The European Counterterrorism strategy in action : the case of ETA

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T h e E u r o p e a n C o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m

S t r a t e g y i n A c t i o n :

T h e C a s e o f E T A

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Virginie Krompholtz – UvA – June 2015

2 The European Counterterrorism Strategy in Action:

The Case of ETA

Written by Virginie Krompholtz

10601406

Date: 26 June 2015

Place: Amsterdam

University: University of Amsterdam

Master: Political Sciences International Relations Subject: Armed Groups and Violent Conflicts

Supervisors: Fleur Ravensbergen and dr. Ram Manikkalingam Second reader: dr. Gavin Sullivan

Word Count: 21119

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Virginie Krompholtz – UvA – June 2015 3

4.4.1 European involvement as a form of punishment ... 48 4.4.2 The European Union as an instigator of peace-process ... 49 4.4.3 The aftermath of the current cease-fire: new role for the European Union? ... 50 4.5. CONCLUSION ... 51 CONCLUSION ... 53 ANNEX 1 ... 55 BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 57

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank everyone who has helped at one point or another during my academic career in Bordeaux, Sydney and finally at the University of Amsterdam. On a personal note, I would like to thank my family and friends for their unconditional support from the beginning of my student life. I would like to thank my grandparents without whom I would not have been able to study at the UvA and who guided me through hard times. I also thank Alice and Alexandre for always knowing how to cheer me up when I needed it. Special thanks to the Schonewille family, thank you for being my second-family away from home. I would also like to thank Hugo for being there every step of the way no matter what and for showing me how great life can be. Finally, I would particularly like to thank my mom. Thank you for giving me the strength that allowed me to get through a life abroad and a master thesis. Finally, I am grateful to my supervisors Fleur Ravensbergen and Ram Manikkalingam for their patience, support and much needed advice, and who provided me with feedback that helped shape this thesis that I am proud of.

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Abbreviations

CT: Counterterrorism EEC: European Economic Community ETA: Euskadi ‘Ta Askatasuna EU: European Union GAL: Grupo de Liberacion Antiterrorista HB: Herri Batasuna IR: International Relations IVC: International Commission Verification MS: Member States NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization PNR: Passenger Name Record PNV: Partido Nacional Vasco UN: United Nations USA/US: United States of America

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Introduction

The year 2015 marked the 60th anniversary of the creation of the European flag. This anniversary is not an object of research for the academic field of counterterrorism (CT) but what is important is more the symbolic hidden behind the image of the flag. This European emblem is constituted of twelve stars because the number twelve is a symbol of stability and continuity for numerous cultures. They illustrate the fundamental principles of the institution like solidarity and union of the cultures. Indeed, the European Union (EU) was created to forge a lasting economical partnership between countries that used to be enemies. Nowadays, the European Union is more than just an economical organization; it became a global actor on the financial scene but also diplomatically. Over time, its relations with its member states progressed and deepened.

On the 11th of September 2001, the world witnessed one of the worst terrorist attack perpetrated on a Western-country soil. This event, horrendous for the public opinion, also deeply influenced and changed the narrative of the counterterrorism field for academics and policy makers. Indeed, while facing the consequences of such attacks, the United States (US), partners states and international organizations had to mobilize themselves and act in order to prevent further attacks and pursue the perpetrators. The United States were looking for strong allies to help them pursue their goals and mainly, to cooperate with them on their new objective: the war on terror.

This event acted as a turning point. It shaped the European interest on security and counterterrorism in the sense that the EU had to create a new narrative with its member states to be prepared in case they had to face a similar threat. In order to do so, the EU released numbers of declarations and treaties to forge and create a common CT strategy to all member states while respecting their own security agenda. This new counterterrorism strategy gives legitimization to the EU within the circle of the member states but also towards international organizations and third parties. This development of the EU CT strategy is the main object of this paper. This thesis seeks to investigate on the development of the European security interest in terms of counterterrorism and

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Virginie Krompholtz – UvA – June 2015 7 strategy. The main question this thesis seeks to answer is the following: To what extend European counterterrorism policies have an effect on the peace process with armed groups in Europe? In order to do so and to give the more accurate answer possible, the thesis

will be divided as follow: first, the thesis will explain the methodology used to do the research inherent to the thesis. Second, an overview of the academic debate and theoretical framework of the counterterrorism field will be given, with the use of the theories of normative power and preemptive security. The third chapter will deal with the core aspect of the thesis: the development of the counterterrorism strategy of the European Union and the policies implement throughout that evolution. Then the fourth chapter will engage in a case study, specifically the case of the Basque terrorist organization Euskadi ‘ta Askatasuna, where the findings of the third chapter will be illustrated. Finally, the last chapter will analyze the findings and results of chapter III and IV and give its final conclusion.

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Chapter I: Methodology

In this chapter the methodology is discussed. This chapter will highlight the research purpose, approach and strategy used to conduct this the research for this thesis.

1.1 Research Purpose

According to “Research, this is it” by Ben Baarda (2010), the methodology to do a research must be clear, precise and referring to the subject. This thesis is for the most part both descriptive and evaluative. Indeed, descriptive as information and facts are collected and summarized on the most important policies and instruments implemented by the EU to tackle the issue of terrorism since the 9/11 events. The descriptive part serves to introduce those counterterrorism policies, to highlight their main features and expected results and to find what possible impacts they might have had on the struggle and elimination of the Basque terrorist group ETA. The evaluative part focuses mainly on data provided by European research and reports but also by the Spanish Government and others non-states actors. This data helps providing answers to the hypotheses formulated before and analyzes the impact of EU counterterrorism policies on the ETA’s terrorist activity. Finally, this thesis is in a less extent exploratory in the sense that little literature has been made on the impact of European counterterrorism policies on the separatist group ETA. In this regard, the thesis and its content provide more insight and enhance further research in this specific niche of terrorism in Europe.

