The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/46112 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation
Author: Mickler, T.A.
Title: Parliamentary committees in a party-centred context : structure, composition, functioning
Issue Date: 2017-02-22
Chapter 1
Introduction: Legislative
Organisation, Parliamentary Party Groups and Committees
Relying on committees “reflects the very essence of democratic decision-making”
(Damgaard & Mattson, 2004, p. 113).
The Significance of Committees in Parliaments
P
A R L I A M E N T S are present throughout the world and play a central role in almost all political systems. They engage in a wide variety of tasks.Traditionally, four core tasks and functions are distinguished: oversight, policy-making, linkage, and representation (Loewenberg, 2011; Kreppel, 2014).
Most legislatures1 fulfil these to some degree. The oversight function of legislatures follows from one of the “foundational tenets of representative democracy” (Kreppel, 2014, p. 84), i.e. the ability of the governed to control the government. Parliaments accomplish this by monitoring the actions of executive agencies and ministers and by authorizing the budget. A number of institutional prerequisites need to be present for a parliament to be able to dutifully assess the budget: Among others, parliaments need to have amendment and information gathering powers. Across countries, a considerable amount of variation is present (Wehner, 2006). Legislatures also participate in the policy-making process of a country (policy-making, or legislative function). The lawmaking power of parliaments is seen by many as a
1 For this dissertation, I use the terms legislatures and parliaments, as well as legislators and members of parliament interchangeably.
primary function, even though the scope of the involvement varies considerably across parliaments from “providing consultative opinions to making significant amendments, and from initiating independent proposals to vetoing those of the executive branch” (Kreppel, 2014, p. 87).
Parliaments are also venues for the expression of different perspectives.
Legislators are expected to represent the beliefs and ideas of their constituents and have debates on matters of the moment (representative function). They represent the public interest in decision-making and allow for the transfer of local demands to the central government. Parliaments are therefore the prime means of linking citizens to the government and function as a ‘bridge’ between governed and government (linkage function). This function is “perhaps the most critical task of legislatures in terms of democratic theory” (Kreppel, 2014, p. 85). In representative democracies, this linkage is achieved by means of regular elections through which parliaments derive their legitimacy. Citizens elect their representatives using a wide variety of possible electoral systems.2 Granted with the mandate to represent their voters, these elected representatives then take decisions on behalf of the citizens but are accountable for their actions at the next election (see Figure 1.1). As the ultimate principal of the representatives, voters can evaluate the representatives’ job performance and either renew their mandate or discontinue it. Elections are the crucial mechanisms to enforce the responsibility of elected representatives.
Parliaments can therefore be understood in terms of a chain of delegation (Bergman et al., 2000) from the electorate (principal) to legislators (agents). The chain of delegation from voters to elected representatives is a core feature of representative democracies (Strøm, 2000).3
Figure 1.1: Chain of delegation from individual voters to elected representatives
Source: Own depiction.
The functions described above assign important tasks to the elected representatives. As they are involved in making (or breaking) the government, giving assent to policies of the state, and representing the demands of the
2 Some electoral systems are based on geographic (single-member or multi-member), ethnic, religious or other sectoral constituencies, others make use of elections through party lists. The relationship between individual members and their citizens is to a large extent dependent on this electoral connection.
3 Next to this link, pure representative democracies are characterised by at least three other steps: The chain of delegation a) from legislators to the executive branch, b) from the prime minister to the heads of different executive departments, c) from the heads of different executive departments to civil servants (Strøm, 2000, p. 267).
population, much is at stake and their decisions can have wide-ranging consequences for a state and its citizens. Ideally, these tasks should be executed with careful thought and decisions should be taken after extensive deliberation.
