The Role of History in the Political Programmes of Populist Parties: A Comparison of Italian and British Cases (1993 – 2018)

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The Role of History in the Political Programmes of

Populist Parties: A Comparison of Italian and

British Cases (1993 – 2018)

University of Groningen

Alessandro Tessari - S3803619

Master Thesis: History Today

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Antoon De Baets, for his guidance through each stage of this process and for having inspired my interest in the subject of the research.

I would also like to thank Federico and Lucie for always being there and Gustavo for being there almost until the end.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Results of British and Italian populist parties in all the general elections taking place

between 1993 and 2018 ... 12

Table 2: Historical references inside the programmes of British populist parties between 1993 and 2008. ... 40

Table 3: Positive and negative motives inside the programmes of British populist parties between 1993 and 2008. ... 41

Table 4: Historical references inside the programmes of the Northern League between 1993 and 2008. ... 51

Table 5: Positive and negative motives inside the programmes of the Northern League between 1993 and 2008. ... 52

Table 6: Historical references inside the programmes of British populist parties between 2008 and 2018. ... 65

Table 7: Positive and negative motives inside the programmes of British populist parties between 2008 and 2018. ... 66

Table 8: Historical references inside the programmes of Italian populist parties between 2008 and 2018. ... 78

Table 9: Positive and negative motives inside the programmes of Italian populist parties between 2008 and 2018. ... 79

Table 10: Historical references inside the programmes of British and Italian populist parties between 1993 and 2018. ... 85

Table 11: Positive and negative motives inside the programmes of British and Italian populist parties between 1993 and 2018. ... 86

Figure 1: Northern League logo. Source: 1996 Northern League political programme ... 44

Figure 2: Padanian flag. Source: clker ... 69

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Introduction

In November 2018, the British newspaper The Guardian published research results about the rise of populism in Europe over the previous twenty years. Paul Lewis, Seán Clarke, Caelainn Barr, Josh Holder and Niko Kommenda gathered data from all over the Old Continent showing that, since 1998, approval of populists has been on a consistent rise among Europeans. From late 1990s, populist parties have more than tripled their voters. On average, the number of Europeans voting for populist parties increased from 7% to 25%; in addition, the amount of Europeans ruled by a government including at least one populist politician rose from 12.5 million to 170 million. In 1998, only Switzerland and Slovakia had populist exponents into government. By 2018, eleven European countries had populist politicians in power. This trend did not only encompass limited areas inside Europe, populist parties grew throughout the continent, although in different proportions.1_{In short, populism had become a political force}

to reckon with over the last two decades.

Italy, for example, experienced a sharper rise in populist approval than some of its neighbours. After the 2018 general elections, The League (La Lega) and the Five Star

Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) formed in fact the first fully populist government in the

history of the Republic. German and French populist parties did not reach the same significant result, although they still managed to increase their electorate considerably. The French

National Front (Front National), led by Marine Le Pen, grew from 10.4% in 2007 to 33.9% in

the 2017 presidential elections. The right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland), after the 2017 federal elections, became the third largest party in the Bundestag (German Parliament) by winning 94 seats out of the 709 available. Other successful results for populist parties around Europe include the Hungarian parliamentary election in April 2018, where Viktor Orban’s Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) won a super majority of 133 seats (out of 199), gathering 44.7% of all the votes. Meanwhile, across the Channel, the strongly Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) grew from a mere 2.2% in 2005 to 12.6% in the 2015 general elections. 2_{In the United Kingdom, however,}

1_{Paul Lewis, Seanne Clarke, Caelainn Barr, Josh Holder and Niko Kommenda. Revealed: one in four Europeans}

vote populist. (The Guardian. 20 November 2018).

2_{Luca Giannandrea. PARTITI POPULISTI IN EUROPA UN’ANALISI COMPARATA TRA FRANCIA, ITALIA E REGNO}

UNITO I casi di Front National, Lega Nord e Independence Party a confronto. (Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali "Guido Carli," 2016). P. 19-22.

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7 the real populist success came with the 2016 referendum regarding the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. This referendum was indeed preceded by intense political campaign, and the leave option was strongly backed by populist parties. Both the UK Independence Party and the British National Party (BNP) participated actively in the campaign. The referendum result was widely considered a success for populist forces.3

Moreover, the recent resolution of the Brexit, which finally saw the United Kingdom leaving the European Union on 31 January 2020, highlights the success of the British populist parties.4

Populism as a Subject of Study

If the marginality of populist parties in the 1990s rendered them minor cases for study, their rise over the past decades put them under the spot light. Independently from the circumstantial causes and reasons that favoured the success of populist parties in this century – analysed later in this thesis – this steep ascent proves that populist parties managed to convey their ideas and policies successfully, thus answering the need of many European voters. Therefore, it is necessary to understand these parties thoroughly from several perspectives. Recent populism and European populist parties have been studied in general terms, as well as in their own national context and comparatively. Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris in Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism analysed the rising support for populist parties in Western societies by examining two theories. The economic insecurity theory emphasizes the consequences of the economic changes in post-industrial economies, and the

cultural backlash theory suggests that populist support can be explained as a conservative

reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population against progressive value changes. Inglehart and Norris approached European populist parties in a broad way, and by analysing the ideological position of 268 political parties in 31 countries, they concluded that the cultural backlash theory provided most consistent evidence inasmuch as people seek answers to present problems in conservative solutions while looking at ‘better’ past times.5_Like

Inglehart and Norris, Maria Daniela Poli in Contemporary Populism and the Economic Crisis in

Western Europe tried to define some of the elements behind populist fortune. The author

3_{Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris. Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and}

Cultural Backlash. (Harvard Kennedy School. August 2016).

4_{Angela Dewan. Brexit’s done. The UK has left the European Union (CNN World, 1 February 2020).}

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8 focused on the relationship between current populist parties and the 2008 Financial Crisis. Poli concluded that the recession helped populists to emerge and form a common ‘frontline’ against the established parties, which were considered corrupt and unable to face the crisis. The crisis also provided populists with a common international enemy to blame for the economic downturn, the European Union.6_{Yann Algan, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioammou}

and Evgenia Passari in The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism tackled the issue from the same perspective as Poli. They observed the repercussions of the 2008 recession on European countries, such as the increase in unemployment and the following decline in trust in national and European political institutions. Thus, they recognised a correlation between the rise of these factors and the increasing support for non-traditional parties and especially populist parties.7_{Authors share the opinion that is impossible to single out one main reason}

for the recent success of populism in Europe. However, both cultural/social and economic reasons played crucial roles, such as the rejection of progressive values by people feeling abandoned by society and traditional politics, and the 2008 Financial Crisis.