1.2 Research Approach and Research Strategy

This thesis is based on a qualitative research approach. Nkwi, Nyamongo, and Ryan (2001)1_{define this kind of approach by “qualitative research involves any research that} uses data that do not indicate ordinal values.” This research is based then on primary and

secondary sources mainly, including treaties, declarations, reports, academic articles and papers but also on TV interviews, journalistic papers and documentaries where interpretive analysis is applied. In sum, this thesis is based on a qualitative research where primary and secondary sources are used and analyzed. The reason to do so is to provide the reader with an in-depth research based on firm foundations that does not rely on only one type of data. This method can be described as ‘combination’ and best 1Nkwi, P., Nyamongo, I., & Ryan, G. (2001). Field research into socio-cultural issues: Methodological guidelines. Yaounde, Cameroon, Africa: International Center for Applied Social Sciences, Research, and Training/UNFPA

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9 defined by Rossman and Wilson (1985) “First, combinations are used to enable confirmation or corroboration of each other through triangulation. Second, combinations are used to enable or to develop analysis in order to provide richer data. Third, combinations are used to initiate new modes of thinking by attending to paradoxes that emerge from the two data sources”. 2

Moreover, this thesis is employing a single case study to illustrate and verify hypothesis formulated in above sections. Case studies can be used on both quantitative and qualitative approaches and this thesis will be thus using the qualitative approach version as EU counterterrorism policies are analyzed with a focus on their possible impact on the fall and elimination of the national/separatist terrorist group ETA. Usually, political sciences researchers tend to prefer a multiple case study scheme rather a single case one but due to the nature of the case study and the aim of the research question, it is preferable to focus on only one single case study, the terrorist organization ETA due to its uniqueness and relevance in the field of EU’s fight against terrorism. 2Rossman, G. B., & Wilson, B. L. (1985). “Numbers and words: Combining quantitative and qualitative methods in a single large-scale evaluation study”. Evaluation Review, 9, 627-643

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Chapter II – Theoretical Framework

In order to discuss the counterterrorism strategy of the European Union, it is important to understand the theories that helped shaped the European interest on security and counterterrorism. It is argued in this thesis that there is not just one theory that can explain the counterterrorism behavior of the EU. To put it in others words, like every other organization or state, the European Union is neither black nor white.

It is the combination of culture and differences that characterize the strength of the EU and for this chapter; it is argued that two main theories can explain the EU counterterrorism strategy: the Normative Power theory and the Preemptive Security theory. 2.1 The Normative Power of the European Union “Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical… it is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms”3

Ian Manners (2002) is the one of the core authors in the normative power research; through numerous articles and books he described and analyzed the normative power theory in Europe throughout decades.4_{In his work, he developed the notion of}

normative power with an explanation of its basis and an elaboration on the diffusion process of said norms. For the purpose of this thesis and the chosen theoretical framework, this thesis follows the logic of Ian Manners (2002) to develop the argument on the theory of normative power.

2.1.1 The basic foundations of the normative power

As Robert Kagan (2002) stated: “Europeans generally favor peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion”.5_This

demonstrates one of the regular assumptions made about the way Europe handled its 3_{As mentioned by Manners, I. (2002) “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies,} Vol.40, n°2, pp.235-258 (pp.238) quote from Rosecrance, R. (1998) “The European Union: A New Type of international Actor”, in Zielonka, J.(ed.) Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), pp.15-23 (pp.22) 4_{In 2007, the members of the European Union Studies Association voted his research in ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction} in Terms?’ (Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002) one of the five most important academic EU works of the last decade. 5_{Kagan, R. (2002) “Power and Weakness” Policy Review, Issue 113, June/July, pp.3-28 (pp.4)}

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11 international and regional affairs over the years. Europe, when facing a threat or a dilemma, tends to favor the ‘soft power’ as diplomacy, mediation and conciliation, opposed to the ‘hard power’ approach when a response is generally given through the means of military and punitive actions.6_{But not only, as the normative power theory}

implies that its roots are found in the EU international and internal discourse, but also within its structure and institutions: “[the European Union] exists as being different to pre-existing political forms and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way”.7_{Thus, the structure of the European itself is the main explanation for}

its ways of creating policies and implementing them. However, as Khandekar (2011) highlights: “ The European Union is not a state and thus does not have the traditional competences of a state. It is interesting to see the European Union respond to this new age threat without typical assets that serve member states - without its own spies, its own prosecutors, its individual police force, or even strong military capabilities. It relies on its strong body of values”.8_{Khandekar (2011) in his article draws on the fact that}

even if the structure of Europe does not possess the same assets as member states or other international or regional organizations; the EU highly relies on its values, here seen as norms. The difference of structure that enabled Europe to adopt this normative power comes from its foundations and roots as Manners (2002) further states: “EU’s normative difference comes from its historical context […] the creation of community institutions took place in a context where Europeans were committed to ‘pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’”.9_{This European share of values}

and norms can been seen empirically in the official texts issued by the different organizations of the EU “the broad normative basis of the European Union has been developed over the past 50 years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions”.10

In sum, the normative difference of the European Union is what makes also its basis; its structure and the relations with the member states. Thus, not only the institutional 6_{To go deeper on the theories of Soft/Hard power see :} - Nye, J. (1990) “The changing nature of World Power”, Political Science Quaterly, Vol.105, n°2, pp.177-192 - Nye, J. (2004) “Soft Power, the Means to Success in World Politics” Persus Book Group - Keohane, R. Nye, J. (1998) “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, n°5, pp. 81-94 7 Manners, I. (2002) “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, n°2, pp.235-258 (pp.242) 8_{Khandekar, G. (2011) “The EU as a Global Actor in Counterterrorism”} 9 Manners, I. (2002) “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, n°2, pp.235-258 (pp.240) 10_{Ibid. (pp.242)}

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12 structure of the European Union has an influence on its normative discourse but also the relations it has with its own member states as Buzan and Litle (2000) emphasize on “new type of entity with actor quality […] experimenting with a new form of both unit and subsystem structure” 11_{which is a direct reference of the internal architecture of the}

EU with its member states.