Yet, visitors of parliaments are at times baffled when watching parliamentary business in plenary sessions, the public display of the decision-making process of their elected representatives. These plenary sessions, which bring together all the members of parliament (MPs) to collectively take decisions in the plenary hall of the parliament, often portray a half-empty room, and (seemingly) disinterested legislators who only listen to the debates with one ear. The conclusion that is sometimes drawn is that legislators do not represent the demands of the citizens and, generally speaking, fail to fulfil the functions expected from them. However, this is a reductionist view and does not account for the internal working procedures of parliaments. Beyond the immediately visible plenary session, parliaments are highly complex institutions. They work through various other venues in which decisions are prepared or even taken.
Once a parliament is constituted, the members of a parliament differentiate themselves in their daily operation to be able to fully exert the powers that are formally granted to them and to dutifully fulfil their functions. The plenary session is mostly simply the public display of the decisions taken in these other venues.
Conceptually, this process of differentiation into different positions and venues can be thought of as legislative organisation. The process of differentiation occurs in parliaments around the world after they are constituted. Within this process “resources and parliamentary rights [are assigned] to individual legislators or groups of legislators” (Krehbiel, 1992, p. 2).
Mattson and Strøm (1995, p.62) distinguish differentiation in terms of
“hierarchy (functional differentiation) and specialisation (horizontal differentiation)”. The process of differentiation is remarkable. Ultimately, legislators are elected with the same rights and privileges. Legislatures are characterised as “collegial, rather than hierarchical, organisations” (Mattson &
Strøm, 1995, p. 62). Nevertheless, this process is a universal phenomenon and vital for ensuring the efficiency of the parliament. Numerous parliamentary resources and positions are distributed in this process. Specialisation is a crucial and necessary element within parliaments. Although legislators should, ideally, be able to make informed decisions on a wide range of issues using a wide array of useful knowledge, in reality, it might be difficult to be able to grasp the details of all issues they face. Given these limitations in terms of time and resources many legislators rather focus on a subset of issues or even single issues. There is a large variation in how parliaments organise themselves. The outcome is a complex system of venues and rights which structure the decision-making process.
This differentiation manifests itself within several groups. One of the main outcomes of this process are partisan groups within the legislature. Parties play an important role in the chain of delegation in modern democracies. As
Schattschneider famously asserted, “political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties”
(Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1). Parties structure elections by offering choices over policies and personnel through elections. In doing so, they allow voters to hold representatives accountable and make “responsible party government”
(Aldrich, 1995) possible. Parties are not only of major importance at election times, but they are also of importance after the constitution of a new legislature.
As one outcome of the above-mentioned process of legislative organisation, elected representatives usually cluster into parliamentary party groups.4These groups comprise all members of the representative body who are “elected either under the same party label or under the label of different parties that do not compete against each other in elections, and who do not explicitly create a group for technical reasons only” (Heidar & Koole, 2000, p. 249). These groups are heavily involved in the organisation of a legislature and fulfil important functions with regard to the preference aggregation among legislators.
Figure 1.2: Chain of delegation from individual voters to elected representatives, including parliamentary party groups
Source: Own depiction.
The strength and unity of these groups vary across legislatures. Strong parliamentary party groups can especially be found in parliamentary systems of government. They are considered strong because these groups are “powerful floor coalitions, capable of disciplining their members and passing their programs, [...] effectively dominating the legislative agenda and taking responsibility for the final legislative product” (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, p. 5).
The reason for their strong organisation lies in the relationship that the legislature has with the executive branch. The institutional structure of parliamentary systems of government involves an additional step in the chain of delegation from the legislatures to the executive. The executive flows from the legislature (usually from within its own ranks) and relies on the absence of a parliamentary majority against it in order to stay in power. In such ‘fused power’
4 These groups are referred to differently in different countries, e.g. Fraktion (Germany), fractie (Netherlands), Club (Austria), or simply party group. In the U.S. Congress, these are referred to as party conferences (Republicans) or party caucuses (Democrats). Following Heidar and Koole (2000) the term parliamentary party groups (PPG) is used as a generic term to describe these partisan groups in this book.
systems, the removal from office can occur at any time when the majority of legislators does not support the executive any more. Both branches of government are highly dependent on each other. A resignation of the government usually means a fall of the legislature as well. Due to this chain, and the subsequent possibility for “mutually assured destruction” (Kreppel, 2014, p.
