Identifying key barriers that limit tactical information sharing
between ground handling operators and airport operators: A case
study at London Gatwick Airport
Identifying key barriers that limit tactical information sharing
between ground handling operators and airport operators: A case
study at London Gatwick Airport
Master dissertation December 9, 2019
Author: N.K. Nanninga
Student No: s2737884 / B8057042
First supervisor: Dr. S. Fazi
University of Groningen
Second supervisor: Dr. Y. Yang
Newcastle University Business School
Courses: EBM028A30 / NBS8399
In collaboration with: London Gatwick Airport
Word count: 14.771
Abstract
At the airport operations center, tactical turnaround information is shared between ground handling operators (GHOs) and airport operators (AOs). Typically, GHOs provide AOs with a target off block time (TOBT), which is the estimated time an aircraft is pushed back from the gate. Vice versa, AOs share tactical decisions based on this information (e.g. gate allocation and gate re-allocation) with GHOs. An accurate exchange of information between GHOs and AOs is beneficial, as it reduces the necessity of buffer times before and after the in-block time and off-block time. However, unidentified communicational barriers limit GHOs and AOs to do so. By conducting a single-case study at London Gatwick Airport, three key barriers that limit effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs are identified: a feeling of
exclusion, protective behavior and characteristics of the ground handling company. In order to
improve effective information sharing, relationship building, the implementation of common
goals during the training phase and adjustments to the overall IT system are required.
Keywords: information sharing, tactical information, airport, barriers, gate allocation, airport
Acknowledgements
At Newcastle University Business School I have attended a training course in leadership. One of the CEOs present said the following:
“Taking a risk for something you’re really passionate about is not a bad thing”
Unfortunately, I do not know the name of the CEO, but his quote deserves to be in the acknowledgement of my thesis. Setting up your own research at a foreign case company is challenging, however, my passion for the airline industry made it worthwhile. Moreover, without the support of the people listed below, this thesis would not be possible.
Firstly, I would like to thank Dr. Stefano Fazi and Dr. Ying Yang for their supervision. By guiding me into the right direction when I got off track, they have helped me to present a thesis which I can be truly proud of. Moreover, I would like to thank Dr. Karen Elliott for her assistance in contacting the airport.
Secondly, I would like to thank Mr. Phil Garrett for his support before, during and after my time at London Gatwick Airport. Thanks to his willingness to provide me with data, operational access and his time, I have had the opportunity to get a glimpse of a fascinating industry. Moreover, I would like to thank Stewart Wingate, Neil Harvey and all the participants for their contribution.
During my stay in London, Nick and Sarah have opened up their home for me and listened to my stories. I would like to thank you both for taking such good care of me.
Table of contents
Abstract ... III Acknowledgements ... IV Table of contents ... V List of tables ... VII List of figures ... VII Acronyms ... VIII
1 INTRODUCTION ... 1
2 INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND ... 4
Ground handling operators ... 4
Airport operators ... 5
Tactical (turnaround) information ... 6
3 LITERATURE REVIEW ... 9
Cost of information sharing ... 9
Inadequate IT system ... 10
Absence of (frequent) face to face communication ... 11
Lack of transparency ... 11 Subcultures ... 12 4 METHODOLOGY ... 15 Research design ... 15 Case study ... 16 Data collection ... 19 Data analysis ... 22 Ethics ... 23
Validity and reliability ... 24
5 RESULTS ... 25
Applicability of earlier identified barriers ... 25
Identifying key barriers, not discussed in the literature, that limit effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs ... 32
Recommendations to improve tactical information sharing ... 37
6 DISCUSSION ... 40
Discussion of findings ... 40
Limitations of the study ... 42
7 CONCLUSION ... 44
9 Appendixes ... 51
Coding scheme for barriers identified from the literature ... 51
Case study protocol ... 53
AOBT-TOBT ... 58
AOBT-SOBT ... 58
Interview guide ... 59
Excluded codes from analysis (key barriers) ... 62
Coding scheme for key barriers ... 63
List of tables
Table 3-1: Elements of 'cost of information sharing' ... 10
Table 3-2: Elements of 'inadequate IT system' ... 11
Table 3-3: Elements of 'absence of (frequent) face to face communication ... 11
Table 3-4: Elements of 'lack of transparency' ... 12
Table 3-5: Elements of 'subcultures' ... 13
Table 3-6: Validation of different barriers by scholars. ✓ = validated by author ... 14
Table 4-1: Characteristics ground handling company 1 and 2 ... 18
Table 4-2: Distribution of questions per barrier ... 21
Table 4-3: Participants of the semi-structured interviews ... 21
Table 4-4: Validity and reliability ... 24
Table 5-1: Applicability of cost of information sharing ... 26
Table 5-2: Applicability of inadequate IT systems ... 27
Table 5-3: Applicability of lack of (frequent) face to face communication ... 29
Table 5-4: Applicability of lack transparency ... 30
Table 5-5: Applicability of subcultures ... 31
Table 5-6: Key barrier 'feeling excluded' ... 33
Table 5-7: Key barrier 'protective behavior' ... 34
Table 5-8: Key barrier 'characteristics of the ground handling company' ... 35
Table 9-1: Participants and their role in the organization ... 56
List of figures
Figure 2-1: Actors and sub-actors at the airport ... 6Figure 2-2: Turnaround activities during in and off-block times. Adapted from Auerbach and Koch (2007) ... 7
Figure 3-1:Overview of generic barriers identified from literature ... 13
Figure 4-1: TOBT accuracy company 1 and 2 ... 18
Figure 4-2: Distribution of codes for analysis (n=222) ... 23
Acronyms
AOBT Actual Off Block Time
APOC Airport Operations Center ATC Air Traffic Control
EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time
IATA International Air Transport Association
LGW London Gatwick Airport
1 INTRODUCTION
The airline industry is a growing market (Czerny and Zhang, 2011). The International Air Transport Association (IATA) predicts a doubling of the current number of air travelers in two decades from now (IATA, 2018). At this rate, it is likely that airports and air traffic control (ATC) will not be able to handle demand in the future with the current capacity (IATA, 2018). As infrastructure expansion is not always an option, it is crucial for airports to use the available capacity in the most efficient way (Liu et al., 2017). In fact, inefficiently used airport capacity causes delays and airport congestion (Wan et al., 2015; Janić, 2017). For example, in August 2019, 250.000 European flights (23,1%) were delayed, resulting in passenger dissatisfaction (Eurocontrol, 2019b). Among the causes of delays, it is acknowledged that the management of gate capacity has an important role (Su and Srihari, 1993; Cheng et al., 2012). By allocating gates efficiently, benefits for passengers can be achieved, such as direct access to the aircraft or terminal, rather than using shuttle busses to remote stands (Guépet et al., 2015). Several decisions concerning efficient gate allocations are made at the airport operations center, henceforth the APOC.
