The effectiveness of the ‘use of force’ in contemporary thinking about peacekeeping missions : examining the efficiency of MINUSMA

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The effectiveness of the ‘use of force’ in

contemporary thinking about peacekeeping missions

Examining the efficiency of MINUSMA

Name: Jules Geelen

Subject: The UN and Peacebuilding Supervisor: Dr Jana Krause

Second reader: Dr Abbey Steele Student number: 10572260

Assignment: Master thesis Political Science Date: 21-06-19

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Abstract

This thesis explores the following research question: “How does the use of force contribute to the implementation of MINUSMA’s mandate?” This research argues that the ‘use of force’ can contribute to short-term ‘stability’, but if ‘robustness’ lacks political purpose, short-term stability is inefficient. Subsequently, in order to

operationalize the ‘use of force’, I developed my own scale of force encompassing the following categories: (1) the show of force, (2) self-defence, (3) robust peacekeeping and (4) counter-terrorism. This operationalization is applied to examine to what extent ‘force’ contributed to the achievement of the short- and long-term goal of

MINUSMA. In order to examine the ‘effectiveness’ of force in case of MINUSMA, it is compared to UNAMSIL and MONUSCO. Using a similar case method, this thesis finds that in all three stabilisation missions, UN personnel perpetrated ‘force’ in order to reach (1) ‘stability’ on the short-term (negative peace) and (2) ‘free and fair

elections’ on the long-term (positive peace). First, in the pursuance of reaching this ‘negative’ and ‘positive peace’ in each case, ‘robust peacekeeping’ led to the successful implementation of UNAMSIL’s mandate. Second, due to ‘robust

peacekeeping’ MONUSCO managed to stabilize eastern DRC on the short-term, but the long-term objective failed because the perpetrated ‘robustness’ lacked political purpose. Finally, by using the conducted semi-structured interviews, this thesis finds that MINUSMA was able to create short-term stability in northern Mali, but failed to create long-term stability due to the ‘trap of state substitution’ and the lack of an ‘inclusive peace’. Finally, this thesis argues that MINUSMA is not moving towards the all-encompassing idea of CT, since it only perpetrates ‘soft’ CT. In the pursuance of the ‘protection of civilians’, MINUSMA is rather using ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ in order to react to ‘asymmetric threats’ instead of ‘hard’ counter-terrorism.

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Abbreviations

ASIFU

All-Sources Information Fusion Unit

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

CIC

Center of International Cooperation

CT

Counter-terrorism

CVE

Countering violent extremism

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECOMOG

Economic Community of West African States

Monitoring Group

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

FIB

Force Intervention Brigade

IDPs

Internally Displaced Persons

ISR

Swedish Intelligence Unit

ISSSS

International Security and Stabilization Support

Strategy

JMAC

Joint Mission Analysis Centre

JPT

Joint Protection Team

M23

Mouvement du 23-Mars

MIJOA

Movement for Tawid and Jihad in West Africa

MINUSMA

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilisation Mission in Mali

MLNA

National Movement for the Liberation of

Azawad

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MONUC

United Nations Organization Mission in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO

Mission de l’Organisation des Nations pour la

stabilisation en République démocratique du

Congo

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCDDR

National Committee for Disarmament,

Demobilisation and Reintegration

ODI

Overseas Development Institute

QIPs

Quick Impact Projects

RI

Refugees International

RUF

Revolutionary United Front

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNAMSIL

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOMSIL

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra

Leone

UNOC

United Nations Operation in the Congo

UNSC

United Nations Security Counsel

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Introduction

In the last decennia, we can see a clear transition of peacekeeping missions that are increasingly moving towards missions of peace-enforcement. However, it is hard to distinguish whether ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘peace-enforcement’ is an effective method in achieving the goals of a UN intervention. Conflicts and crisis used to be addressed in a passive way by the UN. This meant that peacebuilders were only authorized to intervene after the conflict already had taken place. In this way, UN peacekeepers acted according the ‘impartiality principle’, but lacked an immediate response. Nowadays, we can see a clear change in UN mandates that support a more pro-active posture for peacekeeping personnel.

From the Brahimi Report (2000), it becomes clear that the Security-General is convinced that peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development and humanitarian

assistance should be more effective in the future. Due to the failure of

‘non-intervention’ in previous peace-building missions, the international community wants to change the logic of intervention. “Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part

because the international community failed to use or to reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil” (Security Council, 2000, p. 9).

In order to do so, the Panel of the United Nations that designed the Brahimi report (2000) called out for a mandate in which peacekeepers should be authorized to stop violence against civilians in need. Due to the fact that spoilers could endanger the standards of an established peace agreement, the Security Council authorized peacekeepers to ‘use force’ against those that try to breach the peace-agreement. Although this development in capabilities and possibilities of peacekeepers might seem positive, it also endangers some of the core values of peacekeeping missions.

Back in time, the UN only intervened as a ‘third’ party in conflict (Rhoads, 2016). By not picking a side, the UN could not be placed under the banner of one of the fighting forces. However, if peacekeepers are authorized to use force,

peacekeepers lose this specific ‘impartiality’. This could have far-reaching

consequences for the United Nations as a ‘peace’-keeping organization, but also for impartial institutes that work closely with the UN.

Nowadays, many scholars discuss the question whether the use of force in UN peace missions can be seen as a valuable contribution in examining peacekeeping missions. “Today, peacekeeping is at a crossroads: although ‘designed to restrain the

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7 opinions between scholars vary; on the one hand, some are convinced that the use of force is needed to neutralize the enemy and thereby stabilize the critical situations. “For peacekeeping to accomplish its mission, as the United Nations has discovered

repeatedly over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force. However, force alone cannot create peace: it can only create a space in which peace can be built” (Security Council,

2000, p. 17). On the other hand, the use of force endangers some of the core

principles of ‘alleged’ peacekeeping missions. First, it compromises the impartiality of the UN. Second, it puts the security and safety of peacekeepers at danger (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 45).

This thesis will be focused on MINUSMA, an exemplary mission in which the use of force is authorized. “This reaction by MINUSMA forces is supported by the

mission’s mandate, which authorizes the use of force to protect civilians, UN-staff and UN-premises in case of an attack or an imminent threat” (UN, 2015). In order to

have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the use of force, this thesis will examine whether the short-term (1) stability and long-term (2) having ‘free and fair elections’ are being achieved.