84) for both branches, parliamentary party groups within the legislature have an incentive to be strongly organised. A strong internal organisation and cohesiveness allow them to collectively support the government or bring it down. Examples of these strong parliamentary party groups can be found in the legislatures of most European countries.
The role and strength of parliamentary party groups in such ‘fused’ power systems is different than in what is commonly referred to as
‘separation-of-power’5, or presidential, systems. In these systems, the executive is elected by the people and does not rely on the support of the legislature to stay in office. The survival of the government is not dependent on the majority situation in parliament, and the executive branch has no provision for the dissolution of the legislature. Such a system is practised, among others, in the United States of America which comprises a legislature and an executive roughly coequal in power. As the survival of the government is not dependent on the majority situation in the legislature, the existence of strong parliamentary party groups within the legislature is not necessarily expected in presidential systems of government. Parliamentary party groups in the U.S.
Congress have traditionally been characterised as weak in terms of their influence on the individual legislator, at least when comparing them to their counterparts in many European democracies. The United States Congress is characterised as the “terrain par excellence for the individual legislator” (Owens
& Loomis, 2006, p. 263, italics in original).
Depending on their level of unity, “[parliamentary party groups] promote decisional efficiency in the chamber and allow legislators to influence policy”
(Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014, p. 372). Strong parliamentary party groups, like the ones found in most European legislatures, are heavily involved in agenda setting, building majority coalitions, examining and processing legislation.
Parliamentary party groups are important mechanisms to solve internal collective action problems, allow government effectiveness and legislative accountability. Their contribution to running the legislature is undisputed.
Yet in most legislatures, parliamentary party groups are only one part of a more complex internal organization. There is another institution within parliaments which is central for the working procedures: parliamentary committees. Together with parliamentary party groups, committees are “the most important component of legislative organization and preference aggregation” (Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014, p. 372) within legislatures. Parliamentary committees are vital to the functioning of parliaments. Laundy (1989, p. 96)
5 It is common to use this term for presidential systems of government, but see Möllers (2013) for an application in the context of international organizations like the EU and WTO.
notes that “all parliaments work to a greater extent or lesser extent through committees” (see also National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996). Generally speaking, parliamentary committees are deliberative assemblies established by, embedded within, and linked to the larger deliberative body. Each committee consists of a sub-group of legislators across parliamentary party groups who are formally appointed to consider and satisfy a defined organisational need. Probably the most striking definition of what constitutes a committee and how committees decide was given by Sartori (1987) who discusses committees in his proposed decision-making theory of democracy: a committee is a small, interacting, face-to-face group whose existence is recognised - i.e. institutionalised - and durable6which is engaged in a continuous flow of decisions (Sartori, 1987, p. 228). Although he refers to committees in a broad sense, therefore also covering a government under this definition, his description includes parliamentary committees.
Committees are creatures of parliaments. They are established purposefully and are mandated and restricted by the power assigned to them by the plenum.
Within legislatures, they are the prime organisational structures for the preparation of plenary sessions and documents and provide a focal point for parliament’s activity. Committee seats are resources which are distributed in the process of legislative organisation. These lead to the above mentioned specialisation in terms of “hierarchy (functional differentiation) and specialisation (horizontal differentiation)” (Mattson & Strøm, 1995, p. 62).
Committees are privileged institutions which subdivide policy areas and, at least in principle, offer “property rights”: Once assigned, committee members have the right and duty to work on issues within their jurisdiction. As an example, legislators on the committee dealing with agricultural policy have the right to work on issues relating to this policy area before the other members of the parliamentary party groups and before the plenum eventually decides on the issues. By doing so, committee negotiations among this sub-group of legislators constrain the space of possible outcomes. Figure 1.3 depicts the relationship between the plenum and committees schematically.
Committees are the ‘work horses’ of legislatures, which sub-divide the plenum and allow for an efficient policy-making process. Why do legislatures around the world rely on committees? Legislatures work under relatively tight time constraints and time is especially restricted during plenary sessions.
