The Role of Civil-Military Organisational Culture in the Context of UN Integration

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The Role of Civil-Military Organisational Culture

in the Context of UN Integration

Case Study of Mali

Master Thesis International Humanitarian Action (NOHA)

L.J. (Jolien) van Ooijen University of Groningen

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Abstract

Civil and military actors are increasingly operating in the same space. UN integration requires different UN actors to work together in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, whereby overlap and duplication are avoided in order to maximise the impact of the UN as a whole. Civil and military UN actors are thus forced to interact with each other in the context of UN integration. However, civil-military interaction is often problematic and difficult. One of the main complicating factors in this interaction is the difference in organisational culture of military and humanitarian actors. Even though research has developed in this field, it remains mainly focused on culture at the surface, whereas organisational culture goes deeper, consisting of values and basic assumptions that guide organisational perceptions and interpretations of the environment.

This research analyses the role of deep organisational culture in the context of UN integration through an in-depth case study of Mali, focussing on the military within the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) and UN agencies doing development and humanitarian work. It answers the following question: To what extent and how does deep organisational culture of UN agencies and UN military affect UN integration in Mali? UN integration is considered achieved when different UN actors work together in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, avoiding overlap and duplication and thereby maximising the impact of the UN as a whole. This research assesses the impact of deep organisational culture on UN integration by developing a theoretical framework combining organisational culture theory and a perception, interpretation and response model stemming from management literature on strategic issue management. It looks into differences and similarities in perceptions, interpretations and response of UN military and UN agencies to UN integration in Mali. As perceptions and interpretations guide organisational responses and approaches, differences between organisations can impact the respective approach of actors to UN integration and thereby the practical level of UN integration. To answer the research question, data has been gathered through interviews with participants from the UN military and UN agencies working in Mali. This data has been recorded, transcribed and analysed using a qualitative data analysis programme.

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behaviour, which hinders the coherence that is aimed for by UN integration in Mali. It is recommended that actors should be made culturally competent, in order to manage cultural differences and reduce inter-cultural conflict.

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List of Abbreviations

AFISMA: African-led Support Mission in Mali ASIFU: All Sources Information Fusion Unit AU: African Union

AQIM: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb CIMIC : Civil-Military Cooperation CMI: Civil-Military Interaction

CMCS : Civil-Military Coordination Section

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DFS: Department of Field Support

DO: Designated Official

DPA: Department of Political Affairs

DPKO: Department for Peacekeeping Operations DSRSG: Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General ERC: Emergency Relief Coordinator

EU: European Union

EUTM: European Union Training Mission FAO: Food and Agricultural Organisation FC: Force Commander

HC: Humanitarian Coordinator HCT: Humanitarian Country Team IASC: Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross IGO: International Governmental Organisation

MNLA: Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad

MINUSMA: Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali

MUJAO: Mouvement de l’Unité et Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest NGO: Non-governmental organisation

OCHA : Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PIO: Public Information Officer

PoC: Protection of Civilians QIP: Quick Impact Project RC: Resident Coordinator SC: Security Council SG: Secretary-General

SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General UN: United Nations

UN-CMCoord: United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (humanitarian) UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDG: United Nations Development Group

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UNDSS: United Nations Department for Safety and Security UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund

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List of Figures

Figure 1

Civil-Military Cultural Differences

p. 24

Figure 2

Cultural Iceberg

p. 26

Figure 3

Cultural Onion

p. 27

Figure 4

Three Levels of Culture

p. 29

Figure 5

Model of Perception, Interpretation and Response p. 31

Figure 6

Combined Organisational Culture Model

p. 32

Figure 7

Combined Visual Model

p. 34

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1. Chapter One - Introduction

1.1 Brief background

Humanitarian assistance is as relevant as ever. Worldwide a lot of people face shortages of water, food, shelter and other items as a result of conflicts, as well as of natural disasters. A multitude of actors respond to these situations. International military troops are often deployed with mandates given by the UN. At the same time, humanitarian organisations, which comprise UN Funds, Programmes and Agencies (hereafter named UN agencies) as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), respond to emergencies by delivering humanitarian assistance. These different actors operate at the same time and in the same space. In order to have an effective response to the diverse needs of the population and to avoid overlap and duplication, civil-military coordination between the different actors is essential.

UN integration is the principle that UN actors with different mandates and working in different sectors (peacekeeping, humanitarian, development) should work closely and coherently together in order to avoid duplication of effort and resources. Different UN actors are thus forced to interact with each other (Metcalfe et al., 2011; Eide, et al. 2005). An Integrated Mission can be defined as: “An instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework” (Eide et al., 2005, p. 3). The concept of UN integration evolved and developed into a formal policy in 2008 when the UN Secretary-General (SG) affirmed that integration is the guiding policy for all (post) conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or mission.

The integration policy is aimed at “maximizing the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace” (UN, 2008b). The structure in which these different types of UN actors are integrated in the overall UN presence, can take several forms depending on the context. Mandates of peacekeeping forces often include support to humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians, which might overlap with the work of UN agencies. The coordination between civil UN agencies doing development and humanitarian work and military elements of a UN peacekeeping mission is therefore an important part of UN integration to avoid overlap and achieve greater UN coherence (Metcalfe et al., 2011; Eide et al., 2005).

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actors (Metcalfe et al., 2012; Slim, 1996; Duffey, 2000; Rubinstein, 2003, 2008; IASC, 2004; Baumann, 2008). Cultural factors play an important role in UN peacekeeping missions as culture is the basis upon which people structure their actions and provide solutions for problems (Rubinstein, 2008). UN integration brings actors from various organisational cultural backgrounds together, which is challenging for interaction and has the potential of cross-cultural conflict. In order to avoid conflict and promote smooth interaction, research on the role of culture in these settings is essential (Rubinstein, 2003; Slim, 1996, Duffey, 2000; Metcalfe et al, 2012). Using the concept of culture as an analytical lens in the field of UN peacekeeping and civil-military coordination, has developed over the last few decades. Research has mainly focused on describing cultural differences at the surface between military and civilian actors, providing lists of organisational characteristics in order to enhance cultural knowledge of actors about each other (Aall et al, 2000; Metcalfe et al, 2012). Even though this can be helpful in the interaction, it is not sufficient as it has the danger of generating stereotypes about the other and overlooks cultural differences at a fundamental, deeper level, which can complicate civil-military interaction. Further research is therefore needed on deep cultural differences (Rubinstein, 2008; 2014; Baumann, 2008).

