Civil-Military Relations in post-military regimes in Latin America
A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences of Leiden University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Bachelor of Science in International Relations Under supervision of Kevin Koehler Word count: 7655 By Sanne Grave Leiden June 15, 2019
3 Table of Contents
Introduction 4
Civil-Military Relations in Consolidated and New Democracies 5
Civil Control in New Democracies 8
Research Method 9
Argentina and Ecuador 9
Indicators of Civil Control 11
Civil Control in Argentina and Ecuador 13
Comparing Civil Control between Argentina and Ecuador 15
Conclusion 18
Appendix 20
4 Introduction
The biggest puzzle in civil-military relations is how civilians can control their own military to prevent the military from taking over power. Various contributions are considering how civil control should be applied in democratic settings, often claiming coups are unlikely if the military shares democratic norms because these norms prevent the military from disobeying. Less is known about how civil control works in democracies which transitioned from military rule. The conditions of a democracy cannot be expected to exist in these countries because the military has been politically active and is most likely not familiar with democratic norms. The question is then, how can civil control be
accomplished? It is important to know how new democracies successfully control their military. If the mechanisms behind civil control in new democracies are understood, external policies in support of civilian control can be improved. A stable political environment allows the development of a strong democracy. Stepan (1988) already pointed out the contrary: weak civil control will lead to the breakdown of democracy. Therefore, the following question will be answered:
‘What aspect of civil control can prevent or cause a military coup in new democracies?’
Ecuador and Argentina will be reviewed. They are very similar because both are new democracies that emerged from a military regime, both have a presidential system, and they share a similar military history. However, since their democratic transition, only Ecuador experienced a coup in 2000. The period before the coup will be analysed; 1998 until 2000. Each country will be examined, focusing on aspects involving civil control. This paper will start with exploring the existing literature on civilian control in democracies. Then, civil control in post-military regimes will be explored. This will lead to the theoretical argument, after which the hypothesis will be revealed. The dependent variable is the coup in Ecuador, the independent variable is the behaviour of the government which will be explained by using the indicators ability and disposition control, based on Feaver’s (1999) notion of civil control. These concepts will be explained later on. After the hypothesis, the research method and case selection will be explained. The results will be discussed afterwards. The paper will conclude that the behaviour of the government is key in preventing a coup in new democracies. The answer has two elements, first of all, the government should prosecute the military for its past transgression so the government controls the ability of the military to organise a coup and sends a clear message about who is in charge. Secondly, the government should be legitimate towards the electorate in order to decrease the disposition of the military to politically intervene.
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Civil-Military Relations in Consolidated and New Democracies
This paper will focus on civil-military relations in new democracies arising from military regimes because they form an exception to the assumptions of democracy. In democracies emerging from military regimes, democratic norms and the notion of military professionalism are not likely to exist because the military has been politically active for a relatively long period of time. Therefore, civil control works differently than in consolidated democracies. 'New democracies' and 'post-military regimes' are used interchangeably in this paper.
Civilian control is the control of a government over the military. The goal of civil control is to gain as much control over the military as it can to make sure the military will be subordinate (Feaver, 1996). Stepan (1988) argues civil control is successful if there are low military contestation and low military prerogatives. In this paper, the failure of civil control is conceptualised in its most extreme form: a coup. ‘Civilians’ is a broad concept which can be everything that is not military. Since new democracies are analysed, a representative government will be in place. Therefore, when talking about the civilians, the paper refers to civilian representatives. If civilians can be everything but the military, the military can be all that are not civilians. Plato’s question ‘who guards the guardians?’ (Feaver, 1999, p. 211) insinuates the military being the people with guns. Feaver names the military as expert in assessing the nature of the threat (1999). Janowitz (1960) conceptualises military officers as ‘the military’ since they are the ones making decisions and high-rank officers are most successful in organising a coup since they have access to organisational resources and are able to manipulate beliefs (Singh, 2014, p. 36). Therefore, the military in this paper entails high ranking officers and generals of the Navy, Army and Air Force. This paper aims to explain why Ecuador experienced a coup and Argentina did not, while both being new democracies that arose from a military regime. The coup in Ecuador can be called a coup because the military forced the elected president out of the office and installed an interim military government before a new president was chosen (Singh, 2014). Now the concepts are clear, different contributions on civil-military relations and civil control will be
discussed.
The basic assumption of civil-military relations is that the military as an institution is there to protect the citizens as well as the territory of a state from existential threats. The military has to be strong enough to protect. This implies that the military is also strong enough to take over political power (Barany, 2012). This problem is known as the ‘civil-military problematique’ (Feaver, 1999). Feaver accordingly, suggested that the “civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do” (1996, p. 149).