Committees often act as preparatory bodies for the plenum to secure an efficient policy making process. Delegating issues to committees can relieve a legislature to better cope with its workload by examining and processing legislation on behalf of the larger floor. This prevents that an overflow of legislation grinds parliamentary business to a halt. Ceteris paribus, more matters can be handled when more committees are established. The division of labour and delegation to smaller sub-groups also allows for proper consultation
6 Regardless of its actual rate of turnover.
of witnesses and examination of documents.7
Figure 1.3: Schematic depiction of plenum and committees in a legislature with three parliamentary party groups
Source: Own depiction.
Committees are highly adaptable institutions and parliaments rely on them for a wide variety of tasks. The list of tasks can be adapted to the need of the parliament. The frame of reference and room for manoeuvre varies considerably and is guided by formal and informal rules. Next to work of committees which is imposed on them by the chamber (non-discretionary work), committees can have extensive rights to take up issues independently and put them on their own agenda (discretionary work). If not constitutionally restricted, in principle all tasks can be delegated to a committee. What to do in committee or what to do in a plenary session remains a normative (what should be done by all MPs) and a practical issue (what can be done by all MPs). There is great variation in the type and tenure of committees. Committees can be permanent, i.e. established for the duration of a whole legislative period, or temporary (ad hoc), and thus be dissolved once their task is complete. They can be legislative by function (entitled to scrutinise or even pass bills), work on
‘housekeeping’ matters, pursue investigations into issues of current importance, prepare a concern of prospected future importance or review matters that were parliamentary business in the past. They can also have a control function and scrutinise external groups or be charged with the election of certain actors. Of special importance to a legislature are specialised committees.8 These
7 Always assuming that the right to hear witnesses and send for documents is granted.
8 Not all specialised committees have a legislative function. Referring to these simply as ‘legislative’
committees may, therefore, be misleading.
jurisdiction-specific committees are responsible for matters on a particular substantial policy area (agriculture, finance, etc.) and prepare it for plenary treatment. These committees form the backbone of a legislature and are the
‘work horses’ for its content-related work. They are heavily used for the fulfilment of parliaments’ functions (policy-making, control, representation, linkage).
The Puzzle: Committees and the Chain of Delegation
The establishment of committees and the reliance on them is a universal phenomenon in parliaments across the world (see Laundy, 1989; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996). Arguably the strongest committee system is established in the United States Congress. The exceptional standing has been pointed out by Lees and Shaw who argued that “it should be emphasized[..] that the committee system in the American Congress is not only the strongest system in the present study; it is by far the strongest. It might, in fact, be argued that the American committee system is in some ways a deviant case” (Lees & Shaw, 1979, p. 387). The US Congress is unique in its reliance on and the substantial resources accorded to its committees (Owens & Loomis, 2006, p. 269). Committees have been central to the legislative process in this legislature for over 200 years.9 However, also small legislatures such as the Consiglio Grande e Generale of San Marino (60 members) or the States of Guernsey (47 members), the parliament of the British Crown dependency of Guernsey, establish parliamentary committees and effectively delegate tasks to them.
This heavy reliance of parliaments on committees presents an interesting puzzle which serves as the starting point of this dissertation: After each election, through the process of legislative organisation, parliaments around the world differentiate themselves into smaller subgroups and effectively work through different venues. Parliamentary party groups are important institutions in this regard. Despite the fact that the involvement of parliamentary party groups is
9 The U.S. Congress‘ committee system is exceptionally strong. It is characterised by an intricate system of committees and subcommittees. Committees in the House of Representatives go back until the time of its inauguration (1789) when three committees were established, increasing to seven committees in 1804. In the U.S. Senate it was not until 1816 that standing committees were established (Avery, 1901, p. 245). Welsh (2008) notes that around 1914 the number of committees was in danger of surpassing the number of senators (74 committees and 96 senators). and a high number of congressional staff working for committees. An overview provided by Ornstein et al. (2013, p. 104) lists 1300 in the House and over 900 in the Senate in 2009. Research on the U.S. Congress has highlighted the distinctive life of its own that each committee has developed, the substantial degree of freedom that committees possess and the large portion of time spent in committee by each MP. There is wide acceptance that committees are at the heart of the legislative process, “the consideration of matters not previously studied by a committee (’writing legislation on the floor’) is frowned upon” (Matthews, 1960, p. 148). During the after-committee stage on the floor, recommendations of committee members are highly influential on the curse of the debate. Committees play a part in the establishment of norms and the allocation of roles to legislators (Jewell & Patterson, 1966, p. 203).
