Hoofdstuk 5: Conclusie en beperkingen
5.2 Beperkingen en mogelijkheden voor vervolgonderzoek
Chen et al. (2011) hebben onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de verschillende modellen op het gebied van accruals. Het nadeel van deze modellen is dat zij grotendeels zijn gebaseerd op schattingen. Totale accruals kunnen worden onderscheiden in beïnvloedbare en niet-beïnvloedbare accruals. De niet-niet-beïnvloedbare accruals geven de zakelijke transacties (zoals groei, aankomende facturen) aan die op een natuurlijke wijze ontstaan. Beïnvloedbare accruals ontstaan door de beslissingen van de CEO’s. Een tweede implicatie betreft de betrouwbaarheid van dit onderzoek. Ondernemingen waarvan de data ontbrak in Thomson Datastream database zijn handmatig opgezocht uit de desbetreffende jaarrekeningen. Hoewel dit met uiterste zorgvuldigheid is gedaan, kan het voorkomen dat er een cijfer verkeerd is overgenomen. Een derde implicatie betreft de beschikbare variabelen van dit onderzoek. Voor dit onderzoek zijn enkele variabelen niet meegenomen of werd er vertrouwd op eerdere onderzoeken. Om een beter onderzoek uit te voeren is het beter om alle variabelen mee te nemen.
Voor dit onderzoek is gekozen voor beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in Nederland. Het zou interessant kunnen zijn om dit onderzoek ook uit te voeren voor andere landen. Hierdoor kunnen de resultaten van deze landen met elkaar vergeleken worden. Dit kan leiden tot interessante conclusies. Daarnaast kan je ook denken aan de accounting systemen van het land. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan ‘common law’ en ‘code law’. In Nederland hebben we de ‘code law’ rechtssysteem. Een aanbeveling zou zijn om hetzelfde onderzoek uit te voeren in een ‘common law’ land en de resultaten te vergelijken. Daarnaast kan de onderzoeksperiode worden verlengd van drie jaar naar tien jaar om een betrouwbaar en valide onderzoek neer te zetten.
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