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this and its impact in a more practical way, one can look at organisational perceptions and interpretations, as these are closely related processes through which meaning is given to the environment (Mustafa, 2013). In looking for how deep organisational culture plays a role, one can thus analyse how different type of organisations perceive and interpret the same environment. Deep organisational cultural differences between organisations manifest themselves in differences in organisational perceptions and interpretations of the same environment (Schein, 1992; Wilkins and Martin, 1979; Rubinstein, 2005; 2008; 2014). The certain way of perceiving, feeling and thinking in relation to the environment serves as a basis for organisational action or behaviour (Nellen, 1997).

In relation to civil-military coordination or ‘horizontal interoperability’ as Rubinstein calls it, he points out that research should look into deep cultural differences i.e. the perceptions (or meaning given) by civil and military organisations of concepts as partnership, security and coordination (Rubinstein, 2005; 2008; 2014). Research on UN integration has shown that the concept is still poorly understood among the actors and that there is often a discrepancy between the theory and practice. Difficulties continue to arise in the interaction between civil and military actors that are integrated in an UN presence (Metcalfe et al., 2011). Continuous research on this concept is therefore necessary in order to understand what is complicating the functioning of this policy and to improve future operations.

1.2 Objective and problem formulation

UN integration requires different UN actors to work together in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, whereby overlap and duplication are avoided in order to maximise the impact of the UN as a whole (UN, 2008b; UN, 2013b). Mali is a case where UN military of MINUSMA and UN agencies are brought together within such an integrated UN presence and where they are thus required to work in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. The research of Willems (2015) however outlines that civil-military interaction and UN integration are not going smoothly in Mali. Integration remains poorly understood among the different actors and the implementation of UN integration is problematic. Civil-military issues arise related to information sharing, use of armed escorts and quick impact projects (QIPs). There is a lack of coordination and misunderstandings between the different actors.

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whole. UN integration and the required civil-military interaction is something that both type of UN actors (civil and military) face in carrying out their respective jobs. Not only do both type of actors have distinct visible ways of operating, their respective organisational lenses are guiding their perception and interpretation of UN integration, resulting in certain behaviour. This thesis aims to assess the impact of deep organisational culture on UN integration by looking into the perceptions, interpretations and response of UN military and UN humanitarian organisations of UN integration. As perceptions and interpretations guide organisational responses and approaches, differences between organisations can impact the respective approach of actors to UN integration and thereby the practical level of UN integration. This research in underlying and less obvious cultural differences and the effect thereof can help understand complications in civil-military interaction within UN integration and can contribute to the improvement thereof by providing recommendations for future operations.

This research will do so through an in-depth case study of Mali, concentrating on the UN military within the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) and UN agencies, with a focus on Bamako as the headquarters of MINUSMA and many UN agencies. It is a UN integrated presence in which UN agencies doing humanitarian and developmental work and UN peacekeepers are brought together under the heading of UN integration. It is also a recent and on-going integrated mission, which allows for an insight in the current state of affairs of UN integration.

1.3 Research questions

The main research question therefore is:

To what extent and how does deep organisational culture of UN agencies and UN military affect UN integration in Mali?

In order to answer this main research question, the following sub-questions are formulated: - What is UN integration and civil-military interaction?

- What is the state of art in research on civil-military interaction and culture?

- What does deep organisational culture encompass and how can deep organisational culture and the possible impact on UN integration be analysed?

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1.4 Research approach and structure

In order to answer these questions, this thesis is subdivided into several parts.

Following this introductory first chapter, chapter two will outline the concept of UN integration, as well as provide a literature review on civil-military interaction and culture. Chapter three will subsequently be devoted to the theoretical framework. It will provide a review of theories and models of deep culture in general and deep organisational culture in specific. It will then outline a theoretical framework that will be used to analyse how deep organisational culture impacts UN integration. Chapter four will start with an analysis of the background and context of the UN integrated presence in Mali, followed by a description of the civil and military UN actors that are central to this research and their relation in Mali. It will continue with an analysis of the manifestation of deep organisational culture of UN agencies and UN military and the impact on UN integration in Mali. Chapter five will address options to improve UN integration, partly from recommendations from interviewees and partly from theories on managing cultural differences. Finally, chapter six consists of conclusions, reflections and recommendations for future research. It is concluded that deep organisational culture affects UN integration in that it manifests itself in different perceptions, interpretations and responses towards UN integration. As actors regard different aspects of UN integration as positive, negative, a threat or an opportunity, this gives rise to frustrations and misunderstandings and sometimes leading to disintegrating behaviour, which hinders the coherence that is aimed for by UN integration in Mali. Actors should therefore be made culturally competent, in order to manage cultural differences and reduce inter-cultural conflict.

1.4.1 Methodology

In the gathering of data necessary for this research and the analysis thereof, this thesis makes use of qualitative methods. Qualitative research is used to understand phenomena in their context, where this thesis aims for. As a qualitative design allows for in-depth and contextual research, it is a suitable design for the purpose of this thesis.

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research question, data has been gathered from primary sources through semi-structured interviews held with military participants within MINUSMA and with representatives of UN agencies working in Mali as part of the integrated UN presence.