sometimes viewed suspiciously, as critical decisions are often unobservable, or even deliberately concealed, we usually accept political parties as a normal component of modern representative democracy. As has been argued above, the chain of delegation from voters to representatives in modern democracies is largely structured by relying on parties and holding legislators accountable who are elected under a party label. The subdivision into parliamentary party groups occurs at the beginning of the legislative period and, more importantly, is parallel to the choice of the voters. The actions of the parliamentary party groups, therefore, have a democratic mandate. The partisan groups, depending on their level of unity, allow for clear policy choices by setting the agenda, building majority coalitions, and processing legislation and are, therefore, important to allow voters to hold their representatives accountable. But how should committees be assessed, given that they are also central institutions which change legislative outcomes? Together with parliamentary party groups, committees are heavily involved in shaping collective outcomes. Committees subdivide the plenum and prepare documents or even take decisions on behalf of the floor. While parliamentary party groups usually fulfil tasks such as agenda setting and processing legislation for all MPs of the same parliamentary party group, committees consist of sub-groups of legislators across all parliamentary party groups. This is illustrated in Figure 1.4. At least in principle, legislators in committees have an opportunity to work on an issue before the other legislators can.
Figure 1.4: Chain of delegation from individual voters to elected representatives, including parliamentary committees
Source: Own depiction.
Within the democratic chain of delegation, committees are not clearly placed. Voters do not elect committee members. This begs the question of the implications of the reliance of committees for the working procedures of parliaments and the execution of the functions ascribed to parliaments. Does it hinder or even distort the democratic chain of delegation if small numbers of legislators have the right to work on an issue before other legislators? How do
these privileged groups derive their power? Whose views are represented and how are decisions taken within these sub-groups of legislators? These questions are at the core of parliamentary decision-making processes. In order to make an assessment of the role of committees in the chain of delegation we need to reach a deeper understanding of the structure of committees, the composition, and the working procedures and how this relates to parliamentary party groups.
This dissertation aims to tackle these issues.
Strong Parliamentary Party Groups and Strong Committees: No Longer Mutually Exclusive
Within legislatures, strong parliamentary party groups and strong committees were traditionally seen as mutually exclusive.10 In the presence of strong parliamentary party groups, so it was argued, only weak committees are established and vice versa (see Shaw, 1979). The assumption of the absence of strong parliamentary party groups was, traditionally, one of the main keys to understanding the exceptional committee system of the U.S. Congress (Shaw, 1979). In such a ‘separation-of-power’ system practised in the United States, without strong parliamentary party groups to set the agenda, build majority coalitions, and process legislation, the emergence of strong committees was seen as a ‘natural’ step to provide the legislature with the necessary equipment to be a credible counterpart to the executive. Within parliamentary systems of government, the establishment of strong committees is not straightforward (Longley & Davidson, 1998, p. 2). In these systems, the presence of strongly organised parliamentary party groups makes strong committees unnecessary, as the latter would only be a disturbing factor. Following this reasoning, the discussion of the internal organisation of legislatures in parliamentary systems of government usually minimised the importance of legislative committees (Mezey, 1994, p. 433). This conclusion misses, however, the more nuanced picture.