Normative power scholars and advocates, among them Rosecrance (1998) agree that the main explanation for the development of a normative power within the European Union is, in fact, an aggregate of “historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitutions” that enabled the norms to influence the discourse of the EU: “it accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the center of its relations with member states”.12_{The normative power, taking its source from the structure of the EU}

and its relations with its member states, is then based for Christiansen (1997) and other practitioners in that field on the five basic principles of the European Union “peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights”.13_{Those five principles, that are}

common to all member states, must be accepted and fulfilled upon entry in the organization. But even more so than the rules, those principles give legitimization to the EU for acting as a leading organization in terms of norms and discourse and not just being a regional and economical institution: “the reinforcement and the expansion of the norms identified here allows the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts”.14

In this part it is argued that the normative power in Europe rests on the EU structure and relations with its member states that produced values and norms, and those said norms enable the EU of being more than just an economical organization. In the next part, an analysis will be made on how the norms mentioned above are diffused within the European Union and beyond. It is necessary to understand the whole normative power theory as Manners (2002) states because “accepting the normative basis of the 11_{Found in Manners (2002) pp. 240, Buzan, B. Litle, R. (2000) “International Systems in World History”, Oxford University Press.} 12_{Found in Manners (2002) pp.241, Merlingen, M. et al. (2001) “The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics} and Sanctions against Austria”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.39, n°1, pp.59-77 13_{Christiansen, T. (1997) “Legitimacy Dilemmas of Supranational Governance: The European Commission between Accountability} and Independence”, Nentwhich, N. and Weale, A. (eds.) Political Theory and the European Union (London: Routledge) 14_Ibid.

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Virginie Krompholtz – UvA – June 2015 13 EU does not make it a normative”.15_{It is indeed necessary to see how the EU diffuses its} norms and values within the member states but also within international organizations. 2.1.2 The normative power and the diffusion of the norms

Having stated that the norms of the European Union are the values shared by the institution and its member states (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights), it is important to see how those values and norms are diffused to understand how the normative power theory can explain the security and strategic discourse of the European Union with member states and foreign partners. Later on, this chapter will emphasize on the diffusion processes that are relevant for the subject of this thesis and that will enable the thesis findings to answer the main research question.

Following Manners (2002) logic on the normative power theory, the author analyzes and describes six diffusion processes that, according to him, are the basic diffusion processes found in the normative power theory.

The following is directly extracted from Manners (2002) “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?” pp. 244, as the author describes clearly each diffusion process. Diffusion process: - “Informational diffusion is the result of the range of strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives by the EU and declaratory communications, such as initiatives from the Presidency of the EU of the president of the Commission”. - “Procedural diffusion involves the institutionalization of a relationship between

the EU and a third party, such as inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of an international organization or enlargement of the EU itself”. - “Transference diffusion takes place when the EU exchange goods, trade, aid or

technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means”.

- “Overt diffusion occurs as a result of the physical presence of the EU in a third states and international organizations”.

- “Cultural Filter diffusion is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion”.

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As it can be seen above, each diffusion process of norms acts and triggers in specific aspects of the European Union mandate. Some are specific to inter-regional thematic, others are based on financial or economical means.16_{For the purpose of this thesis, this}

part will make one hypothesis about the influence of certain norms diffusion processes on the counterterrorism strategy of the European Union. The hypothesis is that in order to develop its counterterrorism strategy in Europe and outside, the institution uses the “informational” and “procedural” processes17_{. The first one because numerous treaties}

and declarations helped to sustain and support security strategies initiated by the European Union. The second because the thesis argues that, in the case of counterterrorism within the European borders, the EU put a lot of weight in trying to enhance cross-border cooperation by institutionalizing those grey areas.

2.2 The limits of the Normative Power of the European Union

As it has been argued previously, the normative power has been a prominent theory to explain the behavior of the European Union with its pairs, member states and international organizations. But the field of International Relations (IR) is not white or black and some scholars, mainly realists, like Waltz (1995), Bull (1982) and Keohane and Nye (1977) tried to give counter-arguments to the normative power theory seen as liberal/idealist.

Realist insight and critique

The realist scholars mentioned above critique the normative position of the Europe Union, stating that is ambiguous and somehow hypocrite.18_{Indeed, some empirical}

examples show that the normative power of the EU has limits in the sense that it is not playing a leading role as an institution and that the power remains mainly in the hands of its member states:

“But, realists would argue, member states will only allow the EU to act as the repository for shared ethical concerns as long as this does not conflict with their core national interests. The example of economic relations with Putin’s Russia, or 16_{See also: Whitman, R. (1998) “From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union”} (Basingstoke: Macmillian) 17 Manners, I. (2002) “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, n°2, pp.235-258 (pp.244-245) 18_{Sjursen, H. (2006) “The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13:2, 235-251 (pp.243)}

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15 of arms sales to China, underscores the limits of the concept of Europe as a ‘normative power’.”19

The realist position, then, poses some limits to the normative power and aura of the European Union towards its member states but also international organizations and third states. Indeed, for realists, the theory of the normative power of the EU is not complete and focuses only on the behavior of the EU internally to explain its international behavior and for Waltz (1979) it is an issue as he states: “first, they are reductionist in that they seek to explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels”.20_{Also, realists critic} the fact that the EU can allow itself to have a normative power because they can rely on the military strength of its partners and member states in case diplomacy would not be efficient enough. For them, “the power of influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control”.21_{The European Union can rely} on the strength of its member states to implement normative power strategies, which cannot be the case for other states, or institutions that does not have a strong military or diplomatic foundation. Furthermore, Hyde-Price (2006) insists on another issue that is incumbent to the critic of the normative power theory of the EU. The issue is that the normative power has been too prominent in the field of IR because scholars and practitioners tend to agree on the fact that the neorealist approach was not adequate to analyze the security strategy of the EU: “neorealism is widely perceived to be state-centric, overly preoccupied with hard power (particularly military power) and focused on the ‘high politics’ of international security” which did not enable scholars to focus on Europe, which is by definition not a state.22_{Hyde-Price in his article then proceeds to give the a realist point of view on the} strategic discourse of the European Union but states that in order to do so, it needs to focus on international affairs which is not relevant for the topic of this thesis because the it only argues within the framework of the European Union. 19_{Hyde-Price, A. (2006) “Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13:2, pp. 217-234 (pp.223)} 20_{Found in Hyde-Price, A. (2006), Waltz, K. (1979) “Theory of International Politics”, New York: McGraw-Hill. (pp.60)} 21_{Found in Hyde-Price, A. (2006), Bull, H. (1982) ‘Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market} Studies 21(2): 149–182. (pp.151) 22_{Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (1977) “Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition”, Boston: Little Brown. (pp.218)}