The interviews have been held between 28 November 2016 and 11 January 2017. Participants have been selected on their function within their organisation they represent. As this research is focused on civil-military interaction, it looked for participants in leading roles within the respective organisations, as they were expected to be more involved on the UN integration level, and those that are somehow involved in civil-military coordination. For the MINUSMA military side, interviews are therefore been held mainly with participants from the CIMIC component, as well as one ASIFU member. In total six interviews with military participants have been held. On the UN agencies side, eight interviews have been held with participants from UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF and OCHA. In addition, an interview has been held with the desk officer for Mali of the OCHA Civil Military Coordination Section in Geneva, which is the focal point for humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) and providing civil-military coordination training involving both military and civilians participants. The leading person within OCHA on UN integration on headquarters in New York has also been interviewed for more background and insights on UN integration. An overview of the interviews can be found in annex II. The selection of interviewees depended also on the availability and accessibility of participants. This posed quite a challenge for this research as it was carried out on distance and via internet. It would have been easier to be on the ground in Mali, in order to reach more participants. However, the researcher is convinced that a sufficient amount of interviews has been reached for this research. In order to safeguard the validity of data given by the different participants, the same semi-structured questions are asked to all the participants. This allows the researcher to check the validity of the data given. The interview guide can be found in annex I. The interviews have been used to assess how deep organisational culture manifests itself in perceptions, interpretations and response to UN integration in Mali, following the theoretical framework as outlined in chapter three.

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were held in English, some in French and one in Dutch. All interviews except one were audio-recorded with permission of the participants and transcriptions have been made making use of the F4 transcribing software, in order to be able to analyse the data.1_{Due to the bad connection,}

audio-recordings were sometimes difficult to transcribe. The researcher however also used handwritten notes during the interviews, with which the transcriptions could be completed. Out of privacy reasons of the participants, the transcriptions have been anonymised, and the names of the organisations they represent are used. In order to analyse the data gathered, a coding system has been developed based on the theoretical framework of chapter three and by the responses of participants. The F4 analyse software has been used for this analysis.2 This coding system can be found in annex III. Analysis through the coding mechanism has been carried out to assess the similarities and differences of the perceptions and interpretations as part of the deep organisational culture of the UN agencies and UN military, as well as how this affects UN integration in Mali. Also the data has been used for how UN integration could be improved in the future.

1.5 Demarcations and limitations

This research takes organisations, rather than nationalities as units of analysis, as both the UN military and UN agencies are international organisations. As culture exists on a group level, this research focuses on the organisational cultural level of multinational civil and military actors. The perceptions and interpretations of other international, as well as national actors and the local population in Mali are beyond the scope of this research.

As this research is into the specific case of Mali and focused on two specific groups of actors in the context of UN integration, it has its limitations. The fact that only one case study is taken, limits the generalizability of the findings for other cases. Also, not all actors within the UN integration context are taken into account in this research, but there is merely focused on two groups of actors. This limits the analysis of the role that other actors play in UN integration in Mali. Nevertheless, it is believed that this research is contributing to understanding complications in civil-military interaction within UN integration and that it can contribute to the improvement thereof for future operations.

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2. Chapter Two - UN Integration and Civil-Military Interaction

This chapter will give an insight in the development and content of UN integration, as well as in the main issues surrounding this policy. It will then provide a literature review of civil-military interaction in the context of peacekeeping.

2.1 UN integration

History and rationale

UN Integration is the principle that different UN actors should work closely and coherently together wherever the presence of the UN involves a political and/or multidimensional peacekeeping mission, alongside UN humanitarian and development actors. The main purpose is to enhance the impact that the UN as a whole can have in complex emergencies and/or countries recovering from conflict (Metcalfe et al., 2011).

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Nations: A Programme for Reform (UN, 1997). Following several practices to increase UN coherence, the concept of UN integration developed into a formal policy in 2008 with the UN Secretary-General’s Decision No. 2008/24 (see textbox 1). This decision outlines several defining elements of integration.

Structure

Concerning the structure of UN integrated missions, the report by Eide et al. (2005) advocates strongly for a form should follow function approach. This means that fixed templates should be avoided and only that which needs to be integrated should be integrated, depending on the particular context and objectives of the mission. This has been taken up in UN guidelines and has resulted in different country-level arrangements (UN, 2006b; UN, 2008b; OCHA, 2009). In general, there should be a strategic partnership between the UN mission/office and the UN Country Team (UNCT), comprised of UN agencies and led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) (Ulrich, 2010). The SRSG is the overall head of the multidimensional UN peacekeeping or political mission. He/she is also the overall coordinator of the UN in a given country, including tasks specific for the mission and the larger UN system (De Coning, 2010). The SRSG usually has one or two Deputies. The function of one of those Deputies, is often combined with the function of Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in integrated contexts. Through this triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC function, the different peace and security, as well as development and humanitarian responsibilities are linked (De Coning, 2010). Integration arrangements are in practice adapted to the situation on the ground. In the case of Chad and Darfur for instance, the UN decided to separate the RC/HC function from the DSRSG function, due to active conflict. Besides, the OCHA offices, responsible for coordinating the humanitarian community, are often separated from the missions (Ulrich, 2010; OCHA, 2009). Textbox 2 shows more explanation of the different functions and structure.

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Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)

- Appointed by SG - Head of Mission

- Responsible for implementing mission mandate - Head of UN presence in country: overall authority over

activities of the UN

- Senior UN Representative in country

- Reports to SG, through Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

- Often Designated Official: accountable to SG through Under-Secretary General of the Department of Safety and Security for the security of all personnel employed by the UN organisations

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG)

- Usually two, supporting the SRSG

- One is often combined with RC and HC position - DSRSG/RC/HC often Deputy Designated Official - Reports to the SRSG

- Principle interface between mission and UNCT and NGOs

Resident Coordinator (RC) - Most senior UN representation in country

- Usually from UNDP

- Responsible for coordination of UN Country Team and planning and coordination of UN development operations - Reports to SRSG

- Secondary reporting line to UNDP Administrator (Chair of UNDG)

Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) - Responsible for planning and coordination of humanitarian operations

- Reports to SRSG

- Secondary reporting line to ERC

Designated Official (DO) - Most senior UN official in country.

