3. Onderzoeksaanpak
5.2 Beperkingen en aanbevelingen voor vervolgonderzoek
In deze paragraaf worden de beperkingen van het uitgevoerde onderzoek beschreven en worden aanbevelingen gegeven voor een eventueel vervolgonderzoek.
Een belangrijke beperking in dit onderzoek was het gebruik van de
fraudesteekproef. In eerdere onderzoeken is de fraudesteekproef opgesteld aan de hand van informatie van Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) (Carcello en Nagy, 2002, 2004; Messier, 2003). Organisaties waar fraude is geconstateerd en die onderzocht zijn door de SEC staan geregistreerd bij AAERs. Het probleem is echter dat de database niet publiekelijk toegankelijk is. Daarom is voor dit onderzoek
gebruikgemaakt van de data uit AuditAnalytics.
Een tweede beperking in dit onderzoek is het model dat gebruikt is om de complexiteit van organisaties te berekenen. Een industriegespecialiseerde accountant is gespecialiseerd in een bepaalde industrie, maar een organisatie kan in meerdere
industrieën opereren. De accountant kan niet gespecialiseerd zijn in de overige
industrieën van de organisatie. Een aanbeveling voor een vervolgonderzoek is dan ook om een andere methode te gebruiken om de complexiteit van een organisatie te meten. Om de variabele Specialist te berekenen, is gebruikgemaakt van de formule Market Share
38 Approach. De invloed van de formule op de variabele kan wellicht veranderen indien de variabele Specialist op een andere manier berekend kan worden. In een
vervolgonderzoek kan gebruikgemaakt worden van de Portfolio Approach formule of de gemiddelde Market Share Approach formule.
Het onderzoek is uitgevoerd op basis van data van beursgenoteerde Amerikaanse organisaties. De resultaten van dit onderzoek kunnen niet voor organisaties uit andere landen gebruikt worden. Wel kan vervolgonderzoek uitgevoerd worden naar Europese beursgenoteerde organisaties.
De steekproefomvang van de frauduleuze organisaties was eveneens een beperking van dit onderzoek. De totale omvang van de geëxporteerde data uit
AuditAnalytics in de periode 2002 tot en met 2016 was 15.259 dossiers. Het overgrote deel hiervan zijn restatements. In vervolgonderzoek kan gebruikgemaakt worden van restatement data (15.000 restatements) uit AuditAnalytics.
39
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44
Bijlagen
Tabel 7: resultaten multicollineariteit
VARIABELEN N VIF TOLERANCE SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
GROEI 182 1.05 0.9526 -9.690248 105.5686 RTV 182 1.16 0.8625 -12.92111 171.4467 DEBT-RATIO 182 1.23 0.8102 1.648194 5.98179 GROOTTE 182 2.30 0.4350 -.3796399 3.811544 VERLIES 182 1.16 0.8630 .3342424 1.111718 BIG-4 182 1.74 0.5731 -.9486833 1.9 KORT 182 1.82 0.5506 .1987767 1.039512 LONG 182 1.77 0.5656 .698383 1.487739 SPECIALIST 182 1.11 0.9040 -1.607069 3.582671 COMPLEXITEIT 182 1.28 0.7819 1.207399 4.24848
Tabel 8: SIC-codes voor industrie gespecialiseerde accountant
SIC-CODE SIC BESCHRIJVING AANTAL VAN
SIC PERCENTAG E CUM. PERCENTAG E
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 2 1,10% 1,10%
16 Specialty Contractor 2 1,10% 2,20%
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors
2 1,10% 3,30%
20 Food and Kindred Products 2 1,10% 4,40%
22 Textile Mill Products 2 1,10% 5,49%
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products
7 3,85% 9,34%
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1 0,55% 9,89%
26 Paper and Allied Products 2 1,10% 10,99%
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries
1 0,55% 11,54%
28 Chemicals and Allied Products
16 8,79% 20,33%
30 Rubber and Miscellaneaous Plastic Products
1 0,55% 20,88%
33 Primary Metal Industries 4 2,20% 23,08%
45
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinary and Computer Equipement
7 3,85% 27,47%
36 Electric and Other Electric Equipment
24 13,19% 40,66%
37 Transportation Equipment 10 5,49% 46,15%
38 Instruments and Related Products
7 3,85% 50,00%
45 Transportation by Air 2 1,10% 51,10%
48 Communications 8 4,40% 55,49%
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary services 11 6,04% 61,54% 50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 4 2,20% 63,74% 51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 3 1,65% 65,38% 54 Food stores 2 1,10% 66,48%
58 Eating and Drinking places 2 1,10% 67,58%
59 Miscellaneous Retail 5 2,75% 70,33%
62 Security and Comodity Brokers
1 0,55% 70,88%
65 Real Estate 1 0,55% 71,43%
68 Licensing 1 0,55% 71,98%
73 Business Services 33 18,13% 90,11%
75 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking
2 1,10% 91,21%
78 Motion Pictures 2 1,10% 92,31%
80 Health Services 9 4,95% 97,25%
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services 1 0,55% 97,80% 99 Nonclassifiable Establishments 4 2,20% 100,00% EINDTOTAA L 182 100,00%
46 Tabel 9: jaren voor de fraude en niet-fraude dossiers
FRAUDE JAAR AANTAL JAREN PERCENTAGE CUM.
PERCENTAGE FRAUDE NIET-FRAUDE 2002 8 4,40% 4% 4 4 2003 12 6,59% 11% 6 6 2004 29 15,93% 27% 14 15 2005 27 14,84% 42% 14 13 2006 17 9,34% 51% 8 9 2007 12 6,59% 58% 6 6 2008 9 4,95% 63% 5 4 2009 8 4,40% 67% 4 4 2010 8 4,40% 71% 4 4 2011 8 4,40% 76% 4 4 2012 10 5,49% 81% 5 5 2013 8 4,40% 86% 4 4 2014 8 4,40% 90% 4 4 2015 14 7,69% 98% 7 7 2016 4 2,20% 100% 2 2 EINDTOTAAL 182 100% 91 91
Tabel 10: accountantskantoren steekproefselectie
AUDITOR NAAM AUDITOR
CODE
AANTAL PERCENTAGE CUM.
PERCENTAGE EY 4 30 16,48% 16,48% DELOITTE 5 34 18,68% 35,16% KPMG 6 34 18,68% 53,85% PWC 7 32 17,58% 71,43% OTHER 9 31 17,03% 88,46% BDO 11 6 3,30% 91,76%
BAIRD, KURTZ AND DOBSON 12 1 0,55% 92,31% GRANT THORNTON 17 8 4,40% 96,70% J H COHN 18 1 0,55% 97,25% MCGLADERY AND PULLEN 21 3 1,65% 98,90% MOORE STEPHENS 22 1 0,55% 99,45% MOSS ADAMS 23 1 0,55% 100,00% Eindtotaal 182 100,00%