Most contributions to the debate on civil control focus on consolidated democracies. These theories lay down the foundation for understanding civil control in post-military regimes. When looking at consolidated democracies, objective civilian control is the most efficient way to control the
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military because it maximises military professionalism (Huntington, 1957). This means the military is militarised instead of politicised and serves as a tool of the state. The focus of the military is only on military matters simply because its ethics prevent it from being politically active. Civilians are then in control of the norms of the military. In practice, political ideology should be compatible with military ethics. Furthermore, there should be a parallel level of authority and the military should only have authority over military matters (Ibid).
Barany (2012) conceptualises a ‘democratic army’ as an army that supports democratic governance rather than one party. Civilian oversight does not equal democratic control over the military; therefore, he further elaborates on how civil-military relations should look like in democracies. He argues that the military in a democracy should be devoted to democratic norms. Furthermore, he underlines forms of civil control implemented by institutions such as constitutional control, a clear chain of command, budgetary oversight by the executive and minimising political activism within the military.
Another way to carry out civil control is to focus on controlling the ability of the military to take over power (Feaver, 1999). Civil control focussing on ability control consists of administrative restraints, keeping the army divided and weak in relation to the government, cutting the military budget, decreasing the military’s size or making it highly specialised so it is less likely to stage a coup (Ibid). Civil control can also be focused on controlling the disposition of the military to take power in the political sphere. This can be done for by example training, a legitimate division of labour between the civil and the military, introducing civilian-led monitoring mechanisms and by taking personal norms into account during admission. Moreover, increasing the legitimacy of the civilian government is an effective tactic to prevent the military from staging a coup. The military will not intervene because there is no need for a better government (Holsti, in Feaver, 1999).
In contrast to Huntington’s military professionalism and Feaver’s idea of a clear separation between the military and the civilians, Janowitz (1960) argues that politicisation of the military cannot be avoided. The military should share values with the general citizenry so that it can balance its actions between values of society and military factors. The officer is then a military man as well as a citizen and will therefore not turn against the state.
Another way of looking at civil-military relations is the structure versus the agency approach. The structure approach looks at structural explanations for civil control, but structures rarely change over time and can accordingly not be an explanatory factor in changing environments. The agency approach looks at the relation between the one who gives orders and the other who serves, the principal-agent relationship (Pion-Berlin, 2011). An interesting, yet too deep-diving approach for this research.
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Some aspects of civil control that apply to consolidated democracies are also valuable for new democracies. First of all, allowing civil and military norms to mix (Janowitz, 1960) is not only
important for consolidated democracies but also during the democratisation of former military regimes (Stepan, 1988). In order to increase civil control, the military should be incorporated in national security-councils. If the military is included, an effective exchange of information and services can be achieved. In turn, this will increase the capacity of civil control (Ibid). Secondly, the legitimacy of the government is obviously not only important for consolidated democracies. Looking at new
democracies in Eastern Europe, research confirms that a legitimate state is necessary for building an institutional framework. The framework is important for civilians to take control of the military (Dudly, 2014). Apart from benefiting the establishment of an institutional framework, it also influences the behaviour of the military. If the civilian government is subordinate towards the
electorate, the military is more likely to be subordinate to civil control (Kohn, 1997, Karsten, 1998, in Moon & Rhyu, 2011). Thirdly, an important task for the civil government is to prosecute the military for its insubordinate behaviour in the past. Then, the government sends a clear message about who is in charge (Feaver, 1999).
Desch (1999) suggests another way of understanding civil control in new democracies. He uses both Huntington’s (1957) notion of military professionalism, where the military is isolated from the civilians, and Janowitz’ (1960) subjective control, where civil and military norms mix. The approaches are contradictory and applicable in different conditions. If external threats are high and internal threats are low, civilian leaders will focus on military professionalism because civilians are sensitive to internal security. If external and internal threats are both low or both high, civil control can be subjective or focused on military professionalism, depending on the focus of the military itself. An externally focused military will push to military professionalism while an internally focused military will push civilian leaders toward subjective control. If external threats are low and internal threats are high, subjective control will be pressured because civilians are not interested in national security issues. If civilian leaders want to implement changes in the military apparatus, it should be justified by military effectiveness (Desch, 1999). When experiencing a high external threat, it is easier to carry out civil control than when experiencing a high internal threat. Although this theory explains the direction of civil control under different circumstances, it cannot explain the coup in Ecuador.