Subsequently, the MINUSMA mission will be compared with the MONUSCO and UNAMSIL mission in a ‘most similar case method’, to further discuss the

advantages and disadvantages of the use of force. These three African stabilization missions were all focused on (1) stabilising a specific region or country and (2) had the long-term objective to create ‘positive peace’ by holding ‘free and fair elections’ (Malan, Rakate & McIntyre, 2000; Murphy, 2016; Doss, 2015; Security Council, 2013; Tesfaghiorghis, 2016). Besides basing the outcome of this thesis solely on desk research, the knowledge base will be enriched with semi-structured interviews in order to have a better understanding of the situation on the ground in Mali. The respondents for these semi-structured interviews are key-players on the executive side of the MINUSMA mission. This thesis will use these interviews to offer an insight of the perpetrated ‘use of force’, which may differ from the literature. In this way, it becomes feasible to map out the efficiency of this mission. By doing so, this thesis will answer the following research question: “How does the use of force contribute

to the implementation of MINUSMA’s mandate?”

This topic is relevant, because it discusses the effectiveness of stabilisation missions. Although there is a lot of critique on the use of force, this thesis argues that

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8 in some circumstances the ‘use of force’ is an effective tool to achieve the short-term goal of stabilisation missions. Although, ‘force’ does not directly contribute to achievement of the long-term objective, it could definitely create ‘stability’, in which components of ‘positive peace’ are able to thrive. Subsequently, this topic could also be seen as scientifically relevant. Using the ‘scale of force’, this thesis elaborates on the different categories of ‘force’ that either weaken or contribute to the achievement of the short- and long-term objective of UNAMSIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA, in respectively (1) Sierra Leone, (2) eastern DRC and (3) northern Mali.

Finally, this thesis will contradict Karlsrud’s (2017) argument. Meaning that this thesis argues that MINUSMA is not moving towards a mission of

counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. To do so, a clear distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ counterterrorism (CT) will be made. Due to the fact that MINUSMA never participated in ‘hard’ counterterrorism, this thesis argues that this stabilisation mission is not moving towards the all-encompassing idea of CT operations. Additionally, it will explain, by using the obtained information of the conducted interviews, that a potential move towards CT operations would harm the chances of achieving the short- and long-term goal of MINUSMA.

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1. Literature Review

This literature review will describe the wider debates around the use of force and will locate the normative position in which the core argument of this thesis will find its foundations. In doing so, this literature review will examine the following

comprehensive and scientific debates: (1) the changing logic of a UN intervention, (2)

stabilisation, (3) the use of force and (4) moving towards missions of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

First of all, in order to understand the argument of this thesis, it is important to understand how the ‘logic of a UN intervention’ changed over time. By doing so, this thesis will explain why ‘under some circumstances’ the UN thinks that stabilisation missions are needed to restore the power of a ‘failing state’.

Second, in order to understand how the UN wants to create ‘stability’, it is important to understand how ‘stability’ is defined within UN intervention

frameworks. This will offer a wider understanding of the actual objectives of UN stabilisation missions.

Third, in order to achieve the mission’s goals, the UN involved the component of ‘force’ within certain mandates. This thesis examines the implications and

consequences of the ‘use of force’. This is of great importance since it explains why ‘force’ that is perpetrated by UN personnel has a janus-faced effectiveness.

Fourth, this thesis will discuss why Karlsrud (2017) argues that MINUSMA is moving towards a mission of counterterrorism. Nevertheless, it is important to

understand the implications and consequences of ‘potential’ CT practices within UN stabilisation mandates.

Fifth, by elaborating these discussions, it will show why the ‘use of force’ within stabilisation missions is able to create (1) short-term stability. However, if these stabilisation missions are not followed by clear political purposes, the long-term objective (2) ‘holding free and fair elections’ will never be achieved. The same accounts for counter-terrorism (CT). Either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ CT will be disruptive for achieving the mission’s goals.

1.1 Changing the logic of a UN intervention

The Brahimi report (2000) should be pointed out as the starting point in the

redefinition of ‘intervention’. The United Nations were widely critiqued because of the passive mandate that was given to peacekeeping personnel in the 90’s. “No failure

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did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor” (Security Council,

2000, p. 9). Although the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations was

convinced that something needed to be changed, they still underlined the importance of ‘impartiality’ and that the ‘use of force’ could only be carried out in case of self-defence (Security Council, 2000, p. 25). In this way, UN personnel would be offered a mandate in which they could convey more pro-active conduct in situations of need. But at the same time this conduct would be restricted to the fact that they could only take serious measures when safety of the own or innocent civilians would be at stake. “In the far-reaching document, the Panel pressed for a more flexible operation with

the capacity to respond more quickly to fluid situations. It acknowledged that preventing conflict before it explodes can cost less than trying to patch things together later” (Zittel, 2002 p. 502). However, this flexibility entails certain

difficulties for UN peace operations. If UN peacekeeping personnel is authorized to defend (1) themselves, the (2) mission’s mandate and (3) other components of the mission; it will harm the ‘impartiality’ component of the UN. “That means that the

mission’s mandate should give peacekeepers permission to use force against those, who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence. In the same time, the Panel recognized that the United Nations did not wage war” (Yamchuk, 2013, p. 4). It is therefore important to understand that the

‘logic of UN intervention’ changed over time, because it has a significant influence on how scholars discuss the effectiveness of stabilisation missions nowadays. In order to create a better picture of how stabilisation missions are constructed, this thesis will first describe why the definition of ‘stabilisation’ differs between different actors.

1.2 The Stabilisation mission

In order to examine the concept of ‘stabilisation’, this thesis will discuss the various definitions of this concept. It is important to note that this thesis only examines the definition of ‘stabilisation’ within a UN intervention framework. Due to the fact, that this thesis examines the effectiveness of the ‘use of force’, it will only examine those definitions that contributed or shaped the current understanding of ‘stabilisation’.

First of all, there are only a few countries that have conceptualized

‘stabilisation’ in the context of a UN intervention. Among these countries there is a range of NATO member states, including New Zeeland and Australia, who developed

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11 a wide understanding of the concept of ‘stabilisation’. The states that inherit this ‘wide understanding’ of stabilisation are Denmark, France, Norway, The Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Canada and the US. “The central theme in these national

approaches to stabilization is that such interventions are designed to bring support tot the ability of a ‘failed or failing state’ to deliver key services” (Curran & Holtom,

2015, p. 3).

Second, one must understand that there is no single defined understanding of the concept of ‘stabilisation’. For this reason, the conceptualisation of ‘stabilisation’ still varies among the different Western States. Nevertheless, the comprehensive concept is the following: “a combination of civilian and military approaches with a

focus on re-establishing state authority in ‘failed states’ (Curran & Holtom, 2015, p.

4).