Along with the abundant literature on general causes behind recent populists’ successes, many researchers focused on single cases in order to define more specifically the characteristics of the protagonists of the recent populist rise. Luca Giannandrea in Partiti

Populisti in Europa: un’analisi comparata tra Francia, Italia e Regno Unito examined the cases

of the French Front National, the Italian The League and the British UKIP. Giannandrea compared electoral results, policies, parties’ statutes, electoral programmes and the electoral base of the aforementioned parties. Stijn van Kessel in Populist Parties: Agent of Discontent? offered another case-by-case detailed analysis, providing comparisons between parties inside the The Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. Both Giannandrea and Van Kessel found common traits among the parties, especially in their sceptic attitudes towards the European Union, as well as in their opposition to immigration, and their persistent rhetoric on the widening gap between the ‘good’ people and the ‘bad’ traditional political institutions. As will be explored afterwards in this study, these features represent defining characteristics for most of the populist movements. Geraint O. Edwards instead has mounted a case study.

6_{Maria Daniela Poli. Contemporary Populism and the Economic Crisis in Western Europe (Baltic Journal of}

Political Science. December 2016, No 5).

7_{Yann Algan & Sergei Guriev & Elias Papaioannou and Evgenia Passari. The European trust crisis and the rise of}

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9 In A comparative discourse analysis of the construction of “in-groups” in the 2005 and 2010

Manifestos of the British National Party, Edwards narrowed the scope of his research to the

way the nationalist and populist British party BNP communicates, and how its views changed over time. Callum Cook followed the same approach in An analysis of the British National

Party’s Discourse. Both authors described how the positions and language of the party altered

along with national and international socio-economic changes, and they noticed a shift away from its radical attitudes following its rise in popularity.

If dividing the aforementioned studies into two main groups, where the first would encompass the works with a wider approach to the reasons of the populist success, and the second would include focused analysis on single parties and countries, this thesis would clearly fit in the second ensemble of studies. At the same time, this study seeks to step slightly away from this second group. Even though the focus is still on a limited number of parties in two countries (UKIP and BNP in the UK, and The League and the Five Star Movement in Italy), the actual subjects of the study are not the populist parties themselves, but the views and

uses of history in their political programmes. It is therefore crucial for the reader to bear in

mind that, even though this work does try to offer new insights into European populist parties and populism, it has their views and uses of history at its core, rather than populism or political parties’ discourse in general.

Design, Method, Concepts and Theory of this Study

The primary criterion that influenced the decision to restrict the observed cases only to the United Kingdom and Italy is due to personal limits. My insufficient knowledge of most languages spoken into Europe led the research to be inevitably confined to the chosen countries. Political programmes for general elections are clearly compiled for national audiences. Studying official political documents without being able to understand fully the concepts expressed would lead necessarily to poor research and inaccurate results. Notwithstanding these limits, Italy and United Kingdom are highly valuable cases, and considering the crucial results achieved by their populist parties, they surely represent two relevant samples for the study.

The British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) will be studied for the United Kingdom. According to Stijn van Kessel, these parties represent

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10 the only national-level parties sharing most of the fundamental features of populist parties; therefore, opting for them was inevitable.8_{For the Italian case, The League – known until}

2018 as the Northern League (Lega Nord) – and the Five Star Movement have been selected. The League and The Five Star Movement are widely recognised as populist forces. Their leaders often expressed “pride in being populist”, as well as pride in considering their parties as populist.9_{Silvio Berlusconi’s Forward Italy (Forza Italia) was not selected on purpose,}

inasmuch as it did not entirely fit into the populist frame. Forward Italy often stood for a hybrid force using populist language, but representing traditional political ideologies and promoting policies which could be considered as mainstream ones.10_{In another article from} The Guardian focusing on recent populist rhetoric and populist successes, both in Europe and

the Americas, Paul Lewis, Caelainn Barr, Seán Clarke, Antonio Voce, Cath Levett and Pablo Gutierrez, described Silvio Berlusconi as ‘somewhat populist’.11_{Supported and overseen by} Team Populism, the authors quantitatively defined prime ministers and presidents in a scale

from 0 to 2.0 where the limits corresponded to ‘not populist’ (0) and ‘very populist’ (2). Forward Italy’s leader scored 0.8, thus showing populist propensity, although not fitting entirely in the class.12_{Unfortunately, no data are available on the leaders of the studied}

political parties. In fact, none of their politicians ever managed to become prime minister in their respective countries. Even for the 2018 Italian general elections, The League and the Five Star Movement nominated an independent figure as Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte. The latter scored 1.0, thus being considered as ‘populist’.

The period which the study aims to analyse, stretches from the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) to the last Italian general elections (2018). Both ends of the study were chosen for their importance. The Treaty of Maastricht officialised in fact the birth of the European Union from the European Economic Community and decisively promoted European integration. It reformed and amended the treaties establishing the European Communities

8_{Stijn Van Kessel. ‘Populist parties in the United Kingdom’ (in Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent.}

2015) P 144.

9_{La7 Attualita. Casaleggio: 'sono orgoglioso di essere populista' (YouTube. 14 April 2016).}

10_{Tiziano Grottolo. Forza Italia divisa fra la linea moderata e la tentazione populista. Conzatti “Il governo}

legittimato dalla costituzione”(Il Dolomiti. 22 September 2019).

11_{Paul Lewis & Seanne Clarke & Caelainn Barr & Antonio Voce & Cath Levett and Pablo Gutierrez. Revealed:}

the rise and rise of populist rhetoric. The Guardian. (6 March. 2019).