Other scholars argue that the transition to democracy is an important factor for the
institutionalisation of civil control. Chile, Argentina, and Brazil are the most researched cases of Latin America in the civil-military relations literature. All countries experienced a relatively long period of military rule and are culturally and historically comparable since they all have been under Spanish or Portuguese rule. The Brazilian military had a strong position to bargain its way out because it
collaborated with the civilian rulers (Bruneau & Tollefson, 2014). Likewise, the Chilean military was able to bargain institutional safeguards because it left strong; it ruled effectively and succeeded in restructuring the economy (Aguero, 1992 & 1995, in Geddes, 1999; Hunter, 1997; Barany, 2012). The
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Argentinean military left weak, after losing the Falkland/Malvinas war, human-rights abuses and leaving the country in a deep economic crisis. Therefore, the military had a very weak position in bargaining for institutional safeguards (Ibid). The difference in transition, however, does not explain the same stable civil-military relations afterwards.
Civil Control in New Democracies
When looking at Ecuador, the assumptions of the general literature seem to be ambiguous. The military in Ecuador left power on a positive note: the economy was growing and the military itself initiated the transition to civil rule (Isaacs, 1993). Literature suggests that if the military leaves office associated with success, the military enjoys a strong position to bargain institutional prerogatives during the transition to democracy. The military is then included in transition meetings instead of being isolated (Hunter, 1997; Geddes, 1999; Barany, 2012). Military inclusion is important for the establishment of civil control and civil control can prevent coups from happening (Stepan, 1988). Nevertheless, Ecuador experienced a coup after the transition to democracy. Despite the inclusion of the military during the transition, no strong civil control mechanism was established.
The same paradox is true for Argentina. After the transition to democracy, the military had a negative connotation because of economic defects, human-rights abuses and the defeat in the
Falkland/Malvinas war. This led to the isolation of the Argentinean military institution (Hunter, 1997 & 1998). Stepan would argue that it complicated the consolidation of civil control (1988). Moreover, its corporate self-interest was threatened by budget cuts and prosecutions. Threats to the military institution are often the main source of political interventions of the military (O’Donnell, in Desch 1999; Finer, 1976 in Brooker, 2013). Despite these facts, Argentina, since the transition to democracy, did not experience a coup.
To be able to explain this paradox, this research focuses on civil control. Analysing civil control gives us a broad view of the mechanisms that can prevent the military from organising a coup. Successful civil control is conceptualised on its minimum: the absence of a military coup. To establish successful civil control, an important aspect according to the literature is the behaviour of the civil government towards the military. If the civil government is willing to prosecute the military for its disobedient behaviour during the military regime, it will be more successful in securing civil control (Feaver, 1999). In addition to that, the military is inclined to be subordinate to the new democratic civil government if the new government is regarded as legitimate by the electorate (Kohn, 1997, Karsten, 1998, in Moon & Rhyu, 2011). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is formed:
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H1: If the behaviour of the government is characterised by the willingness to prosecute the military for its past transgression and regarded legitimate by the electorate, a military coup is less likely to occur. To keep a broad focus, civil control will be evaluated using Feaver’s (1999) two techniques of civil control. The first is controlling the ability of the military to organise a coup, the second technique is controlling the disposition of the military to organise a coup. These approaches give a broad
understanding of civil control because it covers the institutional framework as well as the behaviour of the military and the civilian government.
Research method
This research focuses on new democracies emerging from military regimes. The issue of civilian control over the military is particularly central to this group of countries. Given their history of military involvement in politics, democratic norms are unlikely to be widespread within the armed forces. Civil control will, therefore, look different than in consolidated democracies. This thesis focuses on a comparison between Ecuador and Argentina. Ecuador turned into a democracy in 1979, Argentina did so in 1983. Both countries had previously been ruled by military regimes. Roughly 10 years after the transition to democracy both countries were challenged by an economic crisis. Following the crisis, Ecuador experienced a coup, while Argentina did not. This makes the cases suitable for a Most Similar Systems Design. To answer the research question, qualitative data-analysis will be used. Different aspects of the dependent variables will be explained in the indicators section. It will be explanatory research because the reason behind stable civil-military relations in new
democracies will be demonstrated. A small N comparison will be made to keep this research realistic, yet interesting. Taking more aspects into account will overreach the scope of this research. Both countries will be explained over the period towards the coup; 1998-2000. If necessary, a broader timeframe will be used for some indicators. When looking at the validity of this research design it is important to know that the analysis is done by secondary sources, mainly documents, out of which conclusions about civil control will be extracted. Analysing secondary sources gives a clear view of the structure of the civil control in a country but is also subject to interpretation.