Two sub-actors at the APOC have a significant impact on the efficiency of the airport, as they are responsible for monitoring turnaround activities and allocating gates and stands: ground handling operators (GHOs) and airport operators (AOs). Ideally, if delays are incurred during turnaround activities, GHOs update and share the estimated time a gate becomes vacant again (target off-block time) with AOs (Eurocontrol, 2018). In response, AOs share tactical decision-making (gate allocation and re-allocation) based on the target off-block time (TOBT) with GHOs. By doing so, AOs can allocate gates efficiently, as alternative gates can be proposed when timeslots conflict with each other (Günther et al., 2006). Tactical information is not always effectively shared between GHOs and AOs, resulting in inconsistencies between the actual off-block time (AOBT) and TOBT values (Schaper et al., 2011; Mori, 2019; Wang
et al., 2019). Consequently, AOs schedule in buffer times between consecutive aircraft to
Improving information sharing between GHOs and AOs at the APOC, requires identifying and breaking down barriers that currently exists between GHOs and AOs (Corrigan
et al., 2015). However, the current body of research focusses on different units of analysis and
tend to neglect the importance of GHOs and AOs. For example, Fields et al. (2005) focus specifically on information sharing between ATC and airport operations, which are two actors with different challenges and different corporate cultures compared to GHOs and AOs. They state that not only spatial barriers exist between different actors, but also cultural divisions become apparent, which influences effective information sharing. Corrigan et al. (2015) also conducted research on barriers that limit effective information sharing at the airport, however, they take a broader perspective. The authors interviewed 27 key stakeholders at the airport, which on the one hand provides valuable insights in the airport as a whole. On the other hand, barriers may become generic due to the wide scope of the research. Consequently, they recommend similar research to be conducted at other case companies.
This thesis focusses on identifying key barriers that limit effective tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs. Hence, this research tends to answer the following research question:
RQ1: What key barriers limit effective tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs?
In order to answer the first research question, a literature review is conducted to identify generic barriers that limit effective information sharing at the airport. Through the analysis of semi-structured interviews, conducted at a mid-sized European airport, the applicability of the generic barriers is tested. Moreover, new barriers, not mentioned by previous research, may be identified. Hence, in order to answer the first research question, the following two sub-research questions are formulated:
Sub-research question 1: What generic barriers identified from the literature that limit effective tactical information sharing are applicable to GHOs and AOs?
Sub-research question 2 :What key barriers, not discussed in the literature, that limit effective tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs can be identified?
RQ2: How can tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs be improved?
In order to answer the research questions, a single-case study at a mid-sized, European airport is performed. Observations, semi-structured interviews and secondary data are gathered and analyzed in order to draw conclusions. London Gatwick Airport (LGW) is unique due to its relatively high volume, despite having a single runway (National Air Traffic Services, 2018). The findings of this study could be compared to airports with similar characteristics, such as having a single runway (London Stansted, Stuttgart Airport) or facing similar capacity constraints (Frankfurt am Main, London Heathrow) (Bubalo, 2011).
2 INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND
Airports are considered complex entities, containing of multiple actors and sub-actors (Fields
et al., 2005). Generally, literature identifies four main actors at the airport: airlines, air traffic
control (ATC), the airport and ground handlers. This study focusses on two sub-actors, both operating at the APOC: GHOs and AOs. In this chapter, the characteristics of GHOs and AOs are outlined. Moreover, the content of tactical information that is shared between GHOs and AOs is described.
Ground handling operators
GHOs communicate and share information with different actors and sub-actors at the airport. In order to use the airport’s capacity most efficiently, intensive communication with AOs is required (Papenfuss et al., 2017). First the characteristics of different ground handling companies are outlined. Then, the roles and objectives of GHOs are explained, as well as the challenges that GHOs are facing.
2.1.1 Characteristics of different ground handling companies
Since 1997, the European Commission has opened up ground handling services to competition (European Commission, 2019). Consequently, within most airports, different ground handling companies operate at the airport (Ansola et al., 2012). Ground handling companies may differ in terms of size and presence at the APOC. As different ground handling companies have different performance metrics, the quality of the information provided may differ per company (Burghouwt et al., 2014).
Figure 2-1 provides an overview of the different actors at the airport. Within this figure,
three different ground handling companies are distinguished. Company 1 is present on a 24/7 basis at the APOC (solid line). Company 2 is present on set times (dashed line), and company 3 is not present at the APOC. As this research investigates information sharing between GHOs and AOs within the APOC, the GHOs of company 1 and 2 are highlighted in the figure.
2.1.2 Roles and objectives
information is crucial for gate allocation and re-allocation (Martin et al., 2014). For example, based on the duration of a delay, AOs can estimate when a gate will become vacant again and change the schedule accordingly. As can be seen in Figure 2-1, GHOs share information with airlines, ground handling agents (located at the aircraft) and AOs. By updating the TOBT value in the central IT system, the departure time displayed on terminal monitors will be updated as well. Therefore, in order to provide passengers with accurate information concerning their flight, it is important that information between GHOs and AOs is shared effectively.
2.1.3 Challenges faced by GHOs
In collaboration with ground handling agents, GHOs estimate the duration of a delay incurred during turnaround activities. Therefore, GHOs must collaborate with ground handling agents in order to receive accurate TOBTs. Moreover, as GHOs are hired by the airline, GHOs must communicate with both the airport and the airline (Ansola et al., 2012). The airline and the airport have different performance metrics (Fricke and Schultz, 2009), which may be challenging for GHOs to take into account simultaneously.
Airport operators
Similarly to GHOs, AOs have their own goals, objectives and challenges. First the roles and objectives of AOs are discussed, after which the challenges are mentioned.
2.2.1 Roles and objectives
Eurocontrol, the European network manager, defines the roles and objectives of AOs as follows: “(1) to provide sufficient capacity for inbound aircraft at the gates and (2) to coordinate with all relevant actors to make tactical adjustments where needed” (Eurocontrol, 2017; Eurocontrol, 2018, p. 20). Based on tactical information, coming from ATC and GHOs, tactical decisions can be made, e.g. gate and stand re-allocation. Gate re-allocation might be necessary due to delays incurred during turnaround activities (Zhang and Klabjan, 2017). If no gate is vacant, an inbound aircraft has to divert to a remote stand, which requires bus transportation to the gate and longer waiting times for the passengers (Glass, 1997; Guépet et al., 2015). Hence, good communication and information sharing with GHOs is necessary, as GHOs manage bus transportation from remote stands to the terminal (Andreatta et al., 2014).
