Who Are They? Social Identity Theory’s Contribution to Understanding Identity Discourses of Home-grown Terrorism in the UK

Who Are They? Social Identity Theory’s Contribution to Understanding Identity Discourses of Home-grown Terrorism in the UK

Jessica Schwarz 2576066

j.schwarz.2@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Supervisor: Dr. Eelco van der Maat Second reader: Dr. Maxine David

Word Count: 14,810 July 2020

Master of Arts in International Relations Global Conflict in the Modern Era

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ABSTRACT

Since the events of 9/11 and the war on terror, there has been a rise in Islamist terrorism and its subcategory of home-grown terrorism, where the perpetrators of terrorist violence are born and raised in the countries of the attack. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of home-grown terrorism by offering an application of social identity theory to the phenomenon’s relevant identity discourses. To do so, this thesis sets out to deconstruct and analyse the significant identity discourses constructed by British government officials and Islamist terrorist organisations. This thesis identifies a push and pull dynamic between British and Islamist identity discourses where vulnerable British Muslims feel alienated and pushed away from British society’s emphasis on assimilative secular, liberal democratic values and instead find the appeal of the global Muslim community, the ummah, as an inclusionary, unifying sense of identity. Certainly, terrorism and home-grown terrorism are complex phenomena without single explanations, but this thesis puts forwards identity as a complementary explanation for home-grown terrorism as it ties in existing explanations such as historical and political grievances and socioeconomic inequalities. Because identity is often constructed on an exclusionary basis, where an individual must be one or the other and never both, social identity theory’s ideas of social comparison and positive group worth explain the need for terrorists to harm other identities to increase its own identity’s social worth.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Foremost, I am grateful to my thesis supervisor, Dr. van der Maat, for providing guidance and feedback throughout this project.

To my friends and family who have supported me throughout, thank you for the unconditional love and encouragement always. There are not enough words to express my gratitude for you all. As much as completing my thesis and master’s is an accomplishment of my own, it is also reflective of the people around me who continuously support me.

Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to mention and thank my dear friends Aileen Schuurmans and Noor ter Meer, without whose continuous friendship, encouragement and laughter from day one, and every day since, my master’s experience would not have been what it is.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction 05

Chapter 2: Literature Review 08

Discursive Explanations of Changes in Identity 09

Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory 11

Chapter 3: Research Design 15

Discourse, Identity and Terrorism 15

Analytical Framework 15

Sources and Structure of Analysis 17

Chapter 4: Analysis of Changing and Conflicting Identity Discourses 19

British Identity Discourse 19

Islamist Identity Discourse: A Global Perspective 23

Islamist Identity Discourse: A Local Perspective 27

The Push and Pull of Identity Discourses 28

Chapter 5: Implications 30

Case Studies 30

Discussion 32

Chapter 6: Conclusion 36

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CHAPTER ONE Introduction

The 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda ushered in an era of ‘war on terror’ as the USA, under then president George W. Bush, invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. This fuelled tension and conflict between the West and the generalised Islamic world as the fight against terrorism brought destruction of territory and death of innocents. Subsequently, new terrorist groups emerged to challenge the West’s influence in the Middle East. After the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings by perpetrators born and raised in Spain and the UK respectively, the focus of Western government officials and scholars turned on ‘home-grown terrorism’ in which national citizens commit terrorist acts. Since then, the UK government has struggled with the implications of these terrorist acts on their society and national identity.

Given the great impact of terrorism on national and internationals affairs and the numerous questions home-grown terrorism raises about identity, society, nationality and radicalisation, it is important to explain and understand the phenomenon of terrorism so as to counter it effectively. Therefore, an understanding of the motives and incentives is crucial (Ozsoy, 2007), especially for government officials in the drafting of future security and terrorism prevention policy. In addition to the social relevance my thesis brings, by offering a less militaristic, identity-based counter-terrorism approach, it also offers significant academic relevance, as it fits into broader discussions of immigration, culture and values, as well as religion’s role in societies based on the separation of church and state.

Since 9/11 and the declaration of the war on terror, substantial research has been conducted on terrorism and its various forms to better understand and combat the phenomenon (see Meierrieks, 2014). However, there remains a gap in existing literature connecting identity theory and home-grown terrorism, specifically due to the focus on explanatory variables such as socioeconomic and political contributors in identifying terrorist motivations (Moten, 2010). While these aforementioned explanatory variables do shed on light on terrorism, they do not touch upon local circumstances and attitudes regarding Islamophobia, assimilation and national identity in Western countries to elucidate home-grown terrorism (Alam and Husband, 2013). However, identity theory is able to address all of these factors as they are related to the formation of one’s identity. As such, the purpose of this thesis is to address the topic of home-grown terrorism and

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identity and to answer the following research question: what explains the relevant British and Islamist identity discourses and their conflict surrounding home-grown terrorism? The matter of the fact is, terrorism is a complex phenomenon requiring a multitude of perspectives from various political levels to understand it, with identity being this thesis’ chosen focus. In this thesis, I argue that social identity theory, as pioneered by Tajfel and Turner, best explains the research question as it captures the interaction between identities due to its focus on inter-group relations, rather than just focusing on one identity discourse, and how the identity discourses are formed in relation to each other, not in isolation. Thus, social identity offers valuable insight and contributions to the understanding of home-grown terrorism, as identity and their discourses underlie the issue of terrorism.

By analysing home-grown terrorism and its identity discourses, this thesis embraces and examines both the local and foreign elements associated with the phenomenon, rather than just focusing on one side. Solely examining one side of the conflict, typically the ‘Muslim’ side, fails to address shortcomings and actions of Western actors in perpetuating conflict and violence, which absolves them of accountability, as well as their contributions to identity formation of the Other. My focus on both of the rival identity discourses from the British government and terrorist organisations is because of social identity theory’s encompassing of inter-group dynamics whose interactions and conflicts play a role in the construction of their identities and discourses. As the purpose of this thesis is not to analyse the causal relationship between identity and home-grown terrorism, but to examine the identity discourses that surround the phenomenon, this chapter deconstructs British identity discourse, as well as global and local Islamist discourses of Muslim identity over time.