Argentina and Ecuador
Argentina and Ecuador have both been subjected to military rule, Argentina from 1976 until 1983, Ecuador from 1973 until 1979. During the time of analysis, from 1998 until 2000, both countries were democratic only for roughly 10 years. Moreover, both countries are part of the third wave of
democratisation which categorises them as new democracies (Huntington, 1991). The cases fit the concept of new democracies arising from military regimes.
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Looking at the political structure, the countries have a lot in common. They both have a presidential system. The president is the head of state and appoints the cabinet. Both presidents serve for a four-year term. Argentina is a federal republic with a bicameral Congress; the senate and a chamber of deputies. Ecuador is a presidential state which has one chamber: the National Assembly (The Economist, 2018 & 2019). The structure of the government and the institutions which are important for civil control are comparable. To understand the structure of civil-military relations in both countries, history should be taken into account.
Regarding their military history, both countries have a comparable background. Both had an indigenous population whose territory was conquered by the Spanish during the 16th century (Vacs, 2015, and Loveman, 1999). The ancestors of both countries are a mix of indigenous and Spanish people. Therefore, in large parts, Argentina and Ecuador are culturally comparable. The countries both have Spanish roots in the military apparatus, so the origin of the militaries are equal in that sense. A quote about the rewards for Spanish soldiers during the reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula shows the origin of the norms of the military apparatus in Latin America: “soldiers in Spain were rewarded booty, land, tax exemptions, special legal status (fueros), and royal privileges” (Loveman, 1999, p. 1). The role of the armed forces during the Spanish conquest of Latin America, mainly to organise central control, was also key during the wars of independence in both countries. After its independence from the Spanish, Argentina fought another war with Uruguay and Brazil, to secure its territory in 1828 (Vacs, 2015). So did Ecuador which became fully independent of Colombia in 1830 (BBC, 2012). The military in both countries was popular and admired for its performance during the war of
independence and the wars that followed. The militaries stayed present in the political spheres to protect its country’s independence. This became clear after an unstable period of economic growth and decline; the military took over political power. Both countries experienced a relatively long period of military rule. In Argentina, the regime lasted from 1976 until 1983 during which the military focussed on restoring economic growth and political rule, something the civilian governments had failed to do thus far (Vacs, 2015). In Ecuador, military rule lasted from 1972 until 1979. The military regime was a response to the oil boom, its main goal was social reform and modernisation of the country (Isaacs, 1993 and Loveman, 1999).
In Ecuador the dictatorship ended with a positive note, after growing pressure of civilians and the fragmentation within the military, the military initiated a transition to civil rule. Also, during its ruling period, the military promoted economic growth and administered the country successfully (Isaacs, 1993). In contrast, the military in Argentina had a negative connotation because of the intense human rights violations, deep economic crisis and the loss of the Falkland/Malvinas war against the United Kingdom (Hunter, 1997). Civil-military relations have changed since the decline of the military regimes. While in Ecuador the military still enjoyed quite some popularity, in Argentina the military was regarded as an unreliable institution. The civilian government in Argentina reduced the military budget, restrained prerogatives and organised widespread prosecutions (Hunter, 1997). In
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contrast, the civilian government in Ecuador initiated negotiations where the military had the leverage to maintain political influence (Quibell, 2002).
In the years leading up to the start of a new millennium, both countries experienced economic problems. Ecuador experienced a banking crisis between 1998 and 1999. So did Argentina, after introducing a new currency. The Argentineans protested because of the budget cuts that were introduced. The military kept quiet and did not intervene. Instead, elections caused a change of government. Ecuador also experienced protests, but when the government demanded the military to shut down the protests, the military turned against the government and forced the president out of office (BBC, 2012, 2018). This paper will explain how civil control influenced these different outcomes.
The cases are to some extent representative of a broader spectrum of third wave post-military regimes in Latin America. Ecuador represents countries that recently experienced a coup and where the military stayed relatively powerful in politics. Argentina represents the opposite, civil-military relations were stable enough to not experience a coup. Nevertheless, civil-military relations depend on domestic and international factors (Dudly, 2014). Although the cases can be a starting point to
speculate about a broader framework, in the end, civil-military relations derive around each case differently.