12_{Team Populism is a global network which brings together scholars from Europe and Americas to study the}

causes and consequences of populism and aims to answer why some populist parties, leaders or movements are more successful than others. https://populism.byu.edu/

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11 and finally established the European currency (Euro). The year 1993 was therefore important for the further integration and European alliance and is a milestone in European history. In a reaction to this strengthened spirit of integration, however, new parties devoted to national and regional independence emerged quickly. This is the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party and Northern League, which were born respectively in 1993 and 1991. Moreover, considering the Euroscepticism from both the BNP and the Five Star Movement, the year 1993 could be considered as a symbolic moment in the struggle between the European establishment and anti-establishment populist forces. On the other hand, the 2015 British and the 2018 Italian general elections are the most recent successes for populism in the chosen countries. Therefore, the Treaty of Maastricht and the year 2018 can be considered as significant limits of the consistent rise of populism in Europe over the past decades, namely from complete marginality to national successes.

In order to reach the aim of this study, many sources from these political parties could be used in principle, like direct interviews or press conferences. However, the study of politicians’ statements would require an immense research. Moreover, the mutability of political debate often leads politicians to utter incongruous opinions. Therefore, to limit the amount of sources and to avoid confusion, it was decided to concentrate on the political programmes for general elections. The latter are essential and official expressions of the parties’ opinions. They represent all-round accounts of the ideas of political parties, and they include views on arguments that are fully embedded into the specific context of each election.

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12 Table 1 shows the results of British and Italian populist parties in all the general elections which took place between 1993 and 2018. However, only four elections for each country will be studied here. It was decided to focus on a reduced number of elections in order to be able to perform thorough and all-round analysis of each political programme. Concerning Italy: 1996, 2008, 2013 and 2018 were the selected elections. Meanwhile, regarding UK: 1997, 2005, 2010 and 2015 were the chosen cases. In order to give further structural balance to the study, the year 2008 was picked as a significant watershed to divide the 25 years into two. Therefore, two elections were chosen before that date and two were picked after it. Such a division line was drawn in full consideration of the pivotal role that the 2008 Financial Crisis played in the rise of populist forces. Although already partially expressed, the role of the 2008 crisis will be explored comprehensively in the first chapter. Other factors did not serve as structuring principles. For example, despite its importance in populist rhetoric, the European migrant crisis was not considered a structuring principle here. The migrant crisis is a fairly recent phenomenon, which started in 2015 only; therefore, theories and discussions about its role in European populism could be applicable only for two of the eight selected

British General Elections UKIP result BNP result

1997 0.10% 0.30% 2001 1.50% 0.20% 2005 2.20% 0.70% 2010 3.10% 1.90% 2015 12.60% 0.00% 2017 1.80% 0.00%

Italian General Elections

Chamber of Deputies Senate Chamber of Deputies Senate

1994 42.84% (8.36%) 42.6% (8.36%) 1996 10.07% 10.41% 2001 49.63% (3.94%) 45.57% (3.94%) 2006 49.74% (4.58%) 50.21% (4.48%) 2008 46.81% (8.30%) 47.31% (8.06%) 2013 29.18% (4.09%) 30.72% (4.33%) 25.56% 23.79% 2018 37% (17.35%) 37.5% (17.61%) 32.68% 32.33%

*: When the entry in the table presents two percentages, one in brackets, it shows the results of the coalition and the results of the single party inside of it.

The Northern League/ The League results* Five Star Movement results

Table 1: Results of British and Italian populist parties in all the general elections taking place between 1993 and 2018. Source: Wikipedia: List of United Kingdom General Elections; Wikipedia: Italian General Elections.

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13 elections.13_{Moreover, migration is more disputed as a factor of change than the 2008 crisis.}

Consequently, it can be less seen as a turning point in the populist success.14_{The same goes}

for the factor of the widening gap between the people and the traditional political institutions.

The relevance of the selected elections in the United Kingdom

1997 – Under the leadership of Tony Blair, the Labour Party ended its eighteen-year spell in

opposition and achieved a landslide victory. In 1997, UKIP participated for the first time to general elections. Both UKIP and BNP were still marginal in the British political scene.

2005 – In 2005, Tony Blair and the Labour Party won their third consecutive general elections.

These were also the last British elections before the Financial Crisis, and to this day, it was the last Labour victory in the United Kingdom. During these elections, UKIP experienced a growth, shifting its percentages from 0.3% in 1997 to 2.2% in 2005.

2010 – The 2010 general elections were the first after the hit of the Financial Crisis. For the

second time in British history, UK had a “hung Parliament”. 15_{The stalemate resulted into a}

Conservative/Liberal Democrats coalition government. In the 2010 general elections, both UKIP and BNP experienced increased approval. The UK Independence party achieved 3.1%, while BNP reached its highest score, hitting 1.9%.

2015 – David Cameron and the Conservative party reached a working majority of twelve seats.

This Conservative majority enabled Cameron to promote most of his manifesto commitments, including the renegotiation of British membership into the European Union. These negotiations were followed by the Brexit referendum in 2016. In the 2015 general elections, UKIP achieved its highest result since its foundation (12.60%).

13_{John Henley. What is the current state of the migration crisis in Europe? (The Guardian, 21 November 2018).} 14_{Khatya Chhor. Income inequality, financial crisis and the rise of Europe's far right (France24, November 20,}

2018).

15_{Usually people refers to a hung Parliament when there is a situation in which no single political party has}

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The relevance of the selected elections in Italy

1996 – The Italian political scene in the early 1990s was in great turmoil after the nationwide

judicial investigation into political corruption known as “Mani Pulite” (clean hands). In these years of political unrest, Italy voted three times for general elections (1992-1994-1996) in just four years. This was a first time in the history of the Republic. In these elections, the Northern League ran alone for the first time – after leaving the coalition it had formed with the party of Silvio Berlusconi in 1994.

2008 – Snap general elections were held in April 2008. These elections were the last before

the impact of the Financial Crisis. Politically, it was the last victory for Silvio Berlusconi. After the vote, the latter formed in fact a government in coalition with The Northern League and the Movement for the Autonomies (Movimento per l’Autonomia).

2013 – The 2013 general elections were the first after the 2008 Financial Crisis. They were

also the first general elections for the Five Star Movement. For the first time, an anti-establishment movement broke the Italian bipartite political tradition in which usually left/centre-left and right/centre-right parties shared most of the votes.

2018 – The last Italian general elections is a milestone in recent populist history. After months

of consultations following the March elections, The League and the Five Star Movement formed a populist and openly anti-establishment government.

