two and four.
63 Stage One Report Annex A – Nature of the Enemy, 6-13. 64 Cullather, 14-16.
Chapter 2 – The Actors: The United States
In this chapter some of the most influential American actors and ‘parties’ that played a role in the 1954 coup will be studied individually. The focus will be on their background, policies, goals and ‘modus operandi.’ These will include the American presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, the State Department and the Secretary of State, the United Fruit Company and the Central Intelligence Agency.
United States presidents
Truman
Harry S. Truman (president from 1945 until 1953) assumed the presidency as incumbent Vice-President when Franklin Delano Roosevelt died after his health had steadily declined for some time. During his first term as president, Truman was confronted with the emerging post-World War II world: the war was already coming to a successful end in Europe, and the creation of the atomic bomb would be the key to successfully ending it in the Pacific.
Towards the end of the war the alliance with the Soviet Union came under pressure, as Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had always been distrusting of his Allied partners, and the Western leaders, Winston Churchill especially, had always considered Communism to be a great threat. After the war was won, tensions started to rise. Meanwhile domestic labor disputes resurged directly after World War II, putting a lot of pressure on Truman as his approval ratings were dropping.65 However, Truman managed to win the 1948 elections, perhaps the most surprising victory of all United States presidential elections, as Truman was expected to lose to Republican candidate Thomas E. Dewey according to every prediction and poll.66
Directly after Truman’s reelection a series of events caused a rapid escalation of Cold War tensions. In 1948 the Berlin Blockade was implemented by the Soviet Union in an attempt to obtain de facto control of the city of Berlin, which was controlled by all four Allied-occupying powers. A year later, in August 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first nuclear weapon, matching the military potential (in terms of destructive power) of the United States, which until then was the only country in the world with a nuclear weapon. In October 1949 China ‘fell to Communism’ as Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China, which came as a shock to the United States who had supported the Nationalist
65 Richard J. Barnet, Roots of War (New York: Atheneum, 1972) 39-40.
66 John Ranelagh, The Agency. The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) 121-122.
government of Chiang Kai-shek. These events, followed by the Korean War in 1950, caused a serious escalation of Cold War tensions and an abrupt change in the American perception of world and regional events, as has been mentioned in chapter one.67 With the Cold War already clearly heating up prior to these events, President Truman had already outlined his approach to the Cold War and with it his foreign policy. Truman believed that the spreading of (Soviet) Communism had to be prevented and that the United States had to play an active role in this (instead of returning to an isolationist policy). In order to accomplish this the American president composed the ‘Truman Doctrine,’ which became the foundation of Truman’s foreign policy. The American president believed that the best way to contain Communism was for the United States to provide militarily and economic aid to any country or region that was the target of (Soviet) communist aggression.68 As the main aim of this policy was to ‘contain’ Communism within its existing territory, the Truman Doctrine is also referred to as ‘containment.’ The economic support would be an important pillar of
containment, of which the Marshall Plan (officially called ‘the European Recovery Program’) is a good example: Truman deemed economic aid as a vital part of any defense against communist expansion. The creation of NATO can also be seen as a result or part of the Truman Doctrine.69
The development of United States foreign policy vis-à-vis Central America follows a similar line to the overall American foreign policy. Truman initially continued Roosevelt’s initiative of the so-called ‘Good Neighbor Policy,’ even though implementing the policy was problematic from the outset. With this policy Roosevelt had made an attempt to improve relations with the Latin American nations after decades of United States interventionist policy. As the name of the Good Neighbor policy suggests, Roosevelt attempted to move away from this interventionism and instead wanted to conduct a policy in which the United States would act as a ‘good neighbor’ to its Latin American neighbors.70 Also, in the aftermath of World War II democratic revolutions throughout the world were welcomed in this period of ‘democratic intoxication.’ The initial American response to the Guatemalan 1944 Revolution is in line with this ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ and general enthusiasm about Democracy being on the rise. However, as the Cold War intensified in the years after World War II, essentially all of the United States foreign policy was put in a Cold War frame. Latin America was no longer looked at and approached as a separate and unique region. From now
