Racism and othering practices

As seen in chapter 4, the biggest wave of European enlargement in 2002, accompanied by its master narrative outlined above, brought about a changing hierarchy of Others within the EU (Triandafyllidou

& Spohn, 2003). Such change took place within Lega Nord’s discursive practices as well. While on EU level Eastern Europeans started to be considered as less of a threat compared to Africans, Latin Americans and Asians, Lega Nord witnessed a shift to secessionism, radicalisation and racism (Triandafyllidou & Spohn, 2003 ; Biorcio & Vitale, 2010 ; Betz, 2016). Such shift favoured a change in

othering practices as Southern Italians were declassed in the hierarchy of Others in favour of a

‘Christian West - Muslim Middle East’ dichotomy that is still being perpetrated. This process, in fact, paved the way for the party’s turn to Italian nationalism.

As the European and populist dynamics present similarities, one could argue that the European

“project of non-domination” failed (Pellerin-Carlin, 2014, p.80). In fact, there are compelling arguments to put forward the idea that the EU has been increasingly engaging in discourse that is heavily pervaded by territorialism. Indeed, from a post-structuralist standpoint, it is only natural to construct an Other and transform it into a threat to create what Bteddini calls “rhetoric of insecurity” (Bteddini, 2008, p.114). More specifically, with the enlargement process, the EU has been furthering the creation of new boundaries through exclusionary practices that prove Campbell’s vision of power as “disciplinary”

extremely applicable (Campbell, 2013, p. 234).

As proof of the ongoing process of hierarchisation by the EU, one could argue that migrant and refugees, the so called “new Islamic reality”, are currently being placed at the top of the hierarchical pyramid (Andre, 2015, p.188). It can be argued that this is so because of the policies that the EU has been developing to face the current refugee crisis. Indeed, as Karolewski highlights, border control policies such as Frontex, or more generally the common asylum policy, clearly ascribe the refugee matter as “the cornerstone of defensive collective identity” (Karolewski, 2010, p.148). Karolewski remarks that, indeed, some might argue that European policies concerning migration are rich with

“Euro-racism” because of the iterated use of “biometrics” and “somatic” criteria (Karolewski, 2010, p.148).

Such distinction between Europeans and extra-communitarians is also retrievable in what Geddes calls an “integration problem” (Geddes, 2003, p.83). As discussed in chapter 4, through the introduction of European citizenship, the EU has been fostering a division between internal and external migrants (McLaren, 1999). Such division, specifically in the Italian case, represents a sensitive issue as Southern Italy, also due to the provisions laid out in the Dublin regulations, deals with the responsibility of welcoming extra-communitarians on the periphery of the EU (Albahari, 2009). This can be seen as reinforcing the core-periphery argument which both Lega Nord and M5S have tapped into to gather consensus in Southern Italy. In the case of M5S, such argument was further exploited to support the creation of an alliance of Mediterranean Member States to oppose austerity and, in a more concealed way, immigration (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2014).

One could argue that the idea of openness and ”borderless world” promoted by the EU is fundamentally vain (Nougayrède, 2016, para.3). In fact, as argued by Albassam, recent policy developments within the EU have proved to be untrue to its core value of solidarity (Albassam, 2015).

They have also remarked the elitist character of the EU as a polity and justified the rise of anti-establishment arguments characterising the EU as an ”anti-democratic cage” (Geddes, 2003 ; Salvini, 2014b). However, there is a substantial difference between the EU and the populist parties considered in this dissertation. While the EU uses othering practices to prioritise widening driven by a ”historic pledge”, populism has been othering in favour of deepening with Lega Nord pushing for federalist reforms and M5S advocating for direct democracy (Archick, 2016, p.4 ; Marraccini, n.d ; Floridia &

Vignati, 2014).

Nevertheless, othering practices across the EU, Lega Nord and M5S present striking similarities, Lega Nord generally presenting a more overtly racist stance and the EU focusing on constructive discourse.

As proof of this, it is enough to focus on the 1990s, when both the EU and Lega Nord were carrying out territorialising othering. As stated above, through the introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU was in fact constructing a boundary separating an economically virtuous West from a backwards East.

In the same way, Lega Nord was opposing the wealth and productivity of Padania against the Southern inertia. Both practices were dictated by the same motivations: economic backwardness and a fundamental fear of mass migration.

As Turkey’s accession to the EU became a more concrete option, both the EU and Lega Nord engaged in geopolitical othering. The Italian party, in fact, dropped its North-South dichotomy to embrace a categorisation of society based on a ’valiant Christianity/uncivilized Islam’ dichotomic order (Betz, 2016). Once again, both othering practices were driven by the same motivations: cultural differences and geographical positions (Diez, 2006). However, Lega Nord added a more radical component by using discourse to create an anti-European, nationalist reality capable of linking migration to health issues and unemployment, as specified earlier in this paper. Such vision of reality has been naturalised among the party’s supporters and has been taken up by rising M5S as a way to gather increasing consensus across all strata of society. Indeed, it is possible to state that, despite the different discursive practices adopted, nowadays, both the EU and populist parties are fundamentally sharing the same Other at the basis of their identity, territorial strategies and systems of values.