Third, in order to understand ‘stabilisation’ within the context of this thesis and the examination of the research question, it is important to note that this thesis uses the UK approach of ‘stabilisation’, since their conceptualisation is widely used in UN intervention frameworks (Karlsrud, 2018). The UK definition of ‘stability’

defines this concept in terms of: “political systems which are representative and

legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all

(UK Government, 2011, p. 5).

In order to understand how the UK puts ‘stabilisation’ into practice, it uses three core ‘stabilisation principles’:

- Protecting the means of survival: “Address any immediate security deficit to

build space for peaceful political processes and –in time- support the restoration of long-term security, the rule of law and access to justice”

(Stabilisation Unit, 2019, p. 13).

- Promoting and supporting political process to reduce violence: “Stabilisation

must work to support and foster political deals and bargains among key conflict elites and actors. These are vital to securing reductions in violent conflict, building support for more formal peace agreements and facilitating stable transitions out of conflict” (Stabilisation Unit, 2019, p. 13).

- Preparing a foundation for longer term stability: “There is no set period for

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activity contributing to the wider goal of creating the conditions for long-term stability” (Stabilisation Unit, 2019, p. 13).

These ‘core stabilisation principles’ will also be present in the analysed stabilisation missions of this thesis. However, in order to create the foundation in which these principles can thrive, the UN was mandated to ‘use all necessary means’. In the case of UNAMSIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA, UN personnel was authorized to ‘use force’. One must understand the implications and consequences of the ‘use of force’ in order to critically analyse its effectiveness.

1.3 The Use of Force

Due to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council (UNSC) can now offer a mandate in which multidimensional peacekeeping operations are authorized to use force. According to Lisa Morjé Howard and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal (2017) the UN owns the largest deployed force in the world. “The use-of-force mandates’

negative effects on peacekeeping are manifold: they undermine peacekeepers’ claims to impartiality; they open peacekeepers and humanitarian workers to attack; and they generate false expectations about the UN’s abilities to achieve goals by forceful means” (Howard & Dayal, 2017, p. 72). On the other hand, the use of force is put to

use by the UNSC because it could help in decreasing violence on the short-term. Having one of the main points of the Brahimi report (2000) in mind: “However, force

alone cannot create peace: it can only create a space in which peace can be built”

(Security Council, 2000, p. 17).

When looking at Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the involved use of force, one could argue that this is part of the ‘exceptions outside the Charter’. “In the event

of flagrant and mass violations of human rights, the use of force, without the consent of the government of the state in which the intervention takes place, could arguably be regarded as legitimate” (Schrijver, 2015, p. 475). However, if the authorization by

the UN Security Council is absent, it cannot be regarded as an international law exception to the prohibition of the use of force. Still, the use of force was developed to defend the innocent. “By mandating UN peacekeepers to protect civilians from

physical violence and by authorizing them to use all necessary means to do so, the Security Council equally sent a message that never again would UN forces stand helplessly by while civilians were being massacred in their areas of deployment”

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13 eradication of the ‘common’ enemy and using ‘force’ to defend established peace-agreements or cease-fires. “[T]he situation in Congo, where the Security Council first

authorized a UN operation to use force by urging ‘the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort”

(Schrijver, 2015, p. 478).

Even in the event of self-defence or the perspective of creating more stability, by attacking the enemy, scholars are convinced that the use of force creates dissension between Member States of the UN, who actually have to take the responsibility to defend civilians against ‘the imminent threat of physical violence’ (Security Council, 1999). Meaning that the report of the General Assembly (2014) showed that troop-contributing countries lack the willingness to put their troops at danger (General Assembly 2014, p. 14). As Blyth and Cammaert (2016) note: “[t]here is a continuing

lack of knowledge at all levels of command regarding the mission mandate and the rights and obligations to use force to protect civilians” (Blyth & Cammaert, 2016, p.

309). In this way, as Bode and Karlsud (2018) argue that the use of force could not only be injurious for the UN on the long-term, it is also unclear who has to take the responsibility to protect civilians from harm. “Examples were provided of

peacekeepers not acting, despite being stationed in the vicinity of deadly violence, and of not following orders given” (General Assembly, 2014, p. 14).

However, some scholars argue that the use of force was also needed to improve certain situations, since the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica massacre eventually lead to the implementation of the use of force. Just being in discomfort with a certain problematic situation wasn’t enough for UN peacekeeping personnel: “[U]N peacekeepers would henceforth need to prepare for, and be ready to engage in,

more ‘robust’ or ‘muscular’ peacekeeping. Since UN peacekeeping picked up again, beginning with the Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999, this emphasis on ‘robustness’ – and along with it a greater readiness to use force – has remained in place” (Berdal & Ucko, 2018, p. 667). This ‘robust peacekeeping’ gave

UN personnel the ability to ‘use force’ in order to protect or defend an established cease-fire or peace-agreements. In this way, the UN is no longer interfering in problematic situations as an ‘impartial’ peacekeeping institution, but rather as a new fighting actor in on-going conflict.

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14 The debate around the use of force therefore contributes to the understanding of contemporary peacekeeping, seeing it as the paradox between ‘impartiality’ and the will to act. So, the use of force has certain implications for the neutral position of the UN. This debate intensified when Karlsrud (2017) argued that some stabilisation missions are moving towards missions of counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency.

1.4 Moving towards missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency

First of all, it is important to note that the definition of wars and violence changed over time. Due to globalisation and the constant interaction between states and non-states, external and private, public and private, political and economic, war and peace, the contextual frame in which these phenomena are defined, is breaking down. In this way, we can actually speak of so-called ‘new-wars’; wars in which we cannot

distinguish forces by simply looking at their uniforms, but wars in which every individual can be part of the perpetrated violence. Meaning that wars used to be fought between regular armed forces, but are now increasingly fought by targeting civilians. “In new wars, battles are rare and territory is captured through political

means, through control of the population. Violence is largely directed against

civilians as a way of controlling territory rather than against enemy forces” (Kaldor,

2013, p. 2). Nevertheless, there is much critique on the conceptualisation of ‘new wars’. One of these critics is Yuval Benziman (2017). He argues that societies might have a rational understanding of ‘new wars’, but still hold a collective memory of ‘old wars’. In this way, Benziman (2017) contradicts Kaldor’s (2013) argument. “This

shared memory makes them think and hope in a way that fits their past experiences, even when knowing that the nature of conflicts has changed” (Benziman, 2017, p.