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Virginie Krompholtz – UvA – June 2015 16 In sum, based on the first part of this theoretical framework, this thesis argues that the normative power is a relevant paradigm to look at the way the European Union developed its counterterrorism strategy. Also, it is important to take into account the critics ventured by realist scholars because they highlight the EU relations with the its member states, relations that prove to be crucial in the security strategy and this particular aspect will be analyzed in the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter III).

However, as it was stated in the introduction of this chapter (Chapter II), this thesis argues that two main theories are necessary to understand the evolution of the European Counterterrorism strategy. After analyzing the roots and effects of the Normative Power theory, the second part of this chapter is focusing on the Preemptive Security theory, essential for the explanation of the notion of counterterrorism. 2.3 Preemptive Security theory in relation to the EU Counterterrorism Strategy The events of 9/11 forced changes in many aspects of civilian life but also for academic theories. Indeed, it forced theories about security strategy to review their assumptions and give another meaning to the term ‘threat’, ‘risk’ and ‘terrorism’ as Ackerman (2002) calls for a “new constitutional concepts and new political imagination in the fight against terrorism”.23_{In this sense, the preemptive security strategy gives another framework}

for security polices around the world. It put the threat and risk as something global actors and states cannot ignore and pressure them to deal with those threats even before they materialize themselves. It became the priority for leaders of top-states to anticipate any risks for their citizens and strategic places. The newly led US war on terror is at the center of the preemptive security strategy and based on uncertainty and doubt as Suskind (2006) states it: “the war on terror is being guided by (…) ‘the principle of actionable suspicion”.24 The preemptive security theory concerns a myriad of aspects, among them, jurisdiction, national security policy, criminology, environment, etc. Stockdale (2011) gives a broad definition that can be applied to the case of counterterrorism “the preemptive security 23_{Ackerman, B. (2002) ‘Don’t Panic’, London Review of Books 24 (pp.3)} 24_{Suskind, R. (2006) “The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of its} Enemies Since 9/11”. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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17 decision can be most succinctly understood as a sovereign decision taken in the face of perceived radical uncertainty, and that is explicitly concerned with confronting and governing the potentially pernicious effects of that uncertainty”.25 In the preemptive security strategy, the notion of prevention is present (like in the EU counterterrorism strategy with the four pillars, one of them being ‘prevent’). However this two notions are not comparable, as de Goede (2008) states that preemption does not equal prevention because the threat is more present but less clear and if the society does nothing to stop it, this could cause ‘dramatic’ damages as Dershowitz (2006) adds “ (it) may cost a society dearly (…) even catastrophically”.26_{To put it in other words, as}

US ex-president Bush declared in 2003 “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long”.27_{Melinda Cooper (2006) emphasizes on that notion of}

“uncertainty” of risk by stating: “it exhorts us to respond to what we suspect without being able to discern; to prepare for the emergent long before we can predict how and when it will be actualized; to counter the unknowable before it is even realized”.28 Furthermore, it is important to state that the theory of preemptive security has been for a long time the token of the United States and was opposed to the normative power of the European Union. This was one of the points of partition between the two entities as Rees (2006) states it “the Europeans have expressed profound misgivings over the new American policy directions towards preemption”.29 On the contrary, de Goede (2008), in her article “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, argues that: “(talking about preemptive security) the European 25_{Stockdale, L. (2011) “Thinking Through Preemptive Security: Catastrophe, Imagination, Temporality, Affect”, working paper,} McMaster University. (pp.3) 26_{de Goede, M. (2008) “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, European Journal of International Relations.} and Dershowitz, A. (2006) “Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways”. New York: WW Norton 27_{Quoted in de Goede (2008) pp.164. Bush, George W. (2003) President Bush Discusses Homeland Security at the FBI Academy,} Virginia, 10 September; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030910–6.html (accessed 23rd of June) 28 Cooper, M. (2006) “Pre-empting Emergence: The Biological Turn in the War on Terror”, Theory, Culture and Society, 23:4, pp.113-135 (pp.120) To go deeper in the notion of risk and its roots see: - Aradau, C. and van Munster, R. (2007) “Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)knowing the Future”, European Journal of International Relations 13(1): 89–115. - Beck, U. (2002) ‘The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited’, Theory, Culture & Society 19(4): 39–55. - Foucault, M. (1977) “Security, Territory, Population” Lectures at Collège de France, 1977-1978. 29_{Quoted in de Goede (2008). Rees, W. (2006) “Transatlantic Counter Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative”. London:} Routledge.

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18 Union is world leader rather than reluctant follower”.30_{Further, she states that there is}

nothing contradictory for Europe to use both theories (normative power and preemptive security) in the development of its counterterrorism strategy “there is nothing inherent in European politics or values to question preemptive security practices”.31_{Moreover, in her article she states: “a closer examination of European}

technologies of counter-terror reveals that Europe, or at least the European Union, vigorously appropriates and develops preemptive security practice”.32_{Thus, the}

assumption enunciated above that the European Union was only a normative power and reluctant to the theory of preemptive security is false. Indeed, in the counterterrorism strategies put in place by the EU the past decade, many of them fall under the definition of the preemptive security theory, such as data retention, assets freezing and blacklisting.