Indicators of Civil Control
The dependent variable will be the coup in Ecuador and the absence of military intervention in
Argentina. The independent variable is the behaviour of the government which will be measured using aspects that control the ability as well as those that affect the disposition of the military to take over political power. These aspects explain civil control because they are both focused on the institutional framework and the behaviour of the military and the government. It, therefore, gives a broad view of how civil control is organised.
Ability control
Examining ability control, the chain of command will be analysed to understand who is in charge of the use of force because it reflects the influence of the military in a political decision. This
construction can be found in the constitution. If a civilian is in charge, the military has no political influence over the use of force (Barany, 2012).
The second aspect of ability control is the amount of military personnel. One way of
controlling the military is to decrease its size (Feaver, 1999). A small military would not necessarily mean it is unable to stage a coup, but it is easier to control. This aspect will be analysed using ‘armed forces personnel, the percentage of total labour force’, collected by the World Bank.
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The third aspect is to what extent alternative institutions guarantee safety. Parallel forces can counterbalance the military so it will not take over power. Furthermore, the separation of internal and external security prevents the ability of one force taking full control (Feaver, 1999). These two elements will be analysed by looking at the constitution and at historical case studies. If alternative institutions are in charge of security, a military coup is less likely.
The fourth aspect is the willingness of the civilian government to prosecute past transgression of the military. This alone will not make the military subordinate, but prosecution is essential for the implementation of the institutional framework and increases the cost-benefit calculation of the military for insubordinate behaviour. Furthermore, prosecution of unwanted behaviour by the military is key for the success of civil control because it gives a clear message to the military about who is in charge (Feaver, 1999). Prosecution of past misconduct controls the ability of the military to intervene because coup-prone military leaders from the past will be excluded from the military. This aspect will be analysed using historical case studies.
Disposition control
Ability control is related to a strong legal framework. However, this is not enough for successful civil control. If the military does not support or respect the legal framework, it is worthless (Feaver, 1999). Therefore, norms within the military should also be taken into account. Norms are difficult to measure, only interviews will be valuable. Instead, this research focuses on the disposition of the military to take control. This covers an even broader range because it also looks at how the military behaves, instead of only focusing on its norms. It will show how civilians try to adjust military incentives to obey.
One way to adjust the disposition of the military is to pay it enough for the job. The size of the military budget in relation to the amount of military personnel indicates the tendency of the military to intervene in politics. If the budget decreases but the number of personnel increases, it is likely for the military to intervene since its self-interest is threatened (O’Donnell, in Desch 1999; Finer, 1976 in Brooker, 2013). This balance will be analysed by using ‘military expenditure in US dollars’ and ‘armed forces personnel, total’ from the World Bank.
A second aspect is the legitimacy of the government. An institutional framework for civil control can only be effective if the society regards the government as a legitimate organisation (Dudley, 2014). This will be measured by looking at the number of published news articles related to protests against the government. More protests against the government will indicate less legitimacy. This can trigger the military to intervene in the political sphere.
The third aspect is the identity of the minister of defence. The identity of the defence minister reflects the influence of the military in politics. If the defence minister is a civilian, it points at civilian control over the military. This can affect the disposition of the military to intervene politically, it
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probably want more influence. If the minister of defence is a general, it is not likely for the military to intervene since it has access to the political field through the minister of defence. This aspect will be analysed using historical case studies.
Civil Control in Argentina and Ecuador Ecuador
Ability control
Looking at the chain of command, the constitution states that the president of Ecuador exercises the highest authority over the fuerza publica, the public force. The public force consists of the police and the military. The president decides over the use of force, decides over the political direction of war and is in charge of internal order, and public security (Constitucíon de 1998 Ecuador, Art. 171). In the chapter about the public force, it is again stated that the public force shall be obedient and not deliberative (Art. 185). On paper, the National Security Council ‘[...] will be the superior body responsible for national defence [...]’(Art. 189). Nevertheless, in deference, the National Security Council relies heavily upon the policies written by the Joint Command, a military body (Quibell, 2002). In practice, the military still has a significant influence on the decision to use force.
The size of the military, as the amount of military personnel in percentage to the total labour force, has been in decline since 1990. Only after 2000 there is a slight increase until 1,08% but does not go back to the old number of 1,3% (Appendix 1). Looking at the total amount of personnel, the size of the military has been stable until the year of the coup (Appendix 2). The size of the military is not an explanatory aspect.