441). Although one might argue that ‘collective memory’ decreases the understanding of an actual shift between ‘old’ and ‘new wars’, ‘contemporary terrorism’ is in this thesis defined as an exemplary concept that could only be understood within the framework of ‘new wars’. “The new form of international terrorism is an autonomous

political strategy that regards its attacks less as an act of provocation than an end in itself. Casualties among the general public are accepted as collateral damage”

(Mello, 2010, p. 304). The same accounts for ‘terrorism’, seeing it as a specific degree of ‘force’ in which immediate targets like people, institutions or events are involved (Vertigans, 2015, p. 237). In order to defend these innocent people, some scholars argue that the UN has the legal responsibility to take part in counter fighting this

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15 violence. Seeing the ‘protection of civilians’ as one of the core tasks of the UN, Karlsrud (2017) argues that the UN is moving towards a mission of counterterrorism. Due to the increase in the fatalities caused by terrorism, the UN feels that now is the time to change certain mandates. “ It is only in recent years that the UN peacekeeping

has been asked to cross the line and become a party to the conflict, when the UN Security Council in 2013 mandated MONUSCO to ‘neutralize’ identified rebel groups” (Karlsrud, 2017, p. 1217).

The new component of counterinsurgency or counter-terrorism (CT) thus creates an extra dimension in the discussion whether this component should be included in stabilisation mandates. This thesis will contradict this argument, seeing counter-terrorism as the actual act of ‘neutralizing’ the ‘hunting terrorists’. It therefore makes a clear distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ counter-terrorism (Rineheart, 2010). In the analysis, this thesis will argue that UN personnel did not perpetrate in ‘hard’ counter-terrorism in UNAMSIL, MONUSCO or MINUSMA. Additionally, this thesis will argue why the UN should not include either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ CT operations in stabilisation mandates, since it will be ineffective for achieving the short and long-term goal of the mission.

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2. Theoretical framework

In order to evaluate the research question, the ‘use of force’ will be examined in a ‘utilitarian’ way of reasoning. It argues that ‘utilitarianism’ is the best possible theoretical lens to explain the ‘effectiveness’ of this phenomenon. In an attempt to create ‘the greater good’, the UN tries to develop ‘effective’ peacekeeping missions in order to create ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace in countries in war. “The moral theory

that an action is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much good (utility) for all people affected by the action as any alternative action the person could do instead” (Brock, 1999, p. 942). Due to the fact that former peacekeeping missions

lacked this ‘effectiveness’, the UN started to design stabilisation missions (Security Council, 2000). These stabilisation missions were ought to bring ‘stability’.

In other words, these renewed UN interventions were created to ‘decrease the level of violence’. Utilitarianism would explain this situation as the ‘prevention of pain’ and, therefore, the increase of another individual’s utility. The theory underlines ‘good social policy’ as the creation of ‘utility’ not only for the self, but also for the whole. “The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be

attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence. Now, whatever amount of this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate, and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others” (Mill, 1879, p. 35). Although, one could argue that the ‘use of force’ also

contributes to the ‘increase of pain’ of others, it is precisely for the purpose of the greater good that the UN justifies the ‘use of force’ in the first place. It is therefore important to acknowledge that stabilisation missions are initially designed in order to ‘protect a government and its people against identified aggressors” (De Koning, 2015). In this way, utilitarianism could potentiality defend the righteousness of using force, by stating that it increases the minimal basis of utility in general. “Even if the

price of possessing a noble character is to experience unhappiness or discontent, this nobility is likely to increase the happiness of others” (Billlington, 2003, p. 122).

The theoretical framework will discuss the different ‘utilities’ that stabilisation mission is ought to achieve within UN intervention frameworks. These utilities are defined as either ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ peace. Second, it will discuss how the UN has to become a ‘fighting combatant’ in order to defend the achieved ‘negative peace’. Third, the ‘use of force’ will be categorized to operationalize perpetrated UN violence in order to see its effectiveness in achieving the mission’s goals. Fourth, it

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17 will discuss why the ‘use of force’ will endanger the lives of humanitarian aid

workers and how this could lead to more instability. Finally, this thesis will conceptualize the short- and long-term goal of MINUSMA. By comparing the effectiveness of the ‘use of force’ to UNAMSIL and MONUSCO, this thesis will analyse how this phenomenon is either ‘creating’ or ‘neglecting’ utilities within the framework of these stabilisation missions.

2.1 Defining different kinds of ‘peace’

The United Nations designed peacekeeping missions in order to create peace. In the pursuance of understanding the concept of ‘peace’, Roland Paris (2018) distinguishes three different kinds of ‘peace’. “Peacekeeping was now defined as a subset of peace

operations focusing on the traditional task of observing ceasefires. A second category of operations –peace enforcement- comprises more heavily armed missions

authorized to use force to achieve purposes other than self-protection. A third category – post-conflict peacebuilding – comprised missions aiming ‘to strengthen and solidify peace’ in the aftermath of ‘civil strife” (Paris, 2018, p. 3).

Taking a better look at the concept of peace, one could also make a difference between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace. “Negative peace is simply the absence of

conflict” (Diehl, 2016, p. 4). Positive peace generates a sustainable freedom. “In a society at war, the first stage op peace begins as the end of personal violence and absence of war (negative peace). In the next stage, a stronger society would emerge with communities that sustain freedom, social equity, social justice, cooperation, and so on (e.g., positive peace)” (Shields & Soeters, 2017, p. 324). You could apply the

concepts of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace to the theory of Roland Paris (2018) by seeing the first two examples of ‘peace’, as the creation of ‘negative peace’: either by observing cease-fires or by using ‘force’ in order to defend the established cease-fire. The third example of peace of Paris (2018) sets the foundation for ‘positive’ peace.

However, in order to establish ‘the absence of violence’ or the foundation for sustainable freedom, one needs to find a strategy to decrease the level of violence. As discussed in the literature review, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica massacre, the UN wanted to change the logic of intervention. In order to participate in combat, the UN will lose one of its core values. Subsequently, one of the main critiques is the fact that if the UN turns into a ‘fighting’ actor, it will lose its desired ‘impartiality’.

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2.2 Changing from the ‘impartial judge’ towards the ‘fighting combatant’

Human rights have always been a key concern of the United Nations. Together with development, peace and security, human rights constituted the three pillars of action of the UN. “Indeed, for over a generation, reaffirming human rights took a back seat

to what was arguably the Charter’s main goal: maintaining international peace and security, predominantly among sovereign states, through the establishment of a framework for impartial diplomacy” (Rhoads, 2019, p. 2). The former

Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon argued that the focus of the UN as an institution should always be at the protection of individuals against serious violations of human rights. One of the main focuses should therefore be on ‘the sustainability and impartiality of the Organization’s work’ (Rhoads, 2019).