2.4 Conclusion

In sum, this thesis has argued that the development of the counterterrorism strategy of Europe is entrenched in the assumptions of two main theories, the Normative Power and the Preemptive Security. Indeed, while the normative power is the promoter of the values and norms of the European Union and reflects them both internationally and regionally; the preemptive security theory is influencing the actual actions of the counterterrorism strategy of the EU.

Being aware of the duality of the counterterrorism strategy narrative is essential in order to understand the factual development of the EU counterterrorism strategy.

The next chapter of this thesis will highlights and analyzes the influence and consequences of both theories in the case of the development of the counterterrorism strategy of the European Union. 30_{de Goede, M. (2008) “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, European Journal of International Relations.} (pp.162) 31_{Ibid . (pp.176)} 32_{Ibid. (pp.168)}

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Chapter III: The European Union and its Counterterrorism Strategy

In the previous chapter, the theoretical framework surrounding the field of counterterrorism has been introduced. States have been premium actors in this area, given the fact that they are the actors usually confronted to terrorism and that most of the time they are the first to be able to give an immediate response to threats or attacks. Some theories though, tend to put more and more organizations at the center of counterterrorism strategies, e.g. United Nations or for this case the European Union. The thesis has argued that two theories shaped the European Counterterrorism Strategy (normative power and preemptive security) and that this two influenced the way Europe handled threats and security issues. Chapter IV of the thesis presents and analyzes several aspects of the Counterterrorism Strategy of Europe, shedding light on its main features but also by highlighting intended results. Indeed, how did the European Union develop its counterterrorism strategy and what are the main features of it? In order to tackle every aspect of this particular security mandate of the European Union, this chapter gives a brief overview of the historical relationship between terrorism and Europe, setting 9/11 as the turning point and will then go further with the main European Counterterrorism policies in action in order to finally, assess its possible results and what we can take out of it. 3. The European Counterterrorism Strategy In this part , the historical background and the foundations of the European counterterrorism strategyy will be discussed. 3.1 Historical Background

Terrorism: a form of non state political violence carried out by individuals and subaltern groups, frequently operating in networks, also threatening democracy, peace, human rights, ways of life, civilization and the international system itself.33

33_{Jackson, R. (2007) “An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post September 11”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,} 20:2, 233-247 (pp.233)

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This definition of terrorism was the one ‘chosen’ by numerous western states and international organizations in order to pin point the causes and consequences of this form of violence in the 20th century. As history proved it, terrorism can take different forms and actions and no agreement has been found on ‘the’ definition for terrorism yet. Unfortunately, there are as many definitions of terrorism as many types of terrorist actions.

3.1.1 Before 9/11

Before 2001, Europe and the world faced numerous terrorist events, different in forms, claims or impacts. For many decades, Europe and its allies had to face the threat of terrorism in their territories but also in areas where they hold strategic positions.34

Indeed, many member states (MS) experimented a wide range of terrorist actions from “the left wing, right wing, separatists, social and religious, domestic as well as international”.35_{However, major events helped shaping the nature of actions taken by}

the EU to prevent those terrorist attacks. In 1976, several members of the European Economic Community (EEC, becoming in 1992 the European Union) decided to create a platform where the member states could discuss and implement policies for counterterrorism, known as TREVI (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale). This organization was supposed to enhance the cooperation between the EEC members on different security matters in order to implement policies to tackle terrorism and other risks the EEC was facing at that time. In 1992, the EEC became the European Union with the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht. This treaty marked a turning point in the history of the European organization as such, with the purpose to promote cooperation of all member states on various subjects but also with the ambition to create an economic and monetary alliance, as stated in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992): “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union”.36_{Furthermore, in order to establish a}

common foreign and security policy, the TREVI platform was reorganized and replaced under the ‘third pillar’ of the EU that dealt with Justice and Home Affairs.37_Among new

recommendations and implementations of new policies related to security, a new 34_{Baldaccini, A. (2008) “Counter-terrorism and the EU strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with Biometric Documents} and Databases” European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol.10, pp.31-49 (pp.32) 35_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.857)} 36_{Treaty of Maastricht, art 2 (check reference from the website)} 37_{Bunyan, T. (1993) “Trevi, Europol and the European state” State watching the new Europe, Vol. 15 pp1-15 (pp.3)}

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21 organization, EUROPOL, was created to answer the calls for cooperation sent by numerous European police chiefs.38 Those changes in the security field for the new European organization were necessary as the threat of terrorism and violence was growing in the region. However, academics and security observes highlighted the fact that especially in the field of terrorism, results were weak. Indeed, as often observed in the case of the European Union, member states had a hard time ‘giving up’ on certain aspects of their national sovereignty, and in this case, information sharing proved to be a real point of discordance. Member states preferred to discuss terrorism issues on a bilateral basis rather than participation in the organizations created for that purpose.39_{Later on, in 1999, the European Council}

ratified a new project including a broader program for European counterterrorism activities where member states cooperation was to be enhanced.

3.1.2 After 9/11

Needless to say, when the world woke up after the terrorist attacks perpetrated on the American soil in September 2001, something had changed. International organizations, governments and non-state actors knew something had to be done in the field of security in order to prevent another terrorist attack.40_{Within this particular framework,}

the EU put terrorism as one of the main issues and threats against peace for the 21st century (European Union Presidency 2002)