Analysing alternative institutions and the division of security, Ecuador seems not to have a clear division of security or alternative institutions that counterbalance the military. The public force, fuerza publica, consists of the military and the National Police. The military serves under the Ministry of Defence, the police serve under the Ministry of Interior and serves as an auxiliary force to the military (Quibell, 2002). Therefore, the police do not serve as a counterbalancing actor to the military. The constitution states that the fundamental mission of the military is the conservation of national sovereignty, defence of the integrity and independence of the state, and the guarantee of its legal system (Art. 183). The mission of the police is to guarantee public security and order (Ibid). Although the mission of the police is only focused on internal security, the mission statement of the military leaves space for interpretation (Quibell, 2002), which causes an unclear division between internal and external security. These two elements increase the ability of the military to organise a coup.
Examining the willingness of the civil government to prosecute insubordinate behaviour of the military in the past, it is non-existing in Ecuador. The military in Ecuador is never prosecuted for its actions during the military regime. Questions about human rights abuse arose, but the military
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not pay attention to this claim (Loveman, 1998). Furthermore, the military itself initiated the transition to democracy and organised political dialogues as a ‘process of juridical restructuring of the Nation’ (Isaacs, 1993, p. 119). Because of this, the sensitive questions about the human rights abuses during the dictatorship were removed from the agenda and the civil government was not willing to prosecute the military for its behaviour during the military regime.
Disposition control
Looking at the relation between military expenditure and size, the total amount of armed forces personnel peaked in the year 2000. The military expenditure declined significantly since 1998 and only increased since 2000. In 1998, the same amount of personnel was employed as in previous years but the budget decreased significantly. The self-interest of the military was threatened, which may explain the coup in Ecuador (Appendix 2 & 3).
When analysing the legitimacy of the government, it becomes clear that the Ecuadorian civil government struggled. Looking at all news published by the BBC regarding Ecuador, the legitimacy of the government appears to be critical in the period before the coup. Students, workers and indigenous people covered the streets to demonstrate against new policies in 1998. In 1999 even more protests took place, regarding the economic situation. Protests became bigger and more violent towards the new millennium (BBC, 1997-2000).
Regarding the identity of the defence minister in Ecuador, at least since the new constitution of 1998, it can only be a civilian. The constitution prohibits active military personnel from becoming a minister (Art. 178). This increases the disposition of the military to take over political power.
Argentina
Ability control
Looking at the chain of command, the constitution of 1993 states that the president of the nation is commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the nation (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Art. 99.12). He has control over the armed forces and is in charge of their organisation and distribution and declares war (Art. 99.14, 99.15). The authority over the use of force is clearly in the hands of a
civilian: the president.
The size of the military, as amount of armed forces personnel as a percentage of the total labour force, droped from 1990 until 1994 after which it increased again, up to around 0,7 % of the total labour force. After this increase, the amount of personnel as a percentage of the total labour force slightly decreased (Appendix 4). When looking at the total amount of personnel, the size of the military clearly decreased. Therefore, the ability of the military to organise a coup was restrained. Analysing alternative institutions and the division of security, the National Defence Law of 1988 states that the military and police forces in Argentina are separated (Hunter, 1997). The military is in charge of external security while the police are in charge of internal security. The military serves under the authority of the national government while the police serve under the authority of the
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provinces and municipalities (Art. 75.30). The police, therefore, serve as a counterbalancing actor for the military and there is a clear division between internal and external security. This decreases the ability of the military to organise a coup.
Examining the willingness of the civilian government to prosecute the military for its crimes during the military regime, it was clearly present in Argentina. Because the military left power while being defeated during the war, it was in no position to bargain institutional safeguards. President Alfonsín was able to prosecute the former military leaders with hard measures. Alfonsín’s actions set the tone for subordination of the military to civil control (Hunter, 1997).
Disposition control
Looking at the relation between military expenditure and size, there has been a significant drop in the amount of military personnel since 1998. While the military expenditure peaked in the year 1999, the amount of personnel was at a low point, which was beneficial for the military. However, the period between 1999 and 2000 may have been critical because the amount of military personnel increased while the budget was still decreasing (Appendix 5 & 6). This could form a reason for the military to intervene.
Analysing the legitimacy of the government, also the Argentinean government experienced problems. When looking at the news reports of the BBC during the period before 2001, it is clear that the government did not enjoy much legitimacy towards the end of its ruling period (BBC, 1997-2001). In 1999 the trade unions protested against new government policies. After a new president was
inaugurated, protests continued and intensified. Especially in 2001, demonstrations against the government became more violent and clashes appeared between protesters and the police. During the mid-term polls, it became clear that Fernando de la Rúa, the president at that time, had lost his support. He resigned and new elections caused a change of government (BBC, 1997-2001). The new elections secured the legitimacy of the government and prevented the military from intervening.