By applying social identity theory to home-grown terrorism, this thesis finds that extremist terrorist ideologies are a claim to a superior group identity that rules over all others and works as a uniting force. For some, the propagated superior group identity increases one’s self-esteem, as claimed by social identity theory. This can appeal to alienated Muslim youths in Western countries, as they often face Islamophobia and xenophobia despite being born and raised in Western societies (Alam and Husband, 2013). The two opposing identity discourses in this case are the British secular, liberal values-based identity focusing on assimilation and the Islamist discourse specifying the unifying global community of Muslims, the ummah. In essence, a push-and-pull dynamic emerges between the British and terrorist identity discourses: where terrorist organisations offer

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the individuals a greater sense of dignity compared to the rejection faced in the West and the identity discourse that focuses on assimilation into society and giving up parts, if not all, of their Muslim identity. The identity conflict here is a result of the British identity that pushes away the religiosity of identities and the Islamist identity that further emphasises religious values through their language. Between the two conflicting identity discourses of British identity and the unifying force of the ummah, the terrorists’ utilisation of the ummah (Piscatori and Sikail, 2019) is at times successful in pulling and recruiting individuals towards extremism and (home-grown) terrorism by playing on existing identity conflicts and insecurities.

Already, there exists an abundance of literature on terrorism and its causes (see Meierrieks, 2014). Therefore, I will instead establish the relevance of identity and identity discourses to understanding home-grown terrorism, which is currently missing in the literature. The analysis of this thesis will also address domestic factors in the UK regarding national identity, nationality and radicalisation, which have all been brought up in relation to discussions of home-grown terrorism. By looking at home-grown terrorism from an identity-based perspective, the emphasis is less on the Islamist ideology but rather on the socialising process experienced by Muslim youths in Western countries, which is currently lacking in academic literature. Certainly, the way in which identities are constructed and propagated by government officials and other authority figures affect the socialisation of individuals and their identities. Likewise, I advocate that governments are able to counter specific discourses or socialisation processes with their own policies of inclusion and acceptance, also through identity. Thus, it is possible for governments to have an effect on the socialisation of Muslim youth in their countries. This is important, as government officials and policy makers can address the issue of home-grown terrorism through domestic counterterrorism strategies to prevent further alienation and radicalisation of Muslim nationals, as well as further terrorist violence.

First, this thesis presents a literature review of existing literature on discourse, its changes and social identity theory. Then, the research design will specifically lay out the analysis of this thesis, including sources and methods to be used and consulted. Thereafter follows the Critical Discourse Analysis of British and Islamist identity discourses and a discussion of their implications within broader society in the succeeding chapter. Lastly, I will conclude the findings of this thesis and suggest areas for future research in the field.

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CHAPTER TWO Literature Review

Having established the topic of research and background of this thesis, this chapter now reviews existing literature and establishing the debates on identity discourse changes and home-grown terrorism. I first delve into discursive explanations for changes in identity discourse then proceed to introduce identity theory and specifically social identity theory. By doing so, I identify the gap in the literature on applying social identity theory to identity discourses related to home-grown terrorism and situate my thesis therein.

This thesis focusses on international Islamist terrorism1 from groups such as the Islamic State

and Al-Qaeda, specifically with respect to the subgroup of home-grown terrorists. Home-grown terrorists are of particular interest because they: i) were born and/or spent significant years of the childhood in a Western country, ii) lack foreign international support compared to international terrorists, iii) were radicalised and trained in their Western home country, iv) and planned/carried out violent attacks in their home country (Mullins in Hinkkainen, 2014: 197). They therefore bridge both Western societies and violent Islamist terrorism, which is reflected in the interaction of rival identity discourses, such as that between British and Islamist identity discourses.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to distinguish between the everyday non-extremist Muslim and Islamist extremist ideology. Islamism is typically understood as political Islam, where both public and personal life of Muslims is governed by Islamic principles under Islamic law or sharia (Al Raffie, 2013: 71). Though many Muslims advocate for Islamism to varying extents, the call for an Islamic order in violent and militant terms is only advanced by terrorist organisations. For a lot of Muslims living in Western societies, such as the UK, they have found a balance between their British and Muslims identities where they are not mutually exclusive from one another. This exemplifies successful integration and socialisation of identities. Home-grown terrorists are therefore considered a failure to negotiate a compromise between these identities.

1 _{For the purpose of this paper, terrorism is understood to be ‘the intentional random murder of defenceless}

non-combatants, with the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amidst a civilian population as a strategy designed to advance political ends’ (Walzer in Meisels, 2008: 20). It is also worth pointing out that the definitions reveal biased perspectives (Moten, 2010), as many definitions do not include state or state-sponsored terrorism, which is also important in understanding the context of modern-day Islamist terrorism.

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Discursive Explanations of Changes in Identity Discourse

Based on research, I have identified two broad explanations for changes in identity discourses that I have divided into discursive explanations and social identity theory. Within discursive explanations of change, I present three explanations that focus on changes in identity discourses, namely the process of Othering, elite narratives and changes in the socioeconomic context and connect them to terrorism and home-grown terrorism.

Firstly, identity is often, if not always, constructed through opposition against an Other (Smith, 1992: 75). This process that I will hereafter refer to as Othering can alter perceptions of identity and their discourses. Triandafyllidou (in McKinlay and McVittie, 2011: 24) highlights how the presence of other people, who are categorised as different or the Other, determines the perception and identity of the first group. Because identity is formed on an exclusionary basis against an Other, a binary of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is thereby created.

In the event of a new Other appearing, one’s identity can change and adapt to the newcomer’s arrival so that clear sets of identity can be distinguished. This can be seen in the aftermath of 9/11 where so-called ‘Muslim terrorists’ all around the world became the enemy. Muslims, though in reality a small subsection of Islamist extremists, have become the new Other for the West to define themselves against. A similar process takes place among Islamist discourses of Muslim identity, as they become more determined to be in opposition to Western identities and values. However, this explanation alone cannot account for the conflicting identity discourses that shape home-grown terrorism, as it only focuses on one side and not necessarily the interaction between identities, which this thesis aims to do so by addressing identity discourses of both sides of the conflict.

Secondly, many scholars have analysed the contribution of elite narratives in the discursive construction of identity (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 103). Todd (2017: 85) asserts that identities change by responding to power shifts and opportunities constructed by elites through various discourses. Analysing narratives is relevant to the study of identities because biographical narratives help people understand their own experiences and identify with a certain form of identity (McKinlay and McVittie, 2011: 13). Indeed, Aydin-Düzgit (2017) emphasises the way in which leaders change citizens’ conceptions of national identity by using historical narratives. This especially can be seen with American policymakers emphasising the religious aspect of terrorism (Moten, 2010).

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After 9/11, a need to redefine Western identities around values such as democracy and freedom emerged to highlight the ‘evilness’ of the Islamist terrorist and to justify foreign intervention and the global ‘war on terror’. Building on generations of inaccurate and demeaning Orientalist depictions of the Middle East and Islam, Western media continued to perpetuate negative views of Muslims. Consequently, the religion of Islam and associated fundamentalism has been portrayed to be inherently violent and antithetical to Western ideas of democracy and freedom. Through these binary constructions of good and evil, political elites were able to alter the image of the Muslim Other and justify their intervention in the Middle East. Certainly, changes in narrative can explain the alterations of discursive identity, but do not take into account various conflicting identity discourses. In essence, it does not address the interaction of identities, their conflicts and why some turn towards terrorism or home-grown terrorism.