Unfortunately, those attacks were followed by other terrorist actions. Like in 2004 where the Spanish capital, Madrid, faced terrible train bombings in the train station Atocha41_{but also in 2005, where several bombs exploded in the London subway,}

causing numerous casualties. After the Madrid attacks, the EU laid out a new plan of actions in order to deal with the so-called ‘roots of terrorism’.42_{The European Union had to organize itself, and quickly,} in order to be able to protect and prevent further attacks. It was not an easy task as the 38_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.857)} 39_Ibid. 40_{Argomaniz, J. (2009) “Post-9/11 institutionalization of European Union counter-terrorism: emergence, acceleration and inertia”,} European Security, 18:2, pp.151-172 (pp. 154) 41_{For further readings on the mentionned attacks :} - Crotty, W (2004) “ The politics of terror: the US Response to 9/11”, Northeastern University Press. - Sinkkonen, T. (2009) “Political Responses to Terrorism, Case Study on the Madrid Terrorist Attacks and its aftermath”, Academic Dissertation, University of Tampere. - Bulley, D. (2008) “ ‘Foreign’ Terror? London Bombings, Resistance and the Failing State”, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol.10, Issue 3, pp.379-394. 42_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.860)}

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22 threat was growing bigger and bigger and member states of the EU all had different opinions on the possible ways of retaliating against terrorism in Europe.43_{Nevertheless,}

the European Union and its member states gathered and joined forces and introduced a new “Plan of Action”.44_{This new phase in the fight against terrorism in Europe (and}

abroad) consisted in a number of measures aiming to develop cooperation and sharing of information for the benefit of counterterrorism (preemptive security theory). Between 2001 and 2006, the EU implemented:

- The European Arrest Warrant is “an arrest warrant that can be used by all member states of the European Union. Once issued, the member state that launched the procedure can require from another member state to arrest and transfer the suspect to its own territory so that the issuing state can start a trial or put the suspect in detention for an undetermined amount of time.45

- Europol is a “European agency aiming to develop law enforcement cooperation between member states. Its main mission is to support its Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international crime and terrorism”.46

- Eurojust is “a European organization aiming to develop judicial and criminal collaboration among member states. Its mission is to coordinate the judicial cooperation of member states on criminal and judicial matters”. 47

Also, the European Union lined up with the United Nations program on counterterrorism. Indeed, in response to the UN 1373 Resolution, the EU implemented a system of counterterrorism listing aiming to enlist any individual or terrorist group in order to monitor their movements and control their activities. In addition, the EU in collaboration with others states like the United States and also the UN, launched a program that enables members to freeze assets and block movements in or outside the EU of the said terrorist individuals or groups. All this implementations of policies and treaties enabled the EU to widen the range of their counterterrorism activities. The “Plan of Action” helped the EU to strengthen the 43_{Oldrich, B. (2006) “EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:1, pp. 57-78 (pp.64)} 44_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.860)} 45_Ibid

46_{Europol website}_{https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/europol%E2%80%99s-priorities-145}_{accessed 28th May 2015} 47_{Eurojust website}_{http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/history.aspx}

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23 cooperation among its member states but also with other organizations and states outside the European community. The European Union focused on prevention, through the identification of underlying causes of terrorism48_{. The new counterterrorism}

strategy of the EU and its member states was based on four pillars: ‘Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond’.49_{One of the benefits of this new counterterrorism strategy was to}

“not only streamlining but also institutionalizing the intra European collaboration in counterterrorism”. 50_{Each pillar referred to organizations established after the events of}

9/11 and mentioned above. For example, the ‘Prevent’ pillar was aimed to target the radicalization process by identifying the roots and causes of radicalization that led to terrorist engagement and activities (EUROPOL). The ‘Protect’ pillar was aimed to defend civilians of the EU, organizations and infrastructures against possible attacks and terrorist activities (EUROPOL). The third and fourth pillar ‘Pursue’ and ‘Respond’ have been reportedly said to be the ones were the actions and results were the least successful.51_{Indeed, the architecture of the EU itself and the relations between MS did}

not allow for those last pillars to achieve enough results, as we will see in the next paragraph of this chapter.

3.1.4 Member States vs. European Union: towards a homogeneous relationship?

It is important to note that during that timeline (2001-2006) and often after, decisions adopted at the EU level have had a hard time being implemented at a member state level. Indeed, issues like security and civilian protection are mostly managed at state level because there are parts of the sovereignty well guarded by member states.

Member states of the EU remain the primary actors in the field of counterterrorism in Europe.52_{National sovereignty concerns domestic issues and security is seen as part of}

it. They retain the majority of authority and decision power “[…] in respect of police, judicial and intelligent services, which are the main instruments in the EU’s distinctive approach to terrorism”53_{states Rik Coolsaet (2010) . In order to explain the behavior of}

member states towards the EU CT strategy, it is adequate to use the paradigm of the

48_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.860)} 49_Ibid. 50_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.861)} 51_{Kaunert, C. (2012) “The social construction of an EU interest in Counter Terrorism: US influence and internal struggles in the cases} of PNR and SWIFT” European Security, 21:4, pp.474-496 (pp.480) 52_Ibid. 53_Ibid.

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24 “logic of diversity”.54_{Needless to say, every member state comes from a different}

background, culture, language and way of living that undeniably shapes the way they respond to European strategies, actions and policies. In the case of counterterrorism, every member state regards it as a ‘high politic’ sensitive subject and in this logic; every member state has its own view and way of dealing with this matter. One of the main issues encountered by Europe in its relation with MS was that most states were trying to implement measures that would only eliminate primary causes of terrorism but they were not trying to tackle the problem on the long run.55_{National bureaucracies lacked}

enthusiasm in implementing political decisions taken at the organizational EU level.56

This phenomenon will be explained further in the next paragraph, with the theory of ‘shock waves’ and the growing sense of “CT Fatigue”57_{in Europe and experimented by}

different member states.

As stated before, national reluctance and preference to act bilaterally on numerous subjects rather than collectively, refrained the possibility to agree in a homogeneous way about the counterterrorism strategy of Europe, as member states had different interpretations and implementations of agreed measures at the EU level. Information sharing proved to be the real ‘issue’ as member states preferred informal arrangements to be discussed in small comities like the ‘Club of Berne’58_{and its Counterterrorism}

Group where heads of EU security agencies and some states discuss security issues. 59

In spite of those issues, “[…] member states still play a crucial role in defining an European interest for counterterrorism, even if they all ultimately approve agreements”.60_{That is to say that even if member states differ in the way they intend to}

apply the European CT strategy and policies, they all come to an agreement that in order for the European Union to properly fight terrorism, a sense of consensus has to be reached (normative power theory). Unity is the only way to end that battle and it is well 54_{Kaunert, C. (2012) “The social construction of an EU interest in Counter Terrorism: US influence and internal struggles in the cases} of PNR and SWIFT” European Security, 21:4, pp.474-496 (pp.477) 55_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.867)} 56_Ibid.