It comes without saying that for the Italian cases, Five Star Movement political programmes regard only the 2013 and 2018 general elections, inasmuch as the movement was founded by Beppe Grillo only in 2009. Moreover, to evade eventual confusion, it is worth to mention that for the 2008 Italian elections, the Northern League decided to run in a coalition with two other parties, namely the Movement for the Autonomies and The People

of Freedom (Il Popolo della Libertà). The three political forces subscribed to the same political

programme. However, The People of Freedom published the document. The People of Freedom was a centre-right party led by Silvio Berlusconi. What has previously been stated about Forward Italy – that is a hybrid party – naturally applies for The People of Freedom as

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15 well. However, it was decided to include it nonetheless, after taking into consideration the active role played by the Northern League inside the coalition. At the end of the elections, the Northern League was anyway the third most voted party in the country. It is therefore natural to assume that the coalition programme had taken due note of the opinions of the Northern League in order to reach its millions of electors. In the United Kingdom, the 2015 political programme of the BNP proved to be unfindable. Multiple attempts in contacting BNP headquarters and its press office were made, although without success. Various prominent centres of political studies were also contacted in the attempt, but none was in the possession of the necessary document. Moreover, despite consulting the detailed Times Guide to The

House of Commons 2015, only a few useful data could be found. Consequently, considering

this lack of valuable data as well as in order to avoid poor approximations in the analysis, it was decided to focus only on the UKIP political programme for the 2015 general elections.16

Nevertheless, throughout the study each collected programme will be analysed singularly and then in comparison with the others, so to answer the following lead question:

How did Italian and British populist parties view and use history in their general elections political programmes between 1993 and 2018?

It is worth explaining what is meant by view and use of history, thus to clarify in advance eventual doubts. In order to avoid confusion it was decided to use the definitions offered by the Oxford University Press, which state as follow:

View: Look at or inspect; regard in a particular light or with a particular attitude.

Use: Take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving something;

employ.17

Therefore, populist parties in Italy and the UK will be analysed in the way they look at history; consequently, it will be seen if history is deliberately or subtly used to achieve the parties’ purposes.

16_{The Times. Times Guide to the House of Commons 2015 (HarperCollins. Glasgow. 2015).} 17_{The definitions have been taken from the Lexico Website Powered By Oxford University Press.} https://www.lexico.com/

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16 In order to display information in a logical and easy-to-access form, the study will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter provides the reader with the necessary background knowledge about the concept of populism and the influence of the 2008 Financial Crisis in the rise of European populist parties, as well as the functions of political programmes and the role and uses of history in politics. The second chapter covers the years going from 1993 to 2008, that is, prior to the Financial Crisis. The chapter will be divided in two sections, one concerning the United Kingdom and one relating to Italy. Each election will be observed separately, and the programmes will be introduced with a brief summary of the context of the year concerned. At the end of each country chapter there will be a short conclusion comparing the views and uses of history over time. Information will be also schematized into tables to facilitate the conclusions. The third chapter will follow the same structure, but for the years between 2008 and 2018. Finally, there will be three conclusions: single country over-time analysis, comparative conclusions between countries before and after the 2008 Financial Crisis, and a general comparative conclusion. In addition to the main question, a few sub-questions will help in outlining the conclusion:

What are the differences and similarities in the views and uses of history among the parties and between the countries?

What are the changes over time in the views and uses of history among the parties and between the countries?

What is the balance between all these differences and similarities?

In order to perform the study of the views and uses of history inside political programmes, and comparing the information between parties and countries, it is necessary to define the meaning of the broad and sometimes slippery concept of history. German historian Karl-Georg Faber in The Use of History in Political Debate (1978) offers a useful toolbox to tackle this issue. Despite stressing the difficulty in classifying the several uses of history as well as the complication of imposing a general framework to a boundless concept like history, Faber defined a pattern to follow while observing political argumentations, and shaped a useful scheme. He distinguished between references to empirically verifiable historical facts and arguments derived from the philosophy of history; or between instrumental, goal-oriented appeals to history and normative, value-oriented ones.

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17 Moreover, he created a three levels scheme, which could be applied in multiple cases.18_To

help the understanding of such a method, as well as to furnish a valuable tool that will accompany the study, hereby there is a schematized version of Faber’s approach:

I. History as a Collection of Examples

The primary focus is on the use in politics of relatively isolated “facts” or events extrapolated from their historical contexts. It can take three forms:

a) Historical events or categories of events that are used instrumentally or normatively as positive or negative examples. In this case, the events cited and their consequences serve usually as deterrent examples or as models for emulation.

b) Concrete legal claims or moral obligations which are based on situations contained in the archives of history. Faber argues that revolutions and

other major disruptive events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries changed one of the most important functions history had since then, that of providing governments with concrete legal claims from the storehouse of history. This form hardly occurs in modern politics.

c) Political events invested with either positive or negative values and used symbolically to represent the values abstracted from the events themselves. According to Faber, the symbolic use of historical events

shows a tendency to oversimplification. Politicians label entire historical events, reducing them to one dimension and discouraging any further reflection on them.

II. Historical Complexes of Meaning and Effect

The use of historical complexes of meaning and effect that include more than relatively isolated events takes three forms:

a) Narration. Among the forms, narration is the dominant one in political

debate. The narration of histories has essentially two functions beyond its function as a conveyer of information. It plays an important role in discussions on the relationship between continuity and change and the

18_{Karl-Georg Faber. “The Use of History in Political Debate Author” (in History and Theory, Vol. 17, No. 4,}

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18 bearing they had on past policies and will have on future ones. On the other end, by revealing meaningful and therefore morally relevant connections in history, narration aids in the formulation of obligations and justifications.

b) Accounts. Historical accounts demonstrating causal relationships or

structures have a twofold function in political debate. First, they are used to shift responsibility for past injustices from individuals onto the inevitable course of history. Second, they can be used to underline the ‘implacability of facts’ in order to promote or justify the necessity for a given policy.

c) Specific arrangement of events in a series in order to highlight the trends they represent. In his study Faber offers an example from 1972 of the

German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. During a Parliamentary debate, Scheel named the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Treaty of Versailles (1919), and the Potsdam Conference (1945) to emphasize a trend that took major world political decisions away from European nations and gave them to Russia and U.S.A.