Emily Paddon Rhoads (2019) defines ‘impartiality’ in a social constructivist sense of the word. “I understand impartiality […], as ‘a prescription for action in

situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that ought to be followed’. Impartiality is an appropriate lens through which to explore these questions because, as social norm, it refers not only to the position of UN officials – that they should be unbiased and informed – but also to the values the institution seeks to protect”

(Rhoads, 2019, p. 2). Working with this definition, impartiality does not have to mean that the UN needs to be neutral among values. This implicates, that the UN can have its own values, but that these values need to account for both sides of the conflict. In this case, we could see ‘the representation of human rights’ as the scale in which the UN can estimate which side is violating the terms. Measuring conflicts along the same ‘scale of values’ implies definitely certain requirements (set by the impartial judge), but important to note is that these requirements are based on the same equal standard. “Impartiality in this general sense does not exclude arbitrariness or

guarantee fairness: nor does it require neutrality among values, for a judge can be impartial between parties while favouring liberty and equality for all”

(Sinott-Armstrong, 1999. p. 419). In this way, we could distinguish ‘impartiality’ from ‘personal commitments’. This means that one could do something in pursuance of his own personal conviction and therefore loses his sight on the impartiality. The same accounts for the earlier described ‘logic of intervention’, helping those in need after conflict instead of intervening in a conflicting situation are two different things. This constitutes a clear difference between ‘what is right’ and ‘what is equal’. “He draws

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attention to the fact that the dictates of impartial morality may conflict with personal ties and affections that matter very much to us, and he notes that, when such a conflict occurs, we may wonder why we should abandon our personal commitments and do the thing that impartial morality would have us do” (Mendus, 2008, p. 2).

This is one of the reasons why Jane Boulden (2005) sets a critical note with the desired ‘impartiality’ of the UN. She wonders if it’s even possible for an institution like the UN to be impartial. “After all, the UN is a political organization

with overtly political goals – the maintenance of international peace and security, for one – that suggest a need to take ‘partial’ positions in situations that threaten

international peace and security. Is it ever possible, then, for the UN to take impartial action in a given situation?” (Boulden, 2005, p. 148). In order to that in order to have

a better idea about the UN’s impartiality, she underlines that one needs to properly examine UN mandates. When the UN is willing to respond to a conflicting situation, its decision-making takes place on several levels. “The UN Charter establishes the

decision making structure for the organization. The political decision makers (the Security Council) determine that action is required, and they establish a set of objectives for an operation (the mandate). Those objectives are then pursued by military means (the operation)” (Boulden, 2005, p. 150).

Subsequently, one can divide UN mandates in two categories: partial and impartial. If the Security Council doesn’t engage in the conflict itself and doesn’t choose sides in the political decision-making of the conflict, one could argue that the mandate is ‘impartial’. The absence of a favourable situation, which Security Council possibly could support, underlines its impartiality. On the other hand, the Security Council has also clear partial mandates. “For example, the UN operation in Korea in

the early 1950s and the one in the Persian Gulf in 1991 were both directed to redress a violation of the charter by altering the situation on the ground and were directed against specific states. They established political objectives and were clearly partial in their approach” (Boulden, 2005, p. 151). Jane Boulden (2005) underlines the

dangers of the so-called ‘grey-zone’ between partial and impartial mandates. Meaning that certain UN operations started ‘impartial’, but were then altered and brought the desired ‘impartiality’ into question. This mostly happens in situations in which there is no peace agreement or cease-fire agreement between the fighting actors. “Any

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position of one or more of the parties and are therefore not impartial” (Boulden,

2005, p. 152).

Spijkers (2015) describes that even in a situation in which a cease-fire or peace agreement was established, the UN eventually had to change their mandate in order to maintain the ‘peace’. Focused on their main goal ‘maintaining international peace and security‘ (Rhoads, 2019). ’Like any impartial referee, the report noted that

UN peacekeepers could punish any party that failed to respect the peace agreement the peacekeeping force was meant to protect. The reports appropriately referred to such parties as ‘spoilers’ defined as ‘individuals or groups that may profit from the spread or continuation of violence, or have an interest to disrupt a resolution of a conflict in a given setting” (Spijkers, 2015, p. 98). This meant that the UN had to

change their vision towards ‘impartiality’. In the pursuance of defending the established agreements, the UN had to pick up arms in order to defend those peace standards that were established in the ‘grey-zone’.

This means that the will of being ‘impartial’ in the current social reality could be defined as highly utopian for any UN peace operation. Arriving from the idea that ‘impartiality’ is impossible for the UN as peace institution in current dynamics of maintaining established peace-agreements; the UN could benefit more for explicitly taking a side in conflict. In order to have a better idea about the exact way the UN could manage this; one should categorize UN force in order to engage in the consequences of each ‘level of UN violence’ in stabilisation missions.

2.3 Categorizing the degree of force

Although UN peacekeeping personnel is in most cases only authorized to use force to defend the established ‘cease-fire’ or ‘peace-agreement’ against spoilers, there is an increasing amount of examples in which the ‘use of force’ is not only a tool of self-defence, but is rather used as a tool to eradicate the enemy. “The gap between

principles and the realities of contemporary peacekeeping has become apparent. Notably, peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali have blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement” (Rudolf, 2017,

p. 161).

In order to understand how this thesis defines the ‘use of force’, it will

categorize the degree of perpetrated UN violence. First of all, one could argue that the ‘show of force’ is already a way of ‘using force’. There is a clear difference, between

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21 deployed UN peacekeeping personnel and deployed ‘armed’ UN peacekeeping

personnel. In the latter, the level of deterrence is much higher. The idea of a ‘possible’ combat can create anxiety or fear and will therefore definitely have an influence on the dynamics in the deployed area. As stated in the ‘Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services’ of the General Assembly (2014), is the ‘show of force against parties, one of the main strategies to prevent and pre-empts ‘potential’ attacks against civilians (General Assembly, 2014, p. 12).

Second, one can look at the ‘use of force’ as a method of self-defence. This means that this kind of force can only be perpetrated to defend yourself or a certain collective. Self-defence as retaliation is therefore illegal. Like the use of force, it is important to note that ‘self-defence’ is also bound to legal norms of the Security Council. “It may only be exercised ‘if an armed attack occurs’, and its purpose is to

repel or reverse such attack; it does not have broader purposes. Action taken must be necessary and proportionate. The right to exercise self-defence lasts only ‘until the Security Council has taken the measure necessary to maintain international peace and security” (Wood, 2015, p. 654). In this way, peacekeeping personnel can defend

itself during an attack, but it will have to be an action in which no preference of outcome is included rather than the decrease of the level of violence. ‘An armed attack’ is then seen as a condition in which self-defence is permitted. “The

circumstances which ‘trigger’ the Council’s powers under Chapter VII (a threat to the peace, or act of aggression under Article 39) are not identical to an ‘armed attack’ which is precondition for the exercise of the right of self-defence as

recognized in Article 51” (Wood, 2015, p. 652). This differs for the third category of

the ‘use of force’.