57_{Press release (2009), Council of the European Union,}_{http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-09-355_en.doc}_accessed 2nd June 2015

58_{For more information see :}_{http://pilac.law.harvard.edu/europe-region-efforts//counter-terrorist-group-ctg}_{accessed 2nd June} 2015

59_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.858)} 60_{Kaunert, C. (2012) “The social construction of an EU interest in Counter Terrorism: US influence and internal struggles in the cases} of PNR and SWIFT” European Security, 21:4, pp.474-496 (pp.491)

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25 highlighted in the adoption of the article (Article 42(7)) from the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and formally introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon. This article is similar to article V of the Washington Treaty (1949), putting the notion of collective defense as a key for the members of the NATO organization. In sum, article 5 of the NATO treaty and the one below state that in case of an attack on one of the member states of the said organization, other members have the obligation to assist the party attacked with whatever means they see fit, e.g. military forces, diplomatic debates, etc. The article below takes its roots from a former article of the modified Brussels Treaty (article V) : “ V. If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”.61 The article 42(7) of the TEU, which is an updated version of the Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, adding provisions for possible retaliations, especially with the NATO organization, states that:

“If a Member State is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitment under the NATO, which, for those States which are member of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation”.62

This symbolic article marks the willingness of Europe and its member states to act and decide in unity, standing one for each other and binding their solidarity in the event of a terrorist attack against one of them. As we have seen, the evolution of the counterterrorism strategy of the European Union is sealed with the willingness of its member states. Indeed, and it can be argued also for others issues, the decisions taken at the European level have an impact on the member states and vice versa. One does not function without the other and that is what, in a sense, what the European Union is all about. In the next part, we will see how the evolution of the CT strategy developed itself and what were they key elements in this evolution.

61_{Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty (1954) Western European Union}_{http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm}_{(accessed 3rd June} 2015)

62_{Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (2009),}

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26

3.2 EU holistic approach towards Counterterrorism and the theory of ‘shock waves’

With retrospective, one can argue that the EU as a CT event driven agenda. Indeed, terrorism has been put at the top of the security agenda for many western countries and international organizations for the past two decades.63_{Terrorism became one of the}

main issues for ‘high politics’ of many states in the world and the counterterrorism discourse of the European Union in particular changed over the years as the threats the continent was facing were changing too. The European CT strategy took a long time to be implemented and faced numerous obstacles (theory of shock waves) until reaching its preferred shape (holistic approach).64_{Also, the European Union was influenced in his}

CT strategy and management of risks by other states and organizations such as great partners in the field of security the like United States, but also by Russia or China and by international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, etc.

After the London bombings in 2005, the EU came to the realization that the threat was not only external but could come from within its very own territory. Radicalization was seen as an external threat and it took some time for the MS to start implementing strategies that would take care of the radicalization within the Schengen borders. Recruiters were perceived to operate from outside the borders and ‘self radicalization’65

and ‘self recruitment’66_{were not yet recognized as roots and causes for terrorist}

activities. Home grown terrorism was neglected until attacks and terrorists actions were pretreated in Europe, notably the murder of a Dutch film director Theo van Gogh, who was shot by a man who had ties with the Dutch Islamist Hofstad Network. It is precisely Europe’s situation that favors terrorist actions as it is described in the discourse of the Council of the European Union in 2005: “[…] free movements of people, ideas, technology and resources in the EU creates an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives”(Council of the European Union, 2005a, paragraph 2).67 63_{Jackson, R. (2007) “An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post September 11”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,} 20:2, 233-247 (pp.233) 64_{Both paradigms will be discussed and analyzed in the paragraph below.} 65_{Kirby, A. (2007) “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of} Autonomous Cliques”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,30:5, pp. 415-428 (pp. 422) 66_Ibid. 67_{Council of the European Union (2005a) ‘The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ 30 November, EU Council document} 14469/4/05 REV 4

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27 3.2.1 The theory of ‘shock waves’

In order to explain the dynamics behind the counterterrorism strategy of Europe and how it evolved during the past fifteen years, it is important to look at this evolution through the lens of the “theory of shock waves”.68_{As Rik Coolsaet (2010) puts it “the}

dynamics behind the EU counterterrorism can be compared to successive shock waves, propelled by major attacks, but gradually winding down once the sense of urgency had faded away”.69_{Borrowed from the chemistry field, this scientific theory states “ a shock}

wave is a thin transitive area propagating with supersonic speed in which there is a sharp increase of density, pressure and speeds of substance. Shock waves arise at explosions, detonation, supersonic movements of bodies, powerful electric discharges”.70_{It illustrates adequately the statement above, that is to say that every time}

Europe faced the challenge of a counterterrorism attack, inside and outside its territory, the EU reacted vividly (e.g by rushing to implement new counterterrorism or security policies) but the further you go on the wave of the shock wave, the less you will be able to find ‘movement’ and in this case, less actions to implement the CT strategy. Two examples can illustrate this theory.

The first one, illustrating the first movement of the wave, the ‘shock’ part, occurred less than six months ago and concerns France. After the attacks perpetrated in Paris in January 2015 (Charlie Hebdo and Jewish Shop terrorists attacks), the French government implemented very quickly a new surveillance law, aiming to enhance French counterterrorism actions and supposedly shelter the citizens in a better way. Concerns were raised because the law in question was not discussed thoroughly at both the Senate and the French assembly and seemed rushed. Policies practitioners had concerns about the lack of consensus on the said law and raised awareness on the possible Human rights violations it could cause, especially in terms of surveillance of civilians, judged abusive by some NGOs.71 The second example highlights the end of the movement of the shock wave, illustrated in this case by Gilles de Kerchove, actual EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (since 2007) in 68_{Coolsaet, R. (2010) “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: value added or chimera?”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, pp 857-873 (pp.858)} 69_Ibid.