- In integrated missions: the SRSG - Without peacekeeping mission: RC/HC

UN Country Team (UNCT) All UN agencies in country

Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) All UN humanitarian agencies in country + NGOs and other humanitarian actors

Force Commander (FC) Military commander of mission

Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) Highest humanitarian coordinator UN Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (DPKO)

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The UN humanitarian agencies, also called the “UN Humanitarians”, that are included in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) are: FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (Weir, 2006). UN humanitarians are often dual-mandated which means their activities include both humanitarian and development aspects, depending on the context and situation.

Main issues

There are several issues when it comes to UN integration. Despite progress that has been made over the last decades, there has been and still is confusion about the concept of UN integration. The study by Metcalfe et al. (2011) on UN integration and humanitarian space shows that UN integration is often still poorly understood among the different stakeholders and inconsistently applied in practice. As it developed over time, the lack of a clear and unified definition of integration and structure is problematic for researches, policy makers, as well as practitioners (Eide et al., 2005; Weir, 2006; Metcalfe et al., 2011). Also, there are different terms that have been used interchangeably in policy documents and literature: “UN integration”, “integrated peace support operations”, “integrated missions” and “UN integrated presence”, which adds to the confusion (UN, 2006b; UN, 2008b; Jennings and Kaspersen, 2008; Eide et al., 2005; Weir, 2006). The policy instruction of OCHA (2009) on Structural Relationships within Integrated

UN Presence tries to clarify the different terms. An UN integrated presence is defined as “any

context in which the UN has a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission in addition to a UN Country Team”. An UN integrated mission is defined as “any UN peacekeeping or political mission that has a double hatted position (DSRSG/RC) or triple-hatted position (DSRSG/RC/HC)”. The UN integrated presence is thus broader than the UN integrated mission, while both terms are in general also referred to as UN integration. Even though the terms are defined in this document, in literature and in practice it is not always clear what is meant by the different terms, nor when to use which term (Metcalfe et al., 2011).

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humanitarian operations. This humanitarian dilemma is also reflected in the key challenge to UN integration as stated by OCHA (2012): “Creating the most effective working relationship between political and humanitarian aspects of a UN presence while simultaneously respecting and protecting humanitarians’ need to be politically neutral”.

2.2 Peacekeeping and civil-military interaction

Peace operations often bring together a variety of civil and military actors: UN military, police and civilian actors working on, for instance, democratisation and human rights aspects as part of UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions; AU, EU or bilaterally deployed military actors; local and international development agencies and often a range of humanitarian actors, which are themselves composed of various organisations as the ICRC, UN agencies and NGOs. Moreover, there are the national and local government actors, as well as the local population.

Different types of actions and actors

In the context of peace operations, literature identifies two main different types of actions, based on different philosophies, having different objectives and implemented by different type of actors. Peacekeeping on the one hand is clearly politically motivated, is usually longer term, focused on stabilisation and democratisation and implemented by political actors and military forces (Weir, 2006; Egnell, 2008; DPKO/DFS, 2008). Humanitarian action on the other hand, is based on the philosophy of the humanitarian imperative and the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, is usually short-term and carried out by humanitarian organisations (see textbox 3). There are fundamental differences

between these two types of actions and the respective objectives. Whereas the humanitarian

Textbox 3

Humanitarian principles (OCHA, 2012; IFRC/ICRC, 1996):

- Humanity: the provision of humanitarian

assistance where it is needed and in a manner that respects the rights and dignity of the individual

- Impartiality: the provision of humanitarian

assistance without discrimination among recipients and guided solely by needs, with priority given to the most urgent cases of distress

- Neutrality: the provision of humanitarian

assistance without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature

- Independence: the provision of humanitarian

assistance in a manner that is autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives of actors engaged in the areas where humanitarian action is being undertaken

Principle of impartiality in peacekeeping (UN DPKO/DFS, 2008):

- Impartiality: UN peacekeeping operations must

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imperative of relieving suffering is aimed to be neutral and impartial, peacekeeping objectives are inherently political and thus not neutral nor impartial (Weir, 2006). Complicating this matter is that in practice the boundaries between these two types of actions are less clear as it may seem. Even though peacekeeping is supposed to preserve an already existing peace, often UN peacekeeping missions are required to be involved in peace-making efforts and peacebuilding activities in conflict contexts, and can take peace enforcement measures depending on the mandate. UN peacekeeping missions are in addition often required to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance (DPKO/DFS, 2008). On the humanitarian side, there are many organisations within the humanitarian community that take a pragmatic approach concerning the humanitarian principles, applying the principles only when they fit best. Also, the mandates of humanitarian organisations are often a mixture of humanitarian and development work, which sometimes includes influencing the political environment. As they are operating in a politicised environment, the presence of humanitarian organisations can therefore often not be regarded strictly neutral either (Weir, 2006). Furthermore, the humanitarian community exists of a range of different actors. The distinction is often made between the ICRC, NGOs and UN agencies. The boundaries between the types of actions are in practice thus not always very clear, as it may seem on paper.

Literature points out that, the main difficulties in civil-military interaction arise between the humanitarian actors and military forces (Metcalfe et al., 2012). Interaction between development organisations and the military is considered less problematic as they both tend to work for political aims. The same civil-military cultural differences remain however (Weir, 2006; Egnell, 2013).

Concepts in civil-military interaction

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appropriate, pursue common goals” (OCHA, 2015, p.7). The definitions of those terms related to civil-military interaction reflect the different philosophies of the actors. For the humanitarian side, it is about protecting and promoting the humanitarian principles, while for the military side, it is a staff function and is focused on implementing the objectives as stated in the UN mission mandate.