Lastly, the third explanation is how changes in socioeconomic contexts impact and alter identity discourse. Through their analysis of national, ethnic and religious identities in various contexts, McKinlay and McVittie (2011) aptly demonstrate how identities are dependent on the contexts they are formed in and how social factors affect their formation. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that context plays a role in the construction of identity and its discourses. As the socio-political context that individuals find themselves in changes, they, too, must renegotiate their identities in the changed circumstances, thereby altering their identity discourses to fit their needs. This can be seen in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, as well as more local events such as the 2005 London bombings. Western countries sought to highlight the aforementioned values of democracy and liberty, while some Muslims found themselves having to redefine their Muslim identity in the face of Islamist discourses’ emphasis on religious loyalty. Both sides of the conflict felt that their ideals and values were under attack and sought to highlight them in their conceptions of identity.

Similarly, Hanks (1992) labelled the incorporation of context into what individuals designate as their position as ‘the indexical ground’, which means that interactants form and reform their positions by referring to the context they find themselves in, be it place or time. Similarly, Simon (in McKinlay and McVittie, 2011: 6) asserts that identity both explains social interaction and arises out of said interactions. This explanation surely explains the changing identity discourses regarding terrorism, as the war on terror drew a line between two opposing sides, the West and the Islamic world, thereby forcing individuals to choose a side and identify as such. This approach’s

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inclusion of the societal context informs my analysis with social identity theory, which similarly takes into consideration context’s role on identity formation.

All in all, these three discursive explanations have been reviewed to highlight the discursive changes of identity. However, they do not enquire into the nature of group identities and their interactions, which social identity, as introduced shortly, sets out to examine. Nevertheless, the discursive explanations offer an important understanding of discursive changes.

Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory

Whereas the above discursive explanations focus on the discursive changes of identity, I now introduce identity theory and how identity discourses change due to various conceptions of identity so as to deconstruct the identity discourses surrounding home-grown terrorism. In order to understand its subcategory of social identity theory, it is important to begin with identity theory, which began with American philosopher and psychologist William James, who claimed that each person has multiple selves, which become more or less prominent depending on the circumstances (James, 1890). Such an understanding means that identities are not static phenomena and that they interact with an individual’s surroundings. Moreover, identity is ‘a tool to frame political claims, promote political ideologies, or stimulate and orientate social and political action, usually in a larger context of inequality or injustice and with the aim of asserting group distinctiveness and belonging and gaining power and recognition’ (Neofotistos, 2013). In this paper, identity is understood as a social construct following constructivist theories of International Relations, which stipulates that meanings are assigned to objects through human interpretation and construction (Fierke, 2013: 188).

Identity theorists Burke and Stets insinuate that identity theory could be the single most important tool for analysing human behaviour (Burke and Stets, 2009: 203). Though I agree that identity and its role in the study of conflicts is of great relevance (Haji et al, 2016), especially because many conflicts are drawn along identity categories of some sort, be it ethnic, national or religious, there are, of course, other explanations for the turn to violent extremism, such as socio-economic and political discriminations and inequalities. However, these explanations do not explain why some and not all individuals turn towards terrorist extremism and violence. On the other hand, identity theory provides an internal examination of the psychological explanations for the turn to terrorism by incorporating other explanations into an individual’s sense of identity,

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which establishes its significant explanatory power. It is, as Richards describes, a bottom-up analysis, instead of a top-down approach through recruitment or radicalisation (Richards, 2017: 4) or other external socio-political reasons. Moreover, examinations of identity reveal how a variety of factors, such as the above explanations, all play a role in identity formation. Certainly, identity theory and related theories provide a relevant epistemological viewpoint for studying terrorism and more specifically home-grown terrorism.

Within the broader framework of identity theory, social identity theory is of greatest relevance for this paper, as social identity theory studies intergroup relations (Stets and Burke, 2000). Social identity theory propositions that personal and social identities of an individual are two distinct concepts and that one’s social identity depends on the group they belong to (Turner and Tajfel, 1986). An individual has multiple selves that are connected to the different social groups they are part of, be it their family, country, or sports team among others (Turner and Tajfel, 1986). As such, the individual has a sense of belonging in a social group. When the individual sees themselves as part of a group, an ingroup mentality forms, where a situation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ arises. This is realised through a threefold process beginning with social categorisation, as individuals are assigned a social category as part of a group. Then, social identification takes place, where the individual starts to identify with their social identity, and ultimately initiate social comparison between social groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Authors on social identity theory hold that in order to enhance one’s own self-esteem, individuals want to maintain a positive social identity of the ingroup and therefore discriminate against the outgroup (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This is related to the concept of thymos outlined by Fukuyama (2018), which is the part of the soul that wants the recognition of one’s dignity. Following from this, there is either isothymia, the desire to be respected as an equal, or megalothymia, the want to be recognised as superior. This resonates greatly with the intergroup behaviour of social identity theory, which Hogg (2016) aptly sums up as a competition of relative status and esteem of the ingroup. This dynamic is evident throughout conflicts in history and indeed on both sides of the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric as both Western countries and Islamist terrorist groups try to appeal to their respective targeted populations. The ingroup/outgroup competition creates a binary: you are one or the other; one of us or not. Brown (2000) argues that some of social identity theory’s greatest contributions are the explanations of ingroup biases of group superiority and responses to inequality and relative deprivation between groups.

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Nevertheless, social identity theory is not without criticisms or problems. For example, studies have found mixed results for correlation between a positive social identity and intergroup comparisons (Brown, 2000: 753). Still, evidence suggests that individuals with higher self-esteem tend to show greater ingroup favouritism and bias (Abrams, 2001), which is in line with social identity theory’s argument of positive self-esteem through group interaction. Moreover, social identity theory offers a non-reductionist social psychological account for intergroup conflict (Martiny and Rubin, 2016: 19), as it does not conduct analysis in terms of simple constituents such as individual behaviour. Instead, social identity theory takes into account the complexity of social identity and the group’s psychological representation in relation to other identities and environment. This, however, does not mean that the individual is insignificant; the emphasis of social identity theory is how social groups affect the operations of the individual (Martiny and Rubin, 2016: 19). Especially as social identity theory focuses on one’s group identity, it pays little attention to individualism, as well as other aspects that contribute to identity formation, such as history and culture. Though these aspects are indeed important, they fail to adequately capture the dynamic of conflicting identities but focus on the formation of just one identity. Thus, social identity theory is relevant to this thesis’ analysis of group identities and their conflicting discourses within the context of home-grown terrorism in the UK.