Contrary to this traditional view, there is agreement among scholars that strong committees and strong parliamentary party groups are no longer mutually exclusive: There is evidence for a strengthening of parliamentary party groups in legislatures with strong committees (such as the U.S. Congress), and strong committees can be found in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups. The strengthening of committee systems within legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups is mostly the result of a reform wave of the committee rules which started several decades ago.11One of the most striking
10 An exception to this rule are the committees established by the legislature of the French 4th Republic (see Wright, 1989, p.137-138)
11 It is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the exact moment of change as committee systems may evolve gradually. According to Hazan (2001, p. 77) “the main stimulus for parliamentary committee reform is a change in the balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches” meaning that when parliaments are relatively deprived vis á vis the government, they adapt. Executives have more ways to broaden their room for manoeuvre to cope with the task of governing by expanding (i.e. the establishment of new departments and the hiring of new staff ).
features of this reform wave was a “trend away from ad hoc arrangements and towards parliamentary committee systems that are specialised and permanent and replicate executive departments” (Shaw, 1998, p. 230, italics in original).
Some legislatures reformed their committee system as early as the 1970s and 1980s (Britain, Denmark, Portugal and Spain). Latecomers like Switzerland and Ireland had introduced changes in the 1990s (see e.g. Shaw, 1998; Hazan, 2001).
Among legislatures of the Westminster tradition, the Australian House of Commons established a comprehensive committee system in 1987 by setting up eight general purpose standing committees and reformed thus a little later than the Canadian House of Commons which reformed in 1968 (Hockin, 1970).
An overview of 18 legislatures provided by Mattson and Strøm (1995) indicates that almost all have established a system of specialised committees which mirror governmental departments. The trend towards specialised systems is still ongoing. By the time of the study of Mattson and Strøm (1995), the Irish Dáil Éireann12 relied on permanent committees merely for government oversight and not for legislative scrutiny. Due to reforms in 1997 each committee now
“monitors the activities of its department, discusses its estimates, and deals with the third stage of legislation within the area of the department” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 231). The British House of Commons is the exception to this process, as it still relies on temporary committees for legislative scrutiny. This particular committee system is characterised to serve “the purposes of the government - wary of informed scrutiny by specialist committees” (Norton, 1998, p. 144) and is still limited in terms of the possibilities of specialisation for MPs. Nevertheless, even in this instance reforms starting in 1979 led to the establishment of fourteen permanent select department committees with government oversight function left the House “more specialised and institutionalised than ever before in its seven-century existence” (Norton, 1998, p. 151).
Similarly, several scholars acknowledge a strengthening of parliamentary party groups in the U.S. Congress. A turning point was a growing influence of the leadership of the House Democratic Caucus since the 1970s which engaged in various activities such as “scheduling committee legislation, structuring floor choices, mobilizing floor votes, and concocting other aspects of legislative strategy” (Owens, 1997, p. 259). By the 1980s, considerable procedural powers were exercised by Democratic Speakers. This development was continued when Republicans won the majority in the mid-term elections of 1994. Under the leadership of Speaker Newt Gingrich, even more drastic changes were induced to enact the ‘Contract With America’. The Republicans continued to disregard
Parliaments, however, remained in a contradictory situation, leaving the executive to become the dominant player in the political arena. Copeland and Patterson (1994, p. 160) argue that
“when an institutionalised parliament finds its ability to fulfil its functions slipping, it must adapt to recover those lost roles or lose its right to be considered a parliament”. Here, not even the immediate threat of losing its existence but rather “the recognition of the weakening of those key functional responsibilities will lead to calls for ’reform‘ or ’adaptation‘” (Copeland & Patterson, 1994, p. 160).
12 In common parlance, the Irish parliament is referred to as the Dáil but without article when using the full name Dáil Éireann
the seniority principle for committee assignments, imposed strict deadlines on committees, and sanctioned committee members in the event that committees failed to deliver legislation which complied with the party programme (see Owens, 1997, p.259). These measures indicate the implementation of a distinctive form of party government.
These developments contradict the old formula of “the existence of strong parliamentary party groups is mutually exclusive to the existence of strong committees”. The question arises how strong parliamentary party groups and committees relate to each other. Both are central institutions and pivotal elements in the internal organisation and preference aggregation of legislatures.