III. History as Argument

According to Faber, the philosophical and speculative dimension of the use of history in political argument is present in any of the aforementioned cases. In any of the observed levels, traits of philosophy of history are present, even though they are disguised in empirical forms through facts, events, narrations and structures. However, on a complete philosophical level, the subjects listed before are replaced by the collective singular History. Events, facts, narrations and accounts become one in History and assume a purely philosophical shape. Faber therefore individuates the last form of political use of history in the concept of History as a collective subject. The “appeal to History” itself becomes an argument and a tool to justify, motivate, support or condemn policies, political actions and ideas.

To conclude, historian Karl-Georg Faber offers a precious toolbox to study the use of history into political discourse. Moreover, his choice of using official documents – like protocols of parliamentary debates – as primary sources for his observations, strongly suggest the applicability of his method to the analysis of political programmes of populist parties. On

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19 top of the Faber scheme, it was decided to add a fourth form, namely indirect historical

implications. This class of reference comprehends those cases where parties indirectly cite

the past without furnishing historical elements. For example, by writing that United Kingdom is nowadays a fairly undemocratic country due to several years of membership to the European Union and that Britain was free and democratic before its accession to the EU in 1973, parties draw historical implications which negatively stigmatize, condense and simplify a relevant part of recent European and British history. This amount to offering a historical view without furnishing direct historical elements. This last form have been designed especially for this study in order to have further empirical tools to cover as many manifestations of history inside the programmes. Consequently, in order to lead the study through each programme and comparison, Faber’s threefold approach and the additional form of historical implication, will be processed through the following sub-questions:

Regarding the view of history: In what form is history present in the programme?

a) As isolated historical events, fact and figures;

b) As stories presenting a form of causality;

c) As an abstract appeal to history;

d) As an implication.

Regarding the use of history: Is there an action component in the views identified above?

a) History used to promote parties, policies and ideas;

b) History used to counter other parties, policies and ideas.

Moreover, in order to deepen the analysis, a list of positive and negative motives has been defined:

Negative motives:

- Motif of the corrupted elite, and of the gap between the people and the elite;

- Motif of undemocratic and/or overly bureaucratic national institutions or international institutions. e.g. the European Union, the United Nations…;

- Motif of national enemies, adversaries and menaces; - Motif of decadence, decay and loss of values;

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20 - Motif of wrong ideologies and policies which damaged the nation and the people. Positive motives:

- Motif of the unheard and forgotten people;

- Motif of the heartland, the national heroes and the national heritage;19

- Motif of restoration, renewal, salvation and/or redemption; - Motif of correct values, ideologies and policies;

- Motif of national and/or regional independence.

The mentioned motives have been selected according to the recurring themes in the discourse of populist parties.20_{Therefore, this study will also calculate the frequency of uses}

and applications of each motive throughout the political programmes. Empirical reasoning will guide the observations in addition to Faber’s toolbox and the mentioned methods. Special attention will be paid to the images printed in the programmes. Moreover, the examination will also inspect the weight of single words in their contexts (terms like restore, rebuild,

return…) in an attempt to understand whether these terms lead to historical assessments or

re-assessments.

19_{The meaning of the term heartland will be explained in the next chapter when dealing with the concept of}

populism.

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Chapter 1: Understanding Populism and the Relationship between

History and Politics

1.1 Populism, New Populism and the Financial Crisis

According to the professor of politics, Paul Taggart, populism is an unusual concept, which has many, though not all, attributes of an ideology. Conceptually awkward and almost undefinable in traditional canons, populism is a phenomenon unlike classic political movements. Usually, political parties develop programmes and policies, and follow familiar political patterns. According to Taggart in his book Populism, populist movements show instead difficulty in control and organization; they lack consistency and their propositions develop and disappear with astonishing frequency.21_{It is therefore difficult to associate}

traditional parties to populist movements. In order to help the definition of such a blurred concept, Taggart determined six key themes recurring in populist forces:

1. Populists are usually hostile to representative politics. At its roots, populism has a fundamental ambivalence about politics, and especially representative politics. According to populist forces, politics is messy, overly bureaucratic and corrupted. Nevertheless, in order to promote their ideas and stances they necessarily engage into it.

2. Populists identify themselves with an idealized heartland within the community they favour. Populism tends to identify itself with an idealized representation of its chosen people, and it moulds really existing people to that idealized image. With the term heartland, populists create an inside and an outside. Everything that does not fit into the canons of the ‘people’ and the ‘heartland’ will be alien, corrupt or debased. Taggart explains also that the ‘people’ is a concept deriving from the ‘heartland’. Moreover, the interaction between the second and the first of Taggart’s themes, namely the opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, represents one of the principal features in most of the academic attempts to describe the phenomenon of populism. In Populism: a Very Short Introduction, Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser define in fact populism as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’

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22 versus ‘the corrupted elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.”22

3. Populism as an ideology lacking core values. Taggart argues that the label populism has been applied to progressives, reactionaries, democrats as well as autocrats. Populism can therefore be both associated with leftist parties and right-wing movements. The secret of its adaptability lies in its lack of commitment to key values.

4. Populism as a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis. Taggart analyses that the emergence of a crisis often leads populists to overcome their reluctance for politics and get active in order to protect the so-called heartland. These looming crises can be both results of populist imagination or may be actual economic, social or political crises.

5. Populism contains fundamental dilemmas that make it self-limiting. For example, the ambivalence of populism regarding representative politics is a crucial problem. Populists try to avoid institutional politics and patterns and reject traditional representative methods. Bypassing the entire system however often leads them to lose credit, and compels them to be passing phenomena.

6. Populism as a chameleon adopting the colours of its environment. Finally, according to Taggart, populism is essentially chameleonic, and it shapes depending on the environment (the heartland) in which it is developing.23

These six themes are independent and capable of interaction among each other in different ways. Moreover, the specific context in which populist parties work is essential in observing these themes. Taggart also warns of the danger of generalization. Yet, his themes are useful guidelines for understanding populism and populist parties. Furthermore, Taggart refers to the recent forms of European populism as the New Populism. According to the author, New Populism is a phenomenon established primarily but not exclusively in Western Europe. New Populism developed in the last decades of the twentieth century as a reaction against the dominance of traditional parties. Besides the themes listed above, New Populist forces aim to reconstruct politics around taxation, immigration, nationalism and/or

22_{Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very short Introduction (Oxfrod University Press,}

2017). P.6.