The ‘use of force’ could also be perpetrated in order to eradicate spoilers. This method of force is not based on the condition of an armed attack, but based on the premise that it will contribute to the political goal of the mandate. We define this as the so-called ‘robustness’ of a mission. “The concept of ‘robustness’ in UN

peacekeeping is a political and operational strategy to signal the intention of a UN mission to implement its mandate and to deter threats…from spoilers…A robust approach is guided by the mission objectives established by the Security Council and should be driven by a clear political strategy” (Murphy, 2016, p. 209). Robust

peacekeeping has two overarching goals. The first one contains the creation of

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22 second entails ‘the security of civilians’ in which the established conditions contribute to a more general feeling of peace and security. “Essentially, robust peacekeeping

involves the use of military pressure (that is, the use of force) to deter or coerce a spoiler (invariably an armed group) into ceasing offensive military operations and/or civilian victimisation (Nadin, Cammaert & Popovski, 2015, 76).

The last degree of force is the earlier discussed level of violence in which a component of counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency is included. The main

difference with ‘robust peacekeeping’ encompasses the incentive why violence is put to use. Within the component of counterterrorism, force is put to use to eradicate those dangers that contribute to crisis and conflicts in countries in which missions of peace-enforcement are deployed. In this way one could argue that the component of counterterrorism is a valuable additional tool in creating ‘negative peace’. “Boko

Haram, IS, the Al Shabaab and other extremist groups in Libya, Mali, Syria and Yemen have challenged policy-makers and the multilateral system, which is poorly equipped to respond to these violent but multifaceted challenges. These groups add to the political complexity and increase the intractable nature of conflict in these

countries. Some groups can be talked to, while others have no interest in negotiating with the UN” (Karlsrud, 2016, p. 119). Although, counter-terrorism could lead to the

establishment of ‘negative peace’, this thesis argues that the UN should not include or perpetrate this degree of ‘force’. It is therefore important to make a clear distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ counter-terrorism.

Table 1: ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard’ CT

Alternative conceptualisation

‘Soft’ counter-terrorism

Countering violent extremism

(CVE)

‘Hard’ counter-terrorism

Counter-terrorism (CT) (Attree & Keen, 2015)

Method Capacity building,

counter-radicalization

Offensive, hard power tactics

Focus/goal Determining the underlying

causes in which terrorism is able to thrive

Isolation and destroying terrorist groups

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23 Gathering information and locating the positioning of terrorists is seen as ‘soft’

terrorism. Using these concepts of counter-terrorism, this thesis will describe why the UN is not participating in ‘hard’ counter-terrorism. It is therefore important to make a clear difference between the conceptualisation of ‘counter-terrorism’ (CT) and

‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE). “Counter-terrorism consists of military efforts

to defeat particular actors who have been defined as ‘terrorist’… It can further involve effort to stop people joining the ranks of ‘terrorists’ – which may be part developmental and include tackling selected root causes of the problem. This latter- and arguably more developmental, preventative – approach is sometimes styled ‘countering violent extremism’ (Attree & Keen, 2015, p. 1). This distinction is

essential in understanding why the UN is not moving towards missions of counterterrorism since MINUSMA is not contributing to the all-encompassing concept of counter-terrorism. Second, in examining the effectiveness of the ‘use of force’, it is important to note that either ‘soft CT’/CVE or ‘hard CT’/ CT will

complicate the process of achieving the mission’s goals (Karlsrud, 2018, p. 153; Keen & Attree, 2015, IV).

Furthermore, the ‘use of force’ does not only have consequences for the level of violence that is perpetrated against Malian civilians, spoilers or terrorists. The ‘use

of force’ also provokes a reaction in which more casualties could potentially be

involved. Besides UN peacekeeping personnel, different kinds of humanitarian aid workers are also at risk due to the deployed stabilisation mission. That is why this thesis does not only examine the violence that is used to ‘protect civilians’; it will also examine the increased level of violence that is perpetrated against humanitarian aid workers. By doing so, this thesis offers a better picture of the general influence of the ‘use of force’ on the amount of fatalities on Malian soil.

2.4 Creating more risks for humanitarians

An increasing amount of humanitarians are living and experiencing more and more threats to their security during their work. Why these aid workers are more at risk is yet unclear. Some argue that it has to do with the changing nature of violence, the politicization of impartial and independent humanitarian aid, terrorism and so on (Fast, 2010). One of the major studies in this field, is the study of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Center on International Cooperation (CIC), which found that there is a: “deep causation through intentionality and an

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examination of specific contextual factors, including intensity of the conflict, presence of UN peacekeeping forces, global terrorist movement cells, regional or UN Security Council member forces, and the use of UN integrated mission (Fast, 2010, p. 371).

They illustrated that these six variables however did not have a significant impact on the increased level of violence against aid workers (Stoddard, Harmer & Haver, 2006, p. 17-19). Nevertheless, there was one slight exception; the presence of UN

peacekeeping forces did have (when present) a slight but statistically significant increasing influence in the number of international staff victims (Fast, 2010). This means, in the most minimal terms, that the presence of UN peacekeeping forces could have a problematic influence in the amount of casualties among aid workers.

But how is this violence perpetrated? And why are humanitarians at risk in areas where peacekeeping personnel is deployed? The reason for this is the

association made between humanitarians and peacekeeping personnel. One of the reasons why humanitarians are often mistaken with peacekeeping personnel is because the goals of their missions do have relevant aspects in common. Where peacekeeping personnel is seeking to find ‘stability’ in order to create peace, humanitarians would like peace to create better conditions for human life. “As a

broader, transformative project, enhancing stability depends on pursuing a number of key parallel and connected goals, including creating a safe and secure environment, establishing the rule of law, achieving good (or at least good enough) governance and viable market economy, and promoting social and psychological well-being

(Collinson, Elhawary & Muggah, 2010, p. 278). Although the goals may seem somehow interlinked, the incentives and motives to reach these goals are quite controversial. One of the main bottlenecks between humanitarians and peacekeeping personnel is the earlier desired ‘impartiality’ of actions. “The majority of international

humanitarian organisations espouse humanity, neutrality, independence and

impartiality as fundamental principles that underpin their activities (Collinson et al,

2010, p. 286). Due to their controversy in incentives, but their similarity in goals, they establish an image in which they disagree from within on the reasons why they are deployed, but seem highly coherent in activities from the outside.