Unfortunately, we know very little about how parliamentary party groups and committees interact and how specialised committees work in parliaments with strong parliamentary party groups. The assumption about the contradictoriness of strong parliamentary party groups and strong committees within a legislature had important ramifications for the study of committees in legislatures. The traditional view of committees being less relevant in parliaments with strong parliamentary party groups meant that the study of committees was largely confined to the U.S. Congress. Much scholarly attention has been devoted to this legislature, comparatively little to other legislatures.
Due to this “Washington bias - which deems Congress, and Congress alone, as the only legislature worthy of study” (Nelson, 1974, p. 120) our knowledge of committees in other legislatures lags behind. We are left with an incomplete picture of how committees work in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups. By studying this issue we can reach a deeper understanding of the policy-making process in parliaments. Of special importance to study are the above mentioned specialised, jurisdiction-specific committees due to their importance for the legislature. This leads to the formulation of the main research question which guides this dissertation:
Main research question: ‘How do specialised committees work in parliaments with strong parliamentary party groups?’
Within this broader question, three sub-questions are pursued. The first part of this book consists of an analysis of the variation of institutional features of committee systems across legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups and the rules which specify them. A wide variety of formal committee structures (e.g. size, jurisdiction, and tenure) exists across legislatures. Why do some legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups establish committee systems with extensive powers while others do not grant many rights to their committees? Only a few researchers have turned their attention to analyse the factors which determine this variation across legislatures. The formal structure of the committee system needs to be taken into account when giving a complete picture of how parliamentary party groups organise their work in committees. The characteristic features of a committee system determine the
‘playing field’ and are not randomly chosen, but purposefully designed.
First sub-question: What factors account for the variation in formal committee structures across legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups?
Apart from this macro-oriented approach, the analysis focuses more closely on the purpose of committees and the question ‘who they serve?’ by analysing the mode(s) of operation of committees. An important process to study in this regard is the assignment process of legislators to committees. The aim of this part of the dissertation is to give more insight into the question ‘who gets what and why’? Committee assignments are the structural manifestation of legislative organisation. When committees are influential or even decisive institutions in the policy-making process, we need to know who controls their power. As Rohde and Shepsle note, understanding the “process by which members are assigned to committees is of the greatest importance” (Rohde &
Shepsle, 1973, p. 889). It is expected that strong parliamentary party groups have a major stake in the assignment process and committee proceedings but we do not fully understand based on which fundamental reasons and principles (rationale) committee seats are assigned. Some scholarly literature is available which has focused on the allocation of committee seats, but the underlying rationale of committee assignments in other legislatures is hitherto still unclear.
By analysing legislators’ goals, motivations and preferences the analysis contributes to the ongoing discussion on what explains why certain legislators serve on particular committees.
Second sub-question:How are members assigned to legislative committees and what criteria play a role in the assignment process?
The third question focuses on the actual working procedures of committees.
The main issue is on the level of independence of committee members vis á vis their parliamentary party groups and other actors once they are assigned. It is important to understand how strict the distinction between committee members and non-committee members is upheld. This is of central relevance with regard to the chain of delegation of voters to legislators. As has been argued, committees subdivide policy areas and, at least in principle, offer
“property rights”: Committee members have the right and duty to work on issues within their jurisdiction. By doing so committee negotiations among this sub-group of legislators constrain the space of possible outcomes. Thus, they
“modify the decision-making principle of one person, one vote” (Mattson &
Strøm, 2004, p. 92) and shape the behaviour of legislators. In how far committee members are autonomous or are tightly monitored and have to report back to their parliamentary party group is hitherto not widely studied. A related issue is the interactions between members on a committee and legislators from other parliamentary party groups (opposition or government) on the same committee. We do not yet understand how exactly committee work is coordinated between committee members and these groups in the legislature.
The third part of this study aims to give more insight into these relationships and the links between individual committee members and other groups outside of the committee by analysing formal and informal rules which can restrain the behaviour of MPs in committees.