67 Ranelagh, 98-100. 68 Ibid, 127-128. 69 Ibid, 131, 135.
on the main principles of American foreign policy, centered on the Cold War oriented
Truman Doctrine, would be the starting point for all foreign affairs. The sudden change in the United States perception of Guatemala must be seen in light of this overall shift.71
Towards the end of his presidency Truman had already decisively moved away from Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor Policy,’ as the decision to intervene in Guatemala had already been made with the approval of operation PBFORTUNE in 1951, which was cancelled due to it having been compromised before it was carried out. The intervention was then effectively put on hold until the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president.72
Eisenhower
Dwight D. Eisenhower (president from 1953 until 1961) won the presidential elections of 1953 in a landslide victory and assumed the presidency in January 1954. He enjoyed
widespread support as one of the best-known and most popular American generals of World War II, having been Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe. Eisenhower had advocated a different approach to the Cold War and foreign policy than Truman during the 1952 elections. Eisenhower believed Truman had been too lenient in the fight against Communism, believed the approach was wrong and advocated a sterner foreign policy. Eisenhower wanted to drastically cut government spending and instead of maintaining a very expensive and large standing army, he looked towards America’s nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent. He also wanted to cut back aid to Europe and instead deemed trade to be the best type of support that could be given in order to rebuild the continent and at the same time ‘keep Communism out.’ Eisenhower intended to ‘take the fight to the communists,’ actively trying to reduce the ‘communist threat’ rather than just contain it. This reducing of Communism is referred to as ‘rollback.’ This new policy of Eisenhower became known as the ‘New Look’ policy.73
The New Look was a distinct break with the Truman Doctrine. When Eisenhower assumed the presidency the experiences and enormous cost of the still ongoing Korean War were an additional motive for him to want to move away from Truman’s policies. Instead of fighting Communism in the costly manner in which it was being done in Korea, Eisenhower would shift the focus of his rollback policy to the ‘Third World,’ as the attempts to rollback Communism in Eastern Europe and in China (and Korea) that were being made by the CIA
71 Cullather, 14-15. 72 Ibid, 28-31.
proved to be utterly fruitless. Eisenhower turned to two main ‘tools’ to use in his version of Cold War policy (and with it his foreign policy): strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence and covert action for rollback. Building and maintaining nuclear weapons was much cheaper than constantly maintaining a large standing army throughout the American sphere of influence. However, actually using these nuclear weapons wasn’t a viable option as this would almost certainly provoke a response from the Soviet Union, as could large-scale deployment of troops: the nuclear arms race with the Soviets was already under way, severely limiting overt and conventional military action. Eisenhower saw covert action as the solution to this
problem.74
The CIA had proved the potential of covert action with it successfully orchestrated the 1953 Iranian coup d’état in collaboration with the British, also known as operation TPAJAX (or ‘operation Boot’ in the United Kingdom). This successful operation, carried out during Eisenhower’s first year as president, gave the CIA an immense reputation-boost at the best possible moment, as the new president saw this type of operation as the perfect tool for
rollback. Above all, this type of operation was incredibly cheap compared to any conventional military intervention. Covert operations had another advantage in this respect, as the fact that the operations were secret meant the United States could deny any involvement, severely limiting possible political or military repercussions.75
When Eisenhower assumed the presidency, the ‘road to intervention’ in Guatemala was already taken under the presidency of Truman. Eisenhower confidently continued down this path, encouraged by the successful operation in Iran.
United States State Department
The United States State Department was the government body charged with foreign affairs. With the creation of the OSS and later the CIA, this position was challenged. The founding of the CIA and the new agency’s place in the Washington bureaucracy met with much resistance of existing governmental organizations, among which the State Department. When the OSS was initially disbanded, the State Department attempted to absorb the ‘research and analysis mandate’ of the OSS.76 The rivalry between the CIA and the State Department was fierce, as the very existence of the CIA and its tasks posed serious “challenges to the traditional
74 Immerman, 13-14. 75 Ranelagh, 230. 76 Ibid, 99-100.
supremacy of the State Department in foreign policy formation.”77 This rivalry will also be treated in chapter 4.
Two Secretaries of State are of importance in respect to the Guatemalan coup d’état: Dean Acheson, who was held the post from January 1949 until January 1953, and John Foster Dulles, who held it from January 1953 until April 1959. Acheson was a fierce supporter of Truman’s containment policies, as he saw the Soviet Union as a major threat. He also was one of the State Department’s strongest advocates for the creation of State Department controlled ‘coordinated intelligence’ after World War II.78 With the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president came a new Secretary of State: John Foster Dulles. The new Secretary was a true ‘Cold Warrior’ and believed that in the post-World War II world the United States would be caught up in a worldwide struggle with the Soviet Union and Communism, as he considered the Soviets as the controlling force behind any and all communist or socialist movements. In this respect his views did not differ much from Acheson. He also was a strong supporter of the idea of containing Communism, but he vehemently criticized Harry Truman’s attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which he considered to be weak and was a strong supporter and one of the main executors of Eisenhower’s rollback. John Foster Dulles’ relationship with the CIA and its director, his brother Allen Dulles, will be treated below.
In all existing studies of the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état a lot of attention has been paid to John Foster Dulles’ connection to the United Fruit Company. This connection is so obvious (and dubious) that it cannot be ignored. Dulles had worked as a senior associate for the law firm Sullivan and Cromwell, which had represented the company for many years and on many occasions (most notably in the signing of the ‘Guatemalan contract’ with Jorge Ubico). This connection to the United Fruit Company prior to his appointment of Secretary of State raises, to put it mildly, some questions as to Dulles’ exact motivation to advocate the removing of the Árbenz regime.79 As mentioned earlier, it also gave the impression of a strong influence of the United Fruit Company on the State Department in regard to the ‘shunning’ of the Guatemalan revolutionary governments. It is probably safe to assume that Dulles would have had sympathetic feelings towards United Fruit due to this connection, but in most studies too much of the motivation behind the decision to remove Árbenz has been accredited to this connection and similar ones within the American government. The CIA, the government and even the American public was already convinced of the communist nature of
77 Ibid, 183. 78 Ibid, 116, 125. 79 Gleijeses, 90, 236.