2.2.2 Challenges faced by AOs
information. Due to ineffective information sharing between GHOs and AOs, TOBT estimates are often inaccurate (Schaper et al., 2011). Consequently, passengers are misinformed on the duration of delays, as the APOCs central IT system is aligned with the terminal monitors. Moreover, buffer times need to be scheduled, to compensate for inaccurate TOBT estimates (Bubalo, 2011). Therefore, the industry calls for breaking down the barriers that exist between GHOs and AOs, such that buffer times can be optimized.
Tactical (turnaround) information
Within this study, tactical turnaround information is defined as TOBTs and strategic decisions
based on TOBTs. It may be obvious that other information is shared between GHOs and AOs
as well. However, this study focusses on TOBTs and strategic decisions based on TOBTs, as they influences gate and stand allocation and buffer times (Wang et al., 2019). Below, the aforementioned topics are explained in greater detail.
2.3.1 TOBT
The target off-block time (TOBT) is the estimated time “at which the aircraft will be ready to push back (all doors closed, boarding bridge removed, etc.)” (Kunze et al., 2011; Guépet et al., 2015, p. 828). In other words, the TOBT is an estimation for GHOs and AOs at which a gate becomes vacant for a new inbound aircraft (Narciso and Piera, 2015). As can be seen in Figure
2-2, various turnaround activities are performed between the in-block time and off-block time Figure 2-1: Actors and sub-actors at the airport
of an aircraft. If delays occur during turnaround activities (e.g. off-loading baggage due to a passenger “no show”) GHOs are required to update the TOBT in a central IT system, such that AOs are informed on the actual status of the turnaround (Eurocontrol, 2019a). Further interpretation of changing TOBT values (i.e. the cause of the delay) can be established through radio or face to face communication. Communication channels may differ, due to absence or presence of different ground handling companies at the APOC.
2.3.2 Strategic decisions based on TOBT
In response to receiving TOBT updates, AOs make tactical decisions (Günther et al., 2006). For example, if a TOBT interferes with a new inbound aircraft, a gate change can be proposed. Depending on the duration of the delay, an inbound aircraft may be parked on a remote stand, before being taxied to the allocated gate. As the exact value of the TOBT determines which strategic decision is suitable, it is of the essence that tactical information is shared freely between GHOs and AOs (Günther et al., 2006).
2.3.3 Tactical information and buffer times
In order to reduce reactional delays, buffer times are installed (Oreschko et al., 2010). Buffer times may act as (1) “safety cushions” in case delays are incurred during turnaround activities and (2) compensation for inaccurate TOBT estimates. By improving tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs, the latter can be minimized (Martin et al., 2014). By breaking
Figure 2-2: Turnaround activities during in and off-block times. Adapted from
3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Within the current body of research, scholars have identified generic barriers that limit effective tactical information sharing between actors at the airport. However, a different unit of analysis is used for the academic work outlined below. When analyzing the literature, five barriers that limit effective information sharing become apparent: (1) cost of information sharing, (2) inadequate IT system, (3) absence of (frequent) face to face communication, (4) lack of transparency and (5) subcultures. Each generic barrier consists of different elements, which are summarized in a table at the end of every barrier (Table 3-1 up to and including Table 3-5). The barriers are derived from a coding scheme (Appendix 1) and are acknowledged by different scholars (Table 3-6). The following subsections will describe each generic barrier in more detail.
Cost of information sharing
In recent academic work, the benefits of sharing information are investigated to a great extent (García Vasco et al., 2014), however the cost of information sharing receives little attention (Donohue, 2001). Sharing information requires investments from all actors involved, i.e. data gathering, new information systems and communication costs (Donohue, 2001, p. 171). Many scholars assume that the benefits created by information sharing are distributed evenly and fairly across all actors involved, however, Corrigan et al. (2015) challenges this assumption. There is an imbalance between the amount of work required to establish efficient information sharing, and the received benefits among actors (p. 8). For example. airlines are considered the big winners of information sharing, as the benefits include higher fleet utilization and shorter TT (García Vasco et al., 2014). According to some actors involved, airlines have too much influence in determining working methods (Okwir and Correas, 2014). “This puts additional strain on people working together when their advantage in being involved is not perceived as great as others” (Corrigan et al., 2015, p. 8). Therefore, the unequal distribution of benefits is an element of the generic barrier cost of information sharing.
jeopardy (Corrigan et al., 2015). Hence, sharing commercially sensitive information with ‘competitors’ is seen as an element of cost of information sharing as well.
Lastly, trust is mentioned as a factor that could influence information sharing between different actors at the airport. In order to communicate information freely, a certain degree of mutual trust must be maintained (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995). Within the research conducted by Corrigan et al. (2015) trust appeared not to be an issue. However, as this study uses a different unit of analysis, ‘lack of trust’ is seen as an element of cost of information sharing.
As different scholars have identified an imbalance between cost and benefits of information sharing among the actors at the airport, and a reluctance to share commercially sensitive data, cost of information sharing is identified as a generic barrier from the literature.
Table 3-1: Elements of 'cost of information sharing'
Cost of information sharing
Element 1 Unequal distribution of benefits Element 2 Commercially sensitive
data Element 3 Lack of trust
Inadequate IT system
In order to enable tactical information sharing between different actors at the airport, a ‘fit for purpose’ IT system should be in place (Brinton and Atkins, 2008). However, scholars indicate that IT systems are often incompatible and built without coordination (Kazda and Caves, 2015, p. 200). Several actors at the airport have IT systems that are designed to share information with external actors (Spies et al., 2008). However, external IT systems are often not aligned with internal IT systems. For example, GHOs might share an IT system with the airline and also with the airport. Consequently, actors have to switch between different IT systems when communicating with different actors, as different tasks require different IT systems (Spies et
al., 2008). For instance, performing gate and stand allocation requires a different IT system
Table 3-2: Elements of 'inadequate IT system'
Inadequate IT systems
Element 1 Incompatible with other systems Element 2 Influences accuracy of
tactical information Element 3 Not fit for purpose
Absence of (frequent) face to face communication
Existing literature indicates that an absence of face to face communication between actors at the airport limits effective information sharing. Firstly, ground handling agents are located at remote stations, away from the airline’s operation base, making information sharing more difficult (Donohue, 2001, p. 200). However, ground handling agents are often equipped with a PDA (Wu, 2008), which enables ground handling agents to send status updates (such as the agent’s arrival at the aircraft). Albeit that this research solely focusses on sub-actors present at the APOC, this element may be relevant as ground handling companies differ in terms of continuous presence at the APOC. Moreover, Fields et al. (2005) state that for more challenging situations “common interpretation (…) cannot simply be shared through electronic media (p. 21). Secondly, an absence of face to face communication results in ineffective information sharing on a managerial level. Corrigan et al. (2015) states that managerial communication between different stakeholder groups only occurs when problems escalate. By enhancing communication between different managers from different stakeholder groups, problems can be resolved directly, rather than waiting till escalation (p.10). As ground handling companies differ in terms of continuous presence at the APOC, absence of frequent face to face
communication is identified as a generic barrier that may limit effective information sharing
between GHOs and AOs.