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23 regionalism, as well as to revise the fundamental policies which guided Western European nations since the end of World War II. New Populist movements also share the will to organize themselves in other ways than existing parties. They often commit to the active participation of the membership of the party. Moreover, they tend to exalt leadership and key characters inside the movement. New Populists emphasize their connection to the common sense of the common people, and pretend to have a special link to the long lost positive features that politics used to have before the monopoly of traditional parties started.24_{The British National}

Party (1982), United Kingdom Independence Party (1993) and the Northern League (1991) are part of this ensemble of populist forces which developed along the last two decades of the twentieth century. The Five Star Movement, born instead in 2009, presents nonetheless most of the characteristics listed by Taggart. It introduced itself to the public as an anti-establishment political movement based on direct democracy, which became active in order to stop the crisis of values inside Italian politics, as well as to lead Italy outside of the economic storm caused by the 2008 Financial Crisis. 25

In On Populist Reason, the Argentine political theorist and philosopher Ernesto Laclau agrees on what stated by Paul Taggart. Heargues that crisis in some degree is a necessary precondition for populism.26_{It is undeniable that the 2008 Financial Crisis dealt a severe blow}

to economies and political systems worldwide. The consequences of the Financial Crisis favoured a wave of anti-establishment messages that led to a growing attraction by the electorate to populist politics.27_{A study by Funke, Schularik and Trebesch, which compiled}

data since 1870 on nearly 100 financial crises and more than 800 national elections in 20 democracies, found that far-right parties, and those conveying populist messages, are the biggest beneficiaries of financial crashes. After a crisis, the share of the vote going to these parties increases by more than 30 percent. At the same time, government majorities tend to shrink and governing becomes difficult as more parties and anti-establishment groups get into legislatures. These effects turn up in the wake of financial crises but, crucially, not in normal

24_{Taggart. Pp.73-84.}

25_{Poli. Contemporary Populism and the Economic Crisis in Western Europe. P. 45.} 26_Ernesto_Laclau_._{On Populist Reason}_{(Verso. London - New York. 2005) P.177.}

27 Melissa De Witte. How the Great Recession Influenced Today’s Populist Movements (Stanford Buisiness, January 11, 2019).

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24 economic downturns.28_{People blame elites for failing to prevent these crises. It is often not}

hard to find policy failures and cronyism among the rich and powerful, so trust in the political system erodes and along with it grows a sense of anti-elitism. This opens the door to political entrepreneurs who try to set “the people” against the "ruling classes”. Along with the Five Star Movement, several other populist parties were founded following the Financial Crisis. Alternative for Germany was founded in 2012. The Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) was born in 2013. Podemos in Spain developed from the anti-austerity Indignados movement in 2014, and Together for the People (Juntos pelo Povo) in Portugal, presented itself in the 2015 elections.29_{Naturally, it is hazardous to imply a direct and inevitable causality between}

financial crises, or crises in general, and populism. As argued by Taggart, but also by most of the cited authors, these recurring traits should help defining guidelines to understand populism. However, it is imperative to acknowledge the importance of the 2008 Financial Crisis in the success of populist forces throughout Europe.

1.2 Political Programmes & the Role and Uses of History

Nikolaus Eder, Marcelo Jenny and Wolfgang C. Müller in Manifesto functions: How party

candidates view and use their party’s central policy document, argue that political

programmes have three campaign-related purposes: they provide a compendium of valid party positions, they streamline the campaign, and they are used as campaign material.30_It

follows that a political programme is a comprehensive summary useful to guide voters, media, as well as party candidates and activists during the elections. It is very much an edict of the party positions and provides a constraint on what individuals, organizational units and intra-party groups should communicate during the electoral campaign. Consequently, it is an all-round document for observing the positions of political parties and therefore reliable for analysing their views and uses of history.31

Inside and outside political programmes, politicians tend to reduce history to source material, which can be used to give reasons for political and "social" measures applicable to

28 Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularik and Christoph Trebesch. Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870-2014 (Center for economic Studies & Ifo Institute, October 2015).

29_{Poli. P.45}

30_{N. Eder, M. Jenny and W.C. Müller, ‘Manifesto functions: How party candidates view and use their party's}

central policy document’ (in Electoral Studies. 2016). P.3.

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25 present problems.32_{Anna Clark in Politicians Using History, highlights that politicians are also}

active actors over history; their actions and their power may have large influence on the historical consciousness of entire nations.33_{Concerns are therefore raised on what can be}

considered as responsible or irresponsible use of history. Antoon De Baets in Responsible

History provides tools to recognise the one from the other. In the first case, by adopting

Bernard Williams’ identification of the two basic virtues of truth, the author argues that a responsible use of history must entail accuracy and honesty.34_{In the second case, De Baets}

also makes a distinction between irresponsible use of history and abuses of history. The former corresponds either to the deceptive or negligent use of history, while, the latter is based on an intent to deceive. While irresponsible history may be characterized by the lack of integrity and/or care, abuses are the fruit of the lack of honesty. According to De Baets, in order to identify a given use of history as an abuse, it is necessary to observe the mental and material elements of that given use. Whereas, the mental elements refer to the mind of the abuser, material elements refer to the conduct (acts or omissions), its consequences and the context in which the conduct takes place. The mental element refers to the intention. If this intention is willingly and knowingly malignant, then the conduct is an abuse of history, if it is “merely” careless or reckless, then the conduct is an irresponsible use of history. The author argues that irresponsible use and abuse of history operate on three levels: heuristic, epistemological, and pragmatic. The first occurs when sources are collected maliciously. The second when information and opinions are changed dishonestly. For example, when data are omitted, re-shaped or invented. Finally, the third deals with data perceived in their totality, and the use of them made by authors and others. Namely when authors lie on their authorship, on the status of their work, or when third parts interfere irresponsibly with their work.35_{Needless to say, such parameters can be applied to any use of history, not only to}

academic ones or professional uses by historians. Consequently, also the several uses of history by politicians and their parties fit entirely into the scheme. Let us now start with the analysis of the political programmes.