Certainly, identity underlies most, if not all, conflicts currently taking place in the world, thereby demonstrating its significance. In all conflicts, there is a division of people along certain lines of identity. Thus, identity plays a role in understanding conflicts. This is because identity taps into Anderson’s (1983) concept of an ‘imagined community’, where people perceive themselves to be part of a community due to a sense of affinity. The global Muslim ummah, a social identity, is such a unifying force in the rhetoric of terrorist organisations, because it already exists among Muslims all over the world and is a vital part of their faith. As such, terrorist groups are able to affirm this identity that was previously disrespected and injured by inflicting violence to outgroup members.

Fukuyama (2018) names this the politics of resentment, as political leaders utilise a rhetoric of an insulted and disrespected group identity in the process of mobilisation. Narratives of group victimisation by Western countries, led by the USA, are evident in previous theories explaining terrorism. Economic motivations for terrorism can been seen as a desire for one’s social identity to be treated as an equal in economic terms. The anger of Muslims around the world being

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subjected to violence and humiliation is a way in which their dignity as a group is being insulted and reduced. As such, social identity manages to tie together many of the existing theories on terrorism and offer valuable contribution to home-grown terrorism.

To conclude this chapter, it has established how there are multiple explanations for home grown terrorism, and multiple ways to look at changes in identity discourse, with social identity theory presenting a gap in existing literature and the focus of this thesis. In essence, social identity theory looks at inter-group relations and the resulting dynamics of group identities. It builds on the previous discursive explanations and goes further to encompass dynamics and interactions, which is what the focus of this thesis is—the interaction and conflict between identities. Given the absence of an application of social identity theory, this thesis aims to do exactly that and address this gap in existing research. Instead of focusing on just one side of identity’s discursive construction, social identity explains how an interaction between identities leads to these processes. The following chapter sets out the research design of this thesis.

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CHAPTER THREE Research Design

Since the previous chapter reviewed existing literature, identified a gap in said literature and established what this thesis will build on, this chapter presents Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the analytical framework to conduct my research within. CDA specifically offers an in-depth deconstruction of the language used to create identity discourses, allowing me to analyse primary sources that will be laid out further on in the chapter.

Discourse, Identity and Terrorism

This paper follows Ditrych (2014: 1), who boldly claims that there ‘is no terrorism beyond the discourse of terrorism’. In other words, I argue that the articulation of terrorism in various ways, under differing conditions and their varying effects hold tremendous power (ibid.) and shape our understanding of what the phenomenon is. Discourse entails not just language, but also the construction of thoughts, identities and actions (Foucault, 1980). According to Foucault (1977, 1980, 2003), discourse is related to social processes of legitimisation and power and also emphasises the construction of truths. Therefore, identity discourses can be understood as the discussions and communication of identity construction, as well as the meaning assigned to them. Identity discourses both reflect the greater changes in society and create meaning for specific identities. Because of the centrality of language in identity construction (Evans, 2015: 15), it is of use to look at identity discourses, as the discourses encompass the ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 1972: 54). In this case, the objects of study are the identity discourses involved with the emergence of home-grown terrorism and their changes over time as home-grown terrorism and the conflict between identity discourses escalate.

Analytical Framework

According to Bryman, discourse analysis is an approach to language that can be applied to forms of communication other than talk (Bryman, 2001: 360). Because my research is concerned with the evolving nature of identity discourses and social identities, I use discourse analysis to elaborate on home-grown terrorism throughout this thesis. This is because discourse analysis is suited to studying the discursive construction of identity and their meanings. In order to understand the

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identity discourses relevant to home-grown terrorism in the UK, namely the discourses from the British government and Islamist terrorist organisations, the spoken and written languages used to form the discourses, as well as their contexts, will be examined. Therein, this thesis presents the purpose and meaning of the identity discourses within their social contexts and the way communication is used to achieve specific goals regarding identity formation. Thus, it is necessary to analyse the way and which the identity discourses develop and influence each other through discourse analysis.

Specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis will be used, as it analyses the ‘opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’ (Wodak 1995: 1). Compared to discourse analysis, CDA highlights manipulation and exploitation in education, media and politics (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000). In Fairclough's Discourse and Social Change (1992), a three-dimensional framework for CDA is outlined: 1) discourse-as-text, or the textural features of discourse, 2) discourse-as-discursive-practice, how discourse is produced, circulated and consumed in society, and 3) discourse-as-social-practice which looks at the ideological effects of said discourse. By following this framework, I will be able to better deconstruct identity discourses through their use of specific language and ideas, as well as their impacts over time, taking into consideration the social contexts and relations of other identity discourses. Because CDA studies power in language (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000)), it enables me to examine the power of language in creating identities and to look specifically at the ideas used to construct identities as well as their meaning and impacts on individuals and society at large. By doing so, the interaction of the British and Islamist identity discourses as opposing discourses is made clear due to their conflicting values and ideologies.

Additionally, CDA can be understood as an orientation to the study of language within its social context, or ‘as a form of ‘social practice’’ (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258), due to the discourse taking place within a background that also shapes its formation. The subsequent discourse then reflects the occurrences and ideas of that setting. This is particularly relevant to my analysis of identity discourses and their impact and implications regarding home-grown terrorism, as they reflect the political environment in which they are formed, allowing for a greater inquiry into their effects in society. By doing so, the language of the identity discourses is analysed at micro, meso and macro levels to better gauge the language’s discursive power.

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Sources and Structure of Analysis

To deconstruct and analyse the British and Islamist identity discourses, I will consult primary and secondary data of relevant individuals and sources to investigate the formation of the identity discourses. For the British identity discourse, I will be using speeches and statements by previous British Prime Ministers, from Tony Blair to the present day, to analyse their conception of British identity and its reactionary nature to terrorist violence. This time period was chosen because it covers the time period of the rise of Islamist terrorism, specifically from 9/11 and its escalations onwards. Besides, I distinguish between global and local Islamist discourses, as represented by terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and their leaders at the global level and Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK at the local level. I examine their discursive construction of Muslim identity as a means of propaganda and unifying force against the West. Islamist propaganda magazines, speeches and published books will be evaluated to outline their constructions of global and local Islamist identity discourses. In a sense, the identity discourses are defined against each other which creates an identity conflict for some British Muslims. The UK was chosen because of its comparatively ambiguously defined nationality (Richards, 2017: 151), which plays a role on the identity formation of home-grown terrorists, and because it is one of the countries with the most home-grown terrorists (Europol, 2018: 26). This allows for a greater pool to select case studies from for the following chapter.

