Large scholarly views agree in conceptualising the EU as a hybrid system with little efficiency in some crucial identity-shaping policy areas. Manners convenes that the EU cannot be seen as a state of any nature but it also does not resemble an international organisation (Manners, 2001). This, he continues, has considerable repercussions on the EU’s international identity which is indeed characterised by
undecidedness and a multi-perspective approach (Manners, 2001). Schmidt convenes that the “EU is a quasi-pluralist system of governance” whose policy outcomes have scarce political relevance (Schmidt, 1999, p.156). This, she argues, mainly has a direct effect on Member States that, due to divergences between the national and supranational level, are not able to make efficient decisions (Schmidt, 1999).
Diez, in accordance with Ole Wæver, points out that the EU can be seen as a “postmodern polity” in which identity is present and absent at the same time in a struggle to fill in the void of its incompletion (Diez, 2004). Such void, Wæver argues, is “due to the presence of the outside in the inside” (Diez, 2004).
Breakwell agrees that the EU is faced with difficulties in shaping its own identity markers. However, he argues, such issue is bound to be solved with the passing of time. In fact, he points out, the EU has had a short existence so far which has not yet determined compelling categories to make up its identity (Breakwell, 2004). Although Smith puts forward a similar argument, he remarks that the EU “lacks a pre-modern past” which has not raised binding Romantic ideals in its population. As a result, the creation of effective identity markers is deemed unlikely (Smith, 1992, p.62).
The hybrid and multi-faced nature of the EU characterises its internal composition as well as its attitude towards the outside. Carta and Morin argue that the variety of EU institutions, processes and policies has multiplied the amount of agents that act on EU level. This, in turn, generated a cluster of interpretations and views on how the EU should position itself (Carta & Morin, 2013). The authors point out that this also reflects in elites’ discursive practices who, for instance, see the EU as “a technocratic edifice” as well as a “Family of nations” (Carta & Morin, 2013, p.10). This subsequently has repercussions on the EU’s attitude towards foreign policy (Carta & Morin, 2013).
Bteddini points out that a state’s foreign policy is based on guaranteeing security for the territory, citizens and political apparatus against a threatening Other situated outside of the ‘virtuous’ national soil (Bteddini, 2008). Kratochvíl points out that, in this regard, the EU’s approach is rather mild. As a result, because of fragmentation and undecidedness, the EU tends to base its foreign policy on its
“benign identity”, without strong political positions or direct involvement in conflictual situations (Kratochvíl, 2009, p.20). This, Schmidt highlights, has allowed Member States to build up a variety of arguments in the sole interest of national politicians (Schmidt, 2010). Closely related is the theme of EU enlargement which has fostered strong national responses. The next section lays out its relevance to the current identity crisis.
4.3 EU enlargement
Ganeshalingam defines the EU enlargement, through commissioner Romano Prodi’s (1999-2000) words, as the final move towards lifting the barriers that were created by the Cold War (Ganeshalingam, n.d.). However, Checkel and Katzenstein remark that there have been multiple attempts to bring politics of exclusion to the forefront by means of debates surrounding the establishment of a European Constitution. The focus, they continue, has been increasingly brought on the downsides related to enlargement with a subsequent impasse in the process of European identity construction (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). Ganeshalingam ascribes such process to endemic causes among which are French feelings of mistrust towards Eastern European citizens and the country’s 2005 consequent retreat to protective rhetoric. Such discourse, the author points out, mainly targeted Poles and Hungarians who were consequently depicted as raiders of the French job market (Ganeshalingam, n.d.).
Maier and Rittberger indeed agree that the general European attitude towards enlargement is aimed at creating what they call “symbolic boundaries” which, they argue, are highly shaped by the way media present information regarding a given country or area (Maier & Rittberger, 2008, p.249). Moreover, they point out how the establishment of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria has influenced citizens’
acceptance or rejection of European enlargement efforts. In fact, they prove, the more EU citizens perceive a high “level of democracy” within a candidate for accession, the more they are willing to assume a proactive attitude towards it, national identity still retaining strong power over opinion formation (Maier & Rittberger, 2008, p.261). Fukuyama also highlights that, consequent to enlargement, solidarity and sharing of responsibilities are not principles that guide relations among European citizens who, on the contrary, engage in suspicion and blaming discourse (Fukuyama, 2012).
Vobruba ascribes the Union’s identity crisis to the very nature of the enlargement process and its legitimation strategies. He argues that enlargement procedures were created and executed in the interest of a core area – Western Europe – with the aim of establishing concentric circles of influence (Vobruba, 2003). He points out that the sole legitimation strategies for carrying out such practices were
“pacification and prosperity”, both of which have currently lost their effectiveness and appeal, the first due to its economic and political costs and the latter because of its long-term character (Vobruba, 2003, p.44). Moreover, he remarks, Eastern enlargement was presented by the core as a “moral
necessity”, a strategy that has backfired and created an economic and social divide between the West and the East (Vobruba, 2003, p.43).
Pellerin-Carlin argues that enlargement is not a failure per se, however the European project was too ambitious, trying to conciliate Eastern orthodox-based culture and Western Catholicism-laden culture (Pellerin-Carlin, 2014). In such way, he continues, the “project of non-domination” envisaged by the EU was jeopardized, leading to an identity crisis (Pellerin-Carlin, 2014, p.80). However, he suggests, there is room for future development as he envisions two scenarios: “Europe 2.0” - which foresees closer political cooperation among a shrinking European Union - or “EFTA 2.0” based on less binding agreements in a multi-cultural, multi-perspective union (Pellerin-Carlin, 2014, p.80).
Archick raises the question of whether the EU deepening (in the form of integration) and widening (enlargement) can co-occur. The answers, according to him, lays in a very much needed streamlining of decision making procedures which necessarily cannot keep pursuing consensus among the broad variety of Member States (Archick, 2016). For the same reason, Archick suggests that solving the EU’s identity crisis is a feasible undertaking as long as deepening is prioritised over widening and some states, such as Greece and the United Kingdom, are left behind (Archick, 2016). However, he observes, the EU seems to feel what he calls a “historic pledge” to pursue further enlargement towards the Balkan area (Archick, 2016, p.4).