This is the reason, why militias and insurgencies do not make a distinction between the two of them. In missions of stabilisation, it is therefore arguably

understandable that violence is not only perpetrated against peacekeeping personnel but is also perpetrated towards humanitarians and aid workers. “Every day, United

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Nations personnel risk their lives and well-being to fulfil humanitarian, development, human rights, and peace and security mandates across the globe. United Nations and humanitarian personnel often deployed in hardship conditions, remain targets of diverse threats from terrorism, crime and armed conflict while providing relief to those in need and supporting Member States and their populations” (General

Assembly, 2018, p. 17). This results in a ‘fundamental dilemma’ for humanitarians. In the pursuance of decreasing human suffering, they end up in a situation in which they eventually become ‘part of the crisis’ (Lopez, Bhungalia & Newhouse, 2015). This dilemma finds its origins in the essence of utilitarianism; seeing humanitarian activities as the moral responsibility in which one prefers ‘the greater good’ to

individual ‘discontent’. This thesis therefore stresses the coherence in ‘desired utility’ between humanitarians and UN personnel. The similarity in desired utility is shaped by the ‘liberal paradox’. “[O]n the one hand, a strict recognition of moral limits to

what one may do to others; on the other hand, a justification for doing ‘anything’, using any kind of degree of violence (so long as it works), if collective ongoingness is seen to be threatened” (Asad, 2015, p. 405).

In this way, the attempts of both UN peacekeeping personnel and humanitarian personnel to create ‘stability’ in which both the level of violence decreases and the value of human life increases, the ‘spoiler’ benefits from any harm that is perpetrated against one of these groups. “The insurgent’s goals becomes to

disrupt and delegitimize the stabilization attempts around local populations. In his eyes, all aid efforts that support the goals of the government or the foreign occupying forces is genuine threat and legitimate target” (Stoddard, 2013).

In order to understand the influence of the ‘use of force’ in contemporary thinking about peace-operations, this thesis will use MINUSMA as an exemplary case in which the stabilisation mission is deployed. By doing so, one does not only need to examine the consequences of using ‘force’, but also needs to elaborate why this mandate was authorized in the first place. Focusing on MINUSMA, the stabilisation mission was deployed in order to succeed the short- and long-term goal of the mission.

2.5 Distinguishing the short and long-term goals of MINUSMA

MINUSMA is one of the peace-operations in which the ‘use of force’ is mandated. In order to understand to what extent the ‘use of force’ contributes to the goals of

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26 MINUSMA, one needs to make a clear difference between the short- and long-term goals of the mission. The MINUSMA mission was officially initiated on the 25th of April 2013 and was meant to ‘support political processes in that country and carry

out a number of security-related tasks’ (UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). In order to establish

these goals, the MINUSMA mission was asked to support the stabilization of the country and to help with the implementation of the ‘transitional roadmap’ (UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). The ‘transitional roadmap’ seems one of the core targets of the mission. As listed by Mali’s Minister for Communication and Government

Spokesman: “The roadmap shows the way to two main issues. The first is how to get

rid of terrorists and traffickers from the north of the country. The second one is how to hold fair, free and credible elections throughout the country, so as to give power to an elected government after the transition” (Butty, 2012).

On 25th of June 2014, by adopting resolution 2164, the Council decided that, besides the stated goals, the mission should also be focused on: “Duties, such

ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country” (UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). In order to establish the goals

of the ‘transitional roadmap’, the main incentive of the MINUSMA mission on the short-term seems to be ‘the stabilization of the country’. Focusing mainly on reducing violence that is perpetrated against Malian civilians. In this way, the stabilization mission could result in ‘negative peace’. Subsequently, when MINUSMA is able to reach these short-term goals, it could establish the long-term goal of the mission: the ‘transitional roadmap’.

By researching the achievements of this mission, this thesis could determine whether ‘the stabilization of the country’ actually helped in reducing the level of violence. Defining ‘violence’ as followed: “as any aggressive act that has its goal

extreme physical harm, such as injury or death” (Hamby, 2017, p. 168), seeing the

stabilization objective as the absence or reduction of that ‘violence’. These

stabilization incentives would have a positive effect on the long-term goals that the UN is willing to achieve. “Such a mission would support the political process and

carry out security-related stabilization tasks […], supporting the extension of state authority, and supporting the preparation of free, inclusive, and peaceful elections”

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27 (Lotze, 2015, p. 13). Subsequently, one can observe whether the components of the ‘transitional roadmap’ are being achieved in Mali.

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3. Methodology

3.1 Methodological approach

In the analysis, this thesis will examine how the ‘use of force’ contributes to the success of each stabilisation mission. In order to research how ‘force’ perpetrated by UN personnel contributes to achieving the mission’s goals; this thesis will make a clear distinction between the ‘independent’ and ‘dependent variables’. The

independent variable in the analysis is the ‘use of force’. The dependent variables are either the short-term or the long-term goals of each stabilisation mission.

First, this thesis will use a most-similar case method (Seawright & Gerring, 2008), comparing UNAMSIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA. In a most-similar case method, there is a strong similarity in background conditions, but each case has divergent outcomes (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016, p. 399). This is due to the fact that all cases are ‘as similar as possible’, except for the phenomenon this thesis addresses (Anckar, 2008, p. 389). In this thesis, the phenomenon that will be addressed is the ‘use of force’. The categorization of this force is therefore important in understanding the argument of this thesis. Because violence is perpetrated in different ways in each case, this thesis is able to examine how the ‘use of force’ contributes in achieving the mission’s goals. Nevertheless, it is therefore important that the so-called ‘background’ conditions of intervention and the objectives are the same in UNAMSIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA.

This thesis therefore argues that in the case of UNAMSIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA, the goal of each analysed stabilisation missions contributed to (1) stability on the short-term and (2) holding ‘free and fair’ elections on the long-term. Seeing the establishment of ‘stability’ as a contribution to ‘negative peace’ and holding ‘free and fair elections’ as a contribution to ‘positive peace’, it is argued that the objectives of these missions are synonymous.

Second, the background conditions for intervention also seem to be similar. In every case, the specific stabilisation mission was deployed in order to establish (1) ‘stability’ in the deployed area and (2) to create a solid foundation in which ‘positive peace’ was able to thrive. Subsequently, this thesis will only examine the

effectiveness of ‘force’ at the moment that each mandate became ‘robust’. By doing so, this thesis will examine the ‘use of force’ when the perpetrated violence scored highest on the ‘scale of force’. In this way, this thesis is able to estimate to what

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29 extent the ‘use of force’ was able to contribute either to (1) stability or (2) holding free and fair elections.