Table 3-3: Elements of 'absence of (frequent) face to face communication
Absence of (frequent) face to face communication
Element 1 Presence at the APOC influences accuracy of information Element 2 Insufficient alternatives to face to
face communication
Lack of transparency
consequence, different actors are unaware of the relevance of sharing tactical information with different actors, or how it affects the KPIs of different actors (Okwir et al., 2017). This is in line with the research conducted by Eurocontrol (2014), which acknowledges that there is a mismatch between the information that is provided by one actor, and offered by the other actor. Moreover, Papenfuss et al. (2017) reveal that actors would like to know “the consequences of actions of other stakeholders on their own plans”, as they are not transparent right now (p. 2). In addition, Fields et al. (2005) describe that a lack of understanding in each other’s goals and objectives “might result in actions that are inconsistent with the expectations of others” (p. 127). Consider the following example, as described by Fields et al. (2005, p. 127):
“Two aircraft A and B, parked next to each other, called the Tower, requesting authorization to start up and push back at approximately the same time. Following the planned departure
sequence, the Tower issued authorizations first to A and soon afterwards to B. At the same time the Follow-me vehicle1 identified both aircraft as being ready to depart and chose to
escort B to the taxiway entrance thus inverting the sequence intended by the Tower”.
The controller corrected the mistake, made by the Follow-me-vehicle, by allowing aircraft A to depart first. Consequently, aircraft B complained to the tower that the usual “come, first-served” policy has been violated. All three actors involved (ATC, ground handling and pilot) share the same priority: to ensure a safe departure for all actors involved. However, due to a lack of transparency in each others intentions, actions and goals, miscommunication occurs.
Table 3-4: Elements of 'lack of transparency'
Lack of transparency
Element 1 Goal misalignment
Element 2 Lack of awareness in each other’s KPIs
Element 3 Non-transparent consequences of actions
Element 4 Mismatch information offered and required
Subcultures
“Organizations have cultures, but parts of organizations may have distinct subcultures” (Hofstede, 1998, p. 1). Different subcultures arise as the main actors at the airport are owned by different entities. For example, ATC is often operated by a third party (public or private)
and airlines and ground handling crew are owned by different private companies as well. All actors have different corporate cultures and need to work together, in order to create a safe environment for all stakeholder involved (Fields et al., 2005). Subcultures may create an “us” vs “them” feeling among different actors, which is not beneficial for effective information sharing (Corrigan et al., 2015). According to Corrigan et al. (2015), actors at the airport lack a certain “family feeling”, which would enable the actors involved to communicate better. This could be caused by the different goals and objectives of the actors involved. Moreover, as described in chapter 3.4, due to a lack of transparency in each other’s goals and objective, actors might be unaware of the existence of subcultures within the airport. In order to create a “family feeling”, a certain commitment from all parties is required to make efficient data sharing between different actors at the airport work (Okwir and Correas, 2014). Sometimes cultural change is necessary to align different goals and objectives of different actors, even though it poses many uncertainties to the actors at the airport (Okwir and Correas, 2014). Since GHOs and AOs are actors owned by different companies, subcultures may be a barrier to efficient, tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs.
Table 3-5: Elements of 'subcultures'
Subcultures
Element 1 “Us vs Them” feeling Element 2 Lack of a family feeling
Based on the literature review, five barriers are identified. Whereas in Figure 2-1 barriers were labelled ‘unidentified’, in Figure 3-1 generic barriers from the literature are now identified. As can be seen in this figure, flows of tactical information sharing (dashed arrows) are obstructed by generic barriers. By answering sub-research question 1, this research tests the applicability of the generic barriers identified from the literature. If the generic barriers are found applicable, they are identified as key barriers that limit effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs.
Figure 3-1:Overview of generic barriers identified from literature
Table 3-6: Validation of different barriers by scholars. ✓ = validated by author Cost of information sharing Inadequate IT system Absence of (frequent) face to face communication Lack of transparency Subcultures
Brinton and Atkins
(2008) ✓ Corrigan et al. (2015) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Donohue (2001) ✓ ✓ ✓ Eurocontrol (2014) ✓ Fields et al. (2005) ✓ ✓ ✓
García Vasco et al.
(2014) ✓
Kazda and Caves
(2015) ✓ ✓
Morell Llorens and
Garcia Vasco (2015) ✓ Okwir and Correas
(2014) ✓ ✓
Okwir et al. (2017) ✓ ✓
Papenfuss et al. (2017) ✓
4 METHODOLOGY
Every research is to a certain extent bound to the subjectivity of the researcher. Consequently, “researchers need to use appropriate methods for collecting and analyzing research data, and they need to apply them rigorously” (Collis and Hussey, 2013, p. 2). In order to answer the research questions posed by this research properly, a suitable methodology should be chosen (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). Therefore, in this chapter, the decisions that the researcher made with respect to the research philosophy, data collection method and case company selection are motivated.
Research design
The philosophy of this research could be best described as a mix of pragmatism and
interpretivism. On the one hand, this research focusses on a problem which might look rather
practical: identifying which key barriers limit effective, tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs, which adheres to a pragmatic philosophy. On the other hand, due to the different actors involved, it is acknowledged that “people of different cultural backgrounds, under different circumstances and at different times make different meanings, and so create and experience different social realities”(Saunders et al., 2007, p. 149). This statement indicates a focus towards interpretivism. According to Saunders et al. (2007), the researcher should be aware of the subjectivity that is bound to the interpretivist philosophy, since the researcher is similarly affected by a different cultural background. Therefore, different precautionary measures are taken to ensure reliability and validity. These precautionary measures are summarized in chapter 4.6.
GHOs and AOs specifically, patterns are discovered that can be elaborated upon by future research.
Similarly to sub-research question 2, no literature has investigated how to improve information sharing between GHOs and AOs. Therefore, in order to answer the second research question, an exploratory, inductive approach is chosen. An inductive approach will focus on discovering patterns and ideas, rather than testing hypotheses (Collis and Hussey, 2013, p. 4). Therefore, the recommendations made to the case company will provide scholars with a guidance on what future research should be conducted (Collis and Hussey, 2013).