Then, I will discuss the findings and implications of my discourse analysis by linking it to various real-life components and cases. By doing so, I will be able to delve into discussions of various conceptions of identity and mention cases that revolve around the term ‘home-grown terrorism’, such as 2005 London bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan and British returnee from the Islamic State, Shamima Begum. I will evaluate how their statements reflect the ideas of social identity theory and arguments of this thesis, which indicate the prevalence and success of the Islamist terrorist organisations’ identity discourse in swaying individuals to pursue terrorism or at the very least reject their British identity entirely. Due to social identities’ interaction often being unexamined in existing research, I aim to highlight their prominence in the language of the identity discourses and examined case studies.

From there on, I will elaborate on the wider implications of such conflicts between social identities and their discourses in society and politics, namely home-grown terrorism and subsequent counter-terrorism policy. Building on social identity theory’s argument of one’s need

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for positive self-esteem, I present various alternative identity constructions and ultimately argue for a more unifying and inclusive sense of British identity to counter home-grown terrorism at the ground level. All in all, chapter five discussing the analysis’ implications is to ground my research in current debates and discussions regarding home-grown terrorism and identity in the UK.

The proposed framework allows for my analysis of social identity theory and the conflicting identity discourses of home-grown terrorism, as I argue that social identity contributes to the understanding of home-grown terrorism. The analysis will evaluate the identity discourses’ changes and conflicting nature, as well as the need for positive, or superior, group worth that underlies Islamist terrorism which can be explained by social identity theory. Ultimately, the thesis investigates the power of language in identity creation in conflicts such as home-grown terrorism.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Analysis of Changing and Conflicting Identity Discourses

This chapter introduces and outlines the identity discourses that surround home-grown terrorism in the UK, specifically focusing on the discourses set out by British government leaders on a British national identity and the Islamist discourses advanced by terrorist organisations and their leaders through propaganda efforts. The analysed discourses were chosen due to their relevance in offering explanation to home-grown terrorism. Going forward, it is important to remember that these discourses do not fully encapsulate or represent the experiences of all Britons or British Muslims, rather only a small fraction of the populace. The following analysis highlights how identities are social constructs and reproduced through discourse, and how these discourses take on meaning. I begin chronologically with the British identity discourse and how it has been created and changed over time by British prime ministers in relation to the geopolitical contexts the UK has faced, namely the war on terror and immigration. Then, the global Islamist identity discourse, propagated first by al-Qaeda and then more prominently the Islamic State, will be deconstructed. Lastly, the local Islamist identity discourse with the UK, as advanced by Hizb ut-Tahrir, will be examined.

British Identity Discourse

Following the constructivist approach, it is understood that identity is not fixed or constant. Certainly, what constitutes Britishness as an identity has been changing for years (Croft, 2012: 161) and is not clearly defined (Richards, 2017: 57). British politicians and society at large have been attempting to redefine their identity throughout history. According to historian Linda Colley, Britain is an imagined community that formed after the 1707 Act of Union as a Protestant nation against Catholic Spain and France (in Richards, 2017: 43). Since the Second World War, British identity has been associated with resolve and determination against adversity (Brown and Hoskins in Richards, 2017: 43). After WWII, the UK saw an increase in migration and the integration to, and later departure from, the European Union, where it had to emphasise its national identity and its British values, as it faced supposed threats from these processes (Richards, 2017).

Indeed, this is reflected in the discourse of former British prime ministers as well. Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown is quoted saying ‘Britain has a unique history… of successive

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waves of invasion, immigration, assimilation and trading partnerships’ with ‘a distinctive set of British values which influence British institutions’ as a result (Brown, 2007). Clearly, the British political elite have sought to construct an identity that advances their agenda. These values will come to be referred throughout the British identity discourse by various leading politicians across the decades. Already in 2000 with Tony Blair’s prime ministership, he stated ‘true Britishness lies in our values not unchanging institutions’, with the core values being ‘fair play, creativity, tolerance and an outward-looking approach to the world’ (Blair, 2000). This is of course before the horrific and world changing events of 9/11.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 bombing, Islam slowly became the focal point against which identity was defined in the West, going back to social identity theory’s argument that identities are defined against an Other to maintain positive self-esteem. Contrasted to the horrific violence of Islamist terrorism, Western countries such as the UK played up their civil and enlightened values and ideals in an interaction of identities and discourses mentioned in social identity theory. After the riots from May to July 2001 across the UK, Muslims communities were depicted as unable or unwilling to embrace British identity due to their deviating cultural traits (Alam and Husband, 2013: 243). 9/11 and subsequent media exacerbated the already existing tensions between Muslim minorities and the rest of the UK, indicating the role of the socio-economic and political context in identity formation and construction.

In 2006, just months after the 7/7 London bombings, then Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that the British identity is ‘shared values – not colour, nor unchanging and unchangeable institutions’ (Brown, 2006). The argument maintained was that a set of values could unite Britain across ethnic and sub-national identities (Richards, 2017: 3). He reiterates that a ‘strong sense of being British helps unite and unify us; it builds stronger social cohesion among communities’ (Brown, 2007). Moreover, Blair declared that British citizenship is founded on a collective identity that respects British common values, rights and responsibilities over other cultural identities:

When it comes to our essential values – belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage – then that is where we come together, it is what we hold in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves British. At that point no distinctive culture or religion supersedes our duty to be part of an integrated United Kingdom (Blair in Woodward, 2006).

After the 7/7 attacks, political leaders constructed terrorist violence as an existential threat to the British values and freedoms (Fekete in Lynch, 2012: 242). By constructing the threat as coming

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from the country’s Muslims community, politicians emphasised the need of Muslims to embrace British values that surrounded the country’s national identity (Kirkup in Lynch, 2012: 242). In the 2006 Commission for Racial Equality study, 73 percent of the British population felt that ethnic minorities needed to ‘demonstrate a real commitment to this country before they could be considered British’ (CRE, 2006: 5). In the study, the research found that diversity and tolerance are simultaneously characteristic, antithetical and a barrier of Britishness (CRE, 2006: 33). Ultimately, the study found that there is no consensus on Britishness despite unifying bases of a common lifestyle, culture, values, shared political institutions or constitution (CRE: 2006: 6). This highlights the complexity of national identity and its conception.

As the threat of terrorism continued in the 2010s, the British government enacted and officialised their discourse of British identity through policies such as multiculturalism and anti-terrorism legislation. In the UK’s Prevent Strategy document, it states that countering radicalisation ‘will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values’, such as ‘a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy’ (HM Government, 2011: 13).