Third, this thesis will also look at other actors that were able to successfully contribute to the achievement of the mission’s goals, defining ‘success’ by examining whether the specific stabilisation mission was able to accomplish (1) the short-term goal and (2) the long-term goal of the mission. In this way, this thesis addresses alternative explanations that would be more effective in establishing either ‘negative’ or ‘positive peace’ in the deployed region.

Fourth, this thesis will examine the purpose of ‘robust peacekeeping’ in each stabilisation mission. By doing so, this thesis is able to determine why in some cases the phenomenon (the use of force) was able to achieve ‘success’ and why in some cases the ‘use of force’ did not establish what it was ought to achieve.

Last, this thesis focuses on MINUSMA. In order to examine whether the level of perpetrated violence during this mission was able to achieve its goals, the analysis includes semi-structured interviews. Due to the fact that the Dutch contributed a lot to the MINUSMA mission, it was possible to conduct semi-structured interviews with key players in the mission. This means that this thesis was able to do inductive

research (Gabriel, 2013). This inductive research led to observations, which were later added within the theoretical framework (Bryman, 2008, p. 26). Due to the semi-structured interviews, a new category within the ‘scale of force’ was discovered. All interviewees underlined the importance of the ‘show of force’ in conflict and for this reason this category was added to the operationalization of the ’use of force’ (I2, Q8: A8; I3, Q10: A10; I4, Q7: A7; I5, Q7: A7).

3.2 Case selection

First of all, it is important to note that within the scope of this research, it chose stabilisation missions that were mandated to ‘use all necessary means’. This resulted in a selection of the cases in which this thesis could examine the effect of the ‘use on force’ on the short- and long-term objective. For this reason, it was important that the examined cases had similar short and long-term objectives.

In the case of UNAMSIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA, all three stabilisation missions were deployed in order to create (1) stability in the deployed region and to (2) reach ‘fair and free’ elections on the long-term (Malan, Rakate, McIntyre, 2000; Adlofo, 2010; Findlay, 2002; Kreps, 2010; Mengede, 2015; Atuobi, 2009; Spijkers,

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30 2015; Clark, 2011; Koko, 2011; Murphy, 2016; Doss, 2015; MONUSCO, n.d.;

Reynaert, n.d.; Berdal, 2018; Tull, 2017). Besides the variables that these missions have in common, it is notable that all three missions were deployed on the invitation of the specific country’s government. Creating either ‘negative peace’ on the short-term or/and ‘positive peace’ on the long-short-term, all stabilisation mission were meant to restore the power of the failing state. This is coherent with the UK definition of stabilisation: (1) reducing violence, (2) moving to a peaceful political process and (3) build the foundation for long-term stability (Stabilisation Unit, 2019, p. 13).

Subsequently, in order to examine the short-term objective of each mission, this thesis researched the effect of ‘force’ in the deployed region/country at the moment when the mandate became ‘robust’. For the case of UNAMSIL, ‘robust peacekeeping’ was authorized in Sierra Leone in 2000 (Kreps, 2000). In the case of MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade, ‘robust peacekeeping’ was

authorized to stabilize eastern DRC in 2014 (Fabricius, 2017). In the case of

MINUSMA, ‘robust peacekeeping’ was authorized in order to achieve the mission’s goals in northern Mali in 2015 (Peace Direct, 2018). When researching the

circumstances in the specific region in which the stabilisation mission was deployed after the perpetrated ‘use of force’, this thesis is able to charter the effects of ‘force’ on the short-term.

Additionally, due to the fact that in each case the ‘variable of interest’ differs, namely the level of perpetrated violence, this thesis is able to explain why in the case of UNAMSIL, the ‘use of force’ was beneficial in establishing the mission’s goals and in the case of MONUSCO and MINUSMA, the ‘use of force’ just slightly succeeded in accomplishing the mission’s objectives.

This thesis argues that in all three cases, the incentives of the intervention were similar. Using the ‘similar case method’, it argues that due to the fact that ‘force’ was perpetrated and followed in a different way, it eventually led to different

outcomes.

3.3 Operationalization

This thesis will operationalize the independent variable, by using the earlier described ‘scale of force’. This scale has the following categories: (1) the show of force, (2) self-defence, (3) robust peacekeeping and (4) acts of counterterrorism. In categorizing this ‘force’, this thesis will examine the first category (1) ‘the show of force’ as the

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31 lightest category of perpetrated violence by the UN and (4) ‘acts of counterterrorism’ as the highest category of perpetrated violence by the UN. Additionally, this thesis will use the earlier distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ counterterrorism in order to argue that MINUSMA is not moving towards missions of counterterrorism.

Subsequently, this thesis had to operationalize the goals of the mission. The goals of UNAMSIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA contribute to (1) the decrease of the level of violence and (2) the creation of a situation in which the host country could organize ‘free and fair elections’. In operationalizing the short-term objective, this thesis examines whether fatalities in the region decreased or increased after the deployment of the stabilisation mission. The long-term goal of the mission could be examined by (1) the presence of elections and (2) to what extent they could be defined as ‘free and fair’.

This thesis will operationalize the goals of the mission (the dependent

variable) by using existing data and documents. In order to get a better picture of the actual presence/absence of violence, the conducted semi-structured interviews will offer an in-depth analysis for the case of MINUSMA.

3.4 Semi-structured interviews

This thesis will use semi-structured interviews in order to obtain valuable information about the effectiveness of the ‘use of force’. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in Dutch, however in order to prove the coherence of this study, the quotes used in the thesis are translated in English. In order to obtain the right information, the semi-structured were conducted with key players in the MINUSMA mission. These interviewees either had an important military role within the Dutch contribution to the mission or are seen as military experts within the field of MINUSMA. In the

pursuance of ‘keeping an open mind’, the semi-structured interviews will be a useful tool in order to examine the pros and cons of the use of force. “[…]semi-structured

interviewing are used so that the researcher can keep more of open mind about the contours of what he or she needs to know about, so that concepts and theories can emerge out of the data” (Bryman, 2008, p. 12). This is one of the reasons, why

semi-structured interviews can offer a new view on the subject. Due to its structure, the interviewer has the possibility to deviate from its own questions and ask questions about those brought up topics or concepts that seem to be valuable and new additions in answering the overarching research question. “Semi-structured interviews fall

The effectiveness of the ‘use of force’ in contemporary thinking about peacekeeping missions : examining the efficiency of MINUSMA