32_{Karl-Georg Faber. P. 38.}

33_{Anna Clark. ‘Politicians Using History' (in Wiley-Blackwell. vol. 56, no. 1. 2010). Pp. 120-131.}

34 _{Bernard Williams. Truth & Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University}

Press, 2002). Pp. 84–148.

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26

Chapter 2: From the Maastricht Treaty to the 2008 Financial Crisis

The study will now proceed in analysing the views and uses of history in the programmes from British and Italian populist parties between 1993 and 2008. To each country section – UK (2.1) and Italy (2.2) – will follow a short over-time conclusion.

2.1 United Kingdom

2.1.1 The 1997 General Elections

The context

The UK general elections of 1997 were held on May 1. In this election, the outgoing Prime Minister John Major sought to repeat his 1992 success and lead the Conservative Party to another win. Tories also aimed to maintain a political dominance which had lasted since Margaret Thatcher election in 1979. Under the leadership of Tony Blair, however, the Labour party managed to win 418 seats out of the 659 available. This result put an end to the Conservative supremacy in the House of Commons. Such a success also represented one of the greatest achievements for the Labour Party, as it was the highest proportion of seats held by a single party since the end of World War II. Moreover, this election started a positive cycle for the Labour Party. After 1997, in fact, Labours remained the leading political power in the United Kingdom until 2010. The outstanding result of the Labour Party and the incapability of Conservatives and John Major to reaffirm their leaderships were widely influenced by the economic turmoil the UK went through in the first half of the 1990s. After the economic growth experienced by Britain in the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher, the UK faced economic chaos especially following the so-called Black Wednesday. On 16 September 1992, the British Government was forced to withdraw the British currency from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The withdrawal was a consequence of the failed attempt to maintain the pound above the lower currency exchange limit imposed by the ERM.36_{Black Wednesday was}

widely considered an extreme blow to the British economy. According to the UK Treasury,

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27 Black Wednesday had costed £3.3 billion to United Kingdom already in 1997.37_Black

Wednesday indelibly tarnished the Conservative party. The huge economic loss influenced the public opinion to reconsider the capabilities of John Major and his party in managing British economy and British international interests. Moreover, internal divisions regarding the role of the United Kingdom in Europe further affected the stability of the Conservative Party. Despite rigid opposition, Prime Minister Major signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The membership of the UK to the European institutions always stimulated debates. This time however, discussions inside the party were exacerbated.

The views and uses of history

The political programmes from the United Kingdom Independence party and the British National Party are visibly similar in style and form, although the BNP offers 50 pages of material while UKIP provides a paper slightly above 25 pages.

United Kingdom Independence Party

UKIP’s views and uses of history are strongly related to European institutions. UKIP introduces the motif of the undemocratic and overly bureaucratic European Union early in the document. In the preface, UKIP leader Alan Sked refers to the previous 25 years of EU development claiming: “After a quarter of a century, it is perfectly plain that ‘Europe’ (EU, EC, EEC) is not working. It is bureaucratic, not democratic.”38_{The party leader focuses on the years after the}

accession of the UK to the European Communities, namely 1973. However, throughout the programme, the development of the European institutions is regarded as a process that has influenced the United Kingdom since the end of World War II. In the chapter ‘Trading Relations’, for example, UKIP writes: “From the beginning, the European programme has been to merge the countries of Western Europe under a centralised government.”39_{The European}

programme resembles a conspiracy aiming to supplant national states. UKIP also claims that this programme has been as such since the beginning of European institutional development. However, UKIP does not provide the actors behind the planning of this machination. Consequently, it indirectly suggests that all the countries involved in the development of the

37_{Hélène Dury. Black Friday. Finance Basics. P.8.}

38_{United Kingdom Independence Party. UK Independence Party Manifesto 1997. (Internet Archive Wayback}

Machine) P.2.

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28 European Union supposedly accepted and supported this alleged plan, including the United Kingdom, although since 1973. In ‘Regulatory Reform’, the party further elaborates the motif of a menacing EU. This time, however, the menace comes from the eventual substitution of the European law making system to the “traditional UK practice” of promulgating legislation.40_{Under ‘Education’, the “EU insidious programme” is a danger to the preservation}

of British cultural identity. According to UKIP, the EU tries to instil a bias into school education by preparing teachers and school governors for “European training.” UKIP also claims: “if we ignore our culture and history, we belittle our society and ourselves.”41_{The European threats}

to the law making and education systems are presumably parts of the European programme towards the merging of nations under a centralised government. A third motive (wrong

policies and detrimental ideologies) is applied in the section regarding ‘The Welfare State’.

According to UKIP:

“The consequence of the UK welfare state since the last war has thus been the growth of dependency and the decline of self-help, help within the immediate and extended family, and the various forms of mutual help like the friendly societies and charitable health care… This decline has been aided by the growth of regulation, much of it originating in Europe…”42

UKIP focuses on the second half of the century because only after the so-called Beveridge

Report (1942), the UK developed an all-round system of social welfare. In this Report, the

Liberal economist William Beveridge designed an ideal welfare state which would have provided security “from cradle to grave” for the British people, and which would have addressed the “five giants on the road to post-war reconstruction”, namely “want, disease, squalor, ignorance and idleness.”43_{Beveridge’s ground-breaking report inspired the 1944}

Butler Act, which reformed schooling, the Family Allowance Act of 1945, the 1946 National Insurance Act and the 1948 National Health Act. 44_{All the acts rested on his report and aimed}

to tackle these “five giants”. Although UKIP accepts that “welfare provision is a legitimate part of government activity in a civilised society”, it criticises the British welfare state to its roots.45

40_{United Kingdom Independence Party 1997. P.7.} 41_{Ibid. P.13.}

42_{Ibid. P.16.}

43_{Polly Toynbee. A cradle-to-grave welfare system is best, but who would want it today? (The Guardian. 26}

February 2018); Centre for Social Investigation. The 5 Giants (Nuffield College).