The discourse advanced by the government and media may seem to be about national identity, but were instead perceived by Muslims as a challenge to their values and beliefs, as the British identity discourse deviated towards assimilation into British culture and secularism (Lynch, 2013: 255). The Other that British identity has increasingly been defined against is not a particular nation, but terrorists and their ideology (Croft, 2012: 161). A ‘new Britishness’ has been created to counter the ‘new terrorism’ of home-grown supporters, who also constitute the internal Other due to the home-grown nature of terrorism (Croft, 2012: 198). Thus, this new form of terrorism is seen as an existential threat to the UK and its identity (Croft, 2012: 198). Statements, such as those made in the government’s White Paper of 2006, stating: ‘as the tragic attacks of 7th July 2005 have shown, it is not possible to eliminate completely the threat of terrorist attacks in this country’ (UK Home Office, 2006: 8), reveal the juxtaposition of two sets of identities.

Although multiculturalism was set out with good intentions to recognise and embrace diversity, in reality it has led to alienation and marginalisation of minority groups (Asari et al, 2008: 5). Going further, some have criticised multiculturalism as breeding racial hatred and secularism which led to further segregation in society (West in Asari et al, 2008: 5), rather than the desired unity. This identification of British Muslims as marginalised and threatening to the

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British way of life and national identity among political discourse has furthered the alienation and exclusion of British Muslims from society and public life, thereby cementing their status as not quite British (Alam and Husband, 2013: 249). There is an underlying message that ‘they’, being Muslims in Britain, must adhere to British values and ideals through assimilation by almost giving up their Muslim values and identity. By not doing so, they threaten social cohesion and identity.

Over time, the discourse changed and new ideas were expressed in the face of increased terrorist activity. David Cameron’s speech after election victory was about how ‘British values’ were under attack by ‘ideology’ of ‘Islamist extremism’, which was an ‘extreme doctrine’ or ‘radical ideology’ ‘subversive’ in nature’ (Cameron, 2015). Moreover, the ‘bigotry, aggression and theocracy’ contradicted the ‘democracy’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘freedoms’ in Britain and the UK (Cameron, 2015). Most importantly, Britain believed in ‘respecting different faiths but also expecting those faiths to support the British way of life’ (Cameron, 2015). Cameron refers to the resilience of British people, referring back to WWII, as well as other liberal democratic values as forming the British identity. Suffice to say, Britishness is defined as an all-embracing, multiculturalist and secular society based on democracy, freedom under various rights and the rule of secular law (Richards, 2017: 153).

In 2014, the Department for Education outlined a ‘duty to actively promote fundamental British values in schools’ along the lines of Section 78 of the 2002 Education Act (UK Department for Education, 2014). As such, schools had to ‘promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (UK Department for Education, 2014). Contradicting in a way to his multiculturalist plan, Cameron in 2011 at the 400th anniversary of King James Bible: ‘the values we draw from the Bible go to the heart of what it means to belong in this country’ (Cameron, 2011). These statements are conflicting to his previous statements that called on diversity, as he now claims that it is only British values based on the Christian faith that have a place in society. He has backtracked on his inclusion of different faiths and leaves no room for other religions in the identity discourse. In combination with anti-immigration attitudes among the press and the Conservative Party, discourses about identity were shaped in a specific way (Garbaye and Latour, 2016; 2-3) that can be classed as unfriendly and exclusionary. Government policy and actions to counterterrorism have instead alienated and demonised Muslims, thereby reinforcing the Muslim community’s Otherness in society.

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Overall, the differences between British values and the Muslim identity have been exacerbated by multiculturalism discourse and policy, further contributing to identity conflict. Indeed, this is in line with Jarvis and Lister’s (2013) finding that anti-terrorism policies set out by the government and its use of language to target Muslims have diminished British Muslims’ sense of national identity and belonging in the UK. The inclusion of cultural traits in the citizenship tests also contributes to the ethnicization of British identity around a white English identity (Asari et al, 2008: 23). Government has failed to foster civic, unifying British identity that could incorporate British values and Muslim identity. In the end, the government’s discourse and actions are not aligned.

Islamist Identity Discourse: A Global Perspective

Since 9/11, the world has seen a rise in Islamist terrorist organisations around the world, with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (also IS) being two of the most notorious groups. Without a doubt, they have had a large impact of the world through their ideology and messages, which also take the form of identity discourse. To analyse the change of their discourse over time, I will first deconstruct al-Qaeda’s propaganda as spearheaded by leader Osama bin Laden and then that of IS and its leader, the self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In particular, I examine and compare how their use of the ummah in creating a sense of community and an unifying identity discourse is portrayed over time.

In existing scholarship, many aspects, such as messages of grievances towards vulnerable audiences, forming relations with like-minded people, exposure to extremist ideology and a sense of belonging to a discriminated and oppressed group, have been identified as explanatory variables for terrorism and subsequently deemed related to an extent (Archetti, 2013: 108, 110). In turn, I offer identity as an explanation for these variables and their interconnectedness. Moreover, Crenshaw (1986) concludes that individuals are drawn to totalitarian movements due to a lacking sense of identity and are able to find comfort in authoritarian belief (in Arena and Arrigo, 2005: 486), perhaps because it provides a clear cut vision of the world for them to pick from. Terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State offer a unified sense of identity based on belonging to the ummah.

Although home-grown terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon, its ideology goes back to that of bin Laden from al-Qaeda in the 1980s and onwards. Bin Laden’s rhetoric plays a role in

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the formation of Islamist identity discourse given his prominence. His ideology has become widespread among terrorist organisations and is therefore of significance to this thesis’ analysis, especially his statements on identity and the role of Muslims followers. In a training manual video, bin Laden recites the Koranic verses (in italics) followed by his ideology regarding the ummah:

You are the best community ever brought forth to mankind… You are the best nation ever brought forth to men, biding to honour and forbidding dishonour, and believing in Allah.

Thus, forever, let there be one nation, calling for good, enjoining honour and fighting dishonour, those are the prosperous (in Hellmich, 2005: 46).

Bin Laden implies that the ummah needs to come together as a nation to pursue good. He continues that ‘Atrocities are committed against our brothers and sisters. Yet they are part of our community, and they deserve our sympathy and our support’ (in Hellmich, 2005: 47). It becomes the duty of Muslims to rectify the situation where the ummah is attacked by foreign forces. This idea of the ummah needing protection is not new and has been advocated before by others (Hellmich, 2005: 47). Bin Laden’s rhetoric appeals to the collective consciousness of the Muslim community by contrasting images of violence and destruction towards the ummah to Koranic verses that justify action to rectify the harm. As such, ‘the ruling to kill Americans and their allies . . . is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it’ (bin Laden, 1998), thereby invoking a sense of duty for his believers.