Need for interaction

Regardless of the differences, civil and military actors share the same operational space and need to interact. In the reality of operations, as for instance was the case in Liberia, Afghanistan and Iraq, there is an interdependence between military and humanitarian actors and an overlapping of tasks. In conflict situations, the lack of security is often a barrier which prohibits the humanitarian aid to reach the beneficiaries. Consequently, civilian organisations depend on the military forces to create a secure area of operation. Often, they make use of armed escorts for their convoys and/or aid workers, even though this is not in line with the humanitarian principles (IASC, 2013). On other occasions, humanitarian organisations lack the necessary assets for the delivery of aid and make use of military and civil defence assets. For military forces, their peacekeeping mandates often include a clause to “facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance” and are increasingly engaging in humanitarian activity. This can be due to tactical necessities or because it can have positive strategic and tactical effects for the military operation (Egnell, 2008). The humanitarian notification system for deconfliction applied for instance in Syria and Yemen is an operational example of civil-military interaction in conflict situation. This system is to notify the military forces of humanitarian locations and movements, in order for the military to avoid bombarding those particular places.3

Civil-military interaction research

Research on peacekeeping or peace operations and the interaction between different actors involved, used to be focused on the practicalities and geopolitical aspects. In the 1990s, a deeper examination into the interaction between military and civilian actors started to evolve when the increase in the amount and the different setup of peace operations required increased interaction between the different actors (Rubinstein, 2008b).

Several scholars have researched civil-military interaction in the context of peace operations. For instance, Weiss (1999) writes about how differences between civil and military

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actors are problematic in intervening in humanitarian crises. Abiew (2003) highlights the differences between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and military actors. Several others have proposed mechanisms on overcoming difficulties in the interaction between civilians and military actors. They mainly recommend joint training, in-field coordination and sharing operational procedures (Slim, 1996; Hatzenbichler, 2001; Sommers, 2000). In addition, Scheltinga (2003) and Scheltinga et al. (2005) give several practical recommendations to manage organisational cultural differences and facilitate smooth cooperation between military and civilian actors. These include presentations about the cultures of both actors in pre-mission training and the formulation of a ‘partnership code’ during missions, outlining shared values and behaviours.

Besides, literature on civil-military coordination points at the potential dangerous effects of the “blurring of lines” between military and civilian actors on humanitarian principles and humanitarian space. It analyses mainly how counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations, and the “winning of hearts and minds” approach of the military can endanger the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian actors (SCHR, 2010; Hofman and Delauney, 2010; Metcalfe et al., 2011; Egeland et al, 2011; Metcalfe et al, 2012).

Problems in civil-military coordination and sources for tension in the complex contexts of peace operations have thus increasingly been researched. However, as Rubinstein (2008b) points out, using culture as an analytical lens for this analysis is a relatively recent development. In scholarly and policy analyses of peacekeeping, culture has not often been taken into account as an analytical concept, neither in the development of doctrine and procedures, nor in textbooks. Even when culture has been taken into account in analysing peace operations and civil-military coordination, it has often been done in a way that addresses culture in a rather static way, through listing differences. Studies have looked into harmonizing national cultural diversity in multi-national forces, as peacekeeping brings together people from a variety of backgrounds (Rubinstein, 1989; Winslow, 1998; Elron et al, 1999; Soeters, 2010). Research has also been carried out on the interaction and its difficulties of international missions and the culturally different local populations. Heiberg (1990) for instance, shows that the relationship with the local population was critical for success of the UN mission in Lebanon. This interaction has increasingly become a subject of research (Duffey 2000; Pouligny, 2006; Schaefer, 2010).

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peace operations. These lists show contrasts in how these two types of actors do business. An example is shown in the following figure.

Whereas the military organisational culture is considered hierarchical and precise, the IGOs/NGOs are considered decentralised and unpredictable. Such a list of differences is meant to create a basis of a working understanding among actors about each other, in order to avoid culture clashes. The book of Aall and others (2000) which provides an overview of general descriptions of the different actors is another example of this.

Though these examples do seem to address cultural elements at a deeper level, Rubinstein (2005) calls this the “pitfall of the fallacy of detachable cultural descriptions” (p.532), as it has the danger of creating static stereotypes and treat culture as unchanging and determining behaviour. According to him, this “leaves the practitioners unware of (or simply mystified by) the different cognitive and affective understandings of critical concepts like partnership, security and coordination that the other communities hold” (Rubinstein, 2004, p. 64). He criticises the way culture has been used for analysis and advocates for the incorporation of a dynamic, rather than static concept of culture in research on peacekeeping and civil-military coordination (Rubinstein, 2003; 2005; 2008a; 2008b; 2014).

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3. Chapter Three - Theoretical Framework

This chapter will clarify what deep organisational culture encompasses by touching upon several cultural theories and models, and will outline a theoretical framework for analysis made specific and fitted for this particular research.

3.1 Different levels of culture

Culture is a broad concept and has been defined in a wide variety of ways and for different purposes. When thinking about culture, one often tends to think of the visible, more obvious parts of culture. Cultural aspects are then defined in terms of clothes, food, habits and behaviour, and differences between cultures are often described along those lines.

The emphasis on the more visible, surface level of culture used to be the tendency in anthropological research as well. This started to change when Edward T. Hall asked attention for a deeper level of culture in his books The Silent Language (1959) and The Hidden

Dimension (1966). He shows that, in addition to what is actually being said on the more

observable level of culture, there are hidden dimensions at a deeper cultural level influencing

how and in which context things are said among different cultures. He calls this the

subconscious nature of culture, comparing culture to an invisible control mechanism that operates subconsciously (Hall, 1983).

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This metaphor is further explained and adapted by other scholars. Ting-Toomey (1999) bases the distinction between the terms surface culture and deep culture on the iceberg. The observable activities and behaviours are part of surface culture (the part above the waterline). In contrast, the hidden part (below the waterline) is where “the underlying set of beliefs and values that drives people’s thinking, reacting, and behaving” is found, and is referred to as deep

culture (p. 10).

Scholars concur with culture existing of different layers with an inner core and more elementary layers. In order to make more sense of the different layers, Geert Hofstede (1991) proposes a model of a four layered onion, in which peeling every layer reveals a deeper content of culture. The inner, most hidden layer he calls the values. According to Hofstede, those values strongly influence behaviour as they represent the ideas people have about what “ought to be”. The other three, easier observable layers, consist of: rituals, heroes and symbols as shown in Figure 2 (Hofstede, 1991).