Case study
Case study research is considered one of the most powerful tools in the development of new theory (Fynes et al., 2015). Simultaneously, case study research “remains one of the most challenging of all social science endeavors” (Yin, 2017). This paragraph will motivate why case study research is a suitable research methodology in order to answer the research questions. First, the benefits of a case study will be discussed. Then, the unit of analysis and the boundaries of the case are explained. Lastly, the limitations that are bound to case study research are mentioned.
According to Yin (2017), case study research is a suitable research methodology if a contemporary phenomenon in depth, and in its real-life context has to be investigated (p. 88). Case study research is a methodology that is anchored in the real world, due to the validation of concepts by experts (Karlsson, 2016, p. 166). The validation by experts is important, due to the pragmatic philosophy of this research, which focusses on a practical problem. Without external validation, the relevance of the barriers identified within this research could be questioned. Moreover, case study research is also a suitable approach when taking into account the interpretivist philosophy of this research. As the aforementioned interpretivist research philosophy implies, people may behave differently due to different cultural backgrounds. However, this is considered a great strength of case study research: the ability to focus on a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context. Moreover, case studies tend to focus on “how” and “why” questions, which is in line with the exploratory nature of the second research question (Yin, 2017, p. 81). Hence, due to the alignment with the research philosophy and research question, case study research is considered a valid methodology for this research.
GHOs and AOs present at the APOC in LGW. Moreover, this single-case study focusses solely on tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs, as defined in chapter 2.3. As a consequence, information and actors outside the boundaries of this case study are not considered (e.g. ground handling company 3 as depicted in Figure 2-1).
Similarly to other research methodologies, case study research is not without its limitations. A frequently mentioned limitation of single-case study research is the issue of generalizability. However, for the purpose of this study, a single-case study is preferred over a multiple case study. By performing a single-case study, the problem can be analyzed in greater depth compared to a multiple case study (Karlsson, 2016, p. 175). Moreover, this study does not aim for statistical generalization, which is not an unusual approach looking at similar studies (Faller et al., 2016). However, in order to improve the validity and reliability of this single-case study, the researcher uses data triangulation and cross-sectional interviews. Moreover, a case study protocol is made and shared with the case company before arrival (Appendix 2).
4.2.1 Case company
In contrast to survey-based research, it is typical for case study-based research to have a non-random sample. In other words, there is no sample that represents a larger population (Ridder, 2017, p. 281). However, this does not automatically infer that every case is equally interesting. Nor that the findings of this study are not helpful to other mid-sized European airports with similar characteristics.
In the following paragraphs, the case company used for this study is described. The paragraph is divided into the airport and ground handling companies, as both have different characteristics.
4.2.1.1 London Gatwick Airport
indicate that improvements can be made regarding effective tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs at LGW.
4.2.1.2 Ground handling companies
As described in chapter 2.1.1, ground handling companies have different characteristics. Ground handling companies 1 and 2 are used for the analysis, as they are both located within the APOC (Figure 2-1).
Table 4-1: Characteristics ground handling company 1 and 2
Ground handling company 1 2
Size of ground handler in terms of total passenger volume of flights handled2
41% 15%
TOBT accuracy3 39% 59%
Presence at APOC 24/7 08:00-18:00
The characteristics of the different ground handling companies used for this study are summarized in Table 4-1. As can be seen, ground handling companies differ in terms of size, performance and presence at the APOC. Ground handling company 1 handles the majority of the flight at LGW. However, based on the analysis of secondary data provided by the case company, ground handling company 1 is outperformed by ground handling company 2 in terms of TOBT accuracy. Figure 4-1 provides a more detailed overview on the differences between ground handling company 1 and 2, in terms of performance.
2 London Gatwick Airport (2018)
3 Based on secondary data provided by the case company. In total 490 flights were analyzed on October 9, 2019. 39% 61% 30% 5% 59% 41% 20% 2% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
On time Delayed Delayed>5 minutes Delayed>15 P er ce n tag e o f to tal flig h ts o b ser v ed Company A (n=352) Company B (n=138)
4.2.2 Company access
Initially, when approaching the case company, access was limited due to the geographic dispersion between the researcher and the case company. Therefore, the scope of the research is discussed through emails and phone calls, rather than face to face meetings. Moreover, an outline of the research is sent to the main contact at LGW before arrival. By doing so, expectations of the research were managed for both parties at an early stage. From September 3, 2019 till October 1, 2019 the researcher spent time at LGW over the course of five face to face meetings with the company contact. Moreover, operational access is granted, such that the researcher can familiarize himself with the different activities performed in and around the APOC. Daily visits to the airport are not possible, since the researcher needs to be supervised by the company contact while being at the restricted areas of the airport. Data is collected from October 9, 2019 till October 11, 2019, where operational access was granted to conduct the interviews on airside. During the first meeting, the content of future meetings is discussed. By doing so, no time is wasted on determining the agenda during individual meetings. Consequently, a thorough understanding of the problem at LGW is created. Moreover, by spending time with GHOs and AOs in advance, a level of trust was created, since the researcher is less considered an ‘outsider’.
Data collection
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) compares data collection within qualitative research as the opposite of finding mushrooms in a forest. You cannot simply search and collect them: the researcher has to make an effort in order to collect valid data. “Qualitative data have to be developed by the researcher: interviews must be prepared for, conducted and transcribed; pictures must be taken; and field notes must be written” (p. 152). Moreover, within case study research, it is seen as an opportunity to use different sources of evidence (Yin, 2017). In other words, Yin (2017) describes the concept of data triangulation. Therefore, to improve the validity and reliability of this single-case study, multiple sources of evidence are gathered. Below, the different types of evidence used in this research are outlined.
4.3.1 Observations
to extract information that helps the researcher to gain a thorough understanding of the problem. Moreover, notes were made during informal conversations, such that the researcher is able to recollect important aspects of the conversations held with different sub-actors.
4.3.2 Semi structured interviews
“Interviews provide opportunities for mutual discovery, understanding, reflection, and explanation [...] and elucidate subjectively lived experiences and view-points” (Tracy, 2019, p. 134). The aim of interviews is aligned with the interpretivist philosophy of this research, which argues that every person is bound to their cultural background. However, certain limitations are bound to conducting interviews, such as: (1) biased answers due to the presence of the researcher and (2) interviewees describe the world from their point of view, which is considered subjective (Clark et al., 2008, p. 202). However, data triangulation mitigates the risk of unreliable results to a great extent. By conducting semi-structured interviews, the researcher is on the one hand bound to an interview guide (see Appendix 5), with pre-determined questions and topics (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). On the other hand, the researcher may ask probing questions to gain a better understanding on where improvements can be made.
multiple questions. Questions 19-21 were used to answer the second, exploratory research question.