Throughout his statements (see bin Laden, 2005), bin Laden frequently refers to the global Muslim community as ‘our ummah’, thereby already projecting an image of belonging and unity. It is apparent that there is a division between believers and non-believers of Islam and whether or not they belong to the ummah. Moreover, bin Laden places the ummah above states and governments and away from un-Islamic influences (Hellmich, 2008: 118), thereby delineating a superior group identity that offers positive self-esteem. This can be especially appealing to individuals who have suffered discrimination and marginalisation due to their identity.

Due to the Islamic State being one of the largest and most well-known international terrorist organisations of the 21st century, it will represent the modern global Islamist discourse. Despite the ideological competition between al-Qaeda, as led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and the Islamic State since 2014 as they fight for influence and power in the Middle East, IS, continues to follow the ideology set out by bin Laden (Styszynski, 2015: 11); it does so by building on existing rhetoric. The Islamic State’s depiction of its caliphate builds on the imaged community of a unified ummah,

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creating an all-encompassing identity in the process (Furlow et al, 2014: 3). Specifically, Islamic State leader al-Baghdadi has called on ‘the ummah (people) of Islam, in the East and in the West’ (al-Baghdadi, 2014), thereby uniting all Muslims under the name and authority of Islam. Furthermore, al-Qaeda cements the binary of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ through al-Zawahiri’s writing on Al-Wala’ Wal Bara, with Al-Wala meaning those they are loyal to and Al-Bara referring to their enemies (Quiggin, 2009: 19,22). Though he focuses less on a specific identity, he contributes to the obligations of an Islamist Muslim.

Low (2016) argues that this rhetoric of the Islamic State uses public pedagogy and aims to construct a new public for Muslims all over the world who may have felt distanced from the communities they reside in by mobilising their Muslim identity. Al-Baghdadi states that ‘Muslims’ rights are forcibly seized ... in the East and in the West’ due to the common enemy of non-Muslim Western states (al-Baghdadi, 2014: 2, 3). A bond has been constructed between disparate individuals beyond just some solidarity and they are unified against a common enemy (Laclau in Low, 2016: 302). This touches on narratives of oppression and violence against Muslims as perpetrated by Western countries. Muslims are presented as victims and underdogs in al-Baghdadi’s conception of their social identity, which negatively affects their self-esteem. Due to the individual’s socialisation growing up, they are more or less susceptible to Islamist ideology because of their lack of a sense of identity and belonging. An individual’s experience of discrimination and marginalisation reinforces historical and political grievances and the binary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Mahmood and Rane, 2017: 19) and therein lies the power of the rhetoric of the ummah, as a unifying sense of superior identity.

As an alternative, a Muslim identity based on a global Muslim community is offered to disenfranchised Muslims in the West. Islamic State propaganda magazine Dabiq writes that the Muslim ummah ‘should strive to be united behind a single imam, fighting under his banner and empowering him to guard the landmarks of this religion and implement the Shari’ah of Allah’ (Dabiq, 2014: 25). Al-Baghdadi (2014) claims that the ummah under the Islamic State’s caliphate is ‘a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers’. Supposedly, this dedication is inclusive to all Muslims around the world, despite their great diversity. Compared to the failing multicultural state in the UK, the supposed all-inclusive Islamic State presents a much more welcoming image than the discrimination faced in the West by minority groups.

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It is evident to note that themes of inclusivity, unity and brotherhood are incorporated in this idealised and romanticised community (Piscatori and Sikail, 2019: 151). This is done to legitimise the Islamic State but also serves the purpose of creating a community for alienated individuals, thereby allowing them to find a sense of belonging. As such, the brotherhood is an oft reoccurring theme in Islamic State propaganda, which similarly works to create a sense of belonging and community. The Islamic State is very much into constructing the ummah under its rule. It aligns the Muslim identity with its own goals and establishes an enemy through its use of language and discourse. This identity discourse exploits human need of belonging, especially in the face of Islamophobia in the West.

By invoking the ummah and the name of Islam, a collective identity is formed, with it taking on an overarching, unifying and transnational character. An enemy Other is positioned in opposition to the ummah, as al-Baghdadi claims that ‘the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr [disbelief] and hypocrisy’ (al-Baghdadi, 2014). In an essay, IS states that it is hypocrisy for a follower of true Islamic faith to reside in a non-Islamic country (Dabiq, 2015). This binary forces individuals to choose and also shapes identity in a way that mobilises them to act against the not-chosen identity. For those living in Western countries, the enemy, or not chosen-Identity, is all around them and thus, atrocities of home-grown terrorism are carried out.

More importantly, a shared collective identity can affect an individual’s interpretation of events and new information (Archetti, 2013: 115). This propagated Islamist identity discourse then supersedes other national, regional or ethnic identities (Furlow et al, 2014: 10). What is important to note, however, is the exclusionary nature of this supposedly unifying ummah, as it only considers their version of Islam as true and rejects all others, often with violence. However, the Islamic world and its identities are not homogenous and take many forms. Mandeville (2001) contends that the ummah, as a constructed transnational community, is an empowering source of identity for Muslims, especially those in Europe (in Lynch, 2013: 255).

Certainly, the Islamic state places a greater emphasis on ummah in their propaganda compared to al-Qaeda as it is central to their legitimisation and creation of a caliphate, though they do still share similar themes but of varying prominence. However, the discourse remains largely unchanged over time, as the ummah and its connotations of community and belonging are still widely drawn upon in terrorist ideology. In this sense, the ummah and caliphate are tools of

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recruitment, but only lead to terrorist violence through further indoctrination and Islamist ideology. For al-Qaeda, the focus is more on defending the ummah from Western attack, whereas the Islamic State is more intent on the creation and solidification of the ummah and caliphate. Nevertheless, both groups utilise the ummah to create a discourse of Muslim identity based on a global community and a sense of belonging.

Islamist Identity Discourse: A Local Perspective

The following subsection moves away from the Islamist discourse propagated at the global level by international terrorist organisations and turns instead to Islamist ideologies advanced by local organisations to better capture the dynamic of ideologies and identity discourses on the ground. Local Islamist discourses within the UK certainly play a role in home-grown terrorism, as they reinforce the ideas of global discourses and work to further push susceptible individuals to radicalisation and extremism. Many similar themes of victimisation, antagonism and loyalty are repeated in local discourses in the UK. Islamist propaganda, including the identity discourses, are tailored to local settings, as they are translated into various languages and reflect local political grievances to heighten alienation (Wilson, 2017: 7). For example, radical groups in the United Kingdom, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, as I will demonstrate below, have called for Muslims to reject Britishness or a British identity and instead take up the transnational identity of belonging to the ummah (Lynch, 2013: 256).

Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, leader of the Islamist political party Hizb ut-Tahrir, wrote that democracy is a ‘system of kufr’ or unbelief that Muslims are ‘forbidden to adopt, implant or call for’ and that patriotism for or assimilation into a non-Muslim society, as well as voting in elections are likewise disallowed (Zalloom, 1995: 5). Very clearly, there is a harsh rejection of the present system of government and values. In the same vein, the Hizb ut-Tahrir branch in the UK states that participating in democracy results in Muslims ‘adopting liberal secular values that are at odds with Islam’ (Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, 2015). Yet again, the entire religion of Islam is put in opposition to Western democracy, further emphasising the division between peoples and communities. In a promotional video, a Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain representative declared: ‘I think Muslims in this country need to take a long, hard look at themselves and decide what is their identity. Are they British or are they Muslim? I am a Muslim. Where I live, is irrelevant’ (BBC News, 2003). In this case, an individual is first a Muslim, then any other identity. The identity

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discourse perpetuated forces one to choose from the binary: you can only be a Muslim if you reject Western values. Indeed, many British Muslims feel that they are not fully British because of their religious commitments to Islam (Abbas and Siddique 2012: 127), thereby reflecting the extremist ideology’s goal of alienating local Muslims and ultimately forcing them to choose one identity or the other. In the face of Islamophobia and xenophobic elements in society at large, certain Muslims individuals may feel the push away from British identity and society and the pull towards a transnational, unifying identity as a Muslim part of the global ummah.

The Push and Pull of Identity Discourses

As the above analysis has demonstrated, not much has changed over time in the global Islamist discourse, as it still greatly focuses on a unifying sense of identity based on the global ummah. The intention of both global and local Islamist discourses is to sever the connection of Muslims from their non-Islamic affiliations and identities and draw them closer to the terrorists’ idealised and romanticised ummah. In comparison, the local Islamist discourses do differ to their global counterparts, as they take on different languages and arguments that have been contextualised to fit the different settings. The local Islamist discourse examined through Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain serves to further alienate British Muslims and push them towards the Muslim identity discourse of terrorist organisations utilising the ummah. It denounces Western values integral to the British identity and reinforce the idea of loyalty to the ummah rather than British society. In essence, it further emphasises the opposition of British and Islamist discourses.

The global Islamist discourse places great value on a sense of unity and loyalty to the ummah over any other identity or affiliation. While the British discourse, along with the remainder of the West, places significance on its liberal democratic values, the Islamist discourses construct the Muslim identity as further away and antithetical. Having a common Other to unite against is what forms British identity. When the enemy is Islam, British Muslims will repel this identity and form their own with the Other being Westerners. Thus, a push and pull dynamic between British and Islamist identity discourses emerges.

Whereas the British and local Islamist discourses at times create a sense of alienation and isolation in the UK, thereby creating a push away from British society, the global Islamist discourse embodying a welcoming, unifying sense of solidarity through the ummah forms a pull factor. This dynamic, as I argue, is particularly relevant to understanding home-grown terrorism,

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as it depicts a vulnerability in Western society where Islamist ideology has an opening for radicalisation in individuals who are unable to find their place in Western society. Certainly, there is a tension between the adherence to religion and assimilation into a culture for Muslims immigrants in the West (Chuang and Roemer, 2012: 102). The analysed identity discourses capture this tension on an individual, personal scale. Because of the clear black-and-white worldview radical groups offer, joining them can be a way of reducing uncertainty for Muslims facing an identity crisis (Hogg in Yusoufzai and Emmerling, 2017: 70).

Going back to social identity theory, if one identity does not provide a sense of belonging and positive self-esteem, then an individual will turn to another source of identity for membership and inclusion. Due to British discourses of identity and the accompanying marginalisation and discrimination, some British Muslims find it difficult to identity as being British. Even worse, some British Muslims feel like an ‘Other’ in their home country (Kabir, 2012: 8). Overall, the discourse analysis conducted is in line with existing literature stating that Muslims find it difficult to connect to Britishness at times.

Of course, it is important to remember that social identity theories simplifies this identity conflict into a simplistic, dualistic dynamic (Marranci, 2009: 5), especially as it is dangerous to homogenise entire groups of people and it is certainly the case with ‘the Muslim community’ who have actually demonstrated a great variety of opinions and politics, often disputing and denouncing Islamist terrorist ideology. Nevertheless, the success of radicalisation can be seen, to a certain extent, with the export of an identity based on a ‘greater, imagined community of resistance’ (Al Raffie, 2013: 67, 74) and one’s loyalty is to an ethnic and religious identity rather than British national identity (Asari et al, 2008: 2).

Evolving knowledge and understanding in this field is revealing that a multitude of personal motives, circumstances and contexts may contribute to why people may become interested and involved in violent extremist groups, causes or ideologies and, perhaps separately, why they may offend on their behalf (Borum, 2012). What this thesis argues is that identity is a way in which these aspects can be tied together. Thus, this chapter has deconstructed the British and Islamist identity discourses to demonstrate their conflicting push and pull nature that is at the core of home-grown terrorism. The following chapter will apply these findings to two case studies and connect it to the greater societal and political implications regarding home-grown terrorism, identity and counter-terrorism policy.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Implications and Further Discussion

Having outlined the relevant identity discourses of home-grown terrorism and their discursive interaction, namely the conflict of the push-and pull-dynamic, this chapter then delves into their implications in the real world. Since the identity discourses of the British government and terrorist organisations have been examined in detail, this implications chapter zooms out to look at greater society and the role of these identity discourses therein. It is vital to connect the preceding analysis to existing literature on nationality, multiculturalism and counter-terrorism to accentuate this thesis’ relevance. Therefore, this chapter will look at the rhetoric of known home-grown terrorists in the form of two case studies as evidence of my analysis above. Moreover, it is important to discuss the social and political implications of the aforementioned identity discourses, such as how the push and pull dynamics play out in society regarding integration and assimilation, in order to pave a path for a better future.

Case Studies

The conflict of identities and their discourses, as I have outlined above, have indeed been rejected in the rhetoric of past home-grown terrorists, most notably Muhammed Sidique Khan, the leader of the four terrorists that were responsible for the London bombings in July 2005. Born into a Pakistani immigrant family in the city of Leeds, Khan grew up as a member of British society and completed a university degree. Yet, he would later come to detonate a bomb on an underground train, killing six civilians and himself and wounding many others (Richards, 2017: 19). After the act of terrorism, a video of him was circulated in the media. In it, he spoke with a British Yorkshire accent and addressed the viewers: ‘Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters’ (Khan, 2005). The ‘you’ in Khan’s statements refers to the British and Western public and his ‘people’ and ‘brothers and sisters’ are Muslims of the global ummah. Evidently, there is a clear binary of ‘us versus them’ in his language, referring to the divide between the West and Islamic world. His Muslim identity builds on the pain experienced by other Muslims throughout history and all over the world by the hands of Western countries.