In different variations of this model, the inner core either consists of values (Hofstede, 1991), basic assumptions (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997) or values and basic assumptions (Spencer-Oatey, 2000). Spencer-Oatey (2000) furthermore describes culture as: “a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural norms, basic assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each member’s behaviour and his/her interpretations of the “meaning” of other

people’s behaviour” (p. 4). Anthropology and organizational development studies thus describe culture as a mechanism through which people construct and enact meaning. It does not stay at the behavioural level, but reaches to this deeper level of interpretation and the attribution of meaning.4

The common anthropological definition of culture by Roy d’Andrade (1984, p. 116) reflects the deep aspects of culture. He sees culture as “consisting of learned systems of

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meaning, communicated by means of natural language and other symbol systems, having representational, directive, and affective functions, and capable of creating cultural entities and particular sense of reality. Through these systems of meaning groups of people adapt to their environment and structure interpersonal activities”. This means that culture is a framework that “allows people to interpret their experiences and see their own and other’s actions as proper or meaningful” (Rubinstein, 2003, p. 36).

Culture exists at the group level, as opposed to the level of the individual. Geert Hofstede points to this in his book Software of the Mind (1991) where he describes culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the member of one group or category of people from another” (p. 5). Rubinstein (2003) also clearly states that: “culture is an aspect of groups, not of individuals” (p. 32) and it can therefore by analysed at the group level.

It has been shown that it is well developed in research that culture consists of different, deeper layers. However, this research has mostly focused on differences between national cultures or countries, which are the preferred units of cultural analysis. Next to the national culture level, a distinction has been made between other areas of cultural analysis, namely the professional or organisational culture of specific groups. In this thesis, organisational culture is central and is elaborated upon in the next part.

3.2. Different levels of organisational culture

Organisations can and have been taken as a unit of cultural analysis. Organisational cultures have their own characteristics and dimensions, as there is always an underlying glue that binds the organisation together, even though the configuration of an organisation can also be affected by national cultures or subcultures within an organisation (Schein, 1985; Hofstede, 1991; Dahl, 2005; Rubinstein, 2003).

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There exists a wide range of definitions for the concept of organizational culture. A way of seeing organisational culture is as “the way we do things around here” (Martin, 2006). This however implies that organisational culture is mostly about doing, about a certain way of behaving, whereas it encompasses more.

Edgar Schein (1992) defines organisational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems through external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way you perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems” (1992). He outlines three deeper and interlinked layers of organisational culture: artifacts, espoused values and basic assumptions. This is visualised in Figure 4. Artifacts are on the surface level and are the visible

products, they are fairly easy to observe and distinguish. Even though they are observed easily, it may be difficult to understand what they truly mean for an outsider. On a deeper level, there are the espoused values: the values and beliefs that are important to an organisation. These can be expressed in the ideals and

goals of organisation. On an even deeper level are the basic assumptions which form the core of an organisation. They manifest themselves through perceptions, thoughts and emotions and are not easily observable. It is at this level that culture defines what we pay attention to, what things mean and how to react (Nellen, 1997).

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organisational cultural lens and its impact however, one can look at how organisations give meaning to the environment. Organisations give meaning to an environment through the two closely related processes of perceiving and interpreting (Mustafa, 2013). In looking for how organisational culture plays a role at this deeper level, one can thus look at how different type of organisations perceive and interpret the same environment. Several authors outline that deep organisational cultural differences are manifested in differences in organisational perceptions and interpretations of the same environment (Schein, 1992; Wilkins and Martin, 1979; Rubinstein, 2005; 2008; 2014). The certain way of perceiving, thinking and feeling in relation to the environment serves furthermore as a basis for more observable organisational action and behaviour (Nellen, 1997).

By combining the organisational culture model with the iceberg metaphor described in the previous paragraph, it can be said that the artifacts are above the surface, as they are the most visible, and the values and basic assumptions are below the water level. In line with this, it can thus be said that deep organisational culture consists of the values and the basic assumptions of an organisation. To visualise this, a waterline has been added to figure 4. In this research, in order to analyse how the deep organisational culture of civil and military organisations impacts UN integration, the organisational processes of perception and interpretation, as well as response in relation to UN integration as a shared environment will be looked at in more detail. The next paragraph outlines a framework of organisational perception, interpretation and response that stems from strategic issues management.

3.3 Perception, interpretation and response framework

As described in the previous paragraph, perception and interpretation are processes through which organisations give meaning to the environment. In order to make these abstract processes more concrete, a useful framework to assess perceptions and interpretations can be found in literature on strategic issue management. This framework shows also how perceptions and interpretations are linked to more visible responses.

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that organisations face. Among the range of strategic issues in the market, not all of them have the same value and thus get the same attention and response. Strategic management literature addresses how managers or organisational decision-makers operate within this ‘market’ to identify issues that are sufficiently important and thus require organisational analysis and response (Dutton et al, 1983; Dutton and Duncan 1987; Jackson and Dutton, 1988; Dutton et al., 1989). This process is called strategic issue diagnosis or strategic issue analysis. As Dutton et al. (1983) explain, this process is twofold: it is not only about how initial data and stimuli facing organisations are translated into strategic issues, but also about how the strategic issues are then perceived, imbued with meaning and interpreted. As strategic issues are subject to interpretation, multiple meanings of the same strategic issue are possible among organisations, which can trigger different decision processes and behaviours (Cowan, 1986; Schneider and De Meyer, 1991).

Management literature identifies two main categorizations of interpretations of strategic issues, which are labelled threats and opportunities (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Sullivan and Nonaka, 1988; Schneider and de Meyer, 1991). When issues are interpreted as threats, they are perceived in a negative way, may involve loss and a have perceived low controllability of the organisation. Opportunities on the other hand, are perceived as something positive, include (the expectation of) gain and have a perceived higher controllability of the organisation. The way in which issues are interpreted can have important consequences for organisational behaviour, for instance, the magnitude of response, as well as the choice for rather proactive (taking actions to effect change) or reactive (responding to change) behaviour (Schneider and de Meyer, 1991).