Table 4-2: Distribution of questions per barrier
Barrier Question
Cost of information sharing 4, 5, 6
Inadequate IT system 7, 8, 9
Absence of communication 10, 11, 12
Lack of transparency 13, 14, 15
Subcultures 16, 17, 18
Table 4-3 provides an overview of the participants of the cross-sectional, semi-structured
interviews. As this research tends to find out what key barriers influence effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs, employees from GHOs and AOs are selected. As can be seen in Table 4-1, not all GHOs are located constantly at the APOC. Therefore, participants from two different ground handling companies are selected.
Table 4-3: Participants of the semi-structured interviews
Participant reference Role and company Relevant experience within
the firm
GHO-1 GHO (company 1) 10-20 years
GHO-2 GHO (company 2) 5-10 years
AO-1 AO (LGW) <5 years
AO-2 AO (LGW) <5 years
AO-3 AO (LGW) 10-20 years
AO-4 AO (LGW) 10-20 years
4.3.3 Secondary data
on September 23 between 04:00 am and 10:00 am (GMT). Results of the analysis of secondary data can be found in Appendix 3 and 4.
Secondly, recent data on performance indicators from ground handling company 1 and 2 is shared in order to characterize both companies. A sample of 494 (n=494) flights are analyzed, after which 4 flights are deleted due to insufficient information. Ultimately, 352 flights of company 1 and 138 flights of company 2 are analyzed to calculate the TOBT accuracy. The results are shown in Figure 4-1.
Data analysis
Data analysis of the gathered data is divided into two sections. The first section includes answering the first sub-research question, by means of testing the applicability of barriers identified from the literature. The generic barriers that limit effective information sharing are used as a priori concepts. A priori concepts “frame the interview questions, drive the interview protocols and structure the initial levels of the coding scheme” (Weston et al., 2001, p. 382). The a priori concepts are established by means of two levels of coding. First as many categories as possible are identified, after which these categories are grouped and integrated (Glaser et al., 1968). The coding scheme can be found in Appendix 1.
The second section includes the generation of key barriers, not identified from the literature and the recommendations to the case company. First, the audio recordings are transcribed in the first week after the interviews are conducted. By doing so, it is easier for the researcher to recall non-verbal reactions of the participants, which are not transferrable through the audio recording (Longhurst, 2003, p. 110). The transcripts are analyzed by using CAQDAS software Atlas.ti, version 8.4. This software enables the researcher to apply the three level coding scheme as described by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Below the three coding steps are briefly described.
4.4.1 Open coding
acknowledged by one participant, and are therefore not taken into account in identifying key barriers. Figure 4-2 provides an overview of the distribution of codes used for the analysis.
4.4.1 Axial coding
Axial coding is “a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 96). For example, participants were asked to describe the nature of the relationship between GHOs and AOs. Examples of words that were used are: extension of the police, governing authority,
parent/kid relationship. In order to group the open coding, the axial code Authoritarian relationship was used. Out of 115 open codes, 10 axial codes are generated.
4.4.2 Selective coding
Strauss and Corbin (1990) define selective coding as “the process of selecting the central or core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development” (p. 116). From 10 axial codes, 3 selective codes are derived. A coding scheme which explains how the three selective codes are derived, can be found in Appendix 7.
Ethics
“The three main issues most frequently raised in the Western research ethical guidelines and by the professional associations are: (1) codes and consent, (2) confidentiality and (3) trust” (Silverman, 1998, p. 418). Within this research, all three aspects will be taken into account. Before conducting the interview, a consent form is handed out to the participants stating the
Figure 4-2: Distribution of codes for analysis (n=222) 115
68 33
6
aim of the report. Also, consent is asked for making audio recording of the interview for reliability purposes. If the participant does not give consent for the audio recording, handwritten notes will be made during the interview. Moreover, the participant is informed that he/she can withdraw from the study up until 48 hours after the interview is conducted. Confidentiality is ensured by anonymizing the participants in this study. By doing so, specific references throughout the report cannot be traced back to an individual within the firm. Moreover, recordings of the interviews are stored on a secured, decrypted, university hard drive. Trust is gained by having informal talks with participants before the actual interview is conducted. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 4.3.2, the complexity of the questions is built up, such that the interviewee feels comfortable. Lastly, this research is subject to the Newcastle University
Codes of Ethics.
Validity and reliability
In line with Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) and Yin (2017), multiple sources of data are used to improve the construct validity of this research. Moreover, by means a case study protocol and audio recording interviews, the internal and external validity is ensured. Lastly, in line with Syed and Nelson (2015) coding schemes are included in the appendix, to provide a transparent overview on the derivation of selective codes. Table 4-4 summarizes the precautionary measures taken by the researcher, in order to improve the reliability and validity of this study.
Table 4-4: Validity and reliability
Validity/reliability Precautionary measure
Construct validity Data triangulation through multiple sources of data (chapter 4.3), cross-sectional interviews (Table 4.3)
External validity Case study protocol (Appendix 2)
Internal validity Audio recorded interviews
Reliability Case study protocol (Appendix 2), Interview
5 RESULTS
In this chapter, the findings of this study are stated and the research questions are answered. This chapter is structured as follows. First, the applicability of the earlier identified barriers is tested in chapter 5.1. By doing so, sub-research question 1 is answered. Then, chapter 5.2 will answer the second sub-research question by identifying other key barriers that influence effective tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs. Finally, recommendations to improve tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs are provided, which answers the second and final research question.
Applicability of earlier identified barriers
In order to test the applicability of a barrier in a structured manner, a barrier consists of multiple elements. The elements flow from the literature review and are in line with Table 3-1 up to and including Table 3-5. The degree to which a participant finds an element applicable, is indicated with a checkmark sign4. If all elements of a barrier are found applicable by the participant, the generic barrier is found applicable within the context of this study. Lastly, as barriers may be perceived differently by GHOs and AOs, this section is described from a GHO and an AO point of view.
5.1.1 Cost of information sharing 5.1.1.1 GHOs
All GHOs acknowledge that the benefits of information sharing are not distributed equally. This implies that one sub actor receives greater benefits compared to the other sub actor. GHOs believe that AOs benefit more from information sharing than GHOs. In addition, GHOs do not consider tactical turnaround information ‘commercially sensitive’. As the TOBT solely consists of a time stamp, commercial sensitivity is not seen as a barrier that restricts effective information sharing for GHOs. However, vice versa GHO-1 beliefs that AOs are restricted in sharing commercially sensitive information with GHOs. Though, both participants say that they trust AOs with the information that they share.