The identity of the minister of defence in Argentina is a civilian since the transition to democracy which may inspire the military to take over power. The constitution does not explicitly keep the military from participating in politics but president Alfonsín transferred decision making from the military to a civilian-led Ministry of Defence (Hunter, 1997). This could increase the disposition of the military to organise a coup.
Comparing Civil Control between Argentina and Ecuador
A broad spectrum of indicators that contained aspects of ability and disposition control, is used in order to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis stated that if the behaviour of the government is characterised by the willingness to prosecute the military for its past transgression and regarded legitimate by the electorate, a coup by the military is less likely to occur. The cases proved the
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hypothesis to be right. One aspect related to ability and one related to disposition explain the
hypothesis. Related to ability, the aspect of the willingness of the government to prosecute the military for its transgressions in the past, explains why the civil government in Argentina managed to send a clear message about who is in charge of the military. Related to disposition, the aspect of the legitimacy of the government points towards the governments’ subordination towards the electorate. Even though the Argentinean government lost its legitimacy during the crisis, it stepped down and organised new elections. In Ecuador, the government stayed in office long after it had lost its legitimacy which led the military to intervene.
Other aspects of ability control only partly explain the different outcomes after ten years of democracy in Ecuador and Argentina. The institutional framework in both countries is comparable on paper but differ in practice. This has mainly to do with the institutional framework which in Ecuador is not substantial. The first example is Ecuador’s military mission. It is drafted rather vaguely, which leaves space for interpretation about when the military is allowed to use force. This ambiguous mission statement causes an unclear division between the responsibility of internal and external security. The second example of a weak institutional framework is the lack of a counterbalancing actor within the state apparatus. Where in Argentina the police is deployed separate from the military, the Police of Ecuador serve as an auxiliary force. Accordingly, the military in Ecuador did not experience any resistance from a counterbalancing actor when it organised the coup in 2000. A third example of this insufficient framework is the way the National Security Council is influenced by the Joint Command. The constitution claims the president, as head of the NSC, has absolute authority over the armed forces. In practice, however, the NSC copies a lot of the policies written by the Joint Command. The military in Ecuador clearly has more influence. The difference in the three aspects mentioned above, explain why the military in Ecuador stayed politically active despite the military regime had ended. However, the different outcomes in Argentina and Ecuador during the crisis cannot only be explained by the difference in the institutional framework. The main explanation for the coup, or the absence of one, is the behaviour of the civil government.
After analysing all indicators, the behaviour of the civilian government seems to be the most important factor in explaining the coup in Ecuador and the absence of a coup in Argentina. Two aspects explain why the behaviour of the government is an important factor. First of all, the behaviour of the government right after the transition to democracy demonstrates its attitude towards the
military. As Feaver argued, prosecuting the military for its disobedient behaviour strengthens the constitutional rules and gives a clear message to the military about who is in charge (1999). The extent to which the government is willing to prosecute misbehaviour of the military during the military regime determines the ability of the military to organise a coup. The more a government is willing to prosecute, the less a military is able to organise a coup. In Argentina, the military had no position to make deals to evade prosecution. The attitude of the government was ruthless and it was able to punish the military heavily. Since the military in Ecuador initiated the transition to democracy itself, it could
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assure no prosecutions would follow. Indeed, the civilian government never started prosecutions against the military. Therefore, the Argentinean civilian government made clear who is in charge of the military and restrained its ability to organise a coup, while the Ecuadorean government failed to do so.
Secondly, the behaviour of the government during the crisis in 2000 plays a significant role in determining the disposition of the military to organise a coup in Ecuador. Dudly (2014) argued the institutional framework for civil control can only be successful if the electorate accepts the
government as legitimate. We have seen that during the crisis both governments lost their popularity. An illegitimate government in itself does not explain a coup or non-coup, what does explain the difference in disposition of the military, is the way the governments reacted on their decreasing popularity. While in Ecuador the president stayed in power and tried to solve the country’s problems, Argentina’s president resigned after his unpopularity was shown by the mid-term polls. The civilian government in Argentina was, after the new elections, still regarded legitimate while in Ecuador the military felt the need to step in to make sure the government did what the civilians demanded it to do. The civil government can only expect the military to be subordinate to civil control if the government itself is also subordinate to the people it represents.
The behaviour of the civilian government is the main factor that explains the coup in Ecuador and the absence of one in Argentina. It is the most important aspect of civil control for explaining coups in post-military regimes. As explained above, it consists of two aspects: prosecuting the military for its crimes during the military regime, and for the civil government being subordinate to the
electorate.