Even though important decisions are usually taken at a high managerial level, Daft and Weick (1984) point out that the perception and interpretation process happens throughout the organisation, whereby events are translated and shared understandings of issues are developed. Interpretation of the same environment or issue can therefore differ among organisations and for different reasons.

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The model outlined above, has mainly been used in quantitative management research, focussing on how organisations and their decision-makers scan the environment for strategic issues (Dutton and Duncan, 1978; Dutton et al., 1989), how different issues are categorized as threats or opportunities (Jackson and Dutton, 1988), and how they are acted upon and affect organisational performance (Thomas et al., 1993).

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3.4 Civil-military organisational cultures

Over time, research on differences in organisational culture of military and civilian actors has developed, showing that the respective organisational cultures are distinct. For instance, Scheltinga (2003) and Scheltinga et al. (2005), address organisational cultural differences in civil-military cooperation in the case of Bosnia. The organisational cultures of the (Dutch) military and international organisations are assessed as two different culture types, based on a Competing Values Framework by Cameron and Quinn (2006). The military organisational culture is considered a hierarchy culture, with main concerns of stability, predictability and efficiency; and the organisational culture of international organisations as a clan culture type, characterised by teamwork, participation and consensus.

In line with other research, Rubinstein (2003; 2008) points out that there are four main areas where cultural differences between military and humanitarian organisations play a role in the context of peace operations. Differences in these areas reveal certain organisational ways of operating or behaviour, as well as deeper values. These are:

Management structures. The military are commonly regarded as having a management

structure of unity of command, valuing structure, clearly defined responsibilities and fast and efficient decision making, whereas humanitarian organisations rather have a camaraderie of command, valuing consultation and participation.

Security. The military missions are usually enacted by control and separation, which are

of high importance. Security for the military is about enlarging boundaries. Humanitarians on the other hand are rather operating with few boundaries from the local population (depending on the context). Military and civilians organisations expect and support different amounts of ambiguity in their environment.

Media and information. Compared to humanitarians, military have the tendency to

tighten the control of information, as news coverage can generate support, as well as protest against their mission. Humanitarians are in general regarded as treating information and the use of media as a mechanism for communicating on the crisis they face and to raise support and funds for their operations.

Legitimacy. Military derive their legitimacy from their legal framework, which is their

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In order to build on this previous research in this field and to make this research more focused and practical, this thesis will analyse the impact of deep organisational culture on UN integration in Mali concentrating on the abovementioned four areas.

3.5 Combined theoretical framework for analysis

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4. Chapter Four - Case Study Mali

4.1 Background and context

The conflict in Mali is a complex combination of armed rebellion and violence by different groups of actors, terrorism, extremism, drugs and arms trafficking, banditry, intercommunal violence, as well as more structural problems due to corruption and bad governance (ICG, 2014, 2015). Mali, just like many other countries in Sahel, moreover faces severe malnutrition and food insecurity. Many Malians, especially in the northern regions of the country, rely on humanitarian assistance to survive. Conflict and violence resulted in high numbers of internally displaced people, as well as refugees. As of date, a dire humanitarian situation is still persisting. The Humanitarian Response Plan for 2017 created in October 2016, outlines five key humanitarian problems: persistent insecurity, the alimentary situation and malnutrition, water shortages, natural disasters and lack of education and drop-outs (OCHA, 2016).

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As AFISMA faced many challenges, it was replaced by a UN Multidimensional Integrated Peacekeeping Mission (MINUSMA) with a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which deployed in June 2013 (UN, 2013e). The following years saw ups and downs in the peace process in Mali. Elections took place and territorial integrity has mainly been restored. Following earlier draft and preliminary agreements, a peace agreement has been signed in June 2015, of which the implementation is taking place since. Despite these positive developments however, the security situation in northern Mali remains very volatile throughout the years, and MINUSMA, as well as the French and Malian defence and security forces are primary targets of jihadist groups in Mali. Insecurity has accordingly hindered many activities of different actors present. In addition, the geographical spread of such insecurity and attacks has recently spread towards central and southern Mali (ICG, 2016; UN, 2014a, 2016b).

4.2 Overview of actors

The theatre of operations in Mali is filled with a variety of different actors, civil as well as military, each with their own mandate and style of operating. This part will provide an overview of the different actors that are central to this research.

4.2.1 UN agencies

Next to a high number of humanitarian and development NGOs of a national and international character, there are quite a number of UN agencies, funds and programmes present in Mali, some already long before the escalation of the crisis in 2012. The UN agencies often have a duel, development and humanitarian, mandate, which means on the one hand providing emergency relief and on the other hand carrying out longer term development activities, depending on the context (UN, 2017c). With the escalation of the situation in 2012 and the following humanitarian crisis in Mali, the development context changed radically and the dual mandated agencies became focused on humanitarian response, carried out based on the humanitarian principles as outlined in the textbox 4. However, development activities are increasingly taken up again, especially following the signing of the peace agreement in Mali. (UNDP, 2017; UN, 2013a; UN, 2015a).

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UNDP.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) operates in Mali since 1978 and works together with the Malian government on development of Mali. In line with its mandate, it carries out activities in several domains: democratic governance, including assisting the national dialogue and electoral process since 2013, redeployment of the public administration, justice and human rights and social-economic resilience. (UNDP, 2017)

FAO

The work of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in Mali has three priority areas: support to agricultural production, competitiveness and food security; sustainable natural resource management and environmental improvement; disaster risk reduction and management, and strengthened resilience of vulnerable population groups affected food and nutrition crises and conflict (FAO, 2013; FAO 2017).

WHO

The World Health Organisation (WHO) works on promotion of health and healthy environments, control of diseases and health system management in Mali. (WHO, 2017). WFP

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UNICEF

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is responsible for assisting children and mothers and works on different aspects in Mali. Including child protection, child survival and development, as well as education and gender equality (UNICEF, 2017).