Third sub-question: Once appointed, how is the work in legislative committees coordinated? What is the relationship between members in the committees and other groups in the legislature?
The Contribution of this Study
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the understanding of committees in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups. The contribution of this study is twofold. In the recent years, a growing interest was devoted to the committee structure and functioning of committees in parliaments outside of the U.S. context. The evidence for these studies has been inconclusive. Several studies have focused on the assignment process of committee members.
Although these studies have enhanced our understanding of this issue, the limitation to assignment criteria is not enough to fully capture the procedures in committees. This analysis extends initial studies of committees in parliaments with strong parliamentary party groups by including the working procedures of committees in the policy-making process. By focusing on different levels of analysis (structural features - macro level; modes of operation of committees - micro level) the evidence from this dissertation allows for a holistic view of committees in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups. All issues are complementary to reach a better understanding of committees in legislatures. The actual relationship between parliamentary party group meeting and committee delegation as well as the formal structures are hitherto not widely analysed. By analysing the structural features, committee assignments and modes of operation, the analysis allows for a complete look on committees in parliamentary systems of government. The formal powers granted to committees provide the incentive structures for legislators. Looking at committee assignments without considering the working procedures gives an equally incomplete description of committee work. Only with a combination of themes the complexity of committee workings can be sufficiently understood.
Answering this question is not merely of academic interest. Research on committees gives important insight into decision-making processes and power relations within modern parliaments. We do not yet fully understand how committee work is organised in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups and, subsequently, how this affects the democratic chain of delegation.
The chain of delegation assumes that legislators and their actions can be held accountable by voters at the next elections. Parliamentary party groups are important actors and have a relatively clear placement in the chain of delegation. In legislatures with strongly organised partisan groups, these groups
set the agenda, build majority coalitions, and process legislation. They, therefore, allow voters to decide, whether they will provide their representatives with a new mandate or not. Yet, committees also constitute a central venue for political actors. Neglecting the committee stage means leaving out a fundamental part of modern sequential decision-making processes within parliaments. Parliamentary procedures affect political outcomes and committees play a major role in shaping parliamentary output. We need to better understand committee organisation and functioning. Research on committees and subcommittees of the U.S. Congress has been vital to understanding the work of the legislature as a whole. Similar in-depth analyses of how committees work within legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups will be equally beneficial.
Another contribution refers to the academic debate on legislative organisation. In the scholarly debate on how and why parliaments organise themselves, there is an ongoing discussion about the theoretical treatment of how to analyse this process. Research on committees has long been characterised by the above mentioned “Washington bias” (Nelson, 1974, p. 120) and focused heavily on the U.S. Congress. As other studies which have analysed committee workings in parliamentary systems, this dissertation builds on the congressional framework of distributive, informational and partisan theories (with the addition of the ‘keeping tabs’ perspective). The debate on ‘how well do the predictions of the congressional theories travel to legislatures outside the United States?’ has been a central issue in the scholarly debate on non-congressional committees (see e.g. S. Martin, 2014a). Some scholars have started questioning the usefulness of the congressional theories and have argued against drawing too much on the congressional theories (Hansen, 2011;
Yordanova, 2011). I contradict these views. One of the central arguments of this study is that the congressional theories are of major help to understand committees in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups. How the theories are used in this dissertation is further clarified in Chapter 3. I argue that, when treating the theories as inter-depending models and acknowledging the multifaceity of committees, the predictions of the congressional theories help us to get a much more accurate and deeper understanding of how parliamentary party groups in parliamentary systems organise their work in committees. This will also be of importance for the discussion on the issue of legislative organisation in the U.S. Congress. As has been argued above, the assumption of weak partisan influences was traditionally one of the key reasons to focus and to understanding committees in this legislature. However, recent literature has questioned this assumption and argued that parliamentary party groups are much stronger nowadays. By studying legislatures in which there is no question of the level of strength of parliamentary party groups, the results of this study may help to broaden the focus of the discussion among congressional scholars as well.