44_{Frank Field. The Welfare State – Never Ending Reform. (BBC. 10 March 2011).} 45_{United Kingdom Independence Party 1997. P.16.}

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29 It claims the failure of the welfare state in respect of at least one of the “five giants”, namely idleness. UKIP suggests that the implemented policies encouraged dependency and indolence instead of tackling things positively. UKIP offers a negative view of the post-war years characterized by the damaging expansion of the welfare state, and blames the EU to be an active ‘perpetrator’ of this decline. Throughout the programme, UKIP uses its views of history to undermine the reputation of the European Union, as well as to support the proposition of withdrawing from the latter. In addition, when discussing the role of the post-war welfare times, UKIP uses the mentioned view to back its policies of deregulation, restriction in the provision of benefits, and support to private pension funds.

British National Party

Four major subjects can be singled out in the programme: the post-WWII years and policies,

British nationalism, the European institutions and immigration. References to the post-war

years are mostly present in the foreword by the BNP chairman, John Tyndall:

“(The general elections of 1997)… will merely substitute the failed ideas and policies of the liberal consensus of the 20th_{century with those same failed ideas and policies in a new}

wrapping… The election of a man like Major as leader of the Tory Party, the extent to which Conservatives have moved into their enemies’ territory, the collapse of socialism as a theoretical force – all these suggest that one of those profound shifts in the political landscape that occur every century or so is taking place around us.”46

Tyndall criticizes the so-called ‘post-war consensus’ that promoted the application of liberal policies in the United Kingdom. Since the end of WWII and roughly until Margaret Thatcher first election in 1979, British governments encouraged nationalisation, heavy regulation and high taxation, and they promoted trade unions and a generous and structured welfare state. Throughout the period, there was consensus among Labours and Conservatives on the mentioned policies. Therefore, Tyndall suggests the failure of the ideas and policies of both the established parties, and offers a negative view of the post-war years.47_{According to}

Tyndall, times are also ready for one of ‘those centennial drastic changes’ that will re-shape society. Interestingly, Tyndall does not provide any historical event to support his view of

46_{British National Party. British National Party Manifesto 1997. (Internet Archive Wayback Machine) p.1.} 47_{Dennis Kavanagh. Thatcherism and the End of the Post-War Consensus. (BBC. 3 March 2011).}

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30 history. When looking back at the United Kingdom in the late 19th_{century, no major political}

shifts were on the way. The Liberal and Conservative parties were the main actors in British politics and they would remain as such until WWI. The Labour Party was founded in 1900; however, it became a prominent political force only in the 1920s.48_{Universal manhood}

suffrage would be granted in 1918, and women’s suffrage in 1928.49_{It is assumable that}

Tyndall refers to the latter events, even though they happened between 70 and 80 years before the 1997 general elections. The complete lack of examples in the text and the lack of actual historical background turn Tyndall’s words on cyclical history into mere assumptions. Tyndall also offers the solution for Britain to disentangle from these wrong and failing ideologies and policies. He proposes a return to a world – much more real – that preceded it: “a world in which there are many competing national interests which are not to be confused with political ideology.”50_{According to Tyndall whatever came after 1945 was:}

“An absurd view of the world” made of “…the great post-war illusions: that there were only two vital interests in the world, namely democracy and totalitarianism, and that Britain’s fate was bound inseparably with the former and under American leadership - because the only alternative was occupation by the Red Army!”51

The BNP chairman calls for a restoration of all the good that has been lost after fifty years of absurd views. Tyndall’s view of the post-war years shifts from national to international perspective. Overall, Tyndall states that the post-war years generated failing policies and ideas, and created an absurd perception of the world based on the illusions that democracy and totalitarianism were the only possible options. He also suggests that post-war Britain was forced by these “illusions” into a form of subjugation under the United States, “a British foreign policy separate from, and not subservient to, the United States was looked upon as a dangerous heresy.”52_{Curiously, Tyndall does not provide the name of any actors behind the}

design of this hoax. His accusation remains generally related to post-war years and indirectly linked to past British politics. The BNP elaborates its narration on two other subjects, namely European institutions and British nationalism, starting from the motives of restoration and

48_{Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan. The Labour Party: A Centenary History. (Basingstoke: Macmillan. 2000).} 49_{Elena Rossi. Universal Manhood Suffrage (The National Archives. 12 April 2018); The British Library.}

Women’s suffrage timeline. (The British Library. 6 February 2018).

50_{British National Party 1997. P.5.} 51_Ibid.

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31

incorrect ideologies. In the short paragraph ‘Abandonment of our kin’, Tyndall reconstructs

British history:

“In Britain’s case, ‘empire’ did not only involve ruling subject races. Vast regions of the earth’s surface were settled and occupied by people originating mainly from the British Isles, who enjoyed institutions of self-government and a partnership with the United Kingdom that was one of complete equality. Post-war ‘political correctness’ told us that it was time to end this partnership, though just why was never adequately explained… without any compulsion, they (the colonies) had traded with us and fought our wars with us because of a generally accepted perception of common heritage and common interest. But in the new wisdom they became expendable… that same new wisdom beckoned us towards the coming Union of Europe… The dominions were an inconvenient obstacle to the fashionable European idea…”53

The BNP exalts a long gone glorious historical era for Great Britain. The colonies are portrayed as close kin to the British islands (which was, in fact, the case only with the dominions, and even there to some degree and at the cost of crimes against humanity). Tyndall hints to a commonly accepted heritage for all the territories and bypasses the cultural and historical differences which formed an Empire extending over the five continents. It can be easily assumed that Tyndall refers to the British heritage as the basis for all the colonies. Therefore, he reviews British Imperial history as one of vast collaboration, and indirectly imposes a heritage that is clearly distant to many of the former dominions. This peaceful and collaborative “partnership” was dismantled without explanations by post-war “political correctness”. Tyndall here adds another element to his negative narration on post-war years and policies. Accordingly, the abstract concept of political correctness was the reason behind the dissolution of the British Empire; and favoured the development of the ‘undemocratic’ European Union, which in turn could not tolerate any form of colonial power in order to succeed. Tyndall opposes the glorious British past, made of collaboration, partnership and equality to the post-war years characterized by failing ideas and policies, and damaging beliefs. The BNP instrumentalizes colonial history to promote British nationalism. The latter is the thread between Tyndall’s foreword and the first section of the programme. In order to justify the necessity of British nationalism and to explain that the latter is a response to the

53_{British National Party 1997. P.4.}

The Role of History in the Political Programmes of Populist Parties: A Comparison of Italian and British Cases (1993 – 2018)