UNHCR

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has a specific mandate for working with refugees, returnees and IDPs. In Mali, the focus is on assisting internally displaced persons and returnees (UNHCR, 2017).

OCHA

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is a special organisation. As opposed to the other UN agencies, it falls under the UN Secretariat and is not an implementing organisation, but is responsible for the coordination of humanitarian affairs. OCHA is thus coordinating all humanitarian actors in Mali, UN agencies as well as NGOs. It is furthermore mandated to carry out humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) between civilians and all uniformed personnel in Mali (OCHA, 2017).

Next to these agencies there are several other UN actors present in Mali. For instance, the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS), which is responsible for security of all UN personnel, UN Women working on gender related issues and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) working on the promotion of human rights (UNDG, 2017).

4.2.2 MINUSMA

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The integrated mission is composed of a military component, a police component and a civilian component that are bound by the mission mandate. The number of deployed uniformed personnel, military and police, is currently 10,579 troops, 40 military observers and 1,264 police (UN, 2017b). The military force is comprised of several elements and has an important intelligence (U2) component, enlarged with an All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) to enhance the gathering of intelligence of the mission (van Dalen, 2015). Also, MINUSMA has an important CIMIC (U9) component which stands for civil-military coordination. It is a military staff function to enhance the interface between the military, police and civilian actors (DPKO/DFS, 2010). The number of deployed civilian personnel is 1,246, of which more than half are local civilians (UN, 2017b). The civilian component has several units, including Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) unit, a Stabilisation and Recovery Unit as well as a Human Rights Division (UN, 2017a; UN, 2017b). This research focuses on the military component of MINUSMA.

MINUSMA Mandate

The mandate of MINUSMA has been renewed four times and changed slightly based on the context in Mali. The latest renewal of the mandate was in June 2016 and validates the mission until 30 June 2017. In 2014 and 2016, a difference was made in the mandate between priority and additional tasks, which was not the case in 2013 and 2015. The June 2016 mandate adds several additional tasks, including a more robust countering of asymmetric attacks, as well as weapons and ammunition management, as the peacekeeping mission has been the deadliest so far, with currently 106 casualties (UN, 2017b). An overview of the differences in mandate per renewal is shown in Textbox 5.

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4.2.3 UN integration and interaction

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started in 2008 with eight pilot countries, and Mali became a self-starter country in 2010. With the changing context and the adoption of this approach, the agencies together created the Cadre Conjoint d’Appui à la Transition (CCAT), signed on 7 March 2013 (UN, 2013a). As the situation escalated in Mali since 2012, this framework is transitional and is bridging the gap between the old UNDAF (2008-2012) and the new one, which was yet to be developed. This transitional framework also reflects the more humanitarian focus that the agencies needed to adopt in light of the worsening situation in Mali (UN, 2013a). The UN agencies were thus coordinated and had established a way to work together when MINUSMA deployed to Mali in June 2013.

Humanitarian concerns

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response required to address the political, social and economic root causes of the multifaceted crisis in Mali’ (para 100). The report thus addresses the humanitarian concerns that have been raised by UN agencies in Mali, but at the same time stresses the need for the comprehensive UN system wide and unified response in responding to the situation in Mali.

UN integrated presence

In order to have this strict distinction between the UN agencies and the UN military, the UNCT strongly advocated for having the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) outside, and thus independent of the mission. However, the UN presence in Mali became structurally integrated with the MINUSMA deployment in June 2013. This means that the SRSG, a civilian, is Head of the Mission and of represents the whole UN in the country. The SRSG has two Deputies: one for political affairs and a second Deputy who has at the same time the function of Resident Coordinator (RC), as well as HC. In its function as the RC, it heads the UNCT and as HC, it heads the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), composed of all humanitarian actors in country. It also means that there are different reporting lines and different responsibilities combined in one function. This triple-hatted function in Mali is currently occupied by Madame Mbaranga. It is meant to promote effective coordination between the UN agencies, the mission and external partners (UN, 2017a). The UN System in Mali thus was enlarged by a big extra factor, the UN mission. This new UNS, was expected to operate as an integrated UN presence, under an overarching strategy and under the leadership of the SRSG.

Civilian integration

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Civil-military integration and interaction

As UN agencies and UN military form part of the UN family, they are supposed to be integrated and are thus required to work together in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, whereby overlap and duplication are avoided in order to maximise the impact of the UN as a whole. As the situation in Mali is one of an integrated UN presence, they are required to do so (UN, 2008b; UN, 2013b). When it comes to interaction between the UN agencies and the UN military force, there are two main actors that play a role. On the military side, there is the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC – U9) component within the UN mission. This is a military staff function that deals with the interaction between the military, police and civilian actors, including the local population. It is the key link between the military and other civilian actors operating in Mali and it enhances civil-military interaction structures in order to support the mission objectives. The main tasks of UN-CIMIC incorporate civil-military liaison and information sharing, as well as civil assistance (DPKO/DFS, 2010). On the civilian side, there is OCHA who is responsible for humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord). This is defined as: “The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals” (OCHA, 2015, p.7). It incorporates the coordination with all uniformed personnel, which means military, as well as police.

In Mali, the function of UN-CMCoord Officer was established in January 2013, when the French military forces deployed. As outlined in the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, strategies can range from cooperation to co-existence, depending on the context, as shown in Figure 8. OCHA together with the HCT decided that the appropriate strategy in Mali is one of

co-existence between the humanitarian and military actors, as the military are having a robust

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policy of UN integration, mainly through the civil-military coordination cells put in place by OCHA (OCHA, 2013b).

The research of Willems (2015) outlines that civil-military interaction and UN integration are not going smoothly in Mali. Integration remains poorly understood among the different actors and the implementation of UN integration is problematic. Civil-military issues arise related to information sharing, use of armed escorts and QIPs. There is lack of coordination and misunderstandings between the different actors.

The Role of Civil-Military Organisational Culture in the Context of UN Integration