This paper started with a paradox of theories which now can be explained. The paradox arose from different theories on civil-military relations. The Ecuadorian military left the office with a positive connotation and was therefore not isolated after the transition to democracy. Military inclusion is important for the establishment of civil control (Stepan, 1988). However, no strong civil control mechanism was implemented and the military took over control during the crisis in 2000. In Argentina, it was the other way around. The military had a negative connotation after the breakdown of the military regime which led to the isolation of the military. This should have had a negative influence on the establishment of civil control because its self-interest was threatened (O’Donnell, in Desch 1999; Finer, 1976 in Brooker, 2013). Nevertheless, the military never took up arms to take over political power.
The cases prove the main arguments of the literature to be wrong. It shows the isolation of the military does not have to be a bad influence on the establishment of civil control in new democracies. It is actually very important for civil control to dominate in the period right after the fall of a military regime. The military can then be prosecuted for its misbehaviour in the past and civil control can be established without the interference of the military.
18 Conclusion
The cases showed that an effective institutional framework that controls the ability of the military to intervene is only partly important for the success of civil control. Although the coup in Ecuador cannot only be explained by the difference in ability control between both countries, the failure of the
institutional framework in Ecuador explains the presence of the military in politics. An institutional framework is important for the establishment of civil control but in itself, it does not explain why Ecuador experienced a coup and Argentina did not.
The answer to the research question about what aspect of civil control can prevent or cause a military coup in a new democracy has to do with a combination of controlling the ability and
disposition of the military to intervene: the behaviour of the civil government. It consists of two aspects, firstly the willingness of the civilian government to prosecute the military for its insubordinate behaviour during the military regime, which decreases the ability of the military to intervene. The more the government is willing to prosecute the military for its past transgression, the less able the military is to organise a coup. In the period right after the military regime, the Argentinean
government prosecuted the military for its misconduct in the past, sending a clear message about who is in charge. The Ecuadorian government failed to prosecute the military for its transgression during the military regime. Argentina, in contrast to Ecuador, successfully controlled the ability of the military to intervene. Secondly, the subordination of the civil government towards the electorate decreases the disposition of the military to intervene. The more subordinate the government is to the electorate, the less it forms a disposition for the military to intervene. When the new democracies were challenged, during the crisis in 1999, both governments lost their legitimacy. Only the Argentinean president resigned and organised new elections, while the Ecuadorian government held on to power. The Argentinean government successfully influenced the disposition of the military, therefore the military did not intervene. The Ecuadorian government failed to do so. To conclude, by prosecuting the military for past transgression, the civilian government sends a clear message about who is in charge and decreases the ability of the military to organise a coup. By being subordinate to the electorate the civilian government preserves its legitimacy so the military has no disposition to intervene.
The behaviour of the civil government can also explain the paradox that this paper started with. The Ecuadorian military was not isolated after the transition which would be beneficial for civil control (Stepan, 1988). However, no strong civil control mechanism was implemented and the military took over control when the democracy was challenged by a crisis. In Argentina, it was the other way around. The military had a negative connotation after the breakdown of the military regime which led to the isolation of the military. Furthermore, its self-interest was threatened but the military never took over power again. Contrary to what the literature suggested, the results show that isolation of the military does not necessarily mean the military takes over power. Moreover, it turns out to be good to
19
isolate the military right after the fall of a military regime so that prosecutions can follow. Then, the civilian government sends a clear message about who is in charge and the ability of the military to organise a coup is restrained. This is beneficial to the establishment of civil control.
This new idea should be tested in other countries as well. To some extent, Argentina and Ecuador are representative for a broader spectrum of third wave post-military regimes in Latin America. The armed forces in Latin America are historically more active in political spheres than militaries in other parts of the world. This research started with the assumption that democratic norms are absent in new democracies and do therefore not prevent the military from organising a coup like they do in consolidated democracies. The results show that in order to foster civil control in new democracies arising from a military regime, it is important that the civilian government is strict towards the military’s past transgression and subordinate towards its voters.
Applied in a broader context, external policies that focus on the establishment of civil control in post-military regimes should focus on the behaviour of the civil government. Only then civil control can be successfully established. Nevertheless, civil-military relations depend on domestic and
international factors (Dudly, 2014). Although these cases can be a starting point to speculate about a broader framework, civil-military relations, in the end, derive around each case differently.
20 Appendix
Appendix 1
21 Appendix 2
22 Appendix 3
23 Appendix 4
24 Appendix 5
25 Appendix 6
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