70_{Power point of Physic Animations}_{http://physics-animations.com/Physics/English/swa_txt.htm}_{accessed 2nd June 2015} 71_{Debating article on the Surveillance law (French version)}

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28 a note concerning the EU CT strategy in the year 2009 where it is stated: “However, he also identifies the major risk of a growing sense of "CT fatigue".72_{That is to say that}

member states and Europe, as stated before, were taking actions in the moment, in a very short timeline, at the time and place where they were facing a terrorist threat but were not focusing on the ‘long run’. The term ‘CT fatigue’ takes also its full sense when thinking that in 2009, Europe was facing a critical economic crisis, paralyzing almost every member states and thus, the Counterterrorism strategy, willingly or not, was put aside. 3.2.2 The holistic approach of Europe for its counterterrorism strategy However, after the Madrid and London bombings, EU changed its discourse and tried to tackle the terrorism issue with a new approach, introduced with this quote: “Terrorism is a threat to all states and all peoples. The threat of terrorism is a threat to our security, our democracies and our way of life in the European Union”.73_{Scholars and}

counterterrorism practitioners have described this new approach as ‘holistic approach’. The term ‘holistic’ means: “characterized by the belief that the parts of something are intimately interconnected and explicable only by reference to the whole”.74_{In the case of} Europe, it means that the European Union as a whole; the organization in itself and the member states; are trying to implement a new security strategy based on cohesion and consistency, coming from both sides.75_{The EU wants to spread its norms through every} member states in order to reach that state of unity mentioned before. This is an example of the normative power theory analyzed in chapter II of this thesis.

Indeed, for numerous experts and practitioners, during the implementation of its counterterrorism strategy, the European Union has been seen as a “norm-taker” rather

than a “norm-maker”.76_{Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define norms as “a standard of}

appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”.77_{This phenomenon of}

‘norm-taking vs. norm-making’ is specifically true in terms of counterterrorism strategy. Some scholars have indicated in their research that post 9/11 security strategy in Europe has

72_{Press release (2009), Council of the European Union,}_{http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-09-355_en.doc}_accessed 2nd June 2015 73_{General Affairs and External Relations Council (2004), ‘Declaration on combatting terrorism’ 25th March 2004} http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf accessed 24th may 2015 74_{Oxford Dictionary of English} 75_{Zwolski, K (2012) ‘The EU and a holistic security approach after Lisbon: competing norms and the power of the dominant} discourse’, Journal of European Public Policy 19:7, pp.988-1005 (pp.989) 76_{Ibid. See also Rik Coolsaet (2010) and Javier Argomaniz (2008)} 77 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International norm dynamics and political change’ International Organisation, 50(2), pp887-917, (pp891)

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Virginie Krompholtz – UvA – June 2015 29 been greatly influenced by the United States of America (USA/US) war on terror: “[…] taken together, the adoption of internal European counterterrorism measures and the development of the EU/US cooperation on terrorism matters have also been important because they have led to the construction of a ‘European interest’ in CT”.78_{To illustrate} this argument, we can take the issue of the Passenger’s Name Records (PNR) agreement where the US strongly influence the EU to strengthen its border security and the flow of people coming in/out of the European Union. The problem faced by the EU during the transatlantic negotiations is that the US asked airlines for information on passengers travelling at destination of the United States, and that even before they were on the plane. Airlines were then facing a dilemma. On one hand, if they complied with US demands, they would be violating national laws in Europe and on the other hand, if they did not meet the demands of the US, airlines would not be able to fly to the US anymore.79_{That is to show that the US on several issues had always an influence on EU}

strategies and sometimes, implemented norms within the EU’s security regulations: “strong sense that the latest anti terrorists strategies are directed by the USA and merely co-produced by the EU”.80_{Also, Notably, there some differences in the way both sides}

deal with counterterrorism strategy. Indeed, “the US sees itself involved in a ‘war on terror’, whereas Europe places less importance on the military aspects and more on diplomatic tools, multilateral institutions and addressing the root causes”.81

Lastly, one can argue that the accepted terrorism narrative of Europe has also normative implications. Since 9/11, the EU along with many of its MS has adopted measures many believe “[…] are damaging to human rights and which undermine democratic institutions and public legitimacy”.82_{This issue was stated above with the case of France}

and its new surveillance law but it can also be found in the case of the blacklisting policies engaged by the European Union under the mandate of the United Nations.83 78_{Kaunert, C. (2012) “The social construction of an EU interest in Counter Terrorism: US influence and internal struggles in the cases} of PNR and SWIFT” European Security, 21:4, pp.474-496 (pp.475) 79_{Hailbronner, K. Papakonstantinou, V. Kau, M. (2008) “The Agreement on PNR and the EU/US Cooperation in Data Communication”,} International Migration, Vol.46, pp.187-197 (pp.189) 80_{Den Boer, M. Monar, J. (2002) ’11 September and the challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a security actor’ JCMS, Vol.40,} Annual Review, pp. 11.28) pp.25 81_{Argomaniz, J. (2008) ‘When the EU is the ‘norm-taker’: The PNR Agreement and EU’s Internalization of US Border Security Norms’,} Journal of European Integration, 31:1, pp.119-136 (pp.133) 82_{Monar, J. (2007) ‘Common threat and common response? The European Union’s counterterrorism strategy and its problems’,} Government and Opposition, 42:3, pp.292-313 (pp.298) 83_{For more information on the blacklists issue, see :} - Sullivan, G & Hayes, B.(2011) Blacklisted: Targeted Sanctions, preemptive security and fundamental rights, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights eV.

The European Counterterrorism strategy in action : the case of ETA