5.1.1.2 AOs
AO-1 and AO-2 confirm that AOs benefit more from information sharing than GHOs, which is in line with comments made by both GHOs. AO-3 and AO-4 believe that the benefits are
equally distributed. However, all actors agree that the unequal distribution of benefits is not necessarily a problem, and may help the operation as a whole:
(…) we’d be able to deliver a better stand plan, a better airfield flow, which ultimately then benefits everybody. (AO-1)
AO-1, AO-2 and AO-4 do not believe that they are reluctant to share commercially sensitive information with GHOs. However, AO-3 states that certain information is not shared with every GHO, if the information is not meant for them. This statement is in line with GHO-1 feeling that AOs are restricted in sharing commercially sensitive information. GHO-1 and AO-2 claim that the quality of information offered by different GHOs is inconsistent. It is argued that this inconsistency is caused by commercial sensitivity.
(…) the flow of information into us is never the same from different handling agents . I can understand that that’s due to business sensitivity, commercial sensitivity (AO-1)
Generally, AOs trust GHOs with tactical information (1 and 4). However, AO-2 trusts GHOs only if a personal relationship is in place with the GHO. AO-3 trusts GHOs only with information that is meant for them. Therefore, element 3 is partly validated for AO-2 and AO-3.
Even though the majority of the participants acknowledge an unequal distribution of benefits, other elements are not validated by the participants. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to suggest that cost of information sharing is a key barrier that limits effective information sharing.
Table 5-1: Applicability of cost of information sharing
GHO AO
1 2 1 2 3 4
Element 1 Unequal distribution of benefits ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Element 2 Commercially sensitive data ✓
Element 3 Lack of trust (✓) (✓)
Barrier Cost of information sharing
5.1.2 Inadequate IT system 5.1.2.1 GHOs
a barrier that limits effective information sharing. Though, technical flaws of the central IT system become apparent, such as the inability to digitally explain why the TOBT value is altered (GHO-1). The ability to do so would enable AOs to accurately assess whether a gate change is necessary or not, without face to face or telephone communication. Moreover, the central IT system is web based, which “slows everything down” (GHO-1). Fast dissemination of information is crucial, as circumstances may change rapidly at the airport.
Finally, GHO-1 does not recognize the benefits of using the central IT system, as a lot of tactical information is available in internal ground handling systems. As the central IT system is crucial for the dissemination of tactical information throughout the airport, it could be questioned whether a lack of recognition of the central IT system fosters effective information sharing:
“What we learned internally is that I don’t need to use it, okay?”(GHO-1) 5.1.2.2 AOs
Similarly to GHOs, AOs use both internal and external IT systems to share tactical information with each other. All AOs, but AO-2, do not believe that inadequate IT systems influence effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs. However, AO-2 mentions that IT systems “do not talk to each other that well”, and need a lot of manual intervention. As a consequence, AOs are prone to make mistakes. This finding contrasts with the other participants. Possibly, assessing the effectiveness of the current IT infrastructure is based on the perception of the participant, rather than the IT system itself.
Only AO-2 validates inadequate IT systems as a key barrier that limits effective information sharing. However, this view is not shared by other participants. Therefore,
inadequate IT systems is found partly applicable for AOs, but does not qualify as a key barrier
that limits effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs. Table 5-2: Applicability of inadequate IT systems
GHO AO
1 2 1 2 3 4
Element 1 Incompatible with other systems ✓ ✓ ✓
Element 2 Influences accuracy of tactical information
✓
Element 3 Not fit for purpose ✓
5.1.3 Lack of (frequent) face to face communication 5.1.3.1 GHOs
Both GHOs acknowledge that being present at the APOC (and therefore being able to communicate face to face) influences the accuracy of tactical turnaround information positively. Benefits that are mentioned of being present are: (1) hearing what the other party is doing (2) helping each other if necessary and (3) understanding the gravity of the request of the other party. By doing so, GHOs can assess whether tactical decisions have an impact on their operation or not. An alternative to face to face communication, particularly for GHO-25, is communication by telephone. GHO-2 believes that the telephone is a good alternative to face to face communication, depending on whether the phone is being answered:
“(…) there is critical information, they’re trying to get a hold of [Company 3] or something, and there is no one there to talk to” (GHO-2)
The ground handling company that GHO-2 works for, generally does not have this problem according to GHO-2.
5.1.3.2 AOs
All AOs acknowledge that face to face communication with GHOs influences tactical information sharing positively. In addition, AO-1, AO-3 and AO-4 state that a lack of face to face communication negatively influences TOBT estimates and cause buffer times to increase. As an alternative to face to face communication, the telephone is used to contact GHOs not present at the APOC. Similarly to GHO-2, AO-4 points out the disadvantages of information sharing by telephone.
“(…) by the time you try and contact the individual, they researched what the problem is and updated the TOBT, it’s 3 or 4 minutes wasted there (AO-4)
Buffer times are scheduled, in order to compensate for such inaccuracies. AOs indicate that it is easier to communicate with ground handling company 1, compared to ground handling company 2 (AO-1, AO-2 and AO-3). As both ground handling companies differ in terms of continuous or intermittent presence at the APOC, this might be seen as a reason. However, sometimes GHO-2 is bypassed by AOs, despite being present at the APOC (AO-2 and AO-3):
“(…) because they’re kind of not aware that they’re in the corner there. You just phone their ops. So it’s kind of defeats the whole point of having them up here” (AO-3)
It appears that it is more convenient to phone the operations of ground handling company 2, rather than speaking to the GHO directly. This may be caused by the personal relationship between GHOs and AOs.
Since not all AOs perceive a lack of (frequent) face to face communication as a key barrier, this generic barrier is not considered a key barrier that limits effective information sharing. Though, the generic barrier is found partly applicable for GHOs and AOs.
Table 5-3: Applicability of lack of (frequent) face to face communication
GHO AO
1 2 1 2 3 4
Element 1 Presence at the APOC influences accuracy of information
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Element 2 Insufficient alternatives to face to face communication
(✓) ✓ ✓
Barrier Lack of (frequent) face to
face communication
(✓) ✓ ✓
5.1.4 Lack of transparency 5.1.4.1 GHOs
“Target’s aren’t the same. They interfere with each other” (GHO-1)
Interestingly, whereas GHO-1 is outspoken about perceiving a lack of transparency as a key barrier, GHO-2 claims the opposite. GHO-1 states that goals and objectives are misaligned and that AOs are generally unaware of the goals and objectives of GHOs:
“They have no idea what I’m trying to achieve” (GHO-1)
GHO-2 does not confirm any misalignment in goals, nor does the participant believe that there is a mismatch between the information offered and required by GHOs and AOs. It is peculiar that all elements of this barrier are validated by GHO-1 and rejected by GHO-2. Discrepancies may exist due to negative experiences of the individual.
5.1.4.2 AOs
performance metrics, for example: (1) GHOs performance metrics does not influence their job roll (AO-1) and (2) performance metrics differ per ground handling company, which makes it increasingly difficult to take them into account during decision-making (AO-3 and AO-4). Though the potential of goal alignment is recognized (AO-2 and AO-4):
“(…) in order for it to be more cohesive we need to share our information, so what our goals and what their goals are, and see how we can work with each other to partnership and make
it work for each other” (AO-2)
For AOs, all elements, but element 4, are rejected as key barriers that limit effective information sharing. Though, AO-4 acknowledges that there is a mismatch between the information offered by the GHOs and required by AOs. A mismatch exists due to delayed information sharing by GHOs which affects the quality of the tactical information.
Therefore, lack of transparency is not a key barrier that limits effective information sharing. Though. as GHO-1 perceives a lack of transparency as a key barrier that limits effective information sharing, this generic barrier is found partly applicable to GHOs.
Table 5-4: Applicability of lack transparency
GHO AO
1 2 1 2 3 4
Element 1 Goal misalignment ✓
Element 2 Lack of awareness in each other’s KPIs
✓ Element 3 Non-transparent consequences of
actions
✓ Element 4 Mismatch information offered and
required
✓ ✓
Barrier Lack of transparency ✓
5.1.5 Subcultures 5.1.5.1 GHOs
GHOs are divided about the existence and nature of different subcultures. GHO-1 states that an “us vs them” feeling exists. The airport is often referred to as “the landlord” or the governing authority. Whereas the culture of the ground handling company is referred to as “the tenant” and the executing body of the organization.
Ground handling companies are customers of the airport. However, GHO-1 does not feel treated as such, as ground handling companies are governed and regulated by the airport. Though, GHO-1 does not believe that this influences effective tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs. GHO-2 does not acknowledge an “us vs them” feeling, however the participant would not describe the airport as a “happy family”:
“(…) some of the GHOs are distant cousins, more than brothers and sisters with the AOs”
(GHO-2)
Due to the fact that not all elements are acknowledged by GHOs, subcultures is not seen as a key barrier that limits effective information sharing for GHOs.
5.1.5.2 AOs
Similarly to GHO-1, an “us vs them” feeling is recognized by AO-1 and AO-2. Moreover, independently of each other, similar words are used to describe the relationship between GHOs and AOs. For example, “landlord/tenant relationship”, “kid/parent” or “an extension of the police”:
“(…) you get people who work for the handling agents and they see GAL6 as an extension of
the police, or an extension of the landlord” (AO-1)
While acknowledging that the relationship between GHOs and AOs can be improved, a “lack of a family feeling” is not fully confirmed (AO-1, AO-2 and AO-4). Though, different AOs forget to mention ground handling company 2 when stating which ground handling companies are present at the APOC (AO-1 and AO-2). This is in line with GHO-2 statement that some of the GHOs are distant cousins, rather than brothers and sisters.
Within the context of this study, subcultures is not seen as a key barrier that limits effective information sharing. However, the generic barrier is found partly applicable to AOs, as AO-1 and AO-2 partly validate this barrier .
Table 5-5: Applicability of subcultures
GHO AO
1 2 1 2 3 4
Element 1 “Us vs Them” feeling ✓ ✓ ✓
Element 2 Lack of a family feeling (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓)
Barrier Subcultures (✓) (✓)
In conclusion, no generic barrier identified from the literature is fully found applicable by all GHOs or AOs. Consequently, none of the generic barriers are considered key barriers that limits effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs.
Identifying key barriers, not discussed in the literature, that limit
effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs
In order to answer the second sub-research question of this research, this tends to find other key barriers that limit effective information sharing, not addressed by the literature. As described in chapter 4.4, a three level coding scheme is used to identify the key barriers. The coding scheme, the inclusion and exclusion criteria that were used to derive these barriers can be found in
Appendix 6 and Appendix 7.
Three key barriers are identified that limit effective tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs: (1) feeling excluded, (2) protective behavior and (3) characteristics of the ground handling company. Below, each key barrier is described in more detail.
5.2.1 Feeling excluded
This study identifies feeling excluded as a key barrier that limits effective information sharing between GHOs and AOs. This key barrier mostly restricts GHOs in effectively sharing tactical information, rather than AOs. To a certain extent, feeling excluded is similar to the generic barrier ‘subcultures’, as exclusion may be caused by the existence of subcultures. However, the mere existence of subcultures is not found applicable within the context of this study (see Table
5-5). Therefore, this key barrier should be seen as an extension of the generic barrier identified
from the literature.
Within the APOC, an authoritarian relationship exists between GHOs and AOs. AOs are seen as the governing authority and GHOs ‘have to follow orders’. As the operating license of ground handling companies is renewed by the airport, the authoritarian relationship is felt by GHO-1:
“So if the landlord requests something, the tenant has to do as its told. You have to bear in mind that the operating license is coming from the airport, okay? So is there a culture
of… is that enforced, is that something you feel? Of course!”(GHO-1)
The authoritarian relationship is not always appreciated by GHOs, as AOs have “no idea how to run the GHOs’ operation” (GHO-1). To some degree, this is in line with the generic barrier
the authoritarian relationship attributes to exclusion within the APOC. AO-2 acknowledges that GHOs are not always happy with the way they are treated by AOs. Moreover, AO-2 believes that this affects their willingness to share information with AOs. According to GHO-1, actual exclusion occurs, when the implications of decision-making are not shared with GHOs, despite being present at the APOC:
“So sometimes I hear it, sometimes it’d be like, or such and such has occurred, and I’m standing there waiting to be told” (GHO-1)
Interestingly, GHO-2 is less outspoken about feeling excluded within the APOC. Nevertheless, GHO-2 is sometimes bypassed by AOs as it is easier to phone the operations. Again, the extent to which a barrier is perceived, has an influence on information sharing between GHOs and AOs.
Table 5-6: Key barrier 'feeling excluded'
Feeling excluded
Element 1 Authoritarian relationship Element 2 Feeling recognized Element 3 Dependency on each other
5.2.2 Protective behavior
The second key barrier that influences effective, tactical information sharing between GHOs and AOs is protective behavior. This key barrier is found applicable for both GHOs and AOs. Though, it becomes apparent that protective behavior is mostly expressed by GHOs. However, as it affects the relationship between GHOs and AOs, both sub-actors are limited in effectively sharing information between GHOs and AOs.
AOs claim that protective behavior (expressed by GHOs) affects information sharing between GHOs and AOs (AO-1, AO-3 and AO-4). In order to protect their operation, GHOs might deliberately delay information sharing due to hidden agenda’s:
“(…) sometimes you only get the information that they want to give you. If we had the whole picture, of what was going on…but again they’re so driven by hidden TOBTs and being seen
to be doing the right